CiviC Disobedience: Taking Politics Seriously: A Democratic Theory of Political Disobedience

Claire Moulin-Doos

doi:10.5771/9783845255576

Summary

Das Buch präsentiert ein Gegenmodell zu klassischen liberalen Theorien zivilen Ungehorsams, wie sie von Autoren wie John Rawls und Ronald Dworkin entworfen wurden. Auf der Basis einer strikten Gegenüberstellung von Liberalismus und Demokratie wird versucht, eine neue Perspektive für das Verständnis von politischem Ungehorsam zu entwickeln. Als Alternative zum ‚civil disobedience‘ wird die Idee eines ‚civic disobedience‘ vorgeschlagen. Mit Verweis auf Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière und Stanley Fish und in Abgrenzung zu liberalen Demokratiekonzepten entwirft die Autorin die Umrisse einer eigenen Theorie der Demokratie.

In englischer Sprache.

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Bibliographic data

Edition: 1/2015
Copyright year: 2015
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-1517-6
ISBN-Online: 978-3-8452-5557-6
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series: Zeitgenössische Diskurse des Politischen
Volume: 7
Language: English
Pages: 205
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 14
1. Traditional perceptions of civil disobedience through famous historical figures No access
2. A mostly American academic theorisation No access
3. Conceptualising the new terminology of “civic disobedience” No access
4. Developing an alternative theory of political disobedience No access
5. 1. 1. “Liberal democracy” in the sense of a liberal polity adopting some democratic-inspired institutional tools No access
    2. “Liberal democracy” in the sense of democracy adopting liberal values No access
  2. Liberalism as an institutional framework enters into a contradiction with democratic logic No access
6. Outline: the definition, the (non) justification and the role of political disobedience No access
1. 1. 1. Political disobedience is a deliberate illegal act No access
    2. Political disobedience is a public and collective act No access
  2. 1. 1. Violence against goods No access
      2. Psychological violence No access
      3. Legal violence No access
      4. Degrees of violence No access
      5. Systemic violence No access
    2. 1. Opposing one specific policy or law No access
      2. Accepting the punishment No access
2. Conclusion of Section I No access
3. 1. 1. 1. Conscientious objection: Individual moral right to object and sometimes even legally recognised right to object No access
      2. Resistance: Moral and sometimes even legal right to restore the endangered regime No access
    2. Illegal actions in risk of assimilation with civil disobedience No access
  2. 1. 1. Conscientious objection: Individual refusal to obey the law No access
      2. Criminal disobedience: Clandestine violation of the law guided by self-interest No access
    2. 1. Revolution: Overthrowing the current political authority to implement a new one No access
      2. Terrorism: Accepted possibility of murderous political action but also paradigmatic example of a clear fight about labelling a political event No access
4. Conclusion of Section II No access
5. Conclusion of Chapter I No access
1. 1. 1. Historically different expressions have been used to express liberal values: natural rights, Human rights, moral rights and today’s fundamental rights. No access
    2. These pre-political rights are sustained by a mythical account No access
    3. The liberal disdain for politics No access
  2. 1. Phrasing political issues solely in terms of rights and impoverishment of the political debate No access
    2. Attempts at making the political decision disappear under the mask of syllogistic juridical solution No access
2. Conclusion of Section I No access
3. 1. Civil disobedience is a defensive action against the political authority No access
  2. The language of “rights” rather than the language of values in a liberal constitutional polity No access
4. Conclusion of Section II No access
5. Conclusion of Chapter II No access
1. 1. A democratic myth: Revolution, a constitutive political act No access
  2. 1. 1. Democracy is always in the (institutional) making No access
      2. An example of a different democratic institutional setting: selection by lot and not by election No access
    2. 1. Distinction between the political and politics No access
      2. Democracy is the very act of defining what is political No access
      3. Democracy is the power to do things No access
      4. Democracy is a form of power and not the absence of power No access
2. 1. 1. Hannah Arendt, the intuition without an explicit attempt at distinguishing two kinds of political disobedience No access
    2. Dworkin’s new concept: “policy-based” disobedience No access
    3. Markovits’s model of “democratic disobedience” No access
    4. José Bové and Gilles Luneau: de-transcendentalising the concept of civil disobedience No access
  2. 1. The adjective “civic” refers to a responsibility, a duty of the citizens No access
    2. Civic disobedience as a political claim and demand for the polity to intervene No access
3. Conclusion of Section II No access
4. Conclusion of Chapter III No access
1. 1. 1. ‘Liberal values’ No access
    2. Analogy between religious/ spiritual conception of civil disobedience and liberal theory: pre-established values are infringed No access
  2. 1. 1. From the unconvincing veil of ignorance to the unconvincing overlapping consensus No access
      2. The unconvincing distinction between comprehensive and political conceptions of justice No access
      3. The liberal need for foundations No access
      4. Liberalism offers a conception of the good and the liberal state is neutral solely among “reasonable” i.e. liberal-compatible conceptions of the good No access
    2. 1. Liberalism is a moralism competing for political success No access
      2. Liberal scholars are risking being illiberal No access
    3. An institutional example of this neutral (“objective”) foundational, religious-like approach: the (German) fundamental rights No access
2. Conclusion of Section I No access
3. 1. 1. Normative theories of democracy No access
    2. 1. Fundamental rights comes from, hence after politics No access
      2. Fundamental (constitutional) rights are revisable No access
      3. Fundamental rights are bound to a polity No access
      4. The French libertés publiques: An example of rights that come from the polity No access
  2. 1. 1. “Political philosophy” is a contradiction in terms No access
        Philosophers offer moral justification to the political debate No access
        Utilitarianism and mostly pragmatism are philosophies compatible with democracy No access
      2. Political theory and democracy No access
    2. 1. Civil disobedience is justified if the interpretation of rights of the disobedients is adopted by the polity No access
      2. Civic disobedience is justified if the claim is considered worth taking into account by the polity No access
4. Conclusion of Section II No access
5. Conclusion of Chapter IV No access
1. 1. 1. First filter: representativeness, nonetheless progressively democratising itself No access
    2. Second filter: the growing power of constitutional judges No access
    3. A “constitutional democracy” is a limited democracy No access
  2. 1. 1. The majority of the representatives No access
      2. The growing power of the executive branch No access
    2. The decision should be in the hand of the judges No access
2. Conclusion of Section I No access
3. 1. The intrinsic imperfection of democracy No access
  2. 1. Who? Giving a voice to non-institutionalised actors No access
    2. How? Inventing new methods of political actions No access
    3. What? Putting new issues on the political agenda No access
    4. 1. Civil disobedience helps create or interpret rights No access
      2. Political disobedience as a democratic “constitutional organ” No access
4. Conclusion of Section II No access
5. Conclusion of Chapter V No access
Conclusion No access Pages 189 - 190
References No access Pages 191 - 205