Force Without War

Barry Blechman; Stephen S. Kaplan

doi:10.5771/9780815714620

Summary

The United States has used military force short of war as an instrument of diplomacy on many occasions and in many areas of the world in the years since the Second World War. This book describes and analyzes the circumstances accompanying 215 shows of force and examines how effective these actions were in helping to attain U.S. foreign policy objectives. Which type of force (air, ground, naval) was most often used? What did the forces do and how effective were they? Of what significance was Soviet involvement when U.S. military power was called upon to influence events? Was the threat presented by the alerting or deployment of strategic nuclear forces or by very large conventional forces especially telling? How clear is it that a desired effect was in fact caused by the demonstration of force? Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan explore these and other questions, examining also such elements as a President's domestic popularity and personal diplomacy preceding or during crises that led to U.S. military demonstrations. Complementing their analysis are five sets of case studies describing ten instances of the use of American military power to influence events in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean. The case studiesby David K. Hall, William B. Quandt, Jerome N. Slater, Robert M. Slusser, and Philip Windsorfocus on the reasons for U.S. action and the methods adopted, on the behavior of other parties, and on the relation between the use of force and the resolution of the crisis. The book's main conclusion is that the demonstrative use of U.S. armed forces has often stabilized a deteriorating situation enough to avoid further deterioration, relieved domestic and international pressure for more drastic and possibly self-defeating action, and gained time for diplomacy to achieve a more lasting remedy.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2010
ISBN-Print: 978-0-8157-0985-5
ISBN-Online: 978-0-8157-1462-0
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham
Language: English
Pages: 584
Product type: Book Titles

1. Contents No access
1. The Armed Forces as a Political Instrument No access
2. The Basic Concept No access
3. Incidents and Sources No access
4. The Question of Utility No access
1. 1. The Political Environment No access
  2. Trends in the Size, Type, and Activity of Participating Military Forces No access
2. 1. Objectives, Not Motives No access
  2. Neither Success nor Failure, but Outcomes No access
  3. Modes and Styles No access
  4. Characteristics of the Sample No access
3. 1. Overall Outcomes of Incidents No access
  2. Individual Outcomes and the Political Use of Armed Forces No access
  3. Outcomes and the Level, Type, Movement, and Activities of Armed Forces No access
  4. The Association between Outcomes, the Use of Armed Forces, and Modes No access
  5. Summary No access
4. 1. Previous Uses of U.S. Armed Forces in the Region No access
  2. Prior Change in the Size of U.S. Forces Deployed in the Region No access
  3. Commitments No access
  4. Administration Attention and Use of Coercive Rhetoric No access
  5. Personal Diplomacy No access
  6. Presidential Popularity No access
  7. The Role of the Soviet Union No access
  8. Conflict and Cooperation between the Superpowers No access
  9. The Strategic Weapons "Balance" No access
  10. Structure of the Situation No access
  11. Summary No access
1. 1. 1. U.S. Behavior No access
    2. Target Behavior No access
    3. Third Party Behavior No access
    4. Outcomes No access
    5. Evaluation No access
  2. 1. U.S. Behavior No access
    2. Target Behavior No access
    3. Third Party Behavior No access
    4. Evaluation No access
  3. COMPARISON OF THE TWO WARS No access
2. 1. 1. Historical Background No access
    2. Events Leading to Crisis No access
    3. U.S. Behavior in the Crisis No access
    4. The Impact on Domestic Lebanese Politics No access
    5. Egyptian Reactions No access
    6. The Soviet Reaction No access
    7. The British Role No access
    8. Outcomes of the Crisis No access
    9. Evaluation No access
  2. 1. Regional and International Developments No access
    2. Toward Confrontation in Jordan No access
    3. Civil War No access
    4. The Actors and Their Objectives No access
    5. U.S. Behavior in the Crisis No access
    6. The Soviet Response No access
    7. The Regional Participants No access
    8. Outcomes No access
    9. Evaluation No access
3. 1. Ousting the Trujillos, 1961 No access
  2. The 1965 Crisis No access
  3. Conclusions No access
4. 1. Historical Background No access
  2. Major Participants in the 1958–59 Crisis and Their Relationships No access
  3. The Problem of Soviet Policy Formulation No access
  4. The Berlin Crisis of 1958–59 No access
  5. The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers No access
  6. Eisenhower's Invitation to Khrushchev No access
  7. Between Two Crises: September 1959 to February 1961 No access
  8. The Crisis of 1961 No access
  9. A Comparative Evaluation, 1958–59 and 1961 No access
5. 1. Yugoslavia, 1951 No access
  2. Czechoslovakia, 1968 No access
  3. Conclusions No access
1. 1. The Special Role of Force No access
  2. Correlates of Success No access
  3. A Last Word No access
1. A. Bibliographical Sources for Incidents No access
2. B. The Incidents No access
3. C. Sample Selection and Characteristics No access
4. D. Bibliography for Utility Analysis No access
1. A No access
2. B No access
3. C No access
4. D No access
5. E No access
6. F No access
7. G No access
8. H No access
9. I No access
10. J No access
11. K No access
12. L No access
13. M No access
14. N No access
15. O No access
16. P No access
17. Q No access
18. R No access
19. S No access
20. T No access
21. U No access
22. V No access
23. W No access
24. X No access
25. Y No access
26. Z No access