Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism
On Disbelieving Our Philosophical Views- Authors:
- Publisher:
- 2023
Summary
The ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics suspended judgment about all philosophical views. Their main opponents were the Dogmatists—those who believed their preferred philosophical views. In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism: On Disbelieving Our Philosophical Views, Mark Walker argues, contra Pyrrhonians and Dogmatists, for a “darker” skepticism: that we should disbelieve our philosophical views. On the question of political morality, for example, we should disbelieve libertarianism, conservativism, socialism, liberalism, and any alternative ideologies. Since most humans have philosophical beliefs, such as about religious and political matters, humanity writ large should disbelieve their preferred philosophical views. Walker argues that Skeptical-Dogmatism permits a more realistic estimation of our epistemic powers. Dogmatists who believe their view is correct, while believing that two or more competing views are false, must—at least implicitly—take themselves to be “über epistemic superiors” to their disagreeing colleagues. Such a self-assessment is as implausible as it is hubristic. Skeptical-Dogmatism, in contrast, permits a more realistic and humbler epistemic self-conception. Walker also shows that there are no insuperable practical difficulties in living as a Skeptical-Dogmatist.
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Bibliographic data
- Copyright year
- 2023
- ISBN-Print
- 978-1-6669-1888-5
- ISBN-Online
- 978-1-6669-1889-2
- Publisher
- Lexington, Lanham
- Language
- English
- Pages
- 300
- Product type
- Book Titles
Table of contents
- Contents No access
- List of Tables No access
- Acknowledgments No access
- Introduction No access Pages 1 - 28
- Chapter 1: A Paradox about Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior? No access
- Chapter 2: Na-Na, Na-Na, Boo-Boo, the Accuracy of Your Philosophical Beliefs Is Doo-Doo No access
- Chapter 3: Noetic Skepticism No access
- Chapter 4: Skeptical-Dogmatism and the External World No access
- Chapter 5: Skeptical-Dogmatism and the Self-Undermining Objection No access
- Chapter 6: Against Skepticism No access
- Chapter 7: Against Egalitarian Dogmatism No access
- Chapter 8: Against Elitist Dogmatism No access
- Chapter 9: The Ethics of Philosophical Belief No access
- Chapter 10: The Lives of Skeptical-Dogmatists No access
- Chapter 11: Philosophizing and Skeptical-Dogmatism No access
- Chapter 12: Creative Gadflies No access
- References No access Pages 283 - 292
- Index No access Pages 293 - 298
- About the Author No access Pages 299 - 300





