Illusions of Paradox

Richmond Campbell

doi:10.5771/9781461601951

Summary

Modern epistemology has run into several paradoxes in its efforts to explain how knowledge acquisition can be both socially based (and thus apparently context-relative) and still able to determine objective facts about the world. In this important book, Richmond Campbell attempts to dispel some of these paradoxes, to show how they are ultimately just 'illusions of paradox,' by developing ideas central to two of the most promising currents in epistemology: feminist epistemology and naturalized epistemology. Campbell's aim is to construct a coherent theory of knowing that is feminist and 'naturalized.' Illusions of Paradox will be valuable for students and scholars of epistemology and women's studies.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 1998
ISBN-Print: 978-0-8476-8919-4
ISBN-Online: 978-1-4616-0195-1
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham
Language: English
Pages: 247
Product type: Book Titles

1. Table of Contents No access
2. Acknowledgments No access
1. Promise or Paradox? No access
2. The Paradoxes No access
3. Three Commitments No access
4. Notes No access
1. 1. Internal Feminist Empiricism No access
  2. Is This a Coherent Empiricism? No access
  3. Can It Be Objective? No access
  4. Does It Have Sufficient Scope? No access
  5. Why Empiricism? No access
  6. Notes No access
2. 1. Systemic Bias and Explanatory Power No access
  2. Truth Versus Models No access
  3. Diversity, Maps, and Individuality No access
  4. More Arguments from Norms No access
  5. Quine's Argument No access
  6. The Bias Paradox No access
  7. Notes No access
3. 1. A Case for Social Epistemology No access
  2. Longino on Dialogue and Objectivity No access
  3. Emotional Knowledge No access
  4. Reflexivity and Empiricism No access
  5. Standpoint Theory Compared No access
  6. Notes No access
1. 1. Quine on Induction No access
  2. Normativity Forsaken? No access
  3. The Circularity Problem No access
  4. Native Inferential Tendencies No access
  5. Truth Versus Fitness No access
  6. Notes No access
2. 1. The Genetic Fallacy Fallacy No access
  2. Hardwig and Baier on Trust No access
  3. MacKinnon on Self-Knowledge and Sexual Pleasure No access
  4. Dillon on Basal Self-Respect No access
  5. Sherwin on Autonomy No access
  6. Feminism and Scientism No access
  7. Notes No access
1. 1. Can Ends Be Objective? No access
  2. The Fact-Value Dichotomy No access
  3. Fact and Value as Interdependent No access
  4. Models and Norms in Okin's Theory No access
  5. Can Norms Explain the World? No access
  6. What Are Epistemic Norms? No access
  7. Notes No access
2. 1. Analyticity and the A Priori No access
  2. Kitcher on A Priori Knowledge No access
  3. Adding Fact-Meaning Holism No access
  4. Is Feminist Metaethics Possible? No access
  5. Feminist Moral Realism? No access
  6. Notes No access
1. 1. Feminist Motivations in Conflict No access
  2. A Hybrid Theory of Moral Judgment No access
  3. Realism and Contractarianism No access
  4. Reconciling Justice with Care No access
  5. The Need for an Archimedean Point No access
  6. Embodied Knowledge No access
  7. Transformational Experiences No access
  8. The Baseline Problem No access
  9. Morality without Foundations No access
  10. Notes No access
2. 1. Analogy with Induction No access
  2. Biology in "Man's" Image? No access
  3. Extending the Analogy No access
  4. Coping with Circularity No access
  5. Foundationalism or Coherentism? No access
  6. The Communitarian Objection No access
  7. Taking Consent Seriously No access
  8. Notes No access
3. 1. The Paradoxes Are Illusions No access
  2. Is It Really Feminism? Or Philosophy? No access
  3. Note No access
Bibliography No access Pages 231 - 240
Index No access Pages 241 - 246
About the Author No access Pages 247 - 247