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Pragmatism and Realism
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Publisher:
1996
Summary
I have no doubt at all, that if philosophy is to prosper in the coming decades, it will have to treat with great seriousness that splendid seriousness that splendid body of philosophical writing of which the essays in this volume constitute one major part'. from the Foreword by Alasdair MacIntyre When historians of philosophy turn to the work of distinguished philosopher Frederick L. Will, Pragmatism and Realism will be an important part of the discussion. In this collection of nine essays, Will demonstrates that a social account of human knowledge is consistent with, and ultimately requires, realism. A timely contribution to the current debate, the book culminates in a naturalistic account of the generation, assessment, and revision of cognitive, moral and social norms. It is written clearly enough for undergraduates, and includes a critical introduction by the editor discussing the bearing of Will's views on current debates among analytic epistemologists, philosophers of science, and moral theorists.
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Bibliographic data
Edition
1/1996
Copyright Year
1996
ISBN-Print
978-0-8476-8350-5
ISBN-Online
978-1-4616-4116-2
Publisher
Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham
Language
English
Pages
208
Product Type
Monograph
Table of contents
ChapterPages
CONTENTS No access
Foreword No access
Editor's Introduction No access
Sources and Acknowledgments No access
1. Thoughts and Things No access Pages 1 - 20
2. Truth and Correspondence No access Pages 21 - 38
3. The Concern About Truth No access Pages 39 - 62
4. The Rational Governance of Practice No access Pages 63 - 84
5. Reason, Social Practice, and Scientific Realism No access Pages 85 - 104
6. Reason and Tradition No access Pages 105 - 120
7. Rules and Subsumption: Mutative Aspects of Logical Processes No access Pages 121 - 136
8. Pragmatic Rationality No access Pages 137 - 158
9. Philosophic Governance of Norms No access Pages 159 - 192
