Leibniz on Human and Animal Apperception

Eve-Lyne Perron

doi:10.24894/978-3-7965-5414-8

Summary

Leibniz introduced the concept of apperception in philosophical discourse. But what does this concept mean? Leibniz seems to equate apperception with reflection while attributing the former to animals but not the latter. If apperception is reflection, however, how could animals possess the one without the other? This study revisits this well-known problem in Leibniz research in two main steps. Using the methodological tool of object- and process-based analyses, it first carves a distinction between apperception and reflection in order to better define the cognitive abilities of humans and animals. This conceptual work sheds light on an animal kind of apperception, yet the unity of “animal apperception” remains problematic. Since it cannot be explained by the function underlying “human apperception”, this study then explores what function might account for it.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2025
ISBN-Print: 978-3-7965-5413-1
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7965-5414-8
Publisher: Schwabe, Basel / Berlin
Series: Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (MediPhil)
Volume: 7
Language: English
Pages: 238
Product type: Book Titles

1. Table of Contents No access
2. Acknowledgments No access
3. Abbreviations No access
1. 1. § 1.1 First proposition No access
  2. § 1.2 Second proposition No access
  3. § 1.3 Third proposition No access
  4. § 1.4 The classic consistency problem No access
2. 1. § 2.1 First strategy No access
  2. § 2.2 Second strategy No access
  3. § 2.3 Third strategy No access
  4. § 2.4 Additional strategies No access
3. § 3 The approach: object- and process-based analyses No access
4. § 4 Methodological remarks No access
5. § 5 Chapters No access
1. 1. 1. § 1.1.1 A note on Leibniz’s rationalism No access
  2. § 1.2 The a posteriori proof for concreteness No access
  3. § 1.3 The a priori proof for concreteness No access
  4. § 1.4 The two proofs for concreteness No access
2. 1. § 2.1 Preliminary remarks No access
  2. § 2.2 Primitive force No access
  3. § 2.3 Derivative forces No access
  4. § 2.4 Acts No access
  5. § 2.5 Appetition No access
  6. § 2.6 The structure of perception and appetition No access
  7. § 2.7 Perceiving-strivings No access
3. § 3 Kinds of faculties, kinds of substances No access
4. § 4 Conclusion No access
1. § 1 Objects as expressions No access
2. 1. § 2.1 Causal self-expression No access
3. § 3 Internal and external, mediate and immediate No access
4. § 4 Expressions and petites perceptions No access
5. 1. § 5.1 Notion and image No access
  2. § 5.2 Overview of possible objects and aspects No access
  3. § 5.3 The textual analysis No access
  4. § 5.4 The restricted reading of reflection No access
6. § 6 Conclusion No access
1. § 1 The principle of sufficient reason No access
2. 1. § 2.1 A note on meta-epistemology No access
3. 1. § 3.1 The role of the body No access
  2. 1. A) The heightening of a perception as sufficient No access
    2. 1. Bm) Memory No access
      2. Br) Reflection No access
      3. Bo) Objections No access
    3. 1. Cr) Retention No access
      2. Ca) Attention No access
    4. D) Concluding remarks No access
4. § 4 Issues with the process-based analysis of reflection No access
5. § 5 Conclusion No access
1. 1. § 1.1 Why is external apperception required? No access
2. 1. § 2.1 The problem of animal souls No access
  2. § 2.2 Wolff on consciousness, attention, and reflection: family resemblances No access
3. 1. § 3.1 How can innate ideas/truths be accessed? No access
4. § 4 The role of abstraction No access
5. § 5 Conclusion No access
1. 1. § 1.1 Animal souls: the object-based analysis No access
  2. § 1.2 Animal souls: the process-based analysis No access
  3. § 1.3 Animal souls vs human spirits No access
  4. § 1.4 Concluding remarks No access
2. 1. § 2.1 Two caveats No access
  2. § 2.2 What is it like for the boar to apperceive a person? No access
  3. § 2.3 Object- vs bundle-awareness No access
  4. § 2.4 Do animal souls have object- or bundle-awareness? No access
3. 1. § 3.1 Object-awareness relies on a unifying function No access
  2. § 3.2 Animals do not have the function of unity via implicit reflection No access
  3. § 3.3 Concluding remarks No access
4. 1. § 4.1 First hypothesis: sensation, memory, association No access
  2. 1. 1. § 4.2.1.1 Caveats time and again No access
    2. § 4.2.2 Imagination as representation of sensory contents No access
  3. 1. § 4.3.1 Caveats time and again? No access
5. § 5 Conclusion No access
1. 1. § 1.1 The classic consistency problem No access
  2. § 1.2 The new consistency problem No access
  3. § 1.3 Bringing the two strands together No access
2. 1. § 2.1 Perception as representation No access
  2. 1. § 2.2.1 Perception No access
    2. § 2.2.2 Sensation No access
  3. 1. § 2.3.1 Reflection No access
    2. § 2.3.2 Reasoning and abstraction No access
  4. § 2.4 Conclusion No access
Annex 1 12 possible readings of the Principles § 4 No access Pages 215 - 216
Annex 2 Occurrences of the terms ‘apperception’ and ‘reflection’ in the New Essays, Theodicy, Principles, and Monadology No access Pages 217 - 220
Annex 3 Objects and aspects of apperception and reflection No access Pages 221 - 222
1. Leibniz No access
2. Other primary sources No access
3. Works cited No access
4. Works consulted No access
Index No access Pages 235 - 238