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Plato Versus Parmenides
The Debate over Coming-into-Being in Greek Philosophy
Authors:
Publisher:
2010
Summary
Plato versus Parmenides investigates the concept of genesis, or coming into being, a problem that has absorbed the greatest philosophical thinkers. Robert J. Roecklein explores two philosophical giants who tackled this issue: Plato and Parmenides from Elea. Particularly interesting to Roecklein is how the respective arguments of reality, or lack thereof, of coming into being functions as a political barometer: how Plato and Parmenides sketch foundations for political regimes. Plato and Parmenides, philosophers of immeasurable respect and influence, represented two sides of a fierce debate. On one side, Parmenides gives the famous argument that coming into being cannot possibly be a reality in nature. The other side, Plato proves in his dialogue the Parmenides that coming into being is a very real thing in nature. He argues that perception does indeed provide accurate information about the external world. In Plato versus Parmenides, Robert J. Roecklein presents the great debate between these two schools, and examines the disposition of other PreSocratic philosophers who were influenced by these great intellectual rivals.
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Bibliographic data
Copyright year
2010
ISBN-Print
978-0-7391-5077-1
ISBN-Online
978-0-7391-5079-5
Publisher
Lexington, Lanham
Language
English
Pages
199
Product type
Book Titles
Table of contents
ChapterPages
Contents No access
Acknowledgments No access
Introduction No access Pages 1 - 12
1 Parmenides’ Argument No access Pages 13 - 36
2 Parmenides and the Milesian Philosophies: “Nothing Comes from Nothing”—Physics or Logic? No access Pages 37 - 56
3 Parmenides’ Influence on Empedocles and Anaxagoras No access Pages 57 - 82
4 Plato’s Socrates and His Theory of Causation No access Pages 83 - 120
5 The Parmenides: Plato’s Proof of Coming to Be No access Pages 121 - 158
6 The Theaetetus: Plato’s Proof That the Objects of Knowledge Are Indivisible No access Pages 159 - 186
