An Enquiry Into Linear Conflict Models

Prof. Dr. Klaus B. Beckmann; Lennart Reimer

doi:10.5771/9783748912088

Summary

This monograph generalises, and extends, the classic dynamic models in conflict analysis (Lanchester 1916, Richardson 1919, Boulding 1962). Restrictions on parameters are relaxed to account for alliances and for peacekeeping. Incrementalist as well as stochastic versions of the model are reviewed. These extensions allow for a rich variety of patterns of dynamic conflict. Using Monte Carlo techniques as well as time series analyses based on GDELT data (for the Ethiopian-Eritreian war, 1998–2000), we also assess the empirical usefulness of the model. It turns out that linear dynamic models capture selected phases of the conflict quite well, offering a potential taxonomy for conflict dynamics. We also discuss a method for introducing a modicum of (bounded) rationality into models from this tradition.

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Bibliographic data

Copyright year: 2021
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8487-7156-1
ISBN-Online: 978-3-7489-1208-8
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Series: GIDS Analysis
Volume: 5
Language: English
Pages: 60
Product type: Book Titles

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 1 - 12
Chapter 1: Introduction No access Pages 13 - 16
Chapter 2: A general linear conflict model for the two-party case No access Pages 17 - 20
1. A. Richardson’s original equations No access
2. B. An incrementalist Richardson model No access
3. C. Probabilistic interaction No access
1. A. Extension of the basic model to three parties No access
2. 1. I. Attenuating agents No access
  2. II. Alliances No access
3. C. Second extension: a psychological reformulation of the Richardsonequations No access
4. D. Monte-Carlo simulations No access
1. 1. I. Description of the data set No access
  2. II. Time series analysis and the suitability of the accumulated Goldstein score No access
  3. III. Structural model estimations No access
2. B. Re-estimating the Francisco (2009) data No access
1. 1. I. The decision heuristic No access
  2. II. Convergence to Nash equilibrium No access
2. 1. I. The state equation No access
  2. II. First example: the political business cycle No access
  3. III. Second example: a dynamic rent-seeking model No access
3. C. Comments No access
Chapter 7: Conclusion No access Pages 55 - 56
Appendix : Programme listing No access Pages 57 - 58
Bibliography No access Pages 59 - 60