Decentralization in Ecuador: Actors, Institutions, and Incentives

Dr. Jonas Frank

doi:10.5771/9783845203904

Summary

Der Band liefert eine Erklärung für die Initiierung und für das Scheitern von Dezentralisierungprozessen. Entscheidend hierfür ist das Zusammenspiel von Akteuren, deren Interessen und Anreize.

Der Autor Jonas Frank zeigt am Beispiel Ecuadors, wie diverse Interessengruppen oft einen entscheidenden Durchbruch zur Neuverteilung von Ressourcen erzielen, während in anderen Situationen alle Versuche der Konsensfindung misslingen. Ironischerweise sind es oft nicht die “Verlierer" sondern die “Gewinner” einer partiellen Dezentralisierung – Akteure die sich einen kurzfristigen Vorteil erwerben konnten – die den zukünftigen Verlauf des Prozesses entscheidend beeinflussen und blockieren, oft auf Kosten des gesamtgesellschaftlichen Nutzens.

Das Buch ist besonders für Ökonomen, Politikwissenschaftler, Entscheidungsträger und all jene interessant, die sich mit Reformen von Staat und Gesellschaft in Entwicklungsländern befassen.

Jonas Frank war jahrelang als Berater von Entscheidungsträgern in Ecuador tätig und analysiert politische Strategien für Dezentralisierungsprozesse, die für alle Länder relevant sind.

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Bibliographic data

Edition: 1/2007
Copyright Year: 2007
ISBN-Print: 978-3-8329-2708-0
ISBN-Online: 978-3-8452-0390-4
Publisher: Nomos, Baden-Baden
Language: English
Pages: 327
Product Type: Monograph

Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis No access Pages 2 - 12
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Figures and Tables No access Pages 13 - 16
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Acronyms No access Pages 17 - 18
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Summary No access Pages 19 - 26
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Introduction No access Pages 27 - 27
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The “Why” and the “How” of Decentralization No access Pages 27 - 30
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Actors, Institutions, and Incentives for Decentralization: Experiencing Real-Life Games No access Pages 31 - 33
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Defi nitions and Scope of Analysis No access Pages 34 - 34
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Research Methods No access Pages 35 - 35
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Structure No access Pages 36 - 38
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1. 1. Public Choice No access Pages 39 - 44
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  2. Crisis Theories No access Pages 44 - 51
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  3. Globalization and Localization No access Pages 51 - 55
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  4. Social and Cultural Theories No access Pages 55 - 59
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  5. Determinism No access Pages 59 - 63
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  6. Conclusion No access Pages 63 - 65
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2. 1. Authors:
    1. Propositions and Assumptions No access
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    2. Decentralization and Institutional Change No access
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    3. Observing Institutional Change: Methodological Aspects No access
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    1. Interests, Incentives, and Distributional Goals No access
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    2. Incentives and Disincentives for Presidents, Legislators, and Regional Governors No access
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    3. Conclusion No access
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    1. Entry and Exit Rules No access
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    2. Position Rules No access
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    3. Interaction Rules No access
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    4. Decision Rules No access
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    5. Implementation Rules No access
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    6. Types of Collective Choice Arenas No access
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  4. Actors, Incentives and the Sequencing of Decentralization No access Pages 99 - 103
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3. 1. The “Why” of Decentralization No access Pages 103 - 104
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  2. The “How” of Decentralization No access Pages 104 - 108
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B: Decentralization in Ecuador: Actors, Institutions, and Incentives No access Pages 109 - 109
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1. 1. Authors:
    1. The Regional Equilibrium: Guayas, Azuay, and Quito No access
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    2. Central Government Responses to Regional Demands No access
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  2. Non-cooperative Equilibrium: 1925-1948 No access Pages 125 - 127
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  3. The Return to the Previous Regional Equilibrium: 1948-1963 No access Pages 127 - 135
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  4. Conclusion No access Pages 135 - 137
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2. 1. Centralization in an Arena of Hierarchy: 1964-1966 No access Pages 137 - 141
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  2. Threat to the Equilibrium: Return to Democratic Rule 1967-1972 No access Pages 141 - 142
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  3. Authors:
    1. Reforms to the Intergovernmental System No access
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    2. Shaping the Arena: New Position and Interaction Rules No access
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    3. Attempts at Co-optation No access
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  4. Conclusion No access Pages 157 - 161
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3. 1. Authors:
    1. Games Played between Mayors, Prefects, and Legislators No access
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    2. Games Played between Legislators and Presidents No access
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    1. Responses from President Roldós (1979-1981) No access
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    2. Responses from President Hurtado (1981-1984) No access
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    3. Responses from Febres Cordero (1984-1988) No access
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    4. Assessment No access
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  3. Conclusion No access Pages 184 - 187
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4. 1. The Reform Coalition and the Collective Choice Arena No access Pages 187 - 192
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  2. Authors:
    1. Formula-Driven Transfers versus Discretionary Transfers No access
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    2. Distribution of Revenue (Transfers) between Municipalities and Provincial Councils No access
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    3. Transfers: Earmarked Revenue versus Non-Earmarked Revenue No access
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    4. Distribution of Expenditure Responsibilities between Central and Local Levels No access
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  3. Conclusion No access Pages 206 - 209
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5. 1. Actors, Interests, and the Collective Choice Arena No access Pages 209 - 213
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    1. Party Politics and Decentralization Arenas No access
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    2. Political, Administrative and Fiscal Goals of Guayaquil Leaders No access
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    3. The Role of Guayas vis-à-vis other Provinces No access
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  3. Sub-game between Municipalities and Provincial Councils No access Pages 222 - 224
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  4. The Congressional Decentralization Committee No access Pages 224 - 227
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  5. Stakeholders in Central Government No access Pages 227 - 231
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  6. Indigenous People No access Pages 231 - 233
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  7. Conclusion No access Pages 233 - 237
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6. 1. Authors:
    1. The Provincial Bias of Decentralization No access
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    2. Responses from Municipalities No access
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    3. The Equilibrium between Provincial Councils and Municipalities No access
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    1. Incentives for Sub-national Government to Bargain for Transfers No access
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    2. Central Government Responses No access
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    3. The Equilibrium between Sub-national and Central Government No access
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  3. Partial Decentralization Equilibrium No access Pages 263 - 266
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  4. Conclusion No access Pages 266 - 269
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7. 1. The “Why” of Decentralization: Actors and Incentives No access Pages 269 - 272
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    1. C: Conclusion and Outlook: New Twist to the Old Game? The Role of External Actors No access
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1. Entry and Exit Rules No access Pages 280 - 283
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2. 1. Highly Asymmetric Fiscal Capacity across Regions No access Pages 283 - 285
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  2. Blurred Position Rules across Levels of Government No access Pages 285 - 286
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  3. Distributional Coalition: Games Played between Mayors, Prefects and Legislators No access Pages 286 - 287
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  4. “Pugna de Poderes:” Games Played between Presidents and Legislators No access Pages 287 - 288
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  5. The Partial Decentralization Equilibrium (1997-2003): New Incentives for the Winners? No access Pages 288 - 290
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3. 1. Ideological Deadlock: the Symbol of “Autonomía” No access Pages 290 - 291
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  2. Withholding of Information No access Pages 291 - 292
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  3. Distrust between Actors and the “Tragedy of the Commons:” Excessive Earmarking No access Pages 292 - 293
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4. 1. Non-Cooperation and Unilateral Decisions: Threats to Secession? No access Pages 293 - 294
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  2. Bargaining: New Incentives for the Veto-Players? No access Pages 294 - 296
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  3. Majority Decisions No access Pages 296 - 296
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  4. Hierarchical Decisions No access Pages 296 - 296
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5. 1. Veto-Players and Implementation No access Pages 296 - 297
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  2. Volatility and Short-term Incentives No access Pages 297 - 299
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  3. Weak Budget Constraints and Fiscal Responsibility No access Pages 299 - 300
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  4. Weak Enforcement of Sanctions No access Pages 300 - 300
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6. Assessment and Outlook No access Pages 300 - 302
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Bibliography No access Pages 303 - 327
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