Constitutional Coup-Proofing

The persistence of military coups in the Global South raises new questions in terms of how constitution-makers use constitutions to prevent, deter or resist a coup and to what effect. In this article, we examine how constitution-makers respond to the threat of future military coups. Building on and extending the literature on coup-proofing, we argue that coup-proofing is not only a political strategy but can also be a legal one. We define constitutional coup-proofing as constitutional design strategies that aim to both prevent coups and deter the future possibility of a coup. We further identify five strategies of constitutional coup-proofing. We illustrate these strategies through case studies. Contributing to calls for a military turn in comparative constitutional law, we outline an agenda for the study of constitutional coup-proofing. The coup-proofing function of constitutions is important but overlooked and requires greater sociological attention given the prevalence of this strategy by constitution-makers in countries with a history of military rule or unconstitutional overthrow of government by force.