Constitutionalised Decentralisation and its Impacts on the Urban Housing Crisis in India and Colombia

In India’s federal constitution, the urban housing agenda is allotted to the state governments. However, the overzealousness of the union government has meant that little of this power has been exercised by the state governments, with policies framed by the union government dominating the pursuit of the mandate. This overzealousness is not unique to the urban housing agenda, even though it has been an area of consistent interest and preoccupation, as evident in the overarching powers exercised by the union government. Such exercise of power appears to be facilitated by the use of the popular label of quasi-federal, recognising the unequal and centralising power of the union government. This situation is further complicated by the enactment of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1993, which sought to decentralise power by creating a third tier of government, local governments. This amendment placed the urban housing agenda as a function of local governments. However, the creation and operation of local governments are subject to the state governments' exercise of the authority to create and empower them with resources to perform these functions. On the other hand, Colombia, despite having a unitary constitution, displays a strong commitment to decentralisation, not just in the textual framing of its constitutional provisions but also in the exercise of power across different administrative units. This stark contrast is explored by analysing how the urban housing agenda is pursued in India and Colombia, through the study of the administration of the cities of Mumbai and Bogota, respectively. The observation from the study, elucidated in the article, highlights the relative success of decentralisation in Bogota, enabling a satisfactory pursuit of the urban housing agenda, in comparison to that of Mumbai, which finds itself caught up in a complex web of governance structures impeding its ability to meaningfully address urban housing challenges. In doing so, the article aims to highlight the limitations of constitutionalised decentralisation in India by examining its federal constitution and government, as demonstrated in India’s pursuance of the urban housing agenda.