Refining Political Insurance: The Indonesian Context

While the establishment of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court is traditionally viewed as an altruistic milestone for institutionalizing democracy and constitutionalism, this narrative remains unsatisfactory when scrutinized through a political science lens. This article challenges this classical understanding by asking: what were the underlying strategic rationales of political elites in empowering a judicial body to check their own power? Adopting a normative approach combined with a historical analysis of the Court’s formation, this study evaluates the applicability of “political insurance” and “preserving hegemony” theories within the Indonesian context. The analysis reveals that while the notion of “preserving hegemony” is insufficient, the “political insurance” theory provides a stronger explanatory framework, albeit with a necessary caveat. Unlike the standard theory where weakened incumbent elites seek judicial protection, the Indonesian scenario illustrates that new prevailing elites, legitimized by democratic elections, instigated this empowerment. Consequently, this article argues for a refinement of the political insurance concept to include “coverage insurance” that may be utilized by any political actor during the unpredictable phases of democratic transition. Ultimately, the pragmatic objectives of these actors shaped the Court’s institutional framework, manifesting a distinct form of the judicialization of politics.