Vom Washington Consensus zum Flexiblen Keynesianismus – der Internationale Währungsfonds nach der Finanzkrise

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Cover of Volume: PVS Politische Vierteljahresschrift Volume 55 (2014), Edition 3
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Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft

Volume 55 (2014), Edition 3

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Nomos, Baden-Baden
Publication year
2014
ISSN-Online
0032-3470
ISSN-Print
0032-3470

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Volume 55 (2014), Edition 3

Vom Washington Consensus zum Flexiblen Keynesianismus – der Internationale Währungsfonds nach der Finanzkrise

Authors:
ISSN-Print
0032-3470
ISSN-Online
0032-3470
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