Schuldenkrisen im Wandel: Das neue Zeitalter von Staatsbankrotten und Umschuldungen

Table of contents

Bibliographic information

Cover of Volume: PVS Politische Vierteljahresschrift Volume 55 (2014), Edition 4
Full access

Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft

Volume 55 (2014), Edition 4

Authors:
Publisher
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Publication year
2014
ISSN-Online
0032-3470
ISSN-Print
0032-3470

Chapter information

Full access

Volume 55 (2014), Edition 4

Schuldenkrisen im Wandel: Das neue Zeitalter von Staatsbankrotten und Umschuldungen

Authors:
ISSN-Print
0032-3470
ISSN-Online
0032-3470
Preview:

Bibliography

  1. Archer, Candace C., Glen Biglaiser, und Karl DeRouen Jr. 2007. Sovereign Bonds and the “Democratic Advantage”: Does Regime Type Affect Credit Rating Agency Ratings in the Developing World? International Organization 61: 341-365. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818307070129. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070129
  2. Arellano, Cristina, Xavier Mateos-Planas, und Jose-Victor Rios-Rull. 2013. Partial Default. Mimeo. Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Open Google Scholar
  3. Benjamin, David, und Mark L.J. Wright. 2009. Recovery Before Redemption? A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations. Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392539
  4. Bi, Ran, Marcos Chamon, und Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 2011. The Problem that Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings. IMF Working Paper No. 11/265. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund. Open Google Scholar
  5. Biglaiser, Glen, und Joseph L. Staats. 2012. Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in ­Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law. International Organization 66: 515-535. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818312000185. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000185
  6. Biglaiser, Glenn, und Karl DeRouen. 2007. Sovereign Bond Ratings and Neoliberalism in Latin America. International Studies Quarterly 51: 121-138. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00442.x
  7. BILD. 2010. Verkauft doch eure Inseln, ihr Pleite-Griechen ... und die Akropolis gleich mit! http://www.bild.de/politik/wirtschaft/griechenland-krise/regierung-athen-sparen-verkauft-inseln-pleite-akropolis-11692338.bild.html. Zugegriffen: 04.09.2014 Open Google Scholar
  8. Bolton, Patrick, und Olivier Jeanne. 2007. Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: The role of a bankruptcy regime. Journal of Political Economy 115: 901-924. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1086/528759
  9. Bolton, Patrick, und Olivier Jeanne. 2009. Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: The role of seniority. The Review of Economic Studies 76: 879-902. Open Google Scholar
  10. Bulow, Jeremy I., und Kenneth Rogoff. 1989. A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt. Journal of Political Economy 97: 155-178. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1086/261596
  11. Chuhan, Punam, und Federico Sturzenegger. 2005. Defaults Episodes in the 1980s and 1990s: What Have We Learned? In Managing Economic Volatility and Crises, Hrsg. Joshua Aizenman und Brian Pinto, 471-520. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510755.014
  12. Cordes, Till. 2014. The Political Economy of Sovereign Rating Criteria. What Rating Agencies Demand from National Governments. Dissertationsschrift eingereicht an der Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies. Open Google Scholar
  13. Cruces, Juan J., und Christoph Trebesch. 2013. Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5: 85-117. DOI: 10.1257/mac.5.3.85. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1257/mac.5.3.85
  14. Das, Udaibir S., Michael G. Papaioannou, und Christoph Trebesch. 2012. Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts. IMF Working Paper WP/12/203. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.5089/9781475505535.001
  15. Dias, Daniel A., Christine Richmond, und Mark Wright. 2012. In for a Penny, In for 100 Billion Pounds: Quantifying the Welfare Benefits from Debt Forgiveness. Mimeo. Illinois: University of Illinois. Open Google Scholar
  16. Dias, Daniel A., Christine Richmond, und Mark Wright. 2014. The stock of external ­sovereign debt: Can we take the data at ‘face value’? Journal of International Economics 94: 1-17. DOI: 10.3386/w17551. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.3386/w17551
  17. Dreher, Axel, Bernhard Herz, und Volker Carb. 2006. Is there a Casual Link between Currency and Debt Crises? International Journal of Finance and Economics 11: 305-325. Open Google Scholar
  18. Eaton, Jonathan, und Mark Gersovitz. 1981. Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Review of Economic Studies 48: 289-309. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.2307/2296886
  19. Eichengreen, Barry, und Richard Portes. 1995. Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors. London: Center of Economic Policy Research. Open Google Scholar
  20. Eichengreen, Barry, Ashoka Mody, und Kenneth Kletzer. 2003. Crisis Resolution: Next Steps. NBER Working Paper No. 10095. Cambridge, Mass.: The National Bureau of Economic Research. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.445520
  21. Elster, John. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Open Google Scholar
  22. Enderlein, Henrik, Christoph Trebesch, und Laura von Daniels. 2012. Sovereign debt ­disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises. Journal of International Money and Finance 31: 250-266. DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.11.011. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.11.011
  23. Enderlein, Henrik. 2008. Makroökonomische Stabilisierung in Schuldenkrisen: Zur Bedeutung von Governance Aspekten in der Interaktion von privaten Gläubigern und staatlichen Schuldnern in Schwellenländern. In Regieren ohne Staat? Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit (Schriften zur Governance-Forschung, Band 10), Hrsg. Thomas Risse und Ursula Lehmkuhl, 309-331. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag. Open Google Scholar
  24. Fearon, James. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88: 577-592. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.2307/2944796
  25. Gelpern, Anna, und Mitu Gulati. 2013. The wonder-clause. Journal of Comparative Eco-nomics 41: 367-385. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2013.03.009
  26. Gennaioli, Nicola, Alberto Martin, und Stefano Rossi. 2014. Sovereign default, domestic banks, and financial institutions. Journal of Finance 69: 819-866. DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12124. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12124
  27. Grossman, Herschel I., und John B. Van Huyck. 1985. Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: Excusable default, repudiation, and reputation. American Economic Review 78: 1088-1097. DOI: 10.3386/w1673. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.3386/w1673
  28. Hale, Galina. 2007: Bonds or Loans? The Effect of Macroeconomic Fundamentals. Economic Journal 117: 196-215. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02007.x
  29. Henry, Peter Blair, und Serkan Arslanalp. 2005. Is Debt Relief Efficient? Journal of Finance, American Finance Association 60: 1017-1051. Open Google Scholar
  30. Institute of International Finance (IIF). 2013. Principles for stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring: Report on implementation by the Principles Consultative Group. Washington, D. C.: Institute of International Finance. Open Google Scholar
  31. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 1999. IMF Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors. Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.5089/9781451951059.023
  32. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2002. Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors: Further Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion. Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. Open Google Scholar
  33. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2013. Sovereign Debt Restructuring. Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework. Washington D. C: International Monetary Fund. Open Google Scholar
  34. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2014. The Fund’s lending framework and sovereign debt - Preliminary considerations. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund. Open Google Scholar
  35. Kruger, Mark, und Andy G. Haldane. 2001. The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds. Bank of Canada Working Paper 01 (20). ­Ottawa: Bank of Canada. Open Google Scholar
  36. Mendoza, Enrique G., und Vivian Z. Yue. 2012. A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press 127: 889-946. Open Google Scholar
  37. Moody’s. 2013. The Role of Holdout Creditors and CACs in Sovereign Debt Restructurings. New York: Moody’s. Open Google Scholar
  38. Panizza, Ugo, Federico Sturzenegger, und Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 2009. The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default. Journal of Economic Literature 47: 651-698. DOI: 10.1257/jel.47.3.651. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.3.651
  39. Ponticelli, Jacopo, und Hans-Joachim Voth. 2011. Austerity and Anarchy: Budget Cuts and Social Unrest in Europe, 1919-2008. CEPR Discussion Paper 8513. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1899287
  40. Mitchener, Kris James, und Marc D. Weidenmier. 2005. Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment. NBER Working Papers 11472. Cambridge, Mass.: The National Bureau of Economic Research. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.3386/w11472
  41. North, Douglass C., und Barry R. Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. Journal of Economic History 49: 803-832. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700009451
  42. Reinhart, Carmen M., und Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2009. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Open Google Scholar
  43. Rogoff, Kenneth, und Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 2002. Bankruptcy procedures for sovereigns: A history of ideas, 1976-2001. IMF Staff Papers Vol. 49, No. 3. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.5089/9781451855500.001
  44. Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. Looking for Audience Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 4: 32-60. DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045001002. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1177/0022002701045001002
  45. Schultz, Kenneth A., und Barry R. Weingast. 2003. The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition. International Organization 57: 3-42. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818303571065. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303571065
  46. Schumacher, Julian, Christoph Trebesch, und Henrik Enderlein. 2014. Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-2010. Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript. Open Google Scholar
  47. Sturzenegger, Federico, und Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 2006. Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Open Google Scholar
  48. Tanaka, Misa. 2006. Bank loans versus bond finance: Implications for sovereign debtors. The Economic Journal 116: 149-171 Open Google Scholar
  49. Tomz Michael. 2004. Interests, Information, and the Domestic Politics of International Agreements. Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript. Open Google Scholar
  50. Tomz, Michael. 2007. Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Open Google Scholar
  51. Trebesch, Christoph. 2010. Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructurings. Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript. Open Google Scholar
  52. Trebesch, Christoph, Udaibir S. Das, und Michael G. Papaioannou. 2010. Sovereign ­Default Risk and Private Sector Access to Capital in Emerging Markets. Chapters in Economics 20024, University of Munich: Department of Economics. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.5089/9781451961942.001
  53. Weltbank. 2007. Debt Reduction Facility for IDA-Only Countries: Progress Update and Proposed Extension. Board Report 39310. Washington D. C.: World Bank. Open Google Scholar
  54. Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, und Mitu Gulati. 2012. Making a Voluntary Greek Debt Exchange Work. CEPR Discussion Papers 8754. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1979474
  55. Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, und Christoph Trebesch, Mitu Gulati. 2013. The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy. Economic Policy 28: 513-563. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0327.12014. Open Google Scholar doi.org/10.1111/1468-0327.12014

Citation

Download RIS Download BibTex

Downloads

Download chapter (PDF)

Share via email

Media