

historisch besondere kognitive Leistungen, etwa den astronomischen Beobachtungen auf der Himmelscheibe von Nebra entnehmbar (Bronzezeit), zu erklären? Aber eine Theorie ist keine Alles-Erklärungs-Theorie. Dass sie bestimmte Phänomene nicht erklären kann, spricht nicht gegen ihre Richtigkeit, sondern nur gegen ihre Anwendbarkeit für jeden historischen Einzelfall.

Dies schmälert nicht den Wert des psychogenetischen Ansatzes (psychogenetisch steht für sich entwickelnde psychische Strukturen) und angewendet auf die Gesellschaft, der strukturgenetischen Soziologie. Beide Bände, insbesondere der Springer-Band, bieten eine reiche Fundgrube empirischer Einzelheiten wie über mittelalterliche Tierprozesse oder Afrika (Dinzelbacher 2006; Grill 2005; u. a.), mitunter so unglaublich und erschreckend, dass man als Leser in verschiedenen Originalquellen deren Richtigkeit überprüfen will (und leider bestätigt findet). Im Anspruch und weitgehend eingelösten Versprechen, eine Theorie der Geschichte vorzulegen, die Entstehung der Moderne zu erklären und den Geist der Zeiten zu verstehen, schimmert die alte große Soziologie wie von Comte, Weber, Sombart und Elias durch. Oesterdiekhoff zu lesen kann das eigene Denken stimulieren, auch dort, wo man ihm widersprechen möchte (etwa in der höheren Gewichtung einer historischen wie individuellen Wissensakkumulation, empirische Falschheit ist nicht logischer Widerspruch usw.). Oesterdiekhoff-Erstlesern würde ich raten, mit dem Velbrück-Band zu beginnen. Er ist theoretisch stärker. Der Springer-Band (sehr hilfreich auch als PDF) zeigt die fruchtbaren Möglichkeiten seiner Anwendung auf verschiedenen relevanten Empiriebereichen, insbesondere auch der Ethnologie, sollte aber von einem Lektor durchgesehen werden.

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Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi's Attempts at Religious Revivalism in South Asia

Belkacem Belmekki

Many historians and contemporaries of early British India bear witness to the fact that the Muslim community in the Indian subcontinent suffered more than any other community there as a result of the imposition of British rule by the mid-eighteenth century. In fact, Muslims faced serious setbacks that were deliberately created by the East In-

dia Company officials, and this affected them badly, and in all walks of life. In such circumstances, they found themselves trailing far behind their Hindu fellow countrymen. Hence, it was against this gloomy background that some Muslim figures in the Indian subcontinent took the initiative to save Islam and Muslims from further disgrace and deterioration. In this article, the main focus of attention will be given to the person of Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi,¹ considering his long-lasting impact on later generations of Indian Muslims in South Asia.

In the eighteenth century, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi was one of those who saw in the political decline of Muslims in the subcontinent a prelude to a total religious disintegration. His fears were further accentuated by the misunderstanding, and in some instances, ignorance of Islam by his community mainly as a result of the centuries' long interaction with the Hindu community as well as the recent contact with the western thought (Malik 1980: 41).

Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi was convinced that unless Muslims went back to their religion in order to face the challenge of Hinduism, permanent decadence of the Muslim community in India would ensue. In his opinion, Muslims in India had to preserve their distinct identity as being different from the rest of the Indians, particularly Hindus. In order to do so, Muslims should restrict their interaction with the latter, or else, Islamic values would go up in smoke. As confirmed by Hafeez Malik (1980: 41):

While the Hindu culture has always been assimilative, and willing to synthesize with other religions, Islam had to face the problem of preserving its distinct identity, which closer cultural relations with the Hindu society would progressively erode.

Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi uttered a cry for Islam in danger in the subcontinent and, as a Muslim theologian, he felt duty bound to do something to save his religion and co-religionists from further disintegration. Therefore, he, and his followers,² embarked on a revivalist and reformist campaign amongst the Muslim community in India that encouraged communal tendencies and attitudes common to Muslims only, mainly in religious thinking.

To that end, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi urged his community to return to the Islamic religion to seek salvation. He stated that only God can be relied on, and Muslims should stick to God's sacred book, namely the Holy Quran (Spear 1990: 224 f.). In fact, he staunchly believed that the Quran was the one and only source that provided guidance to the right path as well as knowledge to the entire humanity, and that it is the real success for Muslims in the earthly life and in the hereafter (Islam 2004: 90). With this in mind, he blazed a trail in undertaking the task of translating the Holy Quran into Persian so as to make it understood by the whole Muslims of the Indian subcontinent (Spear 1990: 225). In fact, the kind of Persian he used was simple and conversational, and the aim behind this endeavour was to bring Indian Muslims closer to the teachings of the Quran and to develop their intellectual understanding of its contents hereafter (Islam 2004: 91). About the language Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi used in his translation of the Quran Archad Islam stated that it was "so simple that anyone who knew the elements of Persian would understand the meaning of the Quran, particularly the soldiers and the children of the commoners" (2004: 91).

It should be noted that Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi was spurred to undertake such a pioneering work by the fact that there was a misconception among the Muslim community that the learning and understanding of the Quran was a field strictly reserved for intellectuals, whereas the commoners could only read it without reflecting on it (Islam 2004: 90 f.).

According to Archad Islam, the primary objective behind Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi's endeavour to popularise the Quran was to inculcate Muslims with the fundamentals of Islam before they learnt much of the Hindu beliefs (2004: 91). To put it in a nutshell, it is worth quoting the same historian who stated that Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi tried to "liberate the [Muslim] community from the brunt of un-Islamic beliefs and malpractices, and to instil the supremacy of the Islamic *Shari'ah* and the Quranic teaching in the daily life of Muslims" (Islam 2004: 91).

On the other hand, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi argued that all religions of the world, except Islam, were corrupted due to innovations brought about by different doctrines. Nonetheless, to his dismay, the Islamic religion in India was subject to the same situation. In his opinion, that was due to interaction with the Hindu community, which made Muslims adopt un-Islamic practices (Karandikar 1968: 127). He pointed the finger of blame in the main to the converts, namely those who used to be Hindus and converted to Islam later on. For him, these con-

1 Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi (1703–1762) was born to a conservative Muslim family in India. He received a traditional Islamic education and memorised the Holy Quran at the age of 7. As a theologian later on, he founded a modern Islamic thought and attempted to reappraise Islamic theology in light of the new circumstances in the Indian subcontinent.

2 Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi's notable followers were Shah Abdul Aziz (1746–1831), Sayyid Ahmed Shahid (1786–1831), and Mawlana Ismail Shahid (d. 1831); see Malik (1980: 255).

verts brought with them their Hindu practices and injected them into the Muslim society (Karandikar 1968: 127). These Hindu practices were referred to by Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi as *bida'a*. As corroborated by Hafeez Malik who stated that “in the Indian environment *bida'a* became a synonym for the Hindu folkways and mores which were retained by the converts, and because of them were diffused into the Indic Muslim society” (1980: 42).

In fact, to Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi and his followers, the essence of the Islamic culture was *sunna* plus *shari'a* minus *bida'a* (Malik 1980: 41). The term *sunna* literally means “trodden path.” It is used to refer to the normative conduct of the Prophet Mohammed. *Shari'a* literally means the path to be followed, and it is used to refer to the laws of Islam based on Allah’s commandments; whereas *bida'a* literally means “impious innovations,” namely acts that contravene the Prophetic model (Malik 1980: 41 f.).

It is worthwhile to mention the fact that one of Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi’s followers, Sayyid Ahmed Shahid (1786–1831), went a step further in extending the term *bida'a* to include those innovations which had developed by association with the Shiites as well as all non-Muslims that he referred to as “Mushrikiyn.” Hafeez Malik quotes Shahid’s message to the Muslim community asking them to “follow the example of Muhammad of Arabia and relinquish all the customs of India, Iran, and Rome” (1980: 261). For the sake of illustration, it is useful to mention Shahid’s strong opposition to the *shi'a*’s religious rites among his community on Muharram, commemorating the martyrdom of Imam al-Husain Ibn ‘Ali, Prophet Mohammed’s grandson via his daughter Fatima, in the Kerbala tragedy.³ In this respect, Shahid wondered: “In what place God or the Prophet stated that after Imam Husain was martyred a mourning procession or *ta'ziyah* should be taken out annually?” (quoted in Malik 1980: 259). These rituals, according to a contemporary eyewitness in India, always ended in bloody incidence (Malik 1980: 259).

Parentetically, this stance of Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi and his disciples vis-à-vis non-Muslims and non-Sunnis reflects the rigidly sectarian character of the approach of their revivalist movement. As a matter of fact, many historians agree on the fact that the leader of this movement, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi, was in line with his contemporary Mohammed Ibn

3 During these religious rites, *shiite* Muslims would walk in processions as mourning rituals in honour of Imam Husain who was martyred in Kerbala, Iraq, in A.D. 680. In these processions, people, very emotionally involved, would wail, cry aloud, weep and beat their breasts (Armstrong 2001: 102).

Abd al-Wahhab,⁴ one of the most radical Islamists, who launched a similar revivalist movement in the Arabian Peninsula, historically known as the Wahhabist Movement.⁵

The repudiation of un-Islamic aspects of Islam led Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi and his followers to embark on a process of Islamisation of the Muslim society in the Indian subcontinent. Towards this end, he urged his co-religionists to adhere to the cultural values of the Muslim world, which were accepted and exemplified by the Prophet Mohammed as his *sunna* (Malik 1980: 257). As a matter of fact, being of Arab origin, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi called upon his community to keep aloof from the cultural mainstream of the Indian subcontinent and to not neglect the customs and mores of the early Arabs because they were the immediate followers of the Prophet Mohammed (Malik 1980: 257). Moreover, for him, it was necessary that Muslims should cease to regard themselves as part of the general Indian society, and should never forget that they were an integral part of the larger Muslim world (Karandikar 1968: 127). In this respect, R. Upadhyay (2003) quotes the Indian historian, Istiaq Hussain Qureshi, as saying that Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi:

did not want the Muslims to become part of the general milieu of the sub-continent. He wanted them to keep alive their relation with the rest of the Muslim world so that the spring of their inspiration and ideals might ever remain located in Islam and tradition of world community developed by it.

Thus, as part of his efforts to reform the Muslim community in India, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi left no stone unturned. In fact, he dealt with even the smallest details of Muslims day-to-day life. According to Hafeez Malik, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi castigated his community for their marriage and funeral customs. For instance, he deplored the prohibition by his co-religionists of a second marriage for widows, a practice so common amongst the Hindu community (Malik 1980: 257). Commenting on this practice, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi stated that it

4 Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) was a fundamentalist Arab scholar, who pursued a radical approach in viewing the Islamic religion. In his view, true Islam is strictly confined to the Holy Quran and *sunna* of the Prophet Mohammed and all the accretions brought by later scholars, such as *fiqh*, should be rejected. In this respect, he launched a campaign against the ottoman sultans who were not in line with his thoughts and accused them as apostates and worthy of death (Armstrong 2001: 114).

5 See Upadhyay (2003); Armstrong defines “Wahhabism” as a form of Islam that is puritan and based on a strictly literal interpretation of scripture and early Islamic tradition (Armstrong 2001: 115).

was not “a tradition among the Arabs, neither during the *jahiliyah* [pre-Islamic] period nor after the advent of the Prophet Muhammad” (quoted in Malik 1980: 257).

With regard to marriage, Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi put into question the practice of asking exorbitant dower which he regarded as a negative innovation in Islam. Hafeez Malik (1980: 257) quoted him as saying:

One of the reprehensible habits of our people is that in the marriage contract an excessive dower is fixed. The Prophet Muhammad, on account of whom we are honoured in religion and in this world, fixed for his spouses a dower, the value of which amounted to 500 dirhams.

On the other hand, excessive and unnecessary Muslim spending on occasions of happiness was also subject to Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi’s criticism. In his opinion, there are only two ceremonies in Islamic tradition, namely *Waliyma* and *‘Aqiqah* (on the occasions of marriage and birth, respectively). He urged Muslims to observe only these two ceremonies and to get rid of other unnecessary ones (Malik 1980: 257).

Furthermore, Muslim funeral ceremonies were also targeted by Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi’s criticism. He strongly deplored the unnecessary ceremonies of *Saywam* (third day), *Chelum* (fortieth day), *Shash Mahiy* (six monthly), and *Salana* (annual) days of mourning. For him, none of these ceremonies had existed among ancient Arabs, and to follow the Prophet Mohammed’s normative conduct, the funeral ceremony should not last more than three days, during which messages of condolence should be presented to the family of the deceased, and that the latter should be treated to only three dinners (Malik 1980: 257 f.).

It is worth mentioning the fact that by urging the Muslim community to keep distance from the mainstream cultural milieu in India, Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi incurred, later on, a wave of opprobrium and condemnation from many prominent leaders of the Indian nationalist movement. He was accused of having sowed the seeds of disunity among the inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent which made it difficult for their struggle for freedom from colonial rule. As confirmed by Upadhyay, who said that Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi’s “emphasis on Arabization of Indian Islam did not allow the emotional integration of Indian Muslims with the rest of the population of this country.” He added: “Regressively affecting the Muslim psyche, his ideology debarred it from forward-looking vision” (2003). In another article, Upadhyay declared that “the religio-political ideology of Wali Ullah made a permanent crack in

Hindu-Muslim relation in this sub-continent, which undermined the self-pride and dignity of integrated Indian society” (2004).

In another sphere, Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi attributed the disintegration of the Mughal Empire in the subcontinent to corruption and division amongst the Muslim military and political leaders as well as intellectuals due to sectarian and linguistic divergences. According to him, this situation culminated in a never-ending political infighting whereby each faction defended its own interests at the expense of the common interests of the whole Muslim community.⁶ Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi argued that in this *status quo*, Islam would be completely wiped out from the subcontinent. In order to avoid this unwished-for consequence, he urged the ruling elite to fulfil their duties and obligations towards the Muslim community and pleaded with them to see beyond their own interests and divergences and come together to help regain Muslim political power (Karandikar 1968: 127).

Again in this respect, Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi thinks that the other reason for the decadence of the Mughal Empire in India was the unquestioned submission, or, to use Karandikar’s phraseology, “blind obedience” to the Mughal Emperor (1968: 127). Shah Walyi Allah Dehlavi was of the opinion that it was necessary to have a unified leadership for all Muslims throughout the world that he referred to as the “caliphate” (Karandikar 1968: 127).⁷ The aim of this institution is twofold: on the one hand, it could serve as a permanent spiritual and temporal guide, in the person of the “caliph,” for all Muslim communities throughout the world; on the other hand,

6 See Malik (1980: 125). According to Masselos, there were major doctrinal differences among the Muslim community in the Indian subcontinent. The majority were Sunnis and the rest were Shiites, and there was considerable hostility between the two. The former, who had always considered themselves as orthodox, had always looked upon the latter as unorthodox or heterodox. Under these two major divisions, there were other subdivisions, or sects, that did not have much in common (1985: 121).

7 The “caliphate,” or “khilafat,” is a very important institution in the Islamic political system. It was initiated with the election of Abu Bakr Seddik, who succeeded the Prophet Mohamed shortly after his death in A.D. 632. Abu Bakr Seddik was the first of the four caliphs historically referred to as the *Khulafa-i-Rashidin*, viz. Omar Ibn Khattab, Othman Ibn Affan, and Ali Ibn Abi Taleb. The caliph would represent a spiritual and temporal symbol for all Muslims of the world. By no means an autocrat, the caliph has to consult with other Muslims in matters related to the running of office, and all his actions and policies were to be strictly in compliance with the norms set up by the Holy Quran and the Prophet’s traditions. This institutions did not outlive the *Khulafa-i-Rashidin*’s era, as the latter’s successors modified it in a way that made it look more like a monarchy (Wasti 1993: 288).

it could serve as a restraint that would keep Muslim rulers under some form of control.

In addition to all that, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi wanted to target each source of Muslim weakness. In his first pamphlet entitled “Hujjatulla-al-Baliga,” which he addressed to the frail Mughal emperor and his staff, he endeavoured to highlight the main underlying causes behind the current chaotic situation in the empire. In his opinion, the decline of the country was due to two major reasons. Karandikar (1968: 126) quotes him as saying that the first reason was:

... pressure on the public treasury which is due to the fact that the people have developed a habit of obtaining money from the Exchequer without performing any corresponding duty. They either come out with the excuse that they are soldiers or “ulama” and have therefore a claim on the treasury; or they claim to belong to that group of men whom the king himself presents rewards ... These people diminish the sources of other peoples’ income and are a burden on the country.

With regard to the second reason, Karandikar (1968: 126) continues quoting Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi as saying that it was:

... heavy taxation on the peasants, merchants and workers and cruel dealings with these groups. The result is that all those who are loyal to the state and obey its orders are going on the way to destruction. The refractory people and the evaders are becoming more refractory and they do not pay the taxes to the state.

In a word, as can be inferred from the paragraphs above, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi, with the help of his followers, was the first Indian Muslim to set alarm bells ringing for Islam in South Asia. He tried to reach the majority of his co-religionists in the region, regardless of their status in society, from the *ashraf* (namely aristocrats), intellectual elite, down to laypeople (Islam 2004: 102). This he fulfilled through his writings and campaigns in which he urged Muslims to study and understand properly the Book of Allah, the Holy Quran, and the *Hadith* of his Prophet Mohamed.

Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi’s works were *per se* an appraisal of various aspects of Muslim life in the Indian subcontinent, some of which he criticised as un-Islamic and contradictory with the Islamic traditions and exhorted Muslims to get rid of. Furthermore, many historians admit the fact that what Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi abhorred most were those Hindu-inspired practices amongst his co-religionists which resulted from centuries-long cohabitation between the two communities, namely Muslim and Hindu.

It is crystal clear from what has been mentioned so far that Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi and his disciples, by opposing the integration of Islamic culture in the Indian cultural mainstream and urging the Muslim community to keep aloof from non-Muslims, and even non-Sunnis, adopted a traditional as well as rigidly doctrinal approach in reforming the Muslim community in India. Hence, in doing so, they, on the one hand, failed to see the benefits of Western education, an opportunity that Hindus were wise enough not to miss. The result of which was to be felt by the second half of the nineteenth century, when Muslims found themselves trailing far behind their Hindu fellow-countrymen.

On the other hand, Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi’s movement failed in his attempt to unite the whole Muslims of the subcontinent, notably those two major doctrinal factions, Sunnis and Shiites. Indeed, in spite of the fact that he managed to forge a strong bond of brotherhood between Sunni Muslims, he opened up a enormous gulf between the latter and their co-religionists, the Shiites (Powell 1993: 66). Powell summarises this drawback in Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi’s movement by saying that: “If bonds between Sunnis were ... considerably strengthened, Shah Waliy Allah’s writings tended, however, to the exacerbation of *sunni-shiite* theological difficulties” (1993: 66).

Be that as it may, for many historians it is taken for granted that Shah Waliy Allah Dehlavi’s pioneering endeavour to reform and revive the Muslim community in South Asia had a significant impact on later Muslim leaders. Indeed, he became a source of inspiration to later Muslim reformists, even to those whose ideas and thoughts were, at times, at loggerheads with his.

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“Fifty Islands That I Have Never Seen and Never Set Foot on”

On the Importance of Bronislaw Malinowski for Comparative Literature

Maja Nazaruk

Introduction

A thinker who infiltrated the discourse of (post-) modern literature, history, psychoanalysis, without failing to notice his numerous contributions to anthropological studies and *culturologie*, Bronislaw Malinowski – in the nostalgic drama in his insect-ridden tent in the heart of “savage” villages and primitive societies – has been a vociferously biting critic, “Oriental Father Figure” and cross-disciplinary mover and shaker. The author of this article wishes to advance common understanding of Bronislaw Malinowski in the context of literary studies.

Namely, it is my aim to demonstrate why Malinowski's writings merit to be co-opted into the literary corpus, an argument which strengthens similar echoes, constructed by Clifford Geertz (1988), Robert Thornton (1985), Andrzej Zawadzki (2001), Grażyna Kubica-Heller (2002), Harry C. Payne (1981), and others. We have unquestionably seen that his writing contains fragmentary literary as-

pects, *enretissés* with cultural lingo and much empirical and linguistic data; however, the importance of Bronislaw Malinowski for comparative literature has not been directly examined.

I am interested in showing that by telling us about the 50 islands, which we have never seen and never set foot on, Malinowski opened Pandora's box of questions for culture-driven inquiry and exploded society's armchair imagination, concerning ancestral roots of civilization.

In a second line of investigation, I will show thematically the issue areas which make Malinowski's writing very much in sync with debates in modern literature: these will concern thematic aspects in his writing (nostalgia, erotic, freedom, and civilization) as well as strictly literary culture study domains of analysis (reflexivity, rewriting of experience, hybridity, transtextuality, reference).

It will, hopefully, become clear that Malinowski's travels to the Trobriand Islands in 1914 have shaped the becoming (*devenir*) in the humanities and mirror the permanence of the very issues which concern and haunt modern comparative literature.

It is not clear how to accomplish this agenda, considering that Malinowski has been on a lonely endeavor appreciated only by a handful of anthropologists. While his work has been a rite of passage in academia in that it trespassed human boundaries of what is possible in research, Malinowski is a read for cross-disciplinary specialists in the field who combine fieldwork, analysis of identity, we-they cleavages, and subliminal interpretations of the subconscious.

Malinowski offers a corpus which is difficult for reading: his diary is chopped with short indicative statements, memories, and flashbacks, tension from his sensual and sexual position, arrogant culture-specific irritation at alterity¹. The writing is not cohesive and it is hardly “prose-writing,” although it meets the criteria of intimate writing with instinctual drives and self-projections. The diary is a travelogue and it would probably earn more currency in current blog-writing cultures than at the time of

1 The argument on the myth has been accomplished by Ivan Strenski (1987). He argued that the roots of Malinowski's myth-making can be traced to German idealism and the notion of *Lebensphilosophie*, which he preferred in comparison to the English culture with its “lack of enthusiasm, idealism, purpose” (1987). Germans had “purpose, possibly lousy ... but there is an élan, there is a sense of mission” (Malinowski 2002: 208). Strenski (1987) mentions in particular the concept of *lili'u* (myth-making leitmotif), which Malinowski had co-opted as a vehicle for his humanist and romantic project. The *lili'u* were important stories told in the circle of Trobriand society.