

Does that conclude that the unificationists have broken through the silence dilemma developed in this work? It is worth recalling Sarah Bertrand's pointedly formulated consideration that one can be silent while screaming loudly. Thus, since unification never came about, the answer seems to be an obvious 'no.' The unification movement had achieved at best a partial success: the Administering Authorities never intended to hold referenda in the territories. The petitioner's securitization of the "Most Secret" document played a pivotal role in compelling the Administering Authorities to acknowledge that without a referendum the General Assembly would vehemently oppose the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. But unificationists failed to ensure that the referenda would be held under the conditions they saw fit. However, the 1958 UN-supervised Legislative Assembly elections brought the unificationists back to electoral power. In this way, the petitioners not only contributed to French Togoland's accession to full independence outside the French Union, but also to the latter's disintegration.

Yet, after independence, the unification issue took on a new character as it was subsumed under the conflictual relations between the Nkrumah-government and the Olympio-government, which were increasingly hostile to each other. The latter's desire to preserve the newly won independence and the reluctance to form a Togo-Ghana union exemplifies that the demand for unification was ultimately (though not only, but certainly also) an argument to merely oust the colonial powers.

7.2.3 Sub-Question 3: The United Nations as an Audience of Securitisation

Was the United Nations able to bend the Administering Authorities under the influence of world opinion? As mentioned before, since Ewe and Togoland unification was not achieved and the destiny of French and British Togoland went separate ways, the obvious answer is 'no.'

The reason dates to the creation of the Trusteeship System. At the San Francisco and London negotiations, the future Administering Authorities would not have agreed to United Nations supervision without the power to limit it. The United Nations was forced to respect the sovereignty of its member states and without being given any real means of sanctions, the United Nations could do little to prevent the Administering Authorities from treating their trusteeship territories as they saw fit. To most member states it was clear that the Trusteeship System was voluntary and accepting a flawed Trusteeship System was better than none.

Thus, given the composition of the Trusteeship Council, an Administering Authority could for the most part rely on the solidarity of the other Administering Authorities. That is why in 1951 the Ewe and Togoland unificationists dragged their case before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly and increasingly resorted to a securitising language. Since the Trusteeship System was a window through which the General Assembly, and extension, world opinion could see whether the interests of the inhabitants of the trusteeship territories were not being violated (thus, representing the colonial powers' greater responsibility towards the inhabitants the other so-called Non-Self-Governing Territories), the colonial powers did their utmost to prevent the General Assembly from becoming a 'court of appeal.' Yet, before the Fourth Committee they were ultimately obliged to justify and account for their own attitudes and policies.

However, the Fourth Committee, and in extension, world opinion had negligible effect on the basic policy of France and Britain. Although the General Assembly formally had authority over the Trusteeship System, it lacked the necessary powers to satisfy the unificationists' demands. Under the aspects of securitisation analysis, the Fourth Committee did not represent the *relevant audience*, because it lacked the necessary powers. The only support the unificationists could expect from the Fourth Committee was a suggestion to the Trusteeship Council or the Administering Authority. When they declined to oblige, the General Assembly could only condemn the latter. Without serious sanction and accountability mechanisms, United Nations supervision was thereby effectively limited to observation.

Nevertheless, the General Assembly was not without influence. Only the General Assembly had the power to change and to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement and thus to determine the conditions under which it would occur. In a sense, this competence was the only sanctioning and accountability tool the General Assembly had.

In theory, the General Assembly would have been in a position that in return for the lifting of the Trusteeship Agreement, the four-unit formula recommended by the 1955 Visiting Mission must be applied for the 1956 referendum in British Togoland. Had the four-unit formula been applied, the majority Ewe-populated Ho and Kpando districts, considered one unit, would have separated from the Gold Coast, and remained under trusteeship. But the General Assembly would then have been faced with the problem that the administration of only these areas would have been even more impracticable. The British played their cards right and, in the end, the General Assembly's eventual rejection of the four-unit proposal sealed the future course of the Togo-Ghana border, which cut right through the heart of Eweland.

However, the clause that only the General Assembly has the power to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement caused the French a headache. The United Nations refused to supervise the 1956 referendum in French Togoland and consider the French Togoland Statute as grounds for terminating the Trusteeship Agreement. For the latter to be granted, the General Assembly demanded that the Legislative Assembly be re-elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. That is to say, the Fourth Committee ultimately exercised direct trusteeship functions, including the hearing of petitioners, deciding upon referenda (1956) and parliamentary election (1958), and sending its own Visiting Mission (1957). Thereby, the Fourth Committee bypassed the Trusteeship Council, reducing it to one of its own subsidiaries. In this way the trustees were not only accountable to themselves, that is, to the clique of Administering Authorities that constituted the Trusteeship Council.

On the other hand, this made future participation in the Trusteeship System increasingly unlikely: although, under the terms of the United Nations Charter, the Trusteeship System was open to the inclusion of further dependent territories, none other than the original eleven territories were ever included in the circle of trusteeship territories. Although most of the 72 so-called Non-Self-Governing Territories to which the Charter applied in 1946 have become independent anyway, 17 Non-Self-Governing Territories still remain under the purview of the Fourth Committee.

Yet, since constitutional reforms were introduced earlier in French Togoland than in other parts of French Africa, James Coleman surmises that the United Nations involve-

ment must have exerted some influence on the progressive development of the trusteeship territories. Here, the archives to which Coleman did not have access reveal that it would be premature to claim that reforms were induced by pressure from the United Nations or the Administering Authority's desire to satisfy its demands.

As Sylvanus Olympio remarked during his outburst before the Fourth Committee in 1952, constitutional progress in the Gold Coast was brought about by the Accra Riots. Thus, the pressure for reform came from considerations of threats to the British colonial order. In French Togoland, on the other hand, reforms came much more hesitantly. Rather, constitutional reform in the Gold Coast increased pressure on the regime in French Togoland, which felt compelled to enter the race of constitutional development to take the wind out of the unificationist sails.

7.2.4 General Conclusion

Thus, how have constructions of threat and (in)security influenced the decolonisation of Togoland? One could argue that the constructions of (in)security had a negligible impact because unification did not materialize and Togoland's path to independence would not have been drastically different if the unificationists had refrained from securitising their cause altogether.

However, the interweaving of the three previous answers indicates a more nuanced assessment, that is, the independence of Togoland, as a general example of decolonisation in Africa and as a particular case under international supervision, was indeed influenced by constructions of (in)security. It should not be overlooked that it took ten long years for the unificationists' failure to make itself evident – ten years in which constructions of (in)security guided the direction that the decolonisation of Togoland would take. No other movement from a trusteeship territory has dominated the agenda of the Trusteeship System as long and as intensely as the Ewe and Togoland unification movement.

What does this imply for peace and conflict studies? In comparative terms, the trusteeship territory of Togoland, where the transfer of state control occurred largely peacefully, is often likened to the trusteeship territory of Cameroon,⁵ where the transfer of power, however, was accompanied by violence.⁶ The claims that the political contexts of the two territories were completely different have already been rejected as unfounded.⁷ The present work indicates that a key difference lies in the fact that, other than the movements of the remaining trusteeship territories, the Ewe and Togoland unification movement pursued its strategy of intervening in international opinion at a very early stage and in a greatly capable manner. Yet, as evidenced by statements made at rallies, as well as various action plans, and the riots during Ghana's Independence Day, some elements of the unification movement did not completely reject the idea of using violence to achieve the long-sought objective of unification. Hence, the unification movement did not decide on a petition campaign because they were completely averse

5 Digre, "Ethnic Loyalties, National Choices, and International Oversight"

6 Ketzmerick, *Staat, Sicherheit und Gewalt in Kamerun*.

7 Michel, "The Independence of Togo," p. 317.