

Climate Crisis and the Political

How to Postpone the End of the World?

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Introduction

Rio Solimões
Rio Amazonas
Rio Tapajós
Rio Xingu
Rio Taquari
Rio Araguaia
Rio Tocantins
Rio Gurupi
Rio Parnaíba
Rio Tietê
Rio Uruguai
Rio Jacuí
Rio Jaguaribe
Rio São Francisco
Rio Jequitinhonha
Rio Doce¹

The current climate crisis is not an unavoidable natural phenomenon. It is, in fact, produced by human action and political processes. By political processes, I refer to the various articulations that derive from the conflicts and antagonistic views intrinsic to our shared existence in the social sphere. Every order in this world is an expression of power relations (Mouffe 2014, 15) and the result of temporary victories over conflicting perspectives. Consequently, the system that has led us to this critical state is deeply intertwined

1 This is a tribute to some Brazilian rivers, struggling to survive, some already devastated by pollution and environmental degradation. All essential for maintaining life. All alive, even if in a state of coma.

with these power dynamics. Recognizing this political dimension is essential for understanding the climate crisis and addressing the root causes of our situation. There are two points that are extremely relevant in this argument: first, the recognition of the political dimension of the climate crisis is a major step to discard technical and inefficient ›solutions‹ and to highlight the power relations behind the climate crisis; second, the political dimension reveals how the social sphere is in a perpetual state of change and dependent on (re)articulations and (re)constructions of our multiple forms of relationship – among humans and nature in general.

There are many ways to talk about the climate crisis. Here, I will engage with a discussion that traces back to political theory, but I will also resort to an indigenous Brazilian perspective to argue that the climate crisis is a result of political disputes, and that change is always possible when we are talking about the social sphere. The end of the world can be postponed with different political choices and different ontologies. The use of this assertion is connected to Ailton Krenak's book *Ideas to Postpone the End of the World* (2019). Originally, the ideas were presented in lectures given by the author. The provocation about postponing the end of the world alludes to the possibility of telling more than one story/history.² And, more importantly, it shows that the political choices that brought us here, were and are not the only path available.

Krenak is an indigenous Brazilian leader, academic, thinker, political activist, and representative of a larger indigenous community, the Krenak or Borum Uatu:

The life story of Ailton Krenak strongly intertwines with the broader history of the Indigenous movement in Brazil, particularly in their struggle for recognition and territory. He was born in 1954 in the region of the Rio Doce Valley in Minas Gerais. At a very young age, at only nine years old, he witnessed his people being taken from their original land and rights, forced into a truck and transported to a strange and unfamiliar territory. (Amaral 2012, 94)

The history of the Krenak people is intricately tied to that of the *Rio Doce*. From a colonial and capitalist perspective, nature can be commodified, polluted, used, discarded, or destroyed. In contrast, the Krenak view nature as family; for them, rivers are relatives. As Krenak (2019) notes, the *Rio Doce*, or *Watu*, is considered a grandfather by the Krenak, who have lived alongside this river for centuries. This relationship reflects a specific understanding of nature and the world, encompassing a distinct ontological perception that emphasizes care and respect for the environment.

There are various perspectives through which we can understand and engage with nature, each representing a different ontology. Ontology explores concepts of existence and reality, shaping how we perceive our relationship with the environment and how we attribute meaning. For instance, those involved in extractivist activities around the *Rio*

2 In Portuguese, the same word applies to both ›history‹ and ›story‹. Formal history, if such a thing exists, is simply distinguished by capitalizing the word as ›History‹. Considering the English conundrum, it is important to highlight that the indigenous movement in Brazil, of which Krenak is a part, takes on a different position on History while simultaneously sharing stories of their beliefs and experiences. The act of storytelling also means confronting the power relations that surround History. Story and history cannot be separated in this context.

Doce, such as corporations and governments, often view nature merely as a resource to exploit. In contrast, Indigenous ontologies like that of the Krenak emphasize interconnectedness and the intrinsic value of nature. Acknowledging these antagonistic views highlights the complexity of human-nature relationships and underscores the importance of recognizing differing ontologies as we seek to address the current climate crisis.

Moreover, our ontological assumptions shape our political decisions. To advance this discussion, I will focus on the insights of Chantal Mouffe (2005; 2014), who draws a clear distinction between ›politics‹ and ›the political‹. The former is closely tied to institutional practices, while the latter encompasses a broader scope, relating to how humanity attributes meaning to existence and relationships (therefore, it is about the ontological level). In Mouffe's terms:

By the political I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, while by politics I mean the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political. (2005, 9)

In essence, the political encompasses humanity's navigation of differences, conflicts, and opposing ideas – essentially, antagonism. Humanity has never been a homogenous group with uniform perspectives or approaches to the world. Instead, differences are inherent among social beings, evident in our diverse beliefs, interests, goals, and behaviors. The political dimension involves our perceptions and the meaning we attribute to the world, as well as our management of differing or conflicting viewpoints. When I suggest that the climate crisis is linked to the political sphere, I mean both our understanding of nature and our relationship with it. Furthermore, the climate crisis arises from political disputes regarding the treatment of nature.

Among the numerous conflicts that arise in the political realm, some points of view gain legitimacy and become hegemonic, thus holding power. This hegemonic order encompasses the prevailing social, political, and economic configuration that shapes our collective experiences and interactions. It reflects the dominant ideologies and practices that determine power distribution, resource allocation, and societal norms. Understanding this dynamic is essential for critically examining how certain perspectives maintain dominance over others within the political landscape. This process of hegemonization presupposes the universalization of one way to conceive the world, perpetuating a single ontology as the norm.

This process is evident in the ascendancy of a colonial and capitalist approach to nature, which took place gradually over centuries, fueled by countless conflicts – not only symbolic or discursive disputes, but also material battles that included genocidal strategies. Amidst these disputes, the norm that emerged results from a coordinated effort to universalize a particular narrative. For example, myths of civilization (associated with colonialism) and myths of development³ (linked to capitalism) were used to justify the occupation of indigenous territories as well as many other regions in the Global South.

3 See more in: Escobar 1995.

As argued by Felwine Sarr (2019, 20), ›development‹ has become one of the most powerful mythemes of our current era and established itself as an unquestionable norm of progress within human societies. Even though this mode of production and consumption driven by the idealized goal of infinite growth is a root cause for the apocalyptic scenario that is the current climate crisis, it remains largely unquestioned. Vandana Shiva (2016) critiques this situation by emphasizing that this type of development – referred by her as maldevelopment – not only exploits the planet's resources, but also undermines local ecosystems and cultures, further perpetuating inequality and ecological destruction.

This text suggests that understanding how the political realm is constituted through antagonism can help us recognize that not everyone participates equally in the destruction of the world. First, on a more subjective level, not everyone agrees with the current political and economic project; some hold counter-hegemonic and antagonistic views (towards development, for example). Second, on a more empirical level, this perspective illuminates the power dynamics arising from the hegemony of a political project, highlighting the differing responsibilities we bear in the present scenario, such as the disparities in carbon dioxide emissions⁴ among countries. By adopting this perspective, we can avoid falling into apathy and conformity in the face of the climate crisis, reminding ourselves that things could indeed be different. The objective here is to underscore the importance of the political dimension. By acknowledging that the social sphere requires meaning, as it is not something pre-determined or fixed, we recognize its openness, incompleteness, and contingency.⁵ This understanding can inspire us to envision and believe in the potential for change regarding the climate crisis.

The political: climate crisis and the need for change

There are numerous ways to argue why change is necessary regarding the climate crisis. Environmental movements as well as scholars from various fields, have been intensively advocating for this change since the 1970s. In terms of data, for example, reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change⁶ (IPCC) highlight the severity of the climate crisis. Despite this mounting evidence, there remains a pervasive sense of apathy surrounding the issue. Many individuals and institutions seem to dismiss or downplay the urgency required for action, resulting in a troubling disconnect between the available information and the necessary steps toward meaningful change. This complacency not only hinders solutions but also exacerbates the challenges we face, fueling the climate crisis in the face of inaction. Naomi Klein perceptively observed:

Climate change is like that; it's hard to keep it in your head for very long. We engage in this odd form of on-again-off-again ecological amnesia for perfectly rational

4 See more about disparities in carbon dioxide emissions in: Hickel, 2020.

5 To see more of this debate: Laclau 2011 [1996].

6 To see all the reports: <https://www.ipcc.ch/>.

reasons. We deny it because we fear that letting in the full reality of the crisis will change everything. And we are right. (Klein, 2014, 4)

Indeed, the climate crisis requires a fundamental paradigm shift because it is, in fact, connected to the entire social sphere: it involves how we organize our lives in terms of institutional politics, the economy and how we produce and consume, diplomatic conflicts, food habits, the reduction of the excessive trash, the way we treat animals, our means of transport, and more. Those who witness their homeland vanishing beneath rising sea levels in the Pacific cannot forget that climate change is an immediate threat. Yet, despite their lived experiences, they often lack a voice in the decision-making processes regarding these urgent issues.

The recognition of the complexity and relationality of the climate crisis can be crucial for understanding the extent of the required change, but equally important is rejecting the ›world‹ that brought us to this point. Change demands a level of rejection. John Holloway, in *Change the World Without Taking Power*, argues that we »need no promise of a happy ending to justify our rejection of a world we feel to be wrong. That is our starting point: rejection of a world that we feel to be wrong, negation of a world we feel to be negative. This is what we must cling to« (2002, 2). In the context of climate change, it is not only about a world that we feel to be wrong; it is about a world that we already have enough evidence to know that it is wrong. Isabelle Stengers (2015) highlights that while the process of creating another world may be extremely challenging, it would be suicidal to consider change impossible.

The plurality and diversity of perspectives enable us to speak of ›worlds‹ in the plural – not only in reference to the planet, but also as encompassing a vast array of meanings related to social existence. A singular understanding of ›the world‹ would imply an attempt to homogenize the social sphere, advocating for a uniform way of interacting with and understanding nature. However, this kind of uniformity is unattainable. There is no universally accepted system of values regarded as ›objectively‹ true by any society. For instance, even something as fundamental as the right to live is not a universal consensus. This right is often applied solely to human lives, neglecting the interests of the non-human and more-than-human world. Furthermore, exceptions are made in various countries to justify capital punishment, highlighting the lack of agreement on such basic principles.

What appears to be universal is but a particular discourse that has become hegemonic and accomplished the status of order⁷ through (re)articulations and (re)constructions around the political dimension. The universal is thus a representation of power relations. In *Agonística* (2014, 22) Mouffe explains how things could always have been different and how every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities:

Any order is always the expression of a particular configuration of power relations. What is at a given moment accepted as the ›natural‹ order, jointly with the common sense that accompanies it, is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices. It is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity that is exterior to the practices that

7 See also: Laclau 2011 [1996].

brought it into being. Every order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices that attempt to disarticulate it in an effort to install another form of hegemony.

Hegemonic practices are a way to create a momentary perception of universality. Hegemony is about power and control, demands a paved road with signs that highlight the way we should go, what we should do, and how we should behave or live. Not necessarily in a subtle way, because hegemonic practices, in many cases, resort to violence to establish an order and keep the road functional. This attempt of hegemonization, challenged by counter-hegemonic practices (that involve rejection, antagonism and conflicts), can be converted into an instrument to expand our abilities to make connections, to improve, and to change. Laclau argues that it is this very instability of the social order, characterized by a back and forth of hegemonic forces/practices, that forms the precondition for democratic systems and counteracts totalitarian tendencies: »This paves the way for an endless interaction between various perspectives and makes the possibility of any totalitarian dream even more distant« ([1996] 2011, 43).

How can these theoretical perspectives assist us in addressing the climate crisis? Why is it important to recognize its political dimension? This answer can be summarized in two points: 1) It can help to identify and eliminate a focus on purely technical solutions, while also highlighting the power relations behind the climate crisis; 2) it can catalyze and inspire change. To illustrate these points, we can look to how the international community has organized and positioned itself in the current scenario. The escalating climate crisis is forcing the international community to address questions of mitigation and adaptation.⁸ However, while mitigation and adaptation are essential and should not be overlooked – especially since the people who depend on these measures are often the most vulnerable to the climate crisis – the scope and pace of change remain severely constrained.

For example, one notable international solution to address the climate crisis is the energy transition concerned with the decarbonization of the economy and abandoning the use of fossil fuels. This transformation of the economy in order to achieve climate neutrality involves the adoption of new technologies that operate using renewable energy sources, as well as the reconfiguration of industrial hubs. An example is the growing production and deployment of electric or hybrid vehicles – which depend on a different set of natural resources. Among these is lithium, a fundamental component of rechargeable batteries, whose concentration of reserves is found, mostly, in Latin American territory in the so-called Lithium Triangle, which comprises Bolivia, Chile and Argentina and holds an approximate sum of 61.5% of world reserves (Musa 2022, 68). Fundamentally, mitigating the use of fossil fuels and adapting to new energy sources might end in exchanging one problem for another.

A more radical change could be brought about by questioning the ideology behind the alleged inevitability of cars and instead advocate for more sustainable modes of pub-

8 COP, or the Conference of the Parties, is an annual gathering of countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that discusses crucial strategies for climate change, including both mitigation measures and adaptation efforts.

lic transport. An even more drastic change could be inspired by the abandonment of widespread extractivism altogether.⁹ When talking about energy transition, it is necessary to be aware of the fact that technological innovations alone will not solve the ecological and civilizational crisis: »[I]n the absence of a fundamental and structural sociocultural transformation, technological and managerial innovation will not get us out of the crises« (Kothari et al. 2021, 45). It is necessary to confront the power relations that led to the current crisis in order to overcome it.

Historically, Latin America was forced into a position of commodity exporter and extractivism itself formed the structural basis of the global hegemony of capitalism. Especially in relation to the countries and territories of the Global South (given their richness in biodiversity), the North's geopolitical behavior was one of pillage and expropriation, which resulted in poverty, social conflicts and a series of ecological catastrophes. According to sociologist Maristella Svampa (2019, 26), the historical-structural dimension of extractivism is linked to the invention of Europe and the rise of capitalism through the process of conquering and colonizing other territories.

Extractivism is also an example of an economic strategy that has been normalized, even though it is causing harm to entire communities through pollution and environmental devastation. In the words of Svampa, Latin America

was reconfigured in the heat of the successive economic cycles imposed by the logic of capital, through the expansion of borders and goods – a reconfiguration that, at the local level, implied a great contrast between extraordinary profit and extreme poverty, as well as an enormous loss of human life and the degradation of territories, converted into areas of sacrifice. (2019, 26)

The extractive activity, therefore, perpetuates the colonial history and exposes the disposability of entire regions along with their human and non-human inhabitants. The unchecked extraction of natural resources causes the widespread destruction of local ecosystems and with them the biodiversity home to these landscapes. The complex and often unique ecosystems become mere commodities to be exploited for financial profit. This financialization of nature (Bruckmann 2016, 13), is accompanied by the expansion of multinational corporations and global companies. As Horácio Machado Araújo points out, »the rhythm and volume (which did not stop growing) of the flows of extracted, transported and processed minerals created the economic and political cartography of the colonial modernity in which we live« (2020, 33). This cartography is rooted in power dynamics and shapes the climate crisis, as it not only devastates the environment but also generates widespread pollution and poverty. But extractivism is only one facet of an ending world, it is one of the harbingers of the apocalypse.

In the context of the climate crisis, as previously mentioned, meaningful change will require a willingness to reject certain practices and identify what must be abandoned to ensure collective survival. Nancy Fraser (2020), when writing *The old is dying and the new cannot be born*, was in dialogue with the Gramscian idea of morbid symptoms – which

9 To read more about post-extractivism see: Acosta 2018.

deals with this interregnum between the old dying and the new yet to come. In a similar consideration about the end of a world, Gustavo Esteva points to a consensus that we would be at the end of a historical period, »but the identification of the corpse – what it turned out to be – is highly controversial« (2014, 145). In his list of suspects, the author includes development, neoliberalism, the American empire, capitalism, economic society and modernity (145). Anyhow, if we want to create something new, design better futures, change is a prerequisite, it is necessary to carry out a material and discursive displacement once moving with the accumulated baggage and towards desired futures. According to Ashish Kothari, »transitions can be messy and not entirely radical, but they can be considered ›alternatives‹ if they at least have the potential for change« (Kothari et al. 2021, 57).

It is the lack of a final fundament, the fact that we are part of a social sphere inherently political, that can make us sure that change is possible. Change is often imbricated in a transit process that causes fear, precisely because it is devoid of blunt certainties about its final outcome. The unpredictable and impromptu are part of the process. However, according to Alyne Costa, »the most important task of our time is to learn how to inhabit this world that we are about to lose« (2019, 21). It is imperative that actions related to the climate crisis promote a displacement of certainties about inhabiting (between being and living) this devastated world.

Considerations about the end of the world

When Krenak (2019, 27) talks¹⁰ about postponing the end of the world, he is addressing the possibility of always telling one more story. Stories, perhaps about a different world, sustain the possibility of change and of living. The rearticulation of political positions in relation to antagonisms not only involves a contest over existing narratives but also encompasses the capacity to envision and project new stories about the future. The act of telling one more story has a triple impact: 1) of literal survival by narration, as it demands that living subjects exercise the continuous act of telling one more story – which is synonymous of a continuous (re)construction of humanity; 2) creates protagonism, involving a subject or group that is expressing its voice – which can challenge or endorse the hegemonic system; 3) creates displacement, with a subject or group that is projecting a (new) narrative, attributing meaning (signifying), which will be part of a political spectrum and all its (re)articulations – therefore, a narrative that will be battling many others.

The idea of postponing the end of the world through storytelling is also about specifying which world is coming to an end, about identifying the ›corpse‹, as mentioned previously. Many worlds have already ended throughout history, as a quick review of the colonization process can demonstrate:

10 Krenak follows an oral tradition to share knowledge; all his books are, therefore, a result of spoken words and speeches.

A person who left Europe and landed on a tropical beach left a trail of death wherever he went. The individual did not know he was a walking plague, a bacteriological war in motion, an end of the world; nor did the victims who were infected know. For the people who received that visit and died, the end of the world was in the 16th century. (Krenak 2019, 71)

Not only have humans faced their world ending, but other animals have also experienced their own apocalypse, and many more are facing this risk of extinction right now. Today, in the 21st century, the world that is ending is marked by a specific form of failure that has been leading to the mass destruction of the planet Earth and its inhabitants. The world, which has been hegemonized and established as the prevailing order, is nearing its end. This world reflects a modern capitalist and colonial approach towards nature, which perpetuates a division between humanity and the natural world (Krenak, 2019). However, that does not mean that a different world or a plurality of worlds cannot be established in this process of collapse. We need different stories that shape our social sphere to imagine or redeem worlds that coexist in harmony with the planet Earth. We need to put an end to a story, a political approach, that naturalizes the death of entire worlds (which includes the genocide of entire populations).

We can resort to the history of the *Rio Doce*. Krenak (2019, 40) affirms that the *Rio Doce*, or *Watu*, is, for the Krenak people, a person, a grandfather, not a resource. The *Rio Doce* flows through two Brazilian states, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo, before reaching the Atlantic Ocean. In 2015, a dam collapsed, releasing a massive toxic mudflow into the river. Today, the river is highly polluted, compromising the entire ecosystem within and beyond its boundaries and affecting the lives of the surrounding communities, as is the case of the Krenak people. This dam was controlled by a mining company, *Samarco Mineração S.A.*, and it was built to store the waste generated by extractivist activities. Here, we can already see two conflicting or antagonistic views with a river in the middle: a) on one side, there are the Krenak people, for whom the river is regarded as family and deserving of care – it must be integrated into the community and preserved, as all lives depend on it; b) on the other, there is a company driven by extractivism, a perspective that considers it legit to turn a river into a dumping ground, a receptacle for the waste produced by mining.

The fact that the dam was built there symbolizes a momentary victory of the second approach; one that naturalizes destroying worlds. However, Krenak's perception highlights the existence of a contrasting view on how to live with the river, exposing a lack of consensus. This lack of consensus, or antagonism, can illustrate how there are different ways to signify nature and establish a relation. At the same time, it can add a new layer to the history of this river, an alternative narrative of how it has been treated for centuries by this indigenous community. Destruction was a path chosen by certain groups, not all of them. This may sound simple, but it actually carries the valuable potential for change as it comes from a completely different ontology. If there are differences, there is openness. If there are disputes, there is the possibility of different outcomes. The end of the world, or the death of a river, is not an inevitable fate. It is a political outcome if the path of commodification, exploitation, and destruction remains unchanged or hegemonic. As Vandana Shiva (2016, 9) argues, the ideology of development is largely based on a vision

of bringing all natural resources into the market economy to produce commodities. The market of commodities expands, but nature shrinks (5).

According to Arturo Escobar, »extractivist projects can be understood as strategies for the ontological occupation of territories, and therefore the struggles against them actually constitute ontological struggles« (2016, 20). This supports the previous argument: the Krenaks, but also the mining companies, are struggling over how to give meaning to the world, how to treat nature (including humans). It is worth noting Marisol de la Cadena's *Uncommoning Nature*, where she discussed the struggle to preserve territories, telling the story of an activist and her deep bond with nature: one relation which »woman-land-lagoon (or plants – rocks – soils – animals – lagoons – humans – creeks – canals!!!) emerge inherently together: an ecological entanglement needy of each other in such a way that pulling them apart would transform them into something else« (2015, 6). Meanwhile, Philippe Descola (2016), in his anthropological analyses of the Peruvian Amazon, documented that for the Achuar people, most beings in nature – including animals and plants – are believed to possess a soul akin to that of humans. Similar to Krenak's case, the river is part of their everyday life, but also of their identities – it is a context of mutual protection. The destruction of one means the annihilation of the other.

»The rivers, these beings that have always inhabited worlds in different forms, are the ones who suggest to me that if there is a future to be considered, that future is ancestral, because it has already been here« (Krenak, 2022, 11). With this assertion, Krenak provokes us to consider how indigenous knowledges, which have existed for centuries (ancestral knowledges), can assist us in addressing contemporary challenges, such as the climate crisis. In my interpretation of his work, the future is ancestral because it depends on the recognition of those knowledges. Postponing the end of the world is about bringing different worlds to the debate of the climate crisis. Postponing the end of the world is also about recognizing the political dimension (along with the notions of antagonism, disputes over signification, and hegemony) of the climate crisis.

The answer to postponing the end of the world, but also to fix those problems created by humanity, lies in the capacity for reinventing worlds, making worlds, but also on recognizing the worlds that were actively marginalized and oppressed along hegemonic practices, like the Krenaks. A counter-hegemonic movement aims at the decolonization of our imaginaries, allowing us to build a pluriverse – *un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos* – rather than a single world, as suggested by the Zapatista indigenous movement from Chiapas, Mexico, which envisions a world of many worlds (Escobar, 2016, 20). To find pluriversal paths (Kothari et. al., 2021) involves a repositioning of the political in the realms of human and non-human life.

Conclusion

This work is one among many attempts to alarm societies and advocate for urgent change to address the climate crisis. I will not uphold any pretensions of writing something completely new and revolutionary; this is a text craving for change. The effort mobilized here was to provide more arguments to affirm that change is not only possible but inevitable. Our social world is political and, therefore, contingent. Moreover, it is open to resignifi-

cations, especially in relation to our perception of nature. The challenge, for sure, is related to the power structure that traps humanity in a pattern of destruction of the planet Earth. We may be trapped, but there are cracks all over the structures – there is no hegemony that is bulletproof. Sometimes, a simple story could be the beginning of the fall of an empire, or, in this case, of an ontology. As addressed in the previous sections, it is not the first time that a world is ending; we just need to let the right one end in order to prolong the lives of many others.

When Krenak talks about postponing the end the world, he is not referring to this one in collapse: »This [world] has such a violent scheme that I wish it would disappear at midnight tonight and that tomorrow we would wake up in a new one« (2022, 40). The future depends on us looking back, recognizing the worlds that were left behind, killed, for this hegemony to exist. Throughout this process, antagonisms will be evident – between societies that treat a river as a grandfather while others turn a river in a dumping ground. Societies that can be conducted with a pluriversal logic, others that take extractivism as progress. These societies are not compatible; there is no middle way. This may appear extreme, but this is what the climate crisis demands: a radical change. The concept of an ancestral future helps assert that somehow this change can be achieved with practices and principles already found in humanity but necessarily put into dialogue with others.

Some concepts of political theory were mobilized to access how the current climate crisis derives from political outcomes, how the climate crisis is a political construct and consequence. It was delineated that recognizing the political dimension is fundamental to address the crisis. Which encompasses conflicts, antagonisms, and battles over the social sphere. The lack of consensus is actually positive because it shows that what we need is to learn how to deal with conflict. Antagonisms cannot disappear, but they must be used as a guide to a pluriversal world. As long as we are living in a world that tries to universalize the view of nature separate from humans, of nature as commodities, we are doomed to failure. And this failure does not carry the same weight for everyone on this planet. The most vulnerable populations are the ones already paying and suffering the consequences of the climate crisis. The struggle is to protect the planet Earth and to build a world of many worlds.¹¹

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11 See also: Cadena and Blaser 2018.

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