

## Conclusion

### I.

The twenty-first century is the century of a worldwide region-building and of a multipolar global order. It also is the century of globalization and therefore, as many analysts see it, of Americanization. It is the century of a return of cultural and religious identity into the sphere of public life and politics. Notwithstanding different definitions of region-building and regionalism, disparate degrees of regional integration and unequal approaches to supranationalism: The concept of the autarkic nation state, the Westphalian order of sovereignty and the age of unrelated political and societal processes in different parts of the world has come to an end.<sup>1</sup> Across the world, the states of the twenty-first century are experiencing the limits of their sovereignty and the gains of cooperative behavior. The main challenges of this age are beyond the ability of single states. To realize and exercise autarkic solutions does not work any more. Managing globalization, coping with the challenges of migration, of climate change or of the trends in world financial markets – these prime issues of our time require common approaches and actions of more than one state government. Managing the welfare state and coping with the social agenda of any country, generating sufficient resources to improve the life chances of all citizens, improving education systems and supporting the stability of families and the values they hand to the next generation, persecuting organized crime and dealing with the potential of aggression and violence in modern society – no national effort to cope with these matters can succeed without comparing one's own performance with that of others, without learning from others and without relying on mutual trust in managing the concrete issues stemming from each country's specific constellation together. Wherever trust and the will to cooperate are absent, it is rare that autarkic, seemingly sovereign decisions can work. The costs of cooperative actions may be high. The risks of non-cooperation can be even higher. Often, the gains of cooperation – or of region-building and the pooling of sovereignty – are not properly communicated to the citizenry. This mistake is not a unique European privilege. Suspicion and mistrust in the mechanism of regional interactions can be detected everywhere. Yet, this skepticism cannot deny the facts: Regional cooperation and integration have become global trends because the gains of region-building outweigh the costs of autonomous state sovereignty. The global trend reflects European

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<sup>1</sup> See Close, Paul, and Emiko Ohki-Close, *Supranationalism in the New World Order: Global Processes Reviewed*, Hounds Mills: Macmillan 1999.

regional integration. More often, European regional integration is echoed in region-building efforts elsewhere across the globe.<sup>2</sup>

No matter the exceptional role of the United States of America, its shining model of freedom for much of the world, its ever reinvigorating economic dynamic and welcoming community spirit, its cultural attraction and military power: The world order of the twenty-first century may be built around a certain American primacy, yet more than ever it is a world order of regions. Some of the regions of the world are economically stronger than others. Political power and the ability to manage one's own or regional affairs are distributed asymmetrically.

The age of globalization, especially the worldwide presence of new and instant means of communication, has made the concept of center and periphery rather porous. The age of globalization has also brought about the quest for cultural identity and recognition. Migration (and travels of all sorts) accelerates the encounter of cultures and religions, of traditions and values. Sometimes, this happens in confrontational ways. Often, it helps to enrich peoples' lives. The dialogue of cultures and civilizations is one of the most important, promising, yet difficult opportunities of the twenty-first century. The world-order of the twenty-first century combines intra-national and intra-societal, international and transnational realities. The monopoly of power is no longer defined purely by state actors, as the rise of modern terrorism – mainly in the name of a radical interpretation of political Islam – demonstrates. Yet, the nation states remain the pillars and central actors in the management of world-order. The supportive role of the United Nations and other global institutions will grow. So does their potential in generating elements of global governance. The UN needs the support of national governments and remains limited by their vetoing capacity. The world-order of the twenty-first century includes elements of cooperation and competition, and it will see stability and conflict. Achievement and stagnation will occur beside hope and fear. It will not end with the creation of a new man. No matter whether human beings visit Mars one day, or not, the world's destiny remains earth-bound as ever it has been.

The political order of the nineteenth century was defined by the European state system and it was dominated by Europe's conflicts and imperial competitions. In the nineteenth century, the United States had hardly been present in the considerations of European powers and it was linked to Europe mostly through the melancholic sentiments of European migrants who had fled hardship, poverty and conflicts in the Old World. At that time though, in Asia the United States behaved not very differently from the European powers, that is to say with military excursions in order to open ports and whole countries, project interests, punish local authorities or engage in outright colonial rule. Balance of power was hardly kept in more than loose balance. It failed to tame the radicalization of internal pressures and external dynamics that could no longer

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<sup>2</sup> See Koesler, Ariane, and Martin Zimmek (eds.), *Global Voices on Regional Integration*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 176, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2007.

be controlled by mechanisms of rationality and the experience of conflict. By the mid-twentieth century, totalitarian rule and a thirty years civil war ended in Europe's self-destruction. This was the end of Europe's status as the world's dominant continent.

World War II was a watershed. It forced Europe into a new beginning. The democratic countries of Western Europe began to recalibrate their internal resources and their inter-state relations. The founding of the European Economic Community was unprecedented. The division of Europe into democracies and communist dictatorships, dominated by an expansionist Soviet Union, convinced the United States to stay a European power. The US was ready to help Europe rehabilitate and then reconstruct democratic peace under America's security umbrella. Soviet totalitarianism held millions of Europeans hostage for decades and the Russians as well, bereaving them of almost a whole century. Ironically, the Soviet Union served as the external threat that helped to facilitate reconciliation among Western Europeans, to build a strong Atlantic civilization and to plant the seeds for the struggle for freedom among its own satellites. What had begun with the independence of Latin American republics in the nineteenth century escalated in the mid-twentieth century: Decolonization brought national sovereignty to more than half of the world's population, soon to be labeled the Third World. Following the imperial age, this first wave of globalization, and the global wars of the twentieth century, more than one hundred new countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific changed the world map. Later, globalization changed the world economy. World War II came to its final end only in 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, symbolizing freedom as the fall of the Bastille had done during the French Revolution in 1789.

European integration began in 1957 with the goal to promote reconciliation in Europe. Five decades later, it was going through the period of its Second Founding: Internal reconciliation, by and large, had been achieved. The European Union was reframing its constitution in order to reconnect its citizens with the institutions that had developed. The EU did so in order to prepare for a more comprehensive global role. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the European Union was established as a federation and a polity with increasing global contributions to free trade, stability projection and peace enforcement. European Union has been achieved, including a reasonable balance between its political institutions. But Europeans are still a rare species and ought to be "developed" in the decades ahead: This can only succeed through a better sense of ownership and a shared understanding of European citizenship as a civil duty exerting loyalty and commitment to the European Union.

These questions affect the internal legitimacy of European integration. But the answers given in this process of Europe's Second Founding are essential for the perception and reputation of the EU's global role. It is academic to discuss whether or not the European Union had developed into a regional power and should ever stay as such, or was to become a global power. The European Union is the indispensable

partner of the United States in the management of global affairs. It is highly abstract to debate whether or not the European Union should or should not become a super-power. Whether its leaders and citizens like it or not, the EU is increasingly challenged by global developments to take up worldwide responsibility. These processes generate, shape and reinforce the evolution of common European interests. The European Union likes to be portrayed as the world's benevolent power, but hard power will increasingly test the benevolence and competence of the EU. The projection of the EU's interests is a matter of internal coherence and competence, external effectiveness and the ability to influence norm-giving elsewhere. No matter whether or not the EU would wish to be only defined as a consequence of its actions (and non-actions), this self-centeredness is increasingly permeated by global realities: The EU has already been forced substantially to broaden its horizon and activities by an agenda (welcomed or not) that the future has brought (and will continue to bring) to its doorsteps. Important is the fact that the revamped European Union of the twenty-first century encounters the world as a new Europe: No longer a colonizing and imperial Europe, and no longer a divided Europe that exports its own conflicts elsewhere. Instead, it has become a Europe of partnership in pursuit of the promotion of stability, freedom, security and prosperity across the globe. At the same time, however, Europe's former civilization mission has been shaken by internal moral relativism. So far, Europe's Second Founding has been primarily one of consolidated institutionalism. The European Union claims to be a community of values. In abstract terms, this claim reflects the political aspiration of the EU. The notion of being a community of values does, however, not coincide with a consensual interpretation of the prime values and their meaning, the religious heritage of Europe and the role of religion in today's Europe.

It is indicative for the new global role of Europe: Europe's internal process of regional integration is finding sympathy and interest in many parts of the world that have been European colonies only one or two generations ago. Other regions strive to emulate European integration, and they do so in their own unique way. They cannot follow European experiences in a static way. Also for Europeans themselves, integration never followed a blueprint. Its first half century of development has been a period of trial and error, with detours, failures and success stories alike. Yet, European integration has become the only innovative contribution to political theory and practical order-building since World War II.

No matter Europe's norms, interests and goals, the European Union is explicitly promoting regional cooperation and regional integration across the world. This policy is an obvious discrepancy with most policy strategies of the United States: Although the US has promoted European integration and cooperation after World War II and although it has supported the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 as a mechanism of defense against communism in Asia, usually the US is not pro-actively supporting region-building. American concepts of regionalism

tend to differ from the European approach: while the US favor free trade, the EU favors institution-building. These objectives are not mutually exclusive. But they can lead to conflicting interests and policy strategies. None of these strategies, of course, can be criticized as neo-colonialism. But it is simply a matter of fact that the EU and the US are pursuing legitimate yet different economic, political and strategic interests in several third regions across the globe. But together, the EU and the US are the main actors in the management of world affairs.

## II.

All trends indicate that the world-order of the twenty-first century will be shaped and defined by several contingent factors. The outcome of the main factors is unpredictable for all those who believe in the open character of history and man. New and so far unexpected realities may completely reshape the global-order over the course of the next decades. For the time being, the following trends can be identified with reasonable certainty as being decisive for the evolution and outcome of the twenty-first century:

(1) Questions of cultural identity, recognition and faith have been moved to the center of the global intellectual debate and political arena. A resurgence of religion can be experienced around the world. It would be superficial to primarily understand this trend as represented by the threatening growth of Islamic fundamentalism. It is certainly the experience with radical and aggressive expressions of religiosity that they can easily transgress the sphere of violence and thus generate terror against innocent people. But it is insufficient to understand the culture of religion primarily through the lens of its excesses. The quest for identity, roots and recognition transcends human and societal interactions. This quest can lead with reason to religious interpretations of human life and society. It cannot be denied that religion has a public meaning. Religion cannot be eliminated from the public sphere without demonstrating authoritarian agnosticism and without provoking religious counter-reactions. The debate about the identity of Europe in the context of the constitution-building of the European Union centered on the meaning of Christianity for the traditions of Europe and, moreover, for the understanding and shaping of today's European Union. While the secularist notion of a clear division between the spheres of religion and politics dominated the debate, the claim for a public role of religion had never been heard that loud in Europe for decades. The insistence of the Christian churches to recognize the Christian view of man as the core of Europe's cultural identity does not contradict the largely secularized reality of many European societies. Religious creed and practiced faith are not only a matter of personal belief and certainly not a challenge for inter-religious peace. Religion – in Christian, Muslim and Jewish connotations alike – is also a challenge to the widely

spread libertarian cultural liberalism in the West. Cultural relativism tends to undermine authentic religiosity as a source of free societies. The quest for a new balance between liberalism and religion implies recalibrated reflections about the meaning of authority and freedom, progress and destiny. It is widely recognized that religious concepts of man introduce a dimension of humility and modesty into the sphere of politics. Defining the limits of politics can serve as a shield against authoritarian or even totalitarian aspirations.

Christianity has reconciled with Western democracy. This has been the result of centuries of accommodation and struggle. In the end, both Christianity and the modern concept of democracy have benefited. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are condemned by the authorities of all Christian churches in Europe. In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, following the Holocaust and the path of migration into Europe, Islam has become the biggest minority religion next to the dominant Christian faith. The debate about the possible development of a “Euro-Islam” has implications worldwide for the relationship between Islam and democracy, and also for the future relationship between Christians, Muslims and Jews across the Middle East. It remains central that the dialogue among religions and religious cultures around the globe will be based on respect and reciprocity. In many ways, this dialogue is the most important test case for global peace and human equilibrium. The resolution of the Middle East conflict remains at the center of all efforts to translate the inter-religious dialogue into a political reality.

(2) Demographic trends and migration patterns have gained prominence in the public debate in Europe. Both, of course, are world-wide phenomena with repercussions in Europe and elsewhere. Europe’s share of world population has shrunk from 20 to 7 percent in the course of one century. Moreover: The aging of the European population does not correspond to trends in most other parts of the world. In light of reduced birth rates, the population in several European countries has begun to shrink (Germany, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), while only Cyprus and Ireland can claim net growth rates of their population. The population of most of the non-European regions in the world is still growing, and it is increasingly younger than in Europe. This holds also true for the United States. Europe’s population is likely to fall by almost a fifth until 2050 while at the same time the number of people in retirement compared with those in jobs will double from 24 percent (2008) to almost 50 percent. The effect of this dependency ratio – with fewer people in work supporting more people out of work – has economic and cultural implications that are of a reverse nature in practically all other regions in the world.

Europe has changed from being a country of emigration into a country of immigration. On a global scale, immigration and emigration coexist with different implications for sender and recipient countries. Migration pattern of a new nature have become a worldwide phenomenon. Two characteristics feature prominently: a) Migration driven by social and political pressure originates most notably from Russia,

Africa and Latin America; more migration due to climate change and the search for a new habitat is already evident in several parts of the world; b) Migration of young and creative people drawn by the attraction of North America or Europe exists across the globe. Migration has human, social, cultural, economic and political implications.

The immediate effects of both types of migration require a wide range of “integration” responses, including the promotion of language skills, the acceptance of cultural and legal patterns, and a host of religious connotations. The management of migration must take into consideration the needs of the countries of origin. It is not rare that the most qualified migrants are much needed in their home country. Yet, they look for better options elsewhere. Especially poor countries can suffer heavy losses from this brain-drain. A balance has to be found between the life chances of the individual and the social needs of each home society. A competent and flexible management of migration must be found that can generate win-win-situations for all.

(3) Globalization has become *the buzz-word* of our age. Time and space have not changed but the human understanding of time and space has changed. Instant communication, many forms of global economic interdependence, activities in world financial markets and the effects of technological discoveries on many spheres of life, including health care and medicine, have brought the globe closer together. It is telling that as a consequence of the de-freezing of the Arctic circle and thus the possible free passage through the Bering Sea, the North Pole and access to its natural resources has been included on the agenda of globalization. Globalization has accelerated the speed of human interactions. But this trend has also created a huge gap between those who partake in globalization processes and those who do not or cannot participate. The term “internet-divide” has significance. In the meantime, the opportunities and implications of globalization are present in all regions and continents of the world. They help to cope with problems of “periphery” (such as weather forecasts and hurricane warnings in remote ocean areas). They enhance the dependency of life chances and, partially, of job opportunities. Both in the European Union and in the US, the implications of globalization are experienced as opportunity and as problem. Whenever the European Union contemplates a “European Social Model,” the EU cannot deny vast differences between several social models that exist in Europe. Beside, different EU member states have different perceptions of globalization and the opportunities for them. While the EU is confronted with growing challenges of demography and competitiveness, both the EU and the US are the global leaders in generating technological innovation and social dynamics in order to enter new spheres of globalization. Among the Atlantic partners, this will happen as a continuous interplay of competition and cooperation. Both will activate the most creative potential in their societies without a dangerous backlash as long as the results of their developments will help the neglected regions of the world to also actively get involved in the global market economy and in the age of globalization.

As for the social implications of globalization, it is not enough for Europe to take refuge in abstract contemplations about the superiority of a “European Social Model” that hardly exists. The EU and the US need to guide the global quest for an ethical underpinning of successful globalization, including the revitalization of family values and structures. Family values and family structures are of central importance in order to provide children with the necessary moral compass and spine to cope with the challenges of individualism and the permanent discovery of new frontiers that are inherent in the age of globalization. Being rooted in a strong personality is the human precondition to come to terms with ever changing and globalized environments.

(4) The European Union and the United States are increasingly challenged by new rising powers, especially China and India. Between 1500 and 1800, China and India represented 50 percent of world trade. In the age of colonialism and due to the internal struggles in China, their share went down significantly, representing less than 8 percent combined by mid-twentieth century. In the meantime, China and India have regained a share in the world economy of around 20 percent. They will not rest until their vast populations can fully participate in the benefits of the globalized world and its possible levels of affluence and security. For the European Union, the rise of new superpowers poses as many challenges and opportunities as for the US. This is, however, more than a bilateral question. It affects the geopolitical reconfiguration of regional and world affairs.

Although the US and the EU are pursuing a steady policy of engagement vis-à-vis China, in many details they follow different strategies and certainly different tactics. This does not only relate to their cooperation with China, but also to their dealings with the overall geopolitical region of the rising China, including the unresolved partition of the Korean peninsula, the fragility of the balance of power system in Northeast Asia and the absence of regional cooperation, let alone integration in that region. The US favors a system a functioning balance of power in East Asia while the EU promotes multilateralism and regional cooperation. This can lead to new rivalry between the US and the EU, but it can also destabilize the smooth evolution of a genuine Northeast Asian order. It is unclear, how far China would be willing to recognize both the US and the EU as “East Asian powers.” It is also unclear, whether or not the US would appreciate the EU as an “Asian power.” Moreover, it is unclear, whether or not the EU will want to become an “Asian power,” an ultimate precondition if it truly wants to acquire world power status.

As for India, the EU and the US are only in the early stages to recognize and respect the true potential and rising relevance of this great nation. Its diversity equals that of the EU, its democratic traditions are impressive, all the more so in light of the enormous social and cultural pressures inside India. The emergence of a second Asian power has ramifications beyond the region. The power ambitions of Iran, for instance, are, at least indirectly, protected by China and India through their engagement in Iran. Energy

supply and access to other natural resources is of essential importance for the rising Asian powers. More than anything else, these preconditions for the rise to global primacy define China's and India's geopolitical interests. The implications for their internal social and political cohesion are not less relevant than their regional posture and global pursuit of interests. The rise of China and India is a clear indication of the reality of a multipolar world. Matters of global relevance, most notably climate change, human rights, global trade issues or the fight against cyber-crime have become much more difficult to be handled for the West on its own terms. New tensions and potential realignments between states, regions and groupings of states are likely.

(5) The challenge of failed or failing states and new forms of threats are also posing a set of concerns that cannot be resolved by simply resorting to the traditional stereotypes of state sovereignty. Terrorism has introduced the phenomenon of asymmetric warfare. Cyber-crime is increasingly understood as a new form of aggression, potentially with as many casualties as the detonation of a huge bomb in a city center. Since the end of the Cold War, the management of failed and failing states has become a continuous concern for the global community. Paradoxically, the Cold War divisions entailed stability and predictability. These are no longer inherent in the nature and performance of states with weak governments that have given up on the imposition of a monopoly of power. Pakistan has turned into a special country of concern, while Iraq and Afghanistan have been at the center of global attention for most of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The world is torn in its perception of Russia. The peaceful and stable management of the decline of Russia from a threatening super-power with an aggressive ideology to a matter of concern because of Russia's poverty and fragile political culture has been replaced by a new authoritarianism in Russian politics, coupled with a rising self-assertiveness of the country's elite. Whether these are indications of a failed state or in turn indications of a renewed neo-authoritarian claim to world power status is debatable. Yet, Russia holds substantial amounts of natural resources, especially energy resources.

Finally, the EU and the US cannot escape the fact that incomplete globalization does "strike back" and forces the leading economies in the world to better support the majority of the world in its quest for inclusion in the promises of modern affluence and life's opportunities. In particular, the EU and the US will have to "rediscover" the African continent and its development potential as test-case of their moral credibility and political long-term wisdom. The migration pressure Africa is beginning to exert on Europe is an indication of trends to come. In combination with the weakness of many Arab states - who at the same time are controlling energy resources that are essential for Europe - the issue has socio-economic and geopolitical implications that go beyond the traditional agenda of development and culture. The growing presence of China in Africa demonstrates the emergence of new constellations and possibly alliances that presage a new world-order no longer monopolized by the West.

### III.

The first wave of globalization in modern history had been initiated by an imperial Europe, followed by an imperial United States. The globalization of the twenty-first century has been initiated by a technologically creative and economically dynamic US, followed by a transformed Europe. Both the US and the EU are bound to manage globalization and to order a world that is enormously asymmetric as far as resources and affluence, freedom and stability, governance and interests are concerned. They can succeed only jointly in pursuing policies of cooperation and gradual inclusion. They continuously need to project their will to stop any force that threatens to undermine the stable evolution of globalization.

Globalization cannot remain an American and European privilege, at best shared with the dynamic societies of Northeast Asia. In its origin, globalization is culturally neutral and primarily a set of technological achievements that redefines our perception of space and time by linking the world as never before. But globalization has obvious effects beyond its original scheme or purpose. It therefore requires stable family structures and other sociological layers everywhere in the world in order to balance the technological dynamics in a way palatable to the human psyche. It requires a form of governance that provides the freedom and breathing space for cultural and religious plurality, technological innovation, economic dynamics and social upward mobility. Global governance has to focus on education and it has to assure the demographic future of each society that projects its purpose beyond the consumption desires of the living. It must respect cultural diversity. Modes of life and work have to be developed that protect the cultural traditions, identities and loyalties of those who are afraid of losing them to a homogenized global culture of entertainment and lifestyle. Technological and economic globalization also calls for a political framework that outlines the norms of conduct for financial, economic and regulatory norms of all sorts. In the end, globalization cannot be complete without global governance. Global governance cannot become sustainable ever if it will not include all societies, countries and regions of the world. To this end, globalization will have to promote a sincere global dialogue among cultures and religions that moves beyond the rhetorical commitment to tolerance. The architects and managers of globalization need to promote a better understanding of the inherent values, practices and rites of cultures and the spiritual creed of religions, including their differences and how to cope with them.

Against this background, European integration appears to be nothing less than anticipated globalization in one region. It provides stability to the world and no longer fear or threat. In its Second Founding, the European Union is reconnecting its original idea with its own citizens and its growing potential with the world at large. Together, the European Union and the United States form the Western circle of stability, in which the highest degree of interactions among two regions in the world takes place. It must

be in their interest to project the stability and dynamics of the Atlantic Community beyond their own shores. The EU and the US must favor and actively promote the creation of further circles of freedom, stability and global management. This is the intrinsic implication of the logic of globalization if it is to generate globally with sustainable success. The concentric circles of global governance consist of transnational, intergovernmental, and transgovernmental elements. They also consist of bilateral, multilateral, regional and interregional constellations. The goal of a transformed world is not global harmonization, and certainly not a global government. But surely it must promote global management. Geographical and topical aspects define the multiple layers of global governance in a world of regions and even of continental sub-regions. All indicators in the early twenty-first century point to a continuation of this trend. The United Nations and the World Trade Organization are its most visible expressions. The important work of UNESCO, FAO or WHO, of UNHCR, UNDP and other agencies of the global community should not be underestimated. Non-governmental organizations also contribute to the emergence of a “global consciousness.” They all strive for a world in which the successful transformation that has occurred in Europe during the past fifty years can be emulated and multiplied in appropriate ways and through indigenous means.

The European Union contributes to the theoretical and practical redefinition of sovereignty. It has transformed the monopoly of state sovereignty, and it is involved in Europeanizing the notion of popular sovereignty. Along with its global partners and supported by region-building trends in other parts of the world, the European Union is contributing to global governance. As the twenty-first century is unfolding, sustainable human development across the globe is the ultimate test case by which to measure the success of European integration. European integration has started to give the concept of human dignity back to Europe. In the further course of the twenty-first century, European integration must be in the service of human dignity worldwide. Contributing to a world with a more human face, in which the dignity of each human being is valued and cherished, protected and supported, signifies nothing less than the final act of the transformation of Europe from a continent of aggression and division to a world partner in the service of humankind. Unity in diversity could become the motto for such a world in which the European Union is appreciated as an indispensable and reliable partner in global leadership.