

this rejection ground through the amendment of claims,¹⁸³ he may only obtain his exclusivity for the claims directed to 10 individual embodiments out of at most 100 times compounds in the extreme, because of the same reason as above. Assume that there were only 3 individual embodiments in the priority application – it is a very typical case in which the applicant prepares more embodiments during a 12 month period –, can even 10 individual embodiments enjoy the claiming of priority?

It would be interesting to see whether the Federal Court of Justice will uniformly apply this concept of disclosure in terms of novelty to other areas of disclosure, and if not, to what extent it would do so.

4. Conclusion

It is acknowledged that determination of the patentability of selection inventions is a more difficult issue,¹⁸⁴ and is considered case by case, specifically different from other inventions.¹⁸⁵

The *Olanzapine* and the *Escitalopram* decisions lowered the bar for patentability, especially for the novelty requirement with respect to selection inventions. On the one hand, it is understood that society wants to motivate companies to research these areas, and thus more selection inventions become available. However, on the other hand, it is hard to find a justification for the fact that selection inventions are treated differently from basic inventions.

Floyd J said in the *Olanzapine* decision that the above discussed extension of the exclusivity term could not alter the principles to be applied when deciding whether the patent's teaching was novel or non-obvious over the basic patent.¹⁸⁶ In his opinion, this situation should not be treated differently from when the basic patent is owned by a party other than the patentee, or when the prior part is not a patent document.¹⁸⁷ It may be difficult to understand why the same reasoning should not be applied to the treatment of selection inventions and basic inventions. The possible impact of this enablement requirement, i.e. a possible extension of exclusivity, will be considered in further depth in IV.C.

183 See e.g., Heiko Sendrowski, “*Olanzapine*” – eine Offenbarung? (*Olanzapine* – a disclosure?) GRUR 797, 801 (2009).

184 Chisum, *supra* note 106, at § 3.02[2][b].

185 See also MPEP *supra* note 157, § 2131.03 (When the prior art discloses a range which touches, overlaps or is within the claimed range, but no specific examples falling within the claimed range are disclosed, a case by case determination must be made as to anticipation).

186 See Dr Reddy's Lab, Patent Court, *supra* note 86.

187 *Id.*

B. Obviousness

As stated in the statutes, the invention should not be obvious to the person skilled in the art. The concept of the person skilled in the art is important to determine obviousness. He is a hypothetical person and has a level of skill which is determined within the art in general but which does not specifically match the level of skill of the inventors.¹⁸⁸

In determining obviousness, the U.S. patent system uses a special procedural tool called ‘*prima facie* obviousness’. Namely, once it is established, the burden of proof is shifted to the applicant, and he could overcome this rejection ground by rebutting.¹⁸⁹ Not all other jurisdictions use this concept; however, it is used as a basis to discuss relevant issues of obviousness of selection inventions below.

1. Prima Facie Obviousness

a) *Size of the Genus*

It is well established that a genus not explicitly disclosing a later species does not anticipate the later species claim.¹⁹⁰ In addition, the mere fact that the claimed compound in the later invention is covered by the prior art generic formula is in itself not yet regarded as rendering the claimed compound obvious over the prior art.¹⁹¹ However, in general, if the genus or generic formula in the prior art discloses only a small number of substituents, it is more likely that the species from the genus would be found obvious, specifically *prima facie* obvious.¹⁹² The opposite situation is also true.¹⁹³ In other words, the chance that a selection of a species is not obvious

188 See e.g., Spenner, *supra* note 116, at 483.

189 See Darrow, *supra* note 124, para 44.

190 See Chisum, *supra* note 106, at § 3.02[2][b]; see also *Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings*, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367-71 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a prior art reference that discloses a genus still does not inherently disclose all species within that broad category); See also Meier-Beck, *supra* note 60, at 985.

191 See *In re Jones*, 958 F.2d 347, 350, (Fed.Cir.1992) (holding that the fact that a claimed compound may be encompassed by a disclosed generic formula does not by itself render that compound obvious); see also, e.g., *In re Baird*, 16 F.3d, 383 (holding that three claimed compounds out of a prior art genus containing more than 100 million species would be found as non-obvious).

192 See Jerome Rosenstock, *The Law of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Invention*, Patent and Nonpatent Protection § 8.02[D] (2d ed. Supp. 2008). This would be more the case under the U.S. practice, so-called ‘finite obvious-to-try argument’; but see also Darrow, *supra* note 124, para 26 (2007) (However, it is not clear how many species must be included in the prior art genus to make the claimed species non-obvious, and the case law has not provided enough data points regarding this issue).

193 *Id.*