

as the “management of unease.”¹⁰⁶ As a prime example, the Paris School draws on the insecuritisation of the migrant, who is made visible as the Other.¹⁰⁷ Drawing from Foucault, Bigo takes fault that the “form of governmentality of postmodern societies is not a panopticon in which global surveillance is placed upon the shoulders of everybody, but a form of ban-opticon in which the technologies of surveillance sort out who needs to be under surveillance and who is free of surveillance, because of his profile.”¹⁰⁸

For the Paris School, internal security agencies such as police, border guards or customs increasingly identify threats beyond state borders, not least through discourse on criminal networks (made up of migrants, asylum seekers, diaspora communities and, not least, Muslims with alleged links to terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational organised crime). Discussing responses of Western border control agencies, Didier Bigo holds that securitisation and liberalism are in fact the same process, whereby the humanitarian discourse “is itself a by-product of the securitization process.”¹⁰⁹ The resulting convergence of the internal and external gives rise to “transversal threats” that make borders more fluid. Bigo uses the image of the Möbius strip for this purpose: “Inside and outside no longer have clear meanings for the professionals of threat management. A Möbius ribbon has replaced the traditional certainty of boundaries. It destabilizes the figures of threat as well as the borders of activities between the institutions.”¹¹⁰

3.3 Research Perspective

Noting that, on the one hand, security must be thought of as a mode of communication, that facilitates issues to be placed on the agenda as security problems, and, on the other hand, as a non-discursive, performative practice of security professionals, the study applies a post-colonially informed reading of the Copenhagen and Paris School. In doing so, the study takes special note of Ruzicka’s contention that securitisation is under-theorised because it suffers from a case-selection bias favouring successful securitisations, powerful actors, and facilitating contextual conditions.¹¹¹ However, as Ruzicka notes, it is equally important to think about failed securitisation, subaltern actors, and *hindering* contextual conditions.¹¹² To do justice to this contention, the analysis primarily turns to Bertrand’s postcolonial reading of the Copenhagen School, that is, *locutionary*, *illocutionary*, and *perlocutionary silencing*, to render visible petitioners’ securitisation efforts in the state-building process at play under the Trusteeship System. The three mechanisms will be illustrated by showing how:

¹⁰⁶ Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” p. 64.

¹⁰⁷ Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” p. 81.

¹⁰⁸ Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” p. 82.

¹⁰⁹ Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” p. 79.

¹¹⁰ Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” p. 76.

¹¹¹ Ruzicka, “Failed Securitization”

¹¹² Ruzicka, “Failed Securitization,” p. 373.

- a) the Administering Authorities tried to limit the scope of acceptance and consideration of petitions via the constant adjustment of the rules of procedure and resorted to repressive measures in the trusteeship territories themselves (*locutionary silencing*),
- b) the Administering Authorities were unwilling to consider the petitioners' securitisation moves / refused to implement General Assembly recommendations and presented their own counter-securitising views (*illocutionary frustration*), and
- c) the discursive construction of the Administering Authorities and mandated peoples inscribed into the Trusteeship System disabled the petitioners' securitisation moves before United Nations venues (*illocutionary disablement*).

Equally, the Paris School finds its way into the analysis. Although for the Paris School, the trans-nationalisation of the security field began only in 1990 through the increasing interaction of different security professionals in the border region, it will be shown here that the European nation states and imperial states did cooperate in the field of colonial security. A particular focus will be placed on the security architecture and practices of the trusteeship administration, such as that of the Special Branch. With reference to the last, that is, aspects of colonial policing and the system of intelligence agencies that collected a wide range of information about the inhabitants, Foucauldian security policy posits that colonies like Togoland were essentially turned into panopticons. In the analysis, agency as well as the performative dimension, symbolic power, or social capital of security actors are important, as was contextual mobilisation. The empirical chapters show for example how colonial powers created contexts and structures that did not provide a level playing field for anti-colonial actors.

In conclusion, this study will utilize the Copenhagen School to analyse expressions of (anti-)colonial fears and threat constructions in the foreground – before the global audience, involving entities such as the Trusteeship Council or the UN General Assembly. Simultaneously, it will turn to the Paris School to contrast these foreground expressions with those articulated in the background, specifically within the colonial administration and ministries, occurring away from the public eye.

