

Scott T. Farrington [ed.]

Enthousiasmos

Essays in Ancient Philosophy,
History, and Literature

Festschrift for Eckart Schütrumpf
on his 80th Birthday



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
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Introduction

διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνῃ περουῖται ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις αἰεὶ ἐστὶν μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεὸς ἐστὶν. τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, τελέους αἰεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται· ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θεῷ γιγνόμενος, νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθεν τοὺς πολλούς. Ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας — ἣν ὅταν τὸ τῇδὲ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμνησκόμενος, περῶται τε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δέ, ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος— ὡς ἄρα αὕτη πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων τῷ τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μανίας ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστὴς καλεῖται.

Plato, *Phaedrus* 249c3-e4¹

And therefore, it is just that the mind of the philosopher alone has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things the communion with which causes a god to be divine. Now a man who employs such memories rightly is always being initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly perfect; but since he separates himself from human interests and turns his attention toward the divine, he is rebuked by the vulgar, who consider him mad and do not know that he has a god in him. All my discourse so far has been about the fourth kind of madness, which causes him to be regarded as mad, who, when he sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and neglects the things below. My discourse has shown that this is, of all divine ecstasies, the best and of the highest origin to him who

1 The text of the *Phaedrus* is taken from Burnet, J. 1967 (1901). *Platonis opera*. Vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

has it or who shares in it, and he who loves the beautiful, partaking in this madness, is called a lover.²

This epigraph, Socrates' description of the best kind of divinely inspired madness, provides the title of this collection, presented to Eckart Schütrumpf on the occasion of his 80th birthday, because it evokes the enthusiasm Eckart has displayed for his scholarship and teaching over the course of his distinguished career. Those who have worked and studied with him have had the pleasure of experiencing that enthusiasm first hand.

The essays presented here reflect Eckart's interests in Greek political theory, philosophy, literature, history, and literary criticism.

Bernd Manuwald, in "How to find Socrates' Views in Plato's *Protagoras*?" considers interpretive problems of the *Protagoras*, particularly the difficulties of determining the extent to which the utterances of the Platonic Socrates transmit his doctrine. Based on textual analysis, Manuwald determines criteria for systematically identifying and compiling the beliefs of the Platonic Socrates in this dialogue. Starting with an analysis of two recent interpretations of Protagoras' Great Speech to illustrate the variety of current interpretations, Manuwald illustrates the pitfalls of interpreting an aporetic dialogue without identifying the relevant and necessary material, methods, and doctrines that the author of the dialogue employs and which may not be explicitly given in any particular dialogue under investigation.

Tiziano Dorandi, in "Una redazione della *Repubblica* di Platone in sei libri?" explores the issue of the possible drafting and revision of Plato's *Republic*. Beginning with an analysis of the contrasting views of Tarrant and Sedley, Dorandi argues that Plato likely did not divide the work into books himself. Furthermore, the work was likely edited differently by various early audiences. Nevertheless, it is clear that Plato conceived of the work as a unified whole that was to be read as a single, continuous conversation.

Francisco L. Lisi, in "Justice in the Ninth Book of Plato's *Laws* and in the Fifth Book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*" considers Aristotle's theory of justice and the context in which it arose. Lisi proposes a common ground between Peripatetic and Academic concepts of justice. Building on Eckart's arguments regarding the projection of modern concepts onto Aristotle's thought in his 2017 publication, "An Overdose of Justice, or the Chimera of Alleged 'Distributive Justice,'" Lisi argues that justice is the necessary premise for the actualization of both human nature and individual interests. Thusly, Aristotle provides a new foundation to the Socratic-Platonic identification between justice and lawfulness and makes the Platonic value of general justice a substantial part of his theory.

2 Adapted from Fowler, H. N. 1914. *Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sabine Föllinger, in “Aristoteles’ Pragmatien als Literatur” provides an examination of the nature of Aristotelian texts, particularly whether his texts originated as lecture notes or were intended for publication and circulation. Building on the arguments in Eckart’s 1989 *Philologus* article, “Form und Stil aristotelischer Pragmatien,” she undertakes an analysis of individual works to provide insights into the position of Aristotle’s treatises in the scientific discourse of the 4th century. Föllinger adds to these earlier studies the more recent observations of a current Marburg project and argues that a comprehensive investigation of Aristotle’s texts must take into account their ‘literary’ idiosyncrasies.

Dorothea Frede, in “*Scholê* and *Eudaimonia* in Aristotle” concentrates on difficulties related to the final two chapters of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in particular, on the questions raised by Aristotle’s “apotheosis” of the theoretical life and its implications for the philosophy of human affairs. By focusing on the sense in which Aristotle employs the terms *σχολή* and *ἀσχολία*, and by confronting the arguments of the commentators—including Eckart’s comments on book 8 of the *Politics*—Frede argues that Aristotle never intended to suggest that philosophers should live in isolation from their cities. Rather, experience in human affairs is essential for the proper education of legislators who help develop the ideal city.

William W. Fortenbaugh, in “Aristotle on Care and Concern” presents a study of Aristotle’s division of the soul into “logical” and “alogical” parts. Fortenbaugh argues that Aristotle recognizes a twofold division of the logical part into a scientific part, which considers things that do not admit change and a calculative part, which considers things that do. In particular, he examines the role *ἐπιμέλεια*, or care and concern, plays in this division and the consequences of that concept for the contemplative life. Fortenbaugh concludes that the prominence of the concept of care and concern in Aristotle’s discussion of social relations reveals his recognition of its importance in human interaction.

Giovanni Giorgini, in “Aristotle on the Best Form of Government” turns to the question of Aristotle’s views on the best form of government and how his ideas on good government interact with historical reality. Beginning with Aristotle’s assertion that the best government allows humans to flourish and develop fully and in which the good person and the good citizen coincide, Giorgini argues that Aristotle argues sincerely that kingship is best, but only when the king is extraordinarily virtuous, an opinion he shares with Plato. Nevertheless, Aristotle distinguishes himself from Plato by considering practical wisdom the proper virtue for the best ruler and by allowing real world circumstance to play a role in his definition of the best government.

Michele Curnis, in “Studying Aristotle’s *Politics* in the 15th Century: Summaries and Anthologies in the Greek Manuscripts” presents several new critical editions of manuscripts that contain quotations, summaries, definitions, and textual *excerpta* that preserve text from Aristotle’s *Politics*. Curnis presents some previously unpublished manuscripts that differ from those that contain the complete text of *Politics*. He argues that the selections preserved in such “anthological literature” reflect the main interests of the readers of the time and illustrate how these interests are connected with the history of the text. Given the relative scarcity of manuscripts of the *Politics*, readers who desired to recover Aristotle’s Greek had to limit themselves to these kinds of *florilegia*.

Klaus Meister, in “Der Feldzug des Xerxes 480/479 und die Sizilische Expedition der Athener 415-413 v. Chr.: Persischer und athenischer „Imperialismus“ bei Herodot und Thukydides,” considers the question of Thucydides’ possible dependence on Herodotus, in particular concerning the problem of Athenian and Persian imperialism, as manifested in Athenian policy towards Sicily and in the campaign of Xerxes against Greece. Meister reconsiders the correspondences between the two authors as defined by K. Raaflaub and offers a significant number of new correspondences of his own. Ultimately, he rejects Raaflaub’s thesis and concludes that, despite the similarities in the narratives, there is no evidence of an Athenian debate concerning imperialism before the so-called First Sicilian Expedition of 427-424 BCE.

Claudia Tiersch, in “Plutarch’s *Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae*—Rupture or Continuation with Aristotelian Tradition?” considers the topic of Plutarch’s possible reception and continuation of Aristotelian political traditions. Starting with a brief summary of the parallels that Eckart has pointed out between Aristotle’s *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Tiersch investigates how Plutarch interprets traditional themes of Greek political thought, noting not only continuities between the two but new tendencies in Plutarch. Though Plutarch understands the limits of political activity in his age, he does not accept that he lives in a period of political decline. Instead, Plutarch values the autarchy of his hometown and the opportunities it provides the citizens for political engagement.

Wilfried Fiedler, in “Kleomedes von Astypalaia, der letzte der Heroen,” examines the oracle concerning the heroization of the pugilist Cleomedes. Fiedler argues that though Pausanias reports extensively on Cleomedes, he (like Plutarch did before him) withholds his judgment concerning the fighter’s afterlife. In contrast, Oinomaos and Eusebius ridicule the oracle. For Celsus, the story of Cleomedes serves to discredit Christian narratives of Jesus, while Origen’s reply to Celsus allows him to argue that Jesus’s work on earth—even isolated from the testimony of his resurrection—is proof of his divinity. In the beginning of the fifth century, Christian writers reduced the story of Cleomedes to an example of pagan superstition and idolatry perhaps to avoid discussing a possible parallel to the figure of Jesus.

Hans-Joachim Gehrke, in “Vom Text zum Raum: Hellenistische Gelehrsamkeit, frühgriechische Lyrik und ein heiliges Land um Olympia” discusses the religious and cultural ideas the Greeks used to define Olympia and the relationship the Alpheios and Arethusa have to that sacred space as revealed in myth and literature. Olympia’s relationships, resulting from its enormous Panhellenic significance, also became part of this sacred world. Old connections, like that between Olympia and Syracuse, obtained a special form and brought the specific ideas of spaces and their connection to life. The philosophers, historians and scholars who discussed these ancient stories contributed to this process.

Scott Farrington, in “Talent, Craft, and Ecstasy: Poetic Forces in Horace and Plato,” examines the concepts of poetic madness and talent in Horace’s *Ars Poetica*, and the relationship of those concepts to their treatment in Democritus, Neoptolemus, and Plato. Horace rejects the Democritean notion of a *furor poeticus*. Those who attribute Democritus’s praise of poetic madness to Plato depend upon an understanding of Platonic literary criticism that emphasizes the arguments of the *Ion* over other treatises. Horace seems to inherit the Platonic notion of ἐνθουσιασμός, but through the intermediary of Neoptolemus, who used the term of the *Ion*, δύναμις, to describe the divine force of the poet. This δύναμις becomes Horace’s *ingenium*, now an ability entirely possessed by the poet but not possessing him.

Reinhard Brandt, in “‘Et in Arcadia ego’ – Ich, der Tod? Oder der Tote? Oder Ich, Goethe?” presents a study of the epitaph “Et in Arcadia ego” depicted in and employed as the title for paintings by Giovanni Francesco Barbieri and Nicolas Poussin in the first half of the 17th century. Brandt argues that Arcadia serves as a sort of critical utopia, a poetic recollection of a human way of life, but that it provides no escape from that way of life. Furthermore, in historical antiquity, there was probably no connection between Arcadia and freedom. That connection begins with Poussin and is continued by the artist-tourists of the 18th century. The ‘ego’ of the dead in Arcadia is appropriated by the modern educated citizen.

Volker Losemann, in “Berlin sey Sparta: Bemerkungen zur preußischen Spartarezeption,” beginning with some observations about the slogan “Berlin sey Sparta,” which originated during the Seven Years’ War, he considers the history of the Grenadier Gleim and his representation as a Prussian Tyrtæus. Losemann then sketches the development of the idealization of Sparta in Germany up to the ‘Third Reich’ and in neoconservative circles in Germany since the 1980s.

Rüdiger Görner, in “Retrospection and Utopia: Stefan Zweig’s Conception of World Literature from the Spirit of Historiography,” discusses Stefan Zweig’s notion of a world community facilitated by literature. Görner argues that Stefan Zweig’s encounter with the New World as an exiled European provided him with a conviction that the future must be supported with a vision of the past: history has a place in the future, and ‘tomorrow’ is a future object of history. Zweig expresses, directly and indirectly, a strong preference for philosophical literature to underpin what he terms “weltgemeinsame Zivilisation,” a conception of civilization common to all parts of the world.

Introduction

On behalf of the contributors, I would like to say happy birthday, Eckart, and thank you for your work, your patient mentoring, and your friendship.

Scott T. Farrington
Dickinson College

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How to Find Socrates' Views in Plato's *Protagoras*?

Bernd Manuwald (Universität zu Köln)

Except for the *Symposium*, the *Protagoras* is probably the most varied of all of Plato's dialogues in terms of content and scenery; at the same time, not least because of its multifaceted nature and its vivid narrative style, it raises a number of interpretative problems. This situation is reflected in the very different views put forward by scholars as they can be found in the enormous number of publications on the *Protagoras*. All interpreters claim that their readings are based on the text. To some extent, the differences are certainly caused by the fact that one may disagree on the interpretation of individual passages, an issue affecting all literary texts. In this case, however, the widely divergent opinions are primarily a consequence of the difficulties encountered when one tries to find out which utterances of the Platonic Socrates reflect his convictions, i.e., to what extent the figure of Socrates can be understood as a transmitter of Plato's doctrines and where these doctrines are most likely to be grasped. Such a situation is characteristic of all of Plato's early dialogues; yet due to its complex structure, the issue is particularly prominent in the *Protagoras*.

In this paper, I would like to begin by surveying two contrary readings advanced recently to exemplify the problem just sketched; following on from that, by an analysis of the dialogue's text, I will try to find criteria for answering the question of where and how the concepts of the Platonic Socrates in the *Protagoras* may be found and then compile these beliefs systematically.

To start with, let me mention two recent interpretations of Protagoras' Great Speech since, together, they illustrate the wide range of interpretations presented so far. As is well known, the introductory scenes of the dialogue are followed by the first major section, the Great Speech, put into the sophist's mouth by Plato, in which Protagoras intends to show that ἀρετή can be taught, which Socrates had denied. Robert Bees strongly argues that this speech is a fiction created by Plato and only has a parodic relationship to the historical Protagoras;¹ in that case, this section would be of no value as a testimony for Protagoras' doctrines. By contrast, Daniel

1 Bees 2014.

Silvermintz assumes such an accurate representation of Protagoras' doctrines that the text (on a second level of interpretation) also yields a secret doctrine of Protagoras, namely the doctrine of the survival of the fittest.² In doing so, Silvermintz has to presuppose that Plato was apparently not aware of this doctrine because he does not have his Socrates comment on it. Bees' theory, though, is not unproblematic either: for it would have been odd for contemporary readers, who still had direct access to Protagoras' doctrines, to see Plato have his Socrates criticize the theses of the dialogue's Protagoras if not even their basis had any connection with the historical Protagoras, but they were entirely a product of Plato's imagination.

In whatever way one may describe the relationship between the content of the Great Speech and Protagoras' doctrines, it certainly is not a problem of real vs fictitious views of Socrates. The Speech, however, is important for the problem that Socrates develops on this basis, which is meant to be significant: Socrates does not continue with the discussion of teachability; instead, he addresses a lack of clarity he notices in Protagoras' model of virtue. Specifically, Socrates claims that it is not clear to him to what extent the virtues form a unity in Protagoras' opinion. Indeed, this uncertainty can be shown to run through Protagoras' entire speech — whether or to what extent it may have applied already to the doctrines of the historical Protagoras can be left open in this context.

The question of the unity of the virtues determines the flow of the dialogue almost until its end, interrupted by two lengthy sections that at least appear to be digressions, Protagoras' and Socrates' interpretation of a poem by Simonides (*Prt.* 338e–347a) and the 'hedonistic' section (*Prt.* 351b–359a), which is based on a fictitious dialogue on pleasure by Socrates and Protagoras with 'the many'. In order to solve the question of the unity of the virtues, Socrates asks Protagoras whether the unity of ἀρετή is to be understood in the sense that individual virtues, such as justice or moderation, are parts of ἀρετή or whether these are different names for the same thing. Protagoras favours the view that they are different parts since, according to him, it is possible to have a single virtue without the others (*Prt.* 329c–330b). Later, Protagoras will modify this theory and assign a special status only to courage: one may be courageous without being wise (*Prt.* 349d; cf. 359a–c). By contrast, Socrates tries to defend the other extreme in that he declares individual virtues as identical with each other, suggesting that all of them are knowledge. Then, they would merely be different

2 Silvermintz 2016.

names for knowledge as a whole, and knowledge would be a sufficient cause for acting rightly, in line with the Socratic paradox that whoever knows what is good will do it. If one regards this as a belief of the Platonic Socrates, one arrives at the so-called Unity Thesis, which is linked particularly to the name of Terry Penner³ and still has adherents particularly in the English-speaking world. One misses, however, a demonstration by the proponents of how to prove that Socrates' opposing position is indeed his belief.

The same problem applies to the assessment of the controversially discussed 'hedonistic' section, in which not only the pleasant as such is called good, but also the good and the pleasant are identified. If one regards this position as a view of the Platonic Socrates, following, e.g., C.B. Gosling and Christopher C.W. Taylor,⁴ a further doctrine emerges (in addition to the Unity Thesis), specific to an early Platonic dialogue, which cannot be found in any other dialogue in the same way. For this reason, among others, most scholars doubt whether Plato's Socrates really adopts this doctrine or even reject this possibility, but not everyone. A particular approach to taking the doctrine on pleasure in the *Protagoras* seriously has been put forward by Jörg Hardy,⁵ who combines it with the doctrine of the power of knowledge and thus proposes an interesting solution to the Socratic paradox on the level of the discussion in the dialogue *Protagoras*:

“Je angenehmer eine Handlung ist, die man auszuführen wünscht, desto stärker ist der entsprechende Wunsch. Nach dieser einfachen sokratischen Gleichung ist das bessere Wissen auch der jeweils stärkere Wunsch (der Wunsch mit dem größten Lustpotential).”⁶

For actions that require courage, he arrives at the following conclusion:

“Wenn jemand weiß, dass eine Handlung auf die Bewältigung einer Gefahr gerichtet ist und die Ausführung dieser Handlung für den Handelnden vorteilhaft (angenehm) und aner kennenswert ist, dann weiß er, dass diese Handlung (in einem umfassenden Sinne) gut ist und möchte diese Handlung ausführen. ... Die Tapferkeit lässt sich zum einen als eine bestimmte Handlungsmotivation und zum anderen als ein Wissen charakterisieren, das mit eben dieser Motivation intrinsisch verknüpft ist. Das »Wissen davon, was gefährlich oder unbeden-

3 Penner 1973 (1992).

4 Gosling and Taylor 1982, 45–68.

5 Hardy 2001.

6 Hardy 2001, 146.

ist«, und die Motivation des Tapferen sind zwei Seiten derselben Medaille.»⁷

Thus, Hardy not only postulates the element of volition, which is supposed to be lacking in Socrates' intellectualism, for the dialogue *Protagoras* (like Lorraine S. Pangle),⁸ but even finds arguments for it in the dialogue itself.

This position raises the question of whether it is methodologically permissible to combine elements from different argumentative contexts to create a thesis that cannot be found explicitly in the dialogue. Moreover, a possible objection to all these theories is that the dialogue ends in *aporia*. This point is not assigned its full significance or is virtually ignored even in the most recent publications. Such a procedure is all the more astonishing since elsewhere Plato demonstrates in theory and in practice how to deal with an *aporia*. The well-known core text is part of the *Meno* (82b–85b). Working out how to double the area of a square, which originally fails through the slave's *aporia* but is eventually successful, demonstrates two points: (1) *Aporia* frees people from assumed knowledge and is a salutary intermediate state that enables them to find the right solution. If one tries hard, an *aporia* can be resolved. (2) The solution is not achieved on the level of the discussion that led to the *aporia*. The slave intended to double the area of the square by first choosing the double length of its side, then one and a half times, both of which would have more than doubled the area. The solution does not consist in looking for a suitable length of the side between its single length and 1.5 times the length, but in a new approach, namely in showing that the diagonal of the original square indicates the side length for a square of double size. Proof of the fact that these two points are rightly inferred as conclusions from the *aporia* section in the *Meno* is Plato's procedure in the *Republic*: Book 1 ends in *aporia*. The question after the nature and the impact of justice is then continued on a different level in Book 2, which could not have been reached from the perspective of Book 1, but only once the doctrine of the soul and of the state have been introduced.

This situation should make one cautious in assuming that a coherent overall thesis could be inferred solely from an aporetic dialogue. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that in such dialogues there may be isolated theorems or statements matching the beliefs of the Platonic Socrates. Yet in

7 Hardy 2001, 161.

8 Pangle 2014.

order to avoid a random selection, one will have to try to find criteria that make such decisions about authenticity as plausible as possible.

The dialogue *Protagoras* actually does offer some direct and indirect hints of both a positive and a negative nature as to where views of the Platonic Socrates might be found or might not be found. With the help of these pointers, it is possible at least to limit the range of possibilities. In what follows, I will investigate these pieces of evidence with a look to the ramifications for the interpretation of the dialogue as a whole.

Discussing the question of the unity of the virtues, Socrates, when reviewing Protagoras' theses, introduces a fictitious interlocutor, who expects answers from Protagoras and Socrates (continuing what Socrates had started):

‘... Is justice something (πρᾶγμα τι), or not a thing at all? It seems to me that it is something; what do you think?’ — ‘I think so too.’ — ‘Well, then, suppose someone asked us, “The two of you, Protagoras and Socrates, tell me, is that thing whose name you have just mentioned, justice, itself just or unjust?” I should reply that it is just. How would you cast your vote? The same as mine, or different?’ — ‘The same.’ — ‘So my reply to the question would be that justice is such as to be just; would you give the same answer?’ — ‘Yes.’ — ‘Suppose he went on to ask us, “Do you say that there is also such a thing as holiness?”, we should, I think, say that we do.’ — ‘Yes.’ — “And do you say that that too is something?” We should say so, don’t you agree?’ — ‘I agree there too.’ — “And do you say that this thing is itself such as to be unholy, or such as to be holy?” I should be annoyed at the question, and say, “Watch what you say, sir; how could anything else be holy, if holiness itself is not to be holy?” What about you? Wouldn’t you give the same answer?’ — ‘Certainly,’ he said.

‘Suppose he carried on with his questioning: “Well, what was it that you were saying a moment ago? Didn’t I hear you correctly? You seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue (ἀρετή) are related to one another in such a way that none of them is like any other.” I should say, “Yes, you heard the rest correctly, but you must have misheard if you think that I said that. It was Protagoras who said it in answer to a question of mine.” Suppose he said, “Is that right, Protagoras? Do you say that none of the parts of virtue is like any of the others?”

Is that your opinion?” What would you say?’ — ‘I should have to agree, Socrates,’ he said. (*Prt.* 330c1–331a5)⁹

Socrates here explicitly distinguishes between questions and answers. He does not wish to be tied down to his questions, but is this perhaps all right for his statements, especially when they are answers? For, if Socrates, who usually is the one who asks questions, introduces a fictitious questioner and thus voluntarily creates a situation forcing him to give answers himself, then this may be regarded as an obvious sign inserted by the author, indicating that these answers are important and should be treated differently from other utterances by Socrates. Therefore, it can be assumed that Socrates’ proposition that the individual virtues are πράγματα and not merely ὀνόματα is meant to be regarded as correct. This observation increases in importance when one realizes that the exposition on justice and piety noticeably agrees with comments made in connection with the doctrine of ideas. It is not only that there is mention of αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, as is frequently the case with reference to ideas (including, for instance, δίκαιον and ὅσιον, *Phd.* 75c11–d2), but in the *Phaedo* there is also the following comment of Socrates (100c4–6):

9 ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμα τί ἐστὶν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τί δὲ σοί; — Κάμοι, ἔφη. — Τί οὖν; εἰ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ: “ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἶπετον δὴ μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὀνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδικον;” ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρινάμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίς ἂν ψήφον θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην; — Τὴν αὐτὴν, ἔφη. — Ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἐγώ γε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ [d] ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ; — Ναί, ἔφη. — Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· “Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι;” φαίμεν ἂν, ὡς ἐγώ μαι. — Ναί, ἢ δ’ ὅς. — “Οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμα τι εἶναι;” φαίμεν ἂν ἢ οὐ; — Καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη. — “Πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὅσιον;” ἀναγκησάμ’ ἂν ἐγώ γε, ἔφη, τῷ ἐρωτῆματι, καὶ εἵπομαι ἂν· Εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῇ μεντὰν τὸ ἄλλο ὅσιον εἶη, εἰ μὴ αὐτῇ [e] γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σὺ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; — Πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς: “Πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἄρ’ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι <τὰ> τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἀλλήλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον;” εἵπομαι ἂν ἐγώ γε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἤκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἶε εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρήκουσας· Πρωταγόρας γὰρ [331a] ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἴποι· “Ἀληθὴ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῆς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὺς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν;” τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιο; — Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογεῖν. Trans. Taylor 1991, adapted.

It seems to me that if anything else is beautiful besides the beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no reason at all other than that it participates in that beautiful; and the same goes for all of them.¹⁰

It would be an odd coincidence if such a prominent statement in the *Protagoras* was intended to mean something different from what it means in other Platonic dialogues. In any case, the passage in the *Protagoras* yields an argument against assuming that Socrates believes that the virtues are merely *ὁνόματα* of one and the same thing; in a later section Socrates speaks of parts of virtue as a matter of course (*Prt.* 353b2), as elsewhere in the *Corpus Platonicum*. To infer from the *Protagoras* the Unity Thesis as a view of Socrates is, therefore, not particularly advisable.

But, it might be objected, Socrates tries to present the individual virtues as a single thing over large stretches of the dialogue, aiming to demonstrate that they are knowledge. Such an observation provokes the following comments in response:

- (1) It is obvious that in terms of the argumentation Socrates reacts to Protagoras' argument for the individuality of the virtues with the extreme counter-thesis of unity. At the same time Socrates indicates on several occasions that he regards the dialogic conversation as a testing of each other (*Prt.* 333c; 348a); this can be understood as another methodological hint. Socrates explicitly envisions the possibility that Protagoras only introduced his original thesis of the virtues to test him and did not actually believe in it (*Prt.* 349cd). The same procedure will therefore have to be assumed as potentially applying to Socrates, too. Whether he makes use of this method in the case of proving that all virtues are one and the same, however, is not yet demonstrated on this basis.
- (2) In the course of the dialogue, it emerges that Socrates does not commit unequivocally to the Unity Thesis. While he originally intends to make Protagoras identify knowledge (or wisdom) and courage (*Prt.* 350c), the discussion eventually reveals that courage is a *part* of knowledge, namely the knowledge of what is dangerous and what is not dangerous (*Prt.* 360d). Both propositions cannot be valid at the same time, as readers, attentively following the discussion in the dialogue, will recognize.

10 φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ πάντα δι' οὕτως λέγω. Trans. Gallop 1983.

- (3) All of Socrates' attempts at identification have logical flaws, because of operations of whose problematic nature Plato is aware, as can be seen from other dialogues.¹¹ Moreover, there is another methodological hint: Protagoras does not accept Socrates' identification of knowledge and courage since it is based on a wrong inversion. Socrates does not defend himself against this objection; instead, after a long argumentative detour he arrives at the definition of courage mentioned above, namely that it is knowledge of what is dangerous and what is not dangerous, a definition again inferred on the basis of logically problematic procedures. The revelation of the wrong inversion that is not rejected can be understood as a pointer for readers: they are to check the argumentation carefully and have to allow for the possibility of logical errors.

If one brings all these points together, there are good reasons for not regarding the Unity Thesis as the belief of Socrates.

A particular method that Plato employs to demonstrate convictions of his Socrates is the interpretation of a poem by Simonides, which Plato puts into Socrates' mouth (*Prt.* 339d–347a). Philosophical scholarship does not always value this section appropriately since at first glance it seems to be an interpretation of a piece of poetry and thus irrelevant in philosophical terms. Socrates' interpretation is triggered because Protagoras, who is fed up with being asked questions, intends to take the lead in the conversation and to show his brilliance by demonstrating contradictions in Simonides. In view of this, Socrates rises to 'defend' Simonides by giving a longer speech, in contrast to the dialogic character of the conversation. But as Socrates says afterwards, he does not approve of interpretations of poetry because some claim that the poet intends to say one thing, and others claim that he intends to say something else, so the conversation is concerned with a matter impossible to verify (*Prt.* 347e). This means that such interpretations reveal the opinions of readers of the poem and not those of the poet. (I will note only in passing that modern scholars may be subject to the same criticism when they interpret Plato's writings. Plato himself has not entangled himself in contradictions since he did not rely on written doctrine as his sole medium.) As for Socrates' procedure, he provides a prime example of arbitrary interpretation in reading the Simonides poem, which suggests that one is meant to see Socrates' own views in this reading. One can discern the thesis that, in contrast to god, a

11 For more details see Manuwald 1999 and 2006.

human being is not able to be constantly good and thus also knowledgeable (*Prt.* 344b–345c), a concept that equally transpires from later Platonic dialogues. Hans-Joachim Krämer already highlighted the importance of this section.¹² Moreover, Socrates infers from the poem in an astonishing interpretation that good and correct behaviour is based on knowledge (345ab) and ‘that no intelligent man believes that anyone does wrong freely or acts shamefully and badly of his own free will’ (*Prt.* 345d9–e2),¹³ which he declares to be his belief (*Prt.* 345d–e). Here, too, connections to other Platonic dialogues, including later ones, can be pointed out,¹⁴ so that, again, one is justified in assuming that Socrates says something he really believes in.

In the ‘hedonistic’ section, Socrates and Protagoras agree on the thesis that knowledge is the key factor in acting appropriately, an opinion that is explicitly shared by Socrates (*Prt.* 352c–d):

[Socrates] ... if someone knows what is good and bad, he would never be conquered by anything so as to do other than what knowledge bids him? In fact, that intelligence is a sufficient safeguard for man? (352c4–7)¹⁵

That Socrates also accepts this thesis as valid cannot be doubted in view of his comments on the Simonides poem; what may be doubted, however, is that, when he demonstrates to ‘the many’ that knowledge is decisive in hedonistic contexts too, he also agrees with the identification of the pleasant with the good. For Socrates repeatedly asks whether ‘the many’ are not able to name a τέλος other than pleasure (*Prt.* 354b7–c2; d1–3; d7–e2), especially when he says:

12 Krämer 1990, 87 and n7.

13 ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι. Trans. Taylor 1991.

14 For evidence, see Manuwald 1999, 326–327; 347–349. Only god is really good and wise: *R.* 379b1; *Smp.* 204a1–2. Restrictions of becoming like god: *R.* 613a7–b1; *Tht.* 176a9–b2; *Phd.* 107b8; *Smp.* 203e–204b. Nobody does wrong of his own free will: *Ti.* 86d7–e1; *Lg.* 731c2–3.

15 καὶ ἐάνπερ γινώσκῃ τις τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὥστε ἄλλ’ ἅττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν ἐπιστήμῃ κελεύῃ, ἀλλ’ ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Trans. Taylor 1991.

But even now you are at liberty to withdraw, if you can give any other account of the good than pleasure, or of evil than pain. Or are you content to live a pleasant life without pains? (*Prt.* 354e8–355a3)¹⁶

This can be seen as a sign of distancing himself from the views of ‘the many’ and as an indication of the fact that Socrates has a τέλος other than pleasure in mind.

But how is one then to assess the theory of measuring pleasure, which Socrates vehemently advocates (*Prt.* 356c–357b), as it is meant to put an end to the power of semblances and lead to scientifically proven decisions, as it were? Is this perhaps not a doctrine that Socrates subscribes to? The upshot of Socrates’ exposition is criticism of ‘the many’ since, in order to save money, they do not visit the sophists present for obtaining the knowledge necessary for acting rightly (*Prt.* 357e). It is hardly possible to disavow the knowledge of measuring pleasure more ironically. Moreover, Socrates proposes to investigate on another occasion what kind of knowledge it is (*Prt.* 357b). This example of the so-called ‘gaps’ in Plato’s oeuvre, perhaps the earliest one, belongs to a type that has a counterpart elsewhere in his writings,¹⁷ namely in the *Politicus* (esp. 283c–284e). In this dialogue, two ways of measuring are distinguished, a relative one and an absolute one with reference to the right measure (μέτριον, cf. esp. *Plt.* 283d7–9; e8–11; 284e2–8.). This right measure, which appears under different names (e.g. ‘the exact itself’ [αὐτὸ τὰκριβές], *Plt.* 284d2; cf. also 284e6–8), is the criterion for the *ethical* sphere (*Plt.* 283e3–6). These two forms (the relative and the absolute art of measurement) are already adumbrated in the *Protagoras*, when Socrates moves from absolutely measurable entities (one chooses a large size instead of a small one, not a larger one instead of a smaller one) to relations between larger and smaller entities, which include feelings of pleasure. The presupposed need to assess what a bigger or a smaller pleasure is, now or later, makes the objective measuring, which could remove the deception of semblances, absurd. In the *Phaedo*, such calculations about pleasure, the moderation out of fear of missing out on a bigger gain of pleasure, are sharply criticized by the Platonic Socrates (68e2–69a4). It is not necessary to assume that, when Plato has a forward reference in the *Protagoras*, he had already in mind exactly what can be found in the *Politicus* (although this cannot be excluded), but he certainly

16 ἀλλ’ ἐτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἐξεστίν, εἴ πη ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν· ἢ ἄρκετ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; Trans. Taylor 1991, adapted.

17 Cf. Szlezák 1999, 51.

thought of more than what is said in the *Protagoras*. This 'gap,' then, suggesting further discussion, together with the other pieces of evidence mentioned, justifies regarding the knowledge of measuring pleasure not as a serious opinion of Socrates.

An argument against this reading seems to be that Socrates defined the investigation of the opinions of 'the many' as of some significance for finding out how courage relates to the other parts of ἀρετή (*Prt.* 353b1–3), so that the 'hedonistic' section might contribute to clarifying this question. Strictly speaking, this should lead to the conclusion that the final round of argument on defining courage is based on the hedonistic thesis and the knowledge of measuring pleasure. Indeed, Socrates creates the impression that there is a seamless transition. In fact, however, he leaves the hedonistic basis without explicitly saying so.¹⁸ While so far, the indications of what may or may not be regarded as a conviction of Socrates have been fairly obvious, from now on the indications are becoming subtler.

One of these is that the art of measuring pleasure is *not* employed, although it would be easily possible. For instance, when one's own city is suffering an enemy attack, the hardships to expose oneself to the dangers of fighting could be balanced by the consideration that these pains will be more than outweighed by the pleasant feeling of living in freedom after the fight and not to be enslaved, so that the unpleasant fighting should be accepted for the sake of a bigger gain of pleasant feeling throughout one's whole life. There is no trace of such a consideration; instead, it emerges that the criterion of pleasure does not help to distinguish between courageous individuals and cowards since nobody is keen on what is dangerous, i.e. selects what is bad and unpleasant for themselves (*Prt.* 359c–e). The overall sum of pleasure has been entirely forgotten. In fact, as Protagoras objects, the courageous and the cowards are distinguished from each other because the former wish to go to war, the latter do not (*Prt.* 359e). It is then established as a criterion that the courageous have no disgraceful fear when they are afraid (*Prt.* 360ab), i.e., the category of αἰσχροὺν independent of pleasure. Yet only a few lines earlier, the following sequence was set up: praiseworthy (καλόν) and good (ἀγαθόν), thus pleasant (ἡδύ) (*Prt.* 360a2–3);¹⁹ this is a significant inversion of an earlier statement: pleasant, thus praiseworthy and good (*Prt.* 358b3–6),²⁰ i.e., the pleasant is now deter-

18 Cf. Manuwald 1999, 425–429.

19 Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ;

20 αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἄρ' οὐ καλαί [καὶ ὠφέλιμοι]; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον;

mined by the good, no longer the good by the pleasant. This agrees with the fact that prior to the last argument on defining courage, only the non-hedonistic evaluative terms αἰσχρόν, καλόν and ἀγαθόν are used and the category of ἡδύ has disappeared (from *Prt.* 360a8 onwards).

In addition, the second definition of courage, the knowledge of what is dangerous and what is not dangerous (*Prt.* 360d4–5), agrees with the definition of courage as put forward by Nikias in the *Laches* (194e11–195a1), where it is in no way linked to the doctrine of pleasure.

All this suggests that the second definition of courage in the *Protagoras* is entirely separate from the hedonistic basis, and the indications in the text do not justify combining the definition of courage and the doctrine of pleasure and regarding the latter as the motivation for taking action, complementing knowledge, as Hardy has argued. His thesis leads to a concept interesting in itself, but not to a concept that Plato is trying to suggest in the *Protagoras*. Therefore, one may ask why the doctrine of pleasure is introduced at all in this dialogue. One reason may be to show that the thesis of the power of knowledge could be proved even if pleasure and the good are identified — which seems more plausible than Marina McCoy's assumption that Socrates demonstrated to Protagoras by his questioning about hedonism that the latter's statements in the hedonistic discussion implied the central significance of knowledge in comparison with the other virtues.²¹ Additionally, there is the side effect that the sophistic interlocutors, who completely agree with the pleasure thesis in the end, are revealed as covert hedonists, though not in the way in which McCoy believes, namely that Protagoras' comments include a hedonistic position from the start.²²

It remains to address the issue of how to clarify whether the second definition of courage, by which Socrates achieves victory over Protagoras, who denies a necessary link between knowledge and courage until the end, can be regarded as the belief of the Platonic Socrates. Apart from the dialogue's aporetic conclusion, there are no direct signals that would encourage doubt, but there are indirect ones. Just as the earlier proofs, the proof for the definition of courage is evidently logically problematic. There is a transition from contraries ('not disgraceful') to polar opposites ('praiseworthy'; *Prt.* 360b2–3), although Socrates shows himself aware of the difference between the two elsewhere in the dialogue (cf. esp. *Prt.* 346d1–2). Then he operates with a double expression consisting of ignorance (ἄγνοια) and er-

21 McCoy 2008, 70.

22 McCoy 2008, 66ff. See also the misinterpretation of 354c3 (p. 68).

ror (ἀμαθία, *Prt.* 360b7), apparently in order to refer back with ἄγνοια to the word introduced previously (γινώσκοντες, *Prt.* 360a4), by which Socrates managed the transition from the expressions of opinion used earlier to the term knowledge. In fact, he had already employed ἀμαθία in the sense of 'false opinion' (*Prt.* 358c4). As a result of the double expression, ἀμαθία is now reduced to the contrast to knowledge, and only for this reason will the subsequent proof work.

Further, the question of whether the definition of courage can be regarded as that of Socrates should not be answered without taking the *Laches* into account, though this dialogue is not even mentioned in the recent studies by L. S. Pangle and R. C. Bartlett.²³ It is not unlikely that the *Laches* was written earlier than the *Protagoras*. The figure of a Socrates whose background and character have to be introduced to at least some of the interlocutors (as is the case in the *Laches*) only makes sense in the early instalments released by an author of Socratic dialogues. Then contemporary readers or pupils of Plato could see that, in his conversation with Protagoras, the Platonic Socrates insists on a definition that he rejected in the *Laches* and that led to an aporia in that dialogue. Attempts have been made since Hermann Bonitz²⁴ (and Hardy does so in his commentary on the *Laches*)²⁵ to save Nicias' definition by linking it with the notion of endurance (καρτερία), which Socrates apparently regards as an element of courage (*La.* 192b9–c1; d10–11); so it was believed that one could infer a result from opinions put forward in the dialogue itself, though its end is aporetic. But such a combination does not resolve the problem raised by Socrates in the *Laches*, namely that there is only overall knowledge (of the good) and not partial knowledge, i.e. knowledge of courage that merely covers the future that may or may not be dangerous. Therefore, the *Laches* on its own does not reveal how endurance and knowledge of virtue are to be linked in Plato's concept of courage. Only by the new aspect of the doctrine of the soul, as outlined in the *Republic*, do these elements come together (*R.* 442b10–c3).²⁶

Against this background, it is unlikely that the second definition of courage in the *Protagoras* is meant to be seen as the view of the Platonic Socrates. Indeed, in the dialogue Socrates himself indicates that he does not regard the entire issue of virtue as resolved (*Prt.* 360e6–8).

23 Pangle 2014; Bartlett 2016.

24 Bonitz 1886.

25 Hardy 2014.

26 Cf. also Manuwald 2000.

If one accepts that in the *Protagoras* Plato has provided hints indicating to readers which positions Socrates really subscribes to or is prepared to discuss more seriously, these criteria lead to a few points that can be assumed with a fair degree of certainty to represent the views of the Platonic Socrates positively or negatively:

According to Socrates, the individual forms of virtue are something substantial (cf. e.g. *Prt.* 330cd): justice and piety appear almost like ideas (*Prt.* 330c3–e1), and in so far as every form of virtue is an entity, there are parts (μέρια) of virtue (as they are called by Socrates in his own argument on one occasion, *Prt.* 353b2). These, however, cannot be possessed each in isolation. Knowledge (or wisdom) is the unifying characteristic of virtue (cf. e.g. *Prt.* 361b); without knowledge there will be no virtue. The other parts of virtue are neither identical with knowledge (or wisdom) as a whole, nor are they to be understood as parts of a genus ‘knowledge’. Virtue based on knowledge can be achieved by individuals for a limited period of time, albeit not forever (*Prt.* 344b–345c). If there is knowledge of the good and the bad, this will be a sufficient condition for acting rightly (*Prt.* 345d–e; 352c–d). Of the models mentioned at the beginning of the discussion on the unity of virtues (*Prt.* 329c–330b) — Socrates had presented the options of whether the virtues are mere names, or quantitatively different like parts of gold, or qualitatively different like parts of the face — the model of the face is most plausibly seen as Socrates’ view if one does not interpret it (like Protagoras) as including the option of separating the virtues (*Prt.* 329d5–6; e2–6), but as an indivisible organic entity, which involves qualitative differences, but of which one cannot have one part without the other or without the whole (i.e. knowledge).²⁷

Against this background, the issue of the teachability of virtue, which Socrates did not pursue any further after Protagoras’ Great Speech, when he used the speech as a prompt to look at the unity of the virtues, is more complex than it seems. Therefore, even if the question of the character of virtue was answered, it would be justifiably brought up again at the end (*Prt.* 361), in contrast to the *Meno*. What seems partly unclear on the level of the *Protagoras* (since Plato does not convey a solution in the *Protagoras*) can receive a possible (preliminary) solution when the doctrine of virtue is linked with the doctrine of the soul in the *Republic*; according to that doctrine, the leading part of the soul (λογιστικόν) is in possession of the overall knowledge of what is advantageous for each part and for the whole (composed of the three parts) while there are also individual forms of virtue.

27 On the issue of the unity of virtues see also Manuwald 2005.

Additionally, courage (as part of virtue and the particular virtue of the courageous part of the soul), for instance, is neither knowledge nor can it exist without knowledge (cf. *R.* 442b10–c3).²⁸

According to the *Protagoras*, the criterion for taking action is not a maximum of pleasure, but an aim beyond pleasure (*Prt.* 354b–355a), i.e. the good. This is to be seen as a point of orientation for an absolute art of measurement, which neutralizes the confusing power of semblances and has the soul keep to the truth (*Prt.* 356de). In comparison with this art of measurement, the relative art of measuring pleasure, which merely measures the pleasant and the unpleasant quantitatively, can only be a distorted picture. The distinction between an absolute and a relative art of measurement, as it becomes clear from the *Politicus* (esp. *Plt.* 283c–284e), is already somehow adumbrated in the *Protagoras*.

It is a fact, however, that only readers who know more of Platonic philosophy than the *Protagoras* reveals are able to understand and evaluate the hints that are sometimes seemingly contradictory and only emerge after careful interpretation.

Still, the demonstrated procedure is not an inadmissible method in that it would read into an 'early' dialogue something that Plato had not yet conceived of at the time. For if the individual elements that can be made plausible as beliefs of the Platonic Socrates in the *Protagoras* as well as in the *Laches* combine to form a plausible whole only from the point of view of later dialogues, the *Republic* in particular, this cannot be a coincidence, or one would have to assume that Plato highlighted some elements as clearly visible convictions of his Socrates, but had not yet noticed under which aspect they could be brought together. Moreover, Plato signals in the *Protagoras* that his Socrates has greater knowledge than is systematically revealed in this dialogue. In the first conversational crisis (*Prt.* 334c–338e) Socrates, who typically does not know anything and therefore enquires, offers the arrangement that Protagoras should ask questions and Socrates will try to show how the respondent should answer. He adds that, as soon as he will have provided answers to everything Protagoras would like to ask, the roles should be reversed again (*Prt.* 338cd). Thus, Socrates presents himself as the teacher of answering, who is ready to answer all questions and claims to be able to do so. Protagoras, however, does not take up this opportunity since he moves to a new theme (in his view) by starting on the

28 Καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ, οἶμαι, τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἓνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασφύζη διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μή.

interpretation of Simonides, so that readers do not get to know Socrates' answers either, though they apparently exist.

All these elements together support the theory suggested at the beginning, namely that an aporetic dialogue cannot be interpreted fully just on its own; instead, a proper satisfactory reading needs further material, methods and doctrines that the author of the aporetic dialogue is already aware of and that readers can identify if they look at other dialogues — as far as answers can be found in Plato's written doctrine.

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Una redazione della *Repubblica* di Platone in sei libri?

Tiziano Dorandi

I. Premessa

La stesura e la revisione della *Repubblica* impegnò Platone a più riprese e per diversi anni, se prestiamo fede alla testimonianza di Dionigi di Alicarnasso:

Tutti gli studiosi conoscono quanto si racconta della infaticabile attività di Platone (περὶ τῆς φιλοπονίας τάνδρως), e tra l'altro in particolare, la storia della tavoletta (τὰ περὶ τὴν δέλτον) che, si dice, fu trovata alla sua morte e che conteneva diverse varianti dell'inizio della *Repubblica*: “*Cesci ieri al Pireo in compagnia di Glaucone, figlio di Aristone*”.¹

Lo stesso episodio è narrato anche da Quintiliano, che non cita il testo di Platone.² Diogene Laerzio, rifacendosi alla autorità di Euforione (fr. 187 van Groningen) e di Panezio (test. 149 Alesse), ricorda infine che l'inizio della *Repubblica* era stato trovato corretto a più riprese (πολλάκις ἐστραμμένην εὐρήσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πολιτείας).³

È lecito chiedersi se gli interventi di Platone in momenti distinti della redazione della *Repubblica* abbiano lasciato tracce nel corso della trasmissione di quell'opera.

Solmsen ne indicò una nelle pagine che il filosofo consacra alla critica dei poeti nei libri 2-3 e in particolare in 3.389b2-d6.⁴ Qui Platone sostiene che i governanti della città, e essi soltanto, hanno il diritto di dire il falso per ingannare nemici o concittadini nell'interesse dello stato. Solmsen ipotizza che Platone avesse scritto questo capitolo in un'epoca in cui pensava di inserire nella *Repubblica* una sezione sulla condotta dei cittadini e sui loro rapporti con i governanti. Poiché nella redazione dell'opera che ci è

1 D. H. *Comp.* 6.25.33 (vol. 2, 133.7-13 Us.-Raderm.). La traduzione è mia. Il riferimento è a R. 1.327a1-2. Il testo dell'inizio della *Repubblica* citato da Dionigi (κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος) non si distingue da quello trasmesso dai manoscritti medievali. Vedi Dorandi 2007, 21 e 27 n. 59.

2 Quint. 8.6.64.

3 D.L. 3.37.

4 Solmsen 1965, 182-5 = 1968, 55-8.

giunta non troviamo traccia di questa rubrica, è possibile concluderne che essa faceva parte di una prima redazione che era stata poi eliminata nel momento in cui il filosofo preparò la versione finale della *Repubblica*. È difficile immaginare che sia stato Platone a collocare quel passo al posto sbagliato: “We probably have to think of an editor who had access to Plato’s discarded drafts.”⁵ L’errore si sarebbe prodotto con verosimiglianza nel momento in cui i membri dell’Accademia prepararono l’edizione postuma dei *Dialoghi*.

Esempi di rimaneggiamenti e riscritture da parte di Platone sono stati reperiti anche in altri dialoghi.

Secondo Thesleff, una prima redazione del *Gorgia* sarebbe stata riscritta e rielaborata con ulteriori e importanti modifiche nella struttura e nel contenuto.⁶

Per il *Teeteto*, nell’anonimo commento a quel dialogo tramandato in maniera lacunosa dal PBerol. inv. 9782 (II sec. d.C.), leggiamo:

Circola anche un altro proemio, piuttosto insipido, all’incirca dello stesso numero di righe, che inizia “Orsù, ragazzo, hai con te il discorso intorno a Teeteto?” Il proemio genuino è quello che inizia “Sei appena arrivato, Terspione ...?”⁷

Questa testimonianza è stata addotta a conforto della tesi che anche il *Teeteto* fosse stato soggetto a una revisione dopo una prima redazione (*Ur-Theaethetus*).⁸

Un caso più complesso si registra infine nel *Cratilo*. Il lettore si trova qui di fronte a due versioni differenti di un medesimo passo (438a3-b7): una versione A e una versione B. La versione A (437d10-438a2 e 438b4-7), che presenta un testo più ampio e che è trasmessa dal codice W (*Vindobonensis Suppl. Gr.* 7, XI s.) e dai suoi apografi, e la versione B (438a3-b4), più breve, tramandata dai restanti manoscritti. La versione A è considerata anch’essa autentica dagli editori del primo tomo del nuovo Platone di Oxford, E. A. Duke e W. S. M. Nicoll, che pubblicano le due redazioni in parallelo.

La questione è assai spinosa e non ancora risolta.⁹ Mi limito qui a richiamare sommariamente la posizione di Sedley che ha cercato sul fonamen-

5 Solmsen 1965, 184 = 1968, 57.

6 Thesleff 2007, 78-82.

7 P. Berol. inv. 9782, col. 3.28-37 Bastianini-Sedley, da cui è tratta anche la traduzione. Il problema del doppio prologo è bene studiato da Carlini 1994, 83-7.

8 Tarrant 1988, 116-22, al quale riviene la definizione *Ur-Theaethetus*. Si tenga tuttavia conto del sensato *caveat* di Carlini 1994, 86.

9 Dorandi 2007, 131-4 e 138-9 n. 38-51.

to, tra l'altro, di interessanti argomenti filosofici, di confermare la paternità platonica delle due versioni.¹⁰

Sedley sostiene che la versione A non conviene al *Cratilo* quale leggiamo oggi; essa conserva piuttosto tracce di una stesura più antica del dialogo con qualche differenza nella struttura e nel contenuto. Nel riprendere la redazione del *Cratilo*, Platone ne avrebbe approfittato anche per introdurre una significativa correzione. Nella prima stesura sembra che Platone non avesse ancora operato la fondamentale separazione di ruoli tra il legislatore linguista e il suo ispettore, il dialettico, ma che avesse supposto che il primo fosse uno specialista che poteva impersonare entrambi i ruoli. Per spiegare come la versione A sia giunta fino a noi, Sedley suppone che essa fosse copiata nel margine di alcune "edizioni" antiche, in parallelo al testo della versione B. Lo stesso fenomeno si sarebbe prodotto anche per un altro passo del medesimo dialogo (385b2-d1), la cui anomala posizione era già stata sottolineata da Schofield, che aveva proposto di spostarlo subito dopo 387c6.¹¹

If I am right, a passage carrying a self-contained argument which Plato must have later come to think of as seriously mistaken appeared in an early edition of the *Cratylus* but was meant to be excluded from the later edition which we possess.... The likely explanation is ... that an early Platonic scholar, coming upon the first edition of the dialogue, copied the offending passage into the margin, presumably as close as he could get it to the part of the dialogue in which it originally occurred, and that ... it got inadvertently copied into the text.¹²

È il momento di ritornare alla *Repubblica* e riprendere la discussione su un aspetto della sua tradizione, certo marginale rispetto a altri relativi al contenuto e allo spessore filosofico del dialogo, ma tuttavia intrigante per più ragioni come prova la rinnovata attenzione che, dopo lunghi anni silenzio, ha di recente suscitato.

II. La *Repubblica* in sei libri

Una divisione della *Repubblica* diversa da quella tradizionale in dieci libri già conosciuta da Trasillo è chiaramente testimoniata nell'*Antiatticista*, un

10 Sedley 2003, 6-14. Su posizioni simili, ma con altri argomenti Valenti 1998.

11 Schofield 1972.

12 Sedley 2003, 13.

lessico compilato nel II sec. d.C., ma fondato su fonti autorevoli più antiche, talune di epoca ellenistica. Se ne conserva solo una redazione abbreviata trasmessa dal codice *Parisinus Coislinianus* 345 (X sec. ex.).¹³

Disponiamo oggi della moderna e eccellente edizione curata da Valente¹⁴ che viene qui per la prima volta utilizzata in questo tipo di indagine.

Nella redazione attuale del lessico, la *Repubblica* è citata 38 volte spesso con l'indicazione del numero del libro al quale il lemma si riferisce. In 20 casi, l'Antiatticista lascia presupporre il ricorso a un esemplare in cui la *Repubblica* era divisa in sei libri e non nei tradizionali dieci. In quattro casi, l'opera è (almeno oggi) citata senza indicazione del numero del libro; in dodici altri, l'individuazione dei passi rispettivi è incerta vuoi per la genericità del lemma vuoi per problemi di ordine testuale. Significativi sono infine i due lemmi per i quali si deve presumere il ricorso a un esemplare della *Repubblica* nella tradizionale divisione in dieci libri: α 53 (ἀμαρτία: Πλάτων Πολιτείας α' [= 1.340d6, 1.342b6] καὶ β [= 2.379d1]) e forse anche ο 1 (ὁμίλια ... Πλάτων Πολιτείας δ' [= 4.431a7?]).¹⁵

13 Non prendo consapevolmente in conto il passo di Aulo Gellio (14.3.3): *Xenophon inclito illi operi Platonos, quod de optimo statu reipublicae civitatisque administrandae scriptum est, lectis ex eo duobus fere libris, qui primi in vulgus exierant opposuit contra conscripsitque diversum regiae administrationis genus, quod παιδείας Κύρου inscriptum est*, “Senofonte dopo avere letto più o meno i due libri che per primi erano stati divulgati di quella famosa opera di Platone che era stata scritta sulla migliore forma di costituzione e sulla amministrazione della stato, oppose loro uno scritto su un diverso tipo di gestione del potere regio, che intitolò παιδεία Κύρου, *Ciropedia*” (traduzione mia). Se intendiamo (Canfora 2014, 29-31) *primi* nel senso “per primi” e non “i primi (due)” viene infatti meno ogni possibile riferimento a una diversa suddivisione in libri della *Repubblica*, che pure è stata ammessa fino a tempi assai recenti. Dopo Hirmer 1897, 654 e Alline 1915, 15 n1 (per i quali *primi* indicherebbe i libri 1-4.427c), vedi almeno Sedley 2013, 70 n3 (Gellio “could hardly refer to anything less than the first *three* books in the familiar division”) e Tarrant 2012a, 72-3 (*primi* indicherebbe il testo fino a circa la metà dell’attuale libro 5). Nella interpretazione di Canfora i libri della *Repubblica* che “per primi” furono diffusi da Platone e che spinsero Senofonte a scrivere la *Ciropedia* sarebbero quelli centrali della divisione tradizionale, cioè 4 e 5.

14 Valente 2015.

15 Il secondo caso (o 1) è più incerto. Gli altri luoghi ai quali è possibile pensare sono R. 8.550b4, 8.560b3, 9.575a5, 10.611e1 e 10.613c6 già indicati da Hirmer 1897, 678. Ma gli ultimi passi creano problemi anche per chi ammetta una divisione in sei libri e l'identificazione con il luogo del libro 4 oltre che rispettare lo stato della tradizione bene si adatta (Hirmer) alla tradizionale “Zehntheilung”.

Ne risulta evidente che le fonti alle quali l'Antiatticista attinge avevano avuto accesso a due esemplari diversi della *Repubblica*: in uno essa era suddivisa in sei libri, nell'altro in dieci.¹⁶

Resta il problema cruciale dei rapporti fra le due suddivisioni, che si declina, a sua volta, in una serie di questioni legate fra loro, alcune delle quali ancora *sub iudice*.

Per cominciare: la *Repubblica* in sei libri conteneva lo stesso materiale di quella in dieci oppure una redazione più breve priva di una parte del testo quale oggi leggiamo? E di conseguenza: si trattava di redazioni composte entrambe da Platone in momenti diversi, oppure di un'unica redazione che corrispondeva a quella di cui disponiamo oggi, ma che era stata suddivisa da lui stesso (o da qualcun altro) in maniera diversa e cioè in sei e in dieci libri?

Né si può infine escludere che le due *Repubbliche* in sei e in dieci libri fossero piuttosto “edizioni” differenti della medesima opera, indipendenti dalla volontà di Platone e preparate da ignoti γραμματικοί che in periodi distinti e indeterminabili avevano diversamente distribuito in sei e in dieci libri il testo dell'opera copiato in precedenza su rotoli la cui estensione non corrispondeva ancora a una equivalenza rotolo/libro qualunque ne fosse la loro lunghezza.

III. Tarrant vs Sedley

La tendenza oggi è quella di privilegiare, seppure con argomenti e per ragioni diverse, l'ipotesi che entrambe le redazioni risalgono, in un modo o nell'altro, a Platone stesso. Saremmo pertanto di fronte a due redazioni della *Repubblica* curate dal filosofo e non a due “edizioni” frutto del lavoro filologico di dotti più tardi.

Ne sono esempio gli articoli di Harold Tarrant (2012a) e di David Sedley (2013) usciti più o meno in contemporanea. Ognuno dei due studiosi dichiara di avere conoscenza delle tesi dell'altro, ma nessuno dei due prende posizione nei confronti dell'altro.

16 Un altro esempio significativo del ricorso dell'Antiatticista a più fonti distinte può essere indicato nelle citazioni della *Antidosi* di Isocrate come prova il fatto che l'orazione è indicata con ben quattro titoli differenti. Vedi Pinto 2012, 367 (con bibliografia nella n. 33).

Comincio con una succinta presentazione di questi contributi e là dove necessario di ricerche precedenti con le quali Tarrant e Sedley si confrontano.

Tarrant si propone di dimostrare che Platone scrisse due redazioni della *Repubblica*, una in sei e una in dieci libri, in due momenti distinti.¹⁷

L'Attiaticista ebbe a disposizione una redazione della *Repubblica* che presentava numerose divergenze rispetto a quella attuale e che era divisa in sei libri e non in dieci.¹⁸ Questa redazione in sei libri nella quale Tarrant individua uno stadio "sub-final" della *Repubblica* risaliva probabilmente intorno al 367 a.C., all'epoca cioè del secondo viaggio di Platone in Sicilia. Essa non solo presentava singolari varianti significative di lingua e di stile, ma era anche più breve poiché non comprendeva ancora certe sezioni presenti nella versione definitiva e soprattutto vi mancavano l'attuale libro 8 e gran parte del 9. Poiché questi due libri si collocano stilisticamente (evitano in particolare lo iato) all'opposto del libro 1 ("VIII and IX still differ from the core-*Republic* in the opposite direction from Book I.")¹⁹ essi devono essere stati fra gli ultimi composti da Platone.²⁰

Assuming that our extant version represents Plato's final intentions, one may presume that significant revision was undertaken *after* the six-book version used by the Ur-Antiatticist was in place.²¹

Più nei dettagli, Tarrant sottolinea come alcune citazioni della *Repubblica* nel lessico dell'*Ur-Antiatticist* si distinguono spesso dal testo che leggiamo oggi e lasciano presupporre anche lacune talora assai ampie rispetto a quest'ultimo.²² A partire da un esame dell'insieme degli estratti dei dialoghi platonici riprodotti nel lessico, è possibile infine ricostruire la fisionomia della collezione di *Platonica* di cui l'*Ur-Antiatticist* disponeva: "The library used by the Ur-Antiatticist...would seem to have had *no Pla-*

17 Tarrant 2012a, 52-78.

18 La situazione è, in realtà, più complessa poiché almeno una delle fonti dell'Antiatticista conobbe e usò anche una *Repubblica* in dieci libri.

19 Tarrant 2012a, 70.

20 Tarrant 2012a, 65-70: "The Stylometry of *Republic* VIII and IX".

21 Si noti che Tarrant impiega la discutibile espressione *Ur-Antiatticist* (il corsivo qui e altrove è mio) per designare il redattore del lessico nella sua forma originaria, cioè prima di essere sottoposto a una operazione di epitomazione. *Contra* Valente 2015, 37 n223 che opportunamente sottolinea come Tarrant avanzi "without full awareness of the nature of Greek lexicography" e bolla di "untenable" la sua idea di un *Ur-Antiatticist*.

22 Tarrant 2012a, 52-6, da cui le citazioni che seguono. I corsivi sono nel testo di Tarrant.

tonic work from the late period.”²³ Dal che Tarrant deduce che l'*Ur-Antiaticist* non disponeva dei dialoghi tardi caratterizzati dalla scelta di evitare lo iato:

If the texts were assembled before the late dialogues were written, then (a) they may offer insights into which works were circulating at a moment well before the end of Plato's life, while (b) the six-book division would itself almost certainly go back to that same time. One would then confidently suppose that the six-book division is Plato's own division, whether or not it was a division of the complete text as we have it.²⁴

Poiché l'*Ur-Antiaticist* appare assai accurato nelle altre citazioni di dialoghi platonici, se ne deve concludere che così egli operò anche con la *Repubblica* e che il testo di quest'ultima differiva notevolmente da quello attuale. La *Repubblica* in sei libri, sebbene contenesse molto materiale che ritroviamo nella redazione in dieci libri, se ne discostava quindi in molti punti anche significativi:

The *Ur-Antiaticist* somehow appears to have been using a rather selective Platonic library, entirely free of hiatus-avoiding dialogues, and with a six-book *Republic* that cannot be identical to our *Republic* unless one assumes that he was less reliable when citing the *Republic* than when citing other Platonic works.²⁵

Di conseguenza, se ammettiamo che la versione in dieci libri rappresenta lo stato ultimo della riflessione di Platone in tema di *politeiai*, dobbiamo presupporre che dopo la redazione in sei libri, la *Repubblica* venne sottoposta da parte del filosofo a una ulteriore profonda e significativa revisione.

Tarrant cerca anche di determinare dove l'*Ur-Antiaticist* aveva potuto reperire la sua collezione parziale e più antica di *Platonica*. Nel 367/6, nel periodo in cui si pensa approssimativamente che Platone compose le opere del periodo intermedio, il filosofo era in Sicilia per la seconda volta, a Siracusa su invito di Dione dopo la morte di Dionigi il Vecchio e la presa di potere di Dionigi il Giovane. È intorno a questa data e in queste regioni che, se non Platone stesso, forse Ermodoro (fr. 1-3 Isnardi Parente), avevano potuto far circolare una prima stesura della *Repubblica* che corrispondeva appunto a quella ancora in sei libri. Poiché, continua Tarrant, ci sono

23 Tarrant 2012a, 55.

24 Tarrant 2012a, 56.

25 Tarrant 2012a, 70.

elementi interni al lessico dell'Antiatticista che provano che l'anonimo redattore poté anche lui lavorare in Sicilia o almeno nell'Italia del Sud, è dunque in questa zona geografica che egli reperì il manoscritto da cui estrasse di prima mano tutte le sue citazioni dai dialoghi platonici.²⁶

Ammessso che la redazione della *Repubblica* utilizzata dall'*Ur-Antiatticist* non era la stessa che leggiamo oggi e che questa versione in sei libri circolò in un specifico momento nel mondo greco, Tarrant ne trae le seguenti conclusioni finali:

1. This provides further evidence of dialogues undergoing development and revision;
2. There should be no expectation that the content of each of the Antiatticist's books can be accurately determined with reference to the Stephanus pages of our own edition;
3. It is likely that his version was missing Book VIII and much of IX;
4. There is no evidence that his version contained much of what we know as Book II, and the assumptions that his first book ended at around 368 are unwarranted, since we cannot presume that anything prior to that was in his text;
5. There is no direct evidence that his version had very much at all corresponding to roughly V.475-VI.499;
6. There is no evidence that book five went beyond the end of our Book VII;
7. Hence there is no evidence that his books were of greater length than the books of our *Republic*.²⁷

Diversa e per molti aspetti più convincente, è la posizione di Sedley. Lo studioso parte dal presupposto che Platone aveva scritto una sola redazione della *Repubblica* e che fu lui stesso (oppure qualcuno sotto la sua diretta sorveglianza) che provvide a una divisione dell'opera in sei libri.²⁸

La suddivisione tradizionale in dieci libri venne invece proposta per la prima volta da Trasillo (I sec. d.C.) o almeno circolò solo dopo i tardi anni 50 a.C. quando Cicerone compose la propria *Respublica* anche lui in sei libri.²⁹

26 Tarrant 2012a, 70-4. A ragione, Valente 2015, 37 n223 giudica l'ipotesi "groundless" e invita alla massima prudenza ("should be received with extreme caution").

27 Tarrant 2012a, 75-6.

28 Sedley 2013, 70-4.

29 Sedley 2013, 70, ma con un opportuno *caveat* nella nota 2. Vedi anche Tarrant 2012a, 72.

Apparentemente Gellio, nel tardo II sec. d.C., avrebbe fatto riferimento alla medesima suddivisione e essa fu senza alcun dubbio utilizzata dal suo contemporaneo Antiatticista.³⁰

Se ci sono buoni elementi—continua Sedley—per ammettere che la versione in sei libri è più antica di quella in dieci, resta pur sempre aperta la questione se essa risale a Platone stesso. È evidente che la *Repubblica* nella sua globalità è troppo lunga per essere copiata in un solo rotolo di papiro; essa dovette dunque essere suddivisa in più volumi o da Platone stesso o da uno scriba. La prima eventualità appare più probabile, ma anche ammettendo la seconda, è evidente che lo scriba dovette lavorare sotto la diretta sorveglianza dell'autore. Sedley rinuncia pertanto all'ipotesi corrente proposta da Hirmer (e Alline) che la divisione di opere lunghe in più libri fosse introdotta soltanto in età ellenistica, convinto che già all'epoca di Platone questa pratica era in uso.³¹

Siamo in grado di farci una idea approssimativa della struttura della *Repubblica* in sei libri grazie alle ricerche di Hirmer, anche se dobbiamo ammettere che quest'ultimo fu “overconfident” nella ricostruzione di tutti i dettagli.³²

La versione in sei libri/rotoli non era più breve rispetto a quella in dieci (come suppone Tarrant), ma aveva la stessa estensione. Platone aveva operato una suddivisione diversa con cesure fra i singoli libri che non corrispondono a quelle tradizionali. Così sistemata, la *Repubblica* risulta molto più interessante perché “The endings of its books were such as to leave the reader poised for a continuation”:

The six-book schema, thus understood, is an artful enough construction to be Plato's own, and we would consider seriously the possibility that it was ... Unlike the ten-book division, the six-book division may have served to minimise the dialogue's fragmentation into discrete episodes, and to maximise its continuity as a single conversation across the unavoidable endings of scrolls ... it indicates that he was keen for

30 Per Gellio, vedi comunque *supra* n. 13. Per l'Antiatticista è necessario parlare della sua fonte o di una delle sue fonti visto che costui non ebbe accesso di prima mano alla *Repubblica*. Vedi Valente 2015, 31-42.

31 Sedley 2013, 71 e n6 con esempi tratti dal *corpus Aristotelicum*. La questione è tuttavia più complessa e per molti aspetti ancora incerta. Vedi *infra*, 43.

32 Hirmer 1897, 589-92 (seguito da Alline 1915, 14-9). Sedley 2013, 72 ripropone una forma semplificata dello schema di Hirmer da lui indipendentemente verificato.

the *Republic*, despite its great length, to be read as a single continuous conversation.³³

L'ipotesi di Sedley è senza dubbio molto più concreta e aderente di quella di Tarrant alla realtà fattuale. Anch'essa si fonda tuttavia su alcuni presupposti che mi lasciano scettico in ragione dei molteplici lati ancora oscuri della trasmissione del testo di Platone nell'Antichità nonché dei metodi compositivi del filosofo.

IV. Edizioni non redazioni della *Repubblica*

La questione della suddivisione della *Repubblica* in libri (sei o dieci) va ripresa da un altro punto di vista tenendo conto sia di quel poco che sappiamo delle pratiche "editoriali" degli autori tra V e IV sec. a.C. sia di quello che conosciamo (purtroppo molto poco) della forme librarie in cui i testi letterari allora circolavano.

Sedley dà per scontato che all'epoca di Platone fosse già corrente la pratica di dividere in libri, la cui estensione era quella di un rotolo di papiro "of suitable length", opere troppo grandi per essere contenute in un unico volume.³⁴

La situazione è in realtà più complessa. Studi recenti hanno rimesso in discussione o almeno ridimensionato una parte di queste acquisizioni.

In particolare, Corcella ha ribadito l'idea "oggi generalmente accettata che le divisioni in libri delle superstiti opere lunghe in prosa del V secolo (Erodoto e Tuciddide) non risalgono agli autori". È nel IV secolo infatti e più in particolare con Eforo di Cuma (400-c. 330 a.C.)³⁵ che comincia e si difonde la pratica da parte di un autore di "una cosciente e calcolata divi-

33 Sedley 2013, 72-3. A partire da questi presupposti nel seguito dell'articolo, Sedley propone in un dialogo con Rowe 2007 una rilettura di quella che definisce "the dialogue's long central digression" (74). La digressione, che inizia a 471c e arriva alla fine del libro 7, interrompe il discorso sulla psicologia tripartita e le virtù cardinali di cui non è più traccia nei libri 5-7 e la cui scomparsa non è accidentale, ma solo temporanea.

34 Sedley 2013, 72.

35 Come si deduce dal confronto fra due passi di Diodoro Siculo 5.1.4 Ἐφορος ... κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐπιτέτευχε· τῶν γὰρ βιβλίων ἐκάστην πεποιήκε περιέχειν κατὰ γένους τὰς πράξεις, "Eforo ... si trovò confrontato con la distribuzione (del materiale); fece in modo infatti che ogni libro contenesse le vicende per genere" e 16.76.5 Ἐφορος ... βιβλούς γέγραφε τριάκοντα, προοίμιον ἐκάστη προθεῖς, "Eforo ... scrisse trenta libri premettendo a ciascuno un proemio" (traduzione mia).

sione della sua opera in libri, che la tradizione successiva non poteva alterare.”³⁶

Già Sedley aveva richiamato a sostegno della propria ipotesi il fatto che i trattati del *corpus Aristotelicum* erano già diffusi in una forma che presupponeva una loro distribuzione in rotoli/libri di lunghezza ideale.³⁷

Con il *corpus Aristotelicum* siamo comunque già in pieno IV sec. Pur ammettendo che sia stato Aristotele stesso a decidere se e come suddividere in singoli libri/rotoli trattati lunghi, il suo esempio (almeno per chi accetti le conclusioni di Corcella) è relativamente troppo tardo per dedurne che tra V e IV secolo Platone avesse praticato lo stesso metodo nel momento di redigere e mettere in circolazione opere come la *Repubblica*.³⁸

Corcella non discute della doppia divisione (in sei e in dieci libri) della *Repubblica*, ma nota, *en passant*:

Relativamente brevi sono ... anche i libri in cui appaiono divise la *Repubblica* e le *Leggi* platoniche; né troppo stupisce che, tra Platone e Filippo di Opunte, l'Accademia abbia adottato libri/rotoli di dimensioni analoghe a quelle attestate per Aristotele.³⁹

È evidente che Corcella prende qui in considerazione la divisione tradizionale dei due dialoghi rispettivamente in dieci e dodici libri. Comunque sia, quello su cui vorrei insistere è l'attribuzione della suddivisione in libri della *Repubblica* e delle *Leggi* all'attività “editoriale” dei primi Accademici e più in particolare del filosofo e segretario di Platone, Filippo di Opunte (IV sec.).⁴⁰

36 Corcella 2013, 25-74. Citazioni rispettivamente da 43-4. Con un rimando a Parmeggiani 2011, 81-97, in particolare 81-3.

37 Sedley 2013, 71 e n6. Non entro in merito alle dibattute e ancora irrisolte vicende della formazione del *corpus Aristotelicum* e della sua prima circolazione.

38 Nonostante l'ottimismo di Sedley 2013, 71: “There is no longer any reason to doubt that Plato had already been following the same practice”.

39 Corcella 2013, 69. Con un rimando a Birt 1882, 442 (cf. anche 447 e 476-7).

40 Vedi D.L. 3.37 (test. VI Tarán, fr. 14b Lasserre): “Alcuni raccontano che Filippo di Opunte ricopiò le *Leggi* di Platone quando erano ancora in una stesura provvisoria” (τοὺς Νόμους αὐτοῦ (sc. Πλάτωνος) μετέγραψεν ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ. Traduzione mia). Su cui Dorandi 2007, 22 e 27 n67-70. Alla luce di quanto finora detto, mi domando oggi se con l'espressione ἐν κηρῷ non venga anche indicato che nel manoscritto di Platone le *Leggi* non erano ancora state distribuite in libri. Se così, Filippo non solo aveva provveduto a una revisione formale del testo non rifinito, ma seguendo una pratica ormai invalsa con l'avanzare del IV secolo, aveva altresì proceduto a una distribuzione delle *Leggi* in dodici rotoli/libri (ai quali aggiunse come tredicesimo il suo *Epinomide*).

Molto resta ancora incerto e fluido, ma ci sono elementi sufficienti per riprendere in considerazione ritoccandone qualche punto la vecchia ipotesi di Hirmer e Alline che la redazione della *Repubblica* in sei libri (come quella in dieci) non risalisse a Platone, ma fosse il frutto di una attività “editoriale” posteriore e indipendente.

In altre parole, penso che Sedley abbia ragione a ritenere (dopo Hirmer e Alline) che la *Repubblica* in sei libri era identica a quella in dieci libri, ma abbia torto a attribuire a Platone quell’operazione fondandosi su elementi non provati.

Un’opera come la *Repubblica* ebbe una gestazione assai lunga e si formò per strati o gruppi compatti legati da argomenti o per affinità tematiche, ma non venne concepita in una serie di libri (sei o dieci), qualunque fosse la loro estensione:

A lungo si è pensato che la “data di pubblicazione” del dialogo potesse essere fissata intorno al 375. Ma si tratta di ipotesi del tutto insostenibile poiché nessuna opera antica è stata pubblicata in un determinato anno quasi si trattasse di un libro a stampa, e perché un testo amplissimo come la *Repubblica* è stato certamente composto, e forse via via parzialmente fatto circolare, lungo un esteso periodo di tempo.⁴¹

Non è qui il luogo né il momento per affrontare la complessa, forse insolubile, problematica di quali libri della *Repubblica* siano stati composti prima e quali dopo.⁴²

Se ammettiamo tuttavia lo scenario appena tracciato e nello stesso tempo escludiamo per le ragioni sopra addotte che la *Repubblica* non venne suddivisa in libri da Platone stesso, possiamo immaginarsi che l’opera al momento della sua redazione si presentava distribuita in più rotoli forse di ineguale lunghezza, ma senza che nessuno di essi equivalesse a un libro di una qualsivoglia delle due versioni di cui abbiamo notizia. Come tale, il manoscritto della *Repubblica* era probabilmente conservato, insieme a quello degli altri dialoghi, nell’Accademia.⁴³

Non sappiamo chi né quando né dove o per quali ragioni decise di preparare “edizioni” nelle quali la *Repubblica* era stata suddivisa rispettivamente in sei o dieci libri corrispondenti a altrettanti rotoli ideali.

41 Vegetti 2007, 7, da cui la citazione.

42 Da ultimo Canfora 2014 ha supposto che una *Ur-Politeia* fu concepita e con tutta verosimiglianza messa già in circolazione prima del primo viaggio di Platone in Sicilia nel 388 a.C.

43 Stando a una controversa testimonianza di Antigono di Caristo citata da D.L. 3.66 (fr. 39 Dorandi). Una messa a punto in Dorandi 2015, 38-42.

Si potrebbe pensare ai membri dell'Accademia che lavorarono alla cosiddetta "edizione" accademica degli *opera omnia* del filosofo,⁴⁴ ai filologi alessandrini fra i quali spicca Aristofane di Bisanzio che mostrò un forte interesse per i dialoghi di Platone e la loro organizzazione,⁴⁵ oppure a più tardi "editori" dell'epoca postellenistica o imperiale.⁴⁶

Anche la questione di quale delle due divisioni precedesse l'altra è destinata, almeno per il momento, a restare senza una risposta convincente. *Mutatis mutandis*, la situazione non è diversa da quella della priorità della distribuzione dei dialoghi platonici in trilogie (proposta da Aristofane di Bisanzio) o in tetralogie (proposta da Trasillo).⁴⁷

È stato suggerito che la divisione in dieci libri risalisse a Trasillo sul fondamento della testimonianza di Diogene Laerzio (3.57 = test. 22 Tarrant):

I suoi dialoghi autentici (γνήσιοι διάλογοι) dice (Trasillo) sono in tutto cinquantasei, con la *Repubblica* suddivisa in dieci libri (τῆς μὲν Πολιτείας εἰς δέκα διαιρουμένης) ... e le *Leggi* in dodici.⁴⁸

Niente prova tuttavia in maniera esplicita che la distribuzione in dieci libri sia stata operata effettivamente per la prima volta da Trasillo. In ogni modo, sia nella divisione tetralogica dei dialoghi di Trasillo sia in quella trilogica di Aristofane di Bisanzio di cui riferisce Diogene Laerzio (3.61-2 = fr. 463 Slater), la *Repubblica* è sempre considerata come una unità, cioè un elemento della tetralogia o della trilogia alla quale viene ricondotta.⁴⁹

Qualche elemento complementare sulla cronologia relativa delle due versioni potrebbe venire semmai dalle ulteriori considerazioni di Corcella

44 Dorandi 2013, 110-3. Ulteriore bibliografia è citata a 112 n5.

45 Vedi D.L. 3.61-2 su cui Lucarini 2010-2011 con discussione della precedente bibliografia e Dorandi 2015, 39-40.

46 Cf. Dorandi 2014, 16-21.

47 Riesaminata da Lucarini 2010-2011.

48 Traduzione mia. La testimonianza è bene analizzata da Boter 1992 discutendo la questione assai dibattuta del titolo della *Repubblica* (probabilmente non platonico): Πολιτεία oppure Πολιτεῖαι. Questo articolo, le cui conclusioni mi appaiono convincenti, è purtroppo sfuggito all'attenzione di Tarrant 2012b.

49 È provato che Aristofane di Bisanzio, e in particolare la sezione iniziale delle *Parole* (Λέξεις) intitolata *Sulle parole che si sospetta non siano state usate dagli antichi* (Περὶ τῶν ὑποπτευομένων μὴ εἰρῆσται τῶν παλαιῶν), è una delle fonti principali dell'Antiatticista (Valente 2015, 31-4). Non sappiamo purtroppo se i lemmi con le citazioni platoniche (o almeno una parte di essi, fra i quali quelli con citazioni della *Repubblica*) derivano da quello scritto. Né tantomeno possiamo dire se Aristofane avesse conosciuto la *Repubblica* suddivisa in sei libri oppure anche quella in dieci. Entrambe (lo ripeto e ci insisto) sono infatti citate nelle pagine dell'Antiatticista.

relative alla lunghezza dei rotoli/libri tra il IV secolo e l'epoca ellenistica. Sono considerazioni in sé lecite, ma che utilizzerei tuttavia con cautela.

L'estensione dei libri in cui vennero suddivise, a cominciare dal IV secolo, opere lunghe corrisponde a quella di un canto di Omero o di una tragedia "e non a caso in età ellenistica e imperiale avviene che i troppo brevi canti omerici, in origine certo pensati come rotoli, vengano accorpati in gruppi di due, tre, forse addirittura quattro in rotoli più lunghi". Omero potrebbe avere fatto testo "in una prima fase dell'evoluzione libraria".⁵⁰ Poiché è largamente attestato per autori del IV secolo il fenomeno di adottare una divisione delle proprie opere lunghe "in libri più brevi di quelli normalmente attestati altrove ... è legittimo pensare che si tratti di una caratteristica di questa epoca". Queste divisioni d'autore furono "presto dimenticate in favore di una divisione in libri lunghi che risentiva dell'uso più tardo". Il che:

consente di ipotizzare ragionevolmente che nel IV secolo, almeno in certi ambienti, si usasse dividere i testi in prosa in libri/rotoli relativamente brevi (più o meno tra i 500 e i 1500 righe "normali" di 34-38 lettere, con sporadiche punte fino a 1900), la cui lunghezza non era troppo differente da quella di un canto omerico o di un rotolo contenente una tragedia.

In un'epoca successiva, "si affermarono invece libri e rotoli generalmente più lunghi (fino ai 4000 righe)".⁵¹

Chi accolga questi risultati e li applichi a quello che conosciamo sulla suddivisione in sei e dieci libri della *Repubblica* di Platone, ammettendo bene inteso che il testo di entrambe fosse lo stesso, ne potrebbe eventualmente desumere che la versione in dieci libri precedette cronologicamente quella in sei libri e cioè che da una "edizione" in rotoli più corti si passò a una in rotoli più lunghi.

Ancora una volta, prudenza si impone perché non conosciamo quasi niente sulle pratiche librerie dei secoli V e IV in ragione della mancanza quasi totale di documenti materiali (frammenti di rotoli di papiro) di confronto.

50 Corcella 2013, 69-70 da cui le citazioni che seguono. Corcella (69 n. 57) si richiama a Schironi 2010, 41-4.

51 Corcella 2013, 67-68 rimanda in particolare a Hemmerdinger 1951, 83-8 e insiste in particolare sulle sue premesse (83): "À Alexandrie, la longueur des rouleaux de papyrus tripla brusquement à la suite de la création de la grande bibliothèque, au début du III^e siècle avant notre ère".

A parte il papiro di Timoteo (P.Berol. inv. 9875, s. IV), che tramanda un testo in poesia trascritto in righe “normali”, cioè senza rispetto della originale colometria del poema, l’altro esempio di cui disponiamo (questo in prosa e in poesia), è il rotolo di Derveni (IV s.). La sua *mise en colonne*, anch’essa in righe “normali”, può qui essere stata influenzata (o imposta) dalla successione di parti in prosa agli esametri del poema orfico intorno al quale la trattazione dell’anonimo autore si sviluppa.

V. Per concludere

L’ipotesi che, alla luce dei dati disponibili, mi appare più verosimile e in linea con quello che conosciamo delle pratiche librerie dell’epoca di Platone, è quella che il filosofo non abbia diviso lui stesso la *Repubblica* in libri, ma che questa operazione sia stata più tarda e sia nata in ambienti diacronicamente lontani frutto di diverse pratiche librerie e direi anche “editoriali:”

However since our knowledge of the internal workings of the Academy is extremely limited and since we know nothing definite about the circumstances of publication, next to nothing about Plato’s “secretaries”, and noting at all about what became of his drafts and discarded versions, it would be most unwise to indulge in further speculations.⁵²

Comunque stiano le cose, ritengo si possa comunque condividere la proposta di Sedley che Platone concepì la *Repubblica* come un tutto organico e unitario che “despite its great length” doveva essere letta “as a single continuous conversation.”⁵³

Il titolo—“Una redazione della *Repubblica* di Platone in sei libri?”—di questo contributo scritto in onore del mio amico e collega *in rebus Peripateticis* Eckart Schütrumpf, potrebbe dunque essere infine riformulato in maniera più esplicita in “Una edizione della *Repubblica* di Platone in sei libri?” oppure *tout court* “Due edizioni antiche della *Repubblica* di Platone in sei e dieci libri.”

52 Solmsen 1965, 57 = 1968, 184.

53 Della necessità di abbandonare “our habitual talk of distinct books, and instead to stick with Stephanus page references” (Sedley 2013, 73) decideranno altri.

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Justice in the Ninth Book of Plato's *Laws* and in the Fifth Book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics**

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Although justice is the only virtue to which Aristotle devoted a complete book and although it plays a central role in his political theory and his ethics, research on the different aspects of justice as a whole is still relatively scarce, and even fewer studies exist concerning the relationship of justice to the Academic background. The last comprehensive account on the issue is Max Salomon's book.¹ In spite of their titles, Wolfgang von Leyden² mainly analyzed the concept of equality and Fred D. Miller, Jr.³ dedicated only 19 pages of his book entitled *Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics* to the topic of justice.⁴ Other monographs focus on specific aspects of Aristotle's theory of justice, such as distributive justice or the natural law.⁵ There are also several contributions that take into account various aspects of the concept of justice, among which is the well-known study by Hans Kelsen.⁶ Nevertheless, a major work on this concept still needs to be written. It is interesting to note, for example, that the collections of papers about Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics* edited by Fritz-Peter Hager⁷ or Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji⁸ do not contain any articles on Aristotle's concept of justice. Although during the last decades, the interest in justice has clearly flourished, as the works of William Mathie,⁹

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1 Salomon 1937.

2 von Leyden 1985.

3 Miller 1995.

4 Touloumakos' 1990-1997 report on Aristotle's *Politics* shows a similar state of affairs.

5 Cf., e.g., Knoll 2009 or Burns 2011.

6 Kelsen 1957. Cf. Ritchie 1894; Trude 1955; Faulkner 1972; Hantz 1975; Rosen 1975; Koch 1978; Winthrop 1978; Cropsey 1977; Williams 1980; Keyt 1985.

7 Hager 1972.

8 Barnes, Malcom, and Sorabji 1977.

9 Mathie 1987.

Bernard Yack,¹⁰ Ulrich Manthe,¹¹ Manuel Knoll¹² or Tony Burns¹³ show, in comparison to the enormous amount of studies about the evolution of the Aristotelian ethical thought or the layers of his ethical and political treatises, these works are of surprising, if not astonishing, scarcity.

This relative oblivion of Aristotle's theory of justice is perhaps related to the fact that finding a congruous approach to the problem of justice in Aristotle's work is rather difficult. Kurt von Fritz has already pointed to the structural and stylistic difficulties of the book.¹⁴ Delba Winthrop, the Harvard political theorist, argued in a well-known but misleading paper about the present subject, that for Aristotle "a politics that understands its highest purpose as justice and a political science that attempts to comprehend all political phenomena within a theory of justice are practically and theoretically unsound."¹⁵ She finds some contradiction between the ideal of virtue as our own good, separate from that of others, and the idea of justice as the good of others.¹⁶ This interpretation relates Aristotle's thought to some sophistic tendencies, as can be found in the Thrasyarchus of the *Republic*, and clearly ignores the central role which the ideas of objective and subjective justice play in Aristotle's practical philosophy. In a recent contribution, Eckart Schütrumpf has pointed to the incongruities of contemporary scholarship in its projections of modern concepts in such a central concept as 'distributive justice' in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*.¹⁷

A better understanding of Aristotle's theory of justice could perhaps be achieved if we took into account the context in which it arose, especially Plato's conception in his last dialogue, the *Laws*. This paper continues the reflections I made elsewhere¹⁸ on the subject of law and tries to contribute to a reflection about the common ground between these two philosophers. A superficial look at the present literature about Aristotle's and Plato's political thought should give convincing reasons to stay on the path that Ada

10 Yack 1990; 1993.

11 Manthe 1996.

12 Knoll 2009.

13 Burns 2011.

14 von Fritz 1980, 241-3.

15 Winthrop 1978, 1201.

16 Winthrop 1978, 1202.

17 Schütrumpf 2017.

18 Cf., e.g., Lisi 2001 and 2018.

Neschke-Hentschke¹⁹ opened more than 40 years ago in this field.²⁰ The subject of justice in both thinkers is very complex, and I do not intend to exhaust the examination of their relation in this paper. I will focus my analysis on some of the aspects I consider most related to the Academic background of what Aristotle calls ‘perfect’ or ‘whole justice’ (ὅλη δικαιοσύνη) in the first chapter of the book devoted to Justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.²¹ I shall also try to point to some of the most important differences between both philosophers concerning this notion of justice.

I. Plato

The Socratic identification between legal (νόμιμον) and just (δίκαιον) is the fundament of Plato's theory of justice, which can be considered an attempt to give an ontological foundation to the Socratic premise. I am not referring here to the Form of Justice, which surely has a central function in this scheme, but rather to the way in which Plato converted Justice into a virtue of the soul, which has, above all, a great significance for the individual. His theory mainly attacks the conceptions of some sophistic currents concern-

19 Neschke-Hentschke 1971.

20 It is still possible to read in the last detailed analysis of the bibliography on Aristotle's *Politics* (Touloumakos 1997, 12-13): “Als Begleiterscheinung der Tugend und als wichtigster Bestandteil der Eudaimonie verstanden wird die Freundschaft in der *Ethik* wie auch in der *Politik* im Zusammenhang mit der Verfassungslehre und der Theorie vom Wandel der Staatsformen betrachtet und stellt, offenbar noch deutlicher als die Eudaimonielehre, den Komplex dar, wo Aristoteles seine Philosophie unmissverständlich von der Moral- und Staatsphilosophie Platons abhebt. Von dieser unterscheidet sich die praktische Philosophie des Aristoteles außerdem durch den Begriff der *mesotes*, die innerhalb der *Ethik*- hier in der Tugendlehre, vor allem aber in der *Politik*- dort im Entwurf der Politie, aber auch in anderen Erörterungen-, bekanntlich eine bestimmende Rolle spielt. Eine Ebenso deutliche Differenzierung zeigen ferner Bedeutungsgehalt und Stellenwert der Gerechtigkeit und der Lehre von der Eudaimonie sowie die für das aristotelische Denken nicht minder charakteristische Erörterung der Frage nach dem Zweck des Staates.” It seems that the author of this enumeration has not read Plato's work. None of the distinctive points mentioned here are exclusively Aristotelian, but all of them belong to Aristotle's Academic background. On the other hand, Miller 1995, 67-86 pays practically no attention to Plato's political theory. This is especially disturbing in his chapter dedicated to Aristotle's concepts of justice and law, which cannot be understood without the Academic background.

21 von Fritz 1980 studied Aristotle's notion of partial justice, but contrary to his express intention, the relationship to the Academic background is not taken into account.

ing justice. In the *Republic*, Thrasymachus defines justice as an ἀγαθὸν ἄλλότριον, in the sense that it is profitable not for the just man, but mainly for the rulers or for others.²² On the contrary, Socrates' argument aims at showing that justice implies a benefit for its owner. This approach does not mean, as many scholars seems to believe, that for Socrates/Plato justice has no relation to others, but only that its main benefit belongs to the just person. Justice thus becomes a virtue of the soul and implies its ordered state, where the intellect rules over the other components. This order is also identified with the νόμος and the νόμιμον in a well-known passage of the *Gorgias*, where both are seen as conditions that make the virtuous state of the soul possible, a state that is called subjective justice (δικαιοσύνη) and temperance.²³ The identification between lawful and just begins already in the subject's soul, for just actions are the consequence of the soul's well-ordered state. Therefore, justice is primarily a benefit to the subject of the action.²⁴ I believe it would be unnecessary in this context to engage in a discussion about the relation of this new concept of justice as being primarily a virtue of the different components of the soul in their mutual relationship with the Socratic premise *nemo sua sponte peccat*. I would, however, at least like to point to the significance of the notion of justice as it is exposed in the *Gorgias* for the medical approach: justice is the ordered and healthy state of the soul and injustice is equivalent to disease and disorder. This internalization of the virtue of justice is to a certain extent (if not completely) contrary to the traditional meaning of it, where it is a mainly political virtue. But Plato needed to guarantee the claim that only just souls could produce just actions and that only just souls were law-abiding souls, i.e., this was necessary to identify lawfulness with justice. This conception of justice is related to another definition of it: "doing one's own business."²⁵ In so far as each part of the soul/society accomplishes its own task (subjective justice), it creates an objectively just state of the soul/society (objective justice). It is remarkable that in this conception of justice as an individual's own benefit, there is no explicit reference to the relation to others, except the precept of following the ruling part, but there is no refer-

22 R. 1 341c-d.

23 Grg. 504d1-3. In classical Greek, there is a clear differentiation between the virtue of justice, i.e. a characteristic of the acting subject (δικαιοσύνη), and the objective just state of affairs (δίκαιον), which is not always taken into account by the scholarship.

24 This is the appropriate perspective for understanding Socrates' statement that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it.

25 R. 2 370a4; 4 433a8, b4, d8; 9 586e5-6.

ence to reciprocity between the different parts of the soul or of society. Only two principles govern their relationship: the duty to care for the inferior parts of the soul/society on the side of the ruling part, and the duty to follow its norms by the ruled parts.

This approach is also clearly formulated in the last of Plato's dialogues. One of the most interesting passages on this subject is the famous excursus in the penal code of the *Laws*,²⁶ where the Athenian guest exposes the leading philosophical principles of his new conception of penal law.²⁷ The basic principle of his penal code is the Socratic conception that no one does wrong willingly. Of the two main problems present in this passage (compatibility of the penal code with the Socratic paradox and the idea of virtue as knowledge as basis of the system), the first one is solved in a similar manner as in the *Gorgias* and other Platonic dialogues. Wrongdoing is the consequence of different psychological diseases, which the laws of the penal code try to heal. This implies a clear internalization of the notion of justice as human virtue: only a just state of the soul can be the cause of a just action. In other words: it is the inner state of the soul that makes an act just or unjust and not its effects.

And, if my view prevails, we shall often say that the author of a benefit wrongly done commits an injustice; for as a rule, my friends, neither when a man gives some material object to another, nor when he takes it away, ought one term such an act absolutely just or unjust, but only when a man of just character and disposition does any benefit or injury to another.²⁸

This passage seems to be an explicit rejection of the traditional commitment to the effects of the act, which is defined by its results, as it is reflected in Cephalus' position in the first book of the *Republic*.²⁹ Furthermore, the Athenian guest clearly states the corrective and healing aims of penalty.³⁰ Even the death penalty is based on this 'medical' conception of penology.³¹

26 *Lg.* 9 859c-864b.

27 This much-discussed passage has been the object of exceptional scholarly papers (e.g., Saunders 1968 and Schöpsdau 1984), but I also believe that some very important points have been overlooked (cf. Lisi 2008).

28 *Lg.* 9 862a7-b4, translation Bury 1968.

29 *R.* 1 327a-331c.

30 *Lg.* 9 862b5-c4.

31 Cf. *Lg.* 9 862c1-863a2.

From the general context of the *Laws*, it is evident that the aim of the legal norm is to enforce this ordered state of the soul, which we call ‘just’ – or, at least, to make it possible. The citizen should internalize the norm prescribed by law through imitation and, thus, allow the rule of the noetic element over the lower ones. There is a passage in the excursus where the Athenian stranger summarizes the different kinds of crime and the link between lawful and just.³² In this section, the Athenian guest explains the nature of justice and injustice.³³ The latter is the consequence of a disordered state of the soul produced by (a) the violence of the θυμός, (b) the ‘violent’ deceit of the lowest part of the soul and (c) the ‘ignorance’ of the highest element of the psyche. Items (a) and (b) are clearly cases where the lower elements overcome the νοῦς and master the entire personality.³⁴ It is more difficult to determine the nature of (c), ‘ignorance,’ the sick state of mind, because it continues to rule the other souls, but it does so in a wrong way.³⁵

The main issue in this passage is that the state of the soul, which corresponds with justice, consists in the mind’s acceptance of the norm of the city, even if the norm can be wrong in some specific determinations. In other words, the main point here is not a ‘good conscience’ or a true opinion in the broadest sense, but the mere acceptance of the norm of the law, the most complete identification between law-abidance and justice. The Athenian is speaking for the future citizens of Magnesia, whose knowledge of the truth comes from the νόμοι, the social norms in their broadest sense, and is practically based on them. But this definition of justice is valid also for every city; hence, it points to the citizen and not to the goodness of the state. The citizen has the obligation of respecting the written and the unwritten laws and of following the direct indication of the best people (i.e. the rulers) of the city; only in this way can he become just.

The excursus clearly shows the new Platonic conception of justice, in which the emphasis is not so much on the results of an action as on the inner disposition of the individual or the society. This inner disposition consists in the ruling of the mind over the mortal souls in the terminology of the *Timaeus*. Justice is the ordered state of the law-abiding soul. The link between law and justice could also provide some clues as to understanding, for instance, Socrates’ attitude in the *Crito*. But above all, I would like

32 *Lg.* 9 863a3-864c2.

33 Saunders 1968, 421.

34 Cf. *Lg.* 9 863e5-864a1, and esp. δυναστεύουσιν at 863b7.

35 For a more detailed analysis of this difficult passage, cf. Lisi 2008.

to underline the relationship of this conception of justice with the one in the *Republic* as order of the soul. In fact, the right order of the soul is what determines the quality of just. It is possible through a disposition of the soul that blindly accepts the norms of the State. The full identification between 'lawful' and 'just' is the central point in this passage, and as will be shown below, it is the Academic foundation of Aristotle's position in the first chapter of the book dedicated to justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

II. Aristotle's treatment of justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*

The *Nicomachean Ethics* begins and ends with the consideration of happiness. After the determination of happiness as the scope of human life and of happiness as a certain actuality of the soul according to complete virtue (τελείαν ἀρετή) in the first Book, virtue is defined as a state or condition of the soul characterized by being a middle between two extremes (2). This definition of virtue makes it necessary to analyze ethical actions and determine the nature of an intentional deed (3.1-5), the theoretical basis, which will lead the study to the conclusion in book 10 that happiness is achieved in contemplation. Between 3.6 and 9, the work consists mainly in a treatise of the ethical (3.6-5) and intellectual virtues (6-7) and of their actualization in friendship (8-9). Just as justice in some sense represents the highest ethical virtue, friendship expresses the highest manifestation of the virtues of the rational part of the soul. This parallelism is implicitly provided by Aristotle in his treatment of the relationship of justice and friendship in book 8, chapters 9 to 11, and clearly stated in the seventh book of the *Eudemian Ethics*, chapters 9 and 10.

Aristotle picks up his treatment of justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* precisely from the point where Plato had left it off. He begins his analysis by considering the doctrine that sees justice as a state of the soul that lets people perform just actions and wish just things. Then, he goes on to propose a definition of injustice from a similar point of view.³⁶ Aristotle claims that this doctrine of justice is universally accepted (πάντας) and adds the remark that they "want to say" (βουλομένους λέγειν). I do not here intend to discuss the implications of this statement. Some critics have understood the πάντας in its most extensive sense.³⁷ In fact, however, such a doctrine can be found explicitly only in the Platonic dialogues and, as shown above,

36 EN 5.1 1129a6-10.

37 So, e.g., Smith in Joachim 1951, 127n1.

Plato has made this doctrine the center of his speculations about justice, and it could scarcely be stated that, for example, the Sophists defended such a view. Lauretta Seminara maintains that Aristotle is pointing to Plato and the Academy.³⁸ In his commentary to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, John Burnet refers the πάντας to Plato's *Gorgias* 460b.³⁹ Although this passage is also related to the doctrine described by Aristotle, the more radical statement of it can be found in the excursus of the *Laws* analyzed above.

The Academic background of the first chapter lies not only in this definition of justice as a state or disposition (ἕξις) of the soul, which serves as a basis for its treatment.⁴⁰ The idea that science includes the knowledge of contraries is likewise of Platonic origin.⁴¹ There are also Platonic echoes in other passages of the chapter.⁴² Aristotle's theory of justice rests on a criticism of Plato's views, even if it does not mention his name in this chapter. As Seminara correctly points out, this endoxon acts as the basis and point of departure of the whole chapter and of Book 5.⁴³

Aristotle accepts that justice is a state of the soul, but refuses to welcome its reference to a unique semantic kernel.⁴⁴ Its analysis of who can be considered unjust or just reveals two main meanings of objective justice: as legality (τὸ νόμιμον) and as equality (τὸ ἴσον).⁴⁵ The first kind of justice is defined as respect of the principles contained in the social norms.⁴⁶ The just is not related to an absolute norm, but to the content of the social norm of a community, whose goal is the production and preservation of happiness and of its parts for the political community.⁴⁷ Happiness, however, is here defined in a positivist way, since the law aims at the common interest of the existing political regime.⁴⁸ The Platonic origin of this approach is once

38 Seminara 1998, 656-8.

39 Burnet 1900, 204.

40 Cf. *EN* 5.1 1129a10.

41 *EN* 5.1 1129a13-4; cf. Seminara 1998, 663.

42 E.g. *EN* 5.1 1129b1-10. Cf. *Lg.* 3 687a2-688d5; 5 742e4-743c4.

43 Seminara 1998, 655-6; cf. also Dirlmeier 1964, 398-9n3; Caiani 1996, 307n3.

44 εἴκοι δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία ("justice and injustice are apparently polysemic"; *EN* 5.1 1129a26-7, transl. Lisi).

45 *EN* 5.1 1129a34.

46 Cf. *EN* 5.1 1129b11-17.

47 *EN* 5.1 1129b17-19. Aristotle only states this in the case of the community, but there is no explicit indication that it is also the case for the individual.

48 οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ πάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον ("The social norms proclaim on every issue [what is right], aiming at either the benefit of the whole community or of the best or of the people holding power or according to other similar criterion" *EN* 5.1, 1129b14-17; transl. Lisi),.

again evident, since Plato defines the νόμος as the “opinion of the community” (δόγμα τῆς πόλεως) not only in the *Laws*,⁴⁹ but already in the *Republic*.⁵⁰ That Aristotle is thinking in Academic terms and not in some kind of either Protagorean relativism or other form of absolute law positivism is evident from his statement that right enacted laws define these issues rightly, while offhand laws do it worse.⁵¹

This kind of justice is characterized as the use of perfect or complete virtue (τελεία/ὅλη ἀρετή).⁵² It corresponds to what Plato calls πᾶσα ἀρετή⁵³ and can be found in the *Laws*, when the Athenian defines δικαιοσύνη as a mixture of the other three virtues of the soul (φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία).⁵⁴ In fact, Aristotle quotes a proverb, in which the expression ‘whole virtue’ (πᾶσα ἀρετή) appears as another denomination of this kind of subjective justice.⁵⁵

To Plato, the whole virtue reflects the ordered state of the soul, while in Aristotle’s view it implies only the acceptance of the current communal values, and at least in this chapter these values are not related to any absolute philosophical good since the treatment of this issue is postponed although it is clear that Aristotle discriminates between a good citizen and a good man in an absolute way.⁵⁶ In spite of this superficial impression, it should be pointed out that the Aristotelian position is not so different from the one expressed in Plato’s *Laws*, since the Athenian guest is just criticizing the Dorian legislation and its ranking of values, i.e., he argues that a correct legislation should have a right hierarchy of values that are to be followed by the members of the community. In fact, in the ninth book of the *Laws*, Plato treats the violation of the Magnesian code as a manifestation of diseases of the soul, since the ordered state of the citizens’ soul is a reflection of the hierarchy of values and norms present in the legislation.⁵⁷

Aristotle adds a characteristic to complete justice that is not present in the Platonic text in the same way. This characteristic makes the use (χρήσις) of virtue in relation to other people (πρὸς ἕτερον) possible. It is precisely the exercise of all virtues in political life that makes the general or com-

49 *Lg.* 1 644 d3.

50 *R.* 3 414b5-6; 4, 429b-d; cf. Lisi 1985, 64-5.

51 *EN* 5.1 1229b24-25.

52 *EN* 5.1 1129b25-33, cf. 1130b18-20.

53 *Lg.* 2 658a5-c4.

54 *Lg.* 1 631c7-8.

55 *EN* 5.1 1129b30.

56 Cf. *EN* 5.2 1130b26-29.

57 Cf. Lisi 2013.

plete justice the most valuable virtue.⁵⁸ This characterization of complete justice raises the question of whether or not it is a state of soul (ἔξις), like the other virtues. In what follows, Aristotle clarifies what he means: it is a possession, a state of the soul,⁵⁹ which makes the use of all virtues towards others possible. In so far as just actions, i.e., actions according to the law, produce and preserve the happiness of the community,⁶⁰ it is clear that this general or complete justice is the foundation of the community. It is mainly a political virtue, as Aristotle clearly expresses.⁶¹ To sum up: it is the state of the soul that makes the use of the virtues in the public sphere possible. From one point of view, this characterization of justice comes very close to Plato's conception of it as the ordered state of the soul. Nevertheless, Aristotle introduces a crucial change in so far as he creates a specific sphere for it and makes a clear difference between the private and public virtue, a difference that Plato tried to eliminate at any cost. Besides, Aristotle put the stress on the relationship to others and on the congruence of the citizen virtue with the normative content of the law. The norm and the virtue are now adapted to the existing ruling system⁶² and clearly distinguished from the virtues of the pure and simple good man.⁶³

III. Conclusions

Plato tries to internalize the notion of justice by also making it an individual virtue that regulates the relation between the different parts of the soul. It is a pre-political conception of justice that serves as a fundament of the political organization. To him, justice has an ontological value, and similarly to what he did with other key concepts in the Greek tradition of political thought, he tries to relate all the meanings of the concept to a basic kernel: the idea of a right distribution of values and honors. Justice is the order originating in the good hierarchical structure that warrants the rule

58 *EN* 5.1 1129b30-1.

59 Cf. ὁ ἔχων αὐτήν at *EN* 5.1 1129b31-2.

60 *EN* 5.1 1129b17-19.

61 *EN* 5.1 1129b33-1130a1.

62 *EN* 5.1 1129b14-17.

63 Miller's translation of universal justice for the general or complete form does not, if I understand the English expression correctly, reflect the Aristotelian sense, because Aristotle does not mean by ὅλη δικαιοσύνη a kind of justice that is valid everywhere. When he states that "universal justice applies to any polis with laws," Miller 1995, 68 sees a kind of natural law in the text, which is not really there.

of the highest element of the soul. In this sense, justice is order and law, and there are different forms of justice according to the participation of the different political orders in the ideal norm.

Aristotle maintains the importance of justice, and in a certain sense radicalizes the Socratic-Platonic identification of justice and legality. Justice as an expression of the existing legality has now become the complete or perfect virtue. The happiness of the community consists in the actualization of this perfect virtue in the public relationships of its citizens. Happiness is the actualization of the rule of law. Does this mean that, for Aristotle, a pre-political form of justice does not exist, even if we can find some remains of it in his work? In other words, does justice no longer have an ontological foundation in the cosmological order of the world?⁶⁴ If we consider that, for Aristotle, politics according to nature is the scope of political knowledge, his thought still stays on the Academic ground and one could speak of a cosmic or natural foundation of justice in so far as good laws are only those according to the nature of the corresponding people. The distinction between political and the so-called pre-political conceptions of justice are not clearly defined, and neither for Aristotle nor for Plato is it truly useful. As a matter of fact, Plato's notion of justice in the ninth book of the *Laws* is very close to the Aristotelian position. To the Athenian guest, justice is mainly respect and internalization of the law.⁶⁵

Aristotle's position does not imply a complete relativism, since nature is the factor which determines the justice or injustice of an action or a law. Nevertheless, he does not mean a universal nature, but the concrete character of each society.⁶⁶ Here, he maintains the Platonic approach.⁶⁷

There is a point where Aristotle takes a different approach from Plato's *Laws*. In the penal excursus, Plato lets the quality of the action completely depend on the state of the soul that does it.⁶⁸ Some passages could be interpreted in the sense that for Aristotle, the qualification of an act as just or unjust was more located in the intentionality of the subject than in the just or unjust disposition of the soul. His acceptance that an unintentional act

64 Miller 1995, 86.

65 Lisi 2013.

66 Winthrop 1997, 228 asserts that a theory of justice in Aristotle is impossible, because of the completely conventional character of the notion in Aristotle's thought, but the assertion fails the point of the Aristotelian argument because of the reasons adduced here.

67 Cf. Lisi 1985, 197-345.

68 Cf. section I above.

can accidentally be just⁶⁹ seems to imply that the quality of the action depends on its effects more than on the disposition or the state of the subject's soul.⁷⁰ As opposed to Plato, Aristotle considers it possible for a just man to do wrong (ἀδικεῖν), but this does not imply that he then becomes unjust.⁷¹ The qualification of an action depends not only on the intentionality of it, but also on a subject's clear consciousness of his action.⁷² Aristotle shifted the accent from the state of the soul to the intentionality in order to qualify the action. A clearer definition in this sense can be found in the first chapter of the second book of the *Eudemian Ethics*, where virtue is also defined as "the best disposition, or state or ability of everything that has a use or a work"⁷³ subordinated to the ends of the action, then "the work of each thing is its end; from this, therefore, it is plain that the work is a greater good than the state, for the end is the best as being an end."⁷⁴

In a certain way, Aristotle here returns to the traditional conception of justice, since he basically sees it as a political virtue, a virtue that needs the normal interchange of a civic life. Nonetheless, if one takes into account the role of the φρόνησις in the Aristotelian ethics and its function in performing virtue as it is exposed in the thirteenth chapter of the sixth book, it is clear that the soul of the virtuous man should enjoy a similar order to that proposed by Plato, i.e., an order where the highest part rules over the lower components of the soul. The acceptance of the norm of the law by the φρόνησις has similar effects in Aristotle and in Plato, and both thinkers establish a clear link between justice and law. And what is more: Aristotle's definition of happiness as "a certain actualization of the soul according to perfect virtue"⁷⁵ clearly indicates that for him the virtuous and ordered state of the soul is justice in its actualization in the life of the political community.

Plato's definition of justice as τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν connects the political and ethical dimension of virtue. Symptomatically, Aristotle does not mention any limitation of human activity in society as proposed by Plato, but

69 EN 5.8 1135a15-28.

70 Cf. EN 5.8 1135a18-24.

71 EN 5.6 1134a17; cf. Williams 1980, 190. Williams clearly confuses the Aristotelian distinction between perfect and partial justice.

72 Cf. Aristotle's qualification of adultery under the influence of passion as an unjust action committed by a subject who is not unjust. In order to have a real unjust subject, the existence of a rational deliberation is necessary.

73 EE 2.1 1218b37-39; transl. Rackham 1981.

74 EE 2, 1, 1219a8-10; transl. Rackham 1981.

75 ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ; EN 1.13 1102a5-6; transl. Lisi.

he also acknowledges that a human community needs justice as its foundation to preserve its unity. Distributive justice instantiates a middle term in the interchange existing between individuals that have different abilities and functions in the society.⁷⁶ Necessity is what keeps a community together. A right political system should establish a correct distribution of honors according to every citizen's value. Corrective justice should reintroduce equality when the middle term established by the law has been infringed. But all these objective manifestations of justice are not possible, at least in an essential way, without the subjective disposition of justice as *τελεία ἀρετή*.

Aristotle, however, has reintroduced the Thrasymachean view of justice as an alien good, but in a new form: justice is the necessary expression of the exercise of virtue. In Aristotelian terms, virtue can be actualized only in a society, and because of that, justice is the whole of virtue. Contrary to Winthrop's interpretation,⁷⁷ justice is not contrary to human nature or individual interests, but rather it is the necessary premise for the actualization of both of them and for the realization of felicity for the political community.⁷⁸ In the case of justice, Aristotle has given a new foundation to the Socratic-Platonic identification between justice and law-abidance, but the Platonic value of general justice as a state of the soul embracing the whole genus of virtue is a substantial part of his ethical and political theory.

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76 EN 5.5 1133a16-19. This is one of the important functions of money, which I cannot treat here. Cf. Lisi 2017.

77 Winthrop 1978, esp. 1214-6.

78 EN 5.1 1129b17-19.

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Aristoteles' Pragmatien als Literatur

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Die Lektüre der Aristotelischen Schriften stellt den Leser vor nicht geringe Herausforderungen.¹ Diese hat in der Moderne Arthur Schopenhauer in seinen 1851 erschienenen *Kleinen philosophischen Schriften* in Form eines Tadels zusammengefaßt: Aristoteles schreibe planlos und gehe die Dinge so durch,

„wie sie ihm einfallen, ohne sie vorher durchdacht und sich ein deutliches Schema entworfen zu haben: er denkt mit der Feder in der Hand, was zwar eine große Erleichterung für den Schriftsteller, aber eine große Beschwerde für den Leser ist.“²

Dieses Mißempfinden faßt, wenngleich etwas einseitig und überspitzt, einen Eindruck von Heterogenität zusammen, der Leser der Aristotelischen Schriften immer wieder beschäftigt.³ Mit ihm hat sich Werner Jaeger 1912 in seiner Untersuchung der *Metaphysik* eingehend befaßt. Dabei stellte er grundlegende Beobachtungen zu der Mischung von Stilebenen, die sich bei Aristoteles finden lassen, an. Gleichzeitig ist seine Erklärung für den Charakter der Aristotelischen Pragmatien symptomatisch für die Probleme, die der Versuch einer Einordnung der Schriften mit sich bringt. So vermißt Jaeger zwar eine „künstlerische Gliederung dieser heterogenen Schriften und Schriftenkomplexe“ und denkt deshalb an „Vorlesungsschriften“,⁴ stellt aber fest, daß die Lehrschriften „im Durchschnitt“ doch „minutiös ausgearbeitet“ und auf einen je „einheitliche[n] skopós“ ausgerichtet seien.⁵ Damit entsprächen sie den Anforderungen, die die antike Literaturkritik an syntagmatische Schriften, d. h. an ausgearbeitete Werke, gestellt habe. Letztendlich weist Jaeger den Schriften eine Zwitterstellung zu: Sie seien „weder Kolleghefte noch Literatur.“⁶ Dies führt zu seiner Schlußfolgerung, man müsse als das Spezifische der Aristotelischen

1 Vgl. auch van der Eijk 2017, 182.

2 Schopenhauer 1988 (1851), 55-6.

3 Vgl. Flashar 2006, 116-7.

4 Jaeger 1912, 130.

5 Jaeger 1912, 136.

6 Jaeger 1912, 137.

Schriften ihre Publikationsweise sehen. Denn sie schienen trotz ihres unliterarischen Charakters „wie literarische Werke zu einer gewissen Verbreitung bestimmt gewesen zu sein.“⁷ Aus diesem Grund lehnt Jaeger die von Zeller aufgemachte Opposition, daß Aristoteles seine Lehrschriften im Unterschied zu den Dialogen nicht publiziert habe, ab und nimmt eine „Publikation nach altjonischer Weise durch Vorlesung“ innerhalb der Schule an.⁸

In der Folgezeit galt als *communis opinio*, daß es sich bei den Aristotelischen Schriften um Vorlesungsschriften handle. Mit diesem ‚Sitz im Leben‘ konnte man begründen, warum der Duktus teilweise schwer verständlich ist, wenn etwa Voraussetzungen nicht expliziert oder neue Gedankengänge unangekündigt eingeschoben werden.⁹ Man bezeichnete die Pragmatien als „Vorlesungsschriften“, „Materialsammlungen“ oder „*lecture notes*“,¹⁰ wobei man aber nicht ausschloß, daß Aristoteles diese Werke weiter überarbeitete. Damit wollte man die Heterogenität im Duktus einzelner Schriften erklären.¹¹

Franz Dirlmeier nannte in seinem wichtigen Beitrag von 1962 Aristoteles‘ „mündlichen Stil“ als Grund dafür, daß die Pragmatien nicht den Eindruck von „Literatur“ machten. Aristoteles verfare im Grunde auch in den ‚internen Schriften‘ dialogisch und halte keinen Monolog *ex cathedra*. Mit seiner Gedankenführung werde „der Hörer oder Leser unmittelbar hineingerissen...in den inneren Dialog, den der Philosoph zuvor mit sich selbst gesprochen hatte.“¹²

Mit der Einordnung der Pragmatien als Produkte des Schulbetriebs¹³ verbanden sich auch Urteile über ihren unliterarischen Charakter. Dem

7 Jaeger 1912, 135.

8 Jaeger 1912, 147.

9 Zur umfangreichen Literatur, die mündliche Erläuterungen als zum Verständnis der Pragmatien notwendig ansieht, vgl. Lengen 2002, 106 mit Anm. 196.

10 So Jackson 1920; Moraux 1968, viii; Düring 1966, 9, 19, 33. Vgl. auch die Literaturangaben bei Lengen 2002, 14. Van der Eijk 1997, 79 weist darauf hin, daß man unter „*lecture notes*“ etwas anderes zu verstehen hat als „Notizenstil“.

11 Vgl. etwa Jaeger 1912, 136-7; Düring 1966, 32-35, der sogar die These vertrat, die Heterogenität verdanke sich der Tätigkeit eines Redaktors, der alle Texte incl. Notizen des Aristotelischen ‚*work in progress*‘ genau abgeschrieben habe: „Dieser Redaktor ist also für die heutige äußere Form der Schriften verantwortlich“ (ebd., 35). Im Blick auf *De partibus animalium* lehnt Kullmann 2007, 4, die Annahme nachträglicher Überarbeitungen ab.

12 Dirlmeier 1962, 12.

13 Daß diese Meinung sich durchgesetzt hat, konstatiert Flashar 2004, 180.

Urteil Jaegers, sie seien „überhaupt nicht Literatur“,¹⁴ und seiner Gegenüberstellung dieser „Sachprosa“ vs. einer „Kunstprosa“¹⁵ schloß sich Ingmar Düring an und nannte die Wissenschaftsschriften „unliterarische Prosa.“¹⁶ Holger Thesleff (1966) sah sie als den Prototyp des schmucklosen, abstrakten und emotionslosen Wissenschaftsstils an.¹⁷

Der mit dem als ‚unliterarisch‘ erscheinenden Charakter der Aristotelischen Pragmatien zusammenhängenden These der „Vorlesungsmanuskripte“ konnte auch die Tatsache nichts anhaben, daß vereinzelt–und mitunter sogar von denjenigen, die Aristoteles' Schriften einen literarischen Charakter absprachen–darauf hingewiesen wurde, daß einzelne Bücher bzw. Werke oder zumindest Passagen einen durchaus ausgefeilten Charakter aufweisen. So notierte Düring, *Physik* 1 habe eine wirkungsvolle Darstellung und einen gepflegten Stil.¹⁸

Es ist das Verdienst des Jubilars, dem diese Festschrift gewidmet ist, mit einem Aufsatz von 1989 schon früh die Problematik der Forschungsdiskussion hervorgehoben und einen neuen Weg eingeschlagen zu haben.¹⁹ Denn Eckart Schütrumpf wies auf die Widersprüchlichkeit hin, daß man einerseits die Pragmatien als Vorlesungsmanuskripte ohne literarische Ambitionen betrachtete, andererseits aber den ausgearbeiteten Charakter einzelner Passagen oder Bücher erkannte. Er selbst demonstrierte am Beispiel von *Politik* 3, daß entgegen den genannten Verdikten, die Aristotelischen Schriften seien keine ‚Literatur‘, der Einsatz rhetorischer Stilmittel der Verwendung in zeitgenössischer Kunstprosa entspreche. Er zog daraus die Schlußfolgerung, daß eine generelle Etikettierung der Pragmatien als Vorlesungsschriften der Problematik nicht gerecht werde. Denn es bleibe letztendlich unklar, „welche formale Qualität dies [sc. das Vorlesungsmanuskript] hat, wie sehr es stilistisch ausgearbeitet war oder nicht war.“²⁰ Gleichzeitig vermutete er, daß die These vom Vorlesungsmanuskript stark von antiken Nachrichten beeinflusst sei, denen zufolge „herausgegebene Schriften auf Vorlesungsmaterialien, *akroatikoi logoi*, beruhen.“²¹ Grundlage dieser These sei wohl der bei Plutarch, *Alex.* 7 überlieferte Brief

14 Jaeger 1912, 133.

15 Jaeger 1912, 137.

16 Düring 1966, 555. Vgl. Moraux 1973, 7: Die Pragmatien seien von einem „fast absolute(n) Mangel an literarischen Ansprüchen“ geprägt.

17 Thesleff 1966, 89-113.

18 Zitiert bei Schütrumpf 1989, 180.

19 Schütrumpf 1989.

20 Schütrumpf 1989, 180.

21 Schütrumpf 1989, 180.

Alexanders an Aristoteles gewesen, in dem Alexander Aristoteles vorwirft, einen Fehler begangen zu haben, indem er seine „akroamatischen Schriften“ herausgegeben habe.²² Diesen Brief könne man aber, so Schütrumpf, nicht zugrundelegen, da sowohl er als auch Aristoteles' Antworten nach der *communis opinio* der Forschung nicht echt seien.²³ Auch konnte Schütrumpf stark machen,²⁴ daß die Kommentatoren Simplicios und Olympiodor die meisten Pragmatien für συντάγματα, also ausgearbeitete Schriften hielten. Zu den συντάγματα zählten sie die ἐχωτερικοί λόγοι, also die Dialoge, und die αὐτοπρόσωπα—die auch als ἀκροαματικά bezeichnet wurden—, das heißt: Schriften, in denen Aristoteles in eigener Person spricht.

Mit Schütrumpfs Beitrag war der Weg gewiesen, sich differenzierter mit dem ‚literarischen‘ Charakter Aristotelischer Pragmatien zu befassen. Dabei erwies und erweist es sich als sinnvoll, mit Urteilen über ‚Publikation‘ und ‚Adressaten‘ zurückhaltend zu sein. Denn mit der Beurteilung des ‚literarischen‘ Charakters wurde und wird auch die Frage verknüpft, ob bzw. inwieweit die Pragmatien, wie die uns nur noch in Fragmenten und Zeugnissen zu fassenden Dialoge des Aristoteles,²⁵ zur Veröffentlichung gedacht gewesen seien. Als Argument für eine Unterteilung in Werke, die für eine Publikation gedacht, und solche, die nur für einen engeren Kreis, etwa in der Schule, bestimmt waren, konnte man anführen, daß Aristoteles selbst auf „exoterische“ Werke in seinen Pragmatien verweist und teilweise deren Kenntnis voraussetzt oder auch von Schriften, die „herausgegeben“ sind, spricht.²⁶ Andererseits wies man bereits früh darauf hin, daß ‚Herausgeben‘ im antiken Sinn nicht mit ‚Publizieren‘ im heutigen Verständnis gleichzusetzen ist. So war bereits das Vorlesen eines ausgearbeiteten Textes eine ‚Herausgabe‘.²⁷

Insgesamt scheint es also geboten, den Weg, den Schütrumpf exemplarisch beschritten hat, weiter zu verfolgen und erst einmal eine Feinanalyse der einzelnen Schriften zu unternehmen. In Kombination mit impliziten und expliziten Verweisen auf den ‚Sitz im Leben‘ und mögliche Adressaten

22 οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐποίησας ἐκδοῦς τοὺς ἀκροατικοὺς τῶν λόγων—„Du hast nicht recht daran getan, die akroamatischen Deiner Schriften herauszugeben.“

23 Schütrumpf 1989, 186-7.

24 Schütrumpf 1989, 187-9.

25 Zu den Aristotelischen Dialogen vgl. Flashar 2006, 112-25, insbes. auch zum Verhältnis von Dialogen und Lehrschriften 116-8. Zur bemerkenswerten Überlieferungsgeschichte der Pragmatien vgl. Flashar 2004, 180-2; Primavesi 2011.

26 Vgl. Flashar 2004, 179; Flashar 2006, 117-8.

27 Vgl. Birt 1882, 437 Anm. 2, zitiert bei Schütrumpf 1989, 180 Anm. 27.

kann man dann vielleicht zu weiteren Aufschlüssen über die Verortung der Aristotelischen Pragmatien im Wissenschaftsdiskurs des 4. Jhdts. v. Chr. gelangen.

Diese Richtung schlugen seit den 90er Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts einzelne Studien in der Aristotelesforschung ein, auf die im folgenden einzugehen sein wird. Allgemein stellte Philip van der Eijk (1997) in einem grundlegenden Beitrag fest, daß eine Unterscheidung in Kunstprosa und Sachprosa keine geeignete Kategorie für die Untersuchung von wissensvermittelnden Schriften bilde, und plädierte für eine neutrale, d. h. nicht wertende Feinuntersuchung solcher Schriften nach Aufbau, strukturellen und sprachlichen Eigenheiten, literarischen Strategien und sprachpragmatischen Gesichtspunkten. In diesem Zusammenhang wandte er sich gegen eine generelle Etikettierung der Pragmatien als ‚Vorlesungsmanuskripte,‘²⁸ da eine solche nicht durchgängig dem Charakter der Aristotelischen Schriften gerecht werde.

Die neuen, differenzierten Ansätze zur Erforschung Aristotelischer Pragmatien sind im aktuellen „Handbuch der griechischen Literatur“ gewürdigt,²⁹ und die Notwendigkeit, diesen Schritt weiterzugehen, faßt eine jüngst erschienene Einführung programmatisch zusammen: „Die aristotelischen Schriften als ‚Literatur‘ zu lesen und zu analysieren, ist eine erst ansatzweise in Angriff genommene Aufgabe.“³⁰

I. Mögliche Untersuchungsperspektiven

Im folgenden möchte ich, im Rückgriff auf bereits früher erarbeitete Beobachtungen und ausgehend von einem rezenten Marburger Projekt, das den ‚literarischen Charakter‘ von *De generatione animalium* untersucht, einige Kriterien vorstellen, die bei einer Feinlektüre Aristotelischer Schriften weiterführend sein könnten.

28 Auf die Variationsbreite der Aristotelischen Pragmatien wies Markus Asper hin. In seiner 2007 erschienenen Monographie, die einen Zugang zur Klassifikation antiker Wissenschaftstexte versucht, klammert er eine eigene Untersuchung der Aristotelischen Lehrschriften zwar aus, vermerkt aber summarisch deren Bandbreite im Rahmen des von ihm zugrundegelegten Klassifikationsrasters von Mündlichkeit–Schriftlichkeit, Konsens–Konkurrenz und Persönlichkeit–Unpersönlichkeit. So stellt er die ausgeprägte Technik einer „immanente(n) Dialogisierung“ einem „Streben nach Un- oder besser Überpersönlichkeit“ gegenüber. Asper 2007, 245–65, mit Bezug zu den Aristotelischen Pragmatien ebd. 261.

29 Erler 2014, 368–9.

30 Flashar 2013, 63.

1) Argumentationsstrukturen

Ein erster zentraler Ansatzpunkt besteht darin, die vielfach konstatierte Heterogenität der Aristotelischen Darstellungsweise Schrift für Schrift zu untersuchen und so das Nebeneinander von deduktiver und diskursiver Vorgehensweise oder Faktenreferat und Problemdiskussion besser zu erfassen und in Bezug auf die Gesamtstruktur eines Werks zu bewerten. Für ein solches Vorgehen plädierte der von mir 1993 erschienene Beitrag zur Diskursivität in den Aristotelischen Schriften. Anknüpfend an Dirlmeiers Beobachtung,³¹ daß Aristoteles vielfach in einem Dialog mit sich selbst begriffen zu sein scheine, habe ich an exemplarisch ausgewählten Passagen verschiedener Schriften (*Metaphysik* Λ 9; *De generatione animalium* 1.17; *Eudemische Ethik* 7.12; *Nikomachische Ethik* 9.12; *Analytika Posteriora* 1.66) den diskursiven Duktus dargestellt und Kategorien zur Beschreibung dieses ‚mündlich‘ erscheinenden Stils herausgearbeitet. Anders als Dirlmeier habe ich diese Elemente aber nicht als ‚Residuum einer ursprünglichen Mündlichkeit‘ gewertet, sondern damit begründet, daß die diskursiven Strukturen bestimmte Argumentationsweisen literarisch umsetzen, die zum einen den Weg der Erkenntnis, etwa Elenktik und Ausschlußverfahren, wiedergeben und zum anderen damit gleichzeitig dem Rezipienten ermöglichen, den Weg des Erkenntnisgewinns nachzuverfolgen. Es handelt sich meines Erachtens um „die Folge einer neuartigen Form wissenschaftlichen Schreibens, das die Umsetzung eines dialektisch verlaufenden Denkens im Medium der Schrift darstellt“³² und gleichzeitig den Rezipienten in den Gedankengang des Autors mit hineinzieht.³³ Diese Überlegungen führt mein 2012 erschienener Beitrag weiter. In ihm habe ich, Kategorien der ‚Schreibforschung‘ anwendend, diese Charakteristika Aristotelischen Schreibens mit einem ebenfalls aus der ‚Schreibforschung‘ stammenden Begriff als ‚epistemisches Schreiben‘³⁴ bezeichnet. Diese Art von Schreiben dient dazu, das eigene Wissen weiterzuverarbeiten und zu präzisieren. Damit kann man die Funktion vergleichen, die aus moderner Perspektive Holmes³⁵ dem Prozeß des Schreibens für das Ver-

31 Dirlmeier 1962, 12-3.

32 Föllinger 1993, 280.

33 Dieser von mir vertretene Ansatz ist rezipiert in dem 2014 erschienenen Beitrag zu Aristoteles’ Philosophie im Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike (Erler 2014, 368-9).

34 Eigler u. a. 1990, 18.

35 Holmes 1987, 226-7.

fassen naturwissenschaftlicher Texte und Heintz³⁶ für mathematisches Beweisen zugewiesen haben.³⁷

Etwa zu derselben Zeit hat sich Philip van der Eijk dem Duktus der *Parva Naturalia* gewidmet. Er konnte nachweisen, daß Aristoteles in *De divinatione per somnum* „polemischer“ und „dialektischer“ verfährt,³⁸ wohingegen er in *De insomniis* mehr „theoretisch und deduktiv“³⁹ vorgeht.

Eine wichtige vergleichende Arbeit bildet die Monographie von Ralf Lengen. In dieser untersuchte er exemplarisch die Darstellungsweise in *Nikomachischer Ethik* und *Rhetorik* sowie in Ausschnitten aus *De partibus animalium* und *Historia animalium* und arbeitete Unterschiede zwischen der problemorientierten Darstellung von *Nikomachischer Ethik* und *De partibus animalium* auf der einen Seite und der ergebnisorientierten Darstellungsweise der *Rhetorik* auf der anderen Seite heraus. Damit konnte er auch zu differenzierteren Ergebnissen zum ‚Sitz im Leben‘ der Pragmatien gelangen, den man von Pragmatie zu Pragmatie neu bestimmen muß.⁴⁰

Um den ‚literarischen Charakter‘ einer Pragmatie als ganzer zu bestimmen, muß man, natürlich, die Feinanalysen im Rahmen der Gesamtordnung der einzelnen Schrift betrachten und untersuchen, auf welche Weise sie durch eine übergeordnete Gedankenführung verbunden sind und ob und wie sich dies durch bestimmte als Verbindungen dienende sprachliche Elemente niederschlägt.

36 Heintz 2000, 169.

37 Vgl. Asper 2007, 121.

38 Eijk 1994, 66.

39 Eijk 1994, 46.

40 Für die biologische Schrift *De partibus animalium* vermutete Wolfgang Kullmann aufgrund des vom Autor geäußerten Stolzes auf die eigene Innovativität in der *Topik* und der Art und Weise, wie Aristoteles *De partibus animalium* I als ‚Programmschrift‘ gestaltet, daß der ‚Sitz im Leben‘ die Vorlesung gewesen sei, aber „daß Aristoteles seine zoologischen Schriften auch für ein weiteres Publikum und für die Nachwelt“ verfaßt habe (Kullmann 2007, 137). Daß Aristoteles allgemein ein Lesepublikum als Sekundäradressaten im Blick hatte, vermutete auch Verdenius 1985, 18.

2) Charakteristika auf der Ebene der „gedanklichen Ordnung“⁴¹

Hierher gehören methodologische Bemerkungen, die Aristoteles macht,⁴² wie die Ankündigung einer Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Positionen und die Feststellung, daß eine Untersuchung nötig ist bzw. warum sie nötig ist. Aber auch metatextliche Bemerkungen sind in diesem Rahmen zu untersuchen. Dies betrifft Ankündigungen, daß bzw. warum ein bestimmtes Thema behandelt werden soll, oder Abschlußbemerkungen, daß im vorhergehenden ein bestimmtes Thema behandelt worden sei. In diesem Zusammenhang ist auf den Beitrag von Reviel Netz zu verweisen. Er hat die These aufgestellt, daß der Aristotelische Text in Paragraphen gegliedert werden könne, und hat plausibel sprachliche ‚Marker‘, die die Einteilung deutlich machen, benannt.⁴³

Auch bestimmte syntaktische Eigentümlichkeiten, die auf den ersten Blick ‚defizitäre‘ Konstruktionen zu sein scheinen, wie Ellipse oder Anakoluth, sind unter Umständen kein Zeichen der „carelessness“ des Autors, sondern das Merkmal einer bestimmten Ordnung des Textes, wie van der Eijk gezeigt hat.⁴⁴

3) ‚Unpersönlicher Stil‘ und Emotionalisierung

Eine gewisse Spannung besteht zwischen einem ‚unpersönlichen Stil‘ auf der einen Seite und einem emotionalisierenden, den Rezipienten mit einbeziehenden und geradezu an ihn appellierenden Duktus auf der anderen Seite. So rechnet man zu Kennzeichen eines ‚unpersönlichen Stils‘ den Verzicht auf direkte Ansprache des Adressaten in der 2. Pers. Sg.⁴⁵ Auch spricht Aristoteles so gut wie gar nicht in der 1. Pers. Sg. Diesem Streben nach Unpersönlichkeit stehen aber Charakteristika gegenüber, die den Autor sehr wohl als emotional an seinem Gegenstand Beteiligten darstellen, wie die Erzeugung von πάθος durch bestimmte sprachliche und syntaktische Elemente. Semantik und stilistische Elemente, die emotionalisierend

41 Ausdruck von Rapp 2013, 300. Van der Eijk 2017 untersucht die Formen von ‚Ordnung‘ anhand zweier Passagen in den *Parva Naturalia*.

42 Vgl. Lengen 2002, 19-21.

43 Netz 2001.

44 Van der Eijk 1997, Zitat: 110.

45 Van der Eijk 1997, 118; Lengen 2002, 166.

wirken und/oder ein bestimmtes ἔθος des Autors⁴⁶ vermitteln,⁴⁷ sind auf der lexikalischen Ebene wertende Adjektive wie „gut“ und „hervorragend“ sowie Ausdrücke, die das Interesse des Rezipienten wecken sollen. Zu diesen zählt die Bezeichnung einer Sache als „spannend“, „wichtig“, „großartig“. Aber auch Formulierungen, die die Expressivität steigern, wie doppelte Verneinungen oder der Intensivierung dienende Wendungen wie „grundsätzlich“, „gänzlich“ erregen Gefühle und damit die Aufmerksamkeit. Ein schönes Beispiel eines solchen Vorgehens ist die berühmte Passage in *De partibus animalium* 1,5 (1,55. 645a5-22). Hier wirbt der Autor auf ansprechende Weise für Biologie, indem er die Ästhetik der Erkenntnis, die auch mit diesem Bereich verbunden sei, hervorhebt, den Ekel vor der Beschäftigung mit ‚Körperlichkeit‘ als „kindisch“ und Beweis mangelnder Selbstliebe brandmarkt und glaubhaft sein eigenes ἔθος als begeistert-er und überzeugender Forscher vermittelt.⁴⁸

Im Bereich der Syntax sind Ausrufesätze sowie rhetorische Fragen und Satzverkürzungen wie die Aposiopese oder Imperative affekterregend. Hinzu kommen Stilfiguren, darunter insbesondere Ironie und rhetorische Frage. Gerade die beiden letztgenannten können Zeichen von Polemik und Engagement sein.

Auf die von Rhetorik geprägte Polemik des Aristoteles hat bereits Vegetti (1993) hingewiesen. So macht Aristoteles zwar immer wieder Kontrahenten „leeres Gerede“ (λόγοι κενοί) zum Vorwurf, wenn jemand bei seiner Beweisführung nicht von den der Untersuchung eigenen, sondern von allzu generischen Prinzipien ausgeht (GA 2.8.747b27-748a16).⁴⁹ Doch er selbst bedient sich einer solchen Vorgehensweise in Fällen, in denen eine generelle Theorie durch Gegenbeobachtungen gefährdet werden könnte und wo es ihm auch nicht möglich ist, den dadurch entstehenden Problemen durch Verweis auf weitere empirische Forschung zu entgehen (z. B. GA 1.1.715a18-b16).⁵⁰

Direkte und indirekte Fragen kommen bei Aristoteles häufig zum Einsatz, und sie können ihre Funktion darin haben, den Rezipienten ‚in den Dialog mit hineinzuziehen‘ entsprechend der unter 1) dargestellten ‚immanenten Dialogisierung‘.

46 Vgl. die Kategorie „Presence of the Author and the Audience in the Text“, in: Van der Eijk 1997, 115-9.

47 Vgl. Föllinger 2016, 138.

48 Vgl. hierzu Föllinger 2016, 139-41.

49 Vegetti 1993, 37-9.

50 Vegetti 1993, 41-5.

4) Die Verwendung von Dichterzitaten

Aristoteles verwendet immer wieder gerne Dichterzitate, zum Beispiel wenn er in *Politik* 1.2.1253a1–7 auf die Genese des Staates eingeht und sich in diesem Zusammenhang auf Homer beruft oder wenn er in der *Nikomachischen Ethik* (7.7.1149b13–18) seine philosophisch begründete Meinung, daß Begierde ein schlimmerer Affekt als der Zorn sei, mit einer Anspielung auf Sappho und einem Homerzitat illustriert. In beiden Fällen sind die Zitate kein Element der Sachargumentation, sondern dienen der zusätzlichen Illustration.⁵¹ Anders ist seine Vorgehensweise in *De generatione animalium* 1.18.722b17–30, wo er Empedokles im Rahmen seiner Auseinandersetzung mit von ihm als falsch angesehenen Zeugungstheorien anführt. Hier dient das Zitieren einerseits dem ‚Belegen‘, andererseits aber kann die Art und Weise, wie er zitiert, die zitierte Meinung auch schon gleich desavouieren.⁵² So ironisiert Aristoteles offensichtlich die Empedokleische Anschauung, daß jeder Geschlechtspartner die Hälfte (σύμβολον) beitrage—diese Erklärung ist Aristoteles zufolge unsinnig, weil sie nicht erklären kann, auf welche Weise die Beiträge im Zeugungsprozeß zusammengesetzt werden—, durch die Formulierung: „wie Empedokles unter der Herrschaft der Liebe erzeugt (γεννά), indem er sagt ...“ (GA 1.18.722b19–20). Dies ist ein Wortspiel mit der ursprünglichen und konkreten Bedeutung von γεννάω und der von ihm abgeleiteten des ideellen ‚Erzeugens‘, wie sie zu Aristoteles‘ Zeit bereits gebräuchlich waren.⁵³ Aristoteles zieht hier die Empedokleische Meinung schon durch das Sprachspiel ins Lächerliche, und daß Empedokles‘ Annahme unhaltbar ist, demonstriert er an den aus ihr sich ergebenden absurden Folgerungen, wie dies der Abschnitt GA 1.18.722b20–30 durch die wiederholte Verwendung entsprechender Wörter (ἀδύνατον, οὐ δύναται, ἀδύνατον, ἄλογά) auch sprachlich geradezu ‚einhämmert‘.

5) Narratio/exemplum/Anekdote

Narrative Partien spielen in Aristoteles‘ Werken überraschenderweise immer wieder eine Rolle. Sie können unterschiedliche Funktionen besitzen. Eine recht ausgedehnte Erzählung bietet die berühmte Anekdote über die

⁵¹ Vgl. hierzu Föllinger 2016, 131–4.

⁵² Ein eigener Beitrag hierzu ist in Vorbereitung.

⁵³ Vgl. *LSJ*, s.v.

ökonomische Expertise des Philosophen Thales in *Politik* 1.11.⁵⁴ Thales habe sich, so die Erzählung,⁵⁵ gegen den Vorwurf verteidigen müssen, daß er so arm sei, weil Philosophie keinen praktischen Nutzen biete. Diese Kritik habe er aber entkräften können, weil er aufgrund seiner astronomischen Kenntnisse eine große Olivenernte vorhersehen konnte, im Winter Olivenpressen zu einem Tiefpreis erwarb und, als die Ernte kam, zu besten Bedingungen verkaufte. Das Exemplum hat an dieser Stelle Beweisfunktion.⁵⁶ Denn es steht anstelle der abstrakten Formulierung eines ökonomischen Gesetzes, um zu demonstrieren, daß auch ein Philosoph die ‚Marktgeseetze‘ kennen und ausnutzen kann. Gleichzeitig bietet es Auflockerung, die der Rezipient nach der vorhergehenden, eher ‚trockenen‘ Passage goutieren wird. Darüber hinaus demonstriert es aber auch noch die Überlegenheit der Philosophie. Denn Thales ist der reichliche Gewinn möglich, weil er über Kenntnisse verfügt, die Händlern abgehen: Er ist in der Lage, astronomische Erkenntnisse zu erlangen und darüber hinaus aus diesen ökonomische Schlußfolgerungen zu ziehen, also gewissermaßen ‚nebenbei‘ auch solche Dinge zu tun, die gar nicht das Ziel der Philosophie darstellen. Damit aber kann Aristoteles ‚unter der Hand‘ seine eigentliche Anschauung von der Minderwertigkeit der Chrematistik vermitteln. Während bei dieser Erzählung der Unterhaltungswert der Anekdote ein Nebeneffekt ist, kann er bei anderen narrativen Partien das Hauptziel sein.⁵⁷

Zu den genannten Merkmalen lassen sich andere hinzuziehen. Aber bereits diese Beispiele zeigen, wie wichtig eine umfassende Untersuchung der Aristotelischen Pragmatien nach ihren ‚literarischen‘ Eigenheiten ist, und ermuntern dazu, den Weg weiterzugehen, den Eckart Schütrumpf bereits früh beschritten hat.

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54 Daß *Politik* I eine Einheit darstellt und die Kapitel 8-11 nicht, wie angenommen, einen Nachtrag bilden, kann Schütrumpf 1989 plausibel begründen.

55 *Politik* 1.11.1259a3-23.

56 Zur folgenden Deutung vgl. Föllinger 2016, 134-6.

57 Vgl. das von mir behandelte Beispiel in Föllinger 2016, 136f.

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Scholê and Eudaimonia in Aristotle^{*}

Dorothea Frede

I. The Background of the Question

There are few passages in Aristotle's ethics that are as troublesome as the two chapters near the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (10.7, 8) that plead—so to speak *ex improviso*—not only for the superiority of the theoretical life over the practical life, but for an almost complete independence of that god-like state from all practical concerns. To name just a few of those problematic claims: Autarky in the true sense applies only to the philosopher; all other activities presuppose interactions with other people. Only the philosopher leads a life of true σχολή, *leisure*, while even the best practical life, the life of the statesman, is ἄσχυλος, *unleisurely*, because it serves further purposes. Virtues of character are tied to the body, while virtue of reason is separate from it, and though all human beings stand in need of external goods, the activities of the philosopher are independent from other people and approximate those of the gods. Because the gods do not interact with one another, they have no need for virtues of character like courage, justice, moderation or magnanimity. Humans capable of νοῦς should emulate the gods and aim to make themselves as immortal as possible by exercising their theoretical reason, for true happiness consists in the life of θεωρία.

Apart from the fact that Aristotle had promised a discussion of the theoretical life early on in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN 1.5 1096a4-5), and declared that humans are inferior beings than the heavenly bodies (EN 6.7 1141a17-b2), there is nothing that prepares the reader for such an apotheosis of the purely theoretical life and a devaluation of the practical life at the end of the EN. For, from Book 1 on, it was Aristotle's concern to show that happiness, the best human life, consists in practical activities that are the joint product of practical reason and virtues of character that involve other people. Thus, in the discussion of friendship in Book 9 Aristotle not only praises the 'alter ego' as someone who shares ones thoughts and arguments

* In honor of Eckart Schütrumpf whose scholarly work represents a model of σχολή and ἀσχυλία.

(*EN* 9.9 1170b10-14), but he also indicates that philosophy presupposes a κοινωνία (*EN* 9.1 1164b2-6) and includes συμφιλοσοφεῖν among the activities that make up a satisfactory life (*EN* 9.12, 1172a5). As it is, the eulogy of the theoretical life in 10.7, 8 suggests that the philosopher is not a ζῶον πολιτικόν at all, and that autarky in his case means that he does what Aristotle has denied of human beings earlier: he leads the solitary life of a hermit (*EN* 1.7 1097b6-11).

The problem caused by the eulogy of the theoretical life also concerns its place in the text. For the elated state of θεωρία is dropped as abruptly as it has come up. Instead in *EN* 10.9, Aristotle turns to the question of the moral education of the citizens, a question that culminates in the problem of the proper education of the legislators who are responsible for that education. Aristotle indicates that the study of the conditions of legislation and of the constitutions in general will provide the necessary background and will thereby lead to the completion of ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία, 'the philosophy of human affairs' (*EN* 10.9 1181b12-15). He makes no mention of a connection between that kind of philosophy and the theoretical philosophy that has just been presented as the only source of true happiness.

As is well known, there have been various and varied attempts to cope with Aristotle's eulogy of the philosophical life. While some interpreters treat the divine form of happiness as incompatible with the human form of happiness as depicted in the previous books,¹ others have done their level best to smooth down the differences and to argue for a 'compatibilist' interpretation of divine and human happiness.² But this is not a debate that will be taken up here. Instead, this article's concern is with the peculiarity that Aristotle treats σχολή as a decisive criterion that separates divine theorizing from even the best human activities, which he treats as ἄσχολοι because they are not self-contained actions but serve further purposes (*EN* 10.7, 1177b4-26). The word σχολή is never mentioned in connection with happiness in the *EN* before this instance. Neither does it occur in the *EE*,

1 Ackrill 1997, 199: the "broken-backed theory"; similarly Hardie 1968 and Bostock 2000.

2 There are 'inclusivists' (Broadie 1991; Charles 1999; Scott 1999, *et al.*), but also compatibilists, such as Cooper 1987; Lear 2004 *et al.*, who argue that θεωρία functions as a kind of organizational principle of a whole network of activities. All these attempts suffer from the same deficiency: there is little indication in the text that Aristotle wants to maintain an inclusivist or compatibilist stance in those chapters.

or in the *Protrepticus*.³ The terms σχολή and ἀσχολία are not much used by Aristotle, anyway, apart from the socio-economic sense that distinguishes the part of the population that does not have to work for a living from that which does in the earlier books of the *Politics*.⁴ But this is clearly not the sense of σχολή and ἀσχολία that Aristotle has in mind in *EN* 10.7, 8.

The only place in Aristotle where that pair plays a significant role in the relevant sense is *Politics* Books 7 and 8. But this is not the only reason why this article is focusing on that text. Aristotle introduces, there, a similarly sharp contrast between the theoretical and the practical life and treats them, at least at first, as incompatible (*Pol.* 7.2-3). That this passage in a way presents a parallel to the troublesome chapters *EN* 10.7, 8 has, of course, not escaped the notice of scholars familiar with the *Politics*. If it is not often resorted to in the discussion of the two forms of life in *EN* 10, that must be due to the fact that Aristotle in the *Politics* presents arguments both for and against the preference of the theoretical and the practical form of life, seemingly without, however, reaching a clear verdict. That text will therefore be subject to closer inspection.

II. Alternative Lives in *Politics* 7.2-3

If the depiction of the contrast between the theoretical and the practical life in *EN* 10.7, 8 takes Aristotle's readers by surprise, the same can be said, albeit for different reasons, for the corresponding passage in *Politics* 7.2-3. For in *Politics* 7, the topic is not philosophy and its role in the good life, but rather the design of the ideal constitution, of ἡ κατ' εὐχὴν πολιτεία, 'the city of one's prayers,' that Aristotle mentioned frequently in the *Politics* before.⁵ As he makes clear right from the start in *Pol.* 7.1, the best city must be of the kind that provides the most choiceworthy life for its citizens, who, in turn, must fulfill the conditions to live a most happy life by com-

3 In *Protr.* 56.1 σχολάζειν occurs only once in a non-specific sense.

4 In ordinary Greek ἀσχολία und σχολή are frequently also used in the sense of having or not having some occupation, and there is, of course, the phrase σχολῇ γε, 'far from it.'

5 The use of the word 'ideal' is not to signify that Aristotle is talking about a utopic design of a never-never land. Not only does he emphasize that he is going to construct a city, none of whose conditions are to be impossible (*Pol.* 7.4 1325b35-39), but he treats the legislators as the authorities whose task it is to work out the concrete conditions in the ideal city (cf. *Pol.* 7.2 1325a8 *et passim*).

binning the virtues of character with practical wisdom.⁶ External, material goods are only as good as the use that the citizens make of them. That use depends on the goods of the soul. And hence it is to be taken for granted that the city will act nobly and live happily, if its citizens do. Although Aristotle does not assume the kind of isomorphism for city and soul that we find in Plato's *Republic*, he does assume that both city and citizens combine the virtues of character with practical wisdom. And in the conclusion of his introductory remarks, Aristotle states that there is total congruence between the happiness of a city and that of its citizens (*Pol.* 7.1 1323b40-1324a4):

“...the best life, both for the individuals separately, and for city-states collectively, is a life of virtue sufficiently equipped with the resources that are needed to take part in virtuous actions. With regard to those who dispute this, if any happens not to be persuaded by what has been said, we must ignore them in our present study but investigate them later.”⁷

After this affirmation of an intimate connection between the best constitution of city and the activities of its citizens, it comes as quite a surprise that Aristotle starts the very next chapter with the question of whether or not the communal life is preferable to the solitary life (*Pol.* 7.1 1324a14-17):

“Which life is more choiceworthy, the one that involves taking part in politics with other people (συμπολιτεύεσθαι) and participating in the polis (κοινωνεῖν πόλεως), or the life of an alien (ξενικός), cut off from the political community (τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος)?”

Although Aristotle admits that this question represents a kind of *πάρεργον*, a side-issue, he devotes quite some time and effort to the discussion of that ‘side-issue’ in what follows, before he returns to his main topic, the construction of the best city in chapter 4.

It is worthwhile, therefore, to take a closer look at the way Aristotle introduces the question of whether life in a community is preferable to a solitary life. He admits that everyone is agreed on the point that the best constitution is the one that provides the best and happy life. But then he claims that the very people who are agreed on that point are in dispute

6 The exclusion of the ‘working’ part of the population from citizenship that is first justified in *Pol.* 3.4, 5 and again in 7.8 will not be discussed here (cf. Frede 2005). Although that workforce is a necessary element in the ideal city, it is not part of the body politic.

7 Cf. *Pol.* 2.1 1260b27-29; 3.1 1288b21-39 *et passim*.

about whether the best life is the political life of action (ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος) or rather the life that is released from such concerns, namely the theoretical life, which some claim is the only life for a philosopher (μόνον τινές φασιν εἶναι φιλοσόφου) (*Pol.* 7.2 1324a25–32). This is the question Aristotle sets out to clear up in chapters 2 and 3. But while the alternatives themselves are fairly clear, the way Aristotle pursues them in his discussion is hard to follow, at least at first sight, because he seems to get side-tracked into questions that are only distantly related to his topic, so that he seems to get entangled in *πάρεργα* with respect to the *πάρεργον*. For he spends quite some time on discussing the reason that ruling over one's neighbors by force constitutes an injustice and he enriches that discussion by illustrations of the bloodthirsty habits of war-like nations. His intention seems to be to rule out that the cultivation of war and a war-like spirit can ever be the highest concern of legislation, and to justify the view that preparations for war should be concerned only with defense (*Pol.* 7.2 1324a35–1325a15).

At the beginning of chapter 3, Aristotle returns to the controversy concerning the two forms of life again and brings forth arguments for both sides: one party pleads that only a life free of all engagements, including political ones, is choiceworthy, while the other party pleads that the political life is preferable, because it is an active life, and only an active life is a life worth living (*Pol.* 7.3 1324a16–24). After some rumination on the arguments for both sides, Aristotle offers an evaluation of the two kinds of lives that is much more even-handed than that in *EN* 10.7, 8: both sides are partly right and partly wrong. While it is true that the happy life must be an active life, not all kinds of activity need involve other people. It is quite possible to be active in one's mind only, in study (θεωρία) and thought (διανόησις). Analogously, city-states can be active internally, without interaction with their neighbors, just as god and the cosmos are active only internally and not externally.⁸ But the claim that activities do not necessarily concern external objects does not settle the question of the superior worth of theoretical and practical activities. There is at best an analogy between

8 The activity of a god consists of pure thinking, which Aristotle ascribes to the 'Unmoved Mover,' the divine first cause of motion of the universe (cf. *Metaph.* 11.7 1072a19–73a13 and 9 1074b15–75a10). The universe, according to Aristotle, is unique and embraces all there is; hence, there is in his system no possibility of any interaction between the κόσμος and other entities.

citizens whose actions concern only interior affairs and the mind that is concerned only with its own thoughts.⁹

The fact that Aristotle in his final verdict in *Pol.* 7.3 does not end up with as clear a verdict in favor of the theoretical life as he does in *EN* 10.7, 8 is one of the reasons why this passage does not receive much attention in the general discussion of that problem. The seeming digressions in *Pol.* 7.2, 3 may represent an additional deterrent. But as a closer look at the text shows, these digressions provide valuable information about the background of Aristotle's discussion of the two alternative forms of life in *Pol.* 7.2, 3. For they support the assumption that the antithesis between the theoretical and the practical life was the topic of a *real-life controversy* and not just Aristotle's brain-child. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that Aristotle *Pol.* 7.2 1324a25 speaks of a controversy (ἀμφισβητεῖται) rather than of something one might have a controversy about (ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχειν). And, in what follows he presents the arguments for the differing points of view as the proposals by two different parties (οἱ μὲν...οἱ δέ).¹⁰ And these views include, at least to a certain point, the digressions in the text. Thus, the proponents of a philosophical life seem to have accused the champions of a politically active life of the kind of imperialisms and expansionism that was so common among Greek city-states (*Pol.* 7.2 1324a35-b40). The champions of a political life seem to have objected to those imputations that military provisions are a necessary part of political planning, so that they are a concern of the respective legislation as well (*Pol.* 7.2 1325a5-15). The distracting side-discussions (that Aristotle may have augmented beyond what was really necessary),¹¹ were, then, part of the original debate that Aristotle inserted as a *πάρεργον* into his discussion of the

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- 9 That the judgment is more evenhanded does not mean that it presents a clear solution to the problem of the worth of theoretical and practical activities. Because 'practical' can also mean 'being active' it applies to theorizing as well. But that clarification of the double meaning of *πρακτικός* does not justify the claim that the life of the citizen contains both activities, as Irwin 1990, 81 suggests.
- 10 The importance of the opposite positions in the controversy has, of course, not escaped the commentators (see Kraut 1997, 61-63; Schürtrumpf 2005, 98f.; 127; 239), but they do not take the possibility into consideration that Aristotle is reporting an actual controversy; Depew 1991, 349 regards it as a construction of Aristotle's.
- 11 Aristotle leaves no doubt about his aversion against wars, against the conquering and subduing of neighbor-states, because he regards them as acts of injustice (*Pol.* 7.2 1324b22-41). That explains his repeated extensive criticism of states like Sparta that educate their citizens for warfare only, rather than for a life in peace (cf. *Pol.* 7.14 1333b5-1334a10; 15, 1334a40-b5). On this point, he is quite in agreement

best constitution, a *πᾶρεργον* that he ends, at least for the time being, in a somewhat undecided way, as far as the competition between the practical and the theoretical way of life is concerned. It also remains an open question whether and how the two forms of life can be combined.

III. *The Platonic Background of the Controversy*

If Aristotle is reporting a real-life life-debate in *Pol.* 7.2-3, we do not have to go far to look for the debaters. It is a topic that must have excited Plato's disciples in the Academy, among them the young Aristotle. For Plato does, in fact, give good reasons to the members of his school for taking either of the two sides, i.e., both for and against an engagement in politics by philosophers. In the *Republic*, Plato argues that the philosophers, after finishing their education, have to actively engage in politics in the Cave for fifteen years, before they are released from that duty at age fifty and allowed to spend most of their time with philosophy, although they still have to take turns in the rule of the city and to engage in the education of the young (*R.* 7 519c-521a; 539e-540c). These rulers are obliged to engage in politics because they have been educated for that very purpose, and this is their contribution to the good of the state.¹² This obligation has been subject to various interpretations.¹³ But against all fanciful speculations, it seems best to take Plato at his word: the tri-partite state, once installed, needs to be ruled by philosopher kings and queens. The philosophers have been separated off, after all, from the other two classes and have received a higher education so that they can act as overseers over the community. They have to look after the selection of the young, to provide for their education and training, and to see to it that order and justice are maintained in the state.

Plato does not, in the *Republic*, give the waging of wars a prominent place, but he regards wars—at least wars of defense—as inevitable, given the fact that the expansion of cities leads to conflicts over territory (*R.* 2

with Plato's criticism of Sparta and Crete as states that educate their citizens with war as their ultimate aim and do not realize that war should serve peace (*Lg.* 1 625c-628e).

- 12 The obligation to rule is not unconditional. For the partners agree later that a philosopher would engage in politics only in his own kind of city and in no other (*R.* 9 591e-592b).
- 13 There is a host of different suggestions on this question in the secondary literature, e.g. White 1986; Silverman 2007; Bobonich 2007.

373d-374a). For this very reason, the state needs professional soldiers with suitable training and education. And although Plato pleads for a humane way of dealing with the enemy, he regards military conflicts as one of the eventualities statesmen have to be prepared for. Questions like that of the justice of wars and the need of preparations for wars would therefore quite naturally have been part of the controversy in the Academy.

But if Plato provides pertinent reasons for why philosophers should engage themselves in politics, he also provides reasons for the very opposite position. In the portrait of the ‘true philosopher’ in the so-called ‘excursion’ in the *Theaetetus*, Plato lets Socrates argue that the philosopher will take no part in the life of the community (*Tht.* 172c-177c). Quite the reverse: only his body is present in the city. His mind is free to roam wherever it takes him. The philosopher does not only stay away from politics and the law-courts, but he does not go to the market-place either. He does not even know if his next-door neighbor is a human being or some other creature. The questions the true philosopher concerns himself with are rather:

“What is man? What actions and passions properly belong to human nature and distinguish it from all other beings? This is what he wants to know and concerns himself to investigate.”¹⁴

The excursion on the true philosopher in the *Theaetetus* contains significant information concerning the controversy not just because it argues strongly against partaking in politics, but also because it introduces the pair of opposites this article is concerned with, namely σχολή and ἀσχολία. For in the *Theaetetus*, Plato uses these concepts in his depiction of the contrast between the philosopher’s and the rhetorician’s life and activities, when he likens the philosopher to a free man (ἐλεύθερος) and the speaker in law courts to a servant (οἰκέτης) (*Tht.* 172d-e).¹⁵ The philosopher leads a life of leisure, while the orator in court is always in a hurry:

“Because the one man always has what you mentioned just now—free time (σχολή). When he talks, he talks in peace and quiet (τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται) and his time is his own... But the other

14 On the digression in the *Theaetetus* cf., e.g., Rue 1993; Sedley 2004; Lännström 2011; Peterson, 2011.

15 Apart from the *Theaetetus*, Plato uses σχολή and ἀσχολία in the ordinary sense of having or not having some occupation. They are not employed as distinctive criteria of the good life in either the *Republic* or the *Laws*. The only place where ἀσχολία is mentioned in connection with philosophy at all, is *Phd.* 66b-d, where the body is said there to act as an impediment to the mind.

man—the man of the law courts—is always in a hurry (ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ) when he is talking; he has to speak with one eye on the clock. Besides, he can't make his speeches on any subject he likes, he has his adversary standing over him, armed with compulsory powers.”

Plato, in the excursion in the *Theaetetus*, contrasts two types of men: the philosopher is not concerned with law-cases, but with the nature of justice and injustice itself, not with the question of whether a certain king or rich man is happy, but with the nature of happiness and misery and how they can be obtained and avoided (*Tht.* 175b-d). The two types of lives are finally summed up there, as follows (*Tht.* 175e): There is the one who has been brought up in true freedom (ἐλευθερία) and leisure (σχολή)—and there is the other one who is worldly wise but does not know how to speak about the gods and about the truly happy among men. Plato denies that the philosopher will ever have anything to do with politics whatsoever, with laws or decrees, with the council or with the public assembly (*Tht.* 173c-e). His studies concern those things that are above the height of the heaven and deep down under the earth:

“Geometrizing upon earth, measuring its surfaces, astronomizing in the heavens; tracking down by every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are and never condescending to what lies near at hand” (*Tht.* 173e-174a).¹⁶

Plato presents, then, as sharp an opposition between the theoretical and the political life as possible. The philosopher lives in peace and leisure, the politician is necessarily always busy and cannot direct his own thoughts where he wants to take them. The difference between the philosopher's σχολή and the orator's ἀσχολία is emphasized once again later in the ‘digression’ (*Tht.* 175e), as a justification of the advice to avoid the human condition altogether, to take refuge with the divine, and to become as much like god as possible (*Tht.* 176b: ὁμοίως θεῷ), by becoming truly good and escaping wickedness.

It is obvious, then, that Plato's dialogues provide sufficient material for both sides of the controversy that Aristotle reports in *Pol.* 7.2 and 3. That there was indeed such a debate in the Academy and that Aristotle took part

16 This is, of course, a rather different Socrates from the one who denies, in the *Apology*, that he was ever engaged in such studies and that the Athenians must have confused him with Anaxagoras (*Ap.* 26d).

in it, must remain a conjecture.¹⁷ But there are several reasons that speak for that assumption. There are, first of all, clear indications that *Politics* Books 7 and 8 were written at an early date, at a time when Aristotle's political thought was still very much influenced by Plato.¹⁸ As noted also by others, Aristotle's plans for an ideal city, its position, organization, and the suitable education for its citizens, are closely related to Platonic views, even where he contradicts them. One significant indication of an early date is also the fact that Aristotle refers to his own exoteric works (ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι) rather than to his ethics as the source for sufficient information concerning the conception of the best life, as well as concerning the distinction between the different types of goods: the material goods, the goods of the body and the goods of the soul (*Pol.* 7.1 1323a21-26).¹⁹ To be sure, later in the text Aristotle also refers to his 'ethics' as a kind of confirmation (*Pol.* 7.13 1332a8-9; a21-25), but that reference may well be a later addition, for as the editor's parentheses show, it interrupts the flow of the text.

Against the assumption that Aristotle is representing a controversy that took place in the Academy that was especially inspired by the excursion in the *Theaetetus* it may be objected that σχολή and ἀσχολία are not even mentioned in the report on the controversy in *Pol.* 7.2, 3. This would be indeed a serious objection, had Aristotle confined his discussion of this issue in *Pol.* 7 to chapters 2 and 3. But in fact, he returns to the question of the best form of life much later in that book (7.13-15), and in that later discussion σχολή and ἀσχολία do play a central role, and they continue to do so in Aristotle's (incomplete) program of education in Book 8. That the connection between the controversy concerning the theoretical and the practical life and the later explanation of the good life as a life that combines both aspects is often overlooked,²⁰ must be due to the fact that this topic is resumed only after the lengthy discussion of the organization of the ideal city in chapters 4-12. For, in those chapters Aristotle is concerned with practical questions such as the ideal city's size, the number of its citizens,

17 Kraut 1997, 61-63 notes that there is a dispute and refers to that between Socrates and Callicles at *Gorgias* 484c-486d and the excursion in the *Theaetetus* as models, but he does not consider the possibility of an actual dispute in the Academy or of Aristotle's participation in it.

18 This view is shared by many experts, albeit for various reasons (cf. Schütrumpf 2005, 166).

19 The distinction of the three types of goods is explained in *EN* 1.8 1098b12-20, and Aristotle states, there, that the distinction is old and well-established among the philosophers.

20 It has not been overlooked by Rowe 1990, Kraut 2000, and Schütrumpf 2005, 130-138.

its location, with air, water and the proximity to the sea, with the necessary functions of the citizens, with military arrangements, etc. It is therefore easy to overlook the fact that in the general depiction of the happy life in the ideal city, Aristotle takes up again certain considerations of the controversy, as reported in 7.2, 3.

IV. The Role of *σχολή* and *ἀσχολία* in the Best State (*Pol.* 7.13-15)

Chapter 13 resumes the discussion of the main topic of the book—the determination of the best constitution itself and of the sort of citizens that the state must be constituted of if it is to be happy and well governed. This question requires a clarification of the question addressed already in chapter 1, what happiness is (*Pol.* 7.13 1332a3-7), and Aristotle here resorts to his definition of happiness from his ‘Ethics’, namely that happiness is the perfect (τέλειος) activation or use of virtue. He adds the explanation that by ‘perfect’ he means what is so in an ‘unqualified’ (ἀπλῶς) way rather than in a ‘qualified’ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) way. He thereby departs from the language used in the passage in *EN* 1.7 1097a30-4, where he defines happiness as the perfect use of virtue and explains that perfect are those actions that are chosen for their own sake, in contradistinction to actions that are chosen for the sake of something else (δι’ ἄλλο / δι’ ἕτερον). The difference in terminology in *Pol.* 7.13 is no accident, for Aristotle has a different distinction in mind.²¹ He is concerned here, not with means and ends, but rather with actions that serve different kinds of ‘beautiful ends’ (καλά) (*Pol.* 7.3 1332a11-16):

“For example, in the case of just actions, just retributions and punishments spring from virtue, but are necessary uses of it and are noble in a necessary way (τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν), since it would be more choiceworthy if no individual or city-state would need such things. On the other hand, just actions that aim at honors (ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς) and prosperity (ἐπὶ τὰς εὐπορίας) are unqualifiedly noble.”²²

21 The contrast ἀπλῶς–ἐξ ὑποθέσεως/ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων/πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινά is used in the *Politics* earlier to distinguish the unqualifiedly best form of constitution and the form under certain limiting circumstances (6.1 1288b21-37; 7, 1239b3-5 *et passim*).

22 The importance of this modification will emerge later in connection with the discussion of *σχολή* and *ἀσχολία*. No such differentiation is contained either in the *EN* or in the *EE*. No mention is made that acts in war are ἀσχοιοί in the discussion of courage, although Aristotle mentions that it is hard to recognize that its

In both cases, the actions are acts of virtue and done for their own sake; the difference lies in the fact that the first type of virtuous actions aims at the restitution of some infraction or deficiency of public peace and harmony, while the latter type of actions are performed in peace and harmony—both types clearly refer to the acts of politicians under different circumstances. The differentiation explains at the same time that people can cope nobly with bad circumstances, because these circumstances are a matter of bad luck (τύχη). So Aristotle has found a place for virtuous actions that involve pain and trouble, although he regards it as the task of legislators to prevent such obstacles. For, a city is excellent if all its citizens can participate in an excellent way (*Pol.* 7.13 1332a32-35).

In what way does the depiction of life in the best city constitute a resumption of the controversy of chapters 2-3? It does so in two respects. First, it emphasizes that there are no excellent people who are not participating citizens. Second, it adds that all citizens receive the same kind of education (*Pol.* 7.14 1332b39-1333a10). And this education ‘for all’ is what occupies Aristotle in what follows. As he states, education is concerned with three things: with nature (φύσις), habit (ἔθος), and reason (λόγος). While all people are born with a certain nature of body and soul, nature can be developed in different ways by habit, for habits can turn out for the better or for the worse. In addition, reason needs to be developed in a certain way by education (παιδεία). And to see to it that all is arranged well is the task of the legislator concerning those things that are learned by habituation (ἐθιζόμενοι), as well as those that are learned by instruction (ἀκούοντες).²³

Both aspects of education are further pursued in what follows. And just as Aristotle does in his ethics, he here distinguishes not only between character, as the part of the soul that listens to reason, and reason itself, but also between the theoretical and the practical kind of reason (*Pol.* 7.14, 1333a16-1333b5). Because Aristotle at the same time refers to the principle that the higher faculty has the higher dignity, we expect him to give preference, again, to the theoretical kind of activity over the practical kind. But

actions contain a kind of pleasure, because soldiers have to put up with fear and pain (*EN* 3.9). In *EN* 10.7 1177b6-12 acts of war and even its preparation are called ἀσχολοί because no one would choose them for their own sake, but only for that of peace.

- 23 Depew 1991, 361 rejects the ‘superstructuralist view’ suggested by Cooper 1975, 143 that “once moral virtue is securely entrenched, intellectual goods are allowed to predominate”; but Depew regards politics and contemplative activity as mutually supportive, even mutually entailing, without explaining how this is supposed to happen—except that it happens in the ideal aristocracy.

this expectation is disappointed. For instead of pursuing the difference between θεωρία and πρᾶξις, Aristotle introduces the distinction between σχολή and ἀσχολία, without attributing the former to θεωρία and the latter to πρᾶξις (*Pol.* 7.14 1333a30): “The whole of life is divided into work (ἀσχολία) and leisure (σχολή), war and peace, and of actions some are necessary or useful, others noble. And the same choice must be made among the parts of the soul and their actions. War must be chosen for the sake of peace, work for the sake of leisure, necessary and useful things for the sake of noble ones.”

Practical activities are here not all and sundry assigned to the side of what is necessary and useful, and theoretical ones to what is noble. How can we be sure? It is suggested by the fact that Aristotle assigns to the statesman the task of seeing to it that the citizens are capable of doing both things well: to go to work (ἀσχολεῖν) and to war (πολεμεῖν), if necessary, but also to remain at peace (εἰρήνη) and leisure (σχολάζειν). And though it is important to perform useful actions (χρήσιμα), it is even more necessary to perform noble ones (καλά) (*Pol.* 7.15 1334a39-b5). This indicates that all unqualifiedly noble actions are a matter of σχολή, and that they are actions that concern moral and political as well as cultural and intellectual pursuits.²⁴

That the noble and therefore leisurely actions include the activities of theoretical as well as those of practical reason can be concluded from Aristotle's request that the legislator keep all the parts of the soul and their actions in good order and see to it that the citizens lead good lives, so that all are capable of coping with work, but also of living a life of leisure (*Pol.* 7.14 1333a33-5). For these aims, children must be educated as well as people of other age groups who need education. Aristotle does not provide an exception for the philosophers' theoretical activities from this injunction.

That Aristotle has an all-encompassing kind of education in mind is somewhat obfuscated by the extensive criticism that fills the rest of that

24 This point is not only missed by all those interpreters who limit σχολή to cultural affairs and to that part of life (cf. Solmsen 1964 who even claims that Aristotle's conception of σχολή is 'Hellenistic'; also Lord 1990; Vander Waerdt 1985, Kraut 1997.). Schütrumpf 2005 seems somewhat undecided. He defines σχολή as 'sinnerfüllte Lebensgestaltung' and though he indicates that it concerns activities that are not merely necessary (484-487), he seems to identify it with those activities that concern the 'muses' (133-5; 574-5). He does not clearly state that all practical perfect activities are those of σχολή (467/8; 498-500), because he regards σχολή as 'die Befreiung von anderen Aufgaben' (501). Varga 2014 limits σχολή to the possibility of 'self-determined activities'; that are pursued independently of commitments to the community.

chapter (*Pol.* 7.14 1333a5-1334a10). It takes up, once again, the complaint that the states that are held in the highest repute do not educate their citizens for a life of peace and leisure by furthering all the virtues, but for a life of gain and conquest. This critique focuses especially on the miserable fate of Sparta after the loss of its power, as a warning against the wrong-spirited kind of education by legislators who do not realize that such states must come to ruin once they lose their military prowess.²⁵

That the avoidance of war and conquest as the aim of education is, nevertheless, not Aristotle's main concern emerges in chapter 15, where he takes up the topic of education in general and emphasizes, once again, that it serves the same end both for the individual citizen and for the community as a whole. The best man and the best citizen are one and the same and a life in peace and leisure is the best form of life. But Aristotle does not content himself here with this frequently repeated slogan, but now also differentiates between virtues that are concerned with work (*ἔργον*), and virtues that are concerned with leisure (*σχολή*). As his further explanations indicate, there is no strict dichotomy between virtues of work and virtues of leisure (*Pol.* 7.15 1334a16-18). To be sure, some of the virtues have their function (*ἔργον*) exclusively in leisure, while others have their function in 'unleisure' (*ἀσχολία*), but other virtues have them in both. What Aristotle means by this *prima facie* enigmatic statement emerges from his further explanations (*Pol.* 7.15 1334a19-40): a city must possess moderation, courage and endurance, because it must be able to defend itself against attackers, if it is not to be enslaved by others. Such defense is war, and fighting in war requires those virtues whose function is 'work' (*ἀσχολία*). But a city must also possess philosophy for leisure. And it must possess temperance and justice for both times—that is, both at times of *ἀσχολία* and of *σχολή*. For if people live in peace and affluence, they need moderation and justice as well; otherwise, they will not know how to make good use of what they have: "Much justice and temperance are needed, therefore, by those who are held to be doing best and who enjoy all the things regarded as bless-

25 The concentration on Sparta speaks for an early date of composition—when its downfall after the battle at Leuctra in 371 was still relatively fresh in people's minds. A much later date would have to be assumed if, as some interpreters assume, the work was intended as advice to Alexander the Great. Sparta would serve, then, only as an example of warning. But if that was Aristotle's intention, Alexander would hardly have been amused by the repeated condemnation of wars and conquests.

ings” (*Pol.* 7.15 1334a28-30).²⁶ Actions of justice and moderation, surely as well as those of other virtues, are required while living in peace and good order (*Pol.* 7.16 1334b36-40):

“It is evident, then, why a city-state that is to be happy and good should share in these virtues. For it is shameful to be unable to make use of good things, but even more shameful to be unable to make use of them in leisure time—to make it plain that we are good men when working or at war, but slaves when at peace and leisure.”

Virtues of character are associated, then, with both ἀσχολία and σχολή, and so must be the respective activities.

Unfortunately, Aristotle does not comment any further on the meaning of ‘philosophy’, i.e. whether he uses it in a narrow sense of θεωρία or in the wider sense that includes intellectual activities of all kinds. But the fact that he subsequently emphasizes that the training of ‘habits’ is only the beginning of education, while that of reason (λόγος) and understanding (νοῦς) concerns the τέλος of human nature as such (*Pol.* 7.15 1334b15), suggests that philosophy is here used as the common name for all higher learning intended for the citizenry as a whole.²⁷

To make the citizens ready for a life in σχολή is, then, the intention that Aristotle pursues with his plan of education. The fact that he refers to the three factors that determine the quality of human beings: nature, habit, and reason, shows that education should concern all three and in the right order. While nature is there from the beginning, habits of character come in second, reason and understanding set in last:

“For spirit, wish and also appetite are present in children right from birth, whereas reason and understanding naturally develop as they grow older. That is why supervision of the body comes first and precedes that of the soul; then comes supervision of appetite and desire.

26 This, in all likelihood, refers to the distinction introduced earlier between ‘necessarily noble’ and ‘unqualifiedly noble’ activities (*Pol.* 7.13 1332a10-16). Justice is used both for punishment, a use one would rather avoid, if possible; such just actions are καλὰ of necessity and in ἀσχολία. But justice also has its function in preserving good order, and in that case its actions are unqualifiedly καλὰ – and the same distinction applies to acts the other virtues of character such as liberality, magnanimity etc. that are, then actions in σχολή. Aristotle may have wanted to avoid a more extended discussion of the difference between the conditions of leisurely and unleisurely virtuous actions.

27 On evidence for a broad sense of philosophy cf. Kraut 1997, 140.

But supervision of desire should be for the sake of understanding, and that of the body for the sake of the soul" (*Pol.* 7.15 1334b22-28).

This is clearly the plan of education that Aristotle regards as necessary for all citizens and that he wants to make a public rather than a private concern (8.1). But of the three aspects of education: nature = the body, habit = the virtues of character, and reason, only the first two are discussed in the detailed plan of education in the subsequent chapters. The discussion of the physical conditions, the procreation and rearing of children up to the age of seven, fills the rest of book (7.16, 17). The education of habit—especially the habits that are to form the character—is the topic of book 8. But its design remains incomplete, for it breaks off in the midst of the discussion of the musical education of children.²⁸ A program of the education of reason and understanding is missing altogether.

The fact that Aristotle's program ends with music has led many experts to the conclusion that the life of leisure intended for the citizens of the ideal city is to consist of 'music' only—in the wider sense that includes all the muses such as literature.²⁹ But this assumption not only ignores the fact that Aristotle has clearly left the design of education incomplete, for it breaks off in the midst of the discussion of the suitable musical modes, but it also ignores the fact that subjects of higher learning have been referred to repeatedly and that their discussion has been deferred until later (*Pol.* 8.3 1338a30-34). Reading and writing are not only useful for everyday chores, but the means for much further learning (*Pol.* 8.3 1338a40: πολλὰς μαθήσεις ἐτέρας).³⁰ These references let one conclude that a program of

28 As Aristotle indicates, he approves of the division of life into periods of seven years, so that is how his program is staged; but he does not specify the subjects of education that he regards as suitable for the periods beyond childhood.

29 Solmsen 1964, Lord 1982; Kraut 1997, 127.

30 Kraut 1997, 175; 183-4 regards the fields of higher learning as one of the subjects Aristotle intended to but did not get around to discuss. He does not, however, mention that they contain activities of σχολή—despite the explanation in *Metaph.* 1.1 980a1-982a3 that the study of mathematics of the priests of Egypt constituted the first use of σχολή. And Kraut assumes that Aristotle wants to exclude politics from σχολή—179-80, thereby ignoring the earlier distinction between different kinds of activities—i.e. those that are done to remedy some defect and those that are καλὰ ἀπλῶς. It seems that all these commentators have simply forgotten that virtuous activities are the constituents of happiness, including, of course, those of politics. Schütrumpf is not very explicit about this question. On the one hand he regards music only as the prelude of the educational scheme, on the other he seems to assume that σχολή consists only of music even in the case of adults.

higher education had originally been intended but not carried out, which also had the aim to make the citizen fit for noble political activities.³¹

The misunderstanding that the educational program is limited to μουσική is not only due to the abrupt end of the discussion in 8.7, but also to the fact that Aristotle does not confine his discussion to the musical education of children but includes in it a lengthy excursion into the effects that music has on grown-ups in general. Thus, he rules out the kind of musical training that is needed for soloists and for competitions. He rules out the use of the αὐλός (flute/oboe) and other instruments that overly excite the audience, but also discusses the cathartic effects that such music can have on souls that are by nature in a state of exaltation (*Pol.* 8.6 1341a21-b8; 8.7 1341b32-1342b28). This lengthy excursion is not without reason; for Aristotle is concerned with the effect that music has on the moral disposition of the citizens in general. But its discussion distracts from the fact that the plan of education, as it unfolds in Book 8, does not get beyond childhood age, as is indicated by the fact that its subjects are limited to reading, writing, gymnastics, music, and drawing (*Pol.* 8.3 1337b24-27). Given that Aristotle adheres to the division of life into periods of seven years that has been attributed to Solon,³² his modest curriculum must concern children up to the age of 14 years only. What plans he had for the education of adolescents up to age 21 and beyond remains an open question. It is, at any rate, highly unlikely that the grown-ups were expected to spend their time only with listening to music, even if μουσική was not limited to music in our sense of the word.

The reason that let Aristotle abandon, *quasi* mid-sentence, his design for the education of the citizens can therefore not be that music is the be-all of σχολή in his best state. He must, rather, have realized that his design of education was getting ensconced in a maze of details that was a distraction from his real concern, namely to give general advice to the legislators about the citizens' education.³³ Initially, the discussion of music was to serve only as a kind of 'prelude' (*Pol.* 8.5 1339a13: ἐνδόσιμον) to the subject. But in its execution, Aristotle found himself haggling with Plato

31 Political activities are mentioned again in *Pol.* 8.6 1341a8.

32 *Pol.* 7.17 1336b40-1337a3.

33 Its closeness to the Platonic criticism of music is one of the points that speak for an early date of book 7 and 8. In the *Poetics*, by contrast, music (μελοποιία) is treated as a factor of lesser importance: it is called one of 'the greatest pleasurable accessories of tragedy, but takes fifth rank after plot, character, diction and thought' (*Po.* 6). Aristotle does not concern himself, there, with the cathartic influence of the musical modes.

about such details as the suitable types of musical mode—whether for children, adolescents, or grown-ups. He must have realized that that pursuit was getting out of all bounds. An extension into all fields of education from childhood to adulthood in detail would have been an enormous enterprise, as Aristotle must have recognized at that point, so that he simply broke it off with a few remarks on the criteria of the suitability of the musical modes.³⁴

Because the design of the citizens' education remained a fragment, we do not know what kind of higher education Aristotle had in mind for the citizens of his ideal city and what role philosophy was to play in it. But there are certain indications concerning the controversial question whether philosophers should participate in the city's political functions or remain strangers outside it. As Aristotle states, in the ideal city all citizens get the same education, and they all take turns in ruling and being ruled.³⁵ This need not prevent certain citizens from pursuing *θεωρία* in a way that exceeds the average mind's interests and comprehension.³⁶ But that is no reason why philosophers should not also be citizens and engage in politics. We can take Aristotle himself as our witness, despite the fact that as a metic, he could not play an active part in politics for practically all his life. But he clearly spent a great amount of time on the study of the conditions of politics and regarded his interest in politics not only as compatible with philosophy, but as part of philosophy. It is the 'philosophy of human affairs' that starts with the principles of ethics and finds its completion with those of politics (*EN* 10.9 1181b12-23). Whether Aristotle regarded the study of those principles as a special kind of *θεωρία* is difficult to say, because he never uses that term in that connection.³⁷ But in the *EN* he indicates once that students of political philosophy need not overburden them-

34 This diagnosis is supported, with caution by Solmsen 1964, 217n97 who refers to the view of H. von Arnim's observation (Sitzungsber. Wien. Akad. 200, 1924.1.82) that his theory "in diesem Stile [scil. of Books 7 and 8] weitergeführt, sehr umfangreich geworden wäre".

35 That all citizens are to partake in ruling and being ruled in turn is repeated several times (*Pol.* 7.14 1332b25-6).

36 That the study of extraordinary subjects (*περιττά*) is not everyone's delight is indicated at *Pol.* 7.14, 1333a27-30, just as Aristotle in *EN* 6.7 1141b2-8 mentions that people admire philosophers with an interest in outlandish subjects, such as Anaxagoras and Thales, but regard these studies as useless, because they do not concern the human good.

37 The often-quoted reference in *EN* 2., 1103b26-29 that his aim is not *θεωρία* as in his other treatises but make people good does not mean that his reflections on the good life and the nature of the virtues are not of a theoretical nature.

selves with those details of other branches of philosophy that are beyond their own concern.³⁸ It is clear, therefore, that they are engaged in the study of the philosophical principles of politics, for they are to learn all the things that legislators need to know if they are to order a city for the best. And once they are accomplished legislators, they will surely be engaged actively in politics and these activities will constitute their life in σχολή.

But if σχολή embraces such a wider range of activities, from music to politics to intellectual pursuits, as long as the respective activities are concerned with unqualified καλὰ and not with the settling of conflicts, whether with other cities or within the city, the question arises why Aristotle in the relevant chapters in *EN* 10.7, 8 confines σχολή to θεωρία in the narrow sense and claims that even the statesman's activities are ἄσχολοι.

V. The origin of *EN* 10.7, 8

As mentioned earlier, there seems to be a close connection between the comparison of the practical and the theoretical life in *EN* 10.7, 8 and the controversy as reported in *Pol.* 7.2, 3. The two parties treat practical and theoretical activities as incompatible—and though σχολή is not mentioned in Aristotle's summary of that controversy, there can be hardly any doubt that the proponents of the theoretical side would have claimed σχολή exclusively for their side, in the spirit of Plato's *Theaetetus*. The argument for the primacy of the theoretical life with respect to happiness in *EN* 10 may represent, of course, a late return to the purist 'Theaetetan' view of the superiority of θεωρία in the narrow sense and a reaffirmation of the philosopher's state outside the political community, a reaffirmation that simply ignores the development in *Politics* 7 and 8. But as pointed out before, this purist stance does not fit well into the context of *EN* in general and not into that of Book 10, given that it ends with the transition to legislation and the study of politics as the concern of the 'philosophy of human affairs'. It is therefore a much more plausible explanation that chapters 7 and 8 contain an early piece of text, namely the contribution that Aristotle made to the controversy in the Academy, as reported in *Pol.* 7.2, 3. If Aristotle participated in that controversy, he may have intentionally presented a one-sided argument in favor of θεωρία. He must have resorted to that

38 *EN* 1.13 1102a23-26. The division of philosophy in *Metaph.* 5.1 is uninformative on this question, because it concerns itself only with metaphysics, mathematics, and physics.

piece of text in *EN* 10 provisionally, in order to fulfill his promise to discuss the theoretical form of life, but with the intention to cut back some of the needlessly hyperbolic claims in favor of the theoretical life, such as the contention that only the theoretical life is a life of *σχολή*.³⁹ Aristotle evidently did not have the time to fulfill his intention to make the necessary revisions that would have led to a more balanced view of the two forms of life.

But even if this conjecture is right and such were his intentions, the question still arises what prompted Aristotle to give pride of place to *θεωρία* in his contribution to the controversy in the Academy. Was it just juvenile enthusiasm in the spirit of the *Theaetetus*? Or was it just a one-sided dialectical exercise? Such explanations are too facile. Aristotle has good reasons to emphasize the primacy of first philosophy and no reason to retreat from that stance. After all, *θεωρία* is concerned with the objects that are the foundation of all knowledge. Without proper knowledge of metaphysics, of what is unchangeable and necessary, there is no knowledge of what is changeable and contingent, whether in the physical world or in the human sphere. All knowledge is ultimately based on knowledge of the first principles of ontology on the one hand, of the different entities there are, and on the first principles of cosmology on the other hand, of the first causes that keep the world together and going. That is why Aristotle in *Metaph.* 5.1 1025b3-26a32 assigns the rank of first philosophy to metaphysics—and the rank of second philosophy to physics. He has no reason to retreat from that assessment of the primary place of *θεωρία* proper.

But he could have, and would have, cut back claims that give to *θεωρία* more than its due place in human life in *EN* 10.7, 8. Not only are its activities not suited for everyone, they are also not the only activities that are worth doing. And there is also no reason to claim that the lonely thinker is the only truly autarkical and happy person. Aristotle would, no doubt, in his revision have refrained from insinuating that the virtues of character are dispensable, because the gods do not interact in the way human beings do. In addition, he would not have just discussed the practical life under the perspective that it provides the material goods that are necessary for the philosopher's upkeep. In short, Aristotle would have proposed a more balanced view that assigns its due place to both the theoretical and the practical form of life in the way he does in the *Politics* 7 and 8. As his dis-

39 The very brief and unclear eulogy of the godly nature of *θεωρία* at the end of *EE* 8.3 1249b13-23 clearly was not a suitable model even as a first draft for a comparison between the theoretical and the practical life.

cussion of education shows, Aristotle did not ignore the fact that although some people may be born to *become* philosophers, none are born *as* philosophers. All citizens need the kind of education that is suitable for the different stages of their development, and that also applies to future philosophers. They, too, are social animals, not only in their early life, but also in their maturity. For philosophy, even first philosophy, presupposes a *κοινωνία* of people who share their thoughts and insights; such a community is provided by a school like that headed by Aristotle.

Had Aristotle been more explicit about his views concerning higher education in *Pol.* 8 and not gotten bogged down in the details of musical education, we might know better what place and role he would have assigned to philosophy in his ideal city. That he did not mean to uphold the idea that philosophers are best off as *ξενικοί* who live separate from the city is shown by Aristotle's own contributions in his ethics and politics. These works are not just concerned with the life in the city, but they aim to provide a new basis for it. For, as he sees it, without the 'philosophy of human affairs' there will be no proper education of legislators who know their job—and without such legislators there will be no ideal city. Such a philosophy cannot be developed by a philosopher who lives in splendid isolation and in separation from the city; it presupposes the kind of familiarity with moral and political principles that in turn presuppose the careful study of human actions and interactions that seems to have occupied a lot of Aristotle's time and energy. That it did so is clearly witnessed by the 'collections of laws and constitutions' that he refers to as the prerequisite material for the education of future legislators.⁴⁰ The evaluation of these studies and the design of the best constitution were clearly part of Aristotle's and his students' *σχολή*.

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40 The reference to collections on laws and constitutions in *EN* 10.9 1181b7 must be to the collection of 158 city-states mentioned in later catalogues of his work (cf. Diogenes Laertius V 27,1). Such collections can obviously be put together by metics and visitors. But they cannot with any sense be put together by philosophers who do, as a matter of principle, not want to be part of a city.

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Aristotle on Care and Concern

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I

Fundamental to Aristotle's ethical treatises, both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics*, is a bipartite psychology, which divides the soul into two parts: τὸ ἄλογον, "the alogical part," and τὸ λόγον ἔχον, "the logical part" (*EN* 1.13 1102a27-8 and *EE* 2.1 1220a9-10). Translators often prefer to speak of "the irrational part" and "the rational part." There is nothing wrong with that as long as one realizes that "irrational" is not used in reference to a part of the soul that is totally divorced from cognition and therefore is closed to reason. Put differently, it would be wrong to think of τὸ ἄλογον as a psychic part that is the locus of sensation, pleasant and painful feelings, which are quite distinct from thought. Rather, the alogical part is the locus of emotional response, e.g. anger and fright, and the logical part is the locus of deliberation and reflection. The two parts are closely related in that both involve cognition. The emotion of anger involves thinking oneself slighted, and the emotion of fright involves thinking that harm is likely. These thoughts become the occasion for deliberation and reflection. The angry person deliberates how to take revenge, and the frightened person considers how to avoid harm. Moreover, if time permits, both the angry individual and the frightened individual may reflect on the particular situation, asking whether a perceived slight is real and whether an apparent danger is serious and imminent.¹

The above is not intended to suggest that the alogical part of the soul is quite separate from sensation. On the contrary, the thoughts involved in emotional response are often accompanied by sensations. For example, the thought that an insult has occurred typically results in an uncomfortable feeling, which depending on the circumstance can be quite painful. The same is true of fright. Indeed, when fright becomes terror, the pain may be not only intense but also localized in the region around the heart. Here it need only be added that while the involvement of sensation in emotion is common—Aristotle says that emotions are accompanied by pleasure and

1 Fortenbaugh 1975, 23-5.

pain (*EN* 2.5 1105b23, *Rh.* 2.1 1378a20-1)—it is not entirely clear whether he thinks of sensation as a necessary feature of emotional response.² In the *Eudemian Ethics*, he says “for the most part” (*EE* 2.2 1220b12-14), and in the *Rhetoric* he dissociates hate from pain (*Rh.* 2.4 1382a13).³ That is not true of thought: both factual and evaluative. Thinking that a slight has occurred is necessary to anger: one thinks that something has been said or done, which is deemed an affront. Hence, in the *Topics*, thought is mentioned in the essential definition as the efficient cause of anger (*Top.* 6.13 151a16-17, cf. *Rh.* 2.2 1378a32). And the same holds for fright; the thought of imminent danger is a necessary part of being frightened and for that reason is mentioned in the essential definition of fright (*Rh.* 2.5 1382a21-2, 1382b30-5).

None of the above is news.⁴ Nor is the fact that Aristotle’s ethical psychology is different from his biological psychology, which is familiar to readers of Aristotle’s work *De Anima*. There we find a threefold division that marks off the faculty of nutrition, from both the faculty of sensation and that of thought. This division corresponds to the *scala naturae*. Plants have only nutritive capacity, animals have sensation as well, and human beings have cognitive capacity in addition to nutrition and sensation.

There is also appetite or drive, ὄρεξις, which is closely related to the faculty of sensation in that the two are found together at birth in both animals and humans. In need of nourishment, the newly born experience discomfort and instinctively search for the mother’s teat. In the case of human beings, drive can also be aroused by cognition, as when a frightened individual decides that flight is the best path to safety and begins to take evasive action.

While the ethical and biological psychologies are different, the two are not incompatible, so that it is possible to move back and forth from one psychology to the other. Take the emotion of anger. Whereas the ethical psychology assigns emotion to the alogical part of the soul, the biological psychology explains emotional response in terms of both sensation and

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- 2 The adverb ὅλως at *NE* 2.4 1105b23 need mean no more than “speaking generally.”
- 3 If Aristotle thinks that the pleasures and pains that accompany emotional response are caused by bodily changes brought on by emotion (e.g., the frightened person not only thinks himself frightened but also experiences an unpleasant increase in heart rate), it is easy to think of cases in which the bodily change is simply too weak to be noticed. Indeed, a person may be so absorbed in deliberating how best to achieve a goal like safety that he fails to notice changes going on within his body, e.g. excessive heart palpitations.
- 4 See Fortenbaugh 1970, 40-70, rpt. 2006, 9-37.

thought. We might say that the biological psychology unpacks what the ethical psychology treats as one. And when the emotion of anger results in action leading to revenge, both psychologies recognize the involvement of drive. Only the ethical psychology sees that as an exercise of the alogical part of soul (*EN* 1.13 1102b29-30, *EE* 1221b31-2); in contrast, the biological psychology recognizes a motive faculty that is closely related to sensation.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the logical part of the bipartite soul is the locus of the deliberations and reflections that emotions occasion (see above). What needs to be added is that Aristotle recognizes a twofold division within the logical part. There is the scientific part, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, which considers things that do not admit change. There is also the calculative part, τὸ λογιστικόν, which considers things that do admit change (*EN* 6.1 1139a5-15). For the most part, this essay will focus on the world of change, but the world of things that do not admit change will receive attention, albeit brief, below in Section VI.

II

Whereas Aristotle's bipartite psychology is especially prominent in the ethical treatises, it also occurs in the *Politics*. Best known may be the final chapter of Book 1, where Aristotle introduces it to justify the subordinate roles of slaves and women within a well-organized city state. Slaves, we are told, completely lack the deliberative faculty; women have it but lacking in authority (*Pol.* 1.13 1260a.12-14). The assertion is puzzling to say the least and has been much discussed in the scholarly literature.⁵

The bipartite psychology is also found in Book 7. There, Aristotle focuses on what steps a legislator can take to ensure that a city-state is marked by well-being and happiness. Such a state is said to require a citizen body, which is morally good, and that is dependent on nature, habituation, and reason: φύσις, ἔθος, and λόγος (*Pol.* 7.13 1332a39-40). Since nature has already been discussed earlier, Aristotle introduces a backward-looking reference (*Pol.* 7.13 1332b9 looking back to *Pol.* 7.7 1327b19-1328a3) and proceeds to education, παιδεία, saying that men learn some things by habituation, ἐθιζόμενοι, and other things by listening, ἀκούοντες (*Pol.* 7.13 1332b10-11). Without expressing himself in the technical language of bipartition, Aristotle is thinking in terms of bipartition, which is fundamentally based on a twofold division of education: a first part that aims to

5 For a recent discussion, see Fortenbaugh 2015, 395-404.

shape a person's emotional responses by means of an early habituation, ἔθος, and a second stage in which a person learns not only to follow an argument but also to reason for himself.⁶

Subsequently, the bipartite psychology is introduced with greater clarity, when Aristotle says that the soul is divided into two parts, μέρη, of which one part has reason in itself, τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' αὐτό, while the other does not have reason in itself, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει [λόγον] καθ' αὐτό, but is able to listen to (obey) reason, λόγῳ ὑπακούειν (*Pol.* 7.14 1333a16-18). The phrase τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον is a variation on τὸ λόγον ἔχον, and the phrase τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει introduces a negative adverb in place of the alpha privative in ἄλογον. What might be puzzling is the occurrence of ὑπακούειν when compared with the occurrence of ἀκούοντες in the earlier passage (*Pol.* 7.13 1332b11), but what Aristotle wants to say is clear enough. The infinitive ὑπακούειν is used in reference to the emotions. Aristotle is thinking of the person whose emotions are under control through the habituation that takes place as a first step in moral education. The participle ἀκούοντες (without a prefix) in the earlier passage refers to a second stage in moral education, when a person learns not only to follow an argument but also to reason for himself and to act accordingly.

In what follows, bipartition is introduced even more clearly. Aristotle uses the contrasting phrases, τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον (*Pol.* 7.15 1334b18-19), which occur in Aristotle's ethical treatises (see above). We are told that the body is prior in generation to the soul and that the alogical part of the soul is prior to the logical part. That is said to be clear, for anger, wish and appetite, θύμος, βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία, are present at birth whereas reasoning and mind/understanding, λογισμός and νοῦς, develop over time (*Pol.* 7.15 1334b22-5). Aristotle goes on to tell us that care of the body should begin before that of the soul. Next comes care of desire/drive, ὄρεξις, which is for the sake of the mind. Here ὄρεξις stands in for anger, wish and appetite. All three provide motive force and so can be viewed as varieties of ὄρεξις. Finally, Aristotle adds that care of the body is for the sake of the soul (*Pol.* 7.15 1334b25-8).

6 Caveat: the habituation of young people does not exclude verbal communication: young people are expected to listen to their tutors and generally to their elders.

III

What especially interests me in *Politics* 7.15 (1334b25-8) is the noun ἐπιμέλεια, which has been translated with “care.” It occurs once in the accusative case and is understood four times after the definite article τὴν. In itself, the word is not exceptional. Indeed, the noun is common and cognate with the verb μέλειν and the noun μελέτη as well as with the verb ἐπιμελεῖσθαι and the adjective ἐπιμελής. In one form or another, it occurs repeatedly in 7.16 (1334b31, 1335a7, 1335b12, 7.17 1336a6 and so on).⁷ Here, repetition is not a fault. Being part of everyday language, ἐπιμέλεια is immediately intelligible to a wide audience, so that Aristotle is able to discuss human behavior—both admirable and deplorable—without introducing the technical language of bipartiton.

Translating ἐπιμέλεια with “care” makes for good English at the end of 7.15 (1334b25), and in what follows “care” will often be the preferred translation. Nevertheless, there will be occasions when “concern” may be substituted and even preferred. For “care” seems to suggest doing something (the phrase “take care”), while “concern” suggests an agent’s mindset (“feel concern”). Moreover, the translator who wants to imitate the Greek grammatical construction or to avoid repeating the same word “care” may on occasion find “concern” to be the better choice. But more often than not, “care” and “concern” can be regarded as synonyms and used interchangeably.

At the beginning of 7.16, Aristotle discusses legislation dealing with reproduction. He says that since the legislator must consider the bodily condition of offspring, “his first care should be about coupling,” πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν (1334b31).⁸ Reasons are given, both biological and familial, for fixing the ages of persons engaging in reproduction.

7 The noun μελέτη occurs earlier at *Pol.* 7.15 1334b17. The Greek word μελέτη is like the English word “care” in that it can refer to the concern and attention devoted to something as well as to the practices and treatments that follow from and exhibit concern and attention. See LSJ s.v. At *Pol.* 7.15 1334b17, μελέτη refers to the practices and disciplines that lead to good character. Much the same holds regarding ἐπιμέλεια. Indeed, on occasion there may be no need to choose between attention and practices. E.g. at *EN* 4.1 we are told that the extravagant man will develop into a self-indulgent person if left unschooled, ἀπαιδαγώγητος; but if he obtains proper care, ἐπιμέλεια, he may attain the median/right state (1121b10-12). In other words, if he comes under the tutelage of someone who cares for him and under that person is subjected to proper practices, he may cease to be extravagant and self-indulgent.

8 Or “he should first concern himself with coupling.”

Aristotle adds that the bodies of the children are to accord with the wish of the legislator: πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν (*Pol.* 7.16 1335a6). Here, we are not to understand wish as an abstract thought apart from desire. Rather, wish here has motive force, so that the legislator is moved to set forth and to explain the guidelines that are to be followed by the citizens of a city-state. Indeed, Aristotle himself assumes the role of legislator, offering various considerations, some of which are biological. When prospective parents are too young, their offspring are adversely affected. And with aging comes a decline in reproductive capacity.⁹ There are also familial considerations: e.g., when one party becomes impotent and the other does not, quarrels are apt to arise, and when children grow up and are ready to succeed to their parents, the latter should not be too old to be pleased and to provide assistance. There are even meteorological considerations: winter is to be preferred as are winds blowing from the north (*Pol.* 7.16 1334b29-1335b2).

Taking care does not stop with coupling. Rather, during pregnancy women should take care, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, of their bodies (*Pol.* 7.16 1335b12-13), neither being lazy nor eating food that lacks nutrients. Regarding the former, Aristotle says that the legislator will require daily walks. In doing so, he is taking a cue from Plato, who says that all bodies benefit from being shaken and then considers legislation enjoining pregnant women to go for walks (*Lg.* 7 789D-E). In regard to mental activity, Aristotle recommends an opposite regimen: the mental activity of a pregnant woman should be more leisurely, for the unborn child draws on the mother in the way that plants draw on the earth. The comparison may be far fetched, but for our purposes that matters little. Important is that Aristotle continues to focus on proper care, which he thinks worthy of legislation. And in setting forth his own views, Aristotle leaves aside the technical language of bipartition. Rightly so, for it would add nothing and even be a distraction. The same holds for the remainder of Book 7. Aristotle speaks of nations in which creating a military habit is a matter of care, ἐπιμελής (*Pol.* 7.17 1336a6), and of the advantages of early care, ἐπιμέλεια (*Pol.* 7.17 1336a22). So too it is a matter of care, ἐπιμελής (*Pol.* 7.17 1336b14), for rulers to shield young people from unseemly words and pictures (*Pol.* 7.17 1336b14-15).

9 Women are to marry at 18 and men at 37, when they are in their prime. As a consequence, the decline in their reproductive capacity will coincide: at 50 for women and 70 for men (*Pol.* 7.16 1335a6-32).

At this point, one may wonder why Aristotle does not recognize ἐπιμέλεια as a virtue. Certainly for the English speaker, “care” and “concern” have a positive ring. And the person who expresses care for others and exhibits concern in his actions is readily seen as a good person. One reason is that the word ἐπιμέλεια is like the English “care” and “concern” in that it has no special tie to ethics. We can refer to the care exhibited by a master craftsman in building a ship without saying anything about his moral character. And so can Aristotle, who refers to a trireme and the possibility of building a ship διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας, “with art and care” (*Rh.* 2.19 1392b1-6). The craftsman applies his art carefully, no matter whether he is a good man or an evil man.

A second reason is that Aristotle recognizes a distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. And in the case of moral virtue, he tends to think of an established disposition closely tied to emotion, i.e., a disposition whereby one responds correctly to a particular kind of situation. For example, courage, ἀνδρεία, is an excellent disposition in regard to fright and in particular fright occasioned by the prospect of bodily harm, even death, on the battlefield. Similarly temperance, σωφροσύνη, is a disposition in regard to appetites aroused by bodily pleasures: in particular those of eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse. And generosity, ἐλευθεριότης, is shown, when material goods are available either for the taking or the giving, thereby increasing or diminishing one’s personal wealth. Care, ἐπιμέλεια, is different in that it is not closely tied to a particular situation. A person can be careful in responding to danger, in choosing bodily pleasures, and in acts of generosity. Since that hardly needs documentation, I limit myself to a few passages in the *Politics*, where ἐπιμέλεια and cognate forms are used in regard to quite different things: food and farming (*Pol.* 1.8 1256a18-19, 1.11 1259a3), common and private property (*Pol.* 2.3 1261b33, 2.5 1263a27), slaves (*Pol.* 2.9 1269b8), and the conduct of public affairs (*Pol.* 3.5 1278b5).

The listed passages focus on different situations in which care, ἐπιμέλεια, is called for, and taken together they tell against construing care as a moral virtue on a par with those recognized by Aristotle. Perhaps, then, care might be better viewed as an intellectual virtue. Indeed, care in farming, handling property, dealing with slaves, and conducting public affairs all invite planning ahead: that is, reflection on the present situation and deliberation how best to proceed. That belongs to practical intellect. Expressed in terms of the bipartite psychology, we might say that such considerations belong to the calculative part, τὸ λογιστικόν, which is a division of the logical half of the soul. And in cases in which change is not a factor, theoretical

intellect is exercised, i.e. the scientific part, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, of the logical half (above, end Section I).

A particularly important case of practical intellect exhibiting care is the establishment of an educational system for the youth of a city-state. Aristotle addresses the topic in the last book of the *Politics*, where he tells us that the legislator should direct his attention to education, παιδεία (*Pol.* 8.1 1337a12). We are told that education should be a public matter and not a private matter, in which each person cares for his own children (ἐπιμέλεια, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι *Pol.* 8.1 1337a22-4). The youth are part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole (ἐπιμέλεια *Pol.* 8.1 1337a29-30). In this regard, we are told, the Spartans merit special praise, for concerning their children they make the greatest effort, πλείστη σπουδή (*Pol.* 8.1 1337a32), treating education as the business of the state.

The use of σπουδή in combination with πλείστη merits comment. In the present context, it makes perfectly good sense. Aristotle thinks that the education of young people should be subject to state control and admires the Spartans for exhibiting exceptional zeal in making education a primary concern.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Aristotle does not think that all acts of care necessarily involve great effort. He makes the point in the *Rhetoric*, where he tells us that acts of care, effort, and strain, ἐπιμέλεια, σπουδαί, and συντονίαι, are painful in that they are constrained and forced, ἀναγκαῖα and βίαια, unless we are habituated to them, in which case habit makes them pleasant (*Rh.* 1.11 1370a11-14). That may be overstatement. Being accustomed to certain tasks does not always render them pleasant, but habit does mitigate constraint, and in many cases it renders enjoyable those tasks that otherwise would be demanding and therefore stressful.¹¹

Much the same can be said in regard to scientific intellect. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle refers to other fields of concern, ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, regarding which there is scientific knowledge, ἐπιστήμη. We

10 Here “zeal” translates σπουδή. Deciding on a suitable translation is not always easy, for much depends on context. Liddell and Scott group possible translations of σπουδή under three major headings: I: “haste, speed,” II: “zeal, pains, trouble, effort” III: “earnestness.” The second category fits *Pol.* 8.1 1337a32, where Sparta’s care regarding the education of young people is endorsed. Nevertheless, the third category would not be wrong, for σπουδή is used of serious engagement and on occasion contrasted with amusement (e.g. *Pol.* 10.6 1177a1-3).

11 Put differently, for Aristotle habit becomes second nature (on “second nature,” see Fortenbaugh 2007, 60), and what is natural is pleasant. Moreover, becoming accustomed to a particular activity typically involves removing impediments, and unimpeded activity is pleasant (*NE* 7.12 1153a15, 7.13 1153b9-19, cf. *Pol.* 4.11 1295a36-7).

are told that one must neither exert oneself nor relax oneself too much or too little (EN 6.1 1138b26-8). Aristotle is not ruling out cases in which maximum concentration is demanded. These can be tiring and unpleasant, and in dealing with them we are to be guided by right reason (EN 6.1 1138b29). But if we have accustomed ourselves to thinking scientifically, such cases will be few and dealt with reasonably.

IV

Aristotle's remarks on education in *Politics* 7-8 have already been touched upon above in the preceding Section. Here, I want to call attention to Aristotle's remarks on education in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10, for in both treatises Aristotle not only recognizes the importance of nature, habit, and reason, φύσις, ἔθος, and λόγος (Pol. 7.13 1332a40, 7.15 1334b6-7; EN 10.9 1179b20-1) but also expresses a strong preference for laws governing the educational system of a city-state (Pol. 8.1 11337a11-34; EN 10.9 1179b31-5). Indeed, in the *Ethics*, he goes beyond educating young people and tells us that we need laws regulating not only a person's early years but also his adult life and generally the whole of a person's life (EN 10.9 1180a1-4).

Especially striking is the fact that the Nicomachean discussion resembles that of the *Politics* (above Section III), in that it makes frequent use of the noun ἐπιμέλεια and its cognate forms. We read that with few exceptions, only in Sparta does the lawgiver exhibit care, ἐπιμέλεια, in the nurture and practices of young people (EN 10.9 1180a23-5). Moreover, it is not sufficient that young people obtain correct nurture and care, τροφή and ἐπιμέλεια (EN 10.9 1180a1-2); habituation must continue throughout a person's life. And when a community fails to provide care, ἐξαμελεῖσθαι, individuals must step up (EN 10.9 1180a30-1). Indeed, nothing prevents an individual lacking scientific knowledge from taking good care, ἐπιμελεσθῆναι, of another person, as long as he has gained experience through accurate observation of the other person (EN 10.9 1180b16-18). All totaled, there are thirteen occurrences of ἐπιμέλεια and cognate words in this portion of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: roughly four pages in the OCT. The number of occurrences in the *Politics* passages discussed above in Section III is seventeen over roughly fourteen pages in the OCT. Perhaps we can say that when Aristotle focuses on education and good character, he finds ἐπιμέλεια an apt word to capture the care and concern that is exhibited by a wise educator. But Aristotle never treats ἐπιμέλεια as a *terminus technicus*. The number of occurrences testify to the importance of care and

concern, but ἐπιμέλεια remains a common noun, which bridges the divisions of Aristotle's bipartite psychology. To be sure, Aristotle uses it when introducing his discussion of intellectual excellences, but he does not suggest tying ἐπιμέλεια to the logical half of the soul. For care and concern can be exhibited in emotional response and when intellectual activity involves care and concern, it does not occur without drive, ὄρεξις, which finds its home in the alogical half.¹²

V

If one focuses on the title of this essay, "Aristotle on Care and Concern," and especially on what has been said in Section III, one might expect the word ἐπιμέλεια and its cognates to be prominent in Aristotle's discussions of social relations, living together, and community of words and actions (*EN* 2.7 1108b9-30, 4.6-9 1126b11-1128b9 and *EE* 2.3 1220b38-1221b3, 3.7 1233b16-1234a34). For there, Aristotle discusses several commendable dispositions, including friendliness, wittiness, and modesty or a sense of shame,¹³ which would seem to involve care and concern. And indeed they do, but in discussing these dispositions, Aristotle does not use ἐπιμέλεια and its cognates. That need not be a regrettable omission, for we find Aristotle using φροντίζειν (*EN* 4.6 1126b15, 27, *EE* 3.7 1233b27), which in the *Politics* occurs as a synonym for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (*Pol.* 2.3 1261b33-6).¹⁴ Moreover, neither in the *Politics* nor in the ethical treatises does Aristotle promote ἐπιμέλεια to the status of a *terminus technicus*, and what he does say in the ethical treatises concerning social relations is comparatively brief and on occasion inconsistent.¹⁵

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- 12 Had later Peripatetics made ἐπιμέλεια into a *terminus technicus*, we might expect some evidence of that in Didymus' work (*The Opinions*) of Aristotle and the Other Peripatetics on Ethics (fort. late 1st c. BC). The noun and cognate forms occur three times (136.18, 151.15, 152.5 Wachsmuth), none of which suggests that ἐπιμέλεια has become a *terminus technicus*. See below, n. 14 and 16.
- 13 Other dispositions discussed are truthfulness, righteous indignation, and dignity. The last two are discussed only in the *Eudemian Ethics*.
- 14 See Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicum* 832.24. Cf. Didymus 152.6-7, where we read, "The entire fighting force and the deliberative (councils) are more authoritative by taking care, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, of virtue and being concerned, σπουδάζειν, with the noble (transl. Tsouni, 2018). The change of verb is stylistic.
- 15 Perhaps most interesting is an apparent difference in what is said in the *NE* and *EE* concerning choice, προαίρεσις. See Fortenbaugh (1968) 122, (repr. 2006) 148, (2011) 228-30, and (2017) 121.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, friendliness, φιλία, is given pride of place among the commendable social dispositions. It is presented as the mean between obsequiousness, ἀρέσκεια, and grouchiness, δυσκολία. Obsequious individuals are said to be pleasant at all times; they offer praise and never object to anything, thinking, οἰόμενοι, that they must avoid giving pain to whomever they meet. In contrast, grouchy individuals object to everything, not caring in the least, οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν φροντίζοντες, whether they give pain (EN 4.6 1126b12-16). Very different are persons whose character occupies a middle position. They put up with and refuse to put up with the right things in the right manner. That means that their behavior will vary depending upon the persons with whom they are interacting. For it is not proper to show consideration, φροντίζειν, in like manner to familiar persons and to strangers (EN 4.6 1126b27).

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, the discussion of friendliness does not have pride of place (it comes third). In addition, there is variation in vocabulary. Whereas the *Nicomachean* version contrasts the friendly individual with grouchy and quarrelsome individuals, δύσκολος and δύσερις (EN 4.6 1126b16), the *Eudemian* version contrasts the friendly individual with the hostile individual, ἀπεχθητικός (EE 3.7 1233b32). Of greater interest is the general statement with which the *Eudemian Ethics* introduces the discussion of social dispositions. We read that both the praiseworthy and blameworthy states of character are emotional, παθητικάί (EE 3.7 1233b18). That seems to contradict the *Nicomachean* assertion that the social disposition of friendliness is different from the relation of friendship existing between two persons. For the latter involves affection, τὸ στέργειν, while the former is without emotion and affection, ἄνευ πάθους...καὶ τοῦ στέργειν (EN 4.6 1126b21-3). The difference is real, to which may be added another difference. The *Eudemian* version takes note of the flatterer but unlike the *Nicomachean* version does not distinguish the flatterer from the obsequious individual (EN 4.6 1127a7-10, EE 3.7 1233b31). These differences are not to be downplayed, but they need not obscure a similarity that relates to the central theme of this paper: namely, the importance of care and concern. Not only does the *Nicomachean* version twice make use of the verb φροντίζειν in discussing friendliness, but also both versions are clear that the friendly individual has in mind the best interests of other people. The *Nicomachean Ethics* tells us that he imparts to each person what is appropriate, and apart from special circumstances he chooses to provide pleasure and to avoid giving pain; he is guided by the noble and the advantageous (EN 4.6 1127a2-5). The *Eudemian Ethics* makes the point, albeit succinctly: the friendly man is said to fall in with what seems to be best (EE 3.7 1233b34).

Care and concern are also exhibited by the educated person, whom Aristotle calls witty and tactful, εὐτράπελος (EN 4.8 1128a10, 33; EE 3.7 1234a4). Such a person makes humorous remarks that are intended to be enjoyed by the listener, and that holds not only for the bystander but also for the person who happens to be the object of a jest, providing he is a person of good judgment (EE 3.7 1234a18-23). The qualifier is important, for Aristotle recognizes mockery as a form of humor, but thinks that there must be limits. Indeed, he calls attention to lawgivers who forbid certain kinds of slander and adds that the ban might be extended to include mockery (EN 4.8 1128a30-1). What needs to be added is that Aristotle's treatment of wittiness focuses as much on the witty man as on the person who listens to what he says. We are told that the witty individual interacts with others in a way that exhibits good taste, ἐμμελής, ἐμμελῶς (EN 4.8 1128a1, 9), that he possesses tact, ἐπιδεξιότης (EN 4.8 1128a17), and that his humor is that of a free and educated man, ἐλευθέριος and πεπαιδευμένος (EN 4.8 1128a21-1). The attributes listed here are unquestionably desirable, so that a person who wishes to be valued for his participation in social gatherings does well to show concern for himself by cultivating the listed attributes.¹⁶

Aristotle's remarks on modesty or sense of shame, αἰδώς,¹⁷ come last in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and are notable in that they not only deny αἰδώς the status of being a moral virtue but also question whether it is a state of character, ἕξις. We are told that αἰδώς is more like an emotion, πάθος. It is defined as a kind of fear of disrepute, ἄδοξία, and said to have a physical effect: blushing occurs. It is not appropriate to every age, but it befits young people, for they live by emotion, and shame keeps them from going wrong (EN 4.9 1128b10-18). In the *Eudemian Ethics*, αἰδώς, is said to be a mean disposition, μεσότης, between lack of shame and bashfulness. We are told that the person who lacks shame, ἀναίσχυντος, exhibits no concern regarding another person's opinion, μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης (3.7 1233b27-8); the bashful person exhibits concern regarding everyone's opinion; the modest person, αἰδήμων, exhibits concern regarding the opinion

16 Ideally the desirable attributes are acquired early in life. They are "the result of care," τὰ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας, "such as the preliminary studies and the way of life suited to a free man," τὰς προπαιδεύσεις καὶ διαίτας ἐλευθερίους (Didymus 136.18-20, transl. Tsouni 2018). But when early education is inadequate or weakened by circumstances, then attention to oneself is necessary. On Didymus see above n. 12 and 14.

17 Ostwald 1962, 109 in his translation of EN 4.9 1128b10 prefers "sense of shame." Rackham 1952, 351 and Kenny 2011, 50 in their translations of EE 3.7 1233b26 prefer "modesty."

of manifestly good persons, τῆς [δόξης] τῶν φαινομένων ἐπεικῶν (EE 3.7 1233b29).¹⁸ Noteworthy here is that exhibiting concern has become self-regarding. To be sure, paying attention to what other people think is to be concerned with the opinions of other people, but the primary concern is with one's own reputation. And in paying attention to the opinion of good people, one is not improving them. Rather one is checking on one's own behavior: how it is viewed by persons whose judgment can be trusted. Such self-concern is natural and to be embraced, for good reputation, εὐδοξία, is a good, albeit an external good.¹⁹

VI

In Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we find Aristotle focused on contemplation, θεωρία, which is said to be an activity of the best part of a human being. That part is intelligence, νοῦς, and the locus of theoretical wisdom.²⁰ Its activity is loved for its own sake and provides pleasures that are said to be marvelous in purity and certainty (EN 10.7 1177a12-b4). Aristotle praises it for being self-sufficient in the highest degree. To be sure, a wise man *qua* human being still needs nourishment and leisure to engage in contemplation, but a wise man can engage in contemplation by himself, and the wiser he is, the more he is able to do so (EN 10.7 1177a32-4). We are told that the activity of our intelligence constitutes complete happiness, providing it lasts a complete lifetime (EN 10.7 1177b24-5).

The emphasis on self-sufficiency, αὐτάρκεια and αὐτάρκης (EN 10.6 1176b5-6, 10.7 1177a27, b21, 10.8 1179a3) is of interest, for in elevating the life of contemplation above the practical life of ordinary men, it tends to diminish the importance of care and concern in relation to other people. If a person is naturally intelligent and has his basic needs met, he is comparatively independent of other people. He can focus on himself and his preferred activity. Care and concern will be in larger measure self-regarding. And to the extent that he is absorbed in contemplation, altruistic care and concern will be crowded out. That is, of course, an exaggeration and not

18 I follow Kenny 2011, 50 and not Rackham 1952, 351 in translating φαινομένων with “manifestly” and not “who appear.” Although φαίνεσθαι can be used in both senses, here Kenny is to be preferred.

19 Cf. Arius Didymus, (*The Opinions*) of Aristotle and the Other Peripatetics on Ethics 122.4-9, 129.14-17.

20 In terms of Aristotle's bipartite psychology, it belongs to the scientific part, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, of the logical half. See above, end Section 1.

Aristotle's considered position. Indeed at one point, Aristotle acknowledges that contemplation can benefit from involvement with others (*EN* 10.7 1177a34). We are not told who these others are, but we can take a cue from Aristotle's discussions of commendable dispositions in social relations. Especially apposite is the characterization of friendliness (already introduced above, Section V). We should think of a friendly person who combines intelligence with cooperation. Engaged in philosophic discussion with others, such a person neither objects to everything that is put forward nor always accepts the view of another. Rather, he is like the friendly man who falls in with what seems best (*EE* 3.7 1233b34).

Also relevant is Aristotle's characterization of truthfulness, ἀλήθεια (not discussed above in Section V). The truthful person cares about the facts and therefore is inclined to say what he knows to be true. Nevertheless, there are occasions when he will do otherwise despite a firm grasp of the truth. By way of illustration, Aristotle cites Socrates (*EN* 4.7 1127b25-6), who was known to diminish himself by professing ignorance when he need not have done so. Aristotle is favorably disposed to this form of self-depreciation, providing it is used moderately (*EN* 4.7 1127b30). It avoids bombast (*EN* 4.7 1127b24) and can be helpful in philosophic discussion. Instead, of claiming knowledge, being a know-it-all, which can intimidate other discussants, Socrates was wise to adopt a manner that encouraged others to share their own views for critical examination.

Moreover, the idea that a person can be fully independent and might live without ever needing the assistance of others is fantasy. As Aristotle observes, there will always be need of external well-being, for human nature is not self-sufficient in regard to contemplation. A person needs health, nourishment and generally beneficial treatment, θεραπεία (*EN* 10.8 1178b35). And even under the most favorable conditions, continuous contemplation is not possible for a human being (*EN* 10.6 1176b44-5).²¹ Members of a philosophic community will have been well-aware that all members of their community share these needs and that care and concern must be altruistic as well as self-regarding. Indeed, if the members have been brought up well, they will recognize that the need extends to all human beings.

21 Cf. *EN* 10.7 1177a21-2, where Aristotle describes the activity of intelligence as "most continuous," συνεχεστάτη and then says that we are more able to engage in contemplation continuously, θεωρεῖν συνεχῶς, than to perform any kind of action, πράττειν ὅτιοῦν. The use of πράττειν is important. Contemplation is an ἐνέργεια, but not a πρᾶξις.

That said, Aristotle's emphasis on self-sufficiency is pervasive and may explain at least in part why the word ἐπιμέλεια and its cognates are not prominent in Aristotle's discussion of the contemplative life. Indeed, it is only at the very end of the discussion that the noun and the participle occur. We are told that the person who cultivates his intelligence, νοῦς, seems to be most beloved by the gods. For if the gods have any concern, ἐπιμέλεια, for humans—and they seem to—it is to be expected that they rejoice in what is most akin to them, and that is man's intelligence, νοῦς (EN 10.8 1179a22-7). And the gods requite good persons who most honor intelligence as being persons who exhibit care, ἐπιμελουμένους, for what is dear to the gods (EN 10.8 1179a27-9). This introduction of the gods may appear to be an afterthought, but it has been prepared for by the assertion that man possesses something divine, θεῖόν τι, and if intelligence is divine (θεῖον), then life according to intelligence is divine in comparison with human life (EN 10.7 1177b28-31).

Whether this appeal to the divine finds favor with the modern reader may be left aside. It is enough to say that by attributing care and concern to the gods, Aristotle is tacitly recognizing the importance of care and concern for human beings in their relationship to each other.



In concluding this article on Aristotle's interest in care and concern, ἐπιμέλεια, I want to make special mention of the Honoree of this volume, namely, Eckart Schütrumpf, whom I have known for many years. We met first at a conference of the American Philological Association, where I overheard Eckart speaking German. Being keen at the time to immerse myself in German scholarship on Aristotle, I was delighted to find Eckart tolerant of my imperfect German and even more pleased with his interest in the Peripatos. That was the beginning of fruitful interaction over more than three decades, during which I have experienced Eckart's generosity—care and concern—regarding the work of Project Theophrastus. He has contributed significantly to the Project's publication series, RUSCH, by serving on the Advisory Board and providing his own text-translations of Aristotle's successors. In addition, he has tactfully stepped in to assist others in completing a text-translation, corrected errors, and written substantive essays for individual volumes. All in all, a paradigm of ἐπιμέλεια.

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Aristotle on the Best Form of Government

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I. Incipit

It is a well-known experience for college professors that, when they ask their students to write papers on the best regime according to Aristotle, they typically receive essays advocating such different regimes as kingship, aristocracy or a well-balanced mixed regime (a πολιτεία) as the best form of government. The interesting and puzzling fact is that all the three answers are correct; or, rather, it is possible to find evidence in the Aristotelian texts in support of each of the three regimes. A lucky topic for the students: whatever they write, they get it right provided they do not pick tyranny or are so cheeky as to maintain that Aristotle was in fact a social-democrat!¹

What I propose to do in this essay is to try to scatter some light on the subject and see whether it is possible to point to a most likely candidate, if not to sort out the problem altogether. My prudent beginning may surprise some readers: after all, isn't Aristotle the founder of the classic theory of the forms of government, which includes three good regimes and three perversions, with Kingship the clear winner? This is true, but even a perfunctory reading of Aristotle's *Politics* leads one to realize that, after devising that neat scheme, Aristotle made things more complicated because of his recourse to history and his observation of reality. For history abounds with examples that tell us reality is much more complicated than Aristotle's neat scheme: there are all sorts of subdivisions and there are multiple, different instantiations of every regime. That grid is more a hermeneutic tool containing ideal-types than the quintessence of Aristotle's investigations about political regimes.²

Accordingly, I will follow Aristotle in his argument, which starts by connecting the best form of government with human flourishing: the best regime enables human beings to fully develop their typically human po-

1 Following some ingenious contemporary interpreter such as Martha Nussbaum: see her piece of bravura: Nussbaum 1990.

2 For an introductory treatment of the subject see Newman 1887-1902, 1.214-225, 2.385-401, and Keyt and Miller 1991.

tentialities, to become virtuous and therefore to flourish. It is the only regime in which the good human being (who acts justly) and the good citizen (who respects the laws) coincide. I will argue that Aristotle is serious in maintaining that kingship is the best form of government if the king is an extraordinarily virtuous person, but only in that case. It is not a mere hypothesis, it requires the lucky conjunction of many elements, but it is historically possible. In this respect, Aristotle always remained Platonic: the best regime for him consists in the rule of one man far superior in virtue and knowledge to any other so that he appears like a god among human beings. However, this statement must be qualified in two respects: Aristotle believes that a king must have a “heroic virtue,” which is different in kind from the virtues possessed by human beings; in general, however, Aristotle identifies the virtue necessary for ruling in *φρόνησις*, practical wisdom, differentiating thus himself from Plato who saw in philosophical knowledge the specific qualification to rule; second, Aristotle thought that the best regime in the end depends on the circumstances, on the human material at hand, namely on the quality of the citizens available to the law-giver and the statesman.

II. Human Flourishing and the Best Regime

The most fruitful start consists in disentangling Aristotle’s reasoning by following in his footsteps. He sees the question of the best regime as inextricably intertwined with that of the best life to live, which is the most conducive to human flourishing. This is clearly shown by the way Aristotle approaches the problem in *Politics* 7.1, where he states that before one can properly undertake the investigation of the best regime, one should determine the nature of the most desirable life (*Pol.* 7.1 1323a13-15). It is evident, for him, that the constitution of a political entity will structure the way of life of the entire community: it will direct citizens towards a view of the good life. Then, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, a work which he describes as “a political treatise” (πολιτική μέθοδος),³ Aristotle examines the question of what is the highest good for human beings: he is persuaded that there is an overarching good that is specific to human beings and the best form of government is the one which enables men to attain it. Everyone calls this

3 Arist. *EN* 1.1 1094b11. Cf. *MM* 1.1 1181b25-6. Vander Waerdt 1991 offers many sensible observations: he strongly argues for reading Aristotle’s ethical teaching inside the framework of his political thought; I have the same approach here.

highest good “happiness” or, better, “human flourishing” (εὐδαιμονία), but when it comes to specifying its content opinions vary: some people identify it with pleasure, others with honour, others yet with contemplative life. In this approach, Aristotle is remarkably different from the typical and most widespread contemporary liberal approach which conceives the task of the State to be the protection of human rights and enabling human beings to pursue their individual, even idiosyncratic image of happiness. On the contrary, Aristotle believes that every living thing has an activity (ἔργον) which is specific to it: for horses it is running and for the eye it is to see; the excellent horse is that which runs fast and the excellent eye is that which sees afar.⁴ The ἔργον specific to human beings is thinking and therefore human excellence will consist in being able to do theoretical activity; human happiness will reside in “a certain activity of the soul according to virtue,”⁵ namely in contemplative activity (θεωρία). Differently from pleasure, which is common also to other sentient beings, and to the life spent pursuing honour, which needs the recognition of other people, theoretical activity is perfectly self-sufficient and unique to human beings.

In order to pursue the βίος θεωρητικός however, human beings need to live in a good form of government. Aristotle stands out in this persuasion, which separates him from previous and subsequent authors: Plato, for instance, shared Aristotle’s view that human happiness resides in a theoretical activity specific to the philosopher, an activity which assimilates man to God,⁶ but he thought that men could pursue this activity even in a corrupt regime and, in addition, believed that external goods (such as wealth, friends, fame) did not contribute to happiness. Subsequent authors, such as the Stoics and the Epicureans, thought that the political regime in which one person happened to live mattered nothing because the Stoic wise man is a citizen of the universe and can find happiness anywhere whereas the Epicurean retreats from the public arena and finds happiness in the φιλία of few friends. Aristotle, on the contrary, shares our modern conviction that human beings cannot flourish in a bad regime, a conviction reinforced by the totalitarian political experiences of the 20th century, which have shown how an evil regime can turn its citizens into evil or degraded human beings. Aristotle very sensibly concludes that the βίος

4 EN 2.5 1106a20-21.

5 EN 1.9 1099b25. See the sensible observations in White 1992.

6 I am especially thinking of the ὁμοίωσις θεῷ of the *Theaetetus*, but this is also the argument of the entire *Republic*. Famously, Aristotle conceives of god as pure thought and maintained that when human beings do theoretical activity, they come close to god, they ‘immortalize’.

πολιτικός necessarily precedes and creates the conditions for our theoretical life and that the political community was created with a purpose in view: the common good, which is what justice consists of.⁷ This connection between ethics and politics is shown also by the *Nicomachean Ethics*' conclusion, where Aristotle connects the two disciplines in the "philosophy concerning human matters" (*EN* 10.10 1181b15). The better the regime you live in, the better your chances to flourish are. Finally, Aristotle very sensibly argued that certain external goods do contribute to our happiness: although Priam's virtue shines (διαλάμπει) even in the midst of his misfortunes, nobody would count him 'happy' (εὐδαιμονίζει).⁸

Let's now turn to the *Politics*, and more specifically to its opening lines. Here, Aristotle famously states that "every polis is a kind of community (κοινωνία) and every community is created with the purpose of attaining some good (ἀγαθόν);" therefore the polis, which is "the most supreme community" will aim at the supreme good, namely human flourishing.⁹ In fact, Aristotle adds, although the polis was created to enable human beings to live (ζῆν), it actually exists in order to make "living well" (εὖ ζῆν) possible: otherwise, we could call a collection of slaves a polis, but it is evident that they do not share in "living well" or have purposeful lives; this expression equals εὐδαιμονία, or human flourishing. Accordingly, Aristotle bluntly dismisses other possible ends for the political community: its object is not military alliance, nor does it exist for the sake of trade or of business relations.¹⁰ It is evident that in Aristotle's thought, the polis exists in order to enable human beings to flourish, and this requires virtue; conversely, one may argue that a human being can be virtuous and flourish only inside a polis. Aristotle's famous statement that "man is by nature a political animal" (*Pol.* 1.2 1253a2) entails exactly this: those who live outside the polis are either inferior or superior to human beings; they are either wild beasts or gods.¹¹ It also entails that those people who live in huge political arrangements where a despot rules over an immense population are not perfect human beings; they are "slaves by nature," and it is just and advan-

7 *EN* 8.11 1160a 13-14. In the opening lines of *Politics* 7, Aristotle states that those who wish to examine appropriately what is the best form of government should first determine what is the most desirable way of life: *Pol.* 7.1 1323a13-14.

8 *EN* 1.9 1100a4-9; 1.9 1100b31; 1.9 1101a6-8.

9 *Pol.* 1.1 1252a1-2. I have used Ernest Barker's classic 1958 translation; it is accurate and stylistically refined. I have sometimes adjusted it for consistency.

10 *Pol.* 3.9 1280a31-37; cf. b31-35.

11 *Pol.* 1.2 1253a3-29. For a very insightful treatment of the relation between human flourishing and the polis see Ritter 1969.

tageous for them to be ruled by a despot.¹² We thus see how exacting Aristotle's formula "man is by nature a political animal" is.

Aristotle's next important step consists in identifying three forms, or relations, of authority inside the household: the head of the household—the father—has a "kingly" authority over the children and a "political" or "aristocratic" authority over the wife (because they are both free, but the wife is inferior); he has a "despotic" authority over the slaves. We learn here that the king ought to be naturally superior to his subjects even if he is of the same stock, and we are given the typical Homeric examples.¹³ This is important because evidently Aristotle believes that, although there is a fundamental difference between the government of a polis and the administration of the household, these relations of authority are mirrored or replicated in political regimes. We will see later how fruitful this insight can be.

Aristotle's approach to the question of the best regime is typical of his method of inquiry. As he states clearly, once one has sufficiently examined this subject in a theoretical way, it is necessary to turn to the practice: "All subjects of this nature may be treated liberally in theory, but have to be handled in practice as circumstances demand."¹⁴ He therefore goes on to examine visions of the best regime in which a human being could live "according to one's wishes" (κατ' ἐχρήν),¹⁵ which include actual forms of government and imagined regimes devised by previous famous authors. It is not by chance that the Platonic projects of a perfect πολιτεία are the first candidates to be examined. Aristotle has several sensible observations against Plato's view of the rule of philosophers accompanied by communion of goods, women and children for the ruling classes. He observes that Plato's exasperated search for unity transforms a polis, which is essentially plurality, into a family,¹⁶ and notices that "men pay most attention to what is their own, they care less for what is common;"¹⁷ from which he concludes that it is better that property be private and be somewhat made

12 *Pol.* 1.5 1255a1-2. Let's recall that δεσποτεία is the rule of the master of the house over the slaves: as a political regime, despotism transfers this private status into the public arena.

13 *Pol.* 1.12 1259b1-16.

14 *Pol.* 1.11, 1258b9-11.

15 *Pol.* 2.1, 1260b2. In 7.2 1324a23-25, Aristotle reiterates that the best form of government is necessarily that in which all sorts of men are at their best and live happily.

16 *Pol.* 2.2 1261a15-20 and 1261b7-9; see also 2.5 1263b33-36.

17 *Pol.* 2.3 1261b33-36.

common in use.¹⁸ After reviewing Plato's major political proposals, Aristotle credits 'Socrates' with "ingenuity, novelty of view and a spirit of inquiry," but he adds two devastating lines of criticism. First, "perfection in everything is perhaps a difficult thing" and one may make assumptions "according to one's wishes" (κατ'εὐχὴν), but one ought not to make any assumption which is plainly impossible (ἀδύνατον).¹⁹ Second, and this is a recurrent idea in Aristotle, "almost everything has been discovered already;" therefore, in the long history of mankind, Plato's measures "would not have gone unnoticed if they had been really good."²⁰ Aristotle then goes on to examine two other projects of ideal πολιτεῖαι, those of Phaleas of Chalcedon and of Hippodamus of Miletus, and criticizes their main lines.²¹ In addition, Aristotle examines two actual forms of government lauded by many Greeks as excellent πολιτεῖαι, namely Crete and Sparta. We may recall that already in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle had maintained that the genuine statesman aims at rendering his citizens good and law-abiding and gave as examples the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta.²² Aristotle is aware that some people consider Sparta a mixed constitution, and they extol its merits for this since they believe that the best regime should consist in a mixture of all constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy and democracy.²³ Sparta, however, is criticized for the bad arrangement between Spartans and helots: these latter are always on the watch for the misfortunes of their masters, "just as if they lay in an ambush;"²⁴ on the contrary, in order to preserve a political arrangement it is necessary that all of its parts want to keep it in the same condition.²⁵ Aristotle also criticizes the excessive freedom of women, the greed of the Spartans and, more generally, the fact that their constitution is designed uniquely to create warrior citizens: Sparta

18 See *Pol.* 2.5 1263a26-28 and 39-40; cf. 6.5 1320b9-10 and 7.10 1329b42-1330a3. On the topic of property in a political regime, see Giorgini 2016.

19 *Pol.* 2.6 1265a19-20; cf. 4.1 1288b37-38; 7.4 1325b37-40.

20 *Pol.* 2.5 1264a2-3. Cf. 7.10 1329b25ff., where Aristotle maintains that most institutions have been invented in the course of years on a number of different occasions, indeed an indefinite number of times: "Necessity itself, we may reasonably suppose, will steadily be the mother of indispensable inventions."

21 On these reformers and 'utopian' thinkers see the pathbreaking essays, Bertelli 1982 and 2012.

22 *EN* 1.13, 1102a10-12.

23 *Pol.* 2.6 1265b32-35. In Sparta, monarchy would be represented by the two kings, oligarchy by the Council of Elders, and democracy by the Ephors, who are drawn from the ranks of the people.

24 *Pol.* 2.9 1269a38-40.

25 *Pol.* 2.9 1270b20-21.

therefore flourished when it was always fighting but it could not keep her empire in peaceful times. And we may add that human flourishing cannot be pursued in times of war and does not consist in warlike virtue. The Cretan constitution is criticized for some of its institutions, which make it a constitutional arrangement only by name while it is in fact “an arbitrary form of oligarchy.”²⁶ These explorations in constitutional theory and practice reveal Aristotle’s desire to learn from the past, be it in the form of ideas put forth by famous thinkers or the actual practice of people.

III. *The Classification of Political Regimes*

Aristotle’s next important constitutional point consists in examining who is to be considered citizen in a polis. He observes that this varies according to the regime and concludes that the citizen under each different kind of constitution must also be different.²⁷ It follows that “the virtue of the citizen is necessarily related to the form of government,” and since there are several different kinds of regimes, there cannot be a single absolute excellence of the earnest (σπουδαῖος) citizen. On the other hand, the good man is so called in virtue of a single absolute excellence. Aristotle’s line of reasoning is clear: different regimes require different virtues from their citizens (and, conversely, they educate them into different virtues). Being an earnest citizen in an oligarchy like Sparta requires different virtues than being an earnest citizen in democratic Athens; not to speak of what it means to be an ‘earnest citizen’ in a tyranny: evil regimes clearly reveal how a person can be an earnest citizen without possessing the virtue of the good human being.²⁸ Again, the examples of the recent totalitarian past, and movies like Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck’s *The Lives of Others* (2006), set in Eastern Germany under the Communist regime and showing the deceit and compromise required by totalitarian regimes in everyday life, may help our memory and imagination. We may add that, in this perspective, there is only one regime in which the virtue of the earnest citizen is identical to that of the good man: and this is the best constitution.²⁹ Only in this regime do the virtues required to be considered an earnest citizen coincide with the virtues of the good human being in general. Why is this

26 *Pol.* 2.10 1272b10-11.

27 *Pol.* 3.1 1275b2-4; 3.4 1276b30-31; 3.5, 1278a15-16.

28 *Pol.* 3.4 1276b35; cf. *EN* 5.3 1130b28-29.

29 Cf. *Pol.* 4.7 1293b5-6.

distinction so important? One simply has to recall how many immoral acts have been perpetrated by ‘earnest citizens’ who followed the law and obeyed orders; although their deeds were criminal, they were neither illegal nor unjust, if one equates what is just with what is legal.

We are at this stage in the best position to examine Aristotle’s famous classification of the forms of government. He recalls that human beings originally get together for the common interest and the common benefit;³⁰ it follows that:

those constitutions which consider the common interest are right constitutions, judged by the standard of absolute justice. Those constitutions which consider only the personal interest of the rulers are all wrong constitutions, or perversions of the right forms. Such perverted forms are despotic whereas the polis is an association of free men.³¹

This is evidently a *qualitative* way of classifying the political regimes: how do rulers exercise their power? To this Aristotle adds a quantitative way: how many are those in power? For the term “constitution” (πολιτεία) identifies the “concrete government” (πολίτευμα);³² this is ‘supreme’ or ‘sovereign’ (κύριον) in any city and may be composed of one, few or many citizens. When the one, the few or the many rule with a view to the common good, we have a right constitution; when they rule for their personal interest, we have a perversion. The resulting classification is as follows:

Right Regimes
Kingship
Aristocracy
Politeia

Perversions
Tyranny
Oligarchy
Democracy

This scheme is so famous, that I will confine myself here to a few observations. Aristotle is very sensibly persuaded that all good forms of government aim at some kind of the just, that is, are based on some notion of justice. For instance, justice consists in equality—but only among equal citizens; conversely, inequality is just when it is applied to unequal citizens.

30 *Pol.* 3.6 1278b22-24.
31 *Pol.* 3.6 1279a18-22. The use of “despotic” emphasises that in such regimes, citizens are not altogether free, and the ruled cannot pursue happiness. A polis, properly speaking, cannot be despotic because it is an association of free men endeavouring to actualize their most typically human potentialities.
32 I here depart from Barker’s translation, which renders πολίτευμα as “civic body.”

So, there is a portion of justice in all these views and this is why it is not so easy to identify the best regime immediately.³³

Furthermore, and differently from Plato who believed that only philosophers' rule was a right form of government and democracy was a very bad regime,³⁴ Aristotle maintains that rule of the δῆμος can be a correct form of government, provided it is exercised for the benefit of the entire citizenry. The rehabilitation of the πλῆθος ἀρχῶν is, indeed, one of the most remarkable departures from Plato in Aristotle's political thought.

From what follows, it emerges clearly that this neat scheme is conceived by Aristotle as a hermeneutical tool for examining existing political regimes. For Aristotle immediately shows it presents serious difficulties which are revealed by historical investigation and the observation of existing constitutions.³⁵ For instance, in reality the few and the many identify the rich and the poor, respectively (a 'sociological' observation, we may say). Also, the quantitative element is accidental: what if in a city the rich are the many and the poor are the few? Can we still speak of oligarchy as rule of the rich? Finally, Aristotle shows that there are many kinds of kingship, aristocracy, oligarchy and democracy and the borders between regimes are not so neat and clear.³⁶ In fact, there exist also "combinations" of constitutions, such as "oligarchical aristocracies" and "*politeiai* inclining towards democracy".³⁷

The Best Regime: Kingship?

In many passages, Aristotle is adamant in maintaining that if in a political community there is someone, or a few people, so incomparably superior in virtue to all others, he (or they) "can no longer be treated as part of the po-

33 *Pol.* 3.9 1280a9-15. See the sensible observations of Knoll 2016.

34 Cf. Plato, *R.* 5.449a and 8.555b ff., for the position of democracy in his classification of constitutions. It is the last but one and prepares the advent of tyranny.

35 I implicitly side with a 'unitarian' reading of Aristotle's *Politics* concerning his constitutional theory. For a reassertion of this view see Knoll 2011a and 2011b. An extreme position in this sense is held by Phillips Simpson 1998, who argues that (xvi): "the *Politics* is a formal and doctrinal unity without even apparent incoherence." For a contrary opinion see Schütrumpf 2011. See also Schütrumpf 2005.

36 See Angell Bates 2003, 80-82, who speaks of Aristotle's "deconstruction" of his own scheme. Bates' book is rich with interesting observations but suffers from the author's assumption that Aristotle's writings are as perfectly polished as Plato's, disregarding the fact that they are notes for lectures.

37 *Pol.* 6.1 1317a3-6.

lis” and should without hesitation rule over all others: “for a person of this order may very well be like a god among men.”³⁸ People like this are not bound by the laws because they are themselves the law. I am inclined to think that by emphasising the god-likeness of such a person (for his language leads us to suppose that he is thinking of one person, not even a few) Aristotle wants to underscore the incommensurability with human standards of such a ruler; but he does not want us to assume that it is impossible to find such a person just as it is impossible to see a god roaming the streets along with men.³⁹ In fact, a little later, Aristotle reiterates that it is ridiculous to think of ruling over, or in turns with, someone of extraordinary virtue just as it would be ridiculous to do so with Zeus: the “natural course” is for all others to pay a willing obedience to the man of outstanding virtue; such men will accordingly be the permanent kings in their cities.⁴⁰ A conclusion that is emphatically reached again a little later:

When it happens that the virtue of a family, or even a single person, is of merit so outstanding as to surpass that of all the rest, it is only just that this family should be vested with kingship and absolute sovereignty, or that this single person should become king.... The only course which remains is that he should receive obedience and should have supreme power without any limit of tenure.⁴¹

This belief is confirmed by what Aristotle says at *Politics* 3.13 1283b22-24:

If some one man be a better man than all the other good men who belong to the concrete government (πολίτευμα), this one man should be sovereign (κύριον) on the very same ground of justice.

Furthermore, at the beginning of *Politics* 3.10 Aristotle poses “the question as to what the authoritative element (τὸ κύριον) of the city should be.” He

38 *Pol.* 3.13 1284a4-11. On the characteristics of this virtue and its compatibility with political association see Newell 1987.

39 I therefore disagree with the interpreters who consider the willing acceptance of a man of extraordinary virtue as king a practical impossibility or merely hypothetical. I will give my reasons in the next section. See, e.g., Bluhm 1962, and Mulgan 1977, 78-88. Among these interpreters I would like to single out the refined view of Bartlett 1994, who sees the foundation of Aristotle’s political science in the rejection of divine law and gives a very nuanced interpretation of his theory of political regimes. I cannot agree, however, with his conclusion that (149): “the absolute kingship Aristotle here describes is for all practical purposes impossible.” For an extreme reading in this line of interpretation see Nichols 1992.

40 *Pol.* 3.13 1284b25-34.

41 *Pol.* 3.17 1288a15-30.

quickly answers that “it is either the multitude, the wealthy, the respectable, the one who is best of all, or the tyrant” (*Pol.* 3.10 1281a11-15). The βέλτιστος ἓν, “the one who is best of all,” later described as σπουδαιότατος (*Pol.* 3.10 1281a33), is clearly the king. Finally, in *Politics* 7.3 1325b10 we read that “if there is anyone superior in virtue it is fine and just to obey him.” We may note Aristotle’s insistence on this god-like virtue of the good king; when he examines the perverted regimes, he says that tyranny is necessarily the worst constitution since it is a perversion of the “best and most divine” (θειοτάτη).⁴² We may also note that, in the quick review of political regimes in *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.12, Aristotle maintains that kingship is the best form of government and adds that the king is “self-sufficient and excels in all good things; and such a man needs nothing further.” Kingship—we read a little further on—aims at being “paternal rule.”⁴³ We may infer that Aristotle thought that a man of extraordinary virtue who ruled a city as king would make laws who foster the common good, educate the citizens to the highest virtues, and protect them by making wise alliances and not waging adventurous wars;⁴⁴ finally, he would allow them to do theoretical activity as much as possible, enabling them to implement their most typically human potentiality by taking upon himself the burden of political matters.⁴⁵ In so doing, he would act as the good father of the house—an image that combines traditional and Homeric suggestions revived by Plato and Xenophon.

It is interesting to note that the extraordinary virtue of the king succeeds in keeping the polis a community although one of its key features disappears: even if one man only rules the city without alternation and there is no shared participation in ruling, the citizens fully retain their political prerogatives and thus the polis remains a κοινωνία. In fact, Aristotle addresses the objection made by some people (δοκεῖ δέ τισιν) that “it is entirely contrary to nature for one person to be sovereign over all the citizens where the city consists of men who are alike;” this objection presupposes the typical view of the polis as a community of equals.⁴⁶ Aristotle’s answer is precisely that one such man of superlative virtue is not like the others: their virtues cannot be compared. This is not the case with perverted one-man rule, namely tyranny, in which there is nothing in common between

42 *Pol.* 4.2 1289a40.

43 *EN* 8.11 1160a35-36; b27-28.

44 Many interesting observations in Horn 2006.

45 I agree with Vander Waerdt 1985 that Aristotle preferred a certain kind of kingship because it is better suited to foster a life of *philosophia*.

46 *Pol.* 3.16 1287a11-13.

the ruler and the ruled and the spirit of community, which is' i.e., the essence of the polis is lost: "for where ruler and ruled have nothing in common (μηδὲν κοινόν), they have no friendship, since they have no justice either."⁴⁷ In the case of tyranny, Aristotle repeatedly and consistently argues that this regime is the mirror-opposite of political and constitutional government.⁴⁸

Finally, a similar conclusion is reached in *Politics* 7.14 1332b16-32, where Aristotle adds an important qualification: if the rulers and ruled differed so much as gods and heroes differ from human beings, it would be just that the same people ruled all the time; but since there is no-one showing such difference and superiority now, it is better to rule and be ruled in turns. This is, in my opinion, a point of fundamental significance and it is confirmed by what we read in *Politics* 5.10 1313a4-8: nowadays kingships are not created anymore, and any government of that type which emerges today is either a personal government or a tyranny. This is because many people today have equal qualities, but no-one is superior to the point of being suited to the greatness and dignity of the position of king. It is the kind of 'human material' present in a city that tips the balance in one sense or the other.

IV. *Beyond the Surface: Things Get More Complicated*

A little later on, Aristotle seems to make things more complicated, for he adds this consideration: if in a city we have a number of excellent persons, an aristocracy should be considered preferable to a kingship.⁴⁹ Aristotle is careful to specify that by 'aristocracy' he means a regime where the members are "not merely good according to some principle" (πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα) but are "absolutely (ἀπλῶς) the best in point of moral quality."⁵⁰ In fact, this is perfectly consistent with his previous reasoning: the matter depends on the circumstances, on the presence in the city of one man of outstanding virtue or of some with equally great virtue. Kingship and aristocracy are thus closely connected because they have virtue as the criterion for

47 *EN* 8.11 1161a33-34.

48 See Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 14 and 16: when describing Pisistratus' fair and just rule in Athens, Aristotle twice remarks that he "ruled politically rather than tyrannically" (μᾶλλον πολιτικῶς ἢ τυραννικῶς).

49 *Pol.* 3.15 1286b4-7; cf. 1287b14 where Aristotle states that "two good men are better than one."

50 *Pol.* 4.7 1293b3-5. On this see the refined observations by Irrera 2016.

the choice of the rulers: “kingship corresponds with aristocracy” in this respect, Aristotle observes.⁵¹ Some confirmation comes also from his remark in *Politics* 5.2 1289a31-32 that speaking of the best form of government is actually identical to speaking of kingship and aristocracy.

This persuasion seems to be corroborated by what Aristotle maintains in the *Eudemian Ethics*. There he reminds the reader that in every constitution there is a form of justice because every political regime is a community and a community is kept together by justice. What he means is that in every constitution there are people who are more or less similar. When, on the contrary, the relation is like that of soul and body or artisan and instrument or master and slave, there cannot be anything in common between them, for one is the instrument of the other.⁵² Hence, kingship is suited only to circumstances when a man has an outstanding virtue compared to his fellow-citizens. In this work, Aristotle reiterates his persuasion that all regimes (or rather all power relations) can be found also in the family: the father has kingly power, the husband and wife have an aristocratic relationship, and the brothers have an egalitarian relationship. Aristotle adds that the aristocratic constitution is based on proportional equality and this is the best regime.⁵³

To make matters (apparently) even more complicated, Aristotle introduces a further consideration accompanied by a beautiful metaphor. For he says that the idea that the people at large—instead of the few—should be sovereign in a city seems defensible and appears to contain some truth.

There is this to be said for the many. Each of them by himself may not be of a good quality; but when they all come together it is possible that they may surpass—collectively and as a body, although not individually—the quality of the few best. Feasts to which many contribute may excel those provided at one man’s expense. In the same way, when there are many, each can bring his share of goodness and moral prudence; and when all meet together the people may thus become something in the nature of a single person, who—as he has many feet, many hands, and many senses—may also have many qualities of character and intelligence.⁵⁴

Aristotle shows here to have no qualms in admitting that the mass of the people may be suited to rule in certain circumstances, namely when

51 *Pol.* 5.10,1310b2-3; cf. 4.2 1289a30-33. Incidentally, this is also Plato’s view in the *Republic*: Kallipolis is ruled by one or a few ‘philosopher-kings’ depending on the lucky chance of finding one or more true philosophers (*R.* 4.445d).

52 *EE* 7.9 1241b13-24.

53 *EE* 7.9 1241b37-8.

54 *Pol.* 3.11 1281a40-1281b8.

there is friendship and concord among the people. They will not possess full virtue,⁵⁵ but their union will make up for that. Some contemporary authors, notably Stanford classicist and political scientist Josiah Ober, have used this statement to argue that Aristotle believed in the “wisdom of the multitude” and had already identified an ‘epistemic’ approach to decision-making which was based on democratic values.⁵⁶

V. Towards a Solution

To solve the riddle of the best constitution according to Aristotle, we may start from the opening lines of book 4 of the *Politics*. There, with a (critical) eye to Plato and the other authors who investigated the topic of the best regime, Aristotle declares that “there is a rule which applies to all the arts and sciences,” including politics: in this field, one has to investigate first what is the best regime “according to our wishes” (κατ’εὐχὴν); secondly, “which sort of constitution suits which sort of civic body.” The good law-giver and the real statesman should, therefore, look not only for what is absolutely best but also for what is in general most efficient and what is best according to the circumstances. Thirdly, they should consider the sort of constitution which is based on a specific presupposition (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως).⁵⁷ Fourthly, one has to know the type of constitution which is best suited to political communities in general (μάλιστα ἀρμόττουσαν). Aristotle criticizes both the thinkers like Plato who investigate what is absolutely best, regardless of the actual conditions of a place or people and the means at disposal; and those who advocate an existing form of government (such as the Spartan or Cretan constitution) as best.⁵⁸

55 *Pol.* 3.7 1279a39.

56 Ober 2013. See also Ober 2017, where he explores the possibility of applying ancient insights to contemporary democracies. Also, Waldron 1995, who coined the expression “doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude.” For a very sensible review of the literature on the subject and an alternative defence of democracy based on the equality of citizens see Schwartzberg 2016. Finally, see the very insightful Lane 2013, who sensibly argues that, read in context, Aristotle’s statement about the ‘wisdom of the multitude’ indicates that he thought the people could make good judgments about officials but were not good themselves at holding offices.

57 By ὑπόθεσις Aristotle means the specific presupposition, namely the target at which the policy of a certain political arrangement aims at: in *Pol.* 6.2 1317a40, for instance, he states that the ὑπόθεσις of democratic regimes is ἐλευθερία, liberty.

58 *Pol.* 4.1 1288b38-1289a1.

After this classification, we may argue that Aristotle believed that the best form of government in which anyone could live κατ'εὐχὴν is a monarchy, provided that the king has an extraordinary virtue. Is it possible to find such a man? I believe Aristotle thought it was, both for theoretical and practical reasons. At the level of theory, in the 4th century BCE, kingship was not immediately assimilated to tyranny as a bad form of government, as it was the case in the 5th century: with Cleisthenes' reforms and the establishment of democracy in Athens, following the expulsion of the Pisistratid tyrants, one-man rule had become an unviable option as a regime.⁵⁹ Monarchy was the negative counterpart to democratic self-image, to democratic ideology. The ideological *Stimmung* of the 4th century is completely different in this respect. Xenophon, already, had rehabilitated kingship as a good form of government in such works as the *Agesilaos* and the *Cyropaedia* where, incidentally, the kings of Sparta and Persia were chosen as examples of excellent monarchs. In Plato's political works, especially in the *Republic* and the *Statesman*, the perfect city is ruled by a philosopher-king or a statesman who possesses true political science. In addition, monarchy had been rehabilitated historically, 'on the ground' so to speak, by such new sole rulers as Evagoras and Hermias of Atarnaeus,⁶⁰ whose merits are extolled also by Isocrates.⁶¹ For Aristotle the possibility of finding an excellent man who can become king of a political community is thus not just a hypothetical but also a historical possibility, based on the examples of his age. It is certainly hard to find all the favourable conditions, above all a man of exceptional virtue devoted to the common good, but this is not just a utopian thought. Once established as king, such a man could rule according to his virtue and art and change the laws according to his knowl-

59 On the tyrant as the dialectical counterpart to democracy and democratic ideology I wish to refer to Giorgini, 1993.

60 Hermias, Aristotle's father-in-law (he married his adopted daughter), is a perfect case in point: he had been Plato's and Aristotle's pupil, and Aristotle dwelled three years in Atarnaeus after leaving Athens following Plato's death; when Hermias was betrayed and then killed by the Persians, Aristotle wrote a *Hymn to Virtue* to praise him. On this composition, the tradition of the text and literary genre, and for comments see Bowra 1938; Renehan 1982; and especially Ford 2011.

61 In an interesting and sophisticated essay, Atack 2015 maintains that Aristotle's treatment of kingship is (319): "a critical response to the virtue kingship theories of Isocrates and Xenophon, parallel to that of Plato in the *Statesman* and the *Laws*." She concludes that Aristotle did not have current examples in mind but was rather looking into a mythical past for exemplars. See also Atack 2014.

edge, just like the perfect statesman envisaged by Plato in the *Statesman*.⁶² We may note, incidentally, that Plato described the best constitution as detached from all the others and standing out “as a god from men.”⁶³ We may add that in his review of historical monarchies, Aristotle speaks of a kind which he defines *παμβασιλεία*, where one person is absolute sovereign on every issue;⁶⁴ a type of kingship which corresponds to paternal rule over a household because “just as paternal rule is kingship over a family, so conversely this type may be regarded as paternal rule over a polis...”⁶⁵ I am inclined to think that the logical conclusion of Aristotle’s reasoning is that a man who excels in virtue like a god among human beings should have the power of a *παμβασιλεία*.

This is a very important point. As we know from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *βίος πολιτικός* is rewarding because it prepares the conditions for the activity which is most suited to human beings and in which their happiness resides—theoretical activity⁶⁶—but it is not itself the supreme form of life. It follows that citizens of the best regime will have most time at their disposal because one person of extraordinary practical virtue takes care of the political affairs himself. They can attend to the *βίος θεωρητικός* undisturbed by practical matters and knowing that they are taken care of in an excellent way. We may remark how similar this conclusion is to Plato’s vision, which Aristotle abundantly criticizes. There is, however, an important difference. Plato was persuaded that philosophers, who know the idea of the good, are also the best statesmen because they know what is really good for their fellow-citizens. Aristotle, on the contrary, draws a hard and fast distinction between theoretical knowledge and practical wisdom and, in fact, finds the perfect example of the *φρόνιμος* in Pericles, not in Socrates.⁶⁷ The situation with the ‘kingly man’ is, however, different. Practical wisdom is the virtue of the rulers,⁶⁸ but the ‘kingly man’ must have something more, a ‘heroic virtue’ which is different in kind from the other human virtues and assimilates him to a god or a hero, setting him above

62 Aristotle remarks that “it is clear that a constitution based on the letter and rules of law is not the best constitution.” *Pol.* 3.15 1286a16. See *Pl., Plt.* 297a; 300c-d. Cf. *X., Cyr.* 7.

63 *Pl., Plt.* 303b; *Lg.* 9 875c.

64 On *παμβασιλεία* see Gastaldi 2009; Nagle 2000; Carlier 1993.

65 *Pol.* 3.14 1285b30-33.

66 On theoretical activity and *scholē* see Solmsen 1964.

67 *EN* 6.5 1140b7-10.

68 *Pol.* 3.4 1277b25-30: “practical wisdom alone of the virtues is peculiar to a ruler.”

human standards.⁶⁹ For Aristotle, the gods are beyond virtue and vice (it would be ridiculous to praise them for observing contracts, for instance, or returning deposits) and have no activity in common with men but thought.⁷⁰ It is this kind of heroic virtue which enables the king to benefit his fellow-citizens by creating the material conditions for their pursuit of philosophy.⁷¹ It follows that this heroic virtue is exercised in political matters and concerns only τὰ πολιτικά. In fact, Aristotle observes that men of outstanding virtue “will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political capacity (τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν).”⁷²

However, since the occurrence of all these circumstances is so rare, and god-like men are rare,⁷³ Aristotle is ready to concede that a government of the most virtuous citizens is an excellent alternative; these would educate their fellow-citizens into the values of the constitution and make them good, law-abiding citizens. The choice is thus between one man of extraordinary virtue and a small group of virtuous men, and it depends on the circumstances, on the ‘human material’ at hand.⁷⁴ Indeed, since Aristotle differentiates between different kinds of aristocracy, at one point he swiftly equates the kind of aristocracy based on virtue of the rulers and the ruled with “the best constitution” *tout court*.⁷⁵ We may note that this was exactly Plato’s solution, who thought that the best form of government should be a philosophical monarchy or, alternatively, what we are accustomed to call the rule of the philosopher-kings, which in practice is an intellectual aristocracy.

The third solution is to opt for the “most efficient” constitution, which can be the best in certain circumstances: this is a mixed regime which com-

69 EN 7.1 1145a15-27, where Aristotle speaks of a “virtue superior to us, a heroic, indeed divine, sort of virtue.”

70 EN 10.8 1178a10-24. This is why, if we love and cherish a friend, we do not wish him to become a god -he would be incomparable to a human being and the friendship would end: EN 8.7 1159a5; cf. 9.4 1166a22.

71 I agree with Vander Waerdt 1985, 267-268 that this leaves open the question of the relation between this heroic virtue and the virtue of philosophy. Vander Waerdt believes that Aristotle wanted to avoid the difficulty inherent in Plato’s rule of the philosopher-kings, who needed to be compelled to re-descend into the cave of politics and were thus destined to be unhappy.

72 Pol. 3.13 1284a9-10.

73 EN 7.1 1145a28: “Now it is rare that a divine man (τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα) exists.”

74 See Pol. 4.2 1289a32-34, where Aristotle says that studying the best form of government is equivalent to studying these two regimes, kingship and aristocracy.

75 Pol. 4.7 1293b20.

bines the traits of oligarchy and democracy and is best suited to situations where there is a prevalence of the middle class.⁷⁶ This conclusion is not totally unexpected, for Aristotle is persuaded that different constitutions are advantageous to different people.⁷⁷ On a more general level, Aristotle believes that one has to evaluate the constitutions according to their approximation to the best, “unless one is judging with a view to a presupposition;” namely, according to the circumstances and the objectives of a constitution.⁷⁸ Interestingly enough, after reviewing the many historical types of oligarchy and of democracy, Aristotle concludes that such a mixed regime may be identified with the *πολιτεία*, although it is customary to call *πολιτεῖαι* only those regimes which tend towards democracy.⁷⁹ From an institutional point of view, such mixture is possible when one takes traits from both forms of government, for instance, by choosing election to the magistracies instead of lot (this is typical of oligarchies), but without limitations according to wealth (this is typical of democracies). Such a constitution is sort of a mean between two extremes and it is therefore excellent.⁸⁰ To the point that Aristotle feels entitled to conclude:

It is clear that the best form of political community is one where power is vested in the middle class and that good government is attainable in those states where there is a large middle class.⁸¹

This middle type of constitution is also best because is stable and free from factional strife. In general, Aristotle remarks, factional strife arises out of inequality (*ἄνισον*) and the corresponding desire for equality;⁸² accordingly, where the middle class is large there is least likelihood of faction and dissension (*στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις*) among the citizens.⁸³ This fact makes it also “the safest” (*ἀσφαλεστάτη*) of all constitutions,⁸⁴ because human beings are happiest when they have equal status (*ἴσον ἔχοντες*)⁸⁵ and therefore

76 *Pol.* 4.8 1293b33-34. At 4.9 1294a16-17, Aristotle describes this as a mixture of the wealthy and the poor.

77 *Pol.* 6.1 1317a14-15; cf. 4.12 1296b13-1297a13.

78 *Pol.* 4.11 1296b9-10.

79 *Pol.* 4.8 1293b35.

80 *Pol.* 4.9 1294b12-20. Irrera 2016 defines this regime a fourth kind of aristocracy because (120): “the mixture of parts in a well-tempered constitution is realized ‘in a beautiful way.’”

81 *Pol.* 4.11 1295b35-38.

82 *Pol.* 5.1, 1301b27-29.

83 *Pol.* 4.11 1296a7-10.

84 *Pol.* 5.1 1302a15.

85 *Pol.* 5.7 1307a18.

do not attempt to overthrow the constitution. One final point: I am inclined to think that Aristotle believed that the fine blending of the qualities of democracy and oligarchy to create a stable πολιτεία is the work of a wise legislator or statesman, endowed with φρόνησις and love for his country. The example he had in mind was probably Solon, who was unique in having created a μέση πολιτεία in Athens.⁸⁶

VI. Looking for Confirmation

Let us now turn to the other works of Aristotle in order to get some insights and confirmation of our conjectures. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle speaks only of four forms of government.⁸⁷ Why is it so? We have to rule out the explanation that at the stage when Aristotle wrote this work, he had not elaborated his more complex theory of the forms of government which included three good ones and three perversions. We must do so because Aristotle explicitly says that these arguments have been dealt more lengthily in his *Politics*. Therefore, we may argue that for rhetorical purposes four forms were enough because the aim of rhetoric is to find persuasive arguments about well-known things and those four regimes were the most widespread and well-known. They are distinguished by their sovereignty, by the part which makes decisions, and are: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and monarchy. They are characterized as follows: in democracy magistrates are elected by lot, whereas in an oligarchy they are chosen according to their wealth; in aristocracy, magistrates are chosen according to their education in the laws: “in aristocracy those who have remained faithful to the institutions rule;” these are by necessity the best. In monarchy, one person alone is sovereign: monarchy which has a certain order (τάξιν) is kingship, that which has no limits (ἀόριστος) is tyranny. Moreover, every regime has a certain purpose, for which each one is chosen: the purpose of democracy is liberty, that of oligarchy wealth, that of aristocracy what concerns education and institutions, that of tyranny the protection of the tyrant. It is just too bad that the line concerning the purpose of kingship is missing. Finally, each constitution has a “character” (ἔθος), which is in line with, and conforms to the constitution itself. The character of the citizens conforms

86 I take the reference in *Pol.* 5.11 1296a38-b2 to be to Solon, who is mentioned before in the chapter. On Aristotle’s positive judgment of Solonian democracy see Lintott 1992, esp. 126-127. Other interpreters believe that the reference is to Theramenes, who is praised in the *Ath. Pol.*

87 *Rh.* 1.8 1365b20ff.

to that of the constitution, for each political regime tends to create citizens similar to the constitution. Accordingly, each political regime has its own specific standard of goodness by which it judges the virtue of citizens: the good citizen and the good human being are one and the same only in the best form of government.⁸⁸ On the other hand, the good ruler is always characterized by practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*), which is an absolute standard that is not relative to a specific political arrangement.⁸⁹

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle examines the question of the best regime with a double intent. First, it is important to know what regime is best because, as such, it will be also the most conducive to human flourishing. This is an important point which enables us to underscore again the difference between Aristotle's and the typical contemporary approach' in a liberal society we certainly do not expect our happiness to come from the State or to be the government's business. We might expect the government to have efficient public services—schools, hospitals, police—but happiness is a private matter; whereas for Aristotle a political community that does not care about the happiness of the citizens is such only in words but not in deeds. The polis creates the political pre-conditions for the flourishing of its citizens, and the best regime succeeds perfectly in doing this. Second, Aristotle considers friendship among the citizens an all-important virtue and devotes a long treatment (two books) to the examination of this topic: he is thus interested in studying the kind of justice and friendship that can be realized in each form of government. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we have a sketchier treatment of the characteristics of the different regimes than in the *Politics*, but the content is very similar. Aristotle maintains that there are three kinds of constitutions and three corresponding “perversions.”⁹⁰ Here, he describes the three constitutions as kingship, aristocracy, and timocracy, “which most people are used to call *politeia*.”⁹¹ He then says clearly that “of these the best is kingship and the worst is timocracy.” The friendship of a king towards his subjects consists in superiority in benefiting them; he takes care of them as a father takes care of his children or as a shepherd takes care of his sheep. This is a typical Homeric image (again already found in Plato's *Statesman*) and in fact Homer's description of Agamemnon as “shepherd of people” is quoted. The three perversions are

88 *Pol.* 3.4 1277a14-16 and b25-30; 3.18 1288a36-39; 4.7 1293b4-7.

89 Fine observations about a good ruler in a non-ideal political community may be found in Irrera 2010.

90 *EN* 8.12 1160a30.

91 *EN* 8.12 1160a35-6.

democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny, and Aristotle comments that in these deviated regimes, there is little justice and friendship.

There is another interesting point here: Aristotle comments that it is possible to have friendship with a king, provided one is excellent in virtue (*EN* 8.9 1159a1). But it is not possible, contrary to popular opinion and Homeric images, to be friends with a god because his or her superiority in virtue far exceeds human standards. In order to have friendship, there must be something in common, which is not the case between gods and men. As he had already argued in the *Magna Moralia*, denying the possibility of friendship between gods and men, Aristotle believes that in order to have friendship it is necessary to have reciprocation, which is obviously impossible in that case.⁹² As he says in the *Eudemian Ethics*, “it is ridiculous if somebody accuses god not to reciprocate friendship.”⁹³ An interesting puzzle thus arises: we wish all the best goods for our friends, but we want them to remain friends and therefore we cannot wish them to become gods; we wish all the goods to our friends but provided they remain human.⁹⁴ We want our friends to flourish and, as we have seen, human flourishing for Aristotle consists in theoretical activity. Since thinking is also the activity of god and our intellect is something divine, when human beings think they assimilate themselves to god: they “immortalize” themselves (ἀθανατίζειν: Aristotle makes up this verb which recurs only in this passage) and live a divine life.⁹⁵

Conclusion

One final point. Aristotle, typically, does not confine himself to these theoretical explorations of the question of the best regime. He devotes the last two books of the *Politics* to an examination of the practical circumstances that are required in order to build the best possible political arrangement.⁹⁶ He thus declares his persuasion based on “the observation of facts”⁹⁷ that, as concerns the size of the population, it has to be “the great-

92 See *MM* 2.11 1208b27-30.

93 *EE* 7.3 1238b27.

94 *EN* 8.9 1159a1-11.

95 *EN* 10.7 1177b28-32. On superhuman virtue see *EN* 7.1 1145a 25. Cf. *MM* 2.5 1200b12.

96 Interesting observations in Chuska 2000.

97 *Pol.* 7.4 1326b12: ἐκ τῶν ἔργων.

est surveyable number required for achieving a life of self-sufficiency.”⁹⁸ As to the location, it is better if the city has access to the sea and is geographically situated in a central zone, not too north nor too south or east: people in the north are typically courageous but lack intelligence and refinement; people of Asia are endowed with skill and intelligence but lack spirit and therefore are prone to live as subjects and slaves. Maybe not surprisingly, Greece happens to have an intermediate geographical position, and the Greek stock possesses both spirit and intelligence: it could “govern every other people, if only it could once achieve political unity.”⁹⁹ One important point concerns property: as we previously saw, Aristotle is persuaded that “it ought not to be owned in common, as some writers have maintained, though it ought to be used in common and as friends treat their belongings.”¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the best arrangement is when the territory of the city is divided in two parts, one which is public property while the other belongs to private owners.

The general features of the best regime depicted in *Politics* 7 and 8 are those of an aristocracy of ‘great-souled’ people (μεγαλόψυχοι) which shares many traits with a πολιτεία.¹⁰¹ Hence, citizens “must not live a mechanic or a mercantile life” and people occupied in such jobs should not be included in the citizenry because they cannot achieve virtue.¹⁰² This feature characterizes this political arrangement as un-democratic because no democracy would exclude such people from citizenry.¹⁰³ The fully virtuous citizens of the best regime would engage in an active life, and—in turn—in politics, and would hold offices, again in turn and according to their age; this will ensure that every one of them has the opportunity to also enjoy the pleasures of theoretical activity. In fact, the purpose of their city will be to lead a peaceful life because waging war and ruling over other nations despotically

⁹⁸ *Pol.* 7.4 1326b24-25.

⁹⁹ *Pol.* 7.7 1327b30-33. Aristotle’s wording is deliberately loose: he says μᾶς τυχάνον πολιτείας, “if they happened to have one constitution.”

¹⁰⁰ *Pol.* 7.10 1329b41-1330a2. Cf. 2.5 1263a40.

¹⁰¹ I agree with Enrico Berti’s refined arguments concerning the nature of Aristotle’s best regime; in his view, the political regime depicted in book 7 and 8 of the *Politics* is an idealization of the city governed by the middle constitution and is therefore a πολιτεία. However, I disagree with him on the fact that the notion that Aristotle was a supporter of kingship “is a legend” because the historical possibility of such kingship was almost non-existent. See Berti 2013, 42.

¹⁰² *Pol.* 7.10 1328b39-40.

¹⁰³ Aristotle’s qualms against democracy, as exemplified by contemporary Athens, are here present. On the unfairness of Aristotle’s depiction of Athenian democracy and its historical motivations see Strauss, 1991.

is unjust. We may notice how this ideal runs against the actual conduct of both Athenian democracy and Macedonian kingship. We may explain the fact that Aristotle, although reminding once again his readers that it is not against nature (παρὰ φύσιν) but rather noble (καλός) and just (δίκαιος) to all obey a man of superior virtue and practical capacity (δύναμιν πρακτικὴν), opts for an aristocracy of true virtue by looking at the political circumstances of his time: current education is not conducive to the creation of extraordinarily virtuous men, so it is better to come to terms with reality and try to implement a regime suited to the circumstances.

Aristotle is well aware that it is easy enough to theorize about such matters, but it is far less easy to realize one's theories: we give an account "according to our wishes" (κατ'εὐχὴν), but the implementation depends on chance (τύχη).¹⁰⁴ By this, Aristotle means that we may "pray that our city is equipped according to our wishes (κατ'εὐχὴν) at all points where fortune (τύχη) is sovereign.... The goodness of the city is a different matter: here we leave the realm of fortune, and we enter the realm of human knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and purpose (προαίρεσις)."¹⁰⁵

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104 *Pol.* 7.12 1331b20-21.

105 *Pol.* 7.13 1332a31-33.

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Studying Aristotle's *Politics* in the 15th Century: Summaries and Anthologies in the Greek Manuscripts*

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I. Introduction

The diffusion in the West of manuscripts with the Greek text of Aristotle's *Politics* had a fairly short duration: the first copies were probably brought to Italy from Constantinople in the final years of the 14th century; when Constantinus Lascaris completed his transcription of the work in 1501,¹ Aldo Manuzio's famous *editio princeps* had been available for three years. Of course, other manuscripts dating back to the 16th century -and even more recent ones- are preserved, but the most important period for manuscript diffusion of this work in the original language is undoubtedly the 15th century. The known copies dating back to this period (or to the end of the 14th century) are not very numerous, if one considers the importance of this work in itself and in the history of Western political thought. As it is well known, the *Politics* had a fairly limited circulation in the Middle Ages; more fortunate than the original Greek version were the Latin translations: the first one by William of Moerbeke, and especially the later one by Leonardo Bruni.² One should not think, however, that in the humanistic age the spread of the *Politics* from Greece to Europe was limited exclusively to the few manuscripts containing the complete text: Aristotelian teaching was also able to circulate in a much more concise form, through quotations, summaries, definitions and textual *excerpta*, i.e., all of those literary resources that are usually referred to as "anthological literature." The aim of this note is to consider some types of textual support, unpublished and different if compared to those that offer the complete text of

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1 Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, mss. 4578 (Andrés 1987, 58-59).

2 Schütrumpf 2014, 33-38.

Politics, primarily because these texts have not yet attracted the attention of editors and scholars. Since the purpose of this analysis is to study the diffusion of the contents of *Politics* -intended as Aristotelian teaching, of essence for the formation of an intellectual in the humanistic and Renaissance age- it would not be appropriate to insist on the conventional distinction between “direct tradition” and “indirect tradition” of the Greek text. In comparison with the manuscripts that present the treatise in full, those that contain only a few quotations, *excerpta*, and summaries have only been able to ensure very partial knowledge of the *Politics*; nevertheless, it is precisely the typology of selection and the quality of the topics chosen for documentation -more than the complete manuscripts- which reflect the main interests of the readers of the time, and how these interests are connected with the history of the text.³

On the other hand, the limited number of complete copies of the text dating back to the Renaissance period should not lead one to think that many other contemporary exemplars were lost. While it is reasonable to suppose that many manuscripts of the 12th and 13th centuries have indeed been lost, above all because of the poor quality of the paper used, this hypothesis loses weight if referring to the 15th century. Since the complete manuscripts of *Politics* are not very numerous, it must have been difficult for a European intellectual of that age to access the Greek text, even when he only wanted to verify the original political terminology, which was already known thanks to the Latin translation.⁴ As it is well established, the publication of the “new” Latin version by Leonardo Bruni stirred up an international controversy, related to the general problem of contemporary Latin translations of ancient Greek texts.⁵ As a result, some readers perceived the need to recover the original Greek version of *Politics* to personally assess the differences among Latin translations. Nevertheless, it is certain that for most of the scholars interested in Aristotle’s political teaching, this was impossible, so they had to limit themselves to compendia, gnomological literature, school extracts, and partial syntheses.

3 Curnis 2011. Regarding the diffusion of Latin commentaries see Lanza 2013.

4 Schütrumpf 2014, 39-64. Regarding the meagerness and scarcity of indirect tradition and the absence of Greek commentaries, see Schütrumpf 1991, 67-71 (*Rezeption*) and Curnis 2016.

5 Schütrumpf 2014, 65-76.

II. *Ōpoi about politics*

Among the variety that exists for this production and its didactic purposes, it is often possible to come across the genre of *ōpoi*, i.e. “definitions,” or “fundamental principles.” These *ōpoi* are very brief and synthetic texts in which philosophers’ doctrines were summarized through their own words and with short quotations from the original texts.⁶ Humanistic and Renaissance manuscripts, especially if miscellaneous contents are present and not limited to a single authorship, often report pages or sections of *ōpoi*, not necessarily related to the rest of the text. In the case of Aristotle’s *Politics*, it is possible to find a group of *ōpoi* in some miscellaneous manuscripts⁷ (some of which are joined by an important element of the Aristotelian tradition, since they contain the text of the short pseudo-Aristotelian script *De virtute* or *De virtutibus et vitiis*). In these manuscripts dating back to the 15th century, an anonymous scholar or reader wanted to gather some definitions about the content of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Rhetoric*, and the *Politics* under the initial title (generic but crucial for understanding the quality of the selection) Ἀριστοτέλους ὄροι ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν, “Aristotle’s definitions about virtues and vices.” Since the text is unpublished, the following is a provisional edition based on five manuscripts from among those in which the text is found: the most authoritative (and perhaps the oldest of these five) is undoubtedly the exemplar of Modena, Biblioteca Estense Universitaria, Mut. gr. 144 (α.Τ.8.12)⁸ = **Mut**, dating back to 1441 for the part that interests here (ff. 161r-v). The second, München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Mon. gr. 495⁹ = **Mon**, depends on **Mut** and is datable to the mid-15th century (ff. 57v-59r); **Mon** is the antigraph of the third

6 The term is well attested in the Aristotelian tradition, starting from the original works of the philosopher (it is sufficient to see *De anima* 403a 25, *Politics* 1294a 35, 1300a 11, 1300b 15 and many pages of *Metaphysics*); “Significat notionis definitionem” (Bonitz 1870, 529b 55). In the gnomological literature, introducing a thematic section formed by quotations and textual *excerpta* or a comparison between different philosophical doctrines is very common (*ōpoi* that contrast, for example, the teaching of Plato and Aristotle are widespread: cf. the manuscripts Vat. gr. 484, ff. 194r-195v, Vat. gr. 485, ff. 178r-182v, Vat. gr. 495, f. 12v, etc.). Cf. McKirahan 1992, 36-48 (especially 47).

7 Regarding manuscripts containing fragments, quotations, *excerpta* or summaries from the Greek text of the *Politics*, see Dreizehnter 1962, 67-69; Dreizehnter 1970, xxxix; Curnis 2017, 18-19.

8 Eleuteri 2016, 82.

9 Eleuteri 2016, 83-84.

manuscript, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 963¹⁰ = **Par**, classified as dating back to “sec. XV terzo venticinquennio” (ff. 296v-298r). A fourth manuscript, Vatican City, Vatican Apostolic Library, Ottob. gr. 151¹¹ = **Ott**, presents the ὅροι in an inaccurate version but accompanied in the initial part by marginal thematic indications (περὶ ἄρχοντος, περὶ πόλεως, etc.), which document how readers isolated the political definitions using the same method of anthological collections (ff. 209r-210r). **Ott** is also a miscellaneous manuscript that assembles documents from very different ages; it is classified as a composite product of the 13th through the 15th century, and it is precisely the later stage that the Aristotelian ὅροι date back to. The fifth manuscript, the monumental Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, G 69 sup. (409)¹² = **Ambr** (ff. 287r-288r) dates back to the second half of the 15th century, perhaps to 1463. Although the content of the first three manuscripts (**Mut Mon Par**) is not at all identical, the stemmatic relationship established for *De virtute* is also confirmed for the ὅροι, and in particular for the political ones. **Ott** does not seem directly related to any of the previous three, despite the fact that it presents the text of *De virtute* (in addition to the homonymous *De virtutibus* by Georgius Gemistus

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- 10 Eleuteri 2016, 85-86 (“assieme a Mon. gr. 495, suo antigrafo, e Vind. phil. gr. 311 appartiene ad uno stesso gruppo”).
- 11 Feron and Battaglini 1893, 84-85; Eleuteri 2016, 76. Feron and Battaglini 1893, 85 correctly report that on f. 210r one can read the definition of “slander” by Lucian: this ὅρος is placed under the political ones taken from Aristotle, although they have no thematic connection (the quotation by Lucian does not appear in the other manuscripts examined). However, it is not at all exact what was reported in the electronic platform *Pinakes* (pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr): according to the database, this codex should contain the script *Calumniae non temere credendum* starting from f. 210; in reality, only this definition is quoted from Lucian’s pamphlet (see the critical apparatus).
- 12 Martini and Bassi 1906, 488-493. In the original index of the manuscript (f. 1v), the Aristotelian section is reported with the same title that we read in **Mut** (Ἀριστοτέλους ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν ὅροι ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν), without the specification of *Politics*, since this lemma is found inside the text. Unlike **Mut Mon Par Ott**, in **Ambr** the entries in red ink which refer to the extracts from *Rhetoric* and *Politics* are placed in the external margin (f. 287v), in order to not interrupt the flow of *definitiones* in the main column of the page. This choice, typical of the tradition of anthological and gnomological manuscripts, also determines another variation with respect to other codices: if in **Mut** (and consequently in **Mon Par**) the copyist only inserts captions like ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς and ἀπὸ τῶν πολιτικῶν, in **Ambr** there is a column for lemmatic entries such as τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς and τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν πολιτικῶν, i.e., with the authorial reference to Aristotle himself (αὐτοῦ). Regarding other gnomological contents of this Ambrosian codex (sentences, *apophthegmata* and anecdotes), see Tartaglia 1978-1979.

Pletho). **Ambr** does not contain the *De virtute*, but it is certainly the most encyclopedic of the five manuscripts: an authentic library of Greek culture gathered in one sole book of great length, written -as it seems- by a single copyist.¹³ The synthetic critical apparatus that follows the Greek text reveals that errors are mostly produced in **Mon** and then repeated in **Par**, except in one case: in definition [13] **Mon** corrects an error present in **Mut**, restoring the original Aristotelian syntax (but it is not sufficient to suppose that the copyist of **Mon** has collated any complete copy of the *Politics*). **Ambr** and **Ott** do contain their own mistakes, especially omissions. Although the most reliable version is in **Mut**, this latter is not completely irreproachable, as can be seen in the text's [14] syntactic inconsistencies; however, it can be resolved by comparison with the original; the text's [14] deterioration can be observed in all the examined documents.¹⁴

Ἀριστοτέλους ὅροι ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν¹⁵ ἀπὸ τῶν πολιτικῶν

[1] Ἄρχον φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν. [2] Δοῦλον φύσει τὸ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ὑπηρετεῖν. [3] Δοῦλός ἐστιν ὁ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἄλλου ἄνθρωπος ὢν. [4] Οἶκός ἐστιν ἡ εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν. [5] Κώμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου. [6] Πόλις ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ πλειόνων

13 A vast bibliography on this codex -but not referring to the section of ὅροι we are interested in- is offered by Pasini 2007, 263-264, to which Pascale 2017 can be added.

14 The transcription tries to reflect as faithfully as possible the editorial characteristics of the manuscript text: in the five copies the single *sententiae* and their corollaries are marked with the first letter in red ink; *rubricatio* has been transformed in our transcription into a progressive number, which allows the reader to isolate and identify the single text on the basis of **Mut**, probably the oldest exemplar of the group. Even the punctuation attempts to be as faithful as possible to the original, if not in the quantity of signs at least in the quality: 'two points' have been rendered with simple points (since in **Mut** they are always before a red letter, i.e. at the end of a single ὅρος); commas have been eliminated, except when they introduce a sentence coordinated with respect to the previous one; 'high points' have been transformed into commas, except when they are placed before a red letter: in this case they have become simple points; on the contrary, 'high points' have been preserved if followed by an argumentative, adversative or explanatory connective (ἄρα, γάρ, δέ, διό, etc.).

15 The integration at the beginning of the title is certain: in all the manuscripts examined the section of ὅροι opens with this caption, followed by the specification concerning the Aristotelian work: ἀπὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς (**Mut**, f. 160r), ἀπὸ ῥητορικῆς (**Mut**, f. 160v), ἀπὸ τῶν πολιτικῶν (**Mut**, f. 161r).

κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος, πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας αὐτάρκειας. [7] Ἡ πόλις τέλος τῶν κοινωνιῶν πασῶν, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου· ἡ πόλις ἄρα φύσις ἐστίν. [8] Ἐτι τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον. [9] Ἐτι πρότερον ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις φύσει ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος, ὅτι αὐτάρκης οὐκ ἂν εἴη μόνον, ἕκαστον τῇ δυνάμει ὥρισται καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ. [10] Δίκη ἐστὶ πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις. [11] Δίκη ἐστὶ τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις. [12] Φύσει δὲ ὁ δοῦλος ὅτι μέρος μὲν οἰκίας· ἡ κτήσις καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας· ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον εὖ ζῆν· ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὠρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖα τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα οὕτω καὶ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ὁ ὑπρέτης· ἐμψυχον γὰρ κτῆμα καὶ ὄργανον. [13] Ἐτι ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις εἶδει, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις ἄλλου ἔνεκα τέλους, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἐαυτῆς τέλος, δέονται δὲ ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν· ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις οὐ ποίησις ἐστίν· διὸ ὁ δοῦλος τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ὑπρέτης ἐστίν. [14] Ἐτι δὲ φύσει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν δηλον καὶ μάλιστα τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς· εὐθὺς γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ ἐκ νοῦ καὶ ὀρέξεως ἄρχοντος αὐτὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν <...>, ἡγουν τοῦ παθητικοῦ τὸ λογιστικόν, ὅτι καὶ συμφέρον. [15] Ἡ οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. [16] Δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος οὐ λέγεται κατ' ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι. [17] Δουλικὴ δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ὑπηρετικὴ τοῦ κοινῇ λυσιτελοῦντος. [18] Δεσποτικὴ δὲ ἡ χρηστικὴ δούλων. [19] Πλοῦτός ἐστιν ὀργάνων πλῆθος οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν. [20] Ἀρετὴ οἰκονομικὴ ἡγουν δεσπότης ἐστίν, οἷον ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ· γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ παιδὸς καὶ δούλου ὑπηρετικὴ· γυναικὸς γὰρ ἀρετὴ σιγὴ· ἀνδρὸς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι, παιδὸς τε οὐ πρὸς ἐαυτόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον, καὶ δούλου ὁμοίως· ὥστε κατ' ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον λόγον ἐπιβάλλει τούτοις ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ. [21] Οὔτε τὸ θῆλυ οὐθ' ὁ παῖς οὔτε ὁ δοῦλος ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος οὐκ ἔχει ὄλως· τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἄκυρον δέ· ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀτελες δέ. [22] Βίοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξ'· νομαδικός, γεωργικός, ληστροικός, ἀλιευτικός, θηρευτικός καὶ καπηλικός. [23] Τῶν τεχνῶν τεχνικώταται μὲν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης· βαναυσόταται δὲ ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβᾶται· δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις· ἀγενέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. [24] Τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα· πάθη, δυνάμεις καὶ ἔξεις· πάθη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὀργῇ, φόβος, μῖσος, πόθος, ζῆλος, ἔλεος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὄλως οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ἐσμεν ὀργισθῆναι, λυπηθῆναι καὶ ὄλως παθεῖν· ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ἡγουν εὖ ἢ κακῶς· ἐπαινούμεθα δὲ καὶ ψεγόμεθα καλῶς ἢ κακῶς ἔχοντες· ἐπαινος δὲ καὶ ψόγος περὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν· ἔξεις ἄρα καὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι [καὶ] οὔτε πάθη οὔτε δυνάμεις.

[1] περί ἄρχοντος Ott¹ mg. [2] περί δούλου Ott¹ mg. [4] περί οἴκου Ott¹ mg. | εἰς om. Ott [5] περί κόμης Ott¹ mg. | κόμη] γνώμη Mon Par | οἰκίων om. Ott [6] περί πόλεως Ott¹ mg. | πέρας] τέλος Mon Par [8] Ἐτι Ott Ambr [9] μόνος Ambr post corr. [10] περί δίκης Ott¹ mg. | Δίκη ... τάξις om. Ambr [11] δίκη] κη Par [13] Ἐτι Ott Ambr | ὁ δούλος ὢν πρὸς Mut | ὑπέρτατος Par [14] Ἐτι δὲ Ott δὲ Ambr | pr. δὲ add. s.l. Mon | εὐθὺ Mon | σώματος ἄρχοντος Ambr : σώματος ἀρχὴν Mut Mon Par : σώματος ἄρχην Ott | post δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν add. Mon καὶ ἐκ πολιτικὴν (postea erasum) | αὐτὴν cor-rexi : αὐτῆς codd. | <...> lac. postulavi sed verbum restituendum praebet Arist. ad 1254b5: ἄρχη [17] δουλικοὶ Ott | λυσitelous Mon Par [18] καὶ χρηστική Ott [20] οἰκονομική Ambr : οἰκονομικῆς Mut mg. : οἰκουμηνικῆς Mut Mon Par | ἀρχιτεκτονική Ott ante corr. | οὐκ ἔστι] οὐκέτι Ambr | καὶ ἄλλον om. Ott [21] post alt. δούλος add. Par ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος [23] τύχης correxi coll. Arist. 1258b36 : τύχη codd. [24] τρία ἔτι Par ante corr. | γιγνόμενα Ambr | φόβος] φόνος Mon | φόβος add. s.l. Ott | μῆσος Ott | post pr. δλως add. Par ζήλος (postea erasum) | ἔξεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ Mut Ott | ἔξεις ἄρα αἱ Mon Par | καὶ αἱ κακία Ott | [καὶ] seclusi | post οὔτε δυνάμεις add. Ott ἔστι τοίνυν διαβολὴ κατεγὼρία τις ἐξ ἐρμίας γινομένη τὸν κατηγορούμενον λεληθῆαι, ἐκ τοῦ μονομεροῦς ἀναντιλέκτως πεπιστευμένη (Luc. 15.6) et rubr. ὁρος διαβολῆς τοῦ Λουκιανοῦ | post οὔτε δυνάμεις add. Ambr alt. manus Χ(ριστ)έ, διδοῦ πονέοντι τεινὴν πολυόλβον ἀρωγὴν. τῇ συντελεσθῇ τὸν καλῶν θεῶ χάρις (cf. Anth. Gr. 1.29, 4 χριστέ, σύ μοι προΐαλλε τεινὴν πολυόλβον ἀρωγὴν et Laur. Conv. Soppr. 39, f. 245v in Lorusso 2016, 248).

Aristotle's definitions of virtues and vices from Politics¹⁶

[1] Lord by nature is which can foresee by the exercise of mind. [2] By nature is a slave which with its body gives effect to such foresight. [3] Is a slave who is by nature not his own but another's man. [4] The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants. [5] Village is the first society to be formed by several families, aiming at not only the supply of daily needs. [6] State exists as a single complete community of several villages, nearly or quite self-sufficing. [7] The state is the end of all the communities, because the nature of a thing is its end; for what when each thing is fully developed, we call it with the name of its nature; so, the state represents nature. [8] Besides, the final cause and the end of a thing is the best. [9] Further, the state is a creation of nature prior to the family and prior to the individual, because the first would not be self-sufficing when isolated, and the second is defined by his power and function. [10] Justice is the principle of order in political society. [11] Justice is the determination of what is just. [12] A slave is by nature, because he is a part of the family as property, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the household. No man can live well, unless he is provided with necessities; as in the arts which have a definite sphere are necessary their proper instruments, so is the servant for the household: he is a living possession and instrument. [13] Further, as production and actions are different in kind (production has a different end, while action is its own end), but both require instruments, these ones must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of what is necessary to action. [14] Further, that the master and the slave are by nature is clear from many things, above all from nature itself: immediately, a man rules from his soul the body ruling principle and the servant's despotical rule, whereas from his intellect and appetency rules the royal rule itself and the political one, as to say that the rational element rules the passionate one, because so it is useful. [15] The rule of a household is a monarchy, whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals. [16] The master and the slave are not so called because of science, but because they are of a certain character. [17] The science of the slave is servile toward the common profit, whereas [18] the science of the master teaches the use of slaves.

16 The proposed translation is inspired by lexical and terminological choices from the version of Barnes and Jowett 1988. In some points with problems and syntactic inconsistencies (as in the case of the text [14]) it is purely indicative.

[19] Riches is a number of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. [20] The excellence of a household of course demands a master, like the most authoritative of the excellences; on the contrary, the excellence of woman, child and slave is servile. Silence is a woman's glory, but this is not equally the glory of man; the excellence of a child is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and the same about the excellence of the slave, so that the excellence of character comes to all them in different ways. [21] Female, child and slave do not have deliberative faculty; the slave hasn't it at all; the woman has, but without authority; the child has, but incomplete. [22] Six are the modes of subsistence among men: the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter and the retail trader. [23] Among the arts some ones are very truly, in which there is the least element of chance; they are the meanest ones, in which the body is most maltreated; the most servile in which there is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least meed of excellence. [24] In the soul there are three states: emotions, capacities and dispositions. Emotions are anger, fear, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity and generally all states which are accompanied by pain or pleasure. Then, there are the capacities, in virtue of which we are capable of feeling anger or pain or pity. At the end, the dispositions, in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed with respect to the emotions: we are either praised or blamed, depending if we are well or ill; praise and blame refer to virtue and vice. So, dispositions, virtues and vices are neither emotions nor capacities.

III. Structure, Sources and Quality of the "Summary"

Although the initial indication of ὅροι refers to τὰ πολιτικά as a whole, the summary concerns only the first book of Aristotle's treatise. The reader is given a fairly accurate examination of the contents of *Politics* I, however it certainly is not homogeneous. Some chapters are completely left out (such as specific ones on economics or crematistics), while there is a pronounced insistence on the definition of physiological effects among social relationships. We have introduced the word "summary" (and not a set of *excerpta*), because this is the intent of all the ὅροι; the term *excerptum* is in general a textual quotation, faithful to the original (and a set of *excerpta* from the same work constitutes an epitome). In this case, the original text of Aristotle has sometimes been faithfully transcribed, but it often has been summarized, condensed and modified. It is possible to compare the short strings of the individual ὅροι with the original Aristotelian text, as in the following table: the systematic comparison allows one to appreciate simultaneously the typology of selection and the techniques to "condense" a philosophical thought, which is anything but predictable or mechanical.

Όροι από τῶν πολιτικῶν

Aristotle's Politics original text¹⁷

[1] Ἄρχον φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν. [2] Δοῦλον φύσει τὸ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ὑπηρετεῖν.

1252a31-34 τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον ταῦτα τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον.

[3] Δουλὸς ἐστὶν ὁ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἄλλου ἄνθρωπος ὢν.

1254a14-15 ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου, ἄνθρωπος ὢν, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλός ἐστιν. 1254b20-22 ἐστὶ γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν.

[4] Οἶκός ἐστιν ἡ εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν.

1252b12-14 ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἶκος ἐστίν.

[5] Κώμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκῶν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου.

1252b15-16 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη.

[6] Πόλις ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ πλειόνων κοινῶν κοινωνία τέλειος, πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας αὐταρκείας. [7] Ἡ πόλις τέλος τῶν κοινωνιῶν πασῶν, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης ταύτην φαιμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου· ἡ πόλις ἄρα φύσις ἐστίν. [8] Ἐτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον.

1252b27-1253a2 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κοινῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἥδη πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γιγνομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὕσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαιμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἄνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας. ἐτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον· ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερόν ἐστι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστίν.

[9] Ἐτι πρότερον ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις φύσει ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος, ὅτι αὐτάρκης οὐκ ἂν εἴη μόνον, ἕκαστον τῇ δυνάμει ὥριστα καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ.

1253a18-26 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένον γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται πούς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμονύμως, ὥσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαυτή· πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥριστα καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμόνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δηλόν.

[10] Δίκη ἐστὶ πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις. [11] Δίκη ἐστὶ τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

1253a37-38 ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

[12] Φύσει δὲ ὁ δοῦλος ὅτι μέρος μὲν οἰκίας· ἡ κτήσις καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας· ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον εὖ ζῆν· ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὥρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖα τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα οὕτω καὶ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ὁ ὑπηρέτης· ἐμψυχον γὰρ κτῆμα καὶ ὄργανον.

1253b23-33 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας· ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν, ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὥρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ. τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἐμψυχα, οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἰαῖς ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ προφρεὺς ἐμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρετῆς ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν· οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ κτήσις πλῆθος ὀργάνων ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἐμψυχον, καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς ὑπηρετῆς.

[13] Ἐτι ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποιήσις καὶ πρᾶξις εἶδει, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποιήσις ἄλλου ἔνεκα τέλους, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἑαυτῆς τέλος, δέονται δὲ ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέραι ὄργανων,

1254a5-8 ἐτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποιήσις εἶδει καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ δέονται ἀμφοτέραι ὄργανων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποιήσις ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρετῆς τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν.

17 The critical text of *Politics* 1 is quoted from the edition of Besso and Curnis 2011.

Όροι από τῶν πολιτικῶν	Aristotle's <i>Politics</i> original text
ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφορὰν· ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις οὐ ποίησις ἐστίν· διὸ ὁ δοῦλος τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ὑπηρέτης ἐστίν. [14] Ὅτι δὲ φύσει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μάλιστα τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς· εὐθύς γάρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ ἐκ νοῦ καὶ ὁρέξεως ἄρχοντος αὐτὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν [...] ἔχουν τοῦ παθητικοῦ τὸ λογιστικόν, ὅτι καὶ συμφέρον.	1254a13-14, 23-26, 30-32 τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· [...] καὶ εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς ἐνία διέστηκε καὶ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεσθαι τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν. καὶ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ἐστίν, καὶ αἱ βελτίων ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ τῶν βελτιόνων ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου· [...] ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμφυχοῖς. 1254b2-9 ἐστὶ δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῳῳ θεωρησαί καὶ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὁρέξεως πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἴσου ἡ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πάντων. 1255b16-23, 30-31 φανερόν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταυτὸν ἐστὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ, οὐδὲ πάντα ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἢ δὲ δούλων ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία, μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος, ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπότης οὐ λέγεται κατ' ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδ' εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος, ἐπιστήμῃ δ' ἂν εἴη καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλική, [...] αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι εἰσι· δεσποτικὴ δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν ἡ χρηστικὴ δούλων. 1256b36-37 ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργάνων πληθὺς ἐστίν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.
[15] Ἡ οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. [16] Δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος οὐ λέγεται κατ' ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι. [17] Δουλικὴ δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν ὑπηρετικὴ τοῦ κοινητῆς λυσιτελοῦντος. [18] Δεσποτικὴ δὲ ἡ χρηστικὴ δούλων.	1260a17-21, 30-33 διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστίν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτον. τὸν δ' ἄλλον ἕκαστον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς, ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, [...] γυναικὶ κόσμον ἢ σιγὴ φέρει, ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην.
[19] Πλοῦτός ἐστιν ὀργάνων πληθὺς οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν. [20] Ἀρετὴ οἰκονομικὴ ἔχουν δεσπότης ἐστίν, οἷον ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ· γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ παιδὸς καὶ δούλου ὑπηρετικὴ· γυναικὸς γὰρ ἀρετὴ σιγὴ· ἀνδρὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ, παιδὸς τε οὐ πρὸς ἐαυτόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον, καὶ δούλου ὁμοίως· ὥστε κατ' ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον λόγον ἐπιβάλλει τούτοις ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ. [21] Οὕτε τὸ θῆλυ οὐθ' ὁ παῖς οὕτε ὁ δοῦλος ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος οὐκ ἔχει ὄλως· τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἄκυρον δέ· ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀτελὲς δέ. [22] Βίοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ὅσων νομαδικός, γεωργικός, ληστρικός, ἀλιευτικός, θηρευτικός καὶ καπηλικός.	1260a12-14 ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὄλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον· ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀτελές. 1256a19-21, 40-1256b2 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζῳῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν· [...] οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδὸν εἰσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτόφυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς καὶ καπηλείας πορίζονται τὴν τροφήν, νομαδικός γεωργικός ληστρικός ἀλιευτικός θηρευτικός.
[23] Τῶν τεχνῶν τεχνικώταται μὲν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχη·	1258b35-39 εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασίων ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης, βανασώματα δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται

Όροι από τῶν πολιτικῶν	Aristotle's Politics original text
βαναυστόταται δὲ ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβᾶται· δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις· ἀγενέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. [24] Τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα· πάθη, δυνάμεις καὶ ἔξεις· πάθη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὀργῇ, φόβος, μῖσος, πόθος, ζῆλος, ἔλεος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ἐσμεν ὀργισθῆναι, λυπηθῆναι καὶ ὅλως παθεῖν· ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ἡγουν εὖ ἢ κακῶς· ἐπαινούμεθα δὲ καὶ ψεγόμεθα καλῶς ἢ κακῶς ἔχοντες· ἔπαινος δὲ καὶ ψόγος περὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν· ἔξεις ἄρα καὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι [καὶ] οὕτε πάθη οὕτε δυνάμεις.	μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγενέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. Text [24] doesn't refer to <i>Politics</i> but to <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> 2.4-5, 1105b19-1106a12¹⁸ Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστὶ, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις, τούτων ἂν τὴ εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν καὶ οἷσι πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὐτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πῶς. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· οὐτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὕτε κακοὶ, οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὐτε ψεγόμεθα· ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἔξω αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ, εἴρηται.

Notwithstanding, this is not a uniform text whose source is located exclusively in *Politics*. The most interesting detail concerns the text [24]: it is placed at the conclusion of the ὅροι on politics, but it is not taken from the *Politics*. On the contrary, it is a very famous passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which likewise enjoys an appreciable fortune in the tradition of commentaries, paraphrases and gnomological compilations of the Aristotelian treatise (see below). In addition, the text [24] is presented as an actual summary of the original page, not a simple quotation, since it leaves out a good deal of secondary information and does not reproduce its syntactic structure (unlike almost all previous ὅροι). The most probable hypo-

thesis is that the mention of virtue¹⁹ at the end of the text [23] induced the anonymous editor/scholar to recall the passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* in which Aristotle precisely explains virtue, starting from the distinction of three internal components of the soul (passions, capacities, conditions). At the beginning of the selection (ὅροι ἀπὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς), this textual passage is neither quoted nor summarized, partly because it stops at some definitions of pleasure, for which only a partial correspondence can be found in the original Greek treatise.²⁰ There is no indication, however, that from this text [23] to the next, the source ceases to be the *Politics* and becomes the *Nicomachean Ethics*; nor could the reader argue it in any way, unless he knows the detailed content of the second treatise.

Referring to the degree of fidelity to the main source, i.e., the way in which *Politics* 1 has been condensed into the succession of ὅροι, it should be noted that the text [3] is the only one interposed in the linear sequence of quotations according to the original book (respected between texts [1] and [21]). It is a comprehensible and relevant interposition, taken from the chapter that Aristotle dedicates to the role of the slave of the household. The texts [22-23], devoted to the different types of human lives, constitute a small autonomous block with respect to the previous sequence. In addition, the final summary taken from the *Nicomachean Ethics* is added to this small block. All these remarks make it possible to conclude that, in the opinion of the anonymous editor, the most important section of *Politics* 1 is found between 1252a31 and 1256b37 (with an appendix of 1260a12-33, which has a precise meaning). Considering the literary nature and practical function of the ὅροι, the disinterest in all of the methodological and exemplifying contents is logical (including the numerous poetic quotations and allusions that Aristotle introduces within the first book); on the other hand, establishing which thematic areas attracted the attention of the anonymous scholar is more complex. *Politics* 1, in fact, is characterized by four major thematic areas: (1) the generation of the πόλις starting from minor social elements, (2) slavery, (3) domestic administration and (4) rela-

19 Moreover, the meaning of ἀρετή in this passage is quite problematic: “Keine Tätigkeit von bausen und Theten wird mit arete verrichtet” (Schütrumpf 1991, 361). No modern commentator relates this *Politics* page with the other one of *Nicomachean Ethics*, as in the final part of the ὅροι.

20 The ὅροι taken from the *Nicomachean Ethics* end with the definition ἡδονὴ ἐστὶ κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασις, which does not seem to have a direct correspondence in the original text (on the contrary, the meaning seem to diverge from the conclusion of *EN* 7.14 1154b27-28); κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς is the definition of αἰνεσις in *Pol.* 8.3 1337b42.

tions between members of the house.²¹ Apart from some definitions concerning the first of these, it is clear that the other three areas do not receive attention in the summary work. It is surprising, moreover, that the first chapter is not an object of any interest, since the quotations begin with chapter 2.²² The anonymous editor, however, is very attentive to the principle with which Aristotle links the themes and develops the arguments: the natural origin of the elements and the relationships that the philosopher is proposing.²³ In the first fourteen texts, focused on anthropology (and not yet on economics), the term φύσις appears at least once in eight of them. It is not possible to establish whether the editor selected the definitions on the basis of a lexicographical or other criteria (as often happens in anthologies from Late Antiquity and the Byzantine age); no doubt, however, we can say that the concept of “nature” constitutes his principle of reading and exegesis of *Politics* 1: a principle actually applied to man, to slave, to those who command or obey, and at the end also to the city, in the sense that it is nature, in the same way that the complete realization of nature represents the ultimate goal of existence. By nature there are different human categories -the anonymous editor notes- and by nature there is also the city. Nevertheless, the famous definition of man, who by nature is a social animal, does not appear among the selections (perhaps because it is already well known, and therefore not necessary in such a succinct selection?).²⁴ It should be noted that in the previous section of the ὅποι, taken from *Nicomachean Ethics*, the editor did not quote the analogous definition of 1.7 1097b11 either. On the other hand, with the frequent insistence on nature, he captures a fundamental element of Aristotle's political conception, decisive as well in the history of Aristotelianism among the monothe-

21 Schütrumpf 1991, 120-128; Besso and Curnis 2011, 59-61.

22 Perhaps because this short chapter focuses on the program of the entire book 1? “Pol. I ist nach dem Programm des ersten Kapitels keine Ökonomik, sondern eine, durch fremde theoretische Ansichten motivierte, Untersuchung über den Unterschied zwischen den verschiedenen Gemeinschaften und den Personen, die diese regieren” (Schütrumpf 1991, 125). It has already been observed that the anonymous editor does not care for either premises or methodological conclusions: the ὅποι have as an object conceptual terms, natural, or metaphysical entities.

23 Miller 2000, 321: “Aristotle's *Politics* is distinguished by the place of honour it accords to the concept of nature. At the outset, the political relations of ruling and being ruled are among the things that develop naturally (cf. *Pol.* 1.2 1252a24-6). In addition, the polis or city-state exists by nature and a human being is by nature a political animal (e.g. 1253a2-3)”; cf. Reeve 2009.

24 Schütrumpf 1991, 207-210; Vegetti 2016.

istic religions of the Hellenistic, Late-Ancient and Medieval ages.²⁵ If the reconstructive hypothesis on the correction of Aristotelian political philosophy by the Stoic school (which during the Hellenistic age would have transformed the conception focused on the city with the other, of the human being citizen of the world) is reliable,²⁶ then the supposition that the culture of the anonymous editor had Stoic implications can be excluded. Even more generally, it seems possible to exclude the premise that the series of political ὅροι comes from a “school” reworking, with ambitions of critical synthesis through an articulated argumentative proceeding.²⁷

In the block affecting the texts [6-9], the editor cites another of the fundamental characteristics of Aristotle’s political society, namely its self-sufficiency, but without recalling by contrast the lack of self-sufficiency that characterizes minor forms of the same society (family and village). The objective of “living well,” which only the πόλις society can guarantee, remains outside the selection, too. Since it was a brief specification, which could have completed the text [6] with the full mention of lines 1252b27-30, it can be presumed that the editor deliberately omitted this argument, as it was considered of little importance or misleading. We do not know what age the collection of ὅροι of *Politics* 1 dates back to, but it hardly could be considered as a compilation prior to the 12th-13th centuries, that is the golden epoch of Byzantine gnomological literature. The chronology of the writing can be brought back to the context of Christian culture, in which the concept of “good” is not to be separated from religious doctrine, even before being linked to the common ethical norm. The cultural context would thus reflect upon the direction of research and its objects: the importance of the *Politics* lies not in the purpose of existence according to Aristotle, but in the teachings on virtue and vice.

Besides the philosophical quality of the selected passages, in relation both to *Politics* 1 and other Aristotelian works on practical philosophy,²⁸ another negative observation can be useful for the reconstruction of the method of the anonymous editor: in the definition of political society is

25 “Ce caractère naturel de la cité est le premier des éléments de l’idée aristotélicienne de société politique” (Berti 2009, 108).

26 Annas 1995; see Rowe’s doubts and reflections in Rowe 2000, 391.

27 Very different, regarding the outline of the structure and treatment of the original text, is the summary reworking of Arius Didymus that Ioannes Stobaeus gathers in the *Anthologion* in 2.7, 26 (II, 148-149 Wachsmuth).

28 In the five manuscripts examined, the ὅροι from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and those from the *Politics* are interspersed with two very short definitions drawn from the *Rhetoric*: 1.11 1369b34-35 and 2.2 1378b18-20.

lacking the holistic concept of the city as an organic and coherent whole, which Aristotle presents in the book 7 (7.8 1328a21-42).²⁹ On the contrary -and this second observation is instead of a positive nature- the editor transcribes the definitions of the book following the order of the original text, without ever altering it (except in an obvious case, as already observed for the text [3]). The two joint observations lead one to believe that the anonymous editor did not know the full text of the *Politics* when he was engaged in drafting the ὅποι, but that he was studying it for the first time, reporting from his model the definitions he considered most significant and the contents he judged inalienable in the teachings of Aristotle.³⁰ This work was interrupted within the first book, but not in a predictable way; one can in fact hypothesize that the interruption was due to the reference to the page of *Nicomachean Ethics* on the components of the soul, because the editor remembered the definition of virtue. This also means that the anonymous reader of the *Politics*, at the mention of virtue, recalled what he had previously studied in another Aristotelian treatise. Disposition and dissimilarity in the different sections of the ὅποι thus indicate the order in which the reader was studying Aristotle's practical philosophy: *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Rhetoric*, *Politics*. It is not known, however, why this systematic study was interrupted at the end of the first book of the last title. Undoubtedly, considering the original collocation of the text [23], one can say that the study of economics, slavery and crematistics have not interested the scholar at all, since his selection barely contains any definition concerning these topics. The main object of the research, as the overall title of the ὅποι clearly indicates, is the dialectic between virtue and vice, between good and evil in terms of ethics. In this regard, *Politics* 1 offers a matter of primary importance, since the term ἀρετή assumes a performance meaning in the relationship between "virtue" and "function" of family members. On the basis of this meaning and its consequences, Aristotle establishes who possesses ethical, economical, and political virtue, explaining the hierarchization between man, woman, child and slave.³¹ And it is precisely for this reason that the anonymous editor coherently connected the block of texts [15-18]

29 This is a fundamental passage of the entire Aristotelian "research program," which includes the same "natural" character of political society: cf. Hentschke 1971, 388-412.

30 According to a need to catalog and summarize the main data that also characterizes modern readers and contemporary scholars: cf. for example the chapter *A Pedestrian Synopsis of Aristotle's Best Polis in Pol 7-8*, in Hansen 2013, 63-70.

31 Gastaldi 2017, 128: "Si manifesta qui il rapporto tra virtù e funzione, e pertanto si pone in primo piano un criterio di differenziazione, che distingue nettamente chi

with the text [20], reaching the completion of his research in correspondence with the final page of book 1.³² If the summary had continued, the editor would have noticed the problematic fruitfulness of this theme in the pages of book 3, in which Aristotle analyzes the specific virtues of the citizen, differentiating *virtuous man* and *virtuous citizen*, i.e. identifying specific political virtues (no longer individual but collective).³³

IV. Between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics

If we consider the first book of the *Politics* as autonomous and unrelated to the others,³⁴ the anthropological study it contains can be summarized in a clear way: man, as a man, is fully realized only within the city and its relations (so he is ζῷον πολιτικόν as “destined to live within the *polis*”). This conclusion -coinciding with the declaration of “the primacy of the city”³⁵- does not appear evident from the selection of the ὅροι in the examined manuscripts.³⁶ Moreover, it is also possible that the selection is incomplete

comanda - il capofamiglia - da chi è comandato. [...] Queste differenze dipendono dalla configurazione antropologica dei soggetti. È proprio l'imperfezione psichica di donne, figli e schiavi a far risaltare la compiutezza etica dell'*oikonomikos*, che lo rende capace di amministrare nel modo migliore la sua famiglia.” Cf. also Mayhew 2009 on the relationship between rulers and governed.

32 In this perspective of reading, the text [19] constitutes a useful definition, but which is inconsistent with respect to the relationship between nature, function and virtue that the other definitions illustrate.

33 Cf. Lisi 2001 and 2007.

34 Regarding the problems of order of composition and relationships between the various books, see Schütrumpf 1980, 264-286; Schütrumpf 1991, 37-67.

35 *The Primacy of the City* is the title of a chapter in Simpson 1998, 14-16.

36 The reader might also ask himself whether the anonymous editor was aware of the Aristotelian analytical method applied to the *Politics*, so that “Dividing a whole into its parts may be a necessary step to understanding the whole but getting to the parts cannot be enough” (Simpson 1998, 17). The same doubt could also be of interest for another manuscript text, of uncertain date (between the end of the 16th and the late 17th century), in which another anonymous scholar transcribed numerous entries of *Politics* 1, accompanying them with exegetical and philological reflections: it is the unpublished codex Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Q 109 sup., ff. 8r-11r (Martini and Bassi 1906, 722). These annotations concern only the first four chapters of the book and cannot in any way be considered as *excerpta* from the *Politics*, because the text presents the structure of a lemmatic commentary. The same manuscript also contains, but by a different hand, perhaps even more recent than the previous one, a series of ὅροι taken from *Magna moralia* and *quaestiones* from the Περί τῆς φιλίας (ff. 16r-v).

and that the initial project has been interrupted for some concrete reason. But perhaps the starting caption and the final digression offer the key to solving the problem: the title specifies that the definitions offered will concern virtues and vices, that is, a specifically ethical (rather than political) sphere. And the digression of the text [24] betrays the true interest of the anonymous editor: virtue. At the end of the first book, the same editor probably realized (wrongly) that the treatise of Aristotle offered him no other material useful for his research; he took the pretext of the term ἀρετή at the conclusion of the text [23] to return to a well-known page of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle actually talks about virtues and vices in relation to the praise or blame that man receives from actions connected to them. On a philological level, the digression of the text [24] constitutes an important document relating to the culture of the anonymous editor; moreover, it can be compared not only with the original text of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but also with a successful anonymous paraphrase of the treatise (circulating in numerous copies from the second half of the 14th century and with various attributions: Heliodorus of Prusa, Andronicus of Rhodes, Olympiodorus, the Emperor John VI Cantacuzene).³⁷ An isolated testimony of this paraphrase, coinciding perfectly with the contents of the text [24], can also be read at the end of the codex Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, mss. 4808.

Anonymi paraphrasis in *Ethicam Nicomacheam*³⁸

Madrid, BNE mss. 4808, f. 196v³⁹

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, σκεπτέον τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή· τρία γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, καὶ πάθη μὲν εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμία ὀργὴ φόβος θράσος φθόνος χαρὰ φιλία μῖσος πόθος ζῆλος ἔλεος, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη. δυνάμεις δὲ αἱ πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς ἐσμεν

Τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ ἃ αἱ ἀρεταί, ταῦτα πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἕξεις· πάθη ὀργῇ, φόβος, μῖσος, ἔλεος, πόθος, ζῆλος, τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷς εἰώθε παρακολουθεῖν λύπη καὶ ἡδονή. δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ἐσμέν ὀργισθῆναι. ἕξεις εἰσὶ καθ' ἃς πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχομεν εὐ καὶ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ

37 "The author of this Paraphrase remains unknown, as he was evidently unknown to the ex-Emperor John Cantacuzene who, in 1366, paid a scribe to copy the work under the modest title of: Ἀνωνύμου παράφρασις" (Nicol 1968, 16). The manuscript with the "modest title" Nicol refers to is the Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo Laurenziana, Plut. LXXX 3.

38 Heylbut 1889, 32-33 (ll. 36-7, 11-13).

39 Bravo García 1978, 81-82 is the first editor of this text, which previously had not been correctly identified. Unlike the political *horoi* of the five examined manuscripts, the note in the Matritensis 4808 lacks initials and detailed punctuation because it is simply an impromptu memo, without any stringent relationship with the textual contents that precede it (Lucian's writings, but nothing of Aristotle: see Andrés 1987, 420-421).

Anonymi paraphrasis in <i>Ethicam Nicomacheam</i>	Madrid, BNE mss. 4808, f. 196v
δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι. ἔξεις δὲ οἱ τρόποι, καθ' οὓς πάσχομεν τὰ πάθη, δηλονότι τὸ πάσχειν αὐτὰ καλῶς ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς καὶ ἀσχετῶς ἔχομεν ἢ τοῦναντίον ἀνεμμένως καὶ μαλακῶς, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, καλῶς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. [...] ἔτι, κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτε ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα.	ὀργισθῆναι εἰ μὲν λίαν ὀργίλως κακῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ὀργήν, εἰ δ' ὅλως μὴ ὀργιζόμεθα ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὕτω κακῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ὀργήν, τὸ ἄρα μέσως ἔχον τὸ μῆτε λίαν ὑπεραλγεῖν μῆτε ἀναλγήτως ἔχειν.

The text of the Madrid manuscript is very useful for the study of the diffusion of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the Aristotelian ὅροι; whoever transcribed it seems to have been inspired by a model closer to the text [24] than to the original version of the treatise or the anonymous paraphrase; said in another way, the source of the Madrid *notula*⁴⁰ is to be found in a section of ὅροι dedicated to passions according to Aristotle, but not entirely coinciding with those on vices and virtues that the examined manuscripts report at the bottom of the political selection.

Finally, it appears evident that the anonymous editor of the ὅροι was looking for ethical definitions inside the *Politics*; anthropology, economics, and political science interest him, but only in relation to the distinction between virtues and vices. For this reason, his ὅροι about politics are markedly poor in political terminology and arguments related to πολιτεία. From the philological investigation point of view, collections of ὅροι taken from a single work do not help the *constitutio textus*, since in most cases the sampling is subject to syntactic and lexical changes, due to the need to summarize and provide a clear and easily remembered definition (although this result is not always achieved in the ὅροι taken from the *Politics*, as we have observed). Consequently, it is not possible to relate the *horoi* drawn from the first book with any part of the manuscript tradition of the *Politics* in full text. The analysis of this summary can however be concluded with an important datum, namely the relationship with the tradition of *De virtute*, the pseudo-Aristotelian text closest to it, both in the thematic choices and in the structural definition sequence. The material datum of the presence of the ὅροι in some manuscripts that also contain *De virtute*⁴¹ leads us to believe they were elaborated within a cultural environment in

40 Cf. the description in the catalogue: “Notulae de passionibus animae excerptae ex *Ethica Nicomachea*” (Andrés 1987, 421).

41 In addition to the already analyzed **Mut Mon Par Ott**, it is necessary to mention the manuscript Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Phil. gr. 311.

which the apocryphal treatise -certainly older and more complex- was widespread and well known.

V. *An Epitome of Politics 1*

A “summary” aimed at drafting a definition is not the only way to disseminate the textual contents of a philosophical treatise. In the anthological literature the most recurring textual typology -more useful for the philological comparison with the direct tradition- is that of *excerpta*, i.e. textual passages selected for their importance (of content and/or form), usually less subject to interpolation. Indeed, ὅποι are synthetic definitions, while *excerpta* have a floristic purpose in the sense that they must retain the reference to the text *auctoritas*. In the 15th century manuscripts, *excerpta* from the *Politics* are not very frequent, but worthy of mention is one of the most significant examples, taken from a manuscript presenting a sort of encyclopedia of Aristotelian doctrine through anthologies of the whole *corpus*: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 2042. In this manuscript, datable to the second half of the 15th century (probably to the 1470's), the succession of works about practical philosophy proceeds from the *Nicomachean Ethics* to the *Politics*, then offers extracts from the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*.⁴² In order to understand the qualitative difference between a possible “summary” of *Politics 1* (such as the one reconstructable with the ὅποι) and an “anthology” of the same, it will be useful to report the series of corresponding extracts from the Parisian codex. In this case, the numbering faithfully reflects the original paragraphs in the manuscript; after the paragraph number, correspondence with the pages of current editions is found in parentheses; finally, the apparatus gives an account of textual variations with respect to the complete text.

42 Starting from f. 253r the extracts from *EN*; f. 273v *Pol.*; f. 280r *Rhet.*; from f. 283r to f. 284v *Poet.* “Der cod. Par. Gr. 2042 und cod. Vat. Gr. 1002 enthalten die gleichen Excerpte der Politik” (Dreizehnter 1962, 68 n 1). The Vatican codex contains works of Cardinal Bessarion and Georgius Gemistus Pletho: the section of the Aristotelian *excerpta* (ff. 100v-130v) could be more ancient with respect to the other ones. Bessarion is the strong element that unites the two manuscripts (cf. *infra*).

Ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν πολιτικῶν Ἀριστοτέλους

- [1 (1252a1-7)] Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὀρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν, καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες, δηλὸν ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται· μάλιστα δὲ ἡ κοινωνία ἢ πολιτική.
- [2 (1252a7-10)] Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἰοῦνται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι· πληθεὶ γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν ἄλλ'· οὐκ εἶδει τούτων ἕκαστον.
- [3 (1252a31-34)] Τὸ μὲν δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν, ἄρχον φύσει, καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει· τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα πονεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον.
- [4 (1252b9-15)] Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν, δηλονότι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς, δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας, οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα· γυναικὰ τε, βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα. ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν. Χαρουνδὰς ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης ὁμοκάπους.
- [5 (1252b15-17)] Ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκῶν κοινωνία πρώτη, χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου, κόμῃ· μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ κόμῃ, ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι.
- [6 (1252b19-26)] Τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη. ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνήλθον, πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία, βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου· [*vacuum*] αὐτοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι. ὅτι καὶ αὐτοί, οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο.
- [7 (1253a2-3, 18-20)] Τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον· καὶ δηλὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγον ἔχειν· πρότερον τῇ φύσει πόλις, ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστὶ. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους.
- [8 (1253a31-37)] Ὡςπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζῶων ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης χεῖριστον πάντων· χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὅπλα· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τάναντία ἐστὶ χρῆσθαι. διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐδωδὴν χεῖριστον.
- [9 (1254b2-9)] Ὅτινι ὥςπερ λέγομεν πρῶτον ἐν ζῳῷ θεωρῆσαι καὶ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικήν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἐστι ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.
- [10 (1255b16-17, 18-20, 31-33)] Οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική· ἡ μὲν ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἢ δὲ δούλων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία· μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. ὁ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι δούλοις.
- [11 (1256a4, 11-14)] Ἡ χρηματιστικὴ οὐχ ἡ αὕτῃ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι· πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὴ ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν.

- [12 (1256a21-25)] Ὡστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζώων. τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ σποραδικὰ ἐστὶ, ὁποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφήν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ζωοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι.
- [13 (1256b1-2)] Οἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίοι, οὗτοι εἰσὶ νομαδικός, γεωργικός, ληστικός, ἀλιευτικός, θηρευτικός.
- [14 (1256b16-22)] Τὰ φυτὰ τῶν ζώων ἔνεκεν οἰητέον εἶναι· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν. Τῶν δ' ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοθηείας ἔνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μὴθὲν μῆτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μῆτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.
- [15 (1258b35-39)] Εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βανυστόταται ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα· δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσταί χρησεις· ἀγενέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. Χάρης Πάριος καὶ Ἀπολλόδορος Λήμνιος ἔγραψαν περὶ γεωργίας. Ὁ Θαλῆς, ὀνειδίζοντα αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὐσης, κατανόησε ἐκ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλαιῶν φορὰν ἐσομένην. ἔτι χειμῶνος ὄντος, ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας τῶν ἐλαιουργίων τῶν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ ἐν Χίῳ πάντων, τοῦ καιροῦ ἤκοντος, πολλὰ χρήματα σύνλεξεν.
- [16 (1259a37-1259b1)] Τρία εἶδη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς· ἐν μὲν δεσποτική, ἐν δὲ πατρική, τρίτη δὲ γαμική· ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ γυναικὸς τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς.
- [17 (1260a17-20)] Διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς.

[1] post μάλιστα δὲ om. καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἢ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις καὶ [4] post κοινωνιῶν add. δηλονότι ... δούλου | post πῆνεσιν ἐστὶν cf. *Pol.* codd. ἢ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἴκος ἐστὶν, οὗς Χαρόνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρήσις ὁμοκάπους [6] διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον *Pol.* codd. | post πρεσβυτάτου vacuum (om. 1252b21-24 ὥστε ... ᾤκουν) | αὐτοὺς θεοὺς | καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς *Pol.* codd. [7] καὶ ἔδλον ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγον ἔχειν excerptoris glossa ex 1253a9-18 | πρότερον δὴ *Pol.* codd. [8] χρηθῆται μάλιστα *Pol.* codd. [9] ἐστὶ δ' οὖν ὥσπερ λέγομεν *Pol.* codd. (ἔτερον δ' οὖν ὥσπερ H) | φανερόν ἐστιν *Pol.* codd. [10] post pr. πολιτική om. 1255b17-18 οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ... τινὲς φασιν | δούλων ἐστὶν *Pol.* codd. | post ἴσων ἀρχή om. 1255b20-31 ὁ μὲν οὖν ... χρηστική δούλων | ὁ γὰρ δεσποτῆς *Pol.* codd. | τοὺς δούλους *Pol.* codd. [11] μὲν γὰρ τὸ *Pol.* codd. | post χρῆσασθαι om. 1256a12-13 τίς γὰρ ... οἰκονομικήν; [12] ἐστὶν *Pol.* codd. [13] Οἱ ... εἰσὶ excerptoris reductio ex 1256a40-1256b1 [14] γενομένοις οἰητέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζώων ἔνεκεν εἶναι *Pol.* codd. [15] τῆς τύχης τῆς om. *Pol.* codd. fere omnes | δ' ἐν αἷς *Pol.* codd. | ἀγενέσταται *Pol.* codd. fere omnes | Χάρης ... σύνλεξεν excerptoris paraphrasis ex 1258b 39-1259a 18 [16] ἔπει δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς *Pol.* codd. fere omnes | τρίτον *Pol.* codd. | γυναικὸς ἄρχειν *Pol.* codd.

Compared to the previous ὅροι, the epitome of Par. gr. 2042 presents a selection of passages which are a little more balanced and better distributed, although the similarity of interests and the coincidence of many passages is undeniable. Each one of the main contents of the book is represented by at

least one passage, but the modality of transcription is quite different with respect to the synthetic *horoi*. The epitomator, in addition to selecting textual portions from all the books of the *Politics* and subdividing them book by book while maintaining the original order, does not exclude arguments, poetic quotations and literary allusions, and only on very few occasions assuming the burden of synthesizing or paraphrasing the original text (like in [7, 13, 15]). Moreover, the epitome preserves some passages that constitute important definitions of Aristotelian philosophy, which were absent in the *ōpoi*, such as the definition of man as a political animal [7] or nature that does not leave anything unfinished or do anything in vain [14]. It is not possible to establish a relationship between the *ōpoi* and this epitome in terms of textual dependence: apart from some coincidence in the transcription, the second cannot derive from the first. But this becomes important evidence of the multiplicity of political readings in the 15th century, dependent on the selection of an editor or an anthologist. The case of Par. gr. 2042 is paradigmatic, since it is a manuscript of great proportions, entirely dedicated to presenting an anthology of the *Corpus aristotelicum*; moreover, the copyist of the *Politics* section, once known as Anonymus δ-καί, was in recent years identified with Alexius Celadenus, of Spartan origins, born around 1450, who from the beginning of the 1470's was an intrinsic part of the Roman house of the Cardinal Bessarion, the owner of the codex.⁴³

The series of *excerpta* reported was considered as the core of *Politics* 1 in terms of textual citations. The most evident analogy with the *ōpoi* is the part of the book affected by the epitome; as in the case of the definitions, it is the first half that occupies almost all the extracts (the texts [1-14] concerning the part from the beginning up to 1256b22, while only the texts [15-17] report passages from the second half). It is a further confirmation that Aristotelian economics and crematistics were perceived as a “difficult”⁴⁴ subject, if not on a conceptual level, certainly in the context of textual selection. It was arduous to isolate short passages capable of effectively summarizing these arguments. A different discourse, on the other hand, concerns the social relations and specific virtues of the various social categories, since Par. gr. 2042 reports extracts from the subsequent books of

43 Speranzi 2009 and 2011.

44 The exegetical problems concerning the economic teachings of Aristotle, above all in relation to justice, continue to be a subject of current critical debate: cf. Lisi 2017.

the treatise, and can retrieve the clarifications that Aristotle inserts in this regard in book 3.

Continuation of the investigation and the publication of the entire epitome, also in comparison with other sources, will likewise allow the establishment of which side of the direct tradition the texts come from. From the extracts of book 1, however, it is already possible to isolate some observations: if in the text [12] the *lectio* is τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων (corresponding to 1256a23), this means that the *excerpta* of Par. gr. 2042 do not derive from the **MS** group (two main manuscripts of the first family), in which τε is omitted, nor from the **ACD** group (important manuscripts of the second family),⁴⁵ in which γὰρ is omitted. In the text [15] the lesson ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης (instead of ἐλάχιστον τύχης, corresponding to 1258b36) is found only in some manuscripts dating back to the late 15th century,⁴⁶ as well as in the exemplar of Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, gr. Z. 200 (**Ven**₂₀₀), which belonged to Cardinal Bessarion and was written in Rome by Ioannes Rhosos in 1457.⁴⁷ It is therefore not surprising that, in the same text [15], the lesson ἀγενέσταται (instead of ἀγεννέσταται of 1258b38-39) is also found in **Ven**₂₀₀. Finally, it is possible to hypothesize that the source of the *excerpta* of Par. gr. 2042, at least limited to the *Politics*, is to be identified in the **Ven**₂₀₀ or in other exemplars very close to it, certainly in the Bessari- on context of the Roman period.

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45 On the families of the manuscript tradition, see Dreizehnter 1962, 13-25; Curnis 2011, 23-34.

46 Besso and Curnis 2011, 178.

47 Dreizehnter 1970, xxxv, xxxviii.

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


Fig. 1: Modena, Biblioteca Estense Universitaria, Mut. gr. 144 (α.Τ.8.12),f. 161r.

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


Fig. 2: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Mon. gr. 495, f. 59r.

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


Fig. 3: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 963, ff. 296v-297r.

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


Fig. 4: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 2042, ff. 273v.

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Der Feldzug des Xerxes 480/479 und die Sizilische Expedition der Athener 415-413 v. Chr.:

Persischer und athenischer „Imperialismus“ bei Herodot und Thukydides.

Klaus Meister

In seiner grundlegenden Untersuchung „Die Wesensbestimmung der Geschichte durch die antike Geschichtsschreibung“ betonte Hermann Strasburger im Jahr 1966, also vor gut 50 Jahren, zur inhaltlichen Abhängigkeit des Thukydides von Herodot: „Ja, wer alle Berührungsstellen beider Werke vorurteilsfrei durchgeht, muß zweifeln, ob Thukydides das des großen Vorgängers mehr als nur oberflächlich zur Kenntnis genommen hat“ (S. 63). In diametralem Gegensatz hierzu urteilt A. Rengakos 2011 im „Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike“ (Bd. 1, S. 399):

„Darüber hinaus hat die Forschung der letzten Jahre eine große Zahl intertextueller, thematischer und struktureller Beziehungen zwischen den herodoteischen Historien und Thukydides' Werk wahrscheinlich gemacht.“

Tatsächlich existiert zu diesem Thema seit ca. 25 Jahren eine große Fülle von Veröffentlichungen, die unten S. 188 f. verzeichnet sind.

Eine der auffälligsten Abhängigkeiten des Thukydides von Herodot betrifft das Problem des athenischen bzw. persischen Imperialismus, wie er sich in der athenischen Politik gegenüber Sizilien bzw. im Feldzug des Xerxes gegen Griechenland manifestiert.

Diesem Thema hat K. Raaflaub im Jahr 2002 einen sehr wichtigen Aufsatz mit dem Titel: „Herodot und Thukydides: Persischer Imperialismus im Lichte der athenischen Sizilienpolitik“ gewidmet.¹ Raaflaub analysiert vergleichend die athenische Debatte, die dem Eingreifen in Sizilien 415 vorausging (Thuk. 6.8-26) und die sog. Kronratsdebatte der Perser vor dem Feldzug des Xerxes 480 v. Chr. (Hdt. 7.8-18). Er konstatiert im ersten Teil eine Reihe von inhaltlichen Parallelen und Gemeinsamkeiten, die auf eine Benützung des Herodot durch Thukydides schließen lassen. Im zweiten Teil erblickt er die Herkunft *beider* Debatten in der athenischen Sizilien-

1 Raaflaub 2002.

politik. Die folgenden Ausführungen weisen eine ähnliche Struktur auf und gliedern sich ebenfalls in zwei Teile:

Im ersten Teil Ich lege ich den Katalog der Übereinstimmungen zugrunde, freilich im Gegensatz zu Raaflaub mit zahlreichen Modifikationen, Erweiterungen und neuen Vorschlägen. Auf diese Weise konstatiere ich ca. 20 Konkordanzen, also die doppelte Anzahl im Vergleich zu Raaflaub. Im zweiten Teil erörtere ich ebenfalls die Herkunft beider Debatten, komme dabei allerdings zu einem völlig anderen Ergebnis als der verehrte Kollege.

Erster Teil: Intertextuelle, thematische und strukturelle Beziehungen zwischen Thukydides und Herodot.

Vielleicht sind nicht alle im Folgenden aufgezählte Konkordanzen gleichermaßen überzeugend, vielmehr einige von ihnen der analogen historischen Situation geschuldet, dennoch erweisen sich zahlreiche intertextuelle Beziehungen als evident.

1. Tiefere Ursachen der Feldzüge.

Beide Autoren informieren über die tiefere Ursachen der Feldzüge. Die Athener erstrebten die Eroberung von Sizilien (Thuk. 6.1), die Perser die Eroberung Griechenlands (Hdt. 7.5 ff.).

2. Äußere Anlässe.

Was die äußeren Anlässe angeht, so ist es bei der athenischen Expedition nach Sizilien der Hilferuf der Egestaier und der Leontiner (Thuk. 6.1-2), im Falle des Perserkrieges der Wunsch des Dareios nach Rache für die persische Niederlage von Marathon (Hdt.7.1).

3. Falsche Versprechen der Hilfesuchenden.

Die angeblichen Reichtümer der Egestaier sind in Wirklichkeit nur vorge spielt (Thuk. 6.6.2-3, 8.1-2); von der angekündigten Unterstützung der Perser durch die Peisistratiden (Hdt. 7.6.2) verlautet später nichts mehr.

4. Mangelnde Kenntnis der zu erobernden Gebiete.

In beiden Fällen war der Souverän, bei den Athenern der Demos, bei den Persern Xerxes bzw. der persische Kronrat, mit Land und Leuten, die sie zu erobern planen, ganz und gar unvertraut: Bei Thukydides wird diese Unkenntnis gleich zu Beginn des Berichtes hervorgehoben (6.1.1), bei Herodot kommt sie sowohl im Gespräch zwischen Xerxes und Demaratos (7.101-105) als auch in der Kronratsdebatte mehrfach zum Ausdruck (7.8ff.).

5. Falsche bzw. manipulierte Prophezeiungen.

Beide Male spielen manipulierte und irreführende Prophezeiungen für die Durchführung der Expeditionen eine nicht unwesentliche Rolle (Thuk. 8.1.1 bzw. Hdt. 7.6.3-4).

6. Zeitpunkt der Debatte.

In beiden Fällen fand die Debatte darüber, ob man die Feldzüge unternehmen sollte, erst dann statt, als die grundsätzliche Entscheidung zu deren Durchführung bereits gefallen war (Thuk. 6.8-25 bzw. Hdt. 7.8-19).

7. Stimmen der Warner.

Beide Male spielt die Person des Warners eine wichtige Rolle. Es handelt sich jeweils um einen älteren, erfahrenen Staatsmann, dessen Ratschläge sich bereits in der Vergangenheit bewährt hatten. Bei Thukydides ist es Nikias,² bei Herodot Artabanos.³ Nikias beansprucht für sich, niemals aus persönlichem Ehrgeiz oder wider besseres Wissen geredet oder gehandelt zu haben (Thuk. 6.9.2). Ferner war es für ihn angesichts der großen Begeisterung der Massen nicht ungefährlich, von dem Sizilienfeldzug abzuraten. Artabanos sprach sich bereits gegen den Skythenfeldzug des Dareios aus (Hdt. 7.10a2) und riskiert jetzt mit seinem Widerspruch den Zorn des Königs sowie den Verlust seiner Ehre (Hdt. 7.11.1, 16a2).

2 Dazu Marinatos 1980.

3 Vgl. Pelling 1991.

8. Scharfe Angriffe gegen die Befürworter.

Weiterhin scheuen sich weder Nikias noch Artabanos, ihre Gegner persönlich scharf zu attackieren (Thuk. 6.12.2-13. Hdt. VII 10ε-η): Beide betonen deren maßlosen Ehrgeiz und Egoismus (Thuk. 6.12.2 bzw. Hdt. 7.10η), werfen ihnen vor, die militärische Stärke der Gegner zu verniedlichen, fordern sie dazu auf, sich genauer über deren Stärke zu informieren (Thuk. 6.20-22 bzw. Hdt. 7.10δ) und warnen sie davor, alles dem Zufall zu überlassen (Thuk. 6.23.3 bzw. Hdt. 7.10δ).

9. Stimmen der Befürworter.

Thukydides und Herodot heben übereinstimmend die relative Jugend der Hauptbefürworter hervor, nämlich des Alkibiades bzw. des Mardonios (Thuk. 6.12.2, 17.1, 18.6. Hdt. 7.12.2. 18,2): Beide Männer werden als Abenteurer vorgestellt, die ständig auf Neues aus sind und sich von diesen Unternehmungen großen persönlichen Gewinn versprechen: *„Vor allem begehrte er das Kommando und hoffte, dadurch Sizilien und Karthago zu erobern, und für sich selbst, wenn er Erfolg habe, Geld und Ruhm zu gewinnen“*, sagt Thukydides (6.15.2) über Alkibiades, während Mardonios nach Herodot (7.16.1) *„selbst gerne Satrap von Griechenland werden wollte.“*

10. Weiterreichende Eroberungsziele der Befürworter.

Beide Historiker schreiben Alkibiades bzw. Mardonios nicht nur die Eroberung von Sizilien bzw. Griechenland zu, sondern weitergehende Ziele: Alkibiades plant die Eroberung Karthagos und des gesamten Mittelmeerraumes (Thuk. 6.15.2), Xerxes träumt von einem Perserreich, *„das alle Völker zu einem einzigen Land vereint und den Himmel zur Grenze des Perserreiches macht“* (Hdt. 7.8γ1-3).

11. Minimierung der Gefahren und Risiken.

In beiden Debatten kommen die Uneinigkeit, die zahlenmäßige Unterlegenheit, die schlechte Ausrüstung und die unwirksame Kampfweise der Feinde zur Sprache; auf diese Weise werden die Gefahren des geplanten Unternehmens heruntergespielt, während die Opposition in realistischer

Einschätzung der Lage davor warnt, die Feinde zu unterschätzen (Thuk. 6.17.2-5, 20.2-21.2 bzw. Hdt. 7.9α1-2, 10 α3-β2, 10η1).

12. Große Begeisterung auf beiden Seiten für die Feldzüge.

Hier existieren bei beiden Historikern wörtliche Übereinstimmungen: Thukydides bemerkt, „daß die Athener darauf drangen, gegen die Insel zu Felde zu ziehen“ (6.6.1: στρατεύειν ὥρμηντο); nach einer Rede des Alkibiades „drangen die Athener noch viel mehr als vorher darauf, zu Felde zu ziehen“ (6.19.2: πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ὥρμηντο στρατεύειν), und nach einer Erwiderung des Nikias „drangen sie noch mehr darauf“ (6.24.2: πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο). Herodot berichtet, daß Dareios nach der persischen Niederlage bei Marathon und nach einer Revolte in Ägypten „noch mehr darauf drang, zu Felde zu ziehen“ (7.1.3: καὶ μᾶλλον ὄρμητο στρατεύεσθαι).

13. Wirtschaftliche Motive.

In beiden Fällen wird die Entscheidung für den Feldzug nicht nur durch politische, sondern auch durch wirtschaftliche Motive beeinflusst. Nach Thukydides (6.24.3) war das athenische Kriegsvolk von der Aussicht begeistert, „schon durch dieses Unternehmen Geld zu verdienen und eine Macht dazuzuzerobern, aus der ihnen für alle Zeit ein täglicher Sold gewiß sei.“ Mar-donios und Xerxes machen den Feldzug ihren Soldaten dadurch schmackhafter, daß sie Hellas und Europa als „schönes, reiches und fruchtbares Land“ bezeichnen (Hdt. 7.5.3, 8α2).

14. Militärischen Vorbereitungen.

Bei Thukydides (6.31.3) heißt es:

„Und jeder der Trierarchen war äußerst bereitwilligst darauf bedacht (ἐς τὰ μακρότατα προθυμηθέντος), daß sein Schiff an prächtiger Ausstattung und Schnelligkeit alle überträfe.“ Xerxes forderte nach Herodot (7.8.δ1) seine Generäle dazu auf, „sich zur näher bezeichneten Zeit bereitwillig (προθύμως) einzufinden.“

Ferner meint Herodot (7.19.2): Als Xerxes für die am besten ausgestatteten Perser einen Preis aussetzte, „bewies jedermann jegliche Bereitwilligkeit, den

Befehlen nachzukommen“ (πᾶς ἀνὴρ εἶχε προθυμίην πᾶσαν ἐπὶ τοῖσι εἰρημένοις). Ferner ähneln sich die Angaben der beiden Historiker (Thuk. 6.31.3 bzw. Hdt. a.a.O.) über die Aufstellung des Heeres am Piräus bzw. am Hellespont in der pathetischen Hervorhebung der großartigen Rüstungen.

15. Trankopfer und Gebete zu Beginn der Feldzüge.

Darüber berichtet Thukydides (6.32.2):

„Als dann die Schiffe bemannt waren und alles endlich verladen war, womit sie in See stechen wollten, wurde mit einem Trompetensignal Schweigen geboten, dann verrichteten sie die vor dem Auslaufen üblichen Gebete, nicht auf jedem Schiffe getrennt, sondern alle zusammen nach den Worten eines Herolds, mischten in Krügen den Wein das ganze Heer entlang, und aus goldenen und silbernen Schalen brachten Schiffssoldaten und Trierarchen Trankopfer dar. Die Gebete sprach auch die übrige Volksmenge vom Lande aus mit, Bürger und wer noch sonst ihnen wohlgesinnt dabei war. Dann stimmten sie den Schlachtgesang an, beendeten die Opfer und stachen schließlich in See.“ (Thukydidesübersetzungen nach G.P. Landmann)

Ähnlich lautet der Bericht Herodots (7.54):

„Diesen Tag verbrachten die Perser mit Vorbereitungen für die Überfahrt. Am folgenden erwarteten sie den Sonnenaufgang, verbrannten allerlei Räucherwerk auf den Brücken und bestreuten den Weg mit Myrten. Als die Sonne emporstieg, spendete Xerxes aus einer goldenen Schale ins Meer und betete zur Sonne: Es möge ihm kein Unglück zustoßen, welches ihn an der Eroberung Europas hindere, ehe er an die Grenzen jenes Erdteils gelangt sei. Nach diesem Gebet warf er die Schale in den Hellespont, dazu einen goldenen Mischkrug und ein persisches Schwert, das sie Akinakes nennen.“ (Herodotübersetzungen nach F. Feix)

Nicht nur die Angaben über die Gebete und Trankopfer finden sich schon bei Herodot, auch der Charakter der beiden Berichte ähnelt einander, wobei gerade die Schaustellung der eigenen Größe und die ἐνάργεια=*Bildhaftigkeit* der Darstellung zu Beginn der Feldzüge einen scharfen Kontrast zu deren katastrophalem Ende bilden.

16. Wettfahrten am Anfang der Feldzüge.

Dazu heißt es bei Thukydides (6.32.2):

„Zunächst noch segelten sie in Kiellinie, dann aber unternahmen sie eine Wettfahrt (ἄμιλλαν) bis Aigina. Danach strebten sie in eiliger Fahrt nach Kerkyra, wo sich das übrige Heer der Bundesgenossen sammelte.“

Herodot (7.44) berichtet ebenfalls über eine Wettfahrt (ἄμιλλα) zu Beginn des Feldzugs:

„Als Xerxes in Abydos eintraf, wollte er sein ganzes Heer mustern. Vorsorglich war für ihn dort ein erhöhter Sitz aus weißem Stein auf einem Hügel errichtet worden; die Abydener hatten ihn nach einem früheren Befehl des Königs errichtet. Hier also nahm er Platz und musterte Fußvolk und Schiffe, indem er auf die Küste schaute. Bei diesem Anblick erfaßte ihn das Verlangen, eine Wettfahrt der Schiffe (τῶν νεῶν ἄμιλλαν) zu erleben. Als diese stattfand und die phoinikischen Sidonier siegten, freute er sich über die Wettfahrt und über sein Heer.“

17. Eine Vorahnung der Niederlage von Persern und Athenern?

Thukydides bemerkt zur Stimmung der Athener vor der Ausfahrt der Flotte (6.31.1):

„In diesem Augenblick, da es nun wirklich bereits ans Abschiednehmen angesichts großer bevorstehender Gefahren ging, kam ihnen das Schreckenerregende ihrer Unternehmung weit mehr zum Bewußtsein, als da sie die Fahrt beschlossen hatten.“

Bei Herodot (7.44) heißt es:

„Der ganze Hellespont war mit Schiffen bedeckt, und die ganze Küste und das Flachland von Abydos war voller Menschen. Xerxes pries sich glücklich, dann weinte er.“

Beide Stellen stehen in scharfem Kontrast zur vorangehenden Euphorie und enthalten vielleicht einen versteckten Hinweis auf die späteren Katastrophen.

18. Argumente für ein präventives Vorgehen.

Bei Thukydides (6.18.2-3) wendet sich Alkibiades prinzipiell gegen eine Stillhaltepolitik und plädiert für ein präventives Vorgehen:

„Gegen den Mächtigen wehrt man sich nämlich nicht nur, wenn er angreift, sondern kommt ihm zuvor, damit er nicht angreift. Wir können es uns nicht einteilen, wie weit wir herrschen wollen, sondern sind gezwungen, da wir nun einmal auf diesem Stand angelangt sind, gegen die einen Anschläge zu sinnen, die anderen nicht hochkommen zu lassen, da uns droht, von anderen beherrscht zu werden, wenn wir nicht selbst über andere herrschen. Und ihr könnt nicht in gleicher Weise wie andere nach Frieden trachten, wenn ihr nicht eure ganze Lebensweise der der anderen anpassen wollt.“ (Übersetzung K. Raaflaub)

Xerxes hatte bei Herodot, der auch hier als Vorbild des Thukydides zu betrachten ist (7.11.21-3), mit dem Hinweis argumentiert, daß Untätigkeit nur das Erreichte gefährde und daß man rechtzeitig neue Eroberungen planen müsse, um eventuellen Angriffen der Feinde zuvorzukommen:

„Denn das weiß ich genau: Wenn wir uns auch ruhig verhalten, jene werden es doch nicht tun, sondern unser Land erst recht angreifen, falls man daraus Schlüsse ziehen kann, was sie bereits getan haben: Sie haben Sardes niedergebrannt und sind gegen Asien gezogen. Zurück kann also keiner mehr von beiden. Hier gilt es zu handeln oder zu leiden, damit entweder dies alles unter die Herrschaft der Griechen oder jenes unter die der Perser kommt. Ein Mittelding gibt es bei dieser Feindschaft nicht.“

Die Analogie der beiden Partien ist evident.

19. Kommentar des Thukydides zur sizilischen Katastrophe eine Parallele zu Herodots Darstellung des Falls von Troia?

Thukydides (7.87.5-7) bewertet die sizilische Katastrophe zusammenfassend wie folgt:

„Man kann wohl sagen, daß dieses Ereignis von allen in diesem Kriege das bedeutendste war, meines Erachtens sogar von allen, die wir aus der Überlieferung kennen, für die Sieger der größte Ruhm, für die Untergegangenen das größte Unglück: Auf der ganzen Linie besiegt und unter Leiden, von denen keines etwa klein war, hatten sie in völliger Vernichtung, wie man so sagt (πανωλεθρία δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον), Fußvolk und Schiffe und

überhaupt alles verloren, und nur wenige von so vielen kehrten nach Hause zurück.

Das Wort πανωλεθρία findet sich in der klassischen Prosa sonst lediglich bei Herodot (2.120.5), und zwar im Zusammenhang mit dem Untergang Troias. Dort heißt es:

„Die Gottheit wirkte darauf hin, daß die Trojaner in ihrer völligen Vernichtung (πανωλεθρία) den Menschen deutlich machten, daß auf großes Unrecht große Rache seitens der Gottheit folgt.“

Als erster vertrat H. Strasburger⁴ die These, daß Thukydides nicht nur das Wort πανωλεθρία von Herodot übernommen habe, sondern sich auch dessen Deutung vom Untergangs Troias zu eigen gemacht habe: „Die Versuchung zu behaupten, daß die Herodotstelle das Schlüsselwort zur Auffassung des Thukydides sein solle, ist für mich nicht gering.“ Zahlreiche Forscher sind dieser Ansicht gefolgt, darunter N. Marinatos Korff und H.R. Rawlings⁵ und N. Fisher.⁶ Mit Modifikationen gilt dies auch für W.R. Connor:⁷ „The passage (sc. of Thucydides) seems to me to raise the question of theodicy but to leave it quite open. It is not a statement of Thucydides' theology, but a way to lead an enlightened and sophisticated audience to confront the awesome possibility that there may be a divine dimension to human history.“ Ähnlich betont neuerdings J. Grethlein:⁸ „Im folgenden wird die These verfolgt, daß die theologische Deutung à la Herodot evoziert wird, aber nicht als Modell, sondern als Kontrast für Thukydides' Deutung des Peloponnesischen Krieges dient.“ Auch S. Hornblower⁹ ist der Auffassung, „but awareness und deliberate allusion to Hdt. seems hard to escape“ und wendet sich damit gegen K.J. Dover,¹⁰ dem er eine überkritische Einstellung vorwirft. Dover äußerte nämlich erstmals schwerwiegende Bedenken gegen die oben genannte Interpretation: Zum einen betonte er, daß Thukydides mit dem Zusatz τὸ λεγόμενον auf den allgemeinen, fast sprichwörtlichen Gebrauch von πανωλεθρία hinweist, der somit keineswegs der Verwendung des Wortes bei Herodot geschuldet sein muß, zum anderen bemerkte er zur angeblichen Übernahme der Deutung

4 Strasburger 1958, 39 Anm. 3 (=1968, 529 Anm. 83 =1982, 707 Anm. 83).

5 Marinatos Korff und Rawlings 1978.

6 Fisher 1992, 368.

7 Connor 1984, 208, Anm. 57.

8 Grethlein 2008, 132.

9 Hornblower 2008, 745.

10 Gomme, Andrewes, und Dover 1970, 465.

Herodots durch Thukydides „I suspect that if Thucydides had recalled the Herodotean passage he would have taken some trouble to avoid the appearance of subscribing to its theology.“¹¹ Noch schärfer fällt die Ablehnung von L. Kallet aus: „Certainly at this stage of narrative Thucydides would not have feared that his readers would infer that he was now imputing divine causation to the Athenian disaster in Sicily, which would jar if not subvert not only the entire narrative of the expedition, but his *History* as a whole.“¹² Diese Kritik erscheint mir berechtigt, daher ist die Abhängigkeit des Thukydides in diesem Fall in der Tat zumindest problematisch.

20. Die athenische Niederlage in Sizilien als Gegenstück zum Sieg über Xerxes.

Dazu bemerkt A. Rengakos: „Besonders auffällig ist der mannigfaltige Bezug auf Herodots Werk in den Büchern VI und VII, wodurch die sizilische Katastrophe Athens als Umkehr des athenischen Sieges in den Perserkriegen gestaltet wird.“¹³

Zum Beleg für die Richtigkeit dieser These ist einerseits an das bereits zitierte Nachwort des Thukydides (7.87.5-7) zur sizilischen Katastrophe der Athener zu erinnern, andererseits an den sog. Athenerpassus (Hdt. 7.138-139), in welchem Herodot die Athener als „*Retter Griechenlands*“ bezeichnet (7.139.5).

Zweiter Teil: Herkunft der herodoteischen Debatte

Im Zusammenhang mit dieser Thematik verdient die These K. Raaflaubs in dem oben zitierten Aufsatz nähere Überprüfung.

Raaflaub betont zunächst mit Recht: „In seiner Kronratsdebatte liefert Herodot den Kern einer im Gesamtwerk detailliert nachgewiesenen systematischen Typologie von ‚Imperialismus‘ als eines politischen Phänomens.“¹⁴ Anschließend stellt er die Gemeinsamkeiten der Debatte bei Thukydides und Herodot, wie oben dargelegt, vergleichend zusammen und folgert aus ihnen mit Recht, „daß Thukydides Herodots Debatte im

11 Gomme, Andrewes, und Dover 1970, 465.

12 Kallet 2001, 115.

13 Rengakos 2011b, 409.

14 Raaflaub 2002, 21.

Auge hatte, als er seine Siziliendebatte verfasste.¹⁵ Raaflaub geht jedoch noch einen Schritt weiter, indem er behauptet: „Das Xerxes‘ Äußerungen zugrundeliegende Denkmuster scheint mir in der Tat am besten auf die athenischen Eroberungspläne in Sizilien zu passen.“¹⁶ Mit anderen Worten: Die persische Imperialismusdebatte Herodots reflektiere in Wirklichkeit eine ähnlich lautende Debatte der Athener, die der Intervention in Sizilien nach Thukydides vorausging. Da Herodot jedoch nach Raaflaub selbst bei Herabdatierung des traditionellen Todesdatum 424 um gut zehn Jahre „den Untergang der großen Sizilischen Expedition im Jahr 413 nicht mehr erlebt haben kann“, ergeben sich aus dieser These große chronologische Schwierigkeiten, die Raaflaub durch die Annahme zu beseitigen sucht, daß die athenische Imperialismusdebatte bereits vor der sog. Ersten Sizilischen Expedition der Athener 427-424 v. stattgefunden habe. Zitat: „Die für unsere Analyse der Debatte in Herodots Kronrat maßgebenden Elemente lassen sich somit in den Motiven und Diskussionen der Athener im Zusammenhang der Sizilienexpedition von 427-424 kaum weniger als in denen von 415 nachweisen oder wahrscheinlich machen.“¹⁷

Diese These ist meines Erachtens aus folgenden Gründen abzulehnen:

1. Die Veröffentlichung des herodoteischen Werkes um 414, wie sie erstmals von C.W. Fornara¹⁸ vertreten wurde, ist sehr fraglich, in neuester Zeit lehnt A. Rengakos¹⁹ im Gefolge von J. Cobet²⁰ diesen späten Ansatz ab und kehrt zum traditionellen Datum ca. 430-424 zurück: (Hauptgrund: Aristophanes, Acharner, von 425 v. Chr., Vers. 523 ff. =Persiflage von Herodot I 4). Falls aber der traditionelle Ansatz zutrifft, erweist sich die These Raaflaubs aus chronologischen Gründen als unmöglich.

2. Doch selbst wenn das spätere Datum zutrifft, so spricht folgender Tatbestand eindeutig gegen die These Raaflaubs: Die Expedition von 427-424 hatte im Vergleich nur ‚Großen‘ Expedition von 415-413 die geringe Größenordnung von 20 Schiffen (Thuk. 3.86.1) und verfolgte nach Thukydides (3.86.4) einen durchaus begrenzten Zweck:

„Und tatsächlich entsandten die Athener ihre Schiffe, wobei sie ihre Stammesverwandtschaft (sc. mit dem ionischen Leontinoi, das damals mit dem dorischen Syrakus im Krieg lag) zum Vorwand nahmen; tat-

15 Raaflaub 2002, 23-25.

16 Raaflaub 2002, 28.

17 Raaflaub 2002, 32.

18 Fornara 1971.

19 Rengakos 2011a, 341-42.

20 Cobet 1977.

sächlich aber wollten sie den Getreidetransport von Sizilien zur Peloponnes verhindern und einen Vorversuch unternehmen, ob es ihnen möglich wäre, Sizilien zu unterwerfen“ (πρόπειράν τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατόν εἴη τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ὑποχεῖρια γενέσθαι).

Hier wird also die erste Sizilienexpedition als ein *Vorversuch*, d.h. als eine Art von Sondierung bezeichnet, ob es den Athenern möglich wäre, Sizilien zu unterwerfen. Diese relativ bescheidene Zielsetzung schließt es meiner Ansicht nach aus, daß im Zusammenhang mit diesem Unternehmen eine grundsätzliche Imperialismusdebatte in Athen stattgefunden hat.

3. Raaflaub selbst spricht, wie oben dargelegt, „von einer im Gesamtwerk detailliert nachgewiesenen systematischen Typologie von ‚Imperialismus‘ als eines politischen Phänomens“ und bemerkt zur Imperialismusdebatte bei Herodot: „Die meisten dieser Argumente tauchen hier nicht zum ersten Mal auf; sie ziehen sich im Gegenteil wie ein roter Faden durch das ganze Geschichtswerk Herodots.“²¹ Diese Beobachtung ist richtig, doch sollte man daraus folgern, daß sich die Kronratsdebatte bei Herodot aus mehreren unterschiedlichen Komponenten zusammensetzt, die sich bereits an anderer Stelle in dessen Werk finden.

4. So ist es heute Gemeingut der Forschung, daß die ‚imperialistische Politik‘ des Lyderkönigs Kroisos (1.6-94) sowie der Perserkönige Kyros (1.141-216), Kambyses (2.1-3.60), Dareios (3.61-7.4) und Xerxes (7.5-8.122) die Leitlinie und Grobgliederung der gesamten Darstellung Herodots bildet. Daß die Debatte größtenteils „Herodots eigene Konstruktion ist“, bemerkt Raaflaub daher mit Recht.²²

5. Die Herkunft der Debatte ist entsprechend nicht so zu erklären, wie Raaflaub annimmt, vielmehr etwa folgendermaßen:

Zum einen sind Elemente der athenischen Volksversammlung mit eingeflossen. Dieser Tatbestand ergibt sich aus der Aufforderung des Xerxes: (Hdt. 7.882) an die Mitglieder des Kronrats: „*Damit ihr mich aber nicht für eigenmächtig haltet, lege ich euch die Sache zur Beratung vor, und jeder, der will, soll seine Meinung dazu äußern.*“

Zum anderen sind mehrere Argumente, wie sogar Raaflaub selbst einräumt, aus den *Persern* des Aischylos übernommen. Zitat Raaflaub: „In Aischylos‘ *Persern* finden sich gewisse Züge von Xerxes‘ Charakterbild, darunter seine jugendliche Agressivität (744), seine Abhängigkeit von schlechten Ratgebern (753, 757), der auf ihm lastende Druck, es Dareios gleichzutun und sich als Kriegsheld zu bewähren (755-58), das

21 Raaflaub 2002, 20.

22 Raaflaub 2002, 18.

Nebeneinander von Rachebedürfnis für Marathon (473-77) und auf ganz Griechenland zielender Eroberungslust (50, 233-34), das Vertrauen in die Unwiderstehlichkeit des riesigen persischen Heeres (87-92), die Mahnung, nicht aus Begierde für Fremdes den bestehenden Besitz zu gefährden (823-826) und die Warnung vor göttlicher Strafe für Hybris und Verblendung (93-100, 808, 820-822).⁴²³

Demnach sind tatsächlich zahlreiche Elemente, welche die Debatte bei Herodot charakterisieren, bei Aischylos vorgebildet, dessen *Perser* bekanntlich im Jahr 472 aufgeführt worden sind, also lange, bevor der athenische ‚Imperialismus‘ seinen Höhepunkt erreichte.

Entsprechend bezieht sich die Debatte Herodots, der bekanntlich auch für die Schilderung der Schlacht von Salamis (8. 56 ff.) die *Perser* des Aischylos benützt hat, in Wirklichkeit, wie es der gesamte Kontext dringend nahelegt, auf den Feldzug des Xerxes gegen Griechenland, während Thukydides wesentliche Elemente und Aspekte der herodoteischen Debatte, von den beteiligten Persönlichkeiten und den historischen Begleitumständen abgesehen, auf die große Sizilische Expedition der Athener übertragen hat und damit im Grundsätzlichen der Darstellung seines Vorgänger gefolgt ist.

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23 Raaflaub 2002, 18.

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Plutarch's *Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae*—Rupture or Continuation with Aristotelian Tradition?

Claudia Tiersch

The time of Roman Empire is normally considered an era of administrative order but political stalemate. Political orders came from the Roman Capital, but usually the Roman Empire only reacted to requests from the provinces, a kind of question and response without a deeper political strategy, as Fergus Millar, one of the leading historians for Roman history once judged.¹ Especially for Imperial Greece, an area of proud political traditions in former times, a region that put forth the Athenian democracy, federal states and the political concepts of Plato and Aristotle, this change proved to be very disadvantageous, according to the former research tendencies of ancient historians. A quite politically active territory was forced by the boots of the Roman to resign itself to a status of mute subservience. That is why provincial Greece in Roman Imperial times, save for its rich cultural foundations, has not found much attention in the scholarship of ancient history.² An additional reason for this long-lasting approach was a problem with the sources: in contrast to classical or Hellenistic times, not a single historiographical source has been preserved that gave a continuous narrative of political activities in imperial Greece. Even the fragmentarily preserved work of Cassius Dio, the Roman senator of Greek origin, who officiated as curator in Smyrna and Pergamum, and returned after his active career to his native country, was a Roman history with only some incidental remarks about imperial Greece.

In the last two decades, however, this somber perspective has changed. A newly focused attention towards Greek imperial inscriptions and a *relecture* of authors like Plutarch or Dio Chrysostom uncovered a rich field of political activities in Greek cities.³ The newly figured picture consisted not only on the political elites, but also their readiness for political engagement in their home cities and the honors they received from their grateful compatriots. The newly considered sources revealed an often very lively po-

1 Millar 1977.

2 Exemplary for that view was Bengtson 1996, 544.

3 E.g. Veyne 2005, 11.

litical climate, active assemblies and councils and citizens who had very clear-cut expectations for their politicians.⁴ Moreover, many political treatises have been rediscovered. Their often unknown authors, stemming from schools like the Neopythagoreans or the Neoplatonians, developed thrilling concepts for the contemporary situation, connecting traditional political thinking with new necessities. The predominant question concerned the political scope between the local sphere and Roman rule.⁵

But was it possible at all to continue Greek political traditions under these changed circumstances? I'd like to follow up this question analyzing one of the most superb treatises of this time, Plutarch's *The Precepts of Statecraft*. Plutarch was not only one of the most productive authors in ancient times, but also a politician active during the 1st and 2nd century BCE in Chaironeia in Boeotia, a rather remote town in a rather remote region of Greece.⁶ Only recently, Jackson Hershbell detected the Peripatetic and Platonic roots of Plutarch's political philosophy,⁷ referring primarily to his frequent connection of ethics and philosophy and some sources of his knowledge. Still missing however, is a deeper analysis about what Aristotelian ideas Plutarch possibly received.⁸

This approach seems to be appropriate not only because it leads to the core of the question what Greek political traditions really were picked up and revived in imperial times, but also because of the nature of Aristotelian thinking. Aristotle was a brilliant categorical thinker, seen especially in his comparisons of different constitutions, be it democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, or the famous 'polity', and their advantages and disadvantages and their possible changes. Aristotle has never left any doubt that his absolute priority was the best possible state, destined for the common good based on law and justice.⁹ On the other hand, Aristotle never stepped out as an apologist for a special kind of government, instead giving a balanced, flexible, and pragmatic kind of political analysis. His main impetus was that the outcome of political government, the pursuit of happiness for all citizens, was much more important than any kind of constitution. What kind of government was best suited for administering a polis in the best possible way was a question to debate and evaluate, and the answer could

4 Meyer-Zwiffelhofer 2003, 375-402.

5 Centrone 2000, 559-584.

6 Swain 1996, 135-186.

7 Hershbell 2004, 151-162.

8 Baltussen 2017 concentrates on the purely philosophical reception of Aristotelian thinking in the Second Sophistic.

9 Arist. *EN* 5.1 1129b11-19; Morrison 2013, 190-193.

differ according to the particular political circumstances. A less perfect but stable order should be preferred against any instability.¹⁰ Social and political differences among the citizens are a necessary part of the constitution as well as the exchange of roles between ruler and ruled.¹¹

Moreover, this perfect state is closely connected with the ethical virtues of its inhabitants and their political cooperation.¹² As much as it should enable the happiness of its inhabitants, it is dependent from their ethical qualities, the ἀρετή of the demos as well as the ἀρετή of the political elite. Therefore, the state is the result of the active participation of its citizens, the target of a happy political life.¹³ Even though Aristotle repeatedly stresses the priority of politically qualified leaders and their obligation to educate the citizens towards good behavior,¹⁴ he does connect their preponderance with a special level of individual ἀρετή. Otherwise the wisdom of the many should prevail, as Aristotle points in his famous summation theory. That means the form of the state was for him only the necessary vessel for ethical content and a functional need. In this respect it is not a coincidence that there are several parallels between his *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as Eckart Schütrumpf has repeatedly pointed out.¹⁵ Therefore, I want to investigate the question of how Plutarch deals with these traditional themes of Greek political thinking. What continuities does his treatise manifest and what new political tendencies, caused by the changed circumstances? Does his paper represent traces of political decline or depression?

I. Continuities

In fact, some close connections with peripatetic philosophy are completely evident, primarily in the prominent importance of the political sphere that Plutarch stresses everywhere in his treatise. Of course, an emphasis on the political field alone is not a specifically Greek tradition, but it could be found, e.g., in the badly preserved Roman political orations of Republican times or in Cicero's treatises as well. But some differences with Roman po-

10 Arist. *Pol.* 3.15 1286b27-37; 4.11 1295a40-b1; Horn 2013, 229; 235.

11 Arist. *Pol.* 2.5 1264a17-22; 3.4 1276b20-31; 3.9 1280a19-25; 4.4 1291 a10-19; Delauriers 2013, 131-138.

12 Arist. *Pol.* IV 8, 1294a3-9; Horn 2013, 241.

13 Morrison 2013, 184.

14 Arist. *EN* 1.2 1095a-b; 10.9 1180 b23-28; Frede 2013, 13; Horn 2013, 243.

15 E.g. Schütrumpf 2014; 2015a; 2015b.

litical thinking emerge and put his considerations closer in line with Greek traditions. His treatise does not denote a simple affirmative praise of the Greek polis or a mere appeal for political engagement. Plutarch rather represents and describes the political sphere as a field with its own complex rules and obligations that confronts every would-be politician with several requirements and responsibilities and is not to be seen as a natural playground for better-off elites.

This already concerns, according to Plutarch, the motivation for the entry into politics. The decision for politics is not self-evident nor should be ready-made because of its weight and its responsibilities. Menemachus, the young man for whom Plutarch wrote the essay, should test his motivation beforehand, to avoid disappointments for himself as well as for the community, in case he would only have been driven by mere interest in glory and power: "First then, at the base of political activity there must be, as a firm and strong foundation, a choice of policy arising from judgment and reason, not from mere impulse due to empty opinion or contentiousness or lack of other activities."¹⁶ Politics, for Plutarch, was too important and serious to be surrendered to mere dandies or men whose only political conviction was greed for power: "These men cast great discredit upon public life by regretting their course and being unhappy when, after hoping for glory, they have fallen into disgrace or, after expecting to be feared by others on account of their power, they are drawn into affairs which involve dangers and popular disorders."¹⁷ To find the appropriate balance between exercising an office and avoiding to seek it too often was crucial.¹⁸ A necessary condition intrinsically connected with the question of attitude was for any politician to pay attention towards an always well-ordered private life. Only in this way, so the argument of Plutarch in pursuing a Platonic approach goes, could the politician gain enough credibility to be accepted by the citizens with his political advice.¹⁹ Referring to examples from the Roman republic and Sparta as a comparison, he states concerning the contemporary times: "So great is the importance, in a free state, of confidence or lack of confidence in a Man's character."²⁰

Another equally important aspect presents the explicit respect for the rules of political life. A politician always has to abide the law and to accept in the rules and laws that have been enacted by the citizens, the necessary

16 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 2 798C; 28 820F.

17 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 2 798E; 12 806BC.

18 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 17 813CD.

19 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 4 800B.

20 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 4 801C.

limits of his own political initiatives. This respect for law and justice should be dominant even in cases when friends of the politician would raise inappropriate demands.²¹ Although these sentences sound like a high-minded idealistic evocation, our sources speak a different language. Several historical examples from imperial Greece illustrate that Plutarch's admonitions in fact came from real experiences. The fall of ambitious men like Herodes Atticus, who tried to overcome established rules in order to obtain a completely new kind of regional political power in imperial Greece but was stopped by citizens all over Greece showed that citizens even in these times certainly had means of limiting exuberant ambitions and rewarding useful ones. Herodes tried to transform his status as a committed Athenian citizen into a Roman client king of Greece by changing his gift practices from financial donations to his fellow citizens into huge building programs throughout Greece.²² But his ambitions were stopped by a front of enraged Athenians, elitist and poorer citizens alike. Herodes was swamped with lawsuits and was constrained at the end to stop his attempts and to beg the emperor Marcus Aurelius for mercy.²³ Surely this is an extreme example, but several cases where politicians were urged by local citizenry to play according to established rules at least show that Plutarch's prescriptive rules are not only manifestations of idealistic hopes.²⁴

An essential part of this respect claimed by Plutarch for political rules belonged to the ongoing importance of political oratory: "However, we should not on this account neglect the charm and power of eloquence and ascribe everything to virtue, but, considering oratory to be, not the creator of persuasion, but certainly its co-worker..."²⁵ A politician has to be more than simply well-informed about the respective political agenda because of the complexity of political matters.²⁶ As a necessary precondition, Plutarch even recommended the would-be politician to 'study' the political character, the political culture of a specific citizenry, because it would differ strongly in several cities and could be essential for any political success and the placement of political messages.²⁷

Even though the scopes of political activities had been shrinking because of Roman dominance, the politician should teach the citizens the

21 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 13 807B.

22 Philostr. *VS* 2, 1, 3; 5; 6.

23 Philostr. *VS* 2, 1, 4; 8; 11.

24 Cf. Aristid. *Or.* 50 71-104; Meyer-Zwiffelhofer 2003, 390.

25 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 5 801C.

26 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 15 812BC.

27 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 3 799B – 800A.

proud political traditions of their cities and legitimize his political plans according to these patterns: “His speech must also have, in a good cause, a charm that pleases and a winning persuasiveness: in addition to nobility of purpose, it must possess grace arising from stately diction and appropriate and persuasive thoughts. And political oratory, much more than that used in a court of law, admits maxims, historical and mythical tales, and metaphors, by means of which those who employ them sparingly and at the proper moment move their audiences exceedingly...”²⁸ Love for the polis, the demos and its institutions should remain the lasting point of reference for all citizens; therefore, even the politician should be ready to enter every kind of public service.²⁹

Of course, all of these prescripts should not only enable the politician’s success, but as Plutarch leaves no doubt about pursuing an Aristotelian tradition, serve the ultimate aim to divert the people’s interest to ‘useful’ things³⁰ and to teach and influence them towards the desired goal: obedience and allegiance towards his intended plans as well as peace and obedience towards Rome. Nevertheless, the politician should avoid humbling the citizens.³¹ This seems advisable even for the purpose of preventing any real enmity or disagreement against himself.³² Instead, there was alternative but to count essentially on the power of carefully selected political arguments and elaborate rhetorical skills. In Plutarch’s view, a politician was entitled to embody the animate law, the personalized knowledge about what to do or not to do by restraining his own passions and holding his office benevolently and leniently.³³ He should reproach wrong ways or meanings, thereby creating limits towards damaging people or their plans.³⁴ Values like mildness or good order (πραότης³⁵ and εὐταξία), established for ages in Greek thinking but now charged with a new semantics, emerge in this argumentative context. Additional hints, how to orchestrate the political procedure as cooperation between the politician and his political allies,³⁶ complete the *vademecum*. It might not be a coincidence that

28 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 6 803A.

29 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 15 811AB; 29, 821F.

30 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 25 818E.

31 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 19 814 EF.

32 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 16 813A.

33 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 4 800A-801C; Alexiou 2008; Cf. for the Aristotelian approach Schütrumpf 2015a, 189-211.

34 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 7 803BE.

35 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 19 814 EF; 26 819B; Zaccaro 2017, 24-27.

36 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 16 813B; 26 819BC.

the term εὐταξία, originally charged with a military semantics and afterwards connected with the submissive behavior of individuals or groups like youths or women, now transferred this submissive significance into the common parlance. Giovanni Salmeri commented on this phenomenon in his analysis: “Thus we encounter a case of mirroring of the private sphere in the public sphere, and vice versa...”³⁷ Plutarch turns out to be part of this broader transformation process.

To sum up, this part of the treatise gives several hints for a reception of an especially Aristotelian tradition in Plutarch. It is a combination of the respect for the demos and established political rules with a top-down perspective, the aim of the politician to educate and shape the citizens towards a defined purpose. All this comes along with a detailed ethics of obligation. Even the rise of Rome has not changed everything.

II. New tendencies

On the other hand, things had changed in Roman times. The stronger focus on local elites or the role of leading politicians instead of rules and procedures in Plutarch's treatise is somewhat symptomatic for changed political circumstances. Politics was seen here essentially from the perspective of leading politicians, their roles and responsibilities. It followed Platonic tradition rather than an Aristotelian, and it represented an essential part of the new political practice, when Rome used primarily the local elite as their contacts, partners, and trustees of the enforcement of Roman political order.³⁸

Another remarkable item is the unveiled discourse concerning the role of friends and patrons in the life of the leading politician, an established way of life in Roman politics, but hitherto not part of Greek political theory. First of all, a patron was indispensable for entering political life: “But anyone who is entering upon a political career should choose as his leader a man who is not merely of established reputation and powerful, but one who is all this on account of real worth.”³⁹ In Plutarch's treatise, these circles are quite rightly attributed a fundamental importance: “for the State needs, not men who have no friends or comrades, but good and self-controlled men...for friends are the living and thinking tools of the states-

37 Salmeri 2008, 151.

38 de Blois 2008.

39 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 12 806C.

man.....⁴⁰ Politics, according to Plutarch, should not only be seen as a result of rules and institutions, but also as a social network system granting privileges and favors. That a politician has the right to grant favors to his friends as long as he respects certain limits is just normal for Plutarch because the politician will need them and their networks to implement his political strategies in the city.⁴¹ He only has to wage interests between the rights of the citizens and the wishes of his friends: “For the principles that govern a statesman’s conduct do not force him to act with severity against the moderate errors of his friends; on the contrary, they make it possible for him, after he has once made the chief public interests safe, out of his abundant resources to assist his friends, to take his stand beside them and help them out of their troubles.”⁴² These considerations in fact mark a distance at least with political theory in Athenian democracy where the granting of favors to enclosed circles has been reproached as a violation of democratic values. The balance of politics has been shifted gradually and since Hellenistic times from the sphere of rules and institutions towards a social phenomenon.

Plutarch indicates the dilemma that this development meant for Greek politicians. On the one hand, they were deeply dependent on good social relations with Roman power and their representatives. The treatise speaks, for example, of an embassy to the emperor as an essential way to advertise oneself and one’s hometown even for Greek politicians: “Nowadays, then, when the affairs of the cities no longer include leadership in wars, nor the overthrowing of tyrannies, nor acts of alliances, what opening for a conspicuous and brilliant public career could a young man find? There remain the public lawsuit and embassies to the Emperor, which demand a man of ardent temperament and one who possesses courage and intellect.”⁴³ Moreover, it stresses the necessity to maintain close and cordial relationships to Roman senators as a vital ability not only for the politician himself, but also for the destinies of his home town: “And not only should the statesman show himself and his native state blameless towards our rulers, but he should always have a friend among the men of high station who have the greatest power as a firm bulwark, so to speak, of his administration; for the Romans themselves are most eager to promote the political interests of their friends; and it is a fine thing also, when we gain advantage from the

40 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 13 807AD.

41 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 13 806F-811A; 19 814E-816A; 26 819B-819F.

42 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 13 808B.

43 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 10 805A; Roskam 2008, 325-337.

great men, to turn it to the welfare of our community...⁴⁴ To avoid Rome's anger was always dependent upon close social relationships and a show of moderation.⁴⁵

On the other hand, a good Greek politician should do everything to keep Rome as far away as possible from his hometown. Simon Sways once characterized Plutarch as a 'non-integrationist' although he thought Roman rule was in accordance with divine planning.⁴⁶ In order to achieve this non-intervention, the politician should pay careful attention to do everything to give Rome no reason for intervention. It is the main task for a politician acting responsibly, but for the rest of the citizens as well because most of these calamities were brought about by internal discord: "And the cause of this is chiefly the greed and contentiousness of the foremost citizens; for either, in cases in which they are injuring their inferiors, they force them into exile from the State, or in matters concerning which they differ from among themselves, since they are unwilling to occupy an inferior position among their fellow-citizens, they call in those who are mightier; and as a result the senate, the popular assembly, the courts and the entire local government lose their authority. But the statesman should soothe the ordinary citizens by granting them equality and the powerful by concessions in return, thus keeping them within the bounds of local government..."⁴⁷

For this essential purpose, all citizens had to stand together, so Plutarch claims. This could also imply for the citizens not only to honor and obey their politicians unconditionally, but even to accept even decisions of the leading politicians where they don't seem to be appropriate or where these persons seem to have acted in a wrong way.⁴⁸ Maybe, for the author, his seemingly wrong decisions have been made for higher interests that could not have been uncovered quickly.⁴⁹ Therefore, his main task should be the taming of citizens, in order not to enrage Roman power. Overall, the pending dominance of Roman power and the question of how to tackle with this somewhat dangerous situation is a prevailing subject within the whole treatise.

44 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 18 814 CD.

45 Alexiou 2008, 365-386.

46 Swain 1996, 185. For the role of history within this cosmic order cf. Desideri 2017, 314-315.

47 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 19 815BC.

48 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 20 816AB; 21 816F; 22 817C; 23 817D.

49 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 24 817F-818A.

III. A Political Decline in Imperial Greece?

Do these considerations stand for a political decline, either in practical or in theoretical terms? In fact, Plutarch's treatise does not hide the limited scope for political activity and the pending danger of central intervention caused by Roman dominance. Therefore, Plutarch urgently admonishes Menemachus to distract the attention of the demos from unrealistic or dangerous projects and to teach the appropriate examples from the Greek past, examples that are apt for asserting oneself under those changed circumstances. The historical cases should stimulate the citizen's pride for the own tradition and their Hellenic identity, but not nourish unrealistic hopes for liberty or revolution.⁵⁰

However, Plutarch's treatise gives a lot of counter-arguments against political decline. First of all, it proves the enduring importance of political engagement for the home town and the applause of fellow citizens, including spending one's own money as an εὐεργέτης.⁵¹ Moreover, it invokes a whole system of normative ethics and mutual obligations describing the polis as a κόσμος of acting citizens who are inseparably bound to each other and have to pay respect to their specific duties. It is a system, fully in the line of Aristotle, that certainly stresses the difference between the citizens, according to rank and prestige, but binds every one of them in to a web of obligations and behavioral expectations. Love for the polis as a shared fatherland should be the highest aim and will be presented as a binding commitment.⁵²

Plutarch's paper can show here in a specific case how Roman rule worked under Greek conditions. It manifested the readiness of Greek elites to cooperate with the new political power and to accommodate the changed situation. This willingness of the local elites to cooperate marked a decisive basis for the success of the Roman Empire for more than three hundred years. It was an arrangement that had advantages for both sides. The Roman Empire has been properly called an 'empire without bureaucracy,' i.e., an empire that focused on military defense and counted on a small group of provincial governors and their entourages for the sphere of civilian administration.⁵³ Modern research increasingly pleads against the assumption that an overall rigid administrative structure was able to govern the

50 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 25 818E.

51 Plu. *Praec. ger.* 30 822AB.

52 For the language of political responsibilities in Roman imperial times cf. Dmitriev 2005, 130-139.

53 Garnsey and Saller 1987, 2-42.

whole Roman Empire.⁵⁴ The enduring effectiveness of local autonomy was not an impediment to Roman rule. Rome rather used hitherto established traditions for its own advantage and shows a fundamentally different form of ruling pattern in comparison with the Byzantine and Ottoman empires.⁵⁵

The essential core of this system, however, marked the groups of local elites that regulated the tax collection as well as local conflicts. They profited from this system by gaining prestige and financial advantages, and they also were entitled to communicate their reproaches to the emperor.⁵⁶ Even if many of them, like Plutarch, were not interested at all in climbing the ranks of imperial administration, they acted as power brokers, as mediating channels between the senatorial aristocracy and their respective towns. They were part of a network that was mediated more through personal contacts than by rules and institutions. Therefore, the ability to create networks and to be an accepted part of the social and political elite was not only important for the politicians but for his community as well. Embassies to the emperor were indeed considered an excellent opportunity to advertise for the city at the emperor's court. This without any doubt meant a shift of political power away from the demos and political institutions to political elites, a process that has been decisively brought about by Rome.⁵⁷ Frequently, Rome tried to undermine the people's assembly in favor of the council and thereby weakened the popular commitment.

But that is only one side of the coin. Rome transferred its established system of political control by socially related elites from its internal sphere to its empire. But it did not intermingle in every aspect of local administrative life as long as there were no obvious problems. Likewise, it did not give an overall ideological shape to all its provinces, offering as an identification model primarily the emperor's cult and the ideology connected with it.⁵⁸ But there was a lot of open space in the administration as well in the normative basis. Therefore, especially in Greece things on went further

54 Bang 2013, 438-442.

55 Brélaz, 2008, 54-55.

56 Bang 2013, 442. Kokkinia 2004, 39-58 gives an illuminating analysis on the power balance between provincial governors and local elites.

57 Cf. for the case of Roman Crete, Chaniotis 2008, 83-105. Roman times not only brought about a social change of ruling elites, but also a disappearance of the ecclesia, only the council continued to exist.

58 Rehak 2006, 138-146, Bang 2011, 322-349.

on their own way.⁵⁹ This did not mean a denial of the new realities; the reduced scopes for political activities could not be ignored.⁶⁰ Several treatises, written by Neopythagoreans as well as Neoplatonists dealt precisely with this new situation: How to get along with an imperial power that demanded obedience?⁶¹ How could the emperor be influenced? What expectations and normative frameworks did even he have to respect? In fact, they discussed the new political situations under normative rules that laid stress on the role of the political magistrates, but saw the whole system as a complex network of mutual obligations and responsibilities. Even the emperor was not the absolute king in this system, but a figure who had to meet expectations and certain moral standards to have the right of being obeyed by his subjects. The stoic and peripatetic philosophy delivered a basic normative standard for this thinking, but it was not the only content. Several treatises dealt with those problems. Polis and state, according to the message of many of them, should remain objects of loyalty and activities for every citizen.

Plutarch is one of these thinkers adding substantial facets to consideration of this problem in papers under titles like ‘That a Philosopher Ought to Converse Especially with Men in Power’, ‘To an Uneducated Ruler’, or ‘Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Affairs’. In the paper analyzed here, he reflects upon the problem more in a local and pragmatic manner. Nevertheless, even in this treatise he combines Greek political traditions with the new political realities in order to encourage a young man to engage politically and to find his way under changed circumstances without losing his Greek identity. Although the theme of reduced political scopes and the best way to wrestle with them is an ongoing subject within the paper, the consequence for Plutarch is not to do without politics. That would have been a betrayal of Greek traditions. Plutarch’s approach, rather, is to keep the autarchy of his home town untouched by Rome as well as possible and to keep alive the citizens’ belonging to the political sphere.

Usually these treatises are reflected mostly under the headline of the second sophistic, a cultural movement of imperial Greece that was destined to remember cultural tradition and to use them for the Roman present. They should also be studied, however, for their significance for the reception of

59 Swain 1996, 87-89. Salmeri 2000, 53-92 notes the same in his analysis of Dio Chrysostomus. Chaniotis 2003, 250-260 analyzes for Aphrodisias, how a city managed to keep a certain range of independence in spite of the realities of imperial power.

60 De Blois 2008, 317-324, 323.

61 Centrone 2000, 559-584.

political ideas and loyalties because they may help to explain a strange phenomenon: when several centuries later both the Eastern and Western Roman Empires were threatened by foreign invaders, they both reacted very differently to the danger. Whereas the Western Roman Empire collapsed in 473 AD, the Byzantine Empire 'simply did not die,' as John Haldon once commented. One of the reasons for this resilience obviously was the high level of loyalty that the Byzantine emperor could count on from his citizens.⁶² Maybe there is a causal connection from those events to the work and activities of men like Plutarch and his compatriots, who were deeply committed to the traditions of Greek political thought and action.

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62 Haldon 2016, 122-142.

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Kleomedes von Astypalaia, der letzte der Heroen

Wilfried Fiedler

I. Kleomedes: Athlet und Heros

ῥστατος¹ ἡρώων Κλεομήδης Ἀστυπαιεύς
ὄν θυσίαις τιμᾶ<θ' ᾗ>τε μηκέτι θνητὸν εἶντα.²

„Der letzte der Heroen ist Kleomedes aus Astypalaia,
den ehret mit Opfern, da er nicht mehr sterblich ist“ (Pausanias 6,9,8).

Diese positiv wirkenden Orakelverse lassen nicht erahnen, dass der Faustkämpfer Kleomedes das Musterbeispiel eines brutalen, abscheulichen Athleten war und der Orakelspruch durchaus Unverständnis erzeugte.

Der früheste Hinweis auf den Faustkämpfer Kleomedes (Moretti Nr. 174), dessen Sieg wohl in die 72. Ol. (= 492 v. Chr.) fällt,³ findet sich bei Plutarch, *Romulus* 28,5, also rund 600 Jahre nach Kleomedes' Auftritt

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- 1 Fontenrose 1968, 74 mit Anm. 1 übersetzt richtig: „Most recent“. Das Orakel kann nicht bedeuten, er sei überhaupt der letzte gewesen; es wurden auch danach weitere Athleten wie Theogenes oder Euthyklus zu Heroen erklärt (vgl. auch u. Anm. 12). Bei Fontenrose 1978, 323 ist das Orakel als Nr. Q166 (= Nr. 88 P-W.) aufgeführt, gehört also zu den „quasi-historical“ Orakeln.
 - 2 Der Vers ist in den Pausanias-Handschriften weder als Hexameter überliefert, was er als Orakelvers wohl sein sollte, noch als Pentameter formal korrekt, so dass Porsons Ergänzung allgemein akzeptiert wurde. Zu überlegen ist allerdings, ob nicht die bei Eusebios und Theodoret in der Mehrzahl der Handschriften überlieferte Form des Verses ὄν θυσίαις τιμᾶθ', ὡς μηκέτι θνητὸν εἶντα als die ursprüngliche anzusehen ist (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* (PE) 34,2 und Theodoret, *De Graecarum affectionum curatione* (Cur) 8,26).
 - 3 So Moretti 1957, 82 und andere. Die Datierungsmöglichkeit bietet Pausanias, der im Rahmen seiner Beschreibung der Siegerstatuen in Olympia Kleomedes als Zeitgenossen Gelons erwähnt (6,9,6). Pausanias liegt jedoch nicht richtig, wenn er über zwei Personen mit Namen Gelon spekuliert und in dem Sieger Gelon aus Gela, der in der folgenden Olympiade siegte und einen Wagen weihte, einen Privatmann und nicht den Tyrannen sieht (6,9,4-5). In der darauf basierenden Datierung sagt auch die Formulierung "in der Olympiade vor dieser" nicht eindeutig, ob Olympiade 73 oder 72 gemeint ist. Für letztlich nicht entscheidbar halten es Brophy, R. und M. 1985, 177. Vgl. dazu auch Habicht 1985, 149.

in Olympia.⁴ Da Pausanias 6,9,6-8 eine vollständigere Darstellung der Ereignisse um Kleomedes bietet, sei sie vorangestellt, ergänzt um zwei Angaben aus Oinomaos (bei Eusebios), die den Kampfesverlauf und die verhängte Strafe betreffen.⁵

„In der Olympiade vor dieser soll Kleomedes aus Astypalaia im Faustkampf mit dem Epidaurier Ikkos diesen im Kampf getötet haben. Da er von den Hellanodiken schuldig gesprochen wurde, unerlaubt gekämpft zu haben, und ihm deshalb der Sieg aberkannt wurde, wurde er vor Schmerz wahnsinnig. Er kehrte nach Astypalaia zurück, ging dort zu einer Schule von etwa sechzig Kindern und stürzte den Pfeiler um, der das Dach trug. Als das Dach auf die Kinder fiel, wurde er von den Bürgern gesteinigt und floh in das Heiligtum der Athena. Er stieg in eine Truhe, die in dem Heiligtum stand, und zog den Deckel zu, und die Astypalaier machten vergebliche Anstrengungen bei dem Versuch, die Truhe zu öffnen. Als sie schließlich die Bretter der Truhe aufgebrochen hatten und Kleomedes weder lebend noch tot fanden, schickten sie Männer nach Delphi, um zu fragen, was mit Kleomedes geschehen sei. Diesen soll die Pythia das Orakel gegeben haben: „Der letzte der Heroen, Kleomedes aus Astypalaia, den ehret mit Opfern, da er nicht mehr sterblich ist.“ Seitdem erweisen nun die Astypalaier dem Kleomedes Heroenehren“ (Übers.: Meyer, E.).

„Er siegte, indem er dem Gegner mit einem Schlag dessen Seite öffnete, die Hand hinein wuchtete und die Lunge erfasste ...

als er daraufhin zu vier Talenten verurteilt wurde, ertrug er die dafür verhängte Strafe nicht“ (Oinomaos, frg. 2 11–15 Hammerstaedt = Eusebios, *Praeparatio Evangelica* 5,34,3-4).

4 Plutarch lebte ca. 45 bis 120 n. Chr. und schrieb seine Parallelbiographien „in den beiden letzten Jahrzehnten seines Lebens“ (Ziegler 1979 in: *Der Kleine Pauly*, Bd.4,947).

5 Pausanias verfasste seine Beschreibung Griechenlands um 180 n. Chr.; zu Oinomaos vgl. u. Anm. 20.

Τῇ δὲ ὀλυμπιάδι τῇ πρὸ ταύτης Κλεομήδην φασὶν Ἀστυपालαιέα ὡς Ἴκκῳ πυκτεύων ἀνδρὶ Ἐπιδαυρίῳ τὸν Ἴκκον ἀποκτείνειεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, καταγνοσθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλανοδικῶν ἄδικα εἰργάσθαι καὶ ἀφηρεμένος τὴν νίκην ἔκφρων ἐγένετο ὑπὸ τῆς λύπης καὶ ἀνέστρεψε μὲν ἐς Ἀστυπάλαιαν, διδασκαλείῳ δ' ἐπιστὰς ἐνταῦθα ὅσον ἐξήκοντα ἀριθμὸν παίδων ἀνατρέπει τὸν κίονα ὃς τὸν ὄροφον ἀνεῖχεν. ἐμπεσόντος δὲ τοῦ ὀρόφου τοῖς παισὶ καταλιθούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν κατέφυγεν ἐς Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερὸν· ἐσβάντος δὲ ἐς κιβωτὸν κειμένην ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ καὶ ἐφελκυσσάμενου τὸ ἐπίθημα κάματος ἐς ἀνωφελὲς οἱ Ἀστυपालαιεῖς ἔκαμον ἀνοίγειν τὴν κιβωτὸν πειρώμενοι· τέλος δὲ τὰ ξύλα τῆς κιβωτοῦ καταρρήξαντες, ὡς οὔτε ζῶντα Κλεομήδην οὔτε τεθνεῶτα εὔρισκον, ἀποστέλλουσιν ἄνδρας ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐρησομένους ὅποια ἐς Κλεομήδην τὰ συμβάντα ἦν. τούτοις χρῆσαι τὴν Πυθίαν φασίν·

ῥστατος ἡρώων Κλεομήδης Ἀστυपालαιεύς
ὃν θυσίαις τιμᾶ<θ' ᾗ>τε μηκέτι θνητὸν ἐόντα.

Κλεομήδει μὲν οὖν Ἀστυपालαιεῖς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμᾶς ὡς ἥρωι νέμονται (Pausanias).

πληγῇ μιᾷ πατάξας τὸν ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἀνέφξε τὴν πλευρὰν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμβάλων τὴν χεῖρα ἐλάβετο τοῦ πνεύμονος ... προστιμηθεὶς τεσσάρων ταλάντων ζημίαν ἐπὶ τούτῳ οὐχ ὑπέστη (Oinomaos).

Aus dem Zusammenhang wird allgemein hergeleitet, dass Pausanias sich einer Quelle bediente, die chronologisch von Olympiasiegern berichtete, also etwa einer ausführlicheren Siegerliste.⁶ Nur bei ihm erfahren wir den Zeitpunkt des Sieges, den Namen des Gegners, Ikkos⁷ von Epidauros, dass 60 Kinder Opfer des Kleomedes wurden, dass er in ein Athenaheiligtum flüchtete und entwand und die Bewohner von Astypalaia ihn aufgrund des Orakels schließlich als Heros verehrten. Dass der Kult des Kleomedes nicht allzu lange Zeit nach dessen Entschwinden ein-

6 Pausanias schließt die Kleomedesgeschichte an seinen Gelonabschnitt mit den Worten an: "In der Olympiade vor dieser ..., so berichtet man ..." (6,9,6). φασίν, das im Kleomedesabschnitt zweimal vorkommt, könnte – muss aber bei Pausanias nicht – auch auf mündlich tradierte Athletenanekdoten hinweisen, die etwa ein Fremdenführer in Olympia zu erzählen wusste. Die Bemerkung, man habe Kleomedes in Astypalaia seither als Heros verehrt, muss umgekehrt nicht gegen ein solches Siegerverzeichnis sprechen, das diese Notiz enthalten haben könnte.

7 Der Suda-Artikel s.v. Κλεομήδης muss nicht weiter behandelt werden, da er aus Pausanias exzerpiert ist und keine neuen Informationen bringt („Kikkos“ für „Ikkos“ ist ein Abschreibfehler).

gerichtet wurde und daher auch das Orakel alt sein dürfte, ist wahrscheinlich.⁸

In der antiken Diskussion spielten besonders drei Elemente der Geschichte eine Rolle: der brutale Kampf in Olympia verbunden mit dem Mord an den Kindern, das wundersame Verschwinden und die Frage nach der Berechtigung von Kleomedes' Heroisierung durch das delphische Orakel.

Auch der modernen Forschung stellen sich nicht wenige Fragen: Während Sporthistoriker die genaue Art des Totschlags, die Regeln des antiken Faustkampfes und den eigentlichen Grund für die Entscheidung der Kampfrichter zu ermitteln versuchen, stehen bei Religionswissenschaftlern, Kirchenhistorikern und Philologen das heidnische Orakelwesen, die möglichen Quellen und die Abhängigkeit der verschiedenen antiken Autoren voneinander – insbesondere die der christlichen Apologeten – im Zentrum der Forschung und haben zu intensiven Analysen geführt, wobei auch da zugegeben wird, dass nicht überall klare Ergebnisse zu erreichen sind.

Dieser Beitrag konzentriert sich ausschließlich auf die Frage, unter welchen Gesichtspunkten und in welcher Absicht die verschiedenen antiken Autoren die Kleomedesgeschichte als ganze oder in Teilen für ihre Argumentation heranziehen. Angesichts der zahlreichen zu interpretierenden Stellen und der Fülle der Sekundärliteratur dazu kann auch das nur bedingt in der gewünschten Ausführlichkeit geschehen.

Betrachten wir zunächst kurz den Faustkampf in Olympia, von dem Pausanias 6,9,6 nur den tödlichen Ausgang, die Verurteilung wegen Regelverstosses (ἄδικα) und die Aberkennung des Sieges mitteilt, während Oinomaos, frg. 2,11–13 H. = Eusebius, *PE* 5,34,3 und der ihn nahezu wörtlich exzerpierende Theodoret, *Cur.* 8,27 die brutalen Einzelheiten schildern. Nun berichtet Pausanias aber an anderer Stelle recht ausführlich von einem ganz ähnlichen Todesfall bei den Nemeischen Spielen (8,40,3–5): Dort verabredeten die Faustkämpfer Kreugas aus Epidamnos und Damoxenos aus Syrakus, als es Abend wurde und der Kampf kein

8 Zur Begründung für die Einführung des Kultes vgl. Rhode 1910, Bd.1, 178–180; es wird auch die Angst der Mitbürger vor möglichen weiteren Schädigungen durch Kleomedes mitgespielt haben, zumal die Astypalaier glauben konnten, dass er unter dem Schutz der Athena stand (er flüchtete übrigens nicht in den „Ahnentempel“ so Rhode 1910, Bd. 1, 179 oder gar nach „Athen“, wie auch zu lesen ist (Astypalaia ist eine Insel des Dodekanes zwischen Santorin und Kos). Zur Einführung von Kulte für Athleten generell Fontenrose 1968, 73–104 und Poliakoff 1989, 176–185.

Ende nahm (es gab keine Runden und keine zeitliche Begrenzung), einen wechselseitigen Schlagabtausch. Als erster hatte Kreugas einen Schlag gegen den Kopf des Damoxenos gesetzt. Dieser „forderte dann Kreugas auf, den Arm zu heben, und schlug ihm, als der das tat, mit gestreckten Fingern seitlich unter die Rippen (ὕπὸ τὴν πλευράν), trieb die Hand infolge der Schärfe der Fingernägel und der Gewalt des Schlages in das Innere, ergriff die Eingeweide und zog sie heraus“⁹ In diesem Falle, so berichtet Pausanias weiter, vertrieben die Kampfrichter nicht nur den Sieger Damoxenos, da er Vereinbarungen übertreten hatte (nach Pausanias bestand Damoxenos' Regelverstoß darin, dass er statt eines Schlages mehrere ausführte), sondern sprachen auch dem toten Kreugas den Sieg zu.

Bei Sporthistorikern führte das zu der kaum lösbaren Frage, was in diesem Falle wirklich geschehen war und den Ausschlag für die Aberkennung des Sieges gab,¹⁰ und ob sich überhaupt zwei Faustkämpfe so in ihren blutigen Details zugetragen haben oder aber Geschehnisse aus dem einen auf den anderen übertragen wurden.¹¹

9 Vorher hatte Pausanias erklärt, dass man damals mit weichen Riemen boxte, bei denen die Finger frei blieben und die wohl auch lange Fingernägel zuließen. Brophy, R. und M. 1985, 178-182 möchten in einer ausführlichen, teils medizinischen Analyse zeigen, dass entgegen Pausanias' Schilderung nicht die Nägel das Entscheidende waren, sondern die konzentrierte Wucht der Fingerkuppen, die zum Durchschlagen der seitlichen Muskulatur oder der unteren Rippen durchaus in der Lage sind; nicht auszuschließen wäre auch ein seitlicher Handkantenschlag.

10 In den beiden behandelten Fällen wird Regelverstoß oder grobe Unsportlichkeit angeführt, nicht etwa Totschlag. Wie aus Platon, *Leg.* 865a-b zu ersehen ist, bestand generell Straffreiheit für den Sieger, wenn der Gegner unabsichtlich getötet wurde. Insgesamt wissen wir von 8 Todesfällen im griechischen Sport, die nur zum Teil mit der Ächtung des Siegers verbunden waren (vgl. Brophy, R. und M. 1985, 171-198; Poliakoff 1989, 234 Anm. 12).

Was im Übrigen die erlaubten Trefferziele betrifft, so möchten Brophy, R. und M. 1985, 184-194 beweisen, dass nur Kopf, Hals und Nacken Ziel der Schläge sein durften und damit Körpertreffer ohnehin schon Grund für einem Ausschluss waren, was u. a. mit auch Stellen aus Johannes Chrysostomos belegt werden soll.

11 Ob Oinomaos und nach ihm Theodoret aus diesem Pausaniasabschnitt oder einer allen gemeinsamen Quelle schöpfen, ist unklar, vgl. Brophy, R. und M. 1985, 178-9. Differenzen bestehen bei den verschiedenen Autoren darin, dass es bei Pausanias und Theodoret, *Cur.* 8,27 die "Eingeweide" (σπλάγχνα bzw. ἐγκάτα) sind, die erfasst werden, bei Oinomaos die Lunge (πνεύμων). Allerdings sollte man diese Varianten bei einer keineswegs klaren Überlieferungsgeschichte von 500 Jahren nicht zu stark belasten und durchaus mit möglichen Verwechslungen oder „ausschmückenden“ Übertragungen rechnen.

Für Pausanias ist festzuhalten ist, dass er die Kleomedesgeschichte kommentarlos berichtet und sich jeglicher Bewertung – sei es der Person des Kleomedes oder des erteilten Orakels – enthält.

Kleomedes ist nur einer der zahlreichen Athleten, die als Heroen verehrt wurden. Fontenrose hat im Vergleich mit weiteren, die nach ihrem Tode eine kultische Verehrung erhielten, eine Liste wesentlicher Merkmale aufgestellt, die zeigt, dass sich in den Berichten über die Heroisierung ein bestimmtes Muster (pattern) findet, das bei Kleomedes besonders augenfällig wird.¹²

II. Kleomedes in der antiken Diskussion

1. Plutarch

In der Vita des Romulus schildert Plutarch das Ende des Romulus: „Er verschwand an den Nonen des Julius, wie er jetzt heißt, des Quintilis, wie er damals hieß“ (*Rom.* 27,3),¹³ und konstatiert, dass nichts Sicheres über den Tod zu erfahren sei, sondern es zwei Varianten gebe: Beiden zufolge sei Romulus plötzlich verschwunden, ohne dass man noch irgendetwas von ihm fand. Nach der einen aber gerieten die Senatoren in den Verdacht, ihn im Tempel des Hephaistos (Vulcanus) ermordet, zerstückelt und versteckt

12 Fontenrose 1968, 73-79. Die wichtigsten Merkmale seien verkürzt zusammengefasst:

Der Athlet zeigt eine ungewöhnliche Stärke und erringt einen spektakulären Sieg (oder Siege), erfährt aber nicht die erhoffte Würdigung, sei es seitens der Kampfrichter oder seiner Mitbürger. Er ist verbittert, was ihn wie bei Kleomedes in den Wahnsinn treiben kann, und er fügt seinen Mitbürgern direkt oder indirekt Schaden zu, die daraufhin Rache an ihm (z. B. wollen sie Kleomedes steinigen) oder seiner Statue nehmen. Der Athlet (oder seine Statue) verschwindet. Die Götter strafen die Mitbürger, was bei Kleomedes nur bedingt zutrifft. Die Astypalaier sind allerdings durch sein unerklärliches Verschwinden beunruhigt und in Angst versetzt, zumal Athena, in deren Heiligtum er „Asyl“ gesucht hatte, möglicherweise als seine Schutzgöttin geholfen hatte. Die Stadt holt ein Orakel ein. Apollon erklärt den Athleten zum Heros, woraus ein Kult entsteht, oder ordnet kultische Verehrung an.

Athleten, auf die das ebenfalls weitgehend zutrifft, sind bei Fontenrose Oibotas von Dyme (Moretti 6, ol. 6 = 756 v.Chr.), Euthykles aus Lokri (Moretti 180, ol. 73 = 488 v.Chr.) und Theogenes von Thasos (Moretti 201, 215, ol. 75, 76 = ol. 480 und 476 v.Chr.); zu Theogenes vgl. auch Pouilloux 1954, 62-105.

13 Plutarch wird hier und im Folgenden zitiert nach der Übersetzung von Ziegler 1979, Bd.1, 111-113.

weggetragen zu haben, nach der anderen – eher versöhnlichen und vielleicht auch älteren Version – sei Romulus nach einem Unwetter mit unbeschreiblichen Begleiterscheinungen nicht mehr auffindbar gewesen. Die Vornehmen kündigten intensive Nachforschungen an und forderten alle auf, Romulus zu verehren und anzubeten, da er Gott geworden sei. Das sei durch den vertrauenswürdigen Julius Proculus bestätigt worden, der unter Eid berichtete, Romulus sei ihm erschienen, schön und groß wie nie zuvor und habe erklärt:

„Es war der Wille der Götter, mein Proculus, dass ich so lange Zeit unter den Menschen weilen, eine Stadt, die zu größter Macht und höchstem Ruhm bestimmt ist, erbauen und dann wieder den Himmel bewohnen sollte, aus dem ich kam ... Ich werde Euch der gnädige Gott Quirinus sein“ (*Rom.* 28,2).

Das habe überzeugt, und fortan habe man Romulus als Gott angesehen und als Quirinus verehrt.¹⁴

Aus seinem reichlichen Kenntnisschatz führt Plutarch drei griechische Geschichten (μυθολογούμενα) an, die der Romuluserzählung gleichen:

Aristeas von Prokonnesos (einer Insel im Marmarameer) war in der Werkstatt eines Walkers gestorben. Als die Freunde ihn holen wollten, sei er verschwunden gewesen. Leute, die von einer Reise zurückkehrten, berichteten jedoch, er sei ihnen nahe Kroton (Unteritalien) begegnet (*Rom.* 28,4 = Frg. 16 Bolton).¹⁵ Die enge Parallele zu Romulus ist deutlich, sie enthält beide Elemente: das wundersame Verschwinden und das – in anderen Varianten sogar zweimalige – Wiedererscheinen.

Es folgt die Kleomedesgeschichte ohne den Hinweis, dass es sich um einen Faustkämpfer handelte, der in Olympia seinen Gegner brutal tötete. Kleomedes sei jedoch äußerst stark und groß gewesen, in seinem Verhalten aber gestört und wahnsinnig, und habe schließlich den Tod vieler Kinder verursacht (*Rom.* 28,5-6). Danach schildert Plutarch, dass Kleomedes in einer großen Truhe Zuflucht suchte und seine Verfolger ihn „weder lebend

14 Zu den verschiedenen antiken Quellen und den Darstellungen von Romulus' Ende vgl. ausführlich Roscher 1909-1915, Bd. 4, sp. 198-201.

15 Die Aristeasgeschichte wird mit weiteren Einzelheiten bei Origenes, *Contra Celsum* 3,26 (= Frg. 17 Bolton) diskutiert, wo Origenes auch Herodot 4,14-15 (= Frg. 12 Bolton) als Quelle zitiert. Zur Datierung des Aristeas als Dichter der *Arimaspea* (zwischen 670 und 620 v. Chr.) und der Frage, ob Aristeas möglicherweise nur eine mythische Person war, vgl. Bolton 1962, 1-4 und 119-141, bes. 126-131, der für die Geschichte des Verschwindens eine eher rationalistische Erklärung versucht.

noch tot“ (*Rom.* 26,6)¹⁶ fanden, als sie die Truhe zertrümmerten. Offenbar verwundert, schickten sie Orakelbefrager nach Delphi und erhielten die Antwort:

„Der letzte der Heroen ist Kleomedes aus Astypalaia“ (*Rom.* 28,6).

Plutarch, der zeitweise auch Priester in Delphi war, kennt offenbar nur den ersten Vers des Orakels. Er enthält sich auch jeglichen Urteils über die verkündete Heroisierung. Obwohl die Parallele zu Romulus nur im mysteriösen Verschwinden liegt, bleibt der Eindruck einer weitgehenden Vergleichbarkeit der Geschehnisse, da die Aristeasgeschichte nachwirkt.

Nach einem kurzen Hinweis auf Alkmene, die ebenfalls verschwand (*Rom.* 27,7), äußert sich Plutarch allgemeiner zu dem Problem, dass man sich viele Geschichten erzählt (μυθολογοῦσι), in denen gegen alle natürliche Erklärung (παρὰ τὸ εἰκός) das von Natur aus Sterbliche zum Göttlichen erhoben wird, deutet aber an, dass er Romulus' Entrückung ebenso für „mythische Erzählung“ hält wie die beigebrachten griechischen Parallelen.¹⁷ Gleichwohl konstatiert er abschließend, man dürfe durchaus glauben, dass tugendhafte Seelen im Einklang mit der Natur und göttlichem Recht (κατὰ φύσιν καὶ δίκην θεῶν) aus Menschen zu Heroen, aus Heroen zu Dämonen, aus Dämonen aber, wenn sie - wie in Weihen - gereinigt und geheiligt sind, ... nicht durch staatliche Verordnung, sondern in Wahrheit und gesunder Vernunft entsprechend zu Göttern erhoben werden und so die schönste und glücklichste Vollendung erlangen (*Rom.* 27,8).¹⁸

Dass Plutarch in Kleomedes einen Kandidaten für solch einen Aufstieg sah, ist unwahrscheinlich; dieser konnte ihm nur als Parallelbeispiel für wundersames Verschwinden dienen.

16 Dieses „οὔτε ζῶντα... οὔτε νεκρόν“ scheint seit Herodot 4,14,3 offenbar zu einer beliebten Formel geworden zu sein, die auch Origenes, *Contra Celsum* 3,26,27 beibehält.

17 Mit Verweisen auf Pindar (Frg. 116 Bowra = 131b Snell) und Heraklit (Frg. 118 D.) fasst er zusammen, dass der Körper dem Tode unterliegt, die Seele (ψυχή Heraklit; αἰὼνος εἶδωλον Pindar) aber aus dem Göttlichen kommt und wieder dorthin ohne Körper zurückkehrt (27,7). Flacelière 1964, 58 bemerkt zu Recht, dass Plutarchs Überlegungen zu dieser Frage besser in einer philosophiegeschichtlichen Abhandlung ihren Platz hätten.

18 Ganz ähnlich wird in *De def. or.* 415B die Möglichkeit des Wandels der besseren Seelen in die nächsthöhere Stufe beschrieben. Dazu, dass sich hier nicht nur platonisches, sondern wohl auch pythagoreisches Gedankengut andeutet, vgl. Dillon 2014, 69, der aber auf unsere Stelle nicht eingeht.

In der Plutarch-Forschung herrscht Einigkeit, dass sich in seinen Schriften nirgends ein Hinweis auf Jesus oder das aufkommende Christentum findet.¹⁹ Die Diskussion über Romulus' Ende kann als indirekte Bestätigung herangezogen werden. Jesus' Entschwinden aus dem Grabe und die Begegnung mit den Anhängern hätte eine vortreffliche zeitnahe Parallele geboten, so wie umgekehrt in der späteren Diskussion Kleomedes als Parallele zu Jesus dient.

2. Oinomaos – Eusebios

Während Plutarch und Pausanias weitgehend auf eine moralische Bewertung des Kleomedes verzichten, und vor allem keine Kritik am Orakel üben, bietet sich bei dem Kyniker Oinomaos in dessen Orakelkritik mit dem Titel „Entlarvung der Gaukler“ (γοϊτῶν φορά)²⁰ ein ganz anderes Bild. Stimmt die Datierung der Schrift in die Zeit Hadrians in das frühe 2. Jh., so hält Eusebios (geb. ca. 260 – 265, gest. ca. 333 – 340) Oinomaos' Ausführungen auch nach ca. 200 Jahren noch für aktuell, und der christliche Apologet kann dem Kyniker völlig beistimmen, wenn dieser das heidnische Orakelwesen verspottet.

Eusebios kritisiert im 5. Buch der *Praeparatio Evangelica* u.a., dass die Orakel häufig doppeldeutig waren (PE 5,20-26), viel Unheil anrichteten, mitunter Trivialitäten verkündeten, viel Unkluges rieten und Partei ergriffen für Personen, die im Unrecht waren oder die zugesprochenen Ehrungen nicht verdienten (PE 5,27-32).

Auf die Kritik an Orakeln, die Apollon den Dichtern zukommen ließ, zu denen auch Archilochos, Euripides und Homer gehörten (PE 5,32), folgt ein umfangreicher Angriff auf Orakel, in denen der „wundersame Gott“ Faustkämpfer und Athleten vergöttlichte. Behandelt werden die Faustkämpfer Kleomedes, Theogenes von Thasos sowie der Fünfkämpfer

19 Z.B. Ziegler 1951, RE Bd. XXI,1, sp. 944-5 und Hirsch-Luipold 2014, 166.

20 Als anderer Titel wird erwähnt κατὰ τῶν χρηστηρίων (gegen die Orakel); zum Titel vgl. Hammerstaedt 1988, 33-47. Datierung des Oinomaos und seiner Schrift, die nur in Exzerpten aus dem 5. Buch von Eusebios' *Praeparatio Evangelica* fassbar ist, ist nicht völlig sicher; die Forschung setzt sie allgemein in die Zeit Hadrians ins frühe 2. Jh. Als Orientierung wird 119 n. Chr. genannt, da Hieronymus zu diesem Jahr (basierend auf Eusebius' *Chronik*) mitteilt, dass Plutarch, Agathobulos und Oinomaos als hervorragende Philosophen galten. Vgl. dazu Hammerstaedt 1988, 11-19. Dass Oinomaos selbst negative Erfahrungen mit dem klarischen Orakel gemacht hat, ist Eusebios, PE 5,22,1-6 und 5,23,1-3 (=Frg. 14 und 15 Hammerstaedt) zu entnehmen.

Euthykles aus Lokri.²¹ Dabei zitiert Eusebios wörtlich, wie er betont (*PE* 5,34,1), den Oinomaos,²² der diese Orakel zu Recht (εἰκότως) kritisiert habe. Im Falle des Kleomedes erging der sich, wie wir sehen können, in besonders gehässigen Bemerkungen. Schon im Kapitel über die Dichter hatte er darauf angespielt, dass Faustkämpfer im Himmel im Saal des Zeus anzutreffen seien; das nämlich sage der „Dichter in Delphi“ (*PE* 5,33,14,3-5). *PE* 5,34 nimmt Oinomaos das auf und redet den Gott mit zwei Versen aus einem seiner Orakel an, die Apollons Allwissenheit betonen,²³ um ihm zu wünschen, dass er statt dessen wüsste, „dass der Faustkampf (πυκτική) sich in nichts vom Ausschlagen (λακτιστική)²⁴ unterscheidet“, damit er entweder auch die Esel für unsterblich erklärte oder es auch bei dem Faustkämpfer Kleomedes aus Astypalaia unterließe, wobei Oinomaos beide Orakelverse zitiert (*PE* 5,33,2).

Entrüstet fragt er weiter, warum er diesen Mann zum Gott erhoben habe, und gibt ironisch eine Auswahl zur Antwort:

Etwa weil er in Olympia...“, es folgt die Schilderung des grausamen Faustschlages, was er ironisch kommentiert: „Apollon, eine gottwürdige Tat“ (*PE* 5,34,3).

1. Oder nicht nur deshalb, sondern auch, weil er eine Strafe von vier Talenten erhielt und das nicht akzeptieren konnte, sondern aus Ärger in depressiver Verbitterung seine Wut an den Kindern in der Schule ausließ, indem er die Säule, die das Dach trug, wegzog (*PE* 5,34,4): „Ist er, Gottmacher, deshalb für uns verehrungswürdig?“

21 Vgl. o. Anm. 12.

22 Mit Namen genannt wird er 5,21,6,1 und 5,36,5,1.

23 „Der Du die Zahl der Sandkörner und die Größe des Meeres kennst, einen Stummen verstehst und einen nicht Sprechenden hörst...“ (aus Orakel Q 99 Fontenrose = 52 P.-W.).

24 Der Vergleich zwischen dem Boxen der Athleten und dem Ausschlagen findet sich bereits bei Dion von Prusa, *or.* 9,22. Dort bekränzt Diogenes ein Pferd, das ein anderes nach längerem Ausschlagen (λακτίζειν) verjagt hatte, und ruft es zum Isthmiansieger aus. λακτίζειν ist auch bei Diog. Laert. 6,27 das Wort, das Diogenes offenbar verwandte, um Faustkampf und Pankration zu verspotten oder die Leistungen der hochgelobten Superathleten mit Hinweis auf die viel größeren entsprechenden Fähigkeiten einzelner Tierarten lächerlich zu machen. Diese kynisch-stoische Polemik geht natürlich auf ältere Diskussionen zurück und spielte z.B. in den verschiedenen Kulturentwicklungstheorien eine bedeutende Rolle. Als 'Mängeltheorie' ist schon im platonischen *Protagoras* (320 c-322 d) anzutreffen, wo sie Protagoras in den Mund gelegt ist, dem die in diesem Mythos enthaltenen Gedanken wohl auch zugeschrieben werden können.

2. Oder willst Du noch als einen weiteren Beweis seiner Tapferkeit und Gottesliebe hinzufügen, dass er in eine heilige Truhe stieg, die Riegel vorschob und so für die Verfolger nicht mehr fassbar (ἄληπτος) war, als sie versuchten, ihn herauszuziehen?

In einer Anrede an Kleomedes, dem er sich jetzt zuwendet (PE 5,34,5,4-5), spielt Oinomaos auf das Entschwinden aus der Truhe an, indem er fragt: „Kleomedes, Heros und nicht mehr sterblich? Welche Tricks (μηχανήματα) hast Du zum Erlangen der Unsterblichkeit erfunden?“ Jedenfalls, so fährt Oinomaos ironisch fort, bemerkten die Götter sein „vortreffliches Verhalten“ (ἀγαθοουργία, PE 5,34,6,2) und entrückten ihn wie die Götter Homers den Ganymed – diesen wegen seiner Schönheit, Kleomedes wegen seiner Kraft und ihrer „vorbildlichen Anwendung“ (PE 5,34,6).

Schließlich kehrt er zum vergleichenden Bild zwischen dem Schlagen des Faustkämpfers und dem Austreten des Esels zurück und steigert es in kynischer Tradition ins Lächerliche: Apollon müsse den wahren Wert des Faustkampfes begreifen, um dann die ausschlagenden Esel als Götter zu betrachten und die Wildesel als die besten Götter, was Oinomaos zur Parodie auf den delphischen Orakelspruch verleitet:

„Herausragend unter den Unsterblichen ist ein wilder Esel, nicht Kleomedes,
ihn verehrt mit Opfern, da er nicht mehr sterblich ist“.

Damit nicht genug: Der Esel würde für sich selbst die Göttlichkeit beanspruchen und Kleomedes mit seinem Ausschlagen in einen Brunnen stoßen und nicht etwa in den Himmel aufsteigen lassen (PE 5,34,8); und er sei in höherem Maße wert, die göttlichen Geschenke zu erhalten, da er nicht nur bereit sei, mit Kleomedes zu kämpfen, selbst wenn der mit eisenen Handschuhen antrete, sondern auch mit dem Faustkämpfer von der Insel Thasos (Theogenes), dessen Geschichte im Folgenden ausgebreitet wird,²⁵ – oder mit beiden.

Und Oinomaos spottet weiter, er habe im Vertrauen auf Apollon erkannt, dass der Faustkampf ein göttliches Geschäft ist und dies der Menge derer, die glauben, weise zu sein, verborgen blieb. Denn sonst hätten sie ihre tugendhafte Lebensweise (καλοὶ καγαθοὶ εἶναι) aufgegeben und würden sich wie der thasische Faustkämpfer in dessen Geschäft üben (PE 5,34,10). Aus der dann ausführlich geschilderten Theogenesgeschichte ergibt sich für Oinomaos ein weiterer Beleg dafür, „dass die gottwürdige Athletik göt-

25 Vgl. o. Anm. 12.

tliche Ehren verdient“ (PE 3,34,15), und aus den Erzählungen über den Fünfkämpfer Euthykles aus Lokri sei zu folgern, dass man die „gemästeten Männer“ ehren müsse.²⁶

Das Athletenkapitel endet mit dem Wunsch an Apollon, doch anstatt Seher (μάντις) lieber Trainer – oder beides – zu werden, damit es wie ein delphisches Orakelzentrum so auch ein sportliches Leistungszentrum gäbe – nicht unpassend zum Pythischen Wettkampf (PE 5,34,17).

Halten wir die Hauptergebnisse aus der Oinomaos-Kritik an Kleomedes fest: Oinomaos wirft Apollon zum einen vor, dass er Kleomedes trotz dessen mehrfachen Fehlverhaltens zum Heros erklärte und für ihn einen Kult stiftete. Zum anderen übt er deutliche Kritik an der Überbewertung der Athletik und hier besonders – vielleicht auch aufgrund der Auswüchse in hellenistisch-römischer Zeit, zu welchen auch die „eisernen Handschuhe“ gehören – am Faustkampf. Eusebios muss das nicht weiter kommentieren und kann sich den Orakelsprüchen für Tyrannen zuwenden. Für spätere Apologeten aber ist eine willkommene Basis gelegt.

3. Kelsos – Origenes

Der „Alethes Logos“ (ἀληθὴς λόγος) des Kelsos ist die älteste Streitschrift eines heidnischen Philosophen gegen das sich ausbreitende Christentum. Verfasst wurde sie – so die allgemeine Datierung – um 178 n. Chr. Als ganze ist sie verloren, in größeren Fragmenten aus Origenes' Schrift „*Contra Celsum*“ rekonstruierbar,²⁷ welche ca. 65 – 70 Jahre später verfasst wurde.²⁸ Kelsos sah in dem Christentum einen Abfall von der „wahren Lehre“, dem gemeinsamen Wissen der alten Völker bis hin zu Platon, und

26 Dass Boxer und Ringer sich möglichst viel Gewicht zulegten, da es keine Gewichtsklassen gab, ist aufgrund der damit verbundenen sagenhaften Kraftleistungen bewundert, aber eben auch regelmäßig verspottet worden. Dass es hier ausgerechnet bei einem Fünfkämpfer geschieht, deutet darauf hin, dass Oinomaos sich in seinem Spott nicht sonderlich um sportliche Feinheiten kümmerte. Aristoteles, *Rhet.* I 5, 1361b 10-11 lobt nämlich: „Die Fünfkämpfer sind deshalb die schönsten Menschen, weil sie zugleich zur Entfaltung von Kraft und von Schnelligkeit die körperliche Disposition haben“. Vgl. auch schon Bakchylides 9,25-38. Zu Euthykles vgl. o. Anm. 12 und Fontenrose 1968, 74.

27 Die wichtigsten Beiträge dazu liefern Bader 1940; Lona 2005 und zuletzt Arnold 2016 mit reicher Literatur.

28 Origenes schrieb seine Erwiderung im Alter von über 60 Jahren unter der Regierung des Kaisers Philippus Arabs (244-249 n. Chr.); vgl. Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 6,36,1-2 und Origenes, *c. Cels.* 1,53,25-27.

hatte den Christen u. a. vorgeworfen, dass sie sich als Randgruppe von der staatlichen Gemeinschaft lossagten und letztlich eine Gefahr für den Staat darstellten. Eines seiner Ziele war daher auch, die Christen durch Belehrung wieder in die Gesellschaft einzugliedern.

Origenes hatte die von Ambrosius²⁹ gestellte Aufgabe, jeden der Vorwürfe zu widerlegen, die der platonisch geprägte Philosoph gegen die Christen vorgebracht hatte. Aus Origenes ergibt sich, dass Kelsos in den beiden ersten Büchern zunächst aus der Sicht eines Juden Kritik an den christlichen Berichten über Jesus und an dem christlichen Glauben übte. Dabei hatte er die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Juden und Christen über Jesus als den sprichwörtlichen „Streit um des Esels Schatten“ abgetan (*c. Cels.* 3,1,14-15; 3,2,2).

Im 3. Buch diskutiert Kelsos dann aus eigener Sicht Jesus' wunderbares Verschwinden aus der Grabkammer, seine Auferstehung und seine Vergöttlichung, nachdem er doch als Mensch geboren war. Er wirft den Christen vor, sie verlangten, dass man ihren Berichten über Jesus glaubt, während sie selbst nicht bereit seien, ähnlich gelagerten Erzählungen der Griechen Glauben zu schenken. Unter den heidnisch-griechischen Beispielen erwähnt er zunächst die Dioskuren, Herakles, Asklepios und Dionysos, von denen die Griechen glaubten, dass sie aus Menschen zu Göttern erhoben wurden (*c. Cels.* 3,22), berichtet dann von den Begebenheiten um Aristeas aus Prokonnesos (*c. Cels.* 3,26-28),³⁰ den Hyperboreer Abaris, der die Macht hatte, von einem Pfeil getragen zu werden (*c. Cels.* 3,31), den Klazomenier (Hermotimos), dessen Seele den Körper verließ und körperlos herumflog (*c. Cels.* 3,32), und schließlich von Kleomedes.

Aus der Kleomedes-Erzählung findet sich bei Origenes (*c. Cels.* 3,33) nur das Element des Verschwindens. Kelsos habe erzählt, dass Kleomedes in eine heilige Truhe gestiegen sei, sich verriegelt habe und nicht mehr darin gefunden wurde, sondern durch eine göttliche Fügung (μοίρα τινὶ δαίμονι) verschwunden war, als man die Truhe zerschlug, um ihn zu ergreifen. Sowohl der Orakelspruch als auch die anstößigen Vorgeschichten fehlen.³¹ Dass Kelsos zumindest von einem Orakelspruch wusste, ergibt sich aus Origenes (*c. Cels.* 3,33 Ende), wo Origenes festhält: Kelsos glaubte,

29 Zur Person des Ambrosius s. Arnold 2016, 1 Anm. 2.

30 Schon Plutarch hatte diese Parallele gebracht, vgl. o. S. 215 mit Anm. 15.

31 Kleomedes war bereits an zwei früheren Stellen (*c. Cels.* 3,3,6 und 3,25,17-19) erwähnt. An der ersten Stelle betont Origenes, dass auch Kelsos Belege dafür anführe, dass übernatürliche Mächte wirken können, nämlich bei Asklepios, der Gutes tat und die Zukunft vorhersagte, weiter bei Aristeas von Prokonnesos, dem Klazomenier und Kleomedes aus Astypalaia. Arnold 2016, 38-40 spricht von einer

dass ein Orakelspruch verkündete, Kleomedes sei durch wundersame (göttliche) Fügung (μοῖρα τὴν δαίμονιαν) aus der Truhe entfleucht.

Lona³² meint, Origenes habe die Fassung des Kelsos verkürzt. Das kann vielleicht für den Orakelspruch gelten, wohl kaum aber für die Vorgeschichte. Denn in seiner Erwiderung an Kelsos fordert Origenes den Kelsos umständlich auf, doch zu erklären, in welcher Absicht die übermenschliche Macht dafür gesorgt habe, dass Kleomedes durch eine „göttliche Fügung“ aus der Truhe entschwand. Erst wenn Kelsos nachweise, dass dieses Geschenk an Kleomedes etwas Wertvolles und dem Willen eines Gottes angemessen sei, werde er entscheiden, was ihm zu antworten ist. In Kenntnis der ganzen Kleomedesgeschichte hätte Origenes wohl kaum so umständlich argumentiert, sondern den brutalen Faustkampf und den irrsinnigen Kindermord angeprangert. Umgekehrt kann man unterstellen, dass Kelsos nicht gleich die wesentlichen Angriffspunkte gegen seine heidnischen Beispiele mitlieferte, sondern eher zurückhielt.

Insgesamt geht es Kelsos aber weniger um die Verteidigung der heidnischen Religiosität, wenngleich er betont, dass erstens die Kraft der griechischen Götter besser bezeugt sei als das, was über Jesus und seine Göttlichkeit berichtet wird (*c. Cels.* 3,22; 3,24), und zweitens auch andere Menschen Wunderdinge vollbracht hätten, ohne dass man sie gleich für Götter hielt (*c. Cels.* 3,26; 3,31; 3,32). Vielmehr möchte er die Aussagekraft der christlichen Überlieferung relativieren und den Eindruck hervorrufen, dass die Erzählungen vom Verschwinden des Kleomedes und seine kultische Verehrung zusammen mit den vorangegangenen und den noch folgenden Beispielen (*c. Cels.* 3,34-37)³³ „auf dem gleichen Niveau“³⁴ stehen und ähnlich zu bewerten seien wie die Berichte der Christen über Jesus. Was die

„partiellen Antizipation“ der Kapitel *c. Cels.* 3,24; 3,26; 3,32 und 33, in denen die aufgezählten Personen ausführlich behandelt werden, wobei noch Abaris hinzukommt (*c. Cels.* 3,31). Hammerstaedt 1988, 26 nimmt an, dass Kelsos nur die Wundergeschichte ohne das Orakel berichtete, glaubt dann aber zu erkennen: „Dass Origenes den Bericht von dem Cleomedes erteilten delphischen Orakel anderswoher geschöpft hat, zeigen auch seine Worte οἶμαι τὸν πύκτην („ich glaube, der Faustkämpfer“, übers. Fiedler) an, mit denen er zu erkennen gibt, dass er den an dieser Stelle (*c. Cels.* III 25) erwähnten Cleomedes mit dem bei Celsus genannten erst zu identifizieren hatte.“ Gegen diese komplizierte Lösung spricht, dass Origenes auch in *c. Cels.* 3,34 keine zusätzlichen Informationen gegenüber 3,25 bietet.

32 Lona 2005, 191.

33 Unter den Beispielen findet sich auch die relativ aktuelle von Hadrian veranlasste Vergöttlichung seines Lieblings Antinoos (*c. Cels.* 3,36), vgl. auch u. Anm. 44.

34 Lona 2005, 192; vgl. auch Fiedrowicz 2011, Bd.1,64.

Auferstehung betrifft, so hatte Kelsos bereits vorher betont, dass Jesus ja nur von einer Frau und wenigen Anhängern gesehen worden sei (c. *Cels.* 2,70), und unterstellt, dass es sich dabei ohnehin nur um einen Schatten (σκιά) gehandelt habe.³⁵

Origenes versucht seinerseits immer wieder klarzustellen, dass die Berichte über Jesus einen ganz anderen Wahrheitsgehalt und vertrauenswürdige Zeugen haben, die sogar ihr Leben dafür hergaben, dass es außerdem Prophezeiungen gab, die sich in ihm erfüllten. Außerdem weist Origenes auch im Kleomedes-Kapitel wie schon vorher darauf hin, dass im Leben jener von Kelsos angeführten Menschen kein Anzeichen der ihnen zugeschriebenen Göttlichkeit zu finden sei (c. *Cels.* 3,33,8-9).³⁶

Dabei geht er keineswegs fair mit Kelsos um, sondern unterstellt ihm, er sage aus Feigheit nicht klar, ob er die heidnischen Wundergeschichten eigentlich glaube oder eher nicht, weil er vermeiden wolle, dass die Leser seiner Schriften ihn für gottlos (ἄθεος) halten (c. *Cels.* 3,22,10-15; ähnlich 3,26,1-4). Kelsos selbst hatte jedoch - so die Zitate bei Origenes - bei dreien seiner Beispielspersonen ausdrücklich betont, dass man sie nicht wirklich für Götter hielt,³⁷ und damit auch indirekt Gleiches für Jesus postuliert.

4. Theodoret

Ungefähr 100 Jahre nach Eusebios' *Praeparatio Evangelica* greifen zu Beginn des 5. Jhs. drei christliche Schriftsteller direkt oder vermittelt die dort überlieferte Kleomedesgeschichte wieder auf. Es sind Theodoret aus Kyrrhos (ca. 393 – 459 n. Chr.),³⁸ Kyrill aus Alexandria (ca. 375/380 – 444 n. Chr.) und Sokrates (Scholasticus bzw. ecclesiasticus) aus Konstantinopel (ca. 380 – 439 n. Chr.).

Außerdem findet sich eine Notiz in den *Anecdota Graeca Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis*, II, p.154,4-5,³⁹ wo Kleomedes im Anhang zu Eusebios' *Sta-*

35 Umgekehrt wertet dann Origenes das Verschwinden des Kleomedes als Erfindung (πλάσμα, c. *Cels.* 3,33,6) bzw. als dämonische Zauberei oder Täuschung der Augen ab (c. *Cels.* 3,33,29-30).

36 Das Fehlen einer moralischen Verurteilung des Kleomedes deutet darauf hin, dass Oinomaos hier nicht die Quelle ist; vgl. auch Hammerstaedt 1996, 90 mit Anm. 68.

37 Bei Aristeas (*Cur.* 3,26,10-11; 3,29,8), bei Abaris (*Cur.* 3,31,5-6) und bei dem Klazomenier Hermotimos (*Cur.* 3,32,4-5) hatte er jeweils konstatiert: „Keiner hielt ihn für einen Gott“.

38 Das genaue Todesdatum ist ungewiss, vgl. Scholten 2015, 12.

39 Cramer 1839, 115-163.

dionikenliste in einer Zusammenstellung von 15 Athleten erwähnt wird, die nicht vergessen werden sollten. Der Verfasser bringt lediglich den 1. Vers des Orakels ohne weitere Angaben und scheint von Kleomedes wenig zu wissen.⁴⁰

Obwohl Theodoret ca. 10 Jahre später geboren wurde als Kyrill und Sokrates, wird er hier zuerst behandelt, da er, soweit es Kleomedes betrifft, ausführlicher ist und den beiden anderen Kirchenschriftstellern möglicherweise als Quelle diente.⁴¹

Im 8. Buch von *De Graecarum affectionum curatione* („Heilung der griechischen Krankheiten“) preist Theodoret zunächst das Wirken und die Standhaftigkeit der christlichen Märtyrer, die im Glauben an die von den Aposteln überlieferten Lehren sogar den Tod auf sich nahmen (*Cur.* 8,9), und wendet sich dann empört an die heidnischen Griechen, die darüber spotteten, dass die Christen ihre Märtyrer verehrten, und ihnen vorwarfen, sich beim Besuch der Märtyrergräber zu beflecken. Selbst wenn alle Menschen daran Anstoß nehmen könnten - den Griechen spricht er das Recht ab, dieses Verhalten zu tadeln, da gerade bei ihnen Trankspenden und Totenopfer, Heroen, Halbgötter und zu Göttern erhobene Menschen das Übliche sind (*Cur.* 8,11-12).⁴² Dazu gehöre als besonders anstößiger Fall Kleomedes, den der pythische Seher durch ein Orakel zu göttlichen Ehren

40 Ein Ringer namens Philumenos (Cramer 1839, *Anecd. Graec. Paris.* II 155,17) liefert einen ungefähren terminus post quem für die Abfassungszeit: "Es lebte aber auch zu den Zeiten des Theodosios des Großen der Ringer aus Philadelphia in Lydien mit Namen Philumenos ..." d.h. Ende des 4. Jhs. (Theodosius lebte von 347 – 395, war Kaiser ab 379 n. Chr.). Ob ausgerechnet Panodoros, ein alexandrinischer Mönch, diese Zusammenstellung verfasste, wie v. Gutschmid, A., in: Schöne (ed.) 1875. Bd.1, app. S. 242 vermutete, bleibe dahingestellt. Er müsste von der Diskussion über diesen Faustkämpfer nichts mitbekommen und möglicherweise nur eine recht dürftige Schrift über Athleten exzerpiert haben.

41 Die Datierung von *De Graecarum affectionum curatione* bereitet Schwierigkeiten: Es werden die Jahre um 437, vor 431 oder vor 423 n. Chr. diskutiert, vgl. Scholten 2015, 13-14 und ausführlich 80-103, der eher eine Datierung nach 431 n. Chr. für wahrscheinlich hält (vgl. S. 101). Hammerstaedt 1996, 91 spricht von einem Frühwerk, und versucht die Abhängigkeit sowohl des Kyrill wie auch des Sokrates von Theodoret zu erweisen; auch Canivet 1958, 28-31 datiert die Schrift vor 431 oder 423 n. Chr.

42 Erstes Beispiel ist Herakles, den sie - obwohl als Mensch geboren - völlig unberechtigt angesichts seines unmoralischen Lebens zum Gott erhoben, und zwar gegen besseres Wissen, wie mit Zitaten aus Platon und Isokrates belegt wird. Es folgen Auslassungen über Asklepios, Dionysos und andere, die sie zu Göttern machten und verehrten, obwohl sie doch „elende und dreimal elende Menschenlein“ waren (ἀθλίους καὶ τρισαθλίους ἐθεοποίησαν ἀνθρώπους, *Cur.* 8,26).

kommen ließ. Theodoret zitiert beide Orakelverse (*Cur.* 8,26), um dann selbst spottend ‚aufzuklären‘, weshalb gerade Kleomedes dem Zeus und den anderen Göttern beigeordnet wurde (*Cur.* 8,27). Er schildert den brutalen Auftritt in Olympia, die Bestrafung durch die Kampfrichter und die daraus resultierende Frustration, die zum Mord an den Schulkindern führte, und fasst sein Urteil ironisch im Stile des Oinomaos zusammen: Wegen dieser „edlen Taten“ (κατορθώματα, *Cur.* 8,28) nahm der Pythier ihn unter die Götter auf. Ein Hinweis auf Kleomedes’ Flucht in eine heilige Truhe und sein für die Astypalaier unerklärbares Verschwinden fehlt hier wie auch bei den anderen Kirchenschriftstellern dieser Zeit, obwohl all das in der Vorlage bei Eusebios-Oinomaos, aus der Theodoret die Geschichte übernimmt,⁴³ als Gipfel des unwürdigen Verhaltens verspottet wurde. Hatte man vielleicht erkannt, dass es sinnvoll sei, diesen Teil der Kleomedesgeschichte aus der Diskussion herauszuhalten, nachdem Kelsos in seinem Angriff versucht hatte, gerade mit der Betonung von Kleomedes’ Verschwinden und dem Hinweis auf ähnliche heidnische Wundererzählungen die Berichte über Jesus’ Entrückung aus dem verschlossenen Grabe und sein Erscheinen vor seinen Anhängern als vergleichbare Fiktion zu diskreditieren, zumal Kelsos angedeutet hatte, dass die Heiden aus ihren Erzählungen nicht folgerten, hier seien Menschen wirklich zu Göttern geworden? Schon Origenes tat sich dort in seiner Entgegnung nicht leicht.

Nach der kurzen Erwähnung, dass Kaiser Hadrian seinen Liebling Antinoos zum Gott erklärt, ihm einen Tempel errichtet und von den Untertanen verlangt habe, ihm göttliche Ehren zu erweisen,⁴⁴ und dass auch die Spartiaten für Hyakinthos (den Liebling des Apollon) ein großes Fest feierten (*Cur.* 8,28)⁴⁵ nimmt Theodoret seine Verteidigung der christlichen Märtyrerverehrung wieder auf und stellt klar, dass die Christen ihre Märtyrer nicht zu Göttern machen, sondern sie als Zeugen und wohlgesonnene Diener Gottes ehren, während die Heiden viele Tote zu Göttern ernannt haben (*Cur.* 8,29).

43 Dass Eusebios, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, Quelle für die Theodorets Kleomedesgeschichte war, ist aufgrund der weitgehend wörtlichen Übereinstimmung nahelegend und scheint allgemein akzeptiert, zumal Theodoret auf diese Schrift verweist (*Cur.* 2,97). Vgl. zuletzt Scholten 2015, 103-122, der auch Theodorets sonstige Quellen und seinen Umgang mit den zahlreichen nichtchristlichen Zitaten verfolgt; vgl. auch Hammerstaedt 1996, 87 mit Anm. 54.

44 Die Vergöttlichung des Antinoos wurde für die Christen ein beliebtes Beispiel der „unangemessenen Verehrung unwürdiger Menschen bei den Heiden“, so Hammerstaedt 1996, 101 mit Anm. 151 und 152 (mit zahlreichen Belegstellen, u.a. Eusebios, *PE* 2,6,8-9).

45 Dazu kurz Scholten 2015, 502-503, Anm. 49.

Danach wendet er sich dem zweiten Vorwurf zu, die Christen würden sich durch den Besuch der Grabstätten beflecken.⁴⁶ An einer Reihe von Beispielen legt er dar – gestützt auf griechische Quellen von Homer über Thukydides zu Platon –, dass auch die Griechen schon immer ihre Toten, die ein hervorragendes Leben geführt hatten, in Tempeln oder Grabstätten verehrten - ohne Angst vor einer Befleckung (*Cur.* 8,30-34), um dann bis zum Ende des Buches immer wieder die besondere Einstellung der Märtyrer und ihr vorbildliches, opferbereites Verhalten hervorzuheben, das ihnen einen Platz im Himmel verschafft (*Cur.* 8,35-37). Diese Vorstellung und Erwartung decke sich - so zeigt Theodoret - auch mit dem, was griechische Dichter und Philosophen schon immer sagten.

Theodoret möchte also nicht nur den Umgang der Christen mit ihren Märtyrern verteidigen, sondern auch den nichtchristlichen Adressaten signalisieren, „daß das Christentum keine unüberwindliche Hürde aufrichtet, den angestammten Denk- und Lebenshorizont preiszugeben. Im Gegenteil läßt sich, so seine Botschaft, das, was richtig und wertvoll im nichtchristlichen Raum ist, in die christliche Denk- und Lebenswelt einbringen. Dort ist es sogar besser verwirklicht.“⁴⁷

Was Theodoret von Kleomedes und seine durch ein Orakel angeordnete kultische Verehrung zu berichten weiß, gehört allerdings nicht dazu. Das bestätigt er nochmals im 10. Buch (*Cur.* 10,38), in dem er über Urheber und Wahrheitsgehalt der Orakel handelt: Das Kleomedes-Orakel, das nochmals zitiert wird, ist ihm ein Beleg für eine Vielzahl verfehlter Orakel, und er hält es für unnötig, nochmals darauf einzugehen, sondern verweist auf die früher (*Cur.* 8,27) geschilderten Mordtaten.

5. *Kyrill von Alexandrien*

Kaiser Julian (331/2 - 363 n. Chr.) hatte eine christliche Erziehung genossen, sich dann aber vom Christentum abgewendet, alte Kulte wiederbelebt und schließlich im Winter 362/3 eine Schrift „Gegen die Galiläer“ (Christen) verfasst, deren Inhalt in erster Linie aus Kyrills Entgegnung erschlossen werden kann.⁴⁸ Obwohl einige Reaktionen von

46 Zur Problematik vgl. Scholten 2015, 503 Anm. 50.

47 Scholten 2015, 44.

48 Zuletz dazu Riedweg 2016 p. LXXXV-CVIII mit weiterer Literatur p. CXCI-CXCII.

christlicher Seite erfolgten,⁴⁹ sah sich Kyrill noch 60 - 70 Jahre später⁵⁰ zu einer Widerlegung der vorgebrachten Kritik veranlasst, da er befürchtete, dass selbst gläubige Christen verunsichert würden, und in heidnischen Kreisen offenbar die Ansicht verbreitet war, dass bisher keiner der christlichen Lehrer in der Lage war, Julians Angriffe zu widerlegen.⁵¹

In der dem Kaiser Theodosius II. gewidmeten Schrift „*Gegen Julian*“ (*contra Julianum*, PG vol. 76) setzt er sich unter anderem mit dem Vorwurf auseinander, die Christen befänden sich in einer Verirrung und seien vom rechten Weg und einem gottgefälligen Verhalten abgewichen: sie würden – anders als die Juden, die statt der vielen nur einen Gott anbeten – einen Menschen oder eher noch viele unglückliche Menschen anbeten (c. *Jul.* 808 C-D und 812 C). Gemeint sind damit Jesus und die Märtyrer. Was Jesus betrifft, so antwortet Kyrill, dass der kein Mensch war, der vergöttlicht wurde, sondern der göttliche Logos sei, der für einige Zeit in menschlicher Gestalt auf der Erde erschien (c. *Jul.* 809 C-D). Den Vorwurf einer Vergöttlichung der christlichen Märtyrer weist er wie Theodoret zurück: „Wir behaupten weder, dass die heiligen Märtyrer Götter sind, noch haben wir den Brauch, sie in einer Art Götzendienst anzubeten (προσκυνεῖν... λατρευτικῶς.), sondern sie in zurückhaltender Weise zu ehren“ (c. *Jul.* 812 A), was später wiederholt wird (c. *Jul.* 812 D), nachdem die Standhaftigkeit und Furchtlosigkeit der Märtyrer gebührend herausgestellt wurde. Und so will Kyrill zeigen, dass gegen diejenigen, die die Wahrheit verehren (die Christen), die Vorwürfe seitens der Griechen aus mangelnder Kenntnis in frevelhafter Weise ausgebreitet wurden (c. *Jul.* 812

49 Zu nennen sind Theodor von Mopsuestia, Alexander von Hierapolis, Philippos von Side, vgl. Riedweg 2016, p. LXXXIX mit Anm. 341; Scholten 2015, 38 mit Anm. 206 und 207.

50 Die Abfassungszeit ist auch hier nicht sicher, sie wurde lange zwischen 434-437 oder 439-441 n. Chr. vermutet (so etwa noch Scholten 2015, 38 mit Anm. 208; weitere Literatur bei Kinzig 2016. In: Riedweg – Kinzig (eds.) 2016, p. CX mit Anm. 411 und 412). Kinzig p. CIX-CXVI versucht eine frühe Datierung zwischen 416-426 zu begründen, die auch Riedweg ins Auge fasste. Bei der Kleomedesgeschichte lassen sich zwar gewisse Anklänge zwischen Kyrill und Theodoret, *Cur.* 8,26-8 ausmachen, die aber kaum ausreichen, eine direkte Abhängigkeit zu beweisen. Auf keinen Fall kann Theodoret seine Details aus Kyrill haben, so dass im Falle einer Abhängigkeit nur die frühere Datierung von *De Graecarum affectionum curatione* in Frage käme, die Hammerstaedt 1996, 87 mit Anm. 53 annimmt, wenn er Theodoret als Quelle für Kyrill wie auch für Sokrates zu erkennen glaubt.

51 Vgl. Kyrill, c. *Jul.*, p. 5.

C). Die Griechen hätten allerdings selbst für Menschen Opfer dargebracht, und zwar für schändliche und zügellose.⁵²

Ein Beispiel dafür ist wiederum Kleomedes, von dem er weiß, „dass er im Faustkampf roh und brutal war und sich kaum von wilden Tieren unterschied“. Aus diesem Grunde habe der Pythier ihn gelobt und von seinen heiligen Dreifüßen verkündet, wie sie (die Griechen) selbst berichten: „Der letzte der Heroen...“ (*c. Jul.* 812 D). Das Orakel wird zitiert ohne konkrete Hinweise etwa auf Kleomedes' Kindermord oder dessen Verschwinden aus der Truhe, was darauf hindeutet, dass Eusebios/Oinomaos kaum die direkte Quelle gewesen sein dürfte, sondern höchstens die bereits ausgedünnte Version des Theodoret. Allerdings fühlt sich auch Kyrill ähnlich wie Oinomaos und Theodoret veranlasst, dem Pythier ironisch zuzurufen: „Glänzende Geschenke bereitest Du den Athleten, Pythier. Welche Milde, welche Großzügigkeit: der abscheuliche und verbrecherische Mörder wird unter die Götter eingeordnet“ (*c. Jul.* 812 D-813 A).

Auch Kyrill bringt die Kleomedesgeschichte, um durch sie den Heiden vor Augen zu führen, dass deren kultische Verehrung völlig unwürdiger Menschen in keiner Weise vergleichbar sei mit der christlichen Verehrung der Märtyrer, die auch nicht für Götter gehalten werden, und schon gar nicht mit der Jesus entgegengebrachten Verehrung, da der nicht erst zu einem Gott erhoben werden musste, sondern es war.

6. Sokrates von Konstantinopel (*Scholasticus; ecclesiasticus*)

Auch für Sokrates' Exkurs in seiner *Kirchengeschichte* (*Hist. Eccl.* 3,22,19 - 3,23,61) ist Julian der Mitauslöser. Nachdem er den Tod des Kaisers geschildert hat, unterbricht er seine geschichtliche Darstellung und setzt sich mit dem Epitaphios auseinander, den Libanios auf den Kaiser verfasst

52 Aus dem offenbar in der christlichen Polemik vorhandenen Vorrat werden genannt Herakles, als dessen „Großtat“ hier die Schändung von 50 Jungfrauen in einer Nacht erwähnt wird, weiter Hermes, Asklepios, die Dioskuren und mit Apis und Osiris auch zwei nichtgriechische Beispiele, zu denen aber nichts ausgeführt wird. Weiter wird nach dem Verweis auf Kleomedes auch Alexander der Große angeführt: seine Zeitgenossen beschlossen, ihn zum 13. Gott zu ernennen, und Alexander seinerseits erhob seinen Vertrauten Hephaestion zum Gott (*c. Jul.* 823 A). Für Kyrill ließe sich diese Reihe derer, die sich den Namen der Göttlichkeit erschlichen (οἱ τὸ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα παρακλέψαντες) ins Unendliche fortsetzen (*c. Jul.* 813 A).

hatte.⁵³ In diesem Epitaphios, so schildert Sokrates entrüstet, habe Libanios den Kaiser unter anderem deshalb gelobt, weil der in seinen Schriften gegen die Christen deren Bücher angegriffen habe, in denen ein Mensch aus Palästina zu Gott und Gottes Sohn erklärt wurde, und er das, was von den Christen geglaubt und verehrt wurde, als „lächerlichen Unsinn“ (γέλωτα καὶ φλῆναφον, *Hist. Eccl.* 3,23,1; zuvor schon 3,22,11) erwiesen habe. Sokrates sieht sich veranlasst, diesen Vorwürfen zu begegnen. Dabei zielt er – anders als Theodoret – zunächst nicht so sehr darauf ab, den Glauben der Christen zu rechtfertigen, sondern betont vielmehr die Unehrllichkeit und Inkonsequenz eines Libanios, Julian und Porphyrios, indem er Libanios als opportunistischen Sophisten charakterisiert und Julian vorwirft, er habe entgegen besseren Wissens den christlichen Schriften unterstellt, sie seien voll von Gotteslästerung. Eine solche Polemik entspringe bei Julian und Porphyrios letztlich negativen Erfahrungen mit einigen wenigen Christen (*Hist. Eccl.* 3,23,1 - 3,23,39).

Dem eigentlichen Vorwurf, dass die Christen einen Menschen zum Gott gemacht hätten, begegnet Sokrates mit dem ein wenig gesuchten Hinweis auf die Inkonsequenz des Libanios selbst, der von Julian wie von einem Gott gesprochen habe (*Hist. Eccl.* 3,23,40-44).⁵⁴ Es folgt die bereits bekannte Feststellung, die heidnischen Griechen schämten sich generell nicht, viele Menschen zu vergöttlichen – und zwar nicht etwa charakterlich hervorstechende, sondern frevelhafte, ungerechte und dem Trunk ergebene wie Herakles, Dionysos und Asklepios. Und die Menge der Dichter, die über sie schreibt, mache allen klar, dass die religiösen Vorstellungen der Griechen der „wahrhaft lächerliche Unsinn“ seien.

Nach kurzer Erwähnung von Attis und Adonis zitiert Sokrates ein Orakel des Pythiers, in dem König Alexander zum Gott neben Zeus und Athene erklärt wird (*Hist. Eccl.* 3,23,53-56).⁵⁵ Während Sokrates vorgibt, noch verstehen zu können, dass das delphische Orakel aus Gefälligkeit Herrscher zu Göttern erhob, fragt er entrüstet: „Was soll man aber dazu sagen, dass es auch den Faustkämpfer Kleomedes vergöttlichte, indem es über ihn folgendes verkündete...“. Es folgt das Orakel mit beiden Versen

53 Zu Einzelheiten Hammerstaedt 1996, 77-79, der den gesamten Exkurs ausführlich behandelt (76-101).

54 Am Ende des Exkurses unterstellt ihm Sokrates, er selbst habe sogar Porphyrios vergöttlicht, als er ihn bat, gnädig (εὐμενῶς) hinzunehmen (*Hist. Eccl.* 3,23,1-2), dass er (sc. Libanios) den Kaiser als klüger und geschickter als ihn bezeichnet habe.

55 Das Orakel (Nr. Q218 Fontenrose = Nr. 509 P.-W.) ist nur bei Sokrates überliefert; allerdings ist die Vergöttlichung Alexanders ja auch bei Kyrill ein Negativbeispiel.

und der Hinweis, dass schon der Kyniker Diogenes und der Philosoph Oinomaos wegen dieses Orakels den pythischen Apollon verurteilt hätten (*Hist. Eccl.* 3,23,56-58 = Hansen (ed.) 1995, 224,10-14).⁵⁶ Mit dem Vermerk, dass es noch weitaus mehr zu sagen gäbe, beschließt Sokrates den Exkurs, den er wegen der Schmähungen des Sophisten für nötig hielt.

Insgesamt bemüht sich Sokrates hier – anders als Kyrill – nicht um eine eher sachliche Auseinandersetzung, sondern lässt seiner Entrüstung über die aus seiner Sicht unehrlichen und bewusst falschen Interpretationen freien Lauf und versucht, die drei heidnischen Kritiker als moralisch zweifelhafte Persönlichkeiten in ihrer Inkonsequenz vorzuführen.

7. *Johannes von Antiochia (Chrysostomos)*

Bei Johannes Chrysostomos (349 oder 344 - 407 n. Chr.) wird Kleomedes nicht namentlich genannt, ist aber sicher auch gemeint, wenn Johannes darauf hinweist, dass die Griechen „Faustkämpfer für Götter hielten“ (*in 2. Cor. hom.* 26,4; PG vol. 61,581,12) bzw. „Faustkämpfer und Ringer anbeteten“ (προσεκύνουν, *in Tit. hom.* 5,4; PG vol. 62,693,1).

In der Predigt über den Titusbrief steht der Satz als Beispiel für das schändliche Verhalten der Griechen, bevor Christus erschien; weitere Beispiele sind ihre dauernden kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen und der Brauch der Knabenliebe.⁵⁷

In der Predigt über den 2. Brief an die Korinther äußert sich Johannes zur heidnischen „Götzenanbetung“ (εἰδωλολατρεία, PG vol. 61,580,51) und führt sie auf eine zu große Bewunderung bestimmter Menschen zurück. Hauptbeispiel ist die Vergöttlichung und Anbetung Alexanders

56 Dass schon Diogenes Kritik an diesem Orakel geübt hat, lässt sich nicht beweisen. Dass Sokrates direkt auf Oinomaos selbst oder Eusebios, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, mit den Oinomaosexzerpten zurückgegriffen hat, ist möglich, aber eher unwahrscheinlich. Auch er würde in seiner Polemik wohl kaum die anstößigen Elemente der Kleomedeserzählung unterdrückt haben. Hammerstaedt 1996, 88-89, bringt eine Reihe von Argumenten, die für eine Abhängigkeit des Sokrates von Theodoret sprechen; das Fehlen aller Details aus der Kleomedesgeschichte und der allein vorgebrachte Vorwurf, dass ein Faustkämpfer vergöttlicht wurde, könnten aber darauf hindeuten, dass Sokrates ganz allgemein aus einem christlichen Schriftstellern vertrauten Vorrat heidnischer Negativbeispiele schöpfte.

57 Vorausgegangen war die Kritik an einem alten Orakel des Apollon, in dem der letztlich zum Töten von Menschen aufgefordert hätte, als er die Athener aufrief, sieben Jungen und sieben Mädchen als Opfer für den Minotaurus nach Kreta zu schicken.

des Großen. Ihn hatte der römische Senat, der dazu befugt war, zum 13. Gott erklärt (PG vol. 61,580,53–581,1). Dagegen sei eine Vergöttlichung von Christus verärgert abgelehnt worden, angeblich, weil sich dessen Göttlichkeit schon vorher gezeigt und das Christentum sich bereits erfolgreich ausgebreitet habe. Das bedeute aber auch, so bemerkt Johannes, dass die Göttlichkeit Christi nicht erst durch menschliche Abstimmung verkündet wurde und dass auch nicht der Glaube aufkam, Christus sei einer der Vielen, die erst durch die Abstimmung von jenen (sc. Senatoren, also Menschen) zu Göttern erhoben wurden (PG vol. 61,582,2–12). Dass die Griechen auch Faustkämpfer⁵⁸ für Götter hielten ebenso wie den Liebling des Hadrian, dient als weiterer Beleg für deren Götzenverehrung (PG vol. 61,582,12–3).⁵⁹

Der Hinweis auf die Verehrung der Faustkämpfer wird nicht weiterverfolgt oder ergänzt, dafür aber die Vergöttlichung Alexanders als verfehlt erwiesen: Dieser habe zwar zu Lebzeiten vieles erreicht und ein großes Reich errichtet, das aber nach seinem Tod zerfiel, was Johannes als Beleg dafür betrachtet, dass nach Alexanders' Tod keine Macht mehr von ihm ausging und er also kein Gott war (PG vol. 61, 581,46–582,3). Ein anderes Bild zeige sich bei Christus, dessen Verehrung andauert und sich beständig ausweitet ebenso wie die Verehrung der Märtyrer, die in verherrlichenden Worten beschrieben wird und mit der keine weltliche Pracht vergleichbar sei.

58 Wenn Johannes den Plural (πύκτας) verwendet, kann das darauf hindeuten, dass ihm mehrere Athleten bekannt waren, denen durch Orakel eine besondere Verehrung zugesprochen worden war. Zu denken wäre an den Faustkämpfer Theogenes von Thasos, den Oinomaos neben Kleomedes behandelt hatte, und den dort ebenfalls erwähnten Euthymos von Lokri, der allerdings Fünfkämpfer war, vgl. o. Anm. 12.

59 Bereits Kelsos hatte Kleomedes und Antinoos zusammen angeführt, vgl. o. Anm. 33 und 44. Dass Johannes mit seinen Beispielen aus dem heidnischen Bereich in dieser Tradition steht, die seit Origenes fassbar ist und bei den Kirchenschriftstellern des beginnenden 5. Jhs. als Folge heidnischer Polemik wieder stärker an Bedeutung gewann, ist offensichtlich. Dass allerdings Theodoret erst durch die Lektüre des Johannes angeregt wurde, die Vergöttlichung der Faustkämpfer näher in den Blick zu nehmen und sich aus Eusebios, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, die nötigen Angaben zu Kleomedes zu beschaffen, was Hammerstaedt 1996, 101 als „eine verlockende, wenn auch nicht zwingende Erklärung“ vorschlägt, ist wohl eher nicht zwingend. Gegen eine direkte Abhängigkeit des Theodoret von Johannes spricht auch, dass die offenbar weitaus wichtigere Auseinandersetzung mit dem für Alexander zitierten Orakel und Alexanders Vergöttlichung – soweit wir sehen – unbeachtet blieb; bei Sokrates (*Hist. Eccl.* 3,23,59) ist Hadrian der 13. Gott.

Das Kleomedesbeispiel und das in der christlichen Polemik verspottete Orakel könnten den Eindruck erwecken, dass der Faustkampf bei den christlichen Autoren nur negativ belegt ist. Auch bei den Griechen gab es seit Xenophanes (Frg 2 D.) ja reichlich Kritik an der übertriebenen Wertschätzung von Faustkampf und Athletik, was in der Eselsparodie des Kynikers Oinomaos einen Höhepunkt findet. Johannes belehrt eines Besseren, selbst wenn auch er an den beiden behandelten Stellen die Vergöttlichung von Faustkämpfern als Beispiel verfehlten heidnischen Irrglaubens anführt. Zahlreiche andere Stellen in seinem umfangreichen Werk zeigen jedoch, dass er gerade Faustkämpfer als Vorbilder hinstellt, wenn er die Christen zu Selbstbeherrschung, Standhaftigkeit, Einsatz und Kampf auffordert. Wiederholt beruft sich Johannes dabei auf Paulus, 1. Kor. 9,24-27: Paulus führt dort zunächst aus, dass alle Wettläufer im Stadion rennen, aber nur einer den Sieg erringt, und fordert dazu auf, um diesen Sieg zu laufen. Jeder aber, der kämpft, muss in jeder Hinsicht Enthaltsamkeit und Selbstdisziplin üben (πάντα ἐγκρατεύται), jene um einen vergänglichen Siegeskranz (στέφανον φθαρτόν) zu erringen, „wir (die Christen) aber einen unvergänglichen (ἄφθαρτον)“ (1. Kor. 9,24-25). Und so kann ihm auch ein Faustkämpfer als Vorbild dienen: „Ich boxe so, dass ich nicht nur in die Luft schlage (οὕτως πυκτεύω ὥς οὐκ ἄέρα δέρω), sondern ich quäle meinen Körper und schinde mich (1. Kor. 9,26-27)“.⁶⁰ Johannes weitet die Metapher aus. An mehr als 10 Stellen schildert er, dass der Faustkämpfer ohne Schmerzen und Wunden keinen Siegeskranz gewinnen kann, unter anderem mit der eindrucksvollen Formulierung: „Seht Ihr nicht die Faustkämpfer, die, obwohl sie am Kopf verwundet sind, die Zähne zusammenbeißen und so die Schmerzen gelassen ertragen“ (PG vol. 60,231,34-6). Und regelmäßig verwendet er „boxen“ (πυκτεύειν) als Metapher, wo im Deutschen „ringen“ gebräuchlich ist: So „boxt“ man nach seiner Wortwahl mit Dämonen, dem Teufel, den Lüsten, der Armut,

60 ἄερα δέρειν ist wie σκιαμαχεῖν („einen Schattenkampf führen“) ein Fachausdruck im antiken Boxsport: man trainiert nur bzw. ist im Kampf nicht wirklich bemüht, den Gegner zu treffen und zeigt keinen Einsatz. Allerdings verherrlicht Dion von Prusa in seinen *Melankomasreden* (or. 28 und 29) den Faustkämpfer Melankomas, der gerade mit dieser Taktik seine Gegner ermüdete und zur Aufgabe zwang, ohne sie mit Schlägen getroffen zu haben, was Dion (or.28,12) vor allem auf dessen Selbstbeherrschung, sein Aushalten von Strapazen und seine (auch sexuelle) Enthaltsamkeit zurückführt; vgl. Fiedler 1985, 145-146 mit Anm.31 zu Melankomas und 140-141 zu Paulus.

mit Tieren, für die Wahrheit oder man „boxt und kämpft“ ganz allgemein.⁶¹

Wir fassen zusammen:

Pausanias berichtet umfangreich über Kleomedes und das erteilte Orakel und enthält sich dabei jeglicher Bewertung wie vor ihm auch Plutarch. Der setzt das Verschwinden des Kleomedes und seine Erhebung zum Heros in Parallele zu Romulus' Ende und dessen Vergöttlichung, was ihn zu allgemeineren Überlegungen über Unsterblichkeit und möglichen Aufstieg der Seele bis zum Göttlichen anregte.

Bei Oinomaos bildet das Kleomedesbeispiel einen Höhepunkt in seiner Orakelkritik: Kleomedes wie Apollon ernten beißenden Spott. Eusebios kann diese Polemik nur begrüßen; sie wird ein wichtiges Element in der Auseinandersetzung der späteren Kirchenschriftsteller mit heidnischen Angriffen auf das Christentum.

Umgekehrt erhält die Kleomedesgeschichte bei Kelsos starkes Gewicht, weil das Verschwinden des Kleomedes und dessen Vergöttlichung zusammen mit weiteren ähnlichen Beispielen dazu dienen kann, die Berichte über Jesus zu diskreditieren und in ihrem Wahrheitsgehalt auf eine Stufe mit den heidnischen Erzählungen zu stellen, welche die Christen als Aberglauben ablehnen und die auch Kelsos nicht als glaubwürdig ansieht. Origenes entgegnet in seiner Widerlegung des Kelsos, dass allein schon Jesus' Wirken auf Erden seine Göttlichkeit bewiesen habe, abgesehen von den glaubhaften Bezeugungen seiner Auferstehung und den voraus gegangenen Prophezeiungen.

Für die Kirchenschriftsteller des beginnenden 5. Jhs. ist die Kleomedesgeschichte beliebter Beleg heidnischen Aberglaubens und Götzendienstes. Dass der wohl widerlichste Athlet und Faustkämpfer durch ein Orakel vergöttlicht wurde, bietet eine willkommene Angriffsfläche und sollte - so die Argumentation der christlichen Apologeten – Kritiker des Christentums

61 Stellen bei Johannes zu ἀέρα δέρειν mit Berufung auf Paulus finden sich z.B. PG vol. 47,453,13; vol. 51,76,26-29; vol. 55,682,72-4; vol. 60,774,12-5; vol. 63,51,48-52; vol. 63,868,34-8; vol. 63,9,32; dazu die Variationen „Schattenboxen“ und „schattenboxend und Luftschläge ansetzend“ (σκιαμαχεῖν, PG vol. 49,51,59 und σκιᾷ πυκτεύων καὶ ἀέρα δέρων, PG vol. 49,74,18). Die Paulusstelle kommentiert auch Theodoret (PG vol. 82,300,43-301,18), wo er von einer Metapher aus dem Bereich der Pankratiasten spricht, der sich Paulus bediene und nach der er handle. Insgesamt finden sich bei Johannes rund 130 Belege für diesen metaphorischen Gebrauch von πυκτεύειν.

verstummen lassen und davon abhalten, die auf ganz anderer Ebene stehende berechnete Verehrung Christi und der Märtyrer in Zweifel zu ziehen oder gar zu verhöhnen. Kleomedes' wundersames Verschwinden wird dabei auffälliger Weise nicht mehr thematisiert - vielleicht erschien es angeraten, diese heidnische Parallele zu Jesus' Entrückung nicht ohne Not erneut in die Diskussion zu werfen.

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Vom Text zum Raum: Hellenistische Gelehrsamkeit, frühgriechische Lyrik und ein heiliges Land um Olympia

Hans-Joachim Gehrke

Der Jubilar hat einen guten Teil seines wissenschaftlichen Lebens der Erforschung der griechischen Philosophie und Gelehrsamkeit gewidmet. Ich möchte deshalb in diesem Sinne einschlägige Texte als Ausgangspunkt nehmen, um von ihnen aus mit interdisziplinären Brückenschlägen einen besonderen Sachverhalt griechischer Kultur und griechischen Weltverständnisses näher zu beleuchten. Auf gleichsam archäologischen Wegen versuche ich, von intellektueller Polemik aus über lebensweltlich verortete Dichtung nach religiös-kulturellen Vorstellungen zu graben, mit denen die Griechen eines ihrer wichtigsten Heiligtümer und dessen Umgebung als besonderen Raum formten und in einen größeren, panhellenischen Zusammenhang brachten.¹

Dazu möchte ich mit einem konkreten Ort beginnen, der uns heute noch mit der Antike geradezu unmittelbar zu verbinden schient. Die wasserreiche Quelle Arethusa auf Ortygia, dem ältesten Teil der korinthischen Kolonie Syrakus, bietet – trotz verschiedenster Veränderungen, der letzten im Jahre 1847 – noch heute ein Bild ähnlich dem, das schon Cicero in den *Verrinen* schildert: „In hac insula (sc. Ortygia) extrema est fons aquae dulcis, cui nomen Arethusa est, incredibili magnitudine, plenissimus piscium, qui fluctu totus operiretur nisi munitione ac mole lapidum diiunctus esset a mari“ (Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.118).² Wie zahlreiche Münzbilder

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- 1 Der vorliegende Beitrag wäre nicht möglich gewesen ohne die Arbeiten am Olympia-Area-Survey. Ich bin deshalb meinen Kolleginnen und Kollegen Birgitta Eder (Wien), Erofilii Kolia (Olympia), Franziska Lang (Darmstadt), Andreas Vött (Mainz) sowie meinem Mitarbeiter Mark Marsh-Hunn (Freiburg) zu großem Dank verpflichtet. Eine ganze Reihe von Berührungen gibt es mit meiner Kieler Felix-Jacoby-Vorlesung im November 2017 (s. Gehrke, im Druck). Ich danke in diesem Zusammenhang meinen Kollegen Lutz Käppel und Peter Weiß für weiterführende Hinweise.
 - 2 „Am Ende dieser Insel (s. Ortygia) ist eine Süßwasserquelle, die Arethusa heißt, von unglaublicher Größe, ganz voll von Fischen, die von der Meeresflut völlig überschwemmt werden würde, wenn sie nicht durch eine Befestigung und eine

und Prägungen zeigen,³ war die mit dieser Quelle verbundene Nymphe gleichsam ein Symbol der Polis Syrakus. Ihr Bild signalisierte, häufig in Verbindung mit anderen sinnfälligen Motiven wie etwa Delphinen, die Identität dieser mächtigen – auch seemächtigen – Stadt.

Mit der Nymphe und auch, ganz konkret, mit ihrem Wasser waren verschiedene Geschichten und Erklärungen verbunden. Vor allem eine von diesen wurde in Gelehrtenkreisen lebhaft diskutiert. Nehmen wir Strabon, unseren wichtigsten Gewährsmann *in geographicis*, als Ausgangspunkt. Er erwähnt (Str. 6.2.4 270-1c.) einen Fluss, der aus der Quelle Arethusa entspringe und direkt ins Meer münde, und man „fabele“ (μυθεύουσι),⁴ dass dieser Fluss der Alpheios sei, der von der Peloponnes aus unterirdisch unter dem Meer hindurch bis zur Arethusa fließe und von dort ins Meer münde. Dafür führe man als Beweise an (τεκμηριοῦνται): eine Trinkschale (φιάλη), die in Olympia in den Alpheios gefallen und hier wieder aufgetaucht sei, eine Trübung des Wassers bei der Arethusa auf Grund der Rinderopfer in Olympia und eine Stelle bei Pindar (N. 1.1-2), an der im Zusammenhang mit Ortygia von einem Rastplatz (ἄμπνευμα) des Alpheios die Rede ist. Dieselbe Auffassung vertrete auch der Historiker Timaios (FGrHist 566 F41).

Dagegen führt Strabon Argumente an, die sich eindeutig auf die natürlichen Gegebenheiten beziehen. Dabei hat er ein Phänomen im Auge, das in Griechenland und darüber hinaus vor allem wegen der Karstmorphologie verbreitet war, nämlich das Verschwinden von Wasserläufen in Karsthöhlen, so genannten Katavothren.⁵ Strabon spricht bezeichnenderweise von „Schlund“ (βάραθρον) bzw. vom „verschluckenden Mund“ (στόμα τὸ καταπῖνον). So konzidiert er durchaus, dass ein unterirdischer Verlauf das Weiterfließen trinkbaren Wassers erlauben würde. Genau eine solche Öffnung gibt es aber an der Mündung des Alpheios nicht. Da das Quellwasser der Arethusa trinkbar ist, der Fluss aber während seines Verlaufes im Meer nicht ungemischt bleiben könne, ist die

Steinmole vom Meer getrennt wäre.“ (Übersetzung Hans-Joachim Gehrke). Zur Arethusa und ihrer Geschichte vgl. auch Smith 1922, 669-672.

3 Grundlegend ist immer noch Boehringer 1929; zur Thematik vgl. auch Morgan 2015, 61-8.

4 Ich übernehme die gelungene Übersetzung von Radt 2003, 179.

5 Das konnte man bezeichnenderweise gerade mit dem Alpheios in Verbindung bringen: Dessen Hauptquellen lagen bei Asea in Arkadien, nachdem er vorher in der Ebene von Tegea verschwunden war, Pausanias 8.44.3, 54.1 (vgl. auch Smith 1922, 38-9); zur modernen Situation mit den Quellen Frangovrysi und Manaraiiki s. Papachatzis 1980, 379-80).

Identifizierung nicht möglich (ἀμήχανον), und die entsprechende Annahme „fabulös“ (μυθῶδες).

Strabons Argumentation ist hier geradezu schulmäßig im Sinne antiker Philosophie und Rhetorik, wie sie auch in Gelehrsamkeit und Historiographie geläufig war, besonders wenn es um Korrektheit und Wahrheit ging. Gerade was „von Natur aus“ (κατὰ φύσιν) unmöglich war, gehört ins Reich der Legende, eben des μυθῶδες, und nicht zu den (wahren) Tatsachen der Natur und der Geschichte.⁶ Dass solche gleichsam naturwissenschaftliche Argumentation nicht überflüssig war, lehrt ein Blick auf zwei römische Autoritäten auf diesem Felde. Der ältere Plinius (*HN* 2.225) erwähnt die Verbindung von Arethusa und Alpheios, ohne diese anzuzweifeln. Ähnliches finden wir auch in Senecas *Quaestiones naturales* (6.8.2). An anderer Stelle jedoch äußert sich Seneca etwas distanzierter: Er spricht von regelmäßigen ‚Selbst-Reinigungen‘ von Quellen und erwähnt in diesem Zusammenhang für die Arethusa einen Zyklus von vier Jahren, passend zu den Olympischen Spielen, deren Rinderopfer sehr viel Mist produzierten, der dann durch den Alpheios zur Arethusa transportiert werde und dort überfließe. Der unterseeische Verlauf des Alpheios ist aber für ihn nur eine „Meinung“ (*opinio*).⁷

In vergleichbarer Weise, nur noch drastischer, polemisiert Polybios (12.4d.1-8) gegen Timaios, und wahrscheinlich hat das auch Strabon beeinflusst.⁸ Auch hier geht es um Wahrheit und Genauigkeit bzw. die Verbindung beider, die „genaue Erforschung der Wahrheit“ (ἀκριβῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐξετάζειν, 12.4d.2). Genau diese habe Timaios verfehlt, deshalb sei er der Lüge, der Falschheit, der „Trugrede“ (ψευδολογία) überführt; und um das festzustellen, brauche es auch nicht „vieler Worte“ (12.4d.4). Polybios bringt zu Timaios’ Widerlegung deshalb nur zwei ganz offenkundige Sachverhalte: Zum einen müsste Timaios als jemand, der aus der Gegend, zumal von einem besonders prominenten (ἐπιφανέστατος) Platz stammte, dort besonders gut Bescheid wissen (12.4d.4), zum anderen ist die

6 S. etwa Str. 1.2.35, 15.1.28, 17.1.43; des Weiteren s. hierzu vor allem Walbank 2011, 402; Gehrke 2014, 115.

7 Auch der eher spielerische Hinweis, dass der Adressat der Schrift, Lucilius, an diese Geschichte „geglaubt“ habe (was sich offenbar auf dessen Dichtungen bezieht), und das Zitat aus der 10. Ekloge Vergils (10.4-5; vgl. auch *Aen.* 3.692-7) mit der Anrede an Arethusa und der Anspielung auf ein Vermischen der Wasser, könnte eine gewisse Reserviertheit zum Ausdruck bringen. – Ähnliche Versionen auch bei Servius in *Vergilii ecloges* 10.4 und in *Vergilii Aeneidem* 3.694.

8 Radt 2007, 185.

Geschichte, die er erzählt, dass nämlich der Alpheios über 4000 Stadien⁹ unter dem Sizilischen Meer hinweg fließe und dass einmal infolge eines regenreichen Unwetters zur Zeit der Olympischen Spiele der Alpheios das Heiligtum überschwemmt und deshalb viel Kot von Opfertieren und eine goldene Trinkschale an der Arethusa zum Vorschein gebracht habe (12.4d.7-8), ganz offensichtlich so absurd, dass er keiner Widerlegung für würdig erachtet wird.

Die agonal-polemische Note, die die ästhetische und intellektuelle Kultur der Griechen bekanntlich kennzeichnet, ist hier besonders ausgeprägt. Ohnehin ist Timaios einer der großen, geradezu exemplarischen Kontrahenten des Polybios, zumal wo es ihm darum geht, seine eigene an Tatsachen orientierte und – dem Anspruch nach – der Wahrheit und Logik¹⁰ verpflichtete Geschichtsschreibung von anderen abzugrenzen und damit erst richtig in Szene zu setzen. Hier wird das Unwahre, die Pseudologie, also die Gegenseite, nicht selten mit dem Unglaublichen und dem Mirakulösen in Verbindung gebracht; Polybios spricht hier auch von „Paradoxologie“;¹¹ der Sucht zum Paradoxen, das hier als das Unglaubliche verstanden wird und zur Pseudologie führt.

Das darf aber nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass auch Timaios argumentiert hat. Auch er befließte sich der Methoden der Intellektuellen und Gelehrten, wie nicht zuletzt noch aus Polybios' Polemik deutlich wird. Zunächst nimmt er die Geschichte von der Verbindung bzw. Identität von Alpheios und Arethusa nicht einfach hin, sondern sucht sie überhaupt zu erklären bzw. Gründe für die Richtigkeit der Identifizierung zu finden. Wie wir sahen, wurden immer wieder zwei Beobachtungen angeführt, das Vorkommen von Rindermist in Überflutungen der Quelle und der Fund einer Trinkschale (wir würden das heute ein archäologisches Argument nennen!). Beide konnte man mit den Olympischen Spielen, also mit Olympia und damit dem Alpheios verbinden. Das konnte sogar zu der Behauptung (oder-angeblichen-Wahrnehmung) periodischer Überschwemmungen nach dem Rhythmus der Olympischen Spiele führen.¹²

9 Nach Walbank 1967, 329 ist die Angabe übertrieben; doch s. Arnaud 1993 und 2005 zur Problematik der Zahlenangaben, besonders bei direkten Linien.

10 Hierzu s. jetzt Maier 2012, bes. 17-71.

11 Plb. 3.47.6 zur Schilderung von Hannibals Alpenübergang durch „einige“ Historiker; ähnliche Grundgedanken s. bes. auch 2.56.10, 3.58.9, 7.7.1-2, 10.2.6, 15.34.1, 36.1.

12 Sen. a.O. 3.26.5; so heißt es auch in den pseudoaristotelischen *Mirabilia* (847 a 3-4), dass die Arethusa jedes fünfte Jahr „bewegt werde“ (κινεῖσθαι).

Timaíos ist demgegenüber, wenn wir Polybios Glauben schenken (und dazu haben wir gerade auf Grund seiner polemischen Attitude allen Grund), in seiner Argumentation durchaus geschickter – *more sophisticated*, wären hier die passenden Worte: Er spricht nicht von regelmäßigen Vorkommnissen, sondern von einem – einmaligen – Großereignis (κατὰ τινα χρόνον), einem Starkregenfall während der Olympischen Spiele, der die mistreichen Fluten und die goldene Phiale nach Syrakus brachte. Das ist natürlich kein Beweis, zeigt jedoch seine Argumentationsstrategie sehr klar: Er versucht, eine plausible und insofern schlüssige Erklärung aus der Erfahrungswelt zu finden: Jeder wusste – und kann auch noch heute erfahren – dass im Hochsommer (zum Zeitpunkt der Veranstaltung der Olympischen Spiele) in Griechenland starke Gewitter vorkommen können, die so große Regenfluten mit sich bringen, dass sie zu verheerenden Überschwemmungen führen konnten. Mit dieser rationalen Methode der Plausibilisierung erklärt Timaíos also den merkwürdigen Sachverhalt.

Dies sagt nun nicht nur etwas über die Methode und die intellektuelle Zugehörigkeit des Timaíos aus, sondern auch über die Situation, die er im Hinblick auf das Thema Arethusa und Alpheios vorfand. Zum einen muss es die Geschichte bereits vor ihm gegeben haben, und sie war – ganz offensichtlich auf Grund kritischer Fragen – bereits erklärungsbedürftig geworden. In der Tat hatte die Geschichte gerade zu Timaíos' Zeiten besondere Aufmerksamkeit gefunden, und zwar in einer Literaturgattung, die im frühen Hellenismus aufblühte und sich gerade dem Mirakulösen und Phantastischen zuwandte, das Polybios so unheimlich war.

Dass die Geschichte von dem langen unterirdischen bzw. unterseeischen Verlauf des Alpheios auch in diesem neuen Genre Aufmerksamkeit fand – und daraufhin unter Gelehrten und Historikern Debatten auslöste – zeigt sich in einem dem Antigonos zugeschriebenen Exzerpt, das seinerseits die *Thaumasion synagoge* des großen Dichter-Philologen Kallimachos (fr. 407 Pfeiffer; 481 Asper) zitiert.¹³ Dort wird (12.140) ebenfalls auf den Anfang von Pindars Nemeen 1 verwiesen, und dann heißt es, nicht ohne einen Sinn für das Konkrete, dass während der Olympischen Spiele, „wenn die

13 Musso 1985. Dieser wurde häufig mit Antigonos von Karystos identifiziert, was aber nicht mehr aufrechterhalten werden kann (Musso a.a.O.; Dorandi 2002, xiv.). Ob sich Kallimachos seinerseits hier auf den für westgriechische Sachverhalte bedeutsamen frühhellenistischen Autor Lykos von Rhegion berufen hat (wie in dem Abschnitt zuvor, *FGrHist* 570 F9), muss offen bleiben (skeptisch F. Jacoby z.St.; in Brill's New Jacoby (D.G. Smith) nicht in das Lykos-Fragment mit aufgenommen). Für uns tut das aber nichts zur Sache. Weitere Belege zu dieser Variante s. Scholia Pi. N. 1.1-2; Servius in *Vergili eclogas* 10.4; in *Aeneidem* 3.694.

Eingeweide der Opfertiere im Fluss ausgewaschen werden, die Quelle (sc. die Arethusa) nicht sauber sei, sondern überfließe vor Mist. Er (Lynkos? Kallimachos?) sagt aber auch, dass einmal eine Phiale, die man in den Alpheios geworfen hatte, in dieser Quelle wieder aufgetaucht sei. “ (Übersetzung nach M. Asper).

Für diese Aussage ist in dem Antigonos-Exzerpt neben Kallimachos auch Timaios als Gewährsmann genannt, und wer der erste war, lässt sich nicht mehr entscheiden. Aber eines ist dabei deutlich: Beide haben die Geschichte vorgefunden und sie mit unterschiedlichen Intentionen behandelt, als Dichter und Paradoxograph einerseits, als Historiker mit Begründungszwang andererseits.

Neben den konkreten Beobachtungen zum Inhalt der Arethusa selbst ist sowohl bei Timaios als auch bei Kallimachos/Antigonos die Nennung Pindars wichtig. Wie auch andere Beispiele zeigen,¹⁴ war der Hinweis auf literarische Autoritäten innerhalb gelehrter Diskussionen ein wichtiger Bestandteil der Beweisführung.¹⁵ Genau in diesen Zusammenhang gehört aber auch die Erwähnung der Phiale, die ganz offensichtlich auf Ibykos zurückgeht. Dieser habe, so ein Scholiast des Theognis, in seiner beiläufigen Erzählung von „der olympischen Opferschale“ (τῆς Ὀλυμπιακῆς (Wendel; codd. Ὀλυμπίας) φιάλης) den Weg des Alpheios „durch das Meer“ zur Quelle Arethusa erwähnt.¹⁶

Auf diese Weise sind wir von der hellenistischen Gelehrsamkeit in die Welt der frühgriechischen Lyrik gelangt. Hier war die Geschichte des unterseeischen Alpheios, die Kallimachos, Timaios und andere vorfanden, ganz offensichtlich schon verschiedentlich ausgestaltet, spätestens, wie aus der Erwähnung des Ibykos hervorgeht, im 6. Jahrhundert. Deren Kern war aber offensichtlich noch ein ganz anderer, und auch das geht aus Pindars 1. Nemeen (1-3) hervor.¹⁷ Neben dem schon erwähnten „ehrwürdigen Rastplatz“ (ἄμπνευμα σεμνόν) des Alpheios wird nämlich dort auch eine „Lagerstätte“ (δῆμιον) der Artemis erwähnt; und darüber hinaus ist am

14 Zu Aristoteles bzw. zur *Athenaion politeia* s. etwa Gehrke 2006, 282-3.

15 Zu Kallimachos vgl. etwa Asper 2004, 49.

16 Ibykos fr. 323 PMG=Sch. Theoc. 1.117 (p. 67f. Wendel), hierzu s. auch Braswell 1992, 32-34; Morgan 2015, 89f.

17 Die Ode ist Chromios von Syrakus gewidmet, einem engen Gefolgsmann des Hieron von Syrakus, Sieger „mit den Pferden“; 476 v.Chr.?, dazu s. Morgan 2015, 384-5.

Anfang der 2. Pythischen Ode (10-1)¹⁸ im Zusammenhang mit Ortygia von einem „Sitz“ (ἔδος) der Artemis Potamia die Rede.¹⁹

Die Verbindung von Artemis und Alpheios gibt den Schlüssel, denn Alpheios, der sich bei der Arethusa „verschnauften“ musste, hatte die Artemis von der Peloponnes bis nach Sizilien verfolgt, und daran spielt offenkundig Pindar schon an.²⁰ Von einer Flucht der Artemis vor Alpheios hatte im übrigen auch Telesilla von Argos berichtet (fr. 1 Page), die etwa in dieselbe Zeit gehört. Wie der Anfang der Geschichte in etwa ausgesehen hat, wohl schon damals, also spätestens zu Beginn des 5. Jahrhunderts, lehrt uns eine Stelle bei Pausanias, die eine aitiologische Erklärung für eine Kultraxis im Heiligtum der Artemis Alpheiaia liefert, das in Letrinoi, unweit der Mündung des Alpheios, lag.

Alpheios habe sich in die Artemis verliebt, so berichtet der Perieget (6.22.8-10), habe sie jedoch weder durch die Kraft der Überredung (*peithō*) noch durch Bitten zu einer Heirat bewegen können und deshalb versucht, sie zu vergewaltigen. Deshalb habe er sich nach Letrinoi begeben, wo die Göttin mit den Nymphen ihrer Entourage ein nächtliches Fest (παννυχίς) feierte. Artemis habe aber schon einen Verdacht gehegt und deshalb ihr eigenes Gesicht und die Gesichter ihrer Gefährtinnen mit Lehm verschmiert, so dass Alpheios unverrichteter Dinge wieder abzog. Die Letriner

18 Die Ode geht auf Hieron selber, den Sieger im Wagenrennen, 470/69 v.Chr.

19 Der Tempel der Artemis war mit dem der Athena (dieser steckt in der heutigen syrakusanischen Kathedrale Santa Maria delle Colonne) das bedeutendste Heiligtum in Ortygia: „duae (sc. aedes sacrae) quae longe ceteris antecellant, Dianae et altera...Minervae“ (Cic. Verr. 2.4.118: „zwei Tempel, die bei weitem über die anderen herausragen, der der Artemis und der andere...der der Athena,“ Übersetzung H.-J. Gehrke). Man bringt ihn in der Regel (seit Gentili 1967, vgl. auch Hinz 1998, 110) mit den Resten eines ionischen Tempels etwa aus dem letzten Viertel des 6. Jahrhunderts in Verbindung, der im Zentrum von Syrakus etwa parallel zu dem Athena-Tempel lag (s. den Überblick bei Mertens 2006, 244-7, mit weiterer Literatur in Anm. 61.62; zum urbanistischen Kontext Mertens 2006, 73-5). Weil Spolien von jenem Tempel für den der Athena (ab ca. 480 v.Chr.) verwendet wurden (Gullini 1985, 471; Mertens 2006, 247 Anm. 65. 315), war er unvollendet, und deshalb ist seine Zuweisung an den von Cicero erwähnten Artemis-Tempel wohl fraglich. Will man die Identifizierung aber aufrecht erhalten, so könnte das durchaus zu den Pindarstellen passen, weil die Quelle Arethusa nur etwa 200 m von dem ionischen Tempel entfernt ist. Andererseits könnte man auch an eine andere Lokalisierung oder an ein kleineres Heiligtum denken.

20 Vgl. Radt 2007, 185: „In ἀμπνεύμα lässt sich das Verschnauften nach der Verfolgung kaum überhören.“ Vgl. im übrigen auch die Erklärungen der Scholien.

hätten die Göttin deshalb Artemis Alpheiaia genannt.²¹ Daneben muss es aber auch die Version von der Verfolgung der Artemis gegeben haben, ob älter oder später, lässt sich nicht sagen.

Man kann sich nun gut vorstellen, dass eine derart erotisch geladene Geschichte im Hinblick auf die jungfräuliche Göttin manchen Gemütern als zu delikat erschien. Deshalb scheint eine andere Person als Verfolgte gleichsam an ihre Stelle getreten zu sein, die Nymphe Arethusa, also die Quellnymphe selber.²² Sie war eine peloponnesische Jägerin, insofern also eine Gefährtin der Artemis. Als der Jäger Alpheios sie vergewaltigen oder auch heiraten wollte, floh sie nach Ortygia und wurde zu einer Quelle, während Alpheios aus Liebe in einen Fluss verwandelt wurde (Paus. 5.7.2). Ihre Geschichte war in vielen literarischen Variationen präsentiert worden, deren bekannteste Ovids Gestaltung in den „Metamorphosen“ darstellt (592-641).²³

Am Ende war die Geschichte dann völlig gesäubert, denn schließlich wurden Alpheios und Arethusa ein richtiges Braut- und Ehepaar; und als solches genossen sie sogar eine angemessene und adäquate Verehrung: Alpheios hatte sich Arethusa als Freier mit einem „Kranz von Olympia“ genähert und dazu Blätter, Blumen und „heiligen Staub“ als Brautgeschenke dargebracht. Und ebenso warfen Besucher anlässlich der Olympischen Spiele Geschenke in den Alpheios, damit dieser sie seiner Braut zusätzlich zukommen lassen konnte.²⁴

Die literarische Kreativität und die gelehrte Diskussion führen nun aber auf weitere Sachverhalte, die auch historisch Gewicht haben. Bei genauerem Zusehen zeigt sich nämlich, dass die Geschichten auch einen Sitz im Leben hatten. Bei der Erzählung vom Anschlag des Alpheios han-

21 Nach Sch. Pi. N. 1.3 und Sch. Pi. P. 2.12 war der Beiname Alpheioa bzw. allgemein Potamia. Nach Curtius 1852, 73 steckt in der Geschichte mit dem Lehm ein Reflex auf die Überschwemmungen des Alpheios.–Zu der *pannychis* s. Weniger 1907, 105; er erwägt einen Tanz mit dem *re-enactment* der Attacke des Alpheios und seinem Verschwinden im Meer, mit dem Hinweis auf Lukian *de saltatione* 45, nach dem das ein besonders gutes Tanzmotiv sei.

22 Zum höheren Alter der Artemis-Version s. bereits Weniger 1907, 110, vgl. auch Braswell 1992, 34.

23 Vgl. im übrigen auch Verg. *Aen.* 3.692-7; dieser Text ist an der heutigen Fassung der Quelle angebracht; weitere Hinweise s. bei Wentzel 1894, 1643-4.

24 Alpheios mit dem „Kranz von Olympia“ (Stat. *Silv.* 1.2.208; Nonnos *Dion.* 13.334. 37.170; *Anth. Pal.* 9.362,1; Sid. Apoll. 1.101) bzw. einem *kótinós* (Mosch.7.2); Blätter, Blumen und „heiliger Staub“ als Brautgeschenke (Mosch. 7.3; Nonnos 37.173); Geschenke in den Alpheios (*Ach. Tat.* 1.18.2); zu den weiteren Versionen s. auch Wentzel 1894, 1635.

delt es sich, wie schon erwähnt, offensichtlich um ein Aition für den Tempel der Artemis Alpheiaia in Letrinoi und einen dort praktizierten nächtlichen Kult unverheirateter Frauen. Darüber hinaus finden wir hiermit ein sehr starkes Indiz für eine enge Bezugnahme zwischen den beiden genannten Gottheiten, Artemis und Alpheios. Auch diese lässt sich mit historischen Gegebenheiten verbinden. Schauen wir zunächst auf die lokale bzw. regionale Ebene:

Wegen der Bedeutung des Heiligtums von Olympia ragten naturgemäß Zeus, seine Mutter Rhea und seine Frau Hera hier besonders hervor. Daneben aber stehen Alpheios als bedeutender Flussgott (wie wir noch näher sehen werden) und vor allem die Artemis. Diese genoss in der gesamten Region westlich und südlich von Olympia eine besondere Verehrung, in etlichen Heiligtümern.²⁵ Eines von diesen war ein Hain der Artemis Alpheionia oder Alpheiousa an der Mündung des Alpheios. Dieses Heiligtum kann man möglicherweise mit dem schon erwähnten der Artemis Alpheiaia in Letrinoi identifizieren. Strabon (8.3.12) berichtet, dort hätten sich drei berühmte Bilder der Korinther Kleanthes und Aregon befunden. Sie stellten die Eroberung Troias, die Geburt der Athena und eine Artemis auf einem Greifen dar. Man datiert sie heute in das 7. Jahrhundert v. Chr.²⁶

25 Str. 8.3.12; Sinn 2004, 87-89; Taita 2013, 383, vgl. auch die Hinweise bei Maddoli, Nafissi, und Saladino 1999, 364; zu der generellen Verbindung der Artemis zu Flussgöttern s. Weiß 1984, 117 mit weiteren Hinweisen 219 Anm. 769.

26 Vgl. auch Ath. *Deip.* 8.446bc (mit dem Zusatz, dass bei der Darstellung von Athenas Geburt Poseidon dem „in den Geburtswehen liegenden“ Zeus einen Thunfisch reiche); zur Datierung der Kunstwerke Taita 2013, 378 (mit weiteren Hinweisen besonders im Hinblick auf Poseidon und Artemis ebd. 383-7); zum Heiligtum und zum Kult s. auch Weniger 1907, 103-8 (mit zum Teil spekulativen Überlegungen zu einem Zusammenhang mit dem Dionysoskult). Mit diesem Heiligtum verbindet Walbank 1957, 525 plausibel das bei Plb. 4.73.4 erwähnte Artemision. Letrinoi ist am ehesten im Gebiet des heutigen Pyrgos oder bei Ag. Ioannis zu lokalisieren (zu Pyrgos s. schon Partsch 1897, 6, zum heute nicht mehr existierenden Kloster Ag. Ioannis zwischen Pyrgos und Katakolo s. Leake 1830, 33; Buchon 1843, 503; Meyer 1950, 1736, weitere Hinweise bei Papachatzis 1979, 392 A.1; Maddoli, Nafissi, und Saladino 1999, 374; Roy 2004, 499-500; Ruggeri 2004, 171; Taita 2007, 47 mit Anm. 20). Sein Territorium reichte ganz offensichtlich bis an das südlich angrenzende Epitalion und bis an die Mündung des Alpheios. Wenn man Paus. 6.22.8 auf das Territorium von Letrinoi bezieht, könnte man den Tempel der Alpheiaia (Paus. 6.22.8-10) mit dem Heiligtum bzw. Hain der Artemis Alpheionia bzw. Alpheiousa identifizieren (vgl. Maddoli, Nafissi, und Saladino 1999, 374; Ruggeri 2004, 175-6; dagegen Partsch 1897, 6; Taita 2013, 379-80).

Die genannte Artemis Alpheionia/Alpheioussa hatte auch ein jährliches Fest im Heiligtum von Olympia (Str. 8.3.12). Außerdem hatte Alpheios neben seinem dortigen Altar auch noch einen gemeinsamen Altar mit Artemis. Diesen konnte man auf die erwähnte Geschichte in Letrinoi beziehen, und er wurde im Rahmen der monatlichen Opfer der Eleier mit besucht.²⁷ Naturgemäß musste die Göttin ihren jungfräulichen Status behalten; aber nichtsdestoweniger standen die beiden gerade in der Region so wichtigen Gottheiten in einer besonderen Beziehung. Man fühlt sich an die ähnlich unvollkommene Verbindung zwischen Hephaistos und Athena erinnert, die mit der Athener Akropolis und mit der Identität der Athener verbunden ist. Während dort zwei Gottheiten in inniger Verbindung stehen, die Geschicklichkeit und Handwerk verkörpern, sind es hier solche, die gerade das Natürliche symbolisieren, und zwar im Sinne einer durchaus noch wilden und gefährlichen Natur, von Wasser, Wald und Jagd. Es lag nahe, gerade sie im Kult einzuhegen und rituell zu zähmen.

Für die Präsenz des Religiösen in der Landschaft um Olympia ist aber der Fluss Alpheios besonders charakteristisch. Er verdeutlicht auf seine Weise einen dem Thales zugeschriebenen Spruch, dass alles voll Göttern sei.²⁸ Zunächst ist er das Wasser, in ganz physisch-elementarem Sinne, als nährende und zerstörerische Kraft. Das wird jedem sichtbar, der sich an seinen Ufern bewegt. Dieses Wasser hat aber auch eine besondere, numinose Qualität. Zugleich ist er, wie wir sahen, als anthropomorpher Gott ein Akteur in Mythos und Geschichte, in der für die griechische Kultur so charakteristischen Verquickung; es gibt keinen griechischen Flussgott mit einem derart reichhaltigen Narrativ. Und schließlich ist er Gegenstand kultischer Verehrung. Und all dies verdichtet sich an seinem Unterlauf und insbesondere am Platz des Heiligtums von Olympia und dessen näherer Umgebung.

Hier war zunächst eine Furt des Flusses, also eine der wenigen Stellen, wo dieser überquert werden konnte. Das hatte per se eine große Bedeutung, vor allem aber im Leben von Hirten, die hier ihr Vieh ziehen ließen,

27 Herodotos *FGrHist* 31 F34 (Sch. Pi. O. 5.10); Paus. 5.14.6 (dazu Maddoli und Saladino 1995, 213 mit Weniger 1907, 98-101; 108-9); Sch. Pi. N. 1.3, vgl. generell Maddoli, Nafissi, und Saladino 1999, 376; Ruggeri 2004, 175-6; Sinn 2004, 175-6. Bei der Mündung des Kladeos wurde 1975 die Maske eines Flussgottes gefunden, die man mit dem Alpheios-Kult verbinden könnte (Moustaka 2009/10).

28 11 A 22 Diels-Kranz, vgl. vor allem Schlesier 2000, 144.

zumal in den Auf- und Abtrieben zu den verschiedenen Jahreszeiten.²⁹ Dazu kam eine auffällige Erhebung, die man mit Zeus' Vater Kronos in Verbindung brachte sowie eine bei Einrichtung des Kultes im 11. Jahrhundert noch sichtbare und später als Grab des Pelops ausgestaltete Ruine – sie gehört in die Mitte des 3. Jahrtausends –, der man offensichtlich einen numinosen Charakter zuschrieb.³⁰ Genau dies aber war auch mit dem Alpheios geschehen. Der im wirklichen Leben wichtige Fluss mit der Furt hatte darüber hinaus eine große Bedeutung für den Kult.

Schon wegen der Fülle und der Qualität seines Wassers³¹ nahm der Alpheios unter den griechischen Flüssen eine besondere Position ein, als „der lieblichste unter den Flüssen“ (Dionys. Per. 410). Aber am Aschealtar, also am zentralen Punkt des Kultgeschehens und damit des Heiligtums von Olympia, kam diesem Wasser eine besondere Bedeutung zu: Im Zusammenhang mit dem Frühjahrs-Äquinoktium, am 19. Elaphion, in dem der Artemis heiligen Monat (März/April)³² formten die Seher des Heiligtums den Aschealtar empor, indem sie die im Prytaneion aufbewahrte Asche der Opfertiere mit Wasser des Alpheios vermischten. Die Involvierung der Seher hängt mit der wichtigen Rolle des Orakels an diesem Altar zusammen, das als so genanntes Brandorakel funktionierte.³³ Gerade das verbindet Pausanias mit dem Hinweis, dass Alpheios „von allen Flüssen dem Olympischen Zeus am liebsten gewesen“ sei (5.13.11). Sein Wasser

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- 29 Zur Furt (und zu deren Zusammenhang mit dem markanten Kronoshügel sowie dem Pelops-Heiligtum) s. bes. Pi. O. 1.92, 2.14, 10.43-50; angesichts der Tatsache, dass *πόρος* in der poetischen Sprache auch das Bett eines Flusses bezeichnen kann, hält Taita 2001, 127-8 zurecht an der Bedeutung „Furt“ fest; die drei Pindarstellen mit diesem Wort sollen ganz präzise den Punkt beim Heiligtum bezeichnen, nicht dessen „Bett“, also den gesamten Verlauf des Flusses. Zur generellen Bedeutung des Platzes und der Furt auch in der Lebenswirklichkeit s. Taita 2001, 126-7; zur Beziehung zwischen Olympia und dem Alpheios in der archaischen Literatur (und ggf. auch in der Rechtssprache) s. Alonso Troncoso 2013, 219.
- 30 Zum Pelopion und zu den dortigen früheren Resten, insbesondere dem Tumulus aus der Mitte des 3. Jahrtausends v. Chr. (FH II) s. bes. Kyrieleis 2006, 55-61; 79-83.
- 31 Nach Pausanias (5.7.1) war sein Wasser „an Menge viel (*πλήθει πολύ*)...und sehr angenehm anzuschauen (*ἰδόντι ἡδιστον*)“; Bakchylides nennt ihn (passend zu Ausdehnung und Strömung bzw. zum Wasserreichtum auch im Sommer) „breit wirbelnd“ (*εὐρυδῖναν*) und „unermüdlich fließend“ (*ἀκαμαντοροῖαν*) (3.6-7; 5.38; 180); vgl. auch die bei Taita 2013, 368 Anm. 110; 371 Anm. 128 angegebenen Quellen.
- 32 Paus. 6.20.1, mit Maddoli und Saladino 1995, 258; Trümper 1997, 199-201; plastisch dazu Weniger 1907, 96-7.
- 33 Vgl. Pi. O. 8,2-5.

hatte jedenfalls auch sakrale Qualität – und es steht in Verbindung mit der Seherkraft.

Pindars 6. Olympische Ode zeigt nun, wie diese Verbindung narrativ ausgestaltet worden ist.³⁴ Diese Ode gilt Hagesias von Syrakus, dem Olympiasieger im Maultiergespann der Spiele von 472 oder 468 v.Chr. Er war ein Iamide, gehörte also zu einem der beiden berühmten olympischen Sehergeschlechter. Pindar erzählt auch von dessen Stammvater Iamos, der ein Enkel des Poseidon und Sohn des Apollon gewesen war. Als Ephebe, also im Übergang in die Welt der Erwachsenen, sei dieser „mitten in den Alpheios gestiegen“ und habe seinen Großvater Poseidon und seinen Vater Apollon angerufen (96-101). Daraufhin habe ihn Apollon zum „schroffen Fels des hohen Kronion“ (109-10), also zum Platz des Heiligtums, gebracht und ihm „den doppelten Schatz der Sehergabe (μαντοσύνη)“ verliehen: Er konnte deshalb zum einen die untrügliche Stimme Apollons verstehen und zum anderen zu dem Zeitpunkt, als Herakles die Spiele etablierte, „am höchsten Altar des Zeus ein Orakel einrichten“ (111-9). Seitdem sei das Geschlecht der Iamiden hochberühmt (πολύκλειτον γένος) unter den Griechen.

Hier stehen die beiden wesentlichen Elemente des heiligen Platzes, gerade in Bezug auf den konkreten Ort selber, in engster Verbindung: der große Agon und zugleich die Orakelfunktion des Heiligtums. Und beides hängt lokal, rituell und mythisch-historisch mit dem Alpheios genuin und unauflöslich zusammen. Bezeichnenderweise hat der Fluss aber auch eine Verbindung mit dem anderen bedeutenden Sehergeschlecht von Elis bzw. Olympia, den Klytiaden. Diese war eher indirekter Natur, aber wer mit den Mythen vertraut war, konnte sie jederzeit erkennen. Die Klytiaden führten ihr Geschlecht nämlich über ihren eponymen Stammvater Klytios, dessen Vater Alkmaion und Großvater Amphiaraios letztlich auf Melampus zurück, den Sohn des Amythaon, des Enkels des Aiolos (Paus. 5.17.6). Dieser war ein geradezu paradigmatischer Seher und Heiler (beides geht ja nicht selten zusammen) der ältesten griechischen Sagenschichten und entsprechend prominent.³⁵ Auf Grund der hier vorgestellten Beziehungen hat man bestimmte Figuren im Ostgiebel des Zeustempels plausibel mit

34 Zur Ode s. jetzt Adorjáni 2014, bes. 34-7 (zu Hagesias, vgl. auch Luraghi 1997); 53-5 (zum Datum); 78-9; 125; 233-4; 241 (zur Mantik und zum Brandorakel); 101.222 (zum Wasser und zum Alpheios).

35 Er hatte bereits in der homerischen Epik ein klares Profil, s. Hom. *Od.* 11.285-97 (ohne Namensnennung als μάντις ἀμύμων schlechthin, 291), 15.225-55; Weiteres dazu, auch zu seinem Stammbaum, bei Maddoli, Nafissi, und Saladino 1999, 304; Käppel 1999; Köiv 2013, 340 mit Anm. 170.

den erwähnten Stammvätern Iamos (links), Klytios (rechts) und Melampus (rechts) identifiziert.³⁶

Im Mythos (und damit für die Griechen immer auch: in der frühen Geschichte) ist Melampus nicht auf einen Ort fixiert. Man findet ihn zuletzt in Argos. Vorher war er aber, gemeinsam mit seinem Bruder Bias, in der Gegend von Triphylien und Pisa verankert (Str. 8.6.10), und Pisa kann auch geradezu synonym bzw. komplementär zu Olympia gebraucht werden:³⁷ Melampus soll beispielsweise in der Nähe des Heiligtums der Anigriadischen Nymphen bei Samikon die Töchter des Proitos gereinigt haben – und damit erklärte man den Gestank bei den schwefelhaltigen Heilquellen an der Lagune von Kaïapha (den man noch heute wahrnimmt).³⁸ Die dortigen Quellen haben angeblich gegen weißen Ausschlag (*alphos*) geholfen, wie im übrigen auch das Alpheios-Wasser selber – was die Grundlage für eine Erklärung von dessen Namen bildete.³⁹ Am Alpheios soll Melampus auch dem Apollon begegnet sein, und dadurch sei er zum besten Seher geworden (Apollod. *Bibl.* 1.9.11).

Alpheios stand ferner auch in einer mythischen Verbindung mit den Ionidischen Nymphen. Diese verkörperten die Heilkraft einer Quelle, die der von Samikon vergleichbar war und die sich in der Nähe des Ortes Herakleia befand, der zu Pisa gehörte. Sie waren nach Ion genannt und sollen diesem Veilchenkränze dargebracht haben, als er von einem Bade im Alpheios auftauchte. Möglicherweise hat das dem Fluss in Kallimachos'

36 Grundlegend hierzu Simon 1968, 157-165, s. jetzt auch Kyrieleis 2012/13, 77, der für den bärtigen Seher rechts, von Simon mit Melampus' Vater Amythaon identifiziert, den Stammvater Klytios vorschlägt, was wegen der Parallele zu Iamos näher liegt. Der so genannte Jugendliche Seher (Figur E) wurde von Simon 1968, 161-2 (zustimmend jetzt auch Kyrieleis 2012/13, 79) mit Melampus identifiziert, weil er mit seinem Finger offensichtlich auf seinen namengebenden Fuß verweist.

37 IvO 11=Minon 2007, nr. 12. 5; Pi. O. 1.18, 2.3, 3.9, 6.5, 8.9, 10.43, 13.29, 14.23; N.10.33; Parthenia 2.49 Sn.-M., B. 5. 180-2, Hdt. 2.7.1-2.; Niese 1910, 28-9; Meyer 1950, 1737-43, 1755; Minon 2007, 90; Giangiulio 2009, 70, 80, bes. 76: „two sides of one and the same coin.“

38 Str. 8.3.19; Paus. 5.5.10.

39 Str. 8.3.19. Das Wasser des Alpheios soll auch gegen Epilepsie gewirkt haben (Sch. Hom. *Od.* 3.489). Günther Neumann hat eine andere Erklärung des Namens gegeben: Er dachte an einen –es-Stamm und an ein von *alphesios* abgeleitetes Adjektiv *alpheios*. Das würde die Bedeutung „Gewinn“ nahelegen (*alphano* bedeutet „Ertrag bringen“), Alpheios wäre dann der „Gewinn-reiche“ (Neumann bei Weiß 1984, 227 Anm. 901). Auch der Stamm *alphi-* im Sinne von Gerstenmehl wurde ins Spiel gebracht und danach der elische Monat Alphiōos (dazu s. Weniger 1907, 108; Trümper 1997, 199-201; Ruggeri 2004, 174-5 mit Anm. 556) zeitlich fixiert; aber all das bleibt unsicher (Minon 2007, 179).

Zeushymnos (22) den Namen Iaon eingebracht.⁴⁰ Und die Geschenke, die man zu Zeiten der Olympischen Spiele in den Fluss warf, sind bereits erwähnt worden.⁴¹ Sie belegen eine hohe Popularität des Kultes und der damit verbundenen Geschichten und Gedichte.

Der Alpheios war also ein natürlicher Fluss, der zugleich mit besonderem, geheiligtem Wasser ausgestattet war und dadurch mit Heil- und Seherkraft in Verbindung stand bzw. solche verleihen konnte. Zugleich war er, wie wir schon sahen, ein bedeutender Gott, ein Sohn des Okeanos und der Thetys, dem schon Nestor einen Stier geopfert hatte.⁴² Diesem Gott galten verschiedene Kulthandlungen, und über diesen Gott wurden viele Geschichten erzählt: Er war präsent in Ritus und Mythos. Mit anderen Worten, ein Natur- bzw. Landschaftsphänomen war direkt mit dem Numinos-Göttlichen amalgamiert. In diesem Sinne war Alpheios für den an seinem Ufer aufgewachsenen Iamos offenkundig zugleich ein Kourotrophos, also eine fürsorgende Gottheit, die dem Gedeihen der Kinder hilfreich war.⁴³

40 Zu Ion s. Nikandros fr. 74 Schneider (bei Athen. 15. 683ab). Zur Verbindung mit Iaon, der als arkadischer Fluss auch bei D.P. 416 belegt ist, s. die Vermutung von K. Müller (GGM II p. 128). Die Verbindung zu den Ionidischen Nymphen wird gestützt durch eine bei Pindar literarisch angedeutete Etymologie des Iamos: Nach Pi. O. 6.55ff. sei dieser nach seiner Geburt u.a. unter Veilchen ausgesetzt worden. – Zur Lage dieses Heiligtums und dieser Quelle, die in den Fluss Kytherios/Kytheros in der Nähe von Herakleia mündete, s. Str. 8.3.32 (40 Stadien–7,4 km–von Olympia entfernt), Paus. 6.22,7 (50 Stadien–9,3 km). Das Wasser dieser Quelle soll gegen verschiedene Schmerzen und Erschöpfungszustände geholfen haben (Str. a.a.O.; Paus. a.a.O.). Das Heiligtum wurde aus guten Gründen – man vergleiche auch die Situation in der Lagune von Kaiapha, an dem Heiligtum bzw. der Quelle der Anigriadischen Nymphen–mit der schwefelhaltigen Quelle Loutra bei dem kleinen Dorf Pournari in Verbindung gebracht, und in der nahegelegenen Flur „Marmara“ (zwischen den heutigen Orten Pournari und Pelopion) hat man den Platz von Herakleia angenommen (vor allem Panayotopoulos 1991, 275–277, dort auch, 276f., instruktiv zum modernen Badebetrieb zwischen 1909 und 1972, von dem der heutige Zustand kaum noch etwas errahnen lässt); zur Lage vgl. auch Ruggeri 2004, 195.

41 S.o. 242 mit Anm. 24; vgl. auch Nilsson 1906, 425.

42 Hes. *Th.* 338, Hom. *Il.* 11.728. In Euripides' „Iphigenie in Aulis“ haben Nestors Schiffe am Heck als Zeichen (σημα) ein Bild des „benachbarten“ Alpheios, mit Stierfüßen (273–276).

43 Weiß 1984, 134; Griffith 2008, 5; dafür spricht auch das Haaropfer des Oinomaos-Sohnes Leukippos, s.u. 251. Dass dort eine andere aitiologische Erklärung gegeben wird, fällt wenig ins Gewicht, da solche explanatorischen Geschichten in der Regel *ex post* aus dem Ritual entwickelt wurden.

Göttlichen Wesen von dieser Art blieben also Natur, sie konnten aber auch als Gottheit und somit, nach griechischer Vorstellung, anthropomorph imaginiert werden, also auch als Akteure auftreten, ganz konkret, z. B. als Mütter und Väter,⁴⁴ oder, wie wir schon sahen, als brutale oder zärtliche Liebhaber. Ihre Geschichten hingen mit bestimmten Lokalisationen zusammen, und in diesen zeigte sich auch ihre physische Seite. Damit aber fassen wir auch ein wesentliches Element griechischer Raumvorstellungen, nämlich eine spezifische mythisch-religiöse Interpretation der Landschaft. Im Sinne von Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2004, 339) könnte man hier von einem *espace existentiel* sprechen. Dieser ist immer auch ein mythischer Raum, und in diesem geht es nicht um eine „représentation, mais une véritable présence...; toute ‚apparition‘ (*Erscheinung*) est ici une incarnation.“⁴⁵

In solch einem Raum ist ein Fluss ein Fluss, der Wasser schenkt, mit seinen Alluvionen Land und Fruchtbarkeit bringt, aber mit seinen Überschwemmungen auch verheerend wirken kann. Zugleich verkörperte er viel mehr, als numinose Kraft und als göttliche Gestalt. Und damit konnte das Heilige nicht nur als Kraft in der Natur erfasst werden, sondern auch eine Person in einer Erzählung und ein Beteiligter an einem Geschehen sein. Und wenn es als Akteur imaginiert wurde, konnte es auch ganz konkret in der Landschaft unterwegs sein. Es war ein physischer Teil von ihr, aber eben auch ein Bestandteil ihres Mythos und damit ihrer Geschichte. Und als solche konnte es auch kultisch verehrt werden, in allen verschiedenen Formen und auch im Zusammenhang mit den Erzählungen:

In Elis beispielsweise gab es für Alpheios ein Traueritual aus Anlass seiner Abreise. Ganz offensichtlich ist die Geschichte von seiner Verfolgung der Artemis/Arethusa nicht nur mythistorisch memoriert und

44 Alpheios als Stammvater bei Weiß 1984, 139f.

45 Merleau-Ponty 2004 (1945), 342f., vgl. ebd. 345: „Comprendre le mythe n'est pas croire au mythe, et si tous les mythes sont vrais, c'est en tant qu'ils peuvent être replacés dans une phénoménologie de l'esprit qui indique leur fonction dans la prise de conscience et fonde finalement leur sens propre sur leur sens pour la philosophie.“ Das heißt im übrigen nicht, dass der Raum in dieser Vorstellung vollkommen imaginiert ist; er ist immer auch in seiner konkret erfahrbaren, physischen und insofern objektiven Gegebenheit wirksam. Das Charakteristikum dieses Raumverständnisses liegt gerade in der Interdependenz von realer Umwelt und relationaler Deutung (s. Merleau-Ponty a.O. 340-1 und vgl. auch markant Michaels 2006, 276-278).

erzählt, sondern auch kultisch-rituell nachvollzogen worden.⁴⁶ Obwohl in der Stadt und der Ebene von Elis ebenfalls ein mächtiger Fluss präsent war, hatte der Alpheios – gewiss dank einer Ausstrahlung von Olympia her – eine solche Bedeutung in dem politischen Verband von Elis, dass sogar ein Monatsname im dortigen Kalender nach Alpheios benannt war.⁴⁷ Diese Tatsache weist auf eine kultische Verehrung des Alpheios hin, möglicherweise auf das erwähnte Trauerritual, dem dann, ausweislich des Monatsnamens, im religiösen Leben der Eleer besondere Bedeutung zukam.

Besonders aber finden wir Alpheios in seiner Heimat, gerade auch, wie wir sahen, als handelnde Person und Gegenstand religiöser Verehrung. Geradezu emblematisch ist er im Ostgiebel des Zeustempels von Olympia personifiziert. Dort ist er, schon durch seine Situierung in dessen Südecke klar lokalisiert, im linken Zwickel dargestellt.⁴⁸ Schon die künstlerische Ausführung unterstreicht seine Bedeutung. „Der breite, durch die Ebene strömende Alpheios ist durch eine Gestalt charakterisiert, die ruhig daliegt, ihre ganze Körperbreite dem Betrachter darbietet und ihren rechten Arm entspannt auf der Hüfte ruhen lässt. Der Kopf ist bequem auf die Hand gestützt, die ganze Gestalt strahlt Gelassenheit und ruhige Fülle aus.“⁴⁹

Das bringt uns zu dem Wagenrennen zwischen Oinomaos und Pelops selbst, an das – in der Phase vor der großen Auseinandersetzung, die aber das Ende schon vorwegnimmt – der Ostgiebel erinnert. Es wird ja damit zu einem großen Gründungsmythos, als Teil elisch geprägter Mythistorie, die als solche auch vielfältig im Heiligtum und in seiner Umgebung

46 Zu diesem polyvalenten Charakter s. Weiß 1984, 14-5, mit Verweis auf Nilsson 1955, 237, der von einer „Verbindung der Gottheit mit ihrem Natursubstrat“ spricht (vgl. hierzu jetzt auch Saloway 2017). In Elis gab es für Alpheios „eine Art Trauerfest“ (Wentzel 1894, 1632), während dessen die Eleier unter Tränen den Alpheios symbolisch bei seiner Reise geleiteten (Himerios 12.7 Colonna). Alpheios wurde aber, neben Olympia und Elis, auch an verschiedenen anderen Orten göttlich verehrt: Einen Kult hatte er in Heraia (Plb. 4.77.5, 78.2; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Heraia*); das dortige Götterbild stellte den Alpheios in Menschengestalt dar (Ael. *VH* 2,33). In Asea hat es offenbar Kranzopfer für ihn gegeben (Str. 6.2.9).

47 Weniger 1907, 108; Trümper 1997, 199-201; Ruggeri 2004, 174-5 mit Anm. 556.

48 Paus. 5.1.7 mit Weiß 1984, 126-141; Kyrieleis 2012/13, 57, 63 (mit weiteren Hinweisen). Paus. 5.24.7 erwähnt eine Siegesweihung der Chersonesier von Knidos: In ihr war, flankiert von Pelops und Alpheios, Zeus dargestellt, vgl. Kahn 1970, 202; Kyrieleis 2012/13, 66. Auf diese Darstellung des Alpheios bezieht sich offensichtlich Ael. *VH* 2.33.

49 Kyrieleis 2012/13, 63.–Zu Alpheios und Kladeos auf elischen Münzen hadrianischer Zeit s. Weiß 1984, 131-2.

repräsentiert ist.⁵⁰ Und die Präsenz des Alpheios im Ostgiebel verweist nicht nur, wie schon angedeutet, auf den schlichten räumlichen Bezug, sondern auch darauf, dass das Rennen und seine Akteure bezeichnenderweise auch mit dem Alpheios verbunden waren:

In seiner 1. Olympischen Ode, die dem Sieg Hierons von Syrakus im Pferderennen (476 v. Chr.) gilt und vor allem Pelops und seinen Sieg über Oinomaos als aitiologischen Mythos für die Spiele herausstellt,⁵¹ schildert Pindar plastisch (mit Anspielung auf das Pelopion), wie Pelops als Heros „bei der Furt des Alpheios ruht“ (O. 1.92). Leukippos, der Sohn des Oinomaos, soll sich zu Ehren des Gottes das Haar nicht geschoren haben (Paus. 8.20.2-3). Der Sophist Philostrat beschreibt in seinen *Imagines* (1.17.4) ein Bild. In diesem sieht man Alpheios, wie er aus seinem Wasser springt und Pelops den olympischen Siegeskranz überreicht. Entsprechend begegnet Alpheios auf römischen Sarkophagen im Zusammenhang mit Pelops.⁵² Daneben gab es im Hippodrom, an dem Ende der Meta, die dem Ziel nahe war, eine Bronzestatue der Hippodameia, die dem siegreichen Pelops eine Binde umlegte.⁵³ Im Hippodrom wiederholte sich also das legendäre Wagenrennen um die Hand der Hippodameia und die Herrschaft über Olympia symbolisch alle vier Jahre während der Spiele. Und Teil dieses Geschehens, als Handlungsort wie als Beteiligter, war der Alpheios, eingebettet in große religiöse *re-enactments*.

So viel ergibt sich zur Rolle des Flusses, seiner Gestalt und seiner Geschichten, wenn man sich auf deren ‚Tatort‘ und dessen nähere Umgebung konzentriert. Doch kehren wir zum Ausgangspunkt zurück, der merkwürdigen Verfolgung einer Göttin oder einer Nymphe unter dem Meer, von der Peloponnes bis nach Sizilien, von Letrinon bis nach Syrakus. Gerade dadurch erhielten Alpheios und sein Mythos ja schon relativ früh eine besondere Note. Können wir auch für diese Passage einen Sitz im Leben finden?

50 Zu Pelops in diesem Zusammenhang s. Kyrieleis 2006, 55-61; 79-83; vgl. auch 2012/13, 53; 82-84; zu der kultischen und narrativen Memorierung in Olympia und seiner Umgebung s. Gehrke, im Druck.

51 Nagy 1986; 1990, 116-135; Griffith 2008, 3.

52 O. Palagia LIMC nr. 10-12, s. auch Weiß 1984, 135 und zum Zusammenhang mit Pelops (bei Pindar) s. Griffith 2008, 1-2.

53 Paus. 6.20.19; sie ist auch erwähnt in dem byzantinischen metrologischen Text mit den Maßen des Hippodroms, dazu Maddoli, Nafissi, und Saladino 1999, 345-6 (mit weiterer Literatur); eine Übersetzung bei Sinn 2004, 136.

Man hat darin beispielsweise einen Reflex von nautischen Praktiken und Kenntnissen gesehen.⁵⁴ Unabhängig davon, liegt es meiner Auffassung nach am nächsten, hier (auch angesichts mancher Skepsis) an eine konkrete und traditionelle Beziehung zwischen Olympia, Elis und Syrakus zu denken, die mit der Gründung der Kolonie Syrakus (ca. 733 v.Chr.)⁵⁵ zusammenhängt.⁵⁶ Im Hinblick darauf zitiert Pausanias (5.7.3) das delphische Orakel für den Gründer Archias. In diesem wird Ortygia genannt, „wo die Mündung des Alpheios herausquillt und sich mit den Quellen der schön fließenden Arethusa vermischt“ (Übersetzung H.-J. Gehrke). Die Authentizität dieser Verse unterliegt allerdings erheblichen Zweifeln.⁵⁷ Man sollte also nicht zu viel auf sie bauen. Wichtiger – und tragfähiger – ist aber die Figur des Iamiden Hagesandros aus Syrakus in Pindars 6. Olympischer Ode. Dieser wird dort geradezu als „Mitgründer (συνοικιστήρ) des berühmten Syrakus“ vorgestellt (O. 6.6).⁵⁸ Die Beziehung zu Elis–Olympia durch sein Sehergeschlecht einerseits, seine bürgerliche Zugehörigkeit zu Syrakus andererseits könnten ihre Erklärung darin finden, dass das Geschlecht in die Gründung von Syrakus involviert war und dort auch naturalisiert war. Zu berücksichtigen ist ferner das Zeugnis des Ibykos, das die Verbindung von Alpheios und Ortygia immerhin für das 6. Jahrhundert belegt.

Deshalb spricht einiges dafür, dass es zwischen Elis, Olympia und Syrakus besondere Beziehungen gab,⁵⁹ womöglich im Zusammenhang mit der Gründung der Kolonie. Diese konnten in ritueller Form und in

54 Bes. Bilić 2009.

55 Nach Thukydides 6.3.2, 5.3, „à peu près exacte,” (Vallet und Villard 1952, 298), vgl. auch Timaios *FGrHist* 566 F80 (Sch. Apollonios Rhodios 4.1216); Sch.A.R. 4.1212.

56 Vgl. die Hinweise und Überlegungen bei Maddoli und Saladino 1995, 213 sowie neuerdings Griffith 2008, 3-6; Morgan 2015, 62-3; 89-90; 84-5; skeptisch Luraghi 1997.

57 Strabon etwa hat auch noch andere Versionen (6.2.4).

58 Vgl. hierzu auch Sch. Pi. O. 6.8a.

59 Vgl. Weniger 1915, 68-9; Hönle 1968, 68-76; Griffith 2008, 4; Kyrieleis 2012/13, 80f.; Gehrke 2013, 48 mit Anm. 51.; Morgan 2015, 89-90. Zwei Fragmente von *kerykeia*, aus Olympia und im Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe in Hamburg, aus dem 2. Viertel des 5. Jahrhunderts, sind inschriftlich als öffentliches Eigentum der Syrakusaner identifizierbar (Hornbostel und Hornbostel 1988). Sie könnten diese besondere Beziehung reflektieren, freilich auch anders erklärt werden. Luraghi 1997 verortet Hagesias in Stymphalos (als Sohn des Iamiden Sostratos, der dort das Bürgerrecht erhalten habe) und denkt an einen aktuellen Wechsel nach Syrakus. Das ist ingeniös und durchaus vorstellbar, aber insgesamt auch sehr voraussetzungsreich.

mythischem Narrativ bewahrt werden.⁶⁰ Das wird auch dadurch gestützt, dass sich die Deinomeniden in ihrer betont panhellenischen Orientierung und Selbstdarstellung besonders auf diese Verbindungen bezogen: Offenbar spielen Gelons Tetradrachmen-Prägungen auf die Beziehungen zwischen Alpheios, Olympia und der Arethusa an.⁶¹ Und die bereits erwähnte Hervorhebung von Pelops, Iamos und Alpheios in Pindars und Bakchylides' Epinikien gehören zu Hieron und in sein Umfeld. Man kann sie mit einer bewussten Politik des syrakusanischen Tyrannen verbinden.⁶²

Damit hat sich der Kreis geschlossen. Wir haben gesehen, in welcher massiver Weise der Raum um Olympia numinos und sakral geformt war und welche Rolle der Alpheios dabei spielte. Zugleich waren aber auch die weitreichenden Beziehungen des heiligen Ortes, die aus seiner enormen panhellenischen Bedeutung resultierten, Teil dieser sakralen Welt geworden. Alte Verbindungen, wie hier gerade die zwischen Olympia und Syrakus, erhielten auf diese Weise eine besondere Gestalt, in der auch auf lokaler Ebene greifbaren Vermischung physischer Phänomene und Beobachtungen mit religiös-mythischen Ritualen und Erzählungen. Nicht zuletzt diese haben die spezifischen Vorstellungen von Räumen und ihrer Verbindung lebendig gemacht und lebendig erhalten. Dazu trugen schließlich auch die Philosophen, Historiker und Gelehrten bei, die diese alten Geschichten diskutierten. Sie belegen, selbst wenn sie der Tradition gegenüber kritisch eingestellt waren, deren Virulenz und Prägekraft – über Jahrhunderte hinweg. Und so öffnen sie uns noch heute, Jahrtausende später, einen Zugang zu einer ganz eigenen Welt.

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60 Eine weitere Spur weist nach Kroton: Der Iamides Kallias hatte hier zunächst den Sybariten, dann den Krotoniaten gedient, und seine Nachkommen hatten noch Besitztümer in Kroton zur Zeit Herodots (Hdt. 5.44-5, vgl. Kyrieleis 2012/13, 81 Anm. 81 mit weiteren Hinweisen).

61 Morgan 2015, 61-68.

62 Griffith 2008, 2-6 und vor allem Morgan 2015, bes. 23-86; 209-59.

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Talent, Craft, and Ecstasy: Poetic Forces in Horace and Plato

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When Horace asks, near the end of the *Ars Poetica*, whether nature or art is the source of literary success, he formulates the question in such a way that is almost bound to give an unsatisfactory answer (Horace *AP* 408-411):

Natura fieret laudabile carmen an arte
quaesitum est. ego nec studium sine divite vena,
nec rude quid prosit video ingenium: alterius sic
altera poscit opem res et coniurat amice.

It has been asked: does a poem become praiseworthy through art or nature?¹ I do not see what profit there is either in study without a rich vein [of talent] or in uncultivated ability: each one demands the aid of the other, and they band together as friends.

The answer, an apparently uncritical acceptance of the “bland Peripatetic compromise”² between φύσις and τέχνη, seems almost a purposeful anticlimax that raises more questions than it settles.

To illustrate the conceptual complex of the elements of literary ability at work in Horace’s question, it is helpful to turn briefly to Hesiod’s *Theogony*. There, the muses “taught Hesiod beautiful song,”³ suggesting that poetry requires an acquisition of a τέχνη or art that the muses teach their student. A few lines later, however, Hesiod describes the process differently, “They breathed a divine song into me, so I could speak of what will be and what was before.”⁴ Here, the muses inspire and take hold of the poet, but there is no indication of a τέχνη. Even later, Hesiod describes a somewhat different kind of gift: “Whomever of divinely cherished kings the daughters of great Zeus [i.e. the Muses] honor and see when he is

1 Text of the *AP* is from Borzsák 1984. All translations of Latin and Greek are mine unless noted otherwise.

2 Brink 1971, 394.

3 Hes. *Th.* 22: αἱ [sc., the muses] νό ποθ’ Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν. Text of Hesiod is taken from Rzach 1958.

4 Hes. *Th.* 31-2: ἐπέπνευσαν δέ μ’ ἀοιδὴν θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τὰ τ’ ἐσόμενα πρὸ τ’ ἔόντα.

born, on his tongue they pour sweet dew, and honeyed words flow from his mouth.”⁵ This gift sounds like an inborn ability or *ingenium*; the kings receive their gift at birth and without going in search of it. Hesiod, like Horace, mentions several elements of poetic ability, but does little to define them or illustrate their relationships to one another. How or whether nature, ability, art, and inspiration create a system is unclear.

Furthermore, describing the view of poetic composition Horace endorses as a “bland Peripatetic compromise”⁶ does little to illuminate the matter as it is not an accurate summary of the position Horace stakes out. As a matter of fact, Aristotle, in the *Poetics*, suggests a different scheme than either Hesiod or Horace: “poetry is the work of a naturally skilled person, or of a manic: of these types, the former are easily molded, the others inclined to lose their minds.”⁷ The choice here is between nature and madness, not nature and art, but this distinction has generally been ignored by Horace’s commentators. C. O. Brink, for instance, argues that, “[although] they [sc. *natura et ars*] are both required...it is not nature that remains in view, and the poem closes with a reminiscence of the stylistic criticisms of Quintilius Varus and the sketch of the *insanus poeta*, whose untutored *ingenium* proves both his undoing and a peril to his fellow men.”⁸ In rescuing Horace from the anticlimax of *et natura et ars*, however, Brink equates madness with *ingenium*, raising precisely the issue I wish to investigate further: the relationship, if any, that Horace and his predecessors posit between the concepts of madness, inspiration, and natural talent

I. Nature, Madness, and Possession

Undeniably, Horace accepts *ingenium* as a fundamental aspect of literary ability and takes a dim view of the *furor poeticus* in the *AP* (Horace *AP* 295-298).

ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte
credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas

5 Hes. *Th.* 81-84: ὄν τινα τιμήσωσι Διὸς κοῦραι μέγαλοιο γεινόμενόν τε ἴδωσι
διοτρεφέων βασιλίων, τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσση γλυκερὴν χεῖουσιν ἔρσην, τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ
στόματος ρεῖ μεῖλιχα....

6 Brink 1971, 394.

7 Arist. *Po.* 16.1455a32-34. διὸ εὐφυοὺς ἢ ποιητικὴ ἐστὶν ἢ μανικὸν· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν
εὐπλαστοὶ οἱ δὲ ἐκστατικοὶ εἰσιν. Text of the *Poetics* is taken from Lucas 1968.

8 Brink 1963, 218 cf. Brink 1971, 394.

Democritus, bona pars non unguis ponere curat,
non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat.

Because Democritus believed that talent (*ingenium*) brought more fortune than wretched craft (*ars*), and because he barred sane poets from Helicon, a good number take no pains to cut their nails or trim their beards; they seek lonely places; they avoid the baths.

From these lines, some commentators have argued that Horace intends to equate poetic mania with *ingenium*, the same concept Horace associated closely with *natura* in the lines quoted above.⁹

That equation is incompatible with the derision Horace displays for those poets who make a claim to poetic madness. Democritus's adherents do not trim their nails or beards, they search out secret places and avoid the baths, and in the subsequent lines (299-301), they will not trust their heads, incurable by any amount of hellebore, to the barber. The verbs are all active; the poets are making conscious choices to behave as they do. In short, they are faking it. Horace's mockery of the maddened poet at the end of the poem makes this point even more clearly. There, Horace would leave the mad poet to die if he should fall into a pit like a fowler transfixed by birds because of the likelihood that he fell in on purpose (462: *prudens*) in his lust for a notable death. Falling into a pit on purpose is not a function of poetic madness; rather, it is an affectation intended to simulate poetic madness.

These poets are so desperate to experience madness that they attempt to inflict it upon themselves by committing a sacrilege, like urinating on their ancestors' graves or disturbing a dark bidental.¹⁰ In any case, Horace's point is that these "insane poets" are neither truly insane nor truly poets. As Pseudoacro says in his gloss to line 295: *multi fingunt furorem, ut poetae*

9 Cf., e.g., Rostagni 1946 87 (*ad* 295): "*fortunatus*: attrib. ben conveniente all' 'ingenio', considerato come dono divino in opposizione all' 'arte' che è *misera* per la fatica che costa." Ringler 1941, 500, though more cautious, still sees an equation: "It will be noticed that in [lines 294-8], Horace combines, and attributes to Democritus, two quite different ideas concerning poets: (a) that their ability in composing comes from an inborn, not acquired, talent or natural skill, and so depends on an internal condition that is constant; (b) that it comes from inspiration or a divine madness, and so depends on a force operating from without that is spasmodic."

10 470-472: *utrum minxerit in patrios cineres, an triste bidental moverit incestus*. Rudd 1989, 228 (*ad* 471): "triste: not just 'gloomy,' but also suggesting an atmosphere of supernatural menace—something like 'sinister.'" Rostagni 1946 132 (*ad* 471): "Apunto per il religioso terrore che ispirava."

uideantur.¹¹ It is clear that they are not divinely affected; it is their opinion, not Horace's, that inspiration functions as a replacement for talent (*ingenium*); furthermore, they believe that talent, in turn, is an effective substitute for craft and the study and work associated with it. The point Horace stresses by mocking these poets is that acting the insane poet is proof of possessing no talent, and since they sought talent in place of craft, they must not possess craft, either.

It is nevertheless incorrect to conclude that Horace rejects the existence of poetic madness itself or that madness might have a positive impact on the quality of poetry that the affected mind produces. A rejection of these charlatan “mad” poets does not preclude the possible existence of poetic madness, and Horace does not quite deny that he experiences fits of insanity himself (*AP* 301-304):

o ego laevus,
qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam!
non alius faceret Meliora poemata: verum
nil tanti est.

I am so perverse;
I purge my bile when the spring season approaches,
or no one else would write better poems!
But nothing is worth that.

Brink argues that “[Horace] will not give up his sanity and therefore cannot write (true) poetry.”¹² But this conclusion, while true enough, overlooks the possibility that Horace takes the cure because he experiences the onset of madness. Without the cure, Horace would descend into insanity. The sarcasm makes it unclear whether he truly believes that his poetry would be unmatched if he experienced madness, but Horace does not reject the possibility of poetic madness or its presumed effect. Instead, he rejects the notion that untutored poetic talent or ability is so much more important than craft that it obviates the need for craft altogether. Furthermore, he rejects the assertion—which he attributes to Democritus—that sane poets have no claim to Helicon, or that insanity is poetic ability itself. Put positively, Horace insists that a poet must pursue craft, possess talent, and reject madness.

11 “Many feign madness to seem like poets.” Text of Pseudoacro is from Keller 1967. For more on the nature of this madness, see Hajdu 2014, 34.

12 Brink 1971, 335 (*ad* 304).

Though Horace does not comment on the relationship himself, a close association between madness and poetic talent goes back as far as Porphyry: *Ait enim Democritus poetice natura magis quam arte constare, et eos solos poetas esse ueros, qui insaniunt; in qua persuasione <et> Plato est.*¹³ With the exception of Porphyry's introduction of Plato, whose ideas I will address below, everything that he says could be nothing but paraphrase of Horace's verses, so it is possible that the association with Plato is created by Porphyry himself. That possibility necessitates confronting the statements of Democritus directly, as far as possible.

Outside of Porphyry, we can find just a few hints regarding what Democritus may have suggested about the nature of poetic inspiration. The first is preserved by Clement of Alexandria, at the end of the sixth book of his *Stromata*. In the broader context, Clement is contrasting Christian doctrine with Greek philosophy. The former has spread out over all the world and persists even in those places where the government has prohibited it; the latter was confined to Greece alone and disappeared anywhere it was opposed by the ruling powers. The reason for this, Clement argues, is that Christian doctrine is the product of divinely inspired ecstasy.¹⁴ To illustrate his point, he quotes Democritus:

6.18.168.2 καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος...“ποιητῆς δὲ ἅσσα μὲν ἂν γράφῃ μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος, καλὰ κάρτα ἐστίν.”¹⁵

And Democritus [says] “Whatever a poet writes with divinely inspired ecstasy is extremely beautiful.”

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- 13 Porphyry *ad* 295: “Indeed, Democritus says that poetry consists more in *natura* than *ars*, and that they alone are true poets who are insane; Plato is of the same opinion.” Text of Porphyry is from Holder 1967. Pseudoacro records Porphyry's gloss with minor changes: *Quia Democritus dicit plus ualere ingenium quam peritiam, et quia dicit non bonos poetas esse, nisi qui insaniunt; hoc idem et Plato.* “Because Democritus says that ingenium is more effective than practical experience, and because he says that there are no good poets except those who are insane; and Plato says the same thing.”
- 14 Clem. Al. *St.* 6.18.167.5 οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἀποθνήσκει διδασκαλία οὐδ' ὡς ἀσθενὴς μαραίνεται δωρεά (οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀσθενὴς δωρεά θεοῦ), μένει δὲ ἀκώλυτος, διωχθήσεσθαι εἰς τέλος προφητευθεῖσα. For it neither dies like human teaching, nor withers away like an insignificant gift (since no gift of God is insignificant), but it persists unhindered, though it is prophesied to be persecuted always. Text of Clement taken from Treu 1985. For a thorough discussion of the term ἐνθουσιασμός, cf. Schüttrumpf 2005, 612-614.
- 15 Diels-Kranz collect the fragment as 68 [55] B 18.

Though Clement's own opinion of the validity of Democritus's conception of inspiration is not necessarily indicative of Democritus's actual views, it is worth noting that he seems to disagree that Greek poetry was the product of divine possession because he adds, "And we know what sorts of things poets say. Would anyone be amazed that the prophets of the all-powerful god become the tools of the divine voice?"¹⁶ The Greeks believed their poetry was the voice of the gods, but the very persistence of Christian texts proves they alone are the true products of the divine voice entering the human body.

Most importantly, however, the statement of Democritus as presented by Clement does not flatly equate poetic madness with poetic ability; rather, it asserts that divinely inspired ecstasy (ἐνθουσιασμός καὶ ἱερὸν πνεῦμα) makes poems beautiful. Though Democritus emphasized the role that divine intervention played in poetic composition, Horace's iteration of the idea, that the sane poet is no poet at all, makes the case against inspiration more definitively.

Additionally, a fragment preserved by Dio Chrystostom suggests that Democritus explicitly claimed that poets rely on more than divinely inspired ecstasy to create their works:¹⁷

Ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος περὶ Ὅμηρου φησὶν οὕτως· Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτήνατο παντοίων· ὥς οὐκ ἐνὸν ἄνευ θείας καὶ δαιμονίας φύσεως οὕτως καλὰ καὶ σοφὰ ἔπη ἐργάσασθαι.

Concerning Homer, Democritus says the following: "Homer, possessed of a divine nature, built a world out of every kind of verse since it is impossible for beautiful and wise verses to be built in that way without a divine and heaven-sent nature."

Homer's nature is unambiguously divine, but nature is not divinely inspired ecstasy.¹⁸ Furthermore, according to Cicero, Democritus argued that the gods were "principles of the mind."¹⁹ In this case, a divine nature would be ever-present in any individual. It seems impossible, therefore,

16 Clem. Al. *St.* 6.18.168.3 ἴσμεν δὲ οἷα ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ παντοκράτορος προφήτας θεοῦ οὐκ ἂν τις καταπλαγείη, ὄργανα θείας γενομένους φωνῆς;

17 D. Chr. 53 (36) 1 (Arnim 2.109.21-24 = D.-K. 68 [55] B 21). Text is taken from von Arnim 1962. I take the quotation to extend to the full stop.

18 Hajdu 2014, 35 does not recognize the difference between nature and ecstasy.

19 cf. Cic. *Div.* 1.43.120.

that Democritus considered nature a kind of divine possession bestowed on a devotee *ad hoc*.²⁰

Furthermore, Dio's citation provides some evidence to suggest that Democritus granted some value to poetic craft.²¹ He uses decidedly workmanlike vocabulary to describe poetic composition. Homer built (ἔτεκνῆναι) his world. The same verb could be used of the activity of a carpenter, and the added detail of the building blocks of his world—words—adds to the impression that the process envisioned is technical in nature. This construction is made beautiful through Homer's divine nature, but the fact that there is construction at all leaves space for some technical craft in the process. Our evidence for Democritus's theories of poetic composition then, suggest that though Horace criticizes his views of poetic madness, their positions are not fully opposed. Both authors allow—though to varying degrees—the existence of a poetic nature working in concert with craft.

Porphry, as we saw above, raises the possibility that Horace is attributing to Democritus a more well-known Platonic theory that does deny the poet both φύσις and τέχνη.²² Clement also invokes Plato alongside Democritus by paraphrasing Socrates' statement at *Ion* 534b2-4 that a poet is light (κοῦφος) and sacred (ιερός) and unable to do anything before he is possessed (ἔνθεος) and out of his mind (ἔκφρων).²³ Clement has zeroed in on the single passage in Plato's entire body of work necessary to argue that

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- 20 cf. Drozdek 2007, 106-107: "The genuine gods are not necessarily the gods of traditional mythology. From the very inception of Greek philosophy, the gods of mythology were replaced by divinities purified from unpalatable features such as their quarrelsomeness, jealousy, vindictiveness, overindulgence, and so on. Beginning as early as Xenophanes, the anthropomorphic character of the gods is explicitly rejected. It is thus possible that Democritus has only two genuine divinities, Punishment and Reward, as reported by Pliny (2.14 = A76). Anthropomorphic divinities can be explained as purified *eidola* of ordinary beings that the uninformed take for genuine divinities."
- 21 cf., Rudd 1989 199, (*ad* 296-7) who argues, "He might not, perhaps, have admitted to despising craftsmanship." Rudd was anticipated by Ringer 1941, 500.
- 22 Brink 1971 422 (*ad* 453-6) sees a direct reference to Plato: "With malicious literalism H. interprets Democritus' and Plato's notion of divine possession: inspiration is like an infectious or frightening disease." Rudd 1989, 199 (*ad* 297-7) is more cautious.
- 23 Clem. Al. *St.* 6.168.1 εἶτα περὶ μὲν ποιητικῆς Πλάτων "κοῦφον γάρ τι χρῆμα καὶ ἱερὸν ποιητῆς" γράφει "καὶ οὐχ οἷός τε ποιεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἐνθεός τε καὶ ἔκφρων γένηται." Accordingly, Plato writes "For a poet is some light and sacred thing and is unable to do anything before he becomes enthused and frenzied." Pl. *Ion* 534b3-6, text from Méridier 1964, runs: κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητῆς ἐστὶν καὶ

no such thing exists as a sane poet, and in the process, he takes the statement out of context and presents the sentiment as far more decisive than it truly is. Socrates' statement that poets only function when out of their minds is very forceful, but such an extreme interpretation of the nature of the poet is unusual in Greek literature.²⁴ Hesiod, for instance, to reiterate the example already presented, speaks of a mixture of teaching, possession, and gifts from the muses.²⁵ Socrates' extreme position raises the possibility that he is being ironic in the *Ion* and questioning the existence of poetic possession, or at least questioning Ion's assertion that he experiences it.²⁶ In fact, Ion undermines his own account of his complete madness when he brags that he carefully watches the audience during his recitation to see if they are crying because he knows they will pay him more if he has them fooled.²⁷ That behavior is *prudens* and far from possessed senselessness.

Though Dio does not compare the ideas of Democritus and Plato as explicitly as Porphyry and Clement do, he does address Plato several times in *On Homer*, the same speech in which he addressed Democritus. His recollection of Plato is as carefully chosen to refer to Plato's concept of divinely inspired ecstasy or poetic possession, a concept that reverberates throughout several of Plato's works, as Clement's was to refer to madness. He mentions explicitly Plato's praise of Homer for relying on the inspiration

πητὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῆ....

- 24 The extremity of the position is summarized well at Tigerstedt 1969, 65: "True, the poet *can* [his] write a poem without being possessed by the Muse. But in that case, the poem will be bad, flat, like the poems of Tynnichus, save for the one paean which he himself called "an invention of the Muses" (*Ion* 534E)...." The opinion that this view represents Platonic innovation is found at Tigerstedt 1969 26: "...with the dubious exception of Democritus, no Greek writer before Plato ever described poetical inspiration in this way. The poets called themselves inspired but not possessed." See also Murray 1996, 9: "P. transforms the traditional notion of poetic inspiration by emphasizing the passivity of the poet and the irrational nature of the poetic process."
- 25 cf. Murray 1996, 7.
- 26 Tigerstedt 1969 28: "The scales seem heavily tilted in favor of the 'ironical' interpretation [of the *Ion*]. Yet, it is in the nature of irony that it leaves us baffled and perplexed. The εἶπων does not speak his mind." Cf. also Tigerstedt 1969 p. 21, n.55.
- 27 Pl. *Ion* 535e. Tigerstedt 1969, 21: "This passage [535E] has not escaped the attention of the interpreters, who rightly have pointed out the incompatibility of the rhapsode's conscious interest in the public's reaction with a real state of possession, for had not Socrates earlier spoken of the possessed poets, 'who are out of their wits' (οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν) (534D)? Therefore, such a possession cannot be Ion's lot."

(ἐπίπνοια) of Apollo and the Muses to compose his poems.²⁸ The conceptual boundaries Dio sets have appeared a little loose to commentators. H. Crosby, for instance, thought that, “Dio here reverts to the doctrine of Democritus.”²⁹ On the contrary, there is no reason to conclude that Dio is confused. His citation of Democritus, we recall, merely mentioned that Homer used a divine nature to construct a world of words. He made no mention of inspiration. Furthermore, Dio reiterates Plato’s praise of Homer, who composed οὐδ’ ἄνευ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπιπνοίας. This language is furthermore suggestive of a passage concerning divine inspiration in the *Laws*, when the Athenian says the conversation has been like a poem and not without some inspiration of the gods, οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς ἐπιπνοίας θεῶν.³⁰ Moreover, in the *Republic*, which is the text to which Dio is referring in *On Homer*, Socrates makes divine inspiration (6.499b8: θεῖα ἐπίπνοια)—later referred to as “the muse of the polis” (6.499d4: Μοῦσα πόλεως)—the force that helps rulers become philosopher kings and strive for perfection in themselves and their city. Dio’s language does not reveal confusion; quite the opposite, it reveals a close familiarity with Plato’s works.

Divinely inspired ecstasy is a concept that appears in several Platonic treatises. In addition to those mentioned above, he revisits the concept at the end of the *Meno*, when Socrates once again connects divinely inspired ecstasy to the politician. After he and Meno come to the conclusion that virtue cannot be taught (96b-d), Meno asks if it follows that there are no virtuous people. Socrates suggests that there may be something besides

28 D. Chr. 53 (36) 6, (Arnim 2.111.9-13): ἔτι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς χάριτος ἐπαινῶν τὴν ποίησιν σφόδρα ἄγαται τὸν ἄνδρα. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄνευ θείας τύχης οὐδ’ ἄνευ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπιπνοίας δυνατόν οὕτως ὕψηλὴν καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴ καὶ προσέτι ἡδεῖαν γενέσθαι ποίησιν.... “And furthermore [Plato] himself, who praises the poetry [of Homer] for its charm, loves the man exceedingly. For absolutely not without some divine providence nor without the inspiration of both the Muses and Apollo is it possible for poetry to be so sublime and magnificent and sweet besides.” I adopt here the text of Crosby 1946; von Arnim prints: ἔτι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς χάριτος ἐπιὼν τὴν ποίησιν σφόδρα ἄγασθαι τὸν ἄνδρα.

29 Crosby 1946, 363 n.3.

30 Pl.Lg.7.811c6-10: Νῦν γὰρ ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἐξ ἔω μέχρι δεῦρο δὴ διεληλύθαμεν ἡμεῖς—ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ φαινόμεθα, οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς ἐπιπνοίας θεῶν—ἔδοξαν δ’ οὖν μοι παντάπασι ποιήσει τινὶ προσομοίως εἰρησθαι. Text of the *Laws* is from Burnet 1967b. Tigerstedt 1969, 62: “..The *Laws* describes the lawgiver as acting under divine inspiration. Looking back at the discussions which he and the other two old men...have been pursuing, ‘as it seems to me not without some divine inspiration’ (οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς ἐπιπνοίας θεῶν), the Athenian finds that ‘they were framed exactly like a poem’ (811c). Is this self-praise or self-irony?”

knowledge that renders human conduct good, namely, right opinion. Knowledge is prized more than right opinion because it is more lasting, but right opinion can produce the same goodness as knowledge and can even become knowledge through the proper method. It is a striking passage because Socrates, who asserts repeatedly that he knows nothing, claims to know for certain that there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge. Neither is a product of nature (φύσις), so they must both be acquired. Yet neither can be taught, for even if they are theoretically capable of being taught, there is no teacher who possesses the wisdom necessary to teach them. If knowledge and right opinion cannot be taught, then any politician who has done good for his polis must have been employing the same mechanism as oracle chanters (χρησμοδοί) and possessed prophets (θεομάντις) who have right opinion when they are in an ecstatic state, but have no knowledge themselves.³¹ And Socrates immediately repeats his assertion that politicians must be, like everyone who is poetic, in a divinely induced ecstatic state whenever they do good.³² These politicians share with Ion their lack of true knowledge about the things they say, but unlike Ion, they have managed to do good through divine inspiration.³³

E. Tigerstedt sees in this passage a condemnation of politicians that is similar to the condemnation of poets in the *Ion*. He argues:

The undeniable irony in the description of Anytus makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to accept the statements about ‘political inspiration’ at their face value. We hesitate to believe in the apparent glorification of a class of men to which the instigator of the judicial murder of Socrates belongs.³⁴

31 Pl. *Men.* 99c1-3: ἢ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμοδοὶ τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἐνθουσιῶντες λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλὰ, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν. Text is from Burnet 1958.

32 Pl. *Men.* 99c11-d5: Ὅρθῳς ἄρ’ ἂν καλοῖμεν θεῖους τε οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμοδοὺς καὶ μάντις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θεῖους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

33 Cf. Bluck 1961, 424-427 (*ad* c2-3). Tigerstedt 1969, 40-41: “The same words which in the *Ion* and the *Apology* were used to describe the poets’ mental state are now used to describe that of the politicians: they are ‘divine and enraptured’; ‘inspired and possessed of God’; not knowing what they say. Their ‘virtue’ is not given by nature but is a ‘divine gift’ ‘without understanding.’”

34 Tigerstedt 1969, 43. He continues: “Nor should we forget that, if the doctrine of the poetical possession could be regarded as an exaggeration of the common be-

But Tigerstedt unnecessarily expands Socrates' list of "good" politicians to include Anytus. On the contrary, in the *Meno*, Socrates vouches only for Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, and Thucydides (93c-94e)—Anytus is certainly excluded from the list, and in the end of the dialogue, Socrates only mentions Themistocles a second time. His point is precisely that good politicians are rare—they can only be created by divine possession—and there may currently be no good politicians in Athens. This conclusion is reinforced by a passage in the *Apology*. There, Socrates, in his search for those with true knowledge, first approaches the politicians, who do not know what is fine and good (21d4 καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν), but they think they do. These men are Anytus and his contemporaries. Next, Socrates goes to the poets, who compose without wisdom, but through nature and divinely inspired ecstasy.³⁵ But as Tigerstedt himself points out, "The poets are better [than politicians]. For, though their wisdom is none, yet their works are not bad."³⁶ These poets surpass both Anytus and Ion because they are inhabited by the divine, so their works are good. The consequence of the arguments in the *Meno* and the *Apology* is that inspiration is necessary to produce good because people lack knowledge in their nature.³⁷

Still, it might be invalid to compare the comments Socrates makes regarding divinely inspired ecstasy in the *Republic*, the *Meno*, and the *Laws* to those he makes in the *Ion*, or indeed to the comments Democritus and Horace make, because in those works, Socrates is not speaking of the ecstasy of poets, but of politicians. To see what he says directly about divinely inspired ecstasy in poets, and even how the poet who does good and the politician who does good are similar, it is necessary to consider the *Phaedrus*.

In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates divides madness into several classes, first into madness that is a consequence of human disease and that which is divinely inflicted, and then he divides the divine madness further into four specific types each associated with its own divinity: Apollo inspires mantic mad-

lief in poetical inspiration, the doctrine of political possession must have been regarded as a bad joke by contemporary readers. Some lawgivers, e.g. Lycurgus, were, indeed, believed to have been inspired by a divinity, but to call all successful—or popular—politicians possessed and to compare them to seers and soothsayers cannot have been regarded as a compliment by Plato's contemporaries—and it is not so by Anytus."

35 Pl. *Ap.* 22b9-c1: ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἂ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί. Text is from Duke 1995.

36 Tigerstedt 1969, 32.

37 Though note Tigerstedt 1969 41 n.114: "Socrates stresses that ἀρετή and ὁρθή δόξα on which the former is based, are not φύσει, in contrast to *Apology* 22 C, where φύσει is coupled together with ἐνθουσιάζοντες."

ness, Dionysus telestic, the Muses poetic, and Aphrodite and Eros erotic.³⁸ He does not explicitly give a complete hierarchy, but does make clear that erotic madness is the finest of the four.

It is unclear to what degree Socrates considers these forms of madness to induce a state of ecstasy like the one that Ion (falsely) claimed to experience when he was—in Socrates' words—possessed (ἐνθεός) and out of his mind (ἔκφρων).³⁹ It seems that the mantic kind of madness requires this sort of ecstasy,⁴⁰ and Dionysiac madness is widely depicted as a form of ecstasy in Greek literature and art.⁴¹ In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates uses as many terms as possible to describe poetic ability as a strong form of possession (245a1-8). Poets experience the madness (μανία) and the possession (κατοκωχή) of the Muses, their soul is aroused (ἐγείρουσα) and excited to frenzy (ἐκβαλκεύουσα). Despite its possession, however, the soul of the poet provides an order (κοσμοῦσα) to the deeds of the ancients and educates (παιδεύει) later generations. The language here suggests that these possessed individuals are of the better sort who manage to do good though they have no knowledge of their own. It is certainly this true possession that Socrates extends to philosophers (Pl. *Phdr.* 249c8-d3):

ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θεῷ γιγνόμενος, νοουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθεν τοὺς πολλοὺς.

38 Pl. *Phdr.* 265a6-b5: ΣΩ. μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα. ἧ γάρ; ΦΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Μανίας δέ γε εἶδη δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην. ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικὴν, Μουσῶν δ' αὖ ποιητικὴν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος, ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν ἐφήσαμεν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι... “[So.] We said that love was some sort of madness, right? [Ph.] Yes. [So.] And that there are two kinds of madness, one comes from human diseases, and the other from a divine alteration of the usual customs. [Ph.] Absolutely. [So.] And we divided four classes divine madness among four gods, assigning the inspiration of Apollo to mantic madness, that of Dionysus to telestic, of the Muses to poetic, and fourthly of Aphrodite and Eros to erotic mania, and we said that madness was the best...” Text of the *Phaedrus* is from Burnet 1967a.

39 Pl. *Ion* 534b2-4.

40 cf., e.g., Yunis 2011, 131 (*ad* 244b1-5): “institutionally ensconced prophets, such as the Pythia at Apollo’s oracle in Delphi and the priestesses at Zeus’s oracle in Dodona, as well as individual diviners used ritual preparation and autosuggestion to attain a physically altered, ecstatic state in which they channeled the divine and thus performed their prophetic service.”

41 Though Yunis emphasizes, rather, that this madness is its own cure. cf. Yunis 2011, 133 (*ad* d6-e5) and the literature cited there.

Because he [the philosopher] has separated himself from human pursuits and is oriented toward the divine, he is rebuked by the majority for being out of his senses, but they have failed to see that he experiences a divine ecstasy.

What the philosopher experiences is divine possession, but those who are mistaken about its nature believe the philosopher is mentally ill. Horace's Democritean poets put this misunderstanding into action; because they have no interest in pursuing a craft, they feign a mad senselessness by looking upward. Whereas Horace stresses that the poet cannot abandon craft for madness, Socrates stresses that τέχνη without divine madness cannot produce the good (Pl. *Phdr.* 245a5-8):

ὅς δ' ἂν ἄνεν μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἰκανὸς ποιητῆς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη.

Whoever approaches the Muses' poetic doors, convinced that he will be a good poet by art, finds both that he is incapable and that the poetry of the sane is obliterated by the poetry of the maddened.

Socrates does not reject craft, but in the absence of true knowledge (or, lacking that, right opinion), craft cannot produce beauty.⁴² It does not follow that divine ecstasy only produces beauty in the absence of craft. Furthermore, the poet is not alone in the need for divine intervention; the politician and the philosopher fare no better without it.

The sentiment here is compatible with that expressed in the *Ion* when Socrates explains to Ion why he can speak well on Homer but on no other subject (Pl. *Ion* 533d1-3): ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ὄν παρὰ σοὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου εὖ λέγειν..., θεία δὲ δύναμις ἣ σε κινεῖ... "For this is not a craft that you have to speak well concerning Homer..., but a divine force (δύναμις) which moves you." Socrates compares this force (δύναμις) to a magnet

42 Tigerstedt 1969, 53 misses the point: "However 'divine' the poet may be, as others possessed, he is unable to understand what he does in his state of possession, and to explain it afterwards to others. He cannot 'give reasons for it' (λόγον διδόναι). He does not belong to the realm of λόγος." But of course, no one has yet achieved a state of true knowledge, and that state will only be achieved by being inspired first. Tigerstedt concludes "But now Socrates speaks contemptuously of him who believes that he can be a good poet by skill alone (245 A), without the madness of the Muses. It is as if he were saying 'that the inspired poet is all the better for his lack of knowledge.'" Socrates does not go so far: the inspired poet is better than the uninspired poet though both lack knowledge.

which not only attracts ferrous objects, but also imparts magnetism to them so they attract other ferrous objects. Similarly, the Muses impart their force to one person, who in turn imparts it to others. This is the same force that is described as divine ecstasy (ἐνθουσιασμός) in the *Phaedrus*.

We find a similar treatment of divine force in Neoptolemus of Parium, whose ideas, according to Porphyry, Horace incorporated into the *AP*. We must approach the ideas of Neoptolemus through the criticism of Philodemus, who complained that his predecessor suggested a threefold division of poetry: poet, poem, and poesy. But for the current discussion, it is his definition of the poet that is of most interest: τὸν τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντα τὴν ποιητικὴν.⁴³ This notion of a divine force guiding the poet is clearly compatible with Socrates' comments in the *Ion* and *Phaedrus*.⁴⁴ Horace appears to render Neoptolemus's τέχνη as *ars/studium* and his δύναμις as *natura/ingenium*.⁴⁵ With this rendering, Plato's ἐνθουσιασμός becomes Horace's *ingenium*.

Horace does clearly reject the idea of the *furor poeticus*, but as he makes explicit himself, this is a rejection of Democritus. His commentators and the others who attributed the same valuation of poetic madness to Plato depend upon an understanding of Platonic literary criticism that emphasizes the arguments of the *Ion* over other treatises. Finally, Horace seems to inherit the Platonic notion of ἐνθουσιασμός, but through the medium of Neoptolemus, who used the term of the *Ion*, δύναμις, to name the divine force of the poet. This δύναμις becomes Horace's *ingenium*, now an ability entirely possessed by the poet but not possessing him. For Plato, in contrast, the poet's ability is derived from the divine. Whereas Plato granted ecstasy and inspiration to the philosophers, Horace granted hard work and talent to the poets.

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43 Mangoni 1993, 14.1-6 = Jensen 10.32-11.1 = Mette F6 1-7.

44 There is no agreement on Neoptolemus's relationship to the Academy and the Peripatos. See Hajdu 2014, 30-33 for discussion. Brink 1963 and Mette 1980 argue for the Academy; Jensen 1973 and Asmis 1992 argue for the Peripatos.

45 Mangoni 1993, 223-4 (*ad* 14.5-11): "Jensen intende con δύναμις il talento naturale contrapposto all' abilità tecnica, come in Hor. A. P. 408-411: *ingenium/ars*." Cf., Jensen 1973, 99-102.

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„Et in Arcadia ego“ – Ich, der Tod? Oder der Tote? Oder Ich, Goethe?¹

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Die Grabinschrift „Et in Arcadia ego“ findet sich zuerst auf einem Gemälde von Giovanni Francesco Barbieri, genannt Il Guercino (1591-1666), entstanden um 1620 in Rom, sodann bei Nicolas Poussin (1594-1665) auf zwei Bildern um 1630 und 1640.² Der übliche Bildtitel ist identisch mit der Inschrift des Grabes.³



Guercino, *Et in Arcadia ego*, 81x91cm, Öl auf Leinwand, Roma, Galleria Nazionale d'Arte Antica.

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- 1 Die folgenden Ausführungen setzen meine Darstellung in *Arkadien in Kunst, Philosophie und Dichtung* (2006) fort.
 - 2 Guercino, *Et in Arcadia ego*, 81x91cm, Öl auf Leinwand, Roma, Galleria Nazionale d'Arte Antica; Poussin I, *Et in Arcadia ego*, 101x82cm, Öl auf Leinwand, Devonshire Collection. Chatsworth House; Poussin II, *Et in Arcadia ego*, 87x120cm, Öl auf Leinwand. Louvre, Paris.
 - 3 Weisbach 1930, 128: „Woher das Wort Et in Arcadia ego stammt, und wie sein erstes Auftauchen im 17. Jahrhundert sich erklärt, ist bisher nicht ermittelt worden.“

I. Erwin Panofsky: *Auch in Arkadien bin ich, der Tod*

Bei der von ihm aufgeworfenen Frage, ob die Grabinschrift „Et in Arcadia ego“ zu fassen ist als „Auch in Arkadien bin ich, sc. der *Tod*“, oder aber als „Auch ich, der *Tote* hier, bin / war in Arkadien“, votierte Erwin Panofsky für die erste Variante, den Tod. Dies sei die ursprüngliche, schon bei Giovanni Pietro Bellori nachweisbare Auffassung, sie sei auch allein grammatisch möglich. Dass mit dem „ego“ der Tote auftritt, verbietet sich also nach Panofsky sowohl aus historischen und wie auch aus sprachlichen Gründen. Ich halte beide Annahmen für falsch, die zweite widerlegt Panofsky selbst.⁴

Der makabre Schädel des Bildes von Guercino sei, so also Panofsky, die Verkörperung des Todes.

„Guercino's painting shows a dramatic meeting with Death which dumbfounds the shepherds by its very unexpectedness. [...] the death's-head, impersonating Death himself had originally been the most important factor in the whole conception as a proclaimer of the sentence 'Even in Arcadia, there I am'. [...] Giovanni Pietro Bellori [...] gave an exact and correct interpretation of the inscription when he wrote: 'Et in Arcadia ego' - cioè che il sepolcro si trova ancora in Arcadia e che la Morte a luogo in mezzo le felicità.“

Panofsky erläutert: „'Et in Arcadia ego' means that the grave is to be found *even* in Arcadia and that death holds sway in the very midst of delight.“⁵

Aber was heißt „cioè“ bei Bellori? Es soll etwas durch etwas erläutert werden.⁶ Panofsky macht daraus ein „means“, eine Übersetzung⁷ des „Et in Arcadia ego“. Aber Belloris Erläuterung passt vorzüglich zur naheliegenden Auffassung des lateinischen Spruchs, gemäß der weder das Grab (!) noch der Tod sprechen, sondern der Tote. Nicht das Grab und nicht „la Morte“ können das mit „ego“ sprechende Subjekt („proclaimer of the sentence“) sein. Mit dem „cioè“ schafft Bellori einen Abstand gegenüber der

4 Im ersten Teil der Kritik stimme ich im Ergebnis mit Weisbach 1937-1938 überein. Im zweiten Teil wende ich mich besonders gegen Panofsky 1975.

5 Panofsky 1936, 236-237.

6 Erschöpfend und korrekt dazu Goldoni 1977.

7 Neben dem zitierten „interpretation“ auch „translation“, 236, Anm. 3 („in Bellori's translation“).

Rede „Et in Arcadia ego“, er will sie nicht wiedergeben, sondern gibt zwei Erläuterungen: Dass sich das Grabmal auch (sc. sogar) in Arkadien findet, und dass der Tod sich mitten im glücklichen Leben ereignet.

Die englische Übersetzung Belloris aus dem Jahr 2007 folgt der falschen Interpretation Panofskys: „‘Et in Arcadia ego’, [I too am in Arcadia] which is to say that the tomb is present even in Arcadia and that death takes place in the midst of joys.“⁸ Aber wo treten je das Grab und der Tod als redendes „ego“ auf? Dies ist eine Erfindung Panofskys; Bellori dagegen erläutert den bekannten Grabspruch nicht mit einer Aussage des Grabes und des Todes, sondern *über* das Grab und den Tod.

Ähnlich wie bei Bellori lautet der Kommentar bei André Félibien, aus dessen *Entretiens sur les vies et les ouvrages des peintres IV* (1685) Panofsky selbst zitiert: „[...] par cette inscription on a voulu marquer que celui qui est dans le tombeau a vécu en Arcadie, et que la Mort se rencontre parmi les plus grandes félicités.“⁹ „[...] on a voulu marquer“: auch hier eine Erläuterung, keine Wiedergabe der Rede.¹⁰

Panofskys Tod ist präsent in seiner abstrakten Allgemeinheit; das Bildgeschehen wird dadurch zur bloßen Illustration: Der Tote hier exemplifiziert die schreckliche Wahrheit der abstrakten allgemeinen Sentenz. Der Schrift mit ihrer generellen Maxime kommt bei Panofsky der Primat zu; sie liest der Betrachter zuerst, dann folgt der Bildinhalt, den der Maler unter das Allgemeine subsumiert hat. Wer das Bild sieht, möchte die Reihenfolge gerne umkehren und den Totenschädel an den Anfang stellen; die Konklusion, dass also der Tod in Arkadien ist, ist trivial. Das Ich des Toten selbst meldet sich im „ego“ zu Wort; natürlich ist damit der Tod präsent. Panofskys Auffassung ist ein unsachliche Schwächung der Bildkraft.

Jetzt zum zweiten Punkt: Der mit „ego“ Redende könne nicht der Tote sein, weil dies gegen die lateinische Grammatik verstoße. Diesen Punkt führt Panofsky besonders in der Fassung seiner Arbeit von 1957 und deren deutscher Übersetzung von 1975 näher aus. Die Inschrift „Et in Arcadia ego“ könne unmöglich die Rede des Toten im Grab wiedergeben, denn eine solche Annahme sei „unvereinbar mit den Regeln der lateinischen Grammatik.“¹¹ „Die Wendung *Et in Arcadia ego* ist einer jener elliptischen Sätze wie *Summum jus summa iniuria*, *E pluribus unum*, *Nequid nimis* oder

8 Bellori 2007, 329.

9 Panofsky 1936, 237, Anm. 2.

10 So auch Weisbach 1937-1938, 288-289.

11 Panofsky 1975, 359.

Sic semper tyrannis, in denen das Verbum durch den Leser zu ergänzen ist.¹² Keineswegs, denn die zitierten Ausdrücke sind frei zirkulierende Motti, das „Et in Arcadia ego“ ist dagegen situativ gebunden und kann vom fiktiv redenden „ego“ (ob nun der Tod oder der Tote) nicht abgelöst werden; es ist damit völlig anders. Nach Panofsky soll die Grabinschrift ergänzt werden durch „bin“, „Vergangenheitsform ist nicht möglich“.¹³ Das vorgebliche Vergleichsmaterial lässt diesen Schluss nicht zu. Und in welcher Grammatik steht das angeführte Vergangenheits-Verbot auch für rhetorische Wendungen?

„Noch wichtiger: das adverbiale *et* bezieht sich unveränderlich auf das unmittelbar darauf folgende Substantiv oder Pronomen (wie in *Et tu, Brute*) und dies bedeutet, daß es sich in unserem Fall nicht auf *ego*, sondern auf *Arcadia* bezieht; [...]“¹⁴ Und wenn sich der Autor diesem vorgeblichen grammatischen Reglement nicht unterwirft, sondern von einer poetischen Lizenz Gebrauch macht?

Wie immer man zu zeigen versucht, dass das „Et“ nicht auf das „ego“ in einem Hyperbaton zu beziehen ist: der gesamten Tradition war dieses Hyperbaton geläufig und der Grabspruch als Rede des Toten verständlich. Das Prädikat fehlt, und man wird dieses Fehlen nicht als Verstoß gegen die Schulgrammatik bemängeln dürfen, sondern als ein Eigentümliches Glanzstück ansehen. Der tote Hirte lebte in Arkadien und beklagt jetzt in vorbereiteter Rede seinen Tod. Vergangenheit und Gegenwart werden in dem Spruch zusammengefaltet. Der Leser versteht dies sofort; in der griechisch-lateinischen Sepulkralkultur wurde von dieser paradoxen Jetzt-Rede der längst Verstorbenen permanent Gebrauch gemacht. „Wanderer, kommst du nach Sparta [...]“ Der spezielle Wegfall des Prädikats lässt sich auf der Frontseite des Daphnisgrabes von Vergil beobachten: „Daphnis ego in silvis“.¹⁵ Hierauf werden wir im Folgenden erneut eingehen.

Es fällt auf, dass sich Panofsky nicht auf die vorchristliche antike Praxis bezieht. Die reiche Tradition der Ich- oder auch Wir-Rede der Toten in dem Grab, vor dem wir stehen, wird von ihm nicht erwähnt. Aber das Renaissancegrab evoziert mit seinem Latein auf dem ungewohnten Grab die vorchristliche Welt und schließt mit einiger Kühnheit an ihre Bräuche an.

12 Panofsky 1975, 359.

13 Panofsky 1975, 360.

14 Panofsky 1975, 360.

15 Vergil, *Eclogae* V 43. Vgl. u. a. Maisak und Fiedler 1992, 113.

Auf dem Grabstein gibt es nur die imaginierte Ich-Rede des Toten. Nach Panofsky müsste dagegen der Tod selbst als Redender den Spruch artikulieren. Aber wie macht er es? Als Skelett? Gibt es dafür eine einzige Parallelstelle? Sagt der Tod in irgendeiner Inschrift: „Ich, der Tod, [...]“? Wo spricht das Grab „Ich, das Grab hier [...]“? Dass dagegen imaginär der Tote redet, ist seit frühgriechischen Zeiten bis hin zu Vergil bezeugt. Man lese nur die musterhafte Arbeit von Häusle 1980.

Nun führt Panofskys Interpretation von Poussins zweiter Fassung des *Et in Arcadia ego* zu einer überraschenden Wende, die den Leser völlig verwirren muss. In dieser Fassung „lädt Poussin selber, indem er in der Inschrift keine verbale Veränderung vornimmt, den Betrachter ein, ja, zwingt ihn fast, sie falsch zu übersetzen, indem er das *ego* auf einen Toten, statt auf das Grab bezieht, indem er das *et* mit dem *ego* verknüpft, statt mit *Arcadia*, und indem er das fehlende Verbum in der Form eines *vixi* oder *fui*, statt eines *sum* ergänzt.“¹⁶

Bei Poussins zweiter Fassung dränge sich somit auf, statt an den Tod oder das Grab (in der vorgeblich korrekten Latein-Fassung) doch (wider alle Grammatik) an den Toten zu denken und die grammatisch unmögliche Fassung des Spruchs zu wählen. Hierbei wird natürlich unterstellt, dass der im Lateinischen geschulte Betrachter die jetzt geforderte Lesart spontan einsetzt, er darf sie nicht für falsch halten, sie muss für ihn die einzig mögliche sein. Damit plädiert Panofsky für eine Zurücknahme seiner Ausgangsthese, eben diese Fassung sei grammatisch unhaltbar. - Es ist schwer, diesen Volten zu folgen.

Die falsche Übersetzung soll jetzt den Toten reden lassen, und just dies legt sich in Poussins zweiter Fassung wenig nahe! Es gibt hier gerade keine dramatische Präsenz des Toten, sondern eine vage Allgemeinheit des Todes, symbolisiert durch ein klassisches Grabmal. Poussins zweite Fassung richtet ihr Interesse jedoch auf einen ganz neuen Gegenstand, den Guercino vorbereitet hat und Poussin nun weiterführt; dazu später einige kurze Überlegungen.

Die wie immer höchst gelehrten Ausführungen Erwin Panofskys beherrschen seit ihrer Publikation die Forschung, besonders das Grammatik-Argument lässt alle Bedenken schwinden, zumal auch König Georg III von England autoritativ gesagt hat: „Ay, ay, Death is even in Arcadia.“¹⁷ Panofsky profitiert vom schlechten Gewissen seiner Leser, im Latein-Unterricht einige raffinierte Paragraphen verschlafen zu haben. Zusammenfassend

16 Panofsky 1975, 367.

17 Panofsky 1936, 237, Anm. 1.

Wikipedia 2016: Der Kunsthistoriker Erwin Panofsky habe festgestellt, die heute verbreitete Übersetzung „Auch ich war in Arkadien“ werde „dem Originaltext bzw. der lateinischen Grammatik nicht gerecht“ und müsse ersetzt werden. Im Gegenteil: Es ist Zeit, Panofskys Grab- und Todes-ego zu vergessen und zum „ego“ des Toten zurückzukehren, zumal Panofsky selbst diese Wende schon vollzogen hat.

II. „Auch ich (der Tote) bin (war) in Arkadien“

1. Arkadien

Arkadien ist eine Landschaft der Peloponnes, der Insel (nesos) des Pelops also, tatsächlich Halbinsel, denn der Isthmus von Korinth verbindet die Fast-Insel mit dem Festland, Goethe im *Faust*: die „Nichtinsel“, „mit leichter Hügelkette / Europens letztem Bergast angeknüpft.“¹⁸ Arkadien ist eine Landschaft ohne Hafen und Schifffahrt und Handel, stagnierend seit Beginn. Es gibt Hirten und vielleicht Sammler, aber keine Jäger und Bauern und Städter, entsprechend kein Recht, kein Eigentum und keine Herrschaft, keine Konkurrenz und Entwicklung, die zu Erfindungen und Fortschritt zwingt und zu herausragenden Taten und zur Teilnahme an der Geschichte. Dieses abgehängte Vergangenheitsland wird im Hellenismus, also in der Zeit nach Aristoteles und Alexander dem Großen, als Land nicht des zivilen Jammers, sondern des ursprünglichen Glücks entdeckt. Das zweite Arkadien ist eine poetische Kreation, die nicht verpflichtet ist, in der Peloponnes zu bleiben, sondern bei Mantua (Vergil) oder später auch in der Nähe von Sevilla (Cervantes) oder südlich von Rom (Goethe) liegen kann; Bestand haben nur der wohlklingende Name „Arkadien“ und das Anfangsdasein. Eine Abwechslung bringen die leicht aufflackernde Liebe zwischen den Hirten und der Tod, besonders der Tod eines abgewiesenen Liebhabers. Auf Grabmalern klagen die Toten: Auch sie waren einst in Arkadien, und die Lebenden halten ein in ihrem sonst gedankenlosen Schäferleben.

Arkadien ist das Land, das abgeschlossen in der Vorgeschichte verharrt und fremd in die Jetztzeit hineinragt. Die Arkader bleiben Primitive,¹⁹ sie können also nicht lesen und schreiben und entwickeln auch keine andere

18 Goethe 1949 ff., III 287 – *Faust* II, Vers 9512-3.

19 Ovid, *Fasti* II 289-290: „Ante Jovem gemitum habuisse ferunter / Arcades [...] Artis adhuc expers et rude vulgus erat.“

Kultur. Wir Späteren können hierüber großzügig hinwegsehen und den Arkadern ein gelungenes Leben andichten („Arkadisch frei sei unser Glück!“), wir können auch das Ovidsche „rudis“ betonen, wie Thomas Hobbes schreibt: „[...] no Arts, no Letters, no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.“²⁰ Aber seit Vergils *Eklogen* (um 40 v. Chr.) wird vor allem an das Glück der naiven Einwohner gedacht, noch nicht gequält vom Unbehagen in der Kultur, von den Leiden, die sich die in die Geschichte hinaus gestiegenen Menschen antun. Dieses Arkadien des „locus amoenus“, der glücklichen Anfangsidylle, lebt in der Neuzeit wieder auf und wird kreativ in die eigene Kultur integriert. Es ist das Arkadien der Gärten und kunstsinnig angelegten Landschaft, der verstreuten Ruinen und Aussichtspunkte. Ursprünglich war jedoch auch der Tote präsent, der uns klagend anredet. Das Land des Ursprungs war nicht nur der Ort unreflektierten Glücks, sondern auch der Totenklage. „Et in Arcadia ego“, so die Inschrift des Grabmals bei Guercino.

In einer listigen Vertauschung wird im 18. Jahrhundert das Toten-„ego“ seines Ich beraubt, es ist jetzt nicht mehr der Gestorbene, sondern mutiert zum Besucher, der mit seinem selbstbewussten „Auch ich in Arkadien“ von der antiken Poesielandschaft Besitz ergreift. Aber das ist schon das Ende der Geschichte.

2. Ego

Schwieriger zu erläutern ist das „ego“, das sich in der Inschrift auf dem Grab meldet. Dieses Ich ist so alt wie die entsprechende Schriftkultur, „Ich bin Dareios der König [...]“.²¹ In der Bibel verrätst Gott sich selbst durch den Ausspruch: „Ich bin, der ich bin“.²²

Wir stellen an den Anfang dieser Ego-Logik einige Hinweise zur Ich-Kultur der Antike, an der die arkadische Ich-Rede „Et in Arcadia ego“ teilhat. Eine wichtige Skizze liefert Bruno Snell in seiner *Entdeckung des Geistes*, zuerst 1946. Snell widmet dem Guercino-Thema ein eigenes Kapitel: „Arkadien. Die Entdeckung einer geistigen Landschaft“.²³ In Vergils *Eklogen* steht der Ursprungssatz unseres Mottos: „Daphnis ego in silvis [...]“

20 Hobbes 1962, 65.

21 Herodot IX 111.

22 Bibel, 2. Moses, 3, 14.

23 Snell 1980⁵, 257-275.

“ (V 43). Daphnis ist der Eigenname des Hirten, der hier von sich sagt, er sei „in silvis“. Schon beginnt die Schwierigkeit, denn „silvae“ sind nicht nur die Wälder Arkadiens, sondern in geläufiger Übertragung auch die Dichtungen. Wir kennen aus dem 18. Jahrhundert noch die „Kritischen Wälder“ von Herder.²⁴ Also das nunmehr tote „ego“ des Daphnis spricht von sich als einem Bewohner der arkadischen Wälder, aber zugleich als Dichter eben dieser Zeile.

Nun gehört zu diesem Textstück nicht nur das Wortmaterial, sondern die Form der Dichtung, und zwar der *Eklogen* insgesamt. Eine Analyse des zehnteiligen Werks zeigt, dass unser Ich-Vers wohlkomponiert in der numerischen Mitte der 9 ersten, als Einheit komponierten Eklogen steht.²⁵ Der Aufbau ist also so konzipiert, dass das Ich des Dichters, des Daphnis alias Vergils, wortwörtlich im Zentrum der 9 Eklogen steht; es geht also zentral um dieses Ich. Lange vor Descartes und allen Subjektwenden stellt der größte römische Dichter das Ego, das Subjekt, deklarativ in die Mitte, gewissermaßen als höchsten Punkt, an dem alles aufgehängt ist. Der tote, in der Erinnerung redende Dichter feiert im „Daphnis ego“ seine Auferstehung. So wie die 4. Ekloge von der Geburt des Kindes berichtete (und als wunderhafte Ankündigung der Geburt Christi gefeiert wurde), so ist das redende „Ego“ des Toten eine Auferstehung im Bewusstsein der Menschen, die vor dem Grabmal stehen und des Toten gedenken. Jedes spätere „Et in Arcadia ego“ soll dieses Wieder-Leben des Ego in der imaginierten Zeitschleife von Tot und Lebend symbolisch wiederholen, für Christen streng genommen ein Sakrileg.

Der lebende Vergil fasst idealiter die Zeilen, die von ihm auf seinem Grabstein künden sollen, mit dem Ego, das in die Zukunft projiziert wird und so die Erinnerung an den Dichter bewahrt.

„Mantua me genuit, Calabri rapuere. Tenet nunc
Parthenope. Cecini pascua, rura, duces.“

(„Mantua hat mich gezeugt, Bewohner von Kalabrien raubten mich,
jetzt hält mich
Neapel. Ich besang die Hirten, die Landkultur, die Fürsten“).²⁶

24 Herder, *Kritische Wälder*, 1769.

25 Vergil, *Ecloga* V 43. Skutsch 1969 (passim) zeigt im Einklang mit der Forschung, dass Vergil bei seiner Komposition nur die ersten 9 Eklogen zählt und die 10. als Anhang ungezählt folgen lässt. So können V 43-45 als Mitte des Buches gelten.

26 Zum Grabmal in Neapel vgl. Capasso 1983.

Das neuzeitliche „Et in Arcadia ego“ ist der Nachfolger der Subjektkultur der Antike, um es ein wenig überspitzt gegen eine immer noch verbreitete Tendenz der Ich-Leugnung in der Antike zu formulieren.

Die griechische und römische Kultur waren großzügig in der Vergabe der Möglichkeiten, Ich zu sein oder sich als Ich zu behaupten. Der Tote spricht aus dem Grab: „Ich war [...]“ oder „Ich bin [...]“. Das wird uns näher beschäftigen. Aber es kann auch eine Vase die Inschrift tragen: „Mich machte Exekias“.²⁷ Die Vase betritt die Bühne der Wirklichkeit und sagt von sich, sie sei das Erzeugnis des Künstlers Exekias. Diese höchst künstliche geistvolle Selbstrede „Ego sum“ und „Me fecit“ ist offenbar ganz problemlos zu verstehen. Jeder weiß sofort, was gemeint ist, theatralisch, nicht philosophisch.

Die Möglichkeit der Ich-Nobilitierung von Dingen, die jemand gemacht hat, ist mit wenigen Ausnahmen²⁸ heute verlorengegangen, sei es, weil die Industrialisierung keinen individuellen Macher mehr zulässt, sei es, weil das Christentum das Ich für Gott und die Menschen reserviert hat; so kann auch kein individuelles Kunstwerk mehr von sich behaupten „Mich hat Pablo Picasso gemacht“. An die Stelle der witzigen Ich-Rede eines Bildes oder Kruges mit dem stolzen Verweis auf den Hersteller tritt mit der beginnenden Neuzeit umgekehrt das Signieren des selbstbewussten Künstlers, man denke an Dürers *AD*, mit dem er dem Betrachter nicht das Jahr des Herrn, *Annus Domini*, sondern Albrecht Dürers Erzeugnis präsentiert. Das Bild ist sein Werk, sein Objekt; dieses hat wohl nicht mehr die Freiheit, selbst zu verkünden, dass Albrecht Dürer es machte, „*AD me fecit*“. In der Industrieproduktion ersetzt das Markenzeichen der Firma die Ich-Firmierung sei es des Produkts, sei es des Herstellers. Es stellt ab auf die rasche Wiedererkennung durch den potentiellen Käufer, mit dem weder Exekias noch Dürer gerechnet hatten. Die Serienproduktion verhindert, dass ein individuelles Stück aus der Reihe tanzt und sich als Ich vorstellt.

Uns interessieren die Grabinschriften, in denen der jetzt Tote in der Ich-Rede hier-jetzt spricht. Er hat vor seinem Ableben den Freunden die Aufgabe gestellt, sein Grab mit der von ihm, dem noch Lebenden, festgelegten Inschrift zu versehen. Daher entsteht eine Zeitschleife in dem Kulturprodukt der Grabinschrift: „Ich, der hier Begrabene, bin [...]“. Aber es kann natürlich auch „ich war“ heißen, wie sich schon oben zeigte. In dem „ego“ verschmilzt paradoxerweise beides, Tod und Leben. Im Gedenken an

27 Brandt 2006, 18, Anm. 10.

28 Zu ihnen gehört die Glocke des Wiener Stephandoms. *Relata refero*.

ihn lebt der jetzt Tote, wie er es damals wollte. Daher verzichtet das Motto auf ein Prädikat; es ist und will beides, Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Zu dieser Erkenntnis bedarf es keiner Grammatik, sondern der Einbildungskraft, über die die Menschen gewöhnlich verfügen und so das paradoxe Diktum im Andenken an den Toten sogleich verstehen. Das Andenken selbst ist auf zwei Weisen möglich; ursprünglich und meistens wird des Toten als des früher Lebenden wegen seiner besonderen Taten oder auch der Zuneigung etwa des Ehegatten oder der Kinder gedacht. Es kann jedoch das redende Ich auch anonym sein; es kann oder will nicht persönlich genannt und erinnert werden, sondern erhebt seine wehmütige Klage über den Verlust des Lebens in Arkadien. Dies letzte ist der Fall in der Maltradition, die mit Guercino beginnt.

III. Guercino, „*Et in Arcadia ego*“

„*Et in Arcadia ego*“ - Guercino benutzt für sein wohl neues Motto eine antike Vorlage, das schon zitierte „*Daphnis ego in silvis*“ aus Vergils *Eklogen*. Nun ist die Christianisierung des Abendlandes nicht folgenlos für das Thema von Tod und Leben. Vergil schrieb in einer antiken Tradition, in der die Grabinschrift die Gewähr bieten sollte, dass der Tote im Gedenken der Leser und Betrachter seinen Tod für eine kurze Zeit aufhebt. Das redende Ego ist ein namentlich genanntes Individuum, das durch bestimmte Eigenschaften und Handlungen identifiziert werden kann. Nur so ist das erhoffte persönliche Andenken und Fortleben möglich. Hiermit ist die christliche Seelenauffassung nicht verträglich; sie rechnet mit einer den Tod überlebenden Seele oder gar Körper-Seeleneinheit, die nach dem irdischen Leben in das himmlische Reich aufgenommen werden. So in aller Härte und unbarmherzigen Zumutung der christliche Glaube. Des Toten wird entsprechend nicht mehr in einer Zwiesprache an seinem Grab gedacht, sondern es wird für sein Heil in der Kirche gebetet.²⁹

In der Übernahme des vorchristlichen Arkadienmotivs liegen somit zwei Probleme, die Guercino sich stellt und genial (und bislang unbeachtet?) löst: Erstens: Die Kultur des Andenkens am Grab des Toten ist vorchristlich und wird sicher von der Kirche, die für das persönliche See-

29 Vgl. dazu Herklotz 1985. Es gibt offenbar bei den „sepulcra“ und „monumenta“ des Mittelalters keine Ich-Rede des Toten, mit der dieser sich an den Wanderer oder Trauernden wendet. Herklotz führt zwar in der Literaturliste die Arbeit von Häusle 1980 auf (Herklotz 1985, 249), vergleicht jedoch nicht deren Inhalt mit der von ihm analysierten christlichen Sepulkralkultur.

lenheit verantwortlich ist, ungern geduldet. Zweitens: Wenn die Arkader realistisch ein vorgeschichtliches ungebildetes Volk sind, wie z. B. Ovid in den *Fasti* bezeugt, dann können sie nicht lesen; ob die Inschrift nun den Toten namentlich nennt oder nur das anonyme „ego“ aufruft, interessiert dabei nicht. Wozu dient aber dann das „Et in Arcadia ego“, an wen richtet es sich, wenn die Arkader nicht die Adressaten sein können?

Zum ersten Punkt: An die Stelle der namentlichen Erinnerung, durch die der Tote oder die Tote ein Weiterleben nach dem Tod sucht, tritt die Klage des anonymen Toten. „Auch ich war einst in Arkadien und weile jetzt unter den Toten,“ ist die Klagerede eines jeden Verstorbenen, besonders natürlich desjenigen, dessen barock-makabren Schädel wir hier im Bild vor uns sehen. Die schriftliche Rede des Toten ist nicht mehr die Evozierung der persönlichen Erinnerung, sondern die Klage über das verlorene Leben in Arkadien.

Zum zweiten: Guercino konzipiert das Bild so, dass die beiden Hirten nur den Totenkopf sehen können; die Inschrift steht dagegen auf der von ihnen abgewandten Seite des Grabsteins und richtet sich an uns, die externen Betrachter und Leser. Eine Bilderfindung, die das weitere Schicksal des Mottos bestimmt und die teilhat an einer antiplatonischen, antiaristotelischen Erkenntnistheorie: sie trennt sinnliche Wahrnehmung und Denken von einander; die erste bildet eine Vorstufe, zu der auch die primitiven Hirten in der Lage sind, die zweite wird erst durch eine Kultur ermöglicht, die nur der externe Betrachter hat. Die beiden Hirten also sind zum Sehen und sinnlichen Erfahren in der Lage, sie sind emotional bewegt beim Anblick des Totenkopfes, aber damit endet auch ihre Möglichkeit, auf den Toten zu reagieren. Wir äußeren Betrachter dechiffrieren dagegen die Schrift, die die Freunde des Toten in den Stein geschlagen haben. Das Bild bezieht sich also auf Personen außerhalb der vorgeschichtlichen Welt der Arkader. Sie sind zu beiden Stufen, dem Anschauen und Denken, in der Lage, sie können beide Geschichtsphasen überblicken, die noch bloß sinnliche der Arkader und die begriffliche der Kultur, die auf die primitive Vorgeschichte folgt. „Et in Arcadia ego“; das Ich wird durch keine herausragenden Züge profiliert, es ist kein denkwürdiges Individuum, sondern ein namenloser Hirt, der über den Verlust des Lebens in Arkadien klagt.

Man beachte: Der Schädel auf dem Steinwürfel hat eine wohlkalkulierte Blickrichtung; sie trennt genau die beiden Phasen, die wir mit der Stufung von Sinnlichkeit (auf der linken Bildseite) und Verstand (auf der nachfolgenden rechten Seite) auffanden.

Betrachtet man das Bild im Ganzen noch einmal, so wird man auch konstatieren, dass es in drei Stücke oder Ideen auseinanderfällt. Da sind zuerst die beiden biedereren Hirten, die auch vor der Krippe des Christus-

Kindes stehen könnten; sodann die drastische Gestaltung des Schädels, und drittens die Inschrift. Zwei Argumente nötigen dazu, das „ego“ der Inschrift auf den früher hier lebenden, jetzt toten Hirten (und nicht etwa „den Tod“) zu beziehen. Erstens eint diese Beziehung das Bild im Ganzen. Wir lesen identisch das, was die Hirten sehen. Es geht um den Toten hier und seine Klage. Zweitens ist damit der Anschluss an die antiken Grabinschriften gewährleistet, auf die der Maler zurückgreift. Der Sprechende ist auch dort der konkrete Tote, nicht der abstrakte Tod, der die günstige Gelegenheit ergreift, sich endlich einmal zu Wort zu melden.

So gerät in das Bild der Riss zwischen Natur- und Kulturzustand; der letztere wird durch die Schriftzeichen markiert. Mit diesem Riss liegt das Interesse des Bildes einerseits in der Präsenz des Toten und dessen Klage, andererseits jedoch in einer geschichtlichen Reflexion über zwei Phasen der menschlichen Entwicklung. Dies wird das dominierende Interesse Poussins sein.

In Vergils 5. Ekloge sagt der Hirt Daphnis zu den anderen Hirten:

„Et tumulum facite, et tumulto superaddite carmen:
‘Daphnis ego in silvis, hinc usque ad sidera notus,
formosi pecoris custos, formosior ipsis’“.³⁰
(„Und schüttet den Hügel auf, und setzt hinzu die Grabschrift:
‘Ich bin Daphnis in den Wäldern, von hier bis zu den Sternen
berühmt,
der Hirt der schönen Herden, - ich selbst noch schöner als sie‘“).³¹

Dass der Tote nach dem Plan des Ego, des Lebenden, aus dem Grab spricht, ist ein in der gesamten antiken Kultur verankerter Brauch, wir müssen dies nicht gesondert an dieser Stelle belegen.³² Die Zeitschleife, die es ermöglicht, dass der jetzt Redende sich als künftiger Toter präsentiert und der Tote als lebendiges Ich, ist zwar höchst paradox, wurde aber in der Sepulkralkultur durchgehend verwendet und ist mühelos zu verstehen. Angeschlossen das doppeldeutige „in silvis“: in den arkadischen Wäldern (damals) und in der Dichtung (jetzt).

Die Helden und Götter Homers haben niemals Schwierigkeiten, die vielerlei Sprachen der Völker, die sie kennenlernen, zu verstehen; so haben auch die Vergilschen Hirten keine Mühe, zu schreiben und zu lesen, weder hier noch in den anderen Werken. Die Tatsache, dass die Bewohner des

30 Vergil, *Eclogae* V 42-44.

31 In der Übersetzung von Bruno Snell 1980, 267.

32 S. auch Panofsky 1975, 366.

frühen Arkadiens schlicht Analphabeten waren, nimmt dagegen Ovid in seinen *Fasti* auf, wie wir sahen. Guercino, der das Arkadien-Motiv zum Gegenstand seiner Malerei machte, reflektiert diesen geschichtlichen Umstand und trägt ihm in seinem Bild Rechnung, vielleicht durch Ovid inspiriert. Die beiden Hirten links im Bild betrachten den Totenkopf; die Inschrift jedoch, das „Et in Arcadia ego“, ist ihnen entzogen. Dies arrangierte physische Nicht-Sehen-Können ist der bildliche Ausdruck des geistigen Nicht-Lesen-Könnens. Erst wir, die wir als weitere Betrachter vor dem Bild stehen, lesen die Inschrift.

„Daphnis ego in silvis [...]“: Guercino übernimmt von Vergil das „ego“ und ersetzt „in silvis“ durch „in Arcadia“. Es fehlt jedoch der Eigenname neben dem „ego“, und dadurch ändert Guercino die Aussage der üblichen antiken Grabinschriften. Diese dienten, wie die Studien besonders von Helmut Häusle zeigen, dem Andenken und Weiterleben einer oder mehrerer bestimmter Personen.³³ Lässt sich der Tote nicht identifizieren, erhält die Inschrift eine andere Funktion. Guercinos Erfindung: „Ego“ ist der Tote, dessen Schädel wir und die Hirten sehen. Dadurch erhält das antike Motiv eine gewissermaßen existenzialistische Wendung. Nicht das Gedenken einer erinnerungswürdigen Person ist die Intention des Bildes, sondern die erschütternde Klage um den Verlust des Lebens in Arkadien. „Non omnis moriar“,³⁴ es gibt ein Nachleben nach dem Tod durch die Erinnerung an die Taten und Werke der Begrabenen. Wenn diese jedoch fehlt wie bei den Arkadern, dann bleibt nur der physische Tote, der in Kürze der Natur verfällt und verschwindet. Dem „ego“ des makabren Totenkopfes bleibt nur die ephemere Klage.

Die Inschrift spricht das aus, was wir und die Hirten im Bild sehen, die drastische Gegenwart des Toten. „Ego“ – bildintern gerichtet an euch, die jetzt in Arkadien lebenden Hirten. Die Konsequenz, dass hiermit auch der Tod in Arkadien anwesend ist, wird nicht gezogen, weil sie nur eine gelehrte Verallgemeinerung des drastisch Sichtbaren ist; wen interessiert sie? Wer weiß nicht, dass die Gegenwart des Toten den Tod impliziert?

Der noch lebende Genosse, etwa Daphnis-Vergil, stiftet in eigener Fürsorge das Mahnmal, an dem seiner gedacht werden soll; in diesem Gedenken liegt seine Überwindung des physischen Todes. Wir können, ohne in verbotene Spekulationen zu geraten, sagen, dass dem Ich des Gestorbenen keine substanzielle Existenz zugesprochen wird; das Ich ex-

33 Häusle 1980.

34 Horaz, Oden III 30,6.

istiert nur und ausschließlich im (antizipierten) Andenken derer, die hier am Grab stehen.

Nun ist unschwer zu sehen, dass das Christentum diese Grabkultur nicht mehr dulden kann, weil die substanzielle Unsterblichkeit der Seele die Kultur des Andenkens am Grab überflüssig macht. Wenn die Seele als getrennt Seiendes im Himmel ist, dann wird des Toten in einer Messe in der Kirche gedacht, aber nicht an seinem Grab. Der Gläubige ist dem Verstorbenen im spirituellen Gebet nahe, aber nicht in der räumlichen Nähe des Leichnams in der Erde. Die modernen Friedhöfe entstanden erst unter neuen Bedingungen am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts.

Guercinos Ich-Rede des Toten schließt also nicht an einen zeitgenössischen Brauch an, sondern ist eine Reminiszenz unter Gebildeten, die einen antiken Brauch in die Kunst aufnehmen. Da eine Gewähr des Weiterlebens nach dem Tod durch das Andenken trauernder Menschen nicht gesucht werden kann, kann und muss die Nennung eines Eigennamens fehlen. Das „ego“ wird nicht als bestimmte Person identifiziert, sondern bleibt anonym: jeder Tote, der zur Ich-Rede fähig ist oder war. Es wird nicht seiner Taten gedacht, sondern sein Tod beklagt.

Ich denke, hiermit ist die unabhängig von Panofsky übliche Lesart wieder in ihr Recht gesetzt.

IV. Poussin: „*Et in Arcadia ego*“ I und II.



Poussin I, Et in Arcadia ego, 101x82cm, Öl auf Leinwand, Devonshire Collection. Chatsworth House.

In den beiden Gemälden von Poussin steht die Schrift selbst, das fremde Medium, im Zentrum der Neugier der Hirten. Der Tote, auf den sich das

„ego“ bezieht, ist belanglos geworden. In der ersten Fassung schirmt uns der Fluss der Zeit, Alpheios, von dem zeitlich fernen Bildgeschehen ab; in der zweiten Fassung entziffern die drei Hirten den rätselhaften Spruch, der von einem anonymen Ego stammt.

Das Interesse der Hirten am „Et in Arcadia ego“ ist reflexiv geworden. Es richtet sich nicht auf den Inhalt der Kundgabe, sondern auf diese selbst: Was besagt die Inschrift als solche für die kulturfernen Arkader? „*Artis adhuc expers et rude vulgus erat*“³⁵ – dieser „clash of civilizations“ interessiert offenbar Poussin. Die Anregung dazu kam, so dürfen wir vermuten, von Guercino. Er richtete, wie wir sahen, das Bild so ein, dass die Hirten, die nicht lesen konnten, die Inschrift schon physisch nicht sahen. Jetzt wenden sie ihre Neugier diesen *fremden* Zeichen zu. Der Bildbetrachter war damit aufgefordert, auch über die Kulturschranke zu reflektieren, die uns von den Arkadern trennt. Das Thema der Aufmerksamkeit der Hirten ist die Schrift, in der ein „ego“ verkündet, es sei bzw. war in Arkadien. Wer ist das „ego“, wenn nichts dazu einlädt, an einen bestimmten Toten zu denken?

In der Fassung Guercinos entdecken zwei arkadische Hirten einen Totenschädel; auf der ihnen abgewandten Seite des Grabsockels lesen wir die Inschrift „Et in Arcadia ego“; „Auch ich bin (war) in Arkadien“. Die beiden Werke Poussins stellen eine zweite Phase der künstlerischen Reflexion dar; die Hirten konzentrieren sich jetzt ganz auf die Inschrift, die sie nicht lesen können, der Tote im Grabmal, wenn es ihn denn gibt, interessiert sie nicht. Die dritte Phase, die bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts reicht, erinnert vage an den Toten, kennt die Poussinsche Kulturreflexion nicht mehr, sondern besetzt häufig das „ego“ mit dem lebendigen Ich, das sich in Arkadien dünkt: „Ich hier, jetzt“. Mit dieser Fassung endet das Arkadienmotiv; es hat weder ein reflektiertes noch seltsamerweise ein touristisches Nachleben gefunden. Die Ruinenmalerei greift die Zeitschleife des „Et in Arcadia ego“ auf und treibt die Paradoxie bis zu dem Punkt, dass jetzt entstehende Paläste als die Ruinen gemalt werden, die sie in einer bestimmten Zukunft sein werden.³⁶ Die Grammatik kann dies nur mühsam mit einem Futur II vergegenwärtigen.

35 Ovid, Fasti II 289-290. „Ante Jovem gemitum habuisse ferunter / Arcades [...] Artis adhuc expers et rude vulgus erat.“

36 Brandt 2006, 99-109.



Poussin II. *Et in Arcadia ego*, 87x120cm, Öl auf Leinwand. Louvre, Paris.

Der Tote in dem Sarkophag der ersten Fassung Poussins und des Kenotaphs der zweiten Fassung³⁷ findet keine Aufmerksamkeit mehr; anders als bei Guercino sind die arkadischen Hirten nur an der Inschrift und dem Sichel-Zeichen des Toten interessiert, nur die künstlichen Symbole und der Schatten einer Sichel fasziniert sie bei ihrem Fund eines Grabmals in der vorgeschichtlichen Landschaft.

Beide Gemälde nutzen die klassische Struktur der Personen 1, 2, 3 / 4.³⁸ In der früheren Fassung treten die drei Hirten bewegt hin zu dem Grabmal, während der Flussgott an der vierten Stelle als ruhender Gegenpol folgt. In der zweiten Version sind auch die drei Hirten schon in Ruhe am Grab versammelt, während die vierte Figur ihnen gegenübersteht. Die vierte Figur in der Frühfassung lässt uns die Landschaft in Arkadien identifizieren, Alpheus ist der Fluss im Südosten der Halbinsel; vielleicht auch: der Fluss als Lebensquell in der arkadischen Dürre. Die vierte göttliche Erscheinung in der Zweitfassung bleibt rätselhaft: Wer ist sie? Sicher ist, dass sie um das Geheimnis der Inschrift und um Leben und Tod weiß.

Für den Kulturhistoriker bleibt wichtig, dass sich Poussin des Musters 1, 2, 3 / 4 in der höchsten Phase seiner Kunst bedient; besonders in der Zweitfassung liefert es die innere Form der bildlichen Schönheit überhaupt. Wie der König der zeitgenössischen Drei-Ständegesellschaft, bündelt und vereint sie die drei verschiedenen Figuren; aber hiermit gelangen wir zu keinen inhaltlichen Bestimmungen.

Der Tote ist zweitrangig geworden, dominant ist in beiden Fassungen das von Guercino präsentierte Thema der Schriftzeichen. In beiden Fassungen Poussins konzentrieren sich die Hirten auf diese Frage: Was tritt hier in unsere Welt? Was bedeuten diese geheimnisvollen Zeichen auf dem Sarkophag oder Kenotaph?

Zur zweiten Fassung: Die zwei inneren Hirten ertasten und lesen (links) und zeigen auf die Zeichen (rechts); ihre Bewegung ist zur Ruhe gekommen, sie sind wie ein lebendes Bild, das die Figuren darstellt. Giovanni Pietro Bellori beschreibt die Szene so:

„Finse un pastore della felice Arcadia, il quale, piegato un ginocchio a terra, addita e legge l'iscrizione di un sepolcro scolpito in questi

37 Sarkophag – Kenotaph, hier die Leiche, die im Lauf der Zeit verzehrt wird (sarx; phagein), dort das Grab (taphos), das leer ist (kenos). Die Zuordnung zu den beiden Fassungen ist nur eine Vermutung.

38 Dazu Brandt 2015.

caratteri: 'Et in Arcadia ego', cioè, che il sepolcro si trova ancora in Arcadia, e la Morte a luogo in mezzo alla felicità.³⁹

Alles ist zur Darstellung geworden, zu einem Metadiskurs, der von der sich selbst zugewandten, sich selbst feiernden Kunst handelt. Der Tote tritt gänzlich zurück, an seine Stelle tritt die Selbstfeier der schönen Kunst.

Der Versuch, die Frau auf der rechten Bildseite als Philosophie⁴⁰ oder gar als Christus-Künderin zu bestimmen, bleibt willkürlich. Man kann jedoch an die erste Fassung des Bildes anschließen und das Motiv des Flussgottes hier als Nymphe wiedererkennen. Sie steht vor einem Lorbeerbaum und ist dadurch als Daphne gekennzeichnet, die Tochter eines Flussgottes; mit dem Lorbeer wird der Dichter oder auch der Maler gekrönt. So ergäben sich einige bildinterne Anknüpfungspunkte.

In der zweiten Fassung von Poussins *Et in Arcadia ego* findet das Motiv seinen anerkannten Höhepunkt. In der Nachfolgezeit dominieren zwei Rezeptionsbereiche; der eine ist die Besetzung des vakanten „ego“ durch das moderne lebende Subjekt, Ich-hier in Arkadien, posierend für die Erinnerung in alle Zukunft. Zum anderen wird die Grab-Ruine aus dem Bildbereich getrennt und für sich als arkadisch thematisiert. An die Stelle des persönlichen Lebens- und Todesschicksals tritt damit der Verfall architektonischer Monumente. Ist in der ersten Variante ein individueller Mensch „Ich-hier-jetzt“ bereit, in alle Zukunft erinnert zu werden, betrachten wir in der zweiten Variante den Verfall vergangener Gebäude in Arkadien und im gegenwärtigen Europa.

V. Epilog: Die Ruinen und „Auch ich in Arkadien“

Die Verbindung des Arkadienmotivs mit einer Ruinenlandschaft ist in der Phase nach Poussin zur Gewohnheit geworden. Aber was haben Ruinen mit Arkadien zu tun? In der ursprünglichen Fassung nichts, ob nun das Arkadien als „rudis“ und unzivilisiert oder als das Land glücklicher Hirten angesehen wird – Ruinen kommen schlicht nicht vor. Auch bei Guercino findet sich keine Verbindung von Arkadischer Landschaft und Ruinen; es gibt die dürftige Grabanlage, aber niemand wird sie als Ruine bezeichnen wollen. Auf der anderen Seite ist die Verbindung von beidem seit dem 17. und 18. Jahrhundert konstant und selbstverständlich. Warum?

39 Zit. nach Brandt 2006, 93.

40 Maisak 1981, 180.

Es gibt eine unbestreitbare Verknüpfung, und sie ist, wenn ich richtig sehe, die einzige. Ihre Voraussetzung ist die poetische Freizügigkeit des vorgeschichtlichen Arkadiens; es konnte bei Mantua und später in Spanien liegen, im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert irgendwo in Italien. Die reale Anknüpfung besteht in der Entdeckung fremdartiger Schriftzeichen auf dem alten Grabmal, das die Hirten in Arkadien finden. Es zeigte sich, dass Guercino unter bestimmten Bildzwängen stand, als er das Motiv „Et in Arcadia ego“ bildhaft realisieren wollte. Die Hirten konnten nicht lesen; so wendete er die Schriftseite des Grabsteines nach außen hin zu uns, den lesekundigen Betrachtern des Bildes. Poussin entwickelte hieraus das zentrale Motiv seiner beiden Fassungen: Es ist der Konflikt zwischen vorgeschichtlichen Hirten und einem Produkt der Schriftkultur. Dargestellt werden Hirten, die mit dem Tast- und Sehsinn erkennen wollen, was die seltsamen artifiziellen Zeichen bedeuten.

Dieses Motiv fand Poussin im zeitgenössischen Rom. Poussins Freund Bellori war ab 1670 Commissario delle Antichità von Rom; durch ihn war Poussin schon lange zuvor mit dem Umgang mit Altertümern in Rom und Umgebung vertraut. Archäologen versuchten, die Schriftzeichen auf den Ruinen zu dechiffrieren. Sie konnten als gegenwärtige Vorlage für den Versuch der arkadischen Hirten dienen, die fremden Zeichen einer Schriftkultur zu entziffern. Hiermit ist Arkadien zu einem Land der Ruinen geworden, zu einem Land der rätselhaften Gegenwart verfallener Bauwerke und Inschriften aus früheren Zeiten. Dieses Motiv bewährte sich als malerisch, und es hatte den Vorteil, nicht nur auf Bildern, sondern in der Wirklichkeit selbst imitierbar zu sein, es konnten Ruinen à la mode in Auftrag gegeben und gebaut werden.

Die Ruine nimmt den Platz ein, den ursprünglich der Tote und sein redendes „Ego“ hatten; nachdem der äußere Betrachter sich das „ego“ lebenskräftig angeeignet hatte, konnte der verfallene antike Bau zu seinem neuen Gegenüber werden. Wer im italienischen Arkadien das selbst-ermächtigte „Et ego“ spricht, ist zum Ursprung seiner beiden klassischen Sprachen zurückgekehrt. Als die Ruinen noch lebendig waren, wurden die jetzt toten Sprachen des Griechischen und Lateinischen hier gesprochen.

So entstand die Dopplung vom Ursprungs-Arkadien und anfänglichen geschichtlichen Bauten, die heute als pittoreske Ruinen überleben.

In den Ruinen im späten 18. Jahrhundert kehrt die Zeitschleife wieder, die wir in der antiken Grabrede gefunden hatten. Die Ruinenphantasie zur Zeitenwende um 1800 projiziert den künftigen Verfall der gerade jetzt entstehenden Paläste und bannt sie jetzt in das Bild, das ihr späteres Ende dokumentiert.

„Auch ich in Arkadien“. So lautet das Motto von Goethes *Italienischer Reise* auf den beiden Titelblättern der ersten Auflage von 1816 und 1817. Goethe hat es in der „Ausgabe letzter Hand“ getilgt, vielleicht im Gefühl eines „non decet“. Das Tischbein-Gemälde von 1787 ist nicht frei vom Gestus der Besitznahme ohne die lästige Tugend der Bescheidenheit. Der Titel lautet „Goethe in der Campagna di Roma“.

Mit der Fassung des „ego“ als des jetzt hier Lebenden geht die innere Spannung des Diktums zwischen Tod und Leben verloren, es bleibt der lebensfrohe Ausruf, im Sehnsuchtsland der Dichtung und Malerei angelangt zu sein. Hiermit verkündet der Spruch sein Ende. Aber zuvor klingt ein modernes Motiv an, das auch Goethe im *Faust* benennt:

Gelockt, auf sel'gem Grund zu wohnen,
Du flüchtestest ins heiterste Geschick!
Zur Laube wandeln sich die Throne.
Arkadisch frei sei unser Glück!⁴¹

Arkadien ist frei von der Demütigung durch die Throne; schon bei Cervantes sucht Marcela, eine reiche Bürgerstochter, in Arkadien das freie Leben außerhalb der gesellschaftlichen Zwänge.⁴²

So wird Arkadien zur kritischen Utopie; keine im Ernst gesuchte Lebensform, doch eine Mahnung, die Rousseau im *Contrat social* ins Zentrum rückt: „L'homme est né libre, et par tout il est dans les fers.“⁴³ Arkadien bietet keinen Ausweg, aber die poetische Erinnerung einer eigentlich menschlichen Lebensform. In der historischen Antike gab es die Verknüpfung von Arkadien und Freiheit wohl nicht.

Genauso wichtig ist die schon angesprochene Besitznahme des „ego“ durch den Lebenden; der Tote der antiken Tradition und noch Guercinos wird enteignet, er muss dem Anspruch der neuen Herren weichen. Diese Umwidmung setzt schon bei Poussin ein und wird von den Künstler-Touristen des 18. Jahrhunderts besiegelt. Die Abwendung von den Toten zu den Lebenden, von der Vergangenheit zur Zukunft liegt im allgemeinen Zeitgeist, dem „climate of opinion“ des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts.⁴⁴ Das Ich des Toten in Arkadien ist stillschweigend verneint und vernichtet und appropriiert von dem modernen Bildungsbürger, der umgeben ist von den Attrappen Arkadiens. Er ruft selbstzufrieden: „Ich

41 Goethe 1962-6, III 288 – *Faust* II, Vers 9570-9573.

42 Cervantes 2005, 79-89 – *Don Quijote de la Mancha* I 13.

43 Rousseau 1959 ff., III 351.

44 Dazu Brandt 2012.

auch“. Hier zu sterben und begraben zu werden fällt ihm auch im Traum nicht ein. „Den Tod statuiere ich nicht“,⁴⁵ sagt Goethe in vielerlei Hinsicht.

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45 Goethes Gespräche in fünf Bänden, hg. von Wolfgang Herwig, Stuttgart 1965 ff., III / 2, 289.


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Berlin sey Sparta. Bemerkungen zur preußischen Spartarezeption.

Volker Losemann

Am 6. April 2003 habe ich einer Einladung von Eckart Schütrumpf folgend im Department of Classics in Boulder einen Vortrag über „The Image of Sparta in the Third Reich“ – den Titel hatte der Jubilar formuliert – gehalten. Meinem kleinen Beitrag „Berlin sey Sparta. Bemerkungen zur preußischen Spartarezeption“ stelle ich die Einführung von Eckart Schütrumpf voran, der darin mein eher zeithistorisches Vortragsthema von 2003 in den antiken Rahmen eingeordnet hat und darüber hinaus mir eine im April 2003 sehr aktuelle Notiz aus der New York Times vom 4. April 2003 übergab, die ich hier mit der Abbildung 1 präsentiere. Darin warnt die prominente Kolumnistin Maureen Dowd (Jahrgang 1952) in der Zeit des Irakkriegs vor einem „turn“ Amerikas (oder G.W. Bush's) „into Sparta“. Die Kolumnistin ruft in ihrer Notiz das traditionelle Bild vom aggressiven Krieger- oder Militärstaat Sparta auf.

In bk. 1 of his *Histories* Thuc. (10) speculates about the possibility that Sparta might be deserted one day but her temples and the foundations of the other buildings preserved. He predicts that people on the basis of the surviving evidence will not believe that Sparta ever could have had the power it actually had. Everybody who has visited Sparta can confirm this: the remains of the old city—if we can call a conglomerate of villages a city—do not suggest in any way Sparta's former importance. But nevertheless, Sparta is still powerful in people's minds. Less than a week ago one could read in the editorial pages of the NY Times:




Obviously, becoming Sparta is not desirable.

People did not always think like that. We know that in Classical times some Athenians admired Sparta, and Socrates was probably one of them.

We will hear today what influence Sparta exercised on Germany during the 12 years of the Third Reich.

Die Parole „Berlin sey Sparta“ stammt aus dem Siebenjährigen Krieg (1756-1763) in dem Friedrich der Grosse mehrfach in kritische Situationen geriet und sie korrespondiert mit der Warnung M. Dowd's insoweit als beide Äußerungen auf die Modellvorstellung vom Kriegerstaat Sparta zurückgreifen. Während M.Dowd eindeutig vor diesem Sparta warnt, setzt der 1757 noch anonyme Urheber der Parole „Berlin sey Sparta“ Hoffnungen auf „Sparta“, das für Berlin bzw. Preußen in Kriegszeiten Rettung oder Erfolg bringen kann oder soll.



Die vier auch im Originaldruck abgebildeten Zeilen entstammen den 1758 zunächst anonym erschienenen „Preussischen Kriegslieder(n) in den Feldzügen 1756 und 1757 von einem Grenadier.“ (Vgl. Abbildung 2). Die zunächst anonyme Publikation der „Grenadierlieder“ hat Gotthold

Ephraim Lessing entscheidend gefördert bzw. betrieben. Hinter dem „Grenadier“, dem eigentlichen Autor verbarg sich Johann Wilhelm Gleim (1719-1803) aus Halberstadt, dem dortigen Domsekretär und Kanonikus, der im Halberstädter und dem jüngeren Hallenser Dichterkreis wirkte und heute am ehesten als gut vernetzter Literaturmäzen bekannt ist. Dem Briefwechsel zwischen Gleim und Lessing ist die starke Anteilnahme Lessings an dem „Grenadier“ Gleim und seinen Liedern zu entnehmen: Am 6.2.1758 bat er darum, der anonymen Publikation ein Vorwort beigeben zu dürfen: „Und der Grenadier erlaubt es doch noch, dass ich eine Vorrede dazu machen darf?“¹

In dem dann anonym von Lessing herausgegebenen „Vorbericht“ wird der Grenadier zunächst wenig zustimmend mit Horaz (deutscher Horaz?) und Pindar verglichen, um dann als ein preußischer Tyrtäus gewürdigt zu werden:

Von dem einzigen Tyrtäus könnte er die heroische Gesinnungen, den Geitz nach Gefahren, den Stolz für das Vaterland zu sterben, erlernt haben, wenn sie einem Preussen nicht ebenso natürlich wären, als einem Spartaner.²

Der hier von Lessing eingeführte „Wahlspartaner“ Tyrtaios – um einen Ausdruck eines neokonservativen Autors aus den 1980er Jahren aufzunehmen – spielt in der europäischen und deutschen, und wie hier in der preußischen Spartarezeption eine zentrale Rolle.³ Der Grenadier Gleim hat die ihm von Lessing zugesprochene zentrale Rolle als „deutsche(r) Tyrtäus“ und Friedrichs ... Horatz“ angenommen.⁴

Johann Gottfried Herder hat in seinen „Frühen Schriften“ in der auf 1767 datierten Textsammlung „Von der Griechischen Literatur in Deutschland“ Gleim den Abschnitt „Tyrtäus und der Grenadier“ gewidmet.⁵ Die „Kriegeslieder des preußischen Grenadiers“ rühmt Herder als „Nationalgesänge“ ..., „die keiner unsrer Nachbarn hat, keiner unsrer Nachbarn uns entwinden kann und die vielleicht mehr als Tyrtäisch sind.“⁶

Herder stellt Gleim weit über Tyrtaios: „Plato würde unsrem Landsmann den Titel eines Göttlichen nicht abgeschlagen haben, und wenn die unwissende Zeit seine Werke so ungerecht verzehren sollte, als die meisten

1 Blitz 2000, Anm. 174.

2 Gleim 1786, Preußische Kriegeslieder, Neue Auflage, IV.

3 Rawson 1969, 293.

4 Riedel 2000, 129 Anm. 40.

5 Herder 1985, 349-351.

6 Herder 1985, 350.

des Tyrtäus: seine elf Kriegslieder haben mehr Anrecht auf die Unsterblichkeit, als die griechischen viere.“⁷ Herders Hymne auf Gleim spiegelt die erstaunliche Rolle, die Gleim in dem „Vaterlandsdiskurs“ im Umfeld des Siebenjährigen Krieges zugesprochen wurde. Sein „friderizianischer“ Personenkult und sein ausgeprägter „Preußenenthusiasmus“ fand erst mit dem preußischen Sieg bei Roßbach am 5. November 1757 Nachahmer und Unterstützer.⁸

Mit seinen „Grenadierliedern“ und der Annahme der Rolle eines „Tyrtaios“ vollzog Gleim vorübergehend einen Wechsel von der Anakreontik zu der „rauheren Tonart“ (Riedel) der Kriegslieder. Seit den 1740er Jahren bis ungefähr 1770 hat er anakreontische Gedichte übersetzt und nachgeahmt.⁹ Was seine „spartanischen“ Kriegslieder angeht, so hat sich die oben zitierte Befürchtung Herders bestätigt: Auf längere Sicht wurden Gleims Nationalgesänge in der deutschen Literatur eher „verzehrt“.¹⁰

Gleim ist gleichwohl in Personalunion als „preußischer Tyrtaios“ an den Beginn einer preußisch-spartanischen Entwicklungslinie in der deutschen Spartarezeption zu setzen. Diese Linie müsste breiter ausgezogen werden, als das hier geschehen kann.

In der deutschen Spartarezeption im frühen 19. Jahrhundert nehmen Karl Otfried Müllers zuerst 1824 erschienene „Dorier“, konzipiert als „Geschichten hellenischer Stämme und Städte“ in Hinblick auf eine durchgängige Spartaidealisierung einen prominenten, wenn nicht den prominentesten Platz, ein. Edouard Will, der 1956 in seiner Studie „Doriens et Ioniens“ die Anwendung ethnischer und rassistischer Kriterien in der deutschen Altertumswissenschaft untersucht hat, charakterisiert den von Müller vorgestellten hierarchisch strukturierten, militaristischen Staat der Dorier als einen preußisch-spartanischen Modellstaat: „évidemment la Prusse“.¹¹

Stärksten Ausdruck findet die preußisch-spartanische Entwicklungslinie dann in der preußischen Kadettenerziehung: Ein instruktives Beispiel liefert etwa der zuerst 1898 erschienene Titel „Spartanerjünglinge. Eine Kadettengeschichte in Briefen von Paul von Szczepański“,¹² die im ersten

7 Herder 1985, 351.

8 Blitz 2000, 205.

9 Riedel 2000, 128.

10 Herder 1985, 351.

11 Will 1956, 12.

12 Losemann 2012, 268.

Weltkrieg aktualisiert wurde – auch im Hinblick auf den Thermopylenkomplex.¹³

Das Aufnehmen dieser preußisch-spartanischen Entwicklungslinie darf nicht das rassenideologisch radikalisierte und aufgeladene Spartabild Hitlers und prominenter Vertreter der NS-Führungsschicht aus dem Blick verlieren, das am Ende der Weimarer Republik stärkere Konturen gewinnt.

Dazu haben auch bekannte Klassische Philologen ihren oft übersehenen Beitrag geleistet: So rühmt Werner Jaeger in seiner weit verbreiteten *Paideia* (1934) die dorische „Herrenrasse“, bei Tyrtaios findet er die „Stiftungsurkunde des spartanischen Machtstaates.“¹⁴

Richard Harder präsentiert im zweiten Weltkrieg in einem für die NS-Eliteerziehung in den Adolf-Hitler-Schulen (AHS) konzipierten Schulungsheft mit dem Titel „Sparta. Der Lebenskampf einer Nordischen Herrenschicht“ (1940 und 1942/43) „Tyrtaios Altspartanische Kampfreden.“¹⁵

Die preußisch-spartanische Entwicklungslinie wird, wie der 1987 erschienene Beitrag ‚Sparta. Huldigung an das altgriechische Preußen‘ des Publizisten Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner (1939-2011) zeigt, von neokonservativen und in der Gegenwart von rechtsextremen Kreisen wiederaufgenommen. Dieser Zusammenhang muss genauerer Untersuchung vorbehalten bleiben.

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13 Losemann 2012, 269.

14 Jaeger 1934, 138-139.

15 von Vacano 1942/43, 8.

- Losemann, V. 2012. The Spartan tradition in Germany, 1870-1945. In: S. Hodgkinson and I. McGregor Morris, eds., *Sparta in Modern Thought: Politics, History and Culture*. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales: 253-314.
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Retrospection and Utopia: Stefan Zweig's Conception of World Literature from the Spirit of Historiography

Rüdiger Görner (London)

I

“The air warm and a marvellous brise all day, sunbaths and waterbathes, nice people, Brasiliens, Argentines, Suisse, Dutch which [sic!] all are good and old readers of my books. – From tomorrow (after Barbados) I shall get a state cabin to work in.”¹

This world traveller on board a passenger cruiser belonging to the Moore-McCormack Line, established under Franklin D. Roosevelt's so-called ‘Good Neighbour Policy’, could have been Thomas Mann, had he insisted in the first place on being put up in a state cabin on leaving New York, even though in August 1940, he would have declined invitations to lecture in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela.

But this traveller was Stefan Zweig *en route* to a state of the future, which perhaps could never have existed, as Franz Werfel put it in his sensitive reflections on his fellow émigré's suicide in early 1942.² Besides Thomas Mann, Zweig was *the* exponent of world literature among German-speaking exiles; his books, according to Werfel, could be found on bookshelves in Cairo or Cape Town, Lisbon or Shanghai, Batavia or Mexico City.

But Werfel also wondered what spurred on this ever-restless writer. Was it the voices of anxiety, the vision of an even more horrendous future?³

Zweig was an explorer in matters of literature, which constituted his world. This remained obvious to the very last of his projects: his memoirs of a European in transatlantic exile, the summary of his life-long engagement with Balzac, his manifold preoccupation with the aftermath of the First World War as the decisive turning point in Europe's cultural identity, whether in essayistic or novelistic form. With *Amerigo* and *Magellan*, the

1 Zweig 2010, 49.

2 Werfel 1975, 401.

3 Werfel 1975, 401.

biographer Zweig had already turned to explorers and the ways in which they shaped history. Since the beginning of his initially self-chosen exile, Zweig had been increasingly concerned with biography and historiography as forms of narratives, and therefore implicit contributions to literature, albeit in a mode derived from 19th century practices charged with 20th century psychological concerns. Arguably, the interplay between invention and retrospection informed Stefan Zweig's conception of world literature as a whole. Admittedly, there were curious absences in his essayistic, or biographical, repertoire if we think of Goethe, Schiller, and most of the Romantics, with no significant reference to Fontane either, or indeed Grillparzer or Stifter. In this respect, there was perhaps an implicit division of labour at work with Hofmannsthal and, to a certain extent, Thomas Mann, who passionately cared for those absent from Zweig's canon.

But there is another revealing indication of Zweig's notion of a world community facilitated by literature. In Petropolis and his villa in the Rua Gonçalves Dias, Zweig kept above his desk a framed extract from Camoës' epic poem *Lusiadas* and, beneath, his own handwritten translation. It reads as follows:

Weh, wieviel Not und Fährnis aus dem Meere!
Wie nah der Tod in tausendfalt Gestalten!
Auf Erden, wieviel Krieg! Wieviel der Ehre
Verhaßt Geschäft! Ach daß nur eine Falte
Des Weltballs für den Menschen sicher wäre,
Sein bißchen Dasein friedlich durchzuhalten.
Indes die Himmel wetteifern im Sturm.
Und gegen wen? Den ärmsten Erdenwurm!⁴

What does this framed original and translation on the wall of Zweig's final destination symbolize? Perhaps a feeling of being within reach of a document of world literature; being in touch as it were with the world outside; and remembering the exploratory dimension of literature. The stanza itself speaks of existential dangers on the open sea and the desire to identify but one "ply of the globe" that would provide safety. It is telling that Zweig uses "ply" twice: "Falte" and "tausendfalt", suggesting an ambiguous "Vielfalt" or multitude, something that might not only protect but unfold itself. One is reminded of Gilles Deleuze's treatise on "le pli," his exploration of the Baroque,⁵ which showed how the ply can contain an entire world. This in-

4 Jacob 1959, 102.

5 Deleuze 1988.

triguing analogy is also relevant in the respect that Camões' *Lusiadas* is after all a key poetic artefact of the Lusophone Baroque.

This poetic double-picture on the wall testifies to Zweig's ambition right to the very end of his life to build up relations with the literatures of the world, and always very much in translation, too. Translation features so prominently, and from so early on, in Zweig's work, that it would be justified to see in him a champion of what is today called "translational literature".⁶ This view is reinforced by a brief but poignant foreword Zweig wrote in 1940 for his and Richard Friedenthal's translation of Irwin Edman's essay *Candle in the Dark: A Postscript to Despair* (1939). In it, Zweig professed that it is only through translation that we become aware of the special coloring and the specific weight of words in different languages.⁷ Edman (1896-1954), a professor of philosophy at Columbia, who shared with Zweig the day of his birth (28th November), confirmed Zweig in his "mitfühlende Art des Weltblicks,"⁸ a sense of empathy with the suffering in Europe that conditioned the philosopher's view of the world. It appears that Edman's role in inspiring some of Zweig's last works, including *Die Welt von Gestern*, has largely been overlooked. At the very beginning of his foreword, Zweig concedes that he turned to this thinker for council in times of "innere Ausweglosigkeit."⁹

Following on from these initial reflections, I will argue that Stefan Zweig's encounter with the New World as an exiled European provided him with an inspiration for both—an insight into the world of tomorrow and the necessity of supporting it with his vision of the past. Zweig's complex literary oeuvre illustrates the intriguing antinomy between his preoccupation with *The World of Yesterday* and *The Historiography of Tomorrow*, to quote a lecture Zweig delivered in fifteen cities in the USA between January and February 1939. Incidentally, the English translation provided by William Rose for Zweig only speaks of the "History of Tomorrow," suggesting, however, a neat double meaning: history's place in the future, and 'tomorrow' as a future object of history. He speaks of two weeks of intensive preoccupation with the work of Edman, whom he saw, quite rightly, as a successor to William James and Santayana in his intellectual approach to questions pertaining to the significance of thinking about history. Referring to Edman's travelogue of 1938, *Philosopher's Holiday*, Zweig translates

6 Cf. The afterword to Fried 2014, 97.

7 Edman 1940, 10.

8 Edman 1940, 8.

9 Edman 1940, 7.

it with “Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen;”¹⁰ that is to say, with the exact title of Hermann Graf Keyserling’s famous two volume account of his world travels of 1919, one of the foundational documents of German post-World War One cosmopolitanism. Zweig expresses, directly and indirectly, a strong preference for philosophical literature to underpin what he terms “weltgemeinsame Zivilisation,”¹¹ a conception of civilization common to all parts of the world.

II

In order to argue this case, it will be essential to analyse this very lecture in some detail and contextualize it with reflections on Zweig’s changing perception of European culture. In the final phase of his life, Zweig’s parameters for discussing cultural issues became distinctly temporal. Since the mid-1930s, his thoughts had begun to hover between ‘yesterday’ and ‘tomorrow,’ then and thereafter. The present day was not exactly eclipsed, but put into quotation marks, as it were. It appears that he drew some comfort, at times at least, from the perceived relativity of the moment. Exploring the ‘world of yesterday’ increasingly complemented trying to single out which culture or country could turn into the ‘land of the future.’

In this context, he was disenchanted and irritated, if not appalled, by traditional historiography. Tomorrow’s historiography, or so he argued in his speech of early 1939, would have to engage in describing cultural achievements and disengage from glorifying wars and their supposed heroes. Hero and hero worship, to use Carlyle’s infamous phrase, had led—according to Zweig—to nothing but nationalistic hype and hatred.¹² In sharp contrast to the practices of his time, Zweig’s vision of tomorrow’s historiography included showing the mutual dependencies of cultures and what it is that one owes to the other. He hopes to see narratives on collective rather than individual achievements,¹³ and in this connection he refers to the Tower of Babel project as the metaphor for a thoroughly positive experience. Zweig had already argued along those lines in an essay published in 1916 when he described this ‘tower’ as a monument to Europe’s spiritual unity (“Denkmal der geistigen Einheit Europas”).¹⁴

10 Keyserling 1919.

11 Keyserling 1919, 9.

12 Zweig 2003a.

13 Zweig 2003a, 242.

14 Zweig 2003c, 72.

In his analysis of the historical situation in early 1939, Zweig drew the attention of his audiences to the role of propaganda and the way it employs the new media. He accurately describes it as an artificial means designed to perpetuate emotional conditions, which would otherwise be short lived.¹⁵ Propaganda, he suggests, appealed to the basic instincts in humans; he calls it a “schreckliche Wissenschaft,” a horrible science.¹⁶ He portrays it as a violent expression of anti-culture that manipulates the achievements of civilization. But Zweig did not engage in revitalizing any culture-versus-civilization antinomy, something he never fell victim to, completely in contrast to Thomas Mann, whose fundamentally fraudulent juxtaposition originated in his confessionary *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* of 1918.

Zweig's paper illustrates that his conception of history, and indeed world literature, reinforced his stance as a humanist in times of ideologically motivated atrocity. This becomes particularly apparent when viewed in connection with his related reflection on the poetic potential of history. Zweig had prepared this lecture (“Die Geschichte als Dichterin”) for the 17th congress of the International PEN, which was scheduled for September 1939 but then cancelled due to the outbreak of the Second World War. In this paper, published posthumously, Zweig compared world history with a “huge” but severely damaged “palimpsest”:

Hunderte Seiten sind unentzifferbar, Tausende aber verschollen und nur durch Kombination, durch Phantasie in ihrem Zusammenhang zu ergänzen. Diese zahllosen rätselhaften Stellen in der Geschichte müssen natürlich den Dichter zur Ergänzung, zur Erdichtung reizen.¹⁷

The writer's imaginative faculties are called upon in order to reconstruct the lost sections in history's account of events. Yet, supplementing history should only happen, according to Zweig, when we do not have authentic materials but need them for the understanding of a significant psychological moment, say, in the biography of a historical figure. Zweig points out that even Shakespeare preferred to refer to original material when it really mattered, for instance in *Julius Caesar*, when he sets Plutarch's version of Marc Antony's funeral speech into verse rather than inventing a new one. He continues:

¹⁵ Zweig 2003a, 228.

¹⁶ Zweig 2003a, 228.

¹⁷ Zweig 2003b, 261.

Die Zeit ist vorbei, wo in Walter Scott mit der Geschichte herumfabulierte und Gestalten formte wie gemalte Puppen, unmöglich wäre heute sogar, was Schiller noch gewagt hat, die Jungfrau von Orléans auf dem Schachtfeld sterben zu lassen, statt am Feuerpfahl.¹⁸

In the light of this comment, Zweig is keen to reject the idea of a “biographie romancée” but argues in favour of “listening deeply” to historical events and applying psychological insights into human nature in the way Tolstoy did in *War and Peace*, which clearly became one of Zweig’s final models for history turned literature.

The palimpsest analogy returns later in his paper in a different way when he speaks of the many truths that history has to offer. Zweig’s chosen image to illustrate his point is telling: Truth, he argues, consists of layers like an artichoke. Ultimately, though, one reaches the base or the heart, in other words a tangible substance. This is considerably different from the metaphor Günter Grass was to use when, in his notorious autobiography of 2006, he spoke of the peeling of an onion, “Beim Häuten der Zwiebel.” The onion has no base; the peeling of it amounts only to accumulating peels that may prompt tears but will not uncover any ‘truthful’ substance.

To a certain extent, Zweig’s late reflections on the meaning of history in terms of *Weltgeschichte* represented a renewed attempt on his part to revisit the conception of *Weltliteratur*. The creative process, to mention another of Zweig’s late preoccupations, can be triggered by globally significant events or moments in history, translating them into a form of literature that can assist a cosmopolitan consciousness. In Zweig’s view, *Weltliteratur* and *Weltgeschichte* interconnect, no longer aided by any Hegelian *Weltgeist*, or so it seems. But in “Die Geschichte als Dichterin,” Zweig refers somewhat surprisingly to history as “God’s workshop,” claiming perhaps even more surprisingly, that in the long run nothing in history could be called pointless or absurd.¹⁹ This assertion does indeed come close to a Hegelian apology for the course of history, but Zweig avoids any reference to dialectics as the structure of historical progress in Hegel’s understanding. Instead, he quotes from Goethe’s *Zahme Xenien*: “Uns zu verewigen sind wir ja da.”²⁰ Self-perpetuation or self-immortalization therefore turns into the prime motivation or driving force behind the creative process. Therefore, *Weltliteratur* in Zweig’s reading acquired an almost spiritual status in view of the circumstances of 1939.

18 Zweig 2003b, 261.

19 Zweig 2003b, 269.

20 Zweig 2003b, 270.

III

Zweig engaged in large-scale biographical projects on authors of world literature, though except in the cases of Romain Rolland, Émile Verhaeren, and Honoré de Balzac, his engagement was reluctant. In terms of literary quality, however, these projects cannot really be seen as equivalents to his biographies on political figures like Mary Stuart, Marie Antoinette, Joseph Fouché, or explorers of the globe like Magellan or Amerigo. Zweig's explorations of Dickens, Dostojewski, Stendhal, Tolstoi, and francophone poets were, in essence, essays. Likewise, his essays on Hölderlin, Kleist and Nietzsche were only marginally biographical, since he intended them more to illustrate his views on the demonic within the creative process than to present new biographical material. Certain essays, however, could—according to Zweig—be classified as world literature, too. The cases in point were the essays by Montaigne. In his novelistic draft *Clarissa*, one of the major fragmentary pieces of prose which Zweig had to leave unfinished, it is the protagonist's lover, Léonard, who reads from Montaigne's essays to her and from Stendhal's *Chartreuse de Parme*. By implication, Zweig's narrator suggests a definition of what 'world literature' is about: It can connect people; it is a form and mode of communication; it offers universal signals and insights into the human psyche. This is Zweig's equivalent to Werther's and Lotte's joint exclamation "Klopstock" when they observe, in Goethe's first novel, the natural magic of flashes of lightning. World literature, therefore, is an institution-like assembly of texts, which people across nations can refer to and identify with—in this instance, the medical helper from Austria and the young French intellectual at the threshold of the First World War.

By the same token, Léonard suggests an additional dimension to the meaning of writing as a form of cathartic perception in which 'ordinary' people, too, can engage. Here he refers to the virtue of keeping a diary as the foundation of any literature. The 'authority' he refers to is Samuel Pepys, whose diaries are arguably part of world literature. In Zweig's text, Léonard speaks of the substance of detail, which forms both the 'story' and 'history'.²¹

As seen before, Zweig's final poetological reflections in relation to world literature focused on problems of historiography, history as 'author' and the 'secret' behind the creative process as such. By implication, he had described historical developments in terms of history's very own creativity, with history generating its distinct narratives of inevitably global dimen-

21 Zweig 1990, 90.

sions and implications. But when Zweig addressed the mechanisms behind individuals' artistic creativity, he detached them from their actual historical circumstances or indeed lines of tradition. Instead, he emphasized the condition of creativity, reminiscent of the Platonic *μανία*: a moment of *ἔκστασις*, or "being outside of oneself" ("außerhalb seiner selbst sein").²² Zweig compares tracing the origins of creative processes, mainly with reference to actual autography, to criminological analyses. But it is important to see that he always included in his reflections works that remained fragments. For him the project or mere intention counted almost as much as the finished work. This was already evident in his essays on Balzac, published in 1920 as part of his collection *Drei Meister*, which was in itself part of his trilogy *Die Baumeister der Welt* together with *Der Kampf mit dem Dämon* and *Drei Dichter ihres Lebens*—the latter consisting of the unlikely combination of Casanova, Stendhal and Tolstoi. His essay concludes with praise for the great French writer's "creative will to the unattainable" ("schöpferischen Willen zum Unerreichbaren").²³ He alludes to the forty uncompleted or unwritten novels Balzac had intended to add to his *Comédie humaine* with its over ninety completed novels and novellas. Zweig speaks of Balzac's "ungeheuerste Aneiferung" and in so doing, creates a neologism that suggests the highest form of intensity and zeal. He believes that Balzac was driven by his "ungeheure[n] Weltwille[n]";²⁴ emphasising again that a writer of world literary stature needs to have larger-than-life ambitions and aspirations. It is significant to find Zweig pointing out that Balzac may have learned how to read by deciphering Napoleonic "proclamations,"²⁵ for Zweig himself was to develop his very own appeal-like style of writing with growing urgency during the late 1920s and 1930s.²⁶

All this gives us a clearer idea of Zweig's rather idiosyncratic conception of world literature: he thought of it as a multitude of literary works that testify to the edifying qualities of their authors. By that he meant what he called "epische Weltbildner,"²⁷ that is to say, writers who were able to shape a world by means of epic narration. It also included morally and poetically valuable accounts of the authors' lives, autobiographies in other words, which Zweig calls "die seltenst gelungenste, weil verantwortungsvollste

22 Zweig 1984, 354.

23 Zweig 1920, 50.

24 Zweig 1920, 16.

25 Zweig 1920, 14.

26 Cf. Görner 2012.

27 Zweig 1920, 8.

aller Kunstgattungen.”²⁸ The excessive use of superlatives in this characterization is revealing. We get the sense that Zweig wanted to highlight the extreme rarity of successful autobiographies in world literature as a comprehensive epos of one’s own ego. The self-searching writer—to Zweig a particular category of writers—will attempt to imbue any kind of literary medium with his self-searching ambition. If measured against his own definitions of world literature, it is indeed uncanny to find that Zweig was to match two of them almost ideally: his large-scale fragments reflect his world encompassing ambitions, and his autobiography has become his very own contribution to world literature in this genre.

As it happens, Zweig’s rather implicit than explicit conception of world literature illustrates David Damrosch’s threefold answer to his own question “What Is World Literature?” He proposed a definition, which he could have derived from Zweig’s own literary practices:

1. World literature is an elliptical refraction of national literatures.
2. World literature is writing that gains in translation.
3. World literature is not a set canon of texts but a mode of reading: a form of detached engagement with worlds beyond our own place and time.²⁹

‘World literature’ as a way of breaking up national canonization for the purpose of establishing a national cultural identity was undoubtedly close to Zweig’s concern. To him, this conception represented indeed a particular “mode of reading” with decontextualizing effects: it is after all a literature that can be understood anywhere at any given time given its value-adding translatory qualities and its ability to build up a (counter-) world of its very own.

Essentially though, Zweig saw himself as a witness of, rather than a contributor to, world literature. With considerable justification, he could have introduced himself as the ‘ideal reader’ of the literatures of the world, given his ability to connect reading with creative receptivity. Judging from Zweig’s essays, his conception of world literature was a generic one. It evolved from global recognition and ever-refining translations. But there was more to this concept, which was intrinsically linked with Zweig’s stance as a humanist. World literature in Zweig’s understanding of this charged expression represented a literary connection with the world in terms of worldly concerns as well as a feeling for worldly matters, including the Nietzschean awareness of things “human, all-too human.” It is an

28 Zweig 1997, 11.

29 Damrosch 2003, 281.

encompassing “sensibility” for human affairs expressed through literature, to use Mark Gelber’s preferred phrase, which he applies, however, more exclusively to Zweig’s empathy with Jewish culture.³⁰ I would argue, though, that “sensibility” for Zweig was a much more inclusive quality for the suffering creature in a world threatened by its own destructive potentials. In reflecting such concerns, world literature seemed to have represented to Zweig an expression of what I should like to term “literarische Weltfähigkeit,” meaning literary ways of connecting with all spheres of life, literally anywhere on the globe. More importantly, *Weltfähigkeit* addresses a specific sensitivity, or indeed sensibility, for moments in life, but also the way in which one is affected by such moments or events as they might be by the changes of the weather. In fact, *Weltfähigkeit* is a distinctly atmospheric quality that may prompt literary responses that can become signals received by an international community of readers. This presupposes that these literary responses contain signs and emblems that are universally understood. Interestingly, in his portrait of a key contributor to world literature, Stendhal, Zweig speaks of him as a “monstre de sensibilité,” a nervous wreck of almost pathological sensitivity.³¹ This negative connotation of sensibility in Zweig’s biographical essay on the self-camouflaging French writer Henri Beyle is surprising at first sight. Zweig explains that this master of pseudonym was desperate to be recognized as a man of the world, obliterating his provincial origins even to the point that, in his will, he stipulated “Milan” be engraved on his marble tombstone as his place of birth. The grandeur of the “world” with all its aspirations can have bizarre side effects. World literature therefore comes, at least occasionally, with an implicit health warning, or so Stefan Zweig suggested.

This third collection in the series *Baumeister der Welt* was dedicated to Maxim Gorki, signalling the significance of Zweig’s own networks, or literary relations, for the building up of a cultural consciousness with direct implications for the continuing formation of world literature. The introduction to this volume written in Salzburg at Easter 1928 amounted to a celebration of the fertility in world literature. Never before had Zweig used the word *Welt* so often and in such pronounced a manner. It is worth reviewing this usage in more detail. He refers to Balzac, Dickens, and Dostojewski as “epische Weltgestalter,” authors who have created a world through their epic narratives. By contrast, Casanova, Stendhal and Tolstoi were engaged in unfolding their own *Ich* into worlds of their own. Zweig, there-

30 Gelber 2014, 11-31, esp. 13.

31 Zweig 1997, 110.

fore, distinguishes between, on the one hand, the extrovert *welterschöpferische* or *weltzugewandte Dichter* who dissolves his ego, like Shakespeare, by way of depicting the world outside of himself, and on the other hand, writers who excel in emotive subjectivity and reduce all worldly affairs to their very ego.³² The latter category of writers, according to Zweig, draws on the *internum aeternum*, the inner infinity, which he terms a “soulful cosmos” or “seelisches Weltall.”³³

Zweig’s study on Stendhal epitomizes his generic conception of world literature in that it contains in its very centre a chapter called “Ein Ich und die Welt.”³⁴ Structurally, this is of interest too, as the other chapters revolve around this central discussion on the relation between Stendhal’s persona and his perception of the world. Moreover, the very structure of his Stendhal essay prefigured his final biographical take on Balzac. What matters in our context most, though, is Zweig’s interest in how Stendhal’s perceived “creative ambiguity” (“schöpferische Zwiespältigkeit”)³⁵ enabled this writer to develop and entertain a thoroughly positive attitude towards the world around him. This, in turn, allowed him to write about worldly matters in a fundamentally affirmative fashion. Zweig convincingly argues that Stendhal schooled his perception of the world through an intensification of self-observation,³⁶ noting a further peculiarity of this writer which Zweig compared with Goethe’s attitude to such moments: on days of world historical significance, Zweig notes, Goethe liked to sample extracts from world literature, preferably from the Chinese, whilst Stendhal turned exclusively to himself, as if he wanted to find an equivalent to those events within his own being. Zweig’s conclusion reads as follows: “[...] die Geschichte seiner Zeit und die seine haben gleichsam ein anderes Alphabet und andere Vokabeln.”³⁷ But it was this very difference that made his writings attractive to a world-wide readership.

It is only when we read Zweig’s reflections on these authors’ approaches to writing consecutively—and he emphatically only dealt with writers of such eminent stature—that we realize just how much he must have internalized their respective strategies of authorship. Perhaps this helps to explain the sheer rapidity of his composition of *Die Welt von Gestern*. Was it that

32 Zweig 1997, 9.

33 Zweig 1997, 23.

34 Zweig 1997, 141-156.

35 Zweig 1997, 141.

36 Zweig 1997, 145.

37 Zweig 1997, 155: “The history of [Stendhal’s] time and his very own [history] appeared to have followed a different alphabet and vocabulary.”

Zweig had acquired the ability to appropriate the literary methods of his revered objects of study to the point that he could decipher the codes of 19th century literary writings as ways of ‘writing the world’ and turn these codes into something of his own? What Zweig was after, or so it seems, was the reactivation of literary potentials buried in the past, posing the question of how it was possible to reconnect them with the present for the sake of establishing a more humane future. *Weltliteratur*, therefore, corresponded in Zweig’s view to the exploration of the two ‘dark continents’ in the shape of what he termed with a Nietzschean flair “ästhetisches Schauspiel:”³⁸ human history and psyche as materials with which various worlds could be written and hopefully still be read with analytical concern and genuine compassion.

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38 Zweig 1997, 143.

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