

Latent factor	Items	Swiss Sample (n=147) ^a		German Sample (n=162) ^b	
		Factor loadings	Indicator reliabilities	Factor loadings	Indicator reliabilities
	Please answers according to the following scale to what extent you agree to the following statements.				
Consensus-orientation	Politicians should give consideration to diverging interests when searching for solutions.	.637	.405	.514	.265
	Political solutions are best found by searching for compromises.	.551	.303	.520	.271
Competition	Politicians should be decisive and shouldn't squabble that much.	.649	.421	.822	.676
	Politicians should give hierarchical orders, if a decision has to be taken.	.540	.292	.675	.456
Efficiency	Political problems should be solved as fast as possible.	.431	.186	.389	.152
	Simple and easy-to-understand political solutions are better than complex programmes.	.629	.395	.691	.477

Note. Entries are factor loadings and indicator reliabilities (i.e. squared multiple correlations) of the Swiss and German samples.

All factor loadings are significant at the 5 % level

a Cases missing to 150 were excluded from the data analysis because they are statistical outliers.

b Cases missing to 163 were excluded from the data analysis because they are statistical outliers.

Table 5.5. Cultural Invariance of Process Preferences


5.3.5. Process Preferences: Test of Invariance Regarding Objects of Assessment

H3 postulates that the scale is invariance as regards the objects of assessment, meaning that the scale measures process preferences equally well for different political institutions, such as the government and the parliament. In order to test this assumption, data from the second pilot survey with 530 Swiss citizens were used. Process preferences concerning decision-making processes in the Swiss government (“Bundesrat”) and the Swiss parliament – which consists of National Council (“Nationalrat”) and Council of States (“Ständerat”) – were distinguished. To test the

invariance as regards the object of assessment, the data are perceived as multitreat-multimethod (MTMM) data, with treats being the nine process preference variables (concede a point, consider diverging interests, compromises, force their points, put their plans through, hierarchical orders, fast decision-making, simple and short processes, avoid delays) and methods being the two different objects of assessment (parliament and government). The conceptualization of the data as MTMM data with process preferences being the treats and methods being the object of assessment is considered to be appropriate, because the logic that underlies the analyses of MTMM data seems applicable for a test of invariance of measurement regarding different objects of assessment. In both cases, the research interest refers to convergent validity, and it is investigated whether different methods (or in this case objects of assessment) or traits (in this case process preferences) explain the variance of observed variables. Convergent validity is given when the variance is explained by traits rather than methods. Hence, if the variance of observed process preference variables is explained by process aspects rather than the objects of assessment, this supports the hypothesis that the scale is invariant as regards the two different object of assessment (government and parliament).

The literature suggests several models to analyze MTMM data (cf. Byrne & Goffin, 1993; Lance, Noble, & Scullen, 2007; H.W. Marsh & Bailey, 1991). I will present results that are based on a Correlated-Uniqueness Model (CU), an approach recently discussed in the literature (Byrne & Goffin, 1993; Lance, Noble, & Scullen, 2007; Marsh, Byrne, & Craven, 1992). Other approaches to test the invariance as regards objects of assessment for the process preferences scale are discussed by the author elsewhere (Floß, 2008). The CU Model was proposed by Marsh (1988) as an approach to MTMM analyses that allows method effects to be represented by correlated error/uniqueness terms (i.e. error covariances).

Figure 5.2 presents the CU Model used to test the hypothesis. Error covariances representing the same method were freely estimated. The measures which are loading on the same trait factor were constrained to have equal factor loadings for identification purposes (Kenny & Kashy, 1992, p. 169).



Note. Chi-Square ($df=36$, $N=521$) = 62.71, Comparative fit index is .99, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is .04 with a 90% confidence interval .02 - .05.

The numbers 11-19 and 21-29 are the number of the variables that measure preferences regarding political processes in the parliament and the government (see Table 5.6. for information on how the numbers relate to variables, see footnote 56 for information on the item wordings).

Figure 5.2. Correlated Uniqueness Model of Preferences Regarding Different Objects

The model fit was satisfactory, with $CFI = .99$, $RMSEA = .04$ (90% CI = .02, .05), $\chi^2 = 62.72$, $df = 36$. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 5.6. The findings are based on the analysis of 511 cases.⁵⁵ The trait-factor loadings for the CU model were strong (mean correlation = .77) and all loadings were statistically significant. Each of the correlated uniqueness represents the correlation between two variables sharing the same method after removing trait effects (Marsh & Bailey, 1991, p. 66). The results suggest good convergent validity and lend support to H3 which assumes that the proposed process preferences scale is invariant as regards the object of assessment, i.e. parliament and government.

55 Cases missing to 530 were excluded from the data analysis because they are statistical outliers.

Factor loadings									
Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
11 gov_concede	.842*								
12 gov_div interests		.889*							
13 gov_compromises			.834*						
14 gov_fast				.815*					
15 gov_short process					.784*				
16 gov_avoid delays						.818*			
17 gov_force points							.580*		
18 gov_plans through								.740*	
19 gov_orders									.779*
21 parl_concede	.730*								
22 parl_div interests		.642*							
23 parl_compromises			.731*						
24 parl_fast				.815*					
25 parl_short process					.827*				
26 parl_avoid delays						.816*			
27 parl_force points							.679*		
28 parl_plans through								.775*	
29 parl_orders									.712*

Factor variances and covariances									
Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1 concede	1								
2 div interests	.552*	1							
3 compromises	.763*	.618*	1						
4 fast	.199*	.1	.035	1					
5 short process	.208*	.147*	.924	.823*	1				
6 avoid delays	.288*	.216*	.138*	.717*	.612*	1			
7 force points	.171	.072	-.055	.436*	.591*	.356*	1		
8 plans through	-.121*	-.135	-.204*	.277*	.347*	.158*	.478*	1	
9 orders	.046	-.082	-.121	.326*	.438*	.286*	.419*	.417*	1

Unique variance and covariance									
Variable	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
11 gov_concede	.321*								
12 gov_div interests	-.023	.202*							
13 gov_compromises	.081	-.037	.312*						
14 gov_fast	.005	-.03	-.106	.427*					
15 gov_short process	-.046	.041	-.026	-.038	.817*				
16 gov_avoid delays	.133	.006	.012	-.141	-.128	.278*			
17 gov_force points	-.151	-.017	-.11	.061	.029	.112	1.379*		
18 gov_plans through	-.162*	.112	-.029	-.09	.162*	-.004	.171*	1.234*	
19 gov_orders	.125	-.018	-.03	-.002	.205*	.126	.331*	.061	1.56*

Variable	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
21 parl_concede	.688*								
22 parl_div interests	.277*	1.087*							
23 parl_compromises	.289*	.338*	.618*						
24 parl_fast	.022	.087	.048	.426*					
25 parl_short process	.152*	-.018	.08	.380*	.603*				
26 parl_avoid delays	-.009	.068	-.098	.412*	.251*	.284*			
27 parl_force points	-.076	-.019	-.04	-.008	.015	-.086	.819*		
28 parl_plans through	.150*	-.143*	-.139*	-.07	-.05	0.027	.373*	.992*	
29 parl_orders	.059	.103	.022	.036	-.013	-.037	.118	.044	1.737*

Note. Values of 1.00 are fixed a priori; * p <.05.

Table 5.6. Results for the Correlated Uniqueness Model

Based on the confirmation of the scale's invariance as regards objects of assessment, a comparison of citizens' preferences regarding political processes in the government and citizens preferences regarding political processes in the parliament was conducted. Table 5.7 shows a comparison of the mean values for citizens' preferences regarding the government and the parliament.⁵⁶ The findings suggest that there are no major differences. Likewise, the correlations between the items measuring process preferences regarding the government and corresponding items measuring process preferences regarding the parliament are high (mean correlation = .59). The empirical evidence for the scale's invariance as regards the objects of assessment along with the finding that citizens' process preferences do not differ significantly when comparing preferences concerning political processes in the government and the parliament warrant the assumption that citizens do hold rather general process preferences. Based on this assumption, the media effects study that is presented in Chapter 7 considers general process preferences as a moderator of the mass media's impact.

56 The following items were used to measure preferences concerning decision-making processes in the government and preferences concerning decision-making processes in the parliament: **Concede**: How important is it for you that politicians in the parliament sometimes concede a point to the other side? / How important is it for you that politicians in the government sometimes concede a point to the other side? **Div interests**: How important is it for you that politicians in the parliament give consideration to diverging interests when searching for solutions? / How important is it for you that politicians in the government give consideration to diverging interests when searching for solutions? **Compromises**: How important is it for you that political decisions in the parliament are based on compromises? / How important is it for you that political decisions in the government are based on compromises? **Fast**: How important is it for you that the parliament solves political problems as fast as possible? / How important is it for you that the government solves political problems as fast as possible? **Short processes**: How important is it for you that political decision-making processes in the parliament are simple and short? / How important is it for you that political decision-making processes in the government are simple and short? **Avoid delays**: How important is it for you that parliamentary actors avoid delays when making political decisions? / How important is it for you that governmental actors avoid delays when making political decisions? **Force points**: How important is it for you that politicians in the parliament are decisive and force their points? / How important is it for you that politicians in the government are decisive and force their points? **Plans through**: How important is it for you that in the parliament one political side is able to put their plans through? / How important is it for you that in the parliament one political side is able to put their plans through? **Orders**: How important is it for you that parliamentary actors could give hierarchical orders, if a decision has to be taken? / How important is it for you that governmental actors could give hierarchical orders, if a decision has to be taken?

items	government	parliament
orders	4.29	3.82
plans through	3.84	4.45
force points	4.96	5.46
avoid delays	6.23	6.21
short processes	5.40	5.43
fast	5.99	5.93
compromises	6.13	5.80
div interests	6.12	5.71
concede	6.07	5.73

Note. Entires are the means for preferences regarding political processes within the parliament and preferences regarding political processes within the government. “1” indicates aspect is not important at all, “7” indicates aspect is very important. Item wordings are presented in footnote 56.

Table 5.7. Comparison between Preferences Regarding Parliament and Government

5.3.6. Construct Validity of the Scales

Further analyses were conducted in order to test the construct validity of the scales. The analyses are based on the final survey and include participants from group 1 and group 2 ($n = 523$). The relationship between both process preferences and process perceptions and a set of variables can be analyzed in order to investigate the construct validity of the scales. Before the results will be presented, the reader will be provided with some descriptive information. Respondents’ process preferences are listed in Table 5.8 along with the mean values and standard deviations. As regards process preferences, a higher mean score in Table 5.8 indicates greater importance attached to that attribute. As regards process perception questions, the higher the mean scores in the Table 5.8, the more the particular attribute applies to decision-making processes in Switzerland. The mean differentials indicate the mean distance between preferences and perceptions. Positive values indicate that preferences exceed perceptions and an attribute is considered to be important but not perceived to be accurate. Negative values indicate that perceptions exceed preferences and an attribute is considered less important but perceived to be accurate.

The most important attributes of political decision-making processes are the respectfulness and the fairness of political behavior. Other typical aspects of consensus democracy such as the consideration of diverging interests, the evading of power struggles and the conceding of points to the other side, are also important to the participants. Attributes of efficiency are also considered to be very important, namely the avoidance of delays and the efficiency of political processes. Factors