

Positively put, when art music's "identity problems" become genuinely perceptible, reflexive globalization becomes truly relevant. Only then can a new framing and definition of perspective regarding established concepts of identity affect both the – admittedly hegemonic – European discourses on aesthetics and the culture-essentialist and neo-nationalist models in and outside of the West. In the process, the resulting musical situations can produce "cluster identities," "patchwork identities," or "multiple identities,"⁷¹ however one chooses to define them in detail. Thus they can ultimately claim contemporary social relevance after all, albeit from a *deluxe* position. Against the backdrop of twentieth-century musical and political history, and the overwhelming economization of present times, this reflexivity appears not merely to be the best of many options, but rather a necessity for advanced art music's survival.

3. Discourses of Intercultural Composition

The term "intercultural" is intended here to refer to the interaction of two or more cultural discourses – a form of interaction that must inevitably critically question the lines separating "cultural entities." One way to accentuate the processual aspect of intercultural action is developed in this chapter. Further below, I will apply Jan Assmann's concept of "hypolepsis" – understood as the transformative continuation of texts within the configuration of (inter)cultural memories – to musical contexts.

In analyzing musical *interculturality*, it would seem that we are obliged to problematize fundamental preconditions of the European concept of art if we are to avoid the frequent accusation of merely integrating elements from non-Western cultures into a "Eurological"⁷² discourse. That integration inevitably places the Other in an asymmetrical power structure, appropriates it in a postcolonial fashion, and thus distorts it without giving its elements a chance to articulate their cultural difference. However accurate this critique may be in the cases of some allegedly intercultural, but in fact monocultural, compositional approaches, its problem lies in its culture-essentialist precondition, which remains trapped in the very dualism of "self" and "other," of "cultural self" and "cultural other," that it purports to reject. Wolfgang Welsch addresses this with his concept of "transculturality," and accuses theories of multiculturality and interculturality of clinging to the traditional concept of culture attributed to Johann Gottfried Herder's "sphere premise."⁷³ This means that they propagate (at least implicitly) a homogeneous concept of culture and thus lay the foundation for culture-based separation and isolation, extending to "cultural racism,"⁷⁴ whereas *multiculturality* retains a basic polarity in the model of coexistence of cultural entities, Welsch argues, and produces "parallel cultures." The basic model of dialogue presupposed in *interculturality* does not solve the basic problem, since its insistence on the singularity of cultures involves the exclusion of others. Rather, Welsch highlights the hybrid, permeable, and transformative constitution of all present cultures and emphasizes, in the context of globalization, the *internal* transculturality of individuals, which is clear in the fact that "we all possess 'multiple attachments and identities'."⁷⁵ This is taken a step further by Byung-Chul Han

⁷¹ See Elberfeld, "Das Ich ist kein Ding, sondern ein Ort."

⁷² Lewis, "Improvised Music after 1950." See Bhagwati, "Imagining the Other's Voice."

⁷³ See Löchte, *Johann Gottfried Herder: Kulturtheorie und Humanitätsidee*, 128–139, Zimmermann, "Globale Entwürfe," 227–231, and Welsch, "Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today."

⁷⁴ Welsch, "Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today," 195.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 198.

with his concept of “hyperculturality,” which assumes a free-floating mass of “defactized” objects no longer tied to the here and now.⁷⁶ These are available to the “hypercultural tourist” with virtually no preconditions, without requiring the effort of crossing boundaries or “wandering.”⁷⁷ The model of a hyperculture, however, is unconvincing because of its definitional imprecision: it is by no means true that the methods, idioms, and grammars of “all cultures” are – for today’s creative artists, for example – equally learnable and available. In addition, any remotely substantial acquisition of such an idiom demands a great deal of time and patience. Paradoxically, the idea of “defactized” cultural objects contradicts the very desire to overcome established cultural concepts that guides Welsch’s and Han’s thought. It is precisely when assuming a dynamic, transformative concept of culture that one thing must become clear: any decontextualization of “cultural objects” risks descending into a stereotypical representation of (national) cultures. Indeed, the notion of a removal of such contexts is an illusion. In addition, the idea of hyperculture overlooks that artistic production to this day is integrated into a global power discourse in which Western and non-Western artists can by no means always act with the same preconditions. What makes both concepts problematic is their idealizing tendency: “parallel cultures” are as much an indisputable reality in today’s societies as the necessity of a continuous intercultural dialogue. Here one can argue against Welsch that the dialogical model is limited in its ability to transcend cultural essentialism (see below).

At any rate, the constantly changing constitution of cultures has long been recognized by the constructivism of postcolonial cultural theory. Since at least the 1970s, cultures have been understood as resulting from a construction of historical “narratives,” and no longer as essential, given *a priori*.⁷⁸ The process of constant reinvention and redefinition has been demonstrated especially through the history of nationalism.⁷⁹ Against the background of increasingly multiethnic societies, the cultural theory of the 1990s developed such concepts as “mixed identities” or “strange multiplicity.”⁸⁰ Edward Said saw the achievement of such theoretical formulations as questioning the “binary oppositions dear to the nationalist and imperialist enterprise”⁸¹ and replacing them with more complex models. On the contrary, there is no doubt that the dichotomy of “us” and “them” continues, and has at times even been intensified in the public consciousness – as can be experienced daily in post-9/11 societies. Here it is important to recognize that this dichotomy not only served the foundation of the (former) colonizers’ identity, but also provided crucial building blocks for a self-definition of the (formerly) colonized cultures.⁸²

The resulting web of entangled intercultural influences, demarcations, and connections makes an “aseptic” definition of cultures (at the expense of their inner complexity) seem reductionist and simplistic. It fails to recognize the long history of their mutual dependence. Such a reduction of complexity is especially characteristic of the authoritarian construction of national cultural identity for political or propaganda purposes. The wealth of examples in the West, East Asia, and elsewhere is well-known. In global music history, they include the simplification of Asian musical models in European exoticism – and in the early style of composed East Asian

76 Han, *Hyperkulturalität*, 13.

77 Ibid., 20, 56–60.

78 See Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, and Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*.

79 See Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* and Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

80 See Tully, *Strange Multiplicity*.

81 Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, xxviii.

82 See Utz, *Neue Musik und Interkulturalität*, 22–23.

music (→ III.1) that Barbara Mittler terms “pentatonic romanticism.”⁸³ She uses this term to describe the dominant compositional style in twentieth-century East Asia, which is usually based on crudely simplified scales, models, and melodies from East Asian tradition cloaked in Western late Romantic harmonies. This style was in turn inseparable from the high degree of politicization in East Asian contemporary music and in some areas has remained this way to the present day.

In the following section, I will connect culture-theoretical discussion to questions of compositional aesthetics and methodology. We can initially assume that the tiny (in the global context) area of an emphatically or critically conceived “art music” seems most suited to provide a space for concrete utopias of musical interculturality. Here, admittedly, composers are faced with a seemingly chaotic “field of possibilities” in the dynamics between individualist and collectivist conceptions of culture, and also between an affirmation and a problematization, or even (potential) negation, of cultural self and cultural Other.

Myth and Migration

It is not always possible to distinguish clearly between mythologizing processes of reception and creative engagement with myth, ritual, and spiritual experience as an open space of encounters between cultures. In the most diverse contexts, composers keep referring back to existential, structural, and spiritual dimensions of archaic-mythological cultural layers. In this, they are often motivated by the intention of pointing beyond a simple East-West (or North-South) cultural dualism, or culturalist thought in general (→ II.6). Admittedly, the less philologically or analytically founded this approach to an allegedly precultural area of myth, the greater the tendency to *construct* “modern myths” of cultures. These find frequent corroboration in the media’s propagation of culturalist stereotypes that portray such phenomena as “mythical India” or “mysterious China” (often for representational purposes) through supposedly “timeless” and “inviolable” attributes and paint a static, collectivist picture of culture as a whole. This culturally essentialist discourse may be accentuated both from the Western side (often for commercial purposes such as tourism) and the non-Western side (often with a nationalist – but also commercial – agenda), frequently buttressed by politically dominant groups. Contrasting practices are found in those forms of myth reception that allow for spaces of intuitive connection or encounter while distancing themselves from essentialist stereotypes.

A direct contrast to mythologization is found in the “migration” discourse, which focuses on the hybridity and complexity of contemporary cultural situations (for example, in urban centers). That discourse rejects a monistic concept of culture and confronts the seemingly “de-politicized” myth discourse with “harsh” political reality. Although migration discourse has rarely been connected to art music, it resonates with Helmut Lachenmann’s aforementioned demand to engage compositionally and existentially with intercultural processes, rather than merely “strolling” comfortably through non-European worlds, safe in the knowledge of always having a “return ticket” “in one’s pocket”:

For me as a European, I think that this aspect of resistance is somehow necessary to avoid simply consuming [Japanese *shō* music] as “fresh non-European meat” (as I called it on one occasion) for the broken, weary European world, or strolling about in it as a tourist – and as long as you still have your return ticket in your pocket so that you can listen to Beethoven again at home, it’s

⁸³ Mittler, *Dangerous Tunes*, 33.

alright. But actually exposing oneself to a world in which that music gives people security, that's an existential challenge.⁸⁴

Lachenmann does not, admittedly, specify what the compositional consequences of entering the other “lock, stock, and barrel” might be, nor whether it has had concrete effects on his own music (→ IV.2). Lachenmann’s polarization, as explained, echoes Slavoj Žižek’s criticism of academic theories that celebrate hybridity without dealing with the existential, often traumatic experience of hybridity among political migrants.⁸⁵ A potential way out of this dilemma would be the existential commitment (formulated by Hans Zender and others) to the multidimensionality of musical cultures in the form of personal, unguarded, even hazardous encounters with actual musicians, ensembles, genres, texts, or through spiritual experiences.⁸⁶ In this context, Charles Taylor has emphasized that a key to overcoming polarized essentialist thought lies in the act of solidarity: in the fact “that we have been transformed by the study of the other, so that we are not simply judging by our original familiar standards.”⁸⁷ Here, at last, the step has been taken from concepts emphasizing the collective to concepts emphasizing the individual experiences of culture. These concepts, especially in a time when collective “cultural values” are still demanded by some in today’s societies, take on ever greater significance and undoubtedly show a tendency toward a fragmentation and individualization of (inter)cultural experience (which is also emphasized by Welsch).

Dialogue and Hypolepsis

We can use the terms “dialogue” and “hypolepsis” to refer to two models that seek to explain how individuals might articulate themselves within the dynamics of myth and migration. While the “dialogue” model presupposes fundamental differences between (usually two) partners in dialogue that are meant to be bridged, or at least contained, the model of *hypólepsis*, a concept from ancient rhetoric taken up by Jan Assmann,⁸⁸ refers to a configuration of cultural memory in which, unlike the discourses of “myth” and “canon,” contradictions and critique are preserved:

Mythical discourse is [...] pacified in so far as it is not confronted by any visible contradiction, and all of its statements and images stand on an equal footing beside one another. Canonical discourse is also appeased because it simply does not allow any contradiction. But hypoleptic discourse is riddled with contradictions, and indeed its whole basis is a sharpened perception of contradictions, that is, of criticism that at the same time preserves the positions that it criticizes.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Helmut Lachenmann in conversation with Rolf Elberfeld and Toshio Hosokawa (see footnote 35); see also Hiekel, “Interkulturalität als existentielle Erfahrung,” 64.

⁸⁵ Žižek, *Ein Plädoyer für die Intoleranz*, 80–81.

⁸⁶ See Hans Zender’s statement in Dorschel, “Interkulturelle Begegnung als existentielles Risiko,” 106–107.

⁸⁷ Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 70.

⁸⁸ Jan Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 255–267. The term *hypólepsis* was coined by Aristotle in his late treatise *De anima* (see Theobald, “Spuren des Mythos in der Aristotelischen Theorie der Erkenntnis”). Assmann, however, mainly refers to the usage in antique treatises on rhetoric (Jan Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 257–258) where the term signifies a connection to what a preceding speaker has said.

⁸⁹ Jan Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 262 (“Der mythische Diskurs ist insofern beruhigt, als er keinen Widerspruch sichtbar werden und alle Aussagen und Bilder gleichberechtigt nebeneinander stehen lässt.”

In classical rhetoric, “hypolepsis” meant taking over from the words of the previous speaker and continuing them freely. Assmann expands the concept to include commentary on and further development of texts within the configuration of cultural memories:

[...] the hypolectic process is one of engaging in approximations. It draws its momentum from the awareness that knowledge is never complete, and there is always more to be had. You can only come closer to the truth [...] by freeing yourself from the delusion that you can keep starting afresh, by recognizing that you have been born into an ongoing process, by seeing which way things go, and by consciously, understandingly, but also critically learning what your predecessors have already said.⁹⁰

In contrast to the “dialogue” model, which may ultimately result in understanding partners merely for the sake of understanding (and may thus block creative and altering processes), hypolepsis leaves space for free, transformative, critical variation. The concept can only be transferred to intercultural musical situations if one assumes that composers today can operate in a theoretically unlimited meta-cultural space in which a globalized cultural memory continually reconfigures itself. Differences are not eliminated in this space, but neither are they posited as absolutes. The hypolectic discourse only becomes visible, however, through the highly specific competencies that enable a substantial identification – whether philological or intuitive – of these differences, and possibly also their points of contact.⁹¹ Thus a globalized cultural memory is by no means a license for the consumerist attitude implicit in the concept of the “hypercultural tourist.”

Alterity, Hybridization, and Incommensurability

One can identify a key problem connected to musical interculturality in supposed explanations of the question of cultural *alterity*: “alterity” can basically be defined as the form of being-different that cannot be directly decoded as a sociocultural phenomenon that is ideological, or shaped by power discourses, and hence historically conditioned. Rather, it requires “essential” justifications, however one chooses to define them. In this definition, the concept of “alterity” has become an important instrument in identity-creating liberation discourses that are critical of authority. In addition, the tendency of those who use alterity toward essentialism exposes them to the critique of constructivist theories of identity summarized above.

In his thoughts on recognition, Paul Ricœur stresses that the foundations of the concept of “alterity” contain an originary asymmetry (“the other remains inaccessible in his or her alterity as such”; “the one is not the other”) and a reciprocity that retains a middle position between

Der kanonische Diskurs ist beruhigt, weil er keinen Widerspruch duldet. Der hypolectische Diskurs ist demgegenüber eine Kultur des Widerspruchs. Er beruht auf einer verschärften Wahrnehmung von Widersprüchen, d. h. Kritik, bei gleichzeitiger Bewahrung der kritisierten Positionen.” Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*, 288).

⁹⁰ Ibid., 261 (“Der hypolectische Prozess ist ein Prozess der Annäherung. Aus dem Bewusstsein der nie ganz vollständigen, immer vorausliegenden Erkenntnis bezieht er seine kinetische Energie. Der Wahrheit kann man nur näher kommen [...], wenn man erkennt, dass man immer schon in einen laufenden Diskurs hineingeboren ist, sieht, wie die Richtungen verlaufen, und lernt, sich bewusst, verstehend und kritisch auf das zu beziehen, was die Vorredner gesagt haben.” Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*, 287).

⁹¹ See Utz, *Neue Musik und Interkulturalität*, 483.

nearness and respect in equal measure, and thus avoids the “pitfalls of a fusional union.”⁹² At the same time, alterity is a key agent of conflict, such that “recognition” can be replaced by Hegel’s model of a “struggle for recognition” implying an “involvement of misrecognition in recognition.”⁹³ In other words, every attempt at mutual recognition must seek a balance between the abandonment of a “narcissism of minor differences” and the acceptance of originary asymmetries. What Freud called the “narcissism of minor differences,” namely “a comfortable and relatively harmless gratification of the inclination to aggression, through which cohesion is made easier for the members of the community,”⁹⁴ ultimately tends toward a stance that is often less harmless than Freud claims. It potentially extends to discriminatory culturalism and essentialism. By contrast, “forgetting” originary asymmetries can result precisely in cementing open or hidden hierarchies.

Ricœur’s emphasis on the “intermediate” finally appears as a common factor with the deconstructivist cultural theory of Homi K. Bhabha, revealing links with the Japanese cultural philosopher Tetsurō Watsuji (Bhabha: “in-between,” Watsuji: “intervening” [*aidagara*]⁹⁵). According to Bhabha, the “in-between” breaks up the “politics of polarity,” advancing into a “Third Space” of articulations in which cultural hybridity becomes possible:

the split-space of enunciation may open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity. To that end we should remember that it is the “inter”—the cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the in-between space—that carries the burden of the meaning of culture. [...] And by exploring this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of our selves.⁹⁶

Martin Stokes, on the other hand, has argued that the concept of hybridity implicitly perpetuates the authenticity discourse so that “authenticity and hybridity are, from a discursive point of view, more complexly entangled concepts. Popular world music discourse reveals the links between the two terms and betrays their ideological dimensions.”⁹⁷ In addition, Peter Burke has criticized the supposedly neutral-objective observer position associated with hybridity-oriented thought, partly following the same argumentation as Žižek. It is from this position that opposites merge almost of their own accord: the concept of “hybridity,” Burke argues, rules out all action and evokes “the outside observer that studies culture as if it were nature, and the products of individuals and groups as if they were botanical specimens.”⁹⁸ So, in the concept of

92 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 259–260, 263.

93 Ibid., 259. This might be further highlighted by the thin line that Ricœur perceives between the French words *mépris* (contempt) and *méprise* (mistake) (ibid., 258). While mistakes turn out to be constitutive components in the search for the truth, contempt is inseparably linked to the “struggle for recognition” and thus ultimately inherent to all forms of recognition.

94 Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 88. (“Narzißmus der kleinen Differenzen, [...] eine bequeme und relativ harmlose Befriedigung der Aggressionsneigung, durch die den Mitgliedern einer Gemeinschaft das Zusammenhalten erleichtert wird.” Freud, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, 79.)

95 See Pörtner and Heise, *Die Philosophie Japans*, 366 and Nagami, “The Ontological Foundation in Tetsuro Watsuji’s Philosophy.”

96 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 38–39.

97 Stokes, “Music and the Global Order,” 59.

98 Burke, *Cultural Hybridity*, 54–55.

hybridity, one can also identify those idealizing traces criticized above in the figures of trans- and hyperculturality. Certainly, we should remain aware that the hybrid substance of cultures describes a fundamental constitution of all cultures that has simply become increasingly visible as we have approached the present day – and can thus claim considerable empirical evidence for itself. Yet hybridity should not be understood as an insubstantial game with cultural articulations, but rather as a complement to fundamental differences between these articulations. These differences – often enough in trivialized forms – like hybridity, continue to define large parts of globalized societies.

Viewed in the broader context of the history of ideas, cultural alterity can also be connected to the idea of “incommensurability.” This is a central topic of discussion in the philosophy of language, political aesthetics, and the philosophy of science, as well as a basic model for understanding the modern and postmodern arts. Though a detailed treatment of this discourse is not possible here, it certainly is a relevant concept for the discussion of musical interculturality.

Incommensurability became a key concept in the philosophy of science as a result of Paul Feyerabend’s writings after the late 1950s, and especially Thomas Kuhn’s influential study *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962/69).⁹⁹ The central focus of Kuhn’s theory is the methodological and conceptual incompatibility between historically successive scientific paradigms, as well as “translation errors” between scientific theories belonging to different paradigms.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, Feyerabend had earlier described the irreconcilability of successive ontological theories: they are incompatible and cannot be reduced to or derived from one another.¹⁰¹ Although they developed their respective theories of incommensurability on different foundations, Kuhn and Feyerabend were both influenced by the gestalt-theoretical postulate that basic theoretical concepts have a lasting effect on the process of observation in the (natural) sciences. Hence, they both followed

the basic idea [...] that because the meanings, even of observational terms, are determined by the theories to which they belong, when there is theory change, there are meaning changes that can result in a new conception of reality. As a consequence, logical relations cannot correctly characterize the relationship between certain pairs of successive scientific theories.¹⁰²

In French poststructuralism in particular, “incommensurability” became a decisive part of the discourse, albeit in a sharper form that constituted a “general attack on rationalism that still triggers defensive reactions to this day.”¹⁰³ Michel Foucault’s concept of the “archaeology of knowledge,” for example, highlights the discontinuous development of the forms in which knowledge is represented in “heterotopias” without offering a (rational) reason for such an abrupt breaking-away of the *episteme*.¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile Jean-François Lyotard, following on from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of language games, uses the term “incommensurability” to address the irreconcilable and untranslatable nature of language systems.¹⁰⁵ He points out, in Wittgenstein’s sense, the fundamental irreconcilability of saying and showing, and thus ulti-

⁹⁹ See Oberheim, “On the Historical Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Incommensurability.”

¹⁰⁰ Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

¹⁰¹ Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism,” 74, 90.

¹⁰² Oberheim, “On the Historical Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Incommensurability,” 386.

¹⁰³ Abitor, “Metapher als Antwort auf Inkommensurabilität,” 124 (“Generalangriff auf den Rationalismus [...], der bis heute Abwehrreaktionen hervorruft”).

¹⁰⁴ Foucault, *The Order of Things*.

¹⁰⁵ Lyotard, *The Differend*, 128–137.

mately the irreducibility of linguistic materiality.¹⁰⁶ Lyotard connects such models to the aesthetics of artistic avant-gardes in the twentieth century and their tendency to make “an allusion to the unrepresentable by means of visible presentations” and thus deny themselves “the solace of good forms.”¹⁰⁷

Those researching music-historical reception and intertextuality have often contented themselves with showing traditions and anxieties of “influence,” without addressing the question of cultural (un)translatability. Yet this has long been discussed in depth by ethnomusicologists and literary scholars¹⁰⁸ – very often explicating language-inherent power discourses in the process.¹⁰⁹ It is clear that even (or especially) in the age of digitalization and the increasing availability of cultural “objects,” the possibility of misunderstanding and talking at cross purposes is omnipresent. Admittedly, “productive misunderstandings” are always welcome in the artistic context, and “communication disturbances” are a popular topic in avant-garde artistic production (projects based on the Theater of the Absurd, for example). In situations of productive misunderstanding, the idea of incommensurability can indeed become fruitful without having to withdraw to the position of a rigorous untranslatability.¹¹⁰

It is also important to recognize that comparable discourses on the incommensurable exist in many cultures, and are also taken up by non-Western composers, often in a very explicit political sense (→ III.4–6). Here one could point to the reception of Daoist philosophy or references to the archaic verses of the exiled poet Qu Yuan (340–278 BCE) in Chinese music of the 1980s. Instances of this reception refer to anti-authoritarian and regime-critical elements of these traditions – a type of coded political statement that forms a tradition of its own in Chinese intellectual history.¹¹¹

In this context, therefore, what is required is no less than a critical discussion of the limits and exclusion mechanisms of the European concept of art already mentioned above, as well as an engagement with the cultural preconditions of composition (→ II.1). We should be aware of the inadequacy of Helmut Lachenmann’s cultural categorizations. That is, his attempt to associate the European concept of art with structuring, rupture, self-reflection, and self-perception, while associating non-European music – with reference to a concert given by Ravi Shankar at the 1957 Darmstadt Summer Course – all too one-sidedly with religious, ritual and magical intentions, and a “paradise of content intactness.”¹¹² (→ IV.2)

In these introductory “circlings,” I have attempted to place contemporary composition in the context of wider discourses, specifically those of canonicity, identity critique, reflexive globalization, and interculturality. Against the backdrop of a continuous dominance of Western

¹⁰⁶ See Mersch, “Geschieht es?”

¹⁰⁷ Lyotard, “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?” 129, 131.

¹⁰⁸ See the late writings of Edward Evan Pritchard as well as Chan and Noble, *Sounds in Translation*; see also the overview in Pym, *Exploring Translation Theories*.

¹⁰⁹ See for example Asad, “The Concept of Cultural Translation.”

¹¹⁰ For an updated and general review of musicology-related translation concepts see Lessmann, “Übersetzung – ein Thema der Musikforschung?”

¹¹¹ See Utz, *Neue Musik und Interkulturalität*, 355–357, 403–423 (Qu Yuan) and 444 (Daoism). See also Mittler, *Dangerous Tunes*, 116–125.

¹¹² Lachenmann, “East meets West?,” 90–91.

cultural centers in global cultural politics,¹¹³ as well as the inescapable ethnocentrism of canon-forming discourses (→ I.1), it is clear that a central challenge of intercultural composition – and a historiography contextualizing and reflecting it – is to respect “originary asymmetries” and seek out areas of the “in-between,” without falling into the trap of a “narcissism of minor differences.” Most of all, however, the task is to contextualize such musical works and their social embeddedness without subsuming these asymmetries under a pseudo-universalist but ultimately ethnocentric conception of global culture. This means that the methodology of a global, or more modestly a “globally informed,” historiography and analysis of music would first have to meet four requirements:

1. It must be shown how musical articulations position themselves in the field of reflexive globalization and what positions they adopt in relation to the figures of alterity or incommensurability.
2. Compositional approaches must be discussed in the context of the dynamic between an intercultural *competency* (which ultimately lies in a critique of established forms of cultural essentialism and cultural stereotyping, represented here by the figure of “hypolepsis”) and the inevitably continued effects of and changes to the cultural essentialism it critiques.
3. An awareness that the recognition of cultural alterity (that can imply or presuppose a “struggle for recognition” involving conflict and aggression) necessitates a profound skepticism toward any form of “synthesis” or “fusional union” – it should not, however, rule out the possibility of reciprocity. Music is destined for such reciprocity to the extent that it can sonically create dialogicity or isolation among different levels of material or coded structures – especially with the help of the compositional techniques developed in musical modernism. Designing suitable historiographical and music-analytical categories for such structures, however, is undoubtedly a great challenge.
4. Not least, the complex situation in which intercultural composition occurs in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries must be approached by considering its divergent but interrelated political and cultural preconditions. These comprise the institutions, media, individuals, performers, writers, and listeners that help to create music as a historical and social event and negotiate its meanings. The next chapter addresses this challenge head-on, favoring decentered, transnational, entangled perspectives in which “asymmetries” and “non-simultaneities” are highlighted without denying real and potential phenomena of historical convergence and coincidence.

¹¹³ I have previously labeled this phenomenon “gravitation.” See Utz, *Neue Musik und Interkulturalität*, 482–483.