

## 9. Government formation with radical right parties in the consolidating democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

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After analysing government formation with radical right parties prior to the first third-generation elections, this chapter turns to government formation in the following two consolidating decades. During this period, the hypotheses state that radical right parties should be included in government if party systems are less fragmented and the radical right has been successful at the polls (Hypothesis 1c), and if they are socio-culturally proximate to the formateur and/or situated on the same side of a bipolar opposition as the formateur (Hypothesis 2b). Furthermore, radical right parties are not expected to be involved in oversized coalitions (Hypothesis 3a) and governments with radical right parties should be ideologically homogeneous, in particular on the socio-cultural dimension (Hypothesis 3b).

### 9.1 Explaining the government participation of radical right parties

#### 9.1.1 Analysis of necessity

The analysis of radical right government participation during the consolidating decades begins with the search for necessary conditions. Table 9.1 shows the parameters of fit for all conditions and their negations. Unlike in the earlier phase, none of these reach the required consistency threshold of 0.9; therefore, they cannot be considered necessary conditions. The consistency of high fragmentation falls just below this threshold, but even if it were slightly higher, the coverage and RoN are too low, indicating that this condition would be trivially necessary. Therefore, typical of much QCA research, the analysis produces no necessary conditions for the government participation of radical right parties in this period.

### 9.1.2 Analysis of sufficiency

The analysis of sufficient conditions begins by converting the raw data into a truth table (see Table 9.2). In contrast to the transformational decade, this truth table reveals that the number of logical remainders is significantly lower, which is partly due to the higher number of cases ( $N = 34$ ). In the period after the first third-generation elections, 19 of the 32 possible combinations of the five conditions have been empirically observed. Yet, the truth table includes a contradictory configuration: The Estonian EKRE in 2019 and the Czech SPD in 2017 both share the same configuration of conditions found in row 8. However, EKRE participated in government, while the SPD remained in opposition.

*Table 9.1: Parameters of fit necessity: Government participation of radical right parties (after first third-generation elections)*

| Condition   | Consistency | RoN  | Coverage |
|-------------|-------------|------|----------|
| LRECONPROX  | 0.73        | 0.52 | 0.50     |
| GALTANPROX  | 0.67        | 0.88 | 0.77     |
| SEATS       | 0.67        | 0.79 | 0.67     |
| FRAG        | 0.87        | 0.52 | 0.57     |
| SAMESIDE    | 0.73        | 0.83 | 0.73     |
| ~LRECONPROX | 0.27        | 0.73 | 0.33     |
| ~GALTANPROX | 0.33        | 0.45 | 0.24     |
| ~SEATS      | 0.33        | 0.52 | 0.26     |
| ~FRAG       | 0.13        | 0.72 | 0.18     |
| ~SAMESIDE   | 0.27        | 0.50 | 0.21     |

Source: Created with QCA Package for R (Duşa 2019).

When such a contradiction cannot be eliminated, despite engaging in the QCA-specific iterative process between ideas and evidence (Ragin 1989, chap. 9; see also Rihoux and Lobe 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012), the investigator may either include or exclude it from the analysis. Exclusion will result in lower solution coverage, whereas inclusion reduces the solution consistency, as it is also based on cases in which the outcome does not occur. The latter strategy is a viable option if the distribution of contradictory cases is uneven, for instance if the outcome occurs in nine

out of ten cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 122).<sup>1</sup> As this is not the case here, row 8 will be excluded from the minimisation. Instead, the two contradictory cases will be subjected to a more detailed examination at the end of the analysis.

After excluding the contradictory configuration, the highest possible consistency cut-off of 1.00 can be applied for the inclusion of truth table rows in the minimisation. The logical minimisation yields a much more complex conservative solution than in the earlier period consisting of four paths, each with four conditions (see Table 9.3). Including logical remainders in the minimisation process produces a more easily interpretable and parsimonious solution. The selection of logical remainders for further minimisation rests on counterfactual claims, or, in other words, theoretically and empirically grounded expectations about the outcome caused by the configuration in the respective truth table row. Here, only easy counterfactuals will be taken into consideration. Easy counterfactuals neither contradict the theoretical assumptions nor the empirical observations and contribute to a more parsimonious solution (Ragin and Sonnett 2005; Ragin 2008, chap. 8; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, chaps. 6 and 8; see also Chapter 4).<sup>2</sup>

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- 1 Such a distribution of cases would also be reflected in a high consistency of the truth table row despite the contradiction.
  - 2 Since the hypotheses in this study involve the interplay of multiple explanatory factors, Schneider and Wagemann's (2012, chap. 8) Enhanced Standard Analysis is preferred over the standard analysis in the fsQCA software because it allows for conjunctural directional expectations.

Table 9.2: Truth table: Government participation of radical right parties (after first third-generation elections)

|    | LRECON-PROX | GALTAN-PROX | SEATS | FRAG | SAMESIDE | GOVPART | Raw consistency | Number of cases | Cases  |
|----|-------------|-------------|-------|------|----------|---------|-----------------|-----------------|--|
| 1  | 1           | 0           | 1     | 1    | 1        | 1       | 1.00            | 4               | LV_2011_NA<br>LV_2014a_NA<br>LV_2014b_NA<br>LV_2018_NA |
| 2  | 1           | 1           | 1     | 1    | 0        | 1       | 1.00            | 3               | SK_2006_SNS<br>SK_2016a_SNS<br>SK_2016b_SNS            |
| 3  | 0           | 1           | 0     | 1    | 1        | 1       | 1.00            | 2               | BG_2014_PF<br>BG_2016_PF                               |
| 4  | 1           | 1           | 0     | 1    | 1        | 1       | 1.00            | 2               | PL_2005_LPR<br>PL_2006_LPR                             |
| 5  | 0           | 1           | 0     | 0    | 1        | 1       | 1.00            | 1               | BG_2009_Ataka  |
| 6  | 0           | 1           | 1     | 0    | 1        | 1       | 1.00            | 1               | BG_2017_UP   |
| 7  | 1           | 1           | 1     | 1    | 1        | 1       | 1.00            | 1               | LV_2016_NA   |
| 8  | 1           | 0           | 1     | 1    | 0        | 0       | 0.50            | 2               | CZ_2017_SPD<br>EE_2019_EKRE                            |
| 9  | 1           | 0           | 0     | 0    | 0        | 0       | 0.00            | 3               | BG_2013_Ataka<br>PL_2001_LPR<br>PL_2003_LPR            |
| 10 | 0           | 0           | 1     | 0    | 0        | 0       | 0.00            | 2               | RO_2004_PRM<br>RO_2007_PRM                             |
| 11 | 0           | 0           | 0     | 1    | 0        | 0       | 0.00            | 2               | CZ_2013_ÚSVIT<br>EE_2015_EKRE                          |

|    |   |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |      |   |                                |
|----|---|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|---|--------------------------------|
| 12 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | BC_2005_Ataka<br>EE_2016_EKRE  |
| 13 | 1 |  | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | SK_2016a_LSNS<br>SK_2016b_LSNS |
| 14 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 2 | BC_2014_Ataka<br>BC_2016_Ataka |
| 15 | 1 |  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | RO_2000_PRM                    |
| 16 | 0 |  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | SK_2020_LSNS                   |
| 17 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | SK_2010_SNS                    |
| 18 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | LV_2010_NA                     |
| 19 | 1 |  | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | HU_1998_MIÉP                   |
| 20 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | ? | 0    | 0 |                                |
| 21 | 0 |  | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | ? | 0    | 0 |                                |
| 22 | 1 |  | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | ? | 0    | 0 |                                |
| 23 | 0 |  | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | ? | 0    | 0 |                                |

|    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |
|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| 24 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | 0 |  |
| 25 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | 0 |  |
| 26 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | 0 |  |
| 27 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | ? | ? | ? | 0 |  |
| 28 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | ? | ? | ? | 0 |  |
| 29 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | ? | ? | ? | 0 |  |
| 30 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | ? | ? | ? | 0 |  |
| 31 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ? | ? | ? | 0 |  |
| 32 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ? | ? | ? | 0 |  |

Source: Created with fsQCA 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2016).

Next, it is necessary to determine which of the 13 logical remainders in the truth table qualify as easy counterfactuals. It has been hypothesised that radical right parties predominantly enter government in the consolidating decades if they hold a large seat share and the fragmentation of party systems is low ( $SEATS^* \sim FRAG$ ). When the fragmentation is low and radical right parties are small ( $\sim SEATS^* \sim FRAG$ ), they should remain in opposition. The other two combinations of these numerical conditions—small and large radical right parties in fragmented party systems ( $\sim SEATS^* FRAG$  and  $SEATS^* FRAG$ )—could also lead to government participation of radical right parties. However, they are not expected to be characteristic of this period, due to the decreasing average fragmentation of Central and Eastern European party systems during the three post-Communist decades (see Chapter 4, esp. Table 4.2).

The empirically observed cases of government participation (truth table rows 1–8) show that all four combinations of the two numerical conditions are present when radical right parties enter government. The truth table reveals that  $SEATS^* \sim FRAG$  is not the predominant configuration in this period. It occurs only in one of the 15 cases of government participation (row 6). Rather, the predominant configuration, observed in nine cases (rows 1, 2, 7, and 8), is  $SEATS^* FRAG$ .<sup>3</sup> The configuration  $\sim SEATS^* FRAG$ , found in most cases of government participation in the transformational decade, is also present in four cases (rows 3 and 4). Thus, logical remainders that include any of these three configurations can be considered easy counterfactuals. Ataka's participation in the 2009 Bulgarian government (row 5) shows that radical right parties can even enter government under the theoretically unfavourable conditions of a low seat share in a party system with low fragmentation ( $\sim SEATS^* \sim FRAG$ ). However, a single outlier is not enough to discard the respective hypothesis completely and consider logical remainders with this configuration easy counterfactuals.

The hypotheses further suggest that radical right parties enter government in the consolidating party systems of Central and Eastern Europe if they are proximate to the formateur on the socio-cultural dimension and/or on the same side of a bipolar opposition in the party system. The data in the truth table support this hypothesis, since all rows that lead to government participation include the GALTANPROX and/or SAMESIDE conditions. The only exception is the contradictory configuration in row 8. Therefore, all logical remainders containing GALTANPROX and/or SAMESIDE qualify as easy counterfactuals.

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3 Row 8 also includes the case of the Czech SPD, which remained in opposition.

Table 9.3: Sufficient conditions for the government participation of radical right parties (after first third-generation elections)

| Conservative solution                               |              |                 |             |  |  |
|---|--------------|-----------------|-------------|--|--|
| Solution paths                                      | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency | Cases  |  |
| LRECONPROX*GALTANPROX*SEATS*FRAG                    | 0.27         | 0.20            | 1.00        | LV_2016_NA<br>SK_2006_SNS<br>SK_2016a_SNS<br>SK_2016b_SNS            |  |
| LRECONPROX*SEATS*FRAG*SAMESIDE                      | 0.33         | 0.27            | 1.00        | LV_2011_NA<br>LV_2014a_NA<br>LV_2014b_NA<br>LV_2016_NA<br>LV_2018_NA |  |
| ~LRECONPROX*GALTANPROX*~FRAG*SAMESIDE               | 0.13         | 0.13            | 1.00        | BG_2009_Ataka<br>BG_2017_UP  |  |
| GALTANPROX*~SEATS*FRAG*SAMESIDE                     | 0.27         | 0.27            | 1.00        | BG_2014_PF<br>BG_2016_PF<br>PL_2005_LPR<br>PL_2006_LPR               |  |
| Solution coverage: 0.93; Solution consistency: 1.00 |              |                 |             |  |  |

| Intermediate solution                               |              |                 |             |  |  |
|---|--------------|-----------------|-------------|--|--|
| Solution paths                                      | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency | Cases  |  |
| LRECONPROX*GALTANPROX*SEATS                         | 0.27         | 0.20            | 1.00        | SK_2006_SNS<br>SK_2016a_SNS<br>SK_2016b_SNS<br>LV_2016_NA            |  |
| LRECONPROX*SEATS*FRAC*SAMESIDE                      | 0.33         | 0.27            | 1.00        | LV_2011_NA<br>LV_2014a_NA<br>LV_2014b_NA<br>LV_2016_NA<br>LV_2018_NA |  |
| ~LRECONPROX*GALTANPROX*SAMESIDE                     | 0.27         | 0.13            | 1.00        | BG_2009_ATAKA<br>BG_2014_PF<br>BG_2016_PF<br>BG_2017_UP              |  |
| GALTANPROX*FRAC*SAMESIDE                            | 0.33         | 0.13            | 1.00        | BG_2014_PF<br>BG_2016_PF<br>LV_2016_NA<br>PL_2005_LPR<br>PL_2006_LPR |  |
| Solution coverage: 0.93; Solution consistency: 1.00 |              |                 |             |  |  |

Source: Created with fsQCA 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2016).

These criteria rule out three of the 13 logical remainders (rows 20 – 22). Further minimisation that includes the other 10 logical remainders, however, not only involves using a large number of unobserved configurations, but it also results in an intermediate solution that is less parsimonious than the conservative one. Identifying those logical remainders that are more likely to lead to the outcome helps to reduce their number further. In light of the empirical observations, for instance, remainders that include the conjunction SEATS\*FRAG, the most frequent configuration of numerical factors when radical right parties entered government during the consolidating decades, should be most favourable. Moreover, while the presence of either GALTANPROX or SAMESIDE is theoretically and empirically sufficient for government participation, the truth table suggests that, with the exception of the contradictory configuration in row 8, radical right parties enter government only if at least two of the three favourable ideological factors (LRECONPROX, GALTANPROX, and SAMESIDE) occur simultaneously.

These criteria eliminate rows 23, 25 and 27, because they contain neither the configuration SEATS\*FRAG nor the simultaneous presence of two favourable ideological conditions. The remainder in row 32 is the only one that fulfils both criteria and will therefore be included in the minimisation to craft the intermediate solution. The six remaining truth table rows (24, 26, 28, 29, 30, and 31) meet only one of the two criteria and will therefore be subjected to a more detailed counterfactual analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, chap. 8), comparing them to empirically observed cases of government participation that differ in only one condition. If the remainder's configuration is more favourable than in the observed case, it should lead to the outcome.

The remainder in row 24, for instance, is very similar to row 2, which covers the government participation of the Slovak SNS in 2006 and twice in 2016. The configurations differ only with regard to party system fragmentation. In the three Slovak cases, a large radical right party entered government in a fragmented party system (SEATS\*FRAG), whereas the remainder refers to large radical right parties in compact party systems (SEATS\*~FRAG). While Hypothesis 1c suggests that SEATS\*~FRAG should be the predominant configuration of the two numerical factors in this period, the configuration SEATS\*FRAG has been observed most frequently in the empirical data. Hence, the observation described in row 24 is not more favourable for government participation than the configuration in row 2. However, this remainder will still be included in the minimisation, because exactly the same configuration led to the participation of the SNS in the 1992 Slovak government.

The remainder in row 26 also differs in one condition from the configuration in row 2. While the SNS and the formateur of the 2006 and 2016 governments shared similar socio-economic positions, the remainder in row 26 contains the condition ~LRECONPROX. Because ideological proximity should favour government partic-

ipation rather than ideological distance, the remainder's configuration is not more likely to lead to the outcome than the configuration in row 2. Unlike in the previous example, there is no additional evidence that would justify the inclusion of this remainder in the minimisation.

Rows 28, 30 and 31 differ in one condition from row 1, which describes four of the Latvian NA's government coalitions. In these instances, the NA controlled a large seat share in a fragmented parliament (SEATS\*~FRAG), while the remainder in row 28 describes large radical right parties in compact party systems (SEATS\*~FRAG), and row 30 refers to small radical right parties in compact party systems (~SEATS\*FRAG). Both remainders are excluded from the minimisation because these conditions are similarly, or even less, favourable for the radical right than row 1, which includes the most frequently observed configuration of the two structural-numerical factors when radical right parties entered government in the consolidating decades. Row 31 differs from row 1 in the LRECONPROX condition. When the NA entered government, it was socio-economically close to the formateur. The remainder lacks socio-economic proximity and is therefore not considered for minimisation.

Row 29 also differs only in the LRECONPROX condition from the configuration in row 6, which covers the government participation of the Bulgarian UP in 2017. The UP and GERB, the formateur of the 2017 government, were on the same side of the bipolar opposition in the Bulgarian party system and close to each other on the socio-cultural but not the socio-economic dimension. The remainder in row 29 includes socio-economic proximity between the radical right party and the formateur. Since there is little doubt that the presence of this condition should support government participation, this logical remainder will be used for crafting the intermediate solution.

Based on these considerations, further minimisation using the logical remainders in rows 24, 29 and 32 yields the intermediate solution reported in Table 9.3. This solution still contains four solution paths, but three of them now include fewer conditions than in the conservative solution, which makes the intermediate solution somewhat more parsimonious and easier to interpret.<sup>4</sup> Factoring the solution term further eases the interpretation of the intermediate solution. In light of the argument that bipolar opposition in the party system can potentially overshadow socio-cultural and socio-economic proximity and that the SAMESIDE condition is present


4 The parsimonious solution generated with the fsQCA software is  $\sim$ LRECONPROX\*GALTANPROX + GALTANPROX\*SEATS + LRECONPROX\*FRAG\*SAMESIDE  $\rightarrow$  GOVPART. The consistency and coverage of the solution is 1.00 and 0.93, respectively.

in three of four solution paths, this condition can be factored out to read:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} LRECONPROX * GALTANPROX * SEATS \\ + \\ SAMESIDE * (LRECONPROX * SEATS * FRAG + \sim LRECONPROX * GALTANPROX \\ + GALTANPROX * FRAG) \end{array} \right\} \rightarrow GOVPART$$

This factorised term, which is logically equivalent to the intermediate solution, better illustrates the conditions under which radical right parties enter government in the presence, or absence, of bipolar opposition in the party system. The branching diagram in Figure 9.1 provides a graphical illustration of this solution term, highlighting the differences and similarities of the four solution paths. The case-based interpretation of these solution paths will be structured accordingly.

Figure 9.1: QCA solution for the government participation of radical right parties (after first third-generation elections)



Source: Own composition.

### Path 1: Ideological proximity and parliamentary strength

The first solution path (LRECONPROX \* GALTANPROX \* SEATS) is the only one that does not contain either of the two party system conditions. It covers a total of four cases: Three government coalitions with the Slovak SNS in 2006 and 2016, as well as the Latvian NA in 2016.

By 2006, the intensity of the bipolar opposition in the Slovak party system had weakened considerably and electoral support for Smer had been growing since the early 2000s. Smer started out as a third way party in the late 1990s, suggesting programmatic ties to New Labour in Britain as well as the attempt to take a middle path

between the autocratic Mečiar camp and the democratic opposition (Haughton and Rybář 2008, 244). However, the party's centre-left socio-economic profile and its nationalist leaning placed it in the position that was previously occupied by Mečiar's declining HZDS. Thus, even though the opposition between competing camps in the Slovak party system was less polarised than in previous years, the general alignment of socio-economic and socio-cultural divides remained stable.

In the run-up to the 2006 parliamentary elections, Smer emphasised socio-economic issues over socio-cultural ones. The SNS—with occasional support from Smer—ensured that nativism, mostly directed against the Hungarian and Roma minorities in the country, remained a salient, though secondary, issue in the campaign (Haughton and Rybář 2008; Mesežnikov 2008; Pytlas and Kossack 2015; Pytlas 2016). As regards socio-economic issues, the SNS' 2006 manifesto was slightly more centrist than the party's usual positions (Pirro 2016). Nevertheless, the SNS and the HZDS were the only parties with compatible centre-left socio-economic positions with whom Fico's Smer, the 2006 government formateur, could negotiate. In turn, Fico's accommodative strategy on the socio-cultural dimension facilitated cooperation with the SNS. Smer's nationalist leaning was not (yet) clearly visible in the 2006 election campaign, but it became more obvious during the subsequent period of government, for instance in the restrictive amendment to the Slovak language law and frequent references to the Hungarian minority as a threat to national identity (Pytlas 2016, chap. 5). The ideological range of the coalition as a whole also provides valuable information about the importance of ideology in this case. Out of the five coalitions formed in Slovakia between 2006 and 2020, the 2006 coalition of Smer, SNS, and HZDS is the only one that qualifies as a minimal connected winning coalition on both ideological dimensions. The other coalitions in the country were more heterogeneous, particularly on the socio-cultural dimension.

The SNS' surprisingly large seat share also helped the party to get into office. After failing to enter parliament in 2002, the SNS won 13.3 per cent of the seats, third most, in 2006. Smer controlled only one-third of the 150 seats and was thus well short of a majority. Hence, Fico required large junior partners, such as the SNS. Moreover, minority governments are rather uncommon in Slovakia and the few that formed after the Velvet Revolution resulted from defections during a legislative term (Bergman, Ilonszki, and Müller 2019a). Hence, it is unlikely that Smer seriously considered the option of forming a minority government after the 2006 election, which improved the bargaining position of a relatively large and ideologically compatible party, such as the SNS, even further.

When the SNS came to power again ten years later, the configuration of the Slovak party system had changed substantially. Socio-cultural and socio-economic divides remained relevant, and party system polarisation had grown due to Fico's controversial personality. However, the emergence of various populist anti-establishment parties that accused Smer and the SNS as well as the SDKÚ-DS of corrup-

tion, introduced a new cross-cutting divide. Thus, the conflict structure of the Slovak party system in 2016 could best be described as multi-polar (Havlík et al. 2020, 230).

Smer once more emerged victorious from the 2016 parliamentary elections and was thus in charge of forming a government. The party had incorporated the SNS' exclusionary conception of Slovak national identity, and during the course of the "migration crisis" in the mid-2010s, Fico's attacks against immigrants and refugees were even more extreme than the radical right party's (Rybář and Spáč 2016; Androvičová 2017; Baboš and Malová 2017). Now that the HZDS had completely vanished from the political arena, the SNS was the only party in parliament with socio-economically and socio-culturally proximate positions to the weakened formateur. Therefore, it was no surprise the SNS was Fico's first choice as a coalition partner in 2016.

The SNS again received a respectable electoral result, yielding ten per cent of the seats in a fragmented eight-party parliament. However, the combined seat share of the two parties was still far away from reaching a majority. Due to the absence of other ideologically compatible coalition partners, however, Smer struggled to find additional junior partners. The eventual formation of an ideologically heterogeneous, four-party majority government with the Hungarian minority party, Most-Híd, and the newly founded conservative party, Siet', was aided by two factors: First, many parties agreed that Slovakia's upcoming role as president of the Council of the European Union should not be managed by a caretaker government (Baboš and Malová 2017) and, second, the country's political culture included a general scepticism towards minority governments. The coalition that was ultimately cobbled together was exceptional in that it included both the anti-Hungarian SNS and Most-Híd, the representative of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. However, the hostility between these parties lost some momentum in the mid-2010s after the SNS changed its leadership and the politicisation of the immigration issue became more intense (Baboš and Malová 2017; Harris 2019; Rybář 2020). In addition, the Hungarian minority was now represented by Most-Híd, not by the SMK, which had been the SNS' main opponent during the late 1990s when the polarisation in the Slovak party system peaked.

After a few months, however, Siet's parliamentary group dissolved, which resulted in a change of the partisan composition of the coalition and, thus, a new government according to the counting rules applied in this study. The new government still held a majority because some Siet' deputies joined Most-Híd's parliamentary group (Baboš and Malová 2017). This re-formation of the coalition, however, underlines the importance of the SNS' relatively large seat share. Since not all Siet' MPs continued to support the government coalition, SNS' seats proved vital for retaining the majority status of the coalition.

While these three Slovak coalitions are uniquely covered by the first solution path, the government participation of the Latvian NA in 2016 is covered by the first (LRECONPROX\*GALTANPROX\*SEATS), second (LRECONPROX\*SEATS\*FRAG\*SAMESIDE), and fourth path (GALTANPROX\*FRAG\*SAMESIDE). Similar to the SNS, the NA also remained in power following a mid-term re-formation of the government coalition in 2016. Here, however, the partisan composition of the coalition remained the same but the prime minister's party changed from the liberal Unity to the Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS) led by the oligarch, Aivars Lembergs. This case diverges from the other instances of the NA's government participation because the radical right was not confronted with Unity as a formateur but with the ZZS. Unlike Unity, the ZZS was not only on the same side of the bipolar opposition in the Latvian party system, which mainly originated from the ethno-linguistic divide, but the parties shared similar positions on other socio-cultural issues beyond that divide as well (Galbreath and Auers 2010).

After a failed attempt by an internal rival to replace Unity's incumbent prime minister, Straujuma, in 2016, the ZZS became the formateur. The party took advantage of this intra-Unity power struggle by nominating its own candidate, who was eventually elected prime minister by the three coalition parties (Auers 2016). Regardless of these machinations, the NA's coalition membership was never in doubt. Hence, the additional proximity to the formateur on socio-cultural issues other than the ethno-linguistic divide, facilitated cooperation with the ZZS, but it is unlikely that the radical right would have left the ruling coalition if a new, socio-culturally incongruent Unity prime minister had taken over. The large seat share, however, helped the NA to remain in power in 2016. It had become one of the strongest and most stable members of the radical right party family in Central and Eastern Europe over the last decade. When the government re-formed in 2016, the party controlled an impressive 17 per cent of the seats in parliament. It could thus contribute much more to the parliamentary majority than the two remaining parties in the ethnic Latvian camp, which were substantially smaller than the NA.

In sum, all four instances of government participation covered by the first solution path follow a similar pattern. Regardless of the configuration of the party system, radical right parties entered government because they were socio-economically (LRECONPROX) and socio-culturally proximate to the formateur (GALTANPROX), and because they controlled a large number of seats in parliament (SEATS). However, the explanation for the NA's government participation diverges slightly from the three Slovak cases. The three party-level factors also facilitated the NA's participation in the 2016 government. Unlike in Slovakia, however, this government was formed in the context of a deep bipolar opposition in the party system that was based on the ethno-linguistic divide. Here, other socio-cultural issues beyond this divide, as reflected in the GALTAN dimension, were less important. Therefore, the socio-cultural proximity to the formateur helped the NA, but it was less decisive for the

party's inclusion in government than for the SNS. These observations, and the fact that this case is also covered by two paths that include the *SAMESIDE* condition, imply that bipolar opposition was more important in the Latvian party system than this solution path suggests.

### **Paths 2 – 4: The impact of a bipolar oppositions in the party system**

Solution paths 2 – 4 differ from the first one in that they describe situations in which the radical right party and the formateur are situated on the same side of a bipolar opposition in the party system (*SAMESIDE*). All three paths, however, include additional conditions that are needed to explain the government participation of radical right parties.

The second solution path (*LRECONPROX\*SEATS\*FRAG\*SAMESIDE*) is the only one in the intermediate solution that does not include socio-cultural proximity (*GALTANPROX*). It covers all cases of government participation of the Latvian NA, including the previously discussed ZZS-led coalition. A deep bipolar opposition rooted in the ethno-linguistic divide between the Latvian majority and the large Russian-speaking minority has been an essential feature of the Latvian party system since the country's independence from the Soviet Union. This opposition was reinforced by a salient socio-economic divide (Saarts 2011; Auers 2013). In this context, Harmony Centre (SC) not only represented the Russian-speaking minority in the Latvian party system, but also the left socio-economic pole. All ethnic Latvian parties, in contrast, held either centrist or liberal socio-economic positions. Although SC emerged victorious from most parliamentary elections in the 2010s, the lack of junior partners in the Russian-speaking camp always prevented the party from forming a government.

Since 2011, the radical right NA has participated in five government coalitions, all including only ethnic Latvian parties. Thus, being part of this camp was clearly key to the NA's government participation. With the exception of the 2016 coalition, the socio-economically and socio-culturally liberal Unity was tasked with the formation of government. Regarding other socio-cultural issues, such as gender equality or immigration, however, Unity held decidedly more liberal views than the radical right (Auers 2016, 3), which is reflected by a distance of around four points between these two parties on the *GALTAN* dimension. The NA differed from most Central and Eastern European radical right parties in its centre-right socio-economic positions. The party advocated socio-economic policies that were not so different from the liberal ones that Unity and the other parties in the ethnic Latvian camp supported (see Chapter 6.2). This solution path and the ideological range of Latvian governments in the 2010s suggest that the parties in the ethnic Latvian camp paid attention to the socio-economic proximity of their partners, whereas they were willing to overlook different positions on the *GALTAN* dimension. All four governments since 2011 were quite homogeneous along the socio-economic dimension. Even the five-party coali-

tion of 2018 features a relatively low socio-economic range of only 2.18 points (see Table 6.6). The socio-cultural range of these coalitions, in contrast, has always been quite broad, ranging from 4.50 to 6.18 points.

This solution path further illustrates that the NA's parliamentary strength also contributed to its inclusion in government. The configuration highlights that the large seat share (SEATS) proved to be an asset for the party in Latvia's fragmented party system (FRAG). Since the whole ethnic Latvian camp shared similar socio-economic positions and placed less importance on compatible socio-cultural ones (outside the ethno-linguistic divide), government formation could almost be reduced to calculating each party's potential contribution to a parliamentary majority. Due to the high fragmentation, all Latvian governments between 2011 and 2018 included at least three parties. With seat shares ranging from 13 to 17 per cent, the NA was among the larger parties in the ethnic Latvian camp, making it harder to form stable majorities without it. Thus, while the previous analysis shows that a small seat share is not necessarily a disadvantage, the Latvian cases demonstrate that a large seat share in a fragmented party system can create an actual advantage for radical right parties.

These observations demonstrate that the interplay of two ideological factors, being on the same side of bipolar opposition in the party system (SAMESIDE) and being proximate to the formateur on the socio-economic dimension (LRECONPROX), as well as two structural-numerical factors, having a large seat share (SEATS) in a fragmented party system (FRAG), explain NA's government participation during the 2010s. This result confirms that the party's socio-cultural proximity to the ZZS in 2016 was helpful, but less important than the socio-economic proximity to the formateur and its large seat share. Hence, there is a clear, country-specific pattern that explains the government participation of the radical right NA in Latvia. In the Latvian party system, conflicts over national identity, and thus the core issue of the radical right, manifested in a deep bipolar opposition in the party system rather than in the broader GALTAN dimension.

In the third solution path ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX\*GALTANPROX\*SAMESIDE), socio-cultural proximity (GALTANPROX) and socio-economic distance ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX) between the radical right party and the formateur accompany the SAMESIDE condition. This path covers the 2009 (Ataka), 2014 (PF), 2016 (PF), and 2017 (UP) Bulgarian government coalitions. In the late 2000s, contestation between two camps had emerged in the Bulgarian party system. The bipolar opposition between the Communist successor party, BSP, joined by the unofficial party of the Turkish minority, DPS<sup>5</sup>, on one side, and the conservative camp, led by GERB, on the other, ran so deep that the BSP and GERB sometimes boycotted parliamentary work altogether, rather than assuming their role as a constructive democratic opposition

5 The formation of ethnic parties is prohibited by law in Bulgaria.

(Karasimeonov 2019). The socio-economic dimension was home to the most salient divide in the Bulgarian party system during this period (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009, 290)<sup>6</sup>, but the antagonism between BSP and GERB rested on affective rather than ideological polarisation.

Ataka's support for the GERB minority government in 2009 represents the first time that a radical right party participated in government in Bulgaria. Situated clearly on the left side of the socio-economic dimension, Ataka is a prime example of radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe supporting social-national economic policies (Avramov 2015, 308; Pirro 2016, 62–63; Popova 2016, 262–63). Hence, the party was quite far away from the socio-economically liberal GERB. On socio-cultural issues, however, the distance between these two parties was smaller. Although GERB did not incorporate radical right narratives into its own platform as extensively as other mainstream competitors in the region, Boyko Borisov and his party still approached some of Ataka's nativist positions and employed a “moderate nationalism” (Krasteva 2016, 176; see also Avramov 2015; Pirro 2016). In return for the formal support of GERB's single-party majority government, Ataka expected concessions regarding its socio-cultural core issues. Hence, socio-cultural proximity (GALTANPROX) was likely more important to Ataka than it was to GERB.

The composition of the 2009 Bulgarian government provides additional insights into the role played by ideological factors. GERB controlled 117 of the 240 seats in parliament and thus missed out on the majority by only a narrow margin. Even though any one of the smaller parties in the conservative camp could have provided GERB with a majority, Borisov struck a deal with all four of them, including the radical right Ataka. The government resembled an “oversized minority government” because all four parties agreed to support a single-party GERB cabinet. Since none of the support parties were simultaneously socio-economically and socio-culturally proximate to GERB, Borisov might have opted to include all of them in order to ensure that he would always have a working majority, whether the parliament was voting on socio-economic or socio-cultural policies.

In the 2014 Bulgarian parliamentary elections, another radical right party, the PF, was elected to parliament, and it was subsequently included in the government. GERB won the election and Borisov was again tasked with forming a government. The situation was different than in 2009, however, because GERB controlled only

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6 Since the 2014 wave, the CHES provides data on the salience of the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions for the individual parties in addition to their positions (Jolly et al. 2022). The salience ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high). The salience of each dimension in the party system can be obtained by weighting the salience of the respective dimension by the parties' electoral strength. In Bulgaria, the salience of the socio-economic dimension is at 6.7, while that of the socio-cultural one is only at 4.9 (see Appendix II).

one-third of the seats in parliament. This time, Borisov formed a three-party minority coalition, which was officially supported by the PF. Unlike in 2009, the support of the radical right was vital for maintaining the government's majority in parliament, as it was the coalition's only support party. In 2016, one of the junior partners left the coalition, which led to a change in its partisan composition, and thus, the formation of a new government. Despite continuing support from the radical right PF, the remaining coalition parties no longer controlled a parliamentary majority. In this situation, Borisov considered including the PF as junior partner in the minority coalition. Later that year, and before this plan had been put into practice, however, Borisov and his government resigned after the GERB candidate was defeated in the presidential elections (Karasimeonov 2014b, 2–3; Kostadinova and Popova 2015; Kolarova and Spirova 2017).

The PF held slightly more moderate positions than Ataka, resulting in a smaller socio-economic and socio-cultural distance to GERB. However, ideological proximity between GERB and the PF existed only on the socio-cultural dimension (GALTANPROX). In the socio-economic sphere, the PF was situated left of centre and thus qualitatively and quantitatively rather distant from GERB's liberal positions (~LRECONPROX). The PF's participation in the 2014 and 2016 government was assisted by the bipolar opposition in the party system which limited GERB's choice of potential partners to parties within its own camp (SAMESIDE). The ideological heterogeneity of the 2014 and 2016 governments shows that GERB was primarily concerned with forming a coalition with parties in its own camp. For that purpose, Borisov accepted support from parties with a wide array of positions on the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions (see Table 6.11). Similar to the cooperation with Ataka in 2009, GERB included the radical right PF despite socio-economic differences, while the party's moderate nationalism provided enough of an incentive for the PF to support the GERB-led coalition.

After the 2017 elections, the re-elected GERB formed a coalition with the radical right UP, an alliance of Ataka and the PF. While Ataka and the PF had already participated in government as support parties, this coalition was the first to provide their leaders with cabinet posts. As the UP consists of the aforementioned radical right parties, their socio-cultural and socio-economic proximity to the formateur is similar to the aforementioned cases. Hence, the bipolar opposition is the primary constraint on GERB's potential coalition partners. Within this camp, GERB favoured a coalition with the UP, which from the radical right's point of view, was again helped by GERB's nationalist-leaning position on the socio-cultural dimension. In 2017, the UP was also in a stronger bargaining position than its predecessors in 2009, 2014, and 2016. Apart from the oppositional parties, BSP and DPS, GERB, the UP and the new national-conservative party, Volya, were the only parties that passed the threshold of representation in the 2017 parliamentary elections. Volya was ideologically more proximate to GERB than the UP, but unlike the radical right alliance, the party

did not control enough seats to form a majority government with GERB. Hence, the UP was ultimately the only party in the conservative camp that could provide GERB with a majority in parliament.

In sum, the third solution path describes a clear pattern that explains the government participation of Bulgarian radical right parties. Here, the bipolar opposition in the party system, and the socio-cultural proximity between the formateur and the different radical right formations, were more important than incongruence on the socio-economic dimension. The absence of socio-economic proximity between radical right parties and the formateur ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX) suggests that the affective polarisation between the two oppositional camps overshadowed ideological distance on this most salient dimension in Bulgarian politics. The ideological heterogeneity of the four Borisov governments shows that GERB was willing to cooperate with junior partners in his camp, regardless of their ideological positions. Socio-cultural proximity still played a role in the formation of these governments, however. The radical right parties' decision to support several GERB minority governments cannot be explained without their proximity to the formateur on the GALTAN dimension and, thus, the prospect of implementing some of their preferred nativist policies. Given that they did not gain access to cabinet posts, it is hard to imagine that Ataka and the PF would have supported Borisov had such ideological incentives been absent.

The fourth solution path ( $GALTANPROX^*FRAG^*SAMESIDE$ ) covers two of the cases already discussed in the previous path, the Bulgarian PF in 2014 and 2016. Therefore, the unique coverage of the third and fourth path, respectively, is relatively low. This observation, and the fact that both paths differ only in one condition, also suggests that they describe different varieties of a similar explanatory pattern. This solution path adds that the PF entered government in a highly fragmented party system (FRAG). In this context, GERB needed three other parties to control a parliamentary majority. Thus, the fourth solution path points out that high fragmentation necessitated that several small parties participate in government, while bipolar opposition limited the number of coalition partners available to the formateur. Since Borisov depended on the support of several parties from the conservative camp, the PF's small seat share proved not to be a decisive disadvantage. Because the bipolar opposition in the party system and socio-cultural proximity to the formateur are consistent characteristics in all instances of government participation of the radical right in Bulgaria, these two paths can be regarded as different varieties of a similar pattern explaining government participation of radical right parties in Bulgaria.

The NA's participation in the 2016 Latvian government has been discussed in the context of the first two solution paths. This solution path corroborates that bipolar opposition helped the NA to enter the coalition and their large seat share served as an advantage in the context of high party system fragmentation. Contrary to the above observation, however, this path does not include socio-economic proximity

between the radical right party and the formateur, which suggests that this condition is causally irrelevant. Instead, it includes socio-cultural proximity, which was found to be less decisive. This solution path provides a logically correct description of the configuration of the individual explanatory factors in the case of the Latvian NA in 2016. All three conditions support NA's participation in government. However, the previous discussion shows that socio-economic proximity (LRECONPROX) was also important for NA to enter government. Thus, analytically, the second solution path, which includes the LRECONPROX condition, provides a more adequate explanation of NA's government participation in 2016 than this one. Because the LRECONPROX condition is absent from the fourth solution path, and does not appear in its negation, this path does not fundamentally contradict this conclusion.

The only two cases that are uniquely covered by the fourth solution path refer to the government participation of the Polish LPR in 2005 and 2006. In the run-up to the 2005 Polish parliamentary elections, everything was set for a coalition including the two main parties, PO and PiS, which had emerged from the post-Solidarność camp. However, due to the fierce competition between their candidates during the presidential elections, scheduled only two weeks after the parliamentary elections, the rift between these parties deepened so quickly and dramatically that the envisioned coalition was no longer possible. Even though this bipolar opposition became increasingly charged with socio-economic and socio-cultural conflicts, polarisation was primarily affective in this initial phase (Szczerbiak 2007; Pytlas and Kossack 2015; Pytlas 2016).

This bipolar opposition prevented cooperation between PiS and PO and, thus, paved the way for the LPR, which had sided with PiS (SAMESIDE), to join the government in 2005. LPR's inclusion was further helped by the party's ideological proximity to PiS, particularly but not exclusively on the socio-cultural dimension (GALTANPROX), which was most evident in their shared support for the idea of a Fourth Republic. "The Fourth Republic would experience moral cleansing through deep lustration, anti-corruption measures, and reaffirmation of Catholic values; its new Constitution would repair the state; it would heal society with a social contract, including fundamental changes in social and economic policy" (Millard 2010, 127). Hence, once the PO-PiS coalition fell apart, the LPR became the most obvious partner for the PiS from an ideological perspective.

The Polish party system was quite fragmented after the 2005 election (FRAG) and PiS controlled only one-third of the seats in the Sejm, so like GERB in the Bulgarian election of 2014, it also depended on support from several parties. After the only possible two-party majority government had been ruled out, PiS required at least two of the four remaining parliamentary parties to reach a majority. Of these four, PiS chose the two with the greatest ideological proximity on the GALTAN dimension—LPR and the populist Samoobrona (SO).

When PiS, LPR, and SO decided to cooperate after the 2005 elections, the parties did not form a coalition government—despite substantial agreement in most policy areas. Instead, the two smaller parties supported a PiS minority government. Sections of the PiS electorate held critical views towards the radical right, and these voters may have motivated this decision. In 2006, however, Kaczyński decided to formalise the cooperation in an attempt to stabilise the conflict-ridden government (Millard 2010, 144). This gambit failed spectacularly, though, and ongoing conflicts between the coalition partners ultimately resulted in the early termination of the government in 2007. The change in the status, as the two small parties shifted from being support parties of a minority government to junior partners in a majority coalition, marks a new government according to the counting rules applied in this study. Yet, the explanation of LPR's participation in the 2005 government also applies to its re-formed version in 2006.

The analysis of this solution path shows that, with the exception of the Latvian case, paths three and four represent different varieties of a similar underlying pattern. All instances of government participation of radical right parties in Bulgaria and Poland were aided by the constraining effect of a bipolar opposition in the party system based on affective polarisation as well as the socio-cultural proximity between the radical right and the formateur. This pattern varies slightly in two ways. First, while the radical right in Bulgaria entered government despite socio-economic distance to the formateur, the LPR and PiS held very similar positions on this dimension. Second, some variation exists regarding the fragmentation of party systems. While Ataka in 2009 and the UP in 2017 entered government in relatively compact party systems, when the formation of governments with few parties was possible, the PF and the LPR were further assisted by the fact that the formateurs needed more than one junior partner, or support party, from within their camp to secure a majority. Interestingly, and contrary to Hypothesis 1a, Ataka was even included in the 2009 government despite its small seat share in a compact party system.

## Summary

The case-based analysis determines that there are different patterns for explaining the government participation of Central and Eastern European radical right parties in the period after the first third-generation elections. These explanatory patterns differ depending on the presence, or absence, of bipolar opposition in the party system. If no bipolar opposition existed, all three party-level conditions—socio-economic proximity, socio-cultural proximity, and a large seat share—needed to be present for radical right parties to enter government.

In 12 of the 15 cases of a government participation of radical right parties in this period, however, party systems were characterised by bipolar opposition. Yet, the fact that radical right parties and the formateur were in the same camp alone was

not sufficient for these parties to enter government. The explanatory patterns within this group of cases differ according to the nature of the bipolar opposition. In Bulgaria and Poland, the bipolar opposition that existed when the radical right entered government resulted primarily from affective polarisation between the largest parties in the country and not so much from policy-oriented divides. In this environment, the radical right party and the formateur needed to share similar positions on the socio-cultural dimension and, thus, on the dimension that concerns the ideological core of the radical right. In Latvia, however, the bipolar opposition itself was deeply rooted in ideological polarisation based on the ethno-cultural divide. Here, ideological proximity on the broader socio-cultural dimension played a subordinate role. Instead, radical right parties needed to be part of the ethnic Latvian camp, be socio-economically close to the formateur, and control a large seat share in parliament in order to enter government.

## 9.2 Explaining the exclusion of radical right parties from government

### 9.2.1 Analysis of necessity

After analysing the government participation of Central and Eastern European radical right parties in the period after the first third-generation elections, this section turns to the conditions under which these parties remained in opposition. The first step is to test for necessary conditions. Table 9.4 shows that none of the conditions or their negations meets the criteria for necessity. With a consistency score of 0.84, the absence of socio-cultural proximity ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX) comes closest to the required minimum of 0.9, but all of the other factors fall well below this threshold. Hence, there is no necessary condition for the exclusion of radical right parties from government in this period.

*Table 9.4: Parameters of fit necessity: Exclusion of radical right parties from government (after first third-generation elections)*

| Condition  | Consistency | RoN  | Coverage |
|------------|-------------|------|----------|
| LRECONPROX | 0.58        | 0.52 | 0.50     |
| GALTANPROX | 0.16        | 0.68 | 0.23     |
| SEATS      | 0.26        | 0.66 | 0.33     |
| FRAG       | 0.53        | 0.46 | 0.44     |

|             |      |      |      |
|-------------|------|------|------|
| SAMESIDE    | 0.21 | 0.63 | 0.27 |
| ~LRECONPROX | 0.42 | 0.85 | 0.67 |
| ~GALTANPROX | 0.84 | 0.72 | 0.76 |
| ~SEATS      | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.74 |
| ~FRAG       | 0.47 | 0.92 | 0.82 |
| ~SAMESIDE   | 0.79 | 0.79 | 0.79 |

Source: Created with QCA Package for R (Duşa 2019).

## 9.2.2 Analysis of sufficiency

In the absence of necessary conditions, the investigation proceeds with the analysis of sufficient conditions for the negative outcome ( $\sim$ GOVPART). Rows 9 – 19 in the truth table above (see Table 9.2) show a consistency of 1.00 for the negative outcome, so they will be included in the minimisation. The contradictory configuration in row 8 is again excluded. The resulting conservative solution generated by the minimisation comprises five solution paths that consist of three to four conditions each (see Table 9.5). Therefore, further steps will be taken to arrive at an intermediate solution that is easier to interpret. The analysis of radical right parties' participation in government during this period highlights the relevance of radical right parties and the formateurs being on the same side of a bipolar opposition in the party system. Four of the five paths in the conservative solution include the condition SAMESIDE, or its negation, indicating that this condition plays an important role in the exclusion of radical right parties from government as well. Therefore, the intermediate solution here is not crafted by further minimisation with the help of logical remainders but by undoing the minimisation step in the fourth solution path ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX\* $\sim$ GALTANPROX\* $\sim$ SEATS\*FRAG), the only path that does not include the SAMESIDE condition.<sup>7</sup> The fourth solution path is based on the minimisation of truth table rows 11 ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX\* $\sim$ GALTANPROX\* $\sim$ SEATS\*FRAG\* $\sim$ SAMESIDE) and 14 ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX\* $\sim$ GALTANPROX\* $\sim$ SEATS\*FRAG\*SAMESIDE). Undoing the minimisation of these two rows adds an additional solution path to the conservative solution, making it even more complex.

7 This solution is intermediate because it results from an intermediate step in the minimisation procedure. It should not be confused, however, with the intermediate solution in the standard analysis in the fsQCA software, which involves logical remainders (see Chapter 5). The parsimonious solution generated by the fsQCA software is  $\sim$ SEATS\* $\sim$ SAMESIDE +  $\sim$ LRECONPROX\* $\sim$ GALTANPROX + LRECONPROX\* $\sim$ FRAG  $\rightarrow$   $\sim$ GOVPART. The consistency and coverage of the solution is 1.00 and 0.95, respectively.

Table 9.5: Sufficient conditions for the exclusion of radical right parties from government (after first third-generation elections)

| Conservative solution                                   |              |                 |             |   |  |
|---|--------------|-----------------|-------------|---|--|
| Solution paths  | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency | Cases   |  |
| $\sim$ GALIANPROX* $\sim$ FRAC* $\sim$ SAMESIDE         | 0.37         | 0.21            | 1.00        | BG_2013_Ataka<br>PL_2001_LPR<br>PL_2003_LPR<br>RO_2000_PRM<br>RO_2004_PRM<br>RO_2007_PRM<br>SK_2010_SNS |  |
| $\sim$ LRECONPROX* $\sim$ GALIANPROX* $\sim$ SAMESIDE   | 0.32         | 0.05            | 1.00        | CZ_2013_Úsvit<br>EE_2015_EKRE<br>RO_2004_PRM<br>RO_2007_PRM<br>SK_2010_SNS<br>SK_2020_I_SNS             |  |
| LRECONPROX* $\sim$ SEATS*FRAC* $\sim$ SAMESIDE          | 0.21         | 0.21            | 1.00        | BG_2005_Ataka<br>EE_2016_EKRE<br>SK_2016a_I_SNS<br>SK_2016b_I_SNS                                       |  |
| $\sim$ LRECONPROX* $\sim$ GALIANPROX* $\sim$ SEATS*FRAC | 0.21         | 0.11            | 1.00        | BG_2014_Ataka<br>BG_2016_Ataka<br>CZ_2013_Úsvit<br>EE_2015_EKRE   |  |
| LRECONPROX* $\sim$ SEATS* $\sim$ FRAC* $\sim$ SAMESIDE  | 0.11         | 0.11            | 1.00        | HU_1998_MIÉP<br>LV_2010_NA  |  |
| Solution coverage: 0.95; Solution consistency: 1.00     |              |                 |             |   |  |

| Intermediate solution                               |              |                 |             |   |  |
|---|--------------|-----------------|-------------|---|--|
| Solution paths                                      | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency | Cases   |  |
| ~GALTANPROX*~FRAG*~SAMESIDE                         | 0.37         | 0.21            | 1.00        | BG_2013_Ataka<br>PL_2001_LPR<br>PL_2003_LPR<br>RO_2000_PRM<br>RO_2004_PRM<br>RO_2007_PRM<br>SK_2010_SNS |  |
| ~LRECONPROX*~GALTANPROX*~SAMESIDE                   | 0.32         | 0.16            | 1.00        | CZ_2013_Úsvit<br>EE_2015_EKRE<br>RO_2004_PRM<br>RO_2007_PRM<br>SK_2010_SNS<br>SK_2020_LSNS              |  |
| LRECONPROX*~SEATS*FRAG*~SAMESIDE                    | 0.21         | 0.21            | 1.00        | BG_2005_Ataka<br>EE_2016_EKRE<br>SK_2016a_LSNS<br>SK_2016b_LSNS   |  |
| ~LRECONPROX*~GALTANPROX*~SEATS*FRAG*~SAMESIDE       | 0.11         | 0.11            | 1.00        | BG_2014_Ataka<br>BG_2016_Ataka  |  |
| LRECONPROX*~SEATS*~FRAG*~SAMESIDE                   | 0.11         | 0.11            | 1.00        | HU_1998_MIEP<br>LV_2010_NA  |  |
| Solution coverage: 0.95; Solution consistency: 1.00 |              |                 |             |   |  |

Source: Created with fsQCA 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2016).

One of these new paths covers only the Czech Úsvit in 2013 and the Estonian EKRE in 2015. These cases are also covered by the second solution path ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX\* $\sim$ GALTANPROX\* $\sim$ SAMESIDE), indicating that the unique coverage of this new path is zero. Therefore, this redundant path can be dropped, because the solution contains the same logical information without it. This results in the intermediate solution found in Table 9.5. It still contains five solution paths and is thus similarly complex as the conservative solution. With regard to bipolar opposition in the party system, however, the intermediate solution is easier to interpret than the conservative one, which is also illustrated in the branching diagram in Figure 9.2.


The diagram shows that the solution includes two paths for radical right parties that remained in opposition when they were on the same side of a bipolar opposition as the formateur and three paths when they were not. In each of these paths, of course, the SAMESIDE condition or its negation is accompanied by further explanatory conditions. Moreover, the consistency (1.00) and coverage scores (0.95) of the intermediate solution indicate that it is a perfect subset of the negative outcome and covers most of the cases in which radical right parties remained in opposition during the consolidating decades. The remainder of this section first investigates the first three solution paths, which cover the 14 cases in which radical right parties were not in the same camp as the formateur ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE) when they remained in opposition. It then turns to the two solution paths, and four cases, where the radical right was excluded from government despite being in the same camp as the formateur.

### Paths 1 – 3: Not in the same camp and not in government

The first three paths of the intermediate solution refer to situations in which radical right parties are not in the favourable position of being on the same side of a bipolar opposition as the formateur. The first two paths are somewhat similar; both include  $\sim$ SAMESIDE,  $\sim$ GALTANPROX and one additional condition,  $\sim$ FRAG and  $\sim$ LRECONPROX respectively. Moreover, these two paths cover three of the same cases—the Romanian PRM in 2004 and 2007, and the Slovak SNS in 2010. The third solution path, instead, differs significantly from the previous two and uniquely covers four cases.

Before analysing the first three solution paths in more detail, it is important to remember that  $\sim$ SAMESIDE can describe two different situations, that is, the absence of a bipolar opposition in the party system on the one hand, and the position of radical right party and formateur on opposite sides of a bipolar opposition on the other (see Chapter 8). In 12 of the 14 cases covered by the first three solution paths, there was no bipolar opposition in the party system. Only the Bulgarian Ataka and the Slovak SNS in 2013 and 2010, respectively, were not in the formateur's camp while bipolar opposition existed in the party system.

Figure 9.2: QCA solution for the exclusion of radical right parties from government (after first third-generation elections)



Source: Own compilation.

The first solution path ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX\*~FRAG\*~SAMESIDE) covers seven cases, including the two ones in which ~SAMESIDE indicates that the radical right party and the formateur are in opposite camps. In the run-up to the 2013 Bulgarian parliamentary elections, Ataka's support was in decline because it had been supporting the GERB minority government since 2009. Participation in government alienated the party's hardcore supporters in particular (Avramov 2015). As a result, the party tried to distance itself from GERB, which marginally affected the bipolar opposition in the party system. The 2013 parliamentary elections resulted in a hung parliament that consisted of only four parties. The 240 seats were split 120–120 between GERB and Ataka, on one hand, and BSP and DPS, on the other. While supporting a GERB-led government was not an option for BSP and DPS, the stalemate between the two camps saved Ataka from completely dissociating from its former ally, since the two parties were one seat short of a majority. Ultimately, a difficult formation process resulted in a minority coalition being formed by BSP and DPS, thus placing Ataka in the opposite camp of the bipolar opposition ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE). However, this government assumed office because Ataka's leader, Volen Siderov, was the only member of the opposition to remain in parliament during the investiture vote. In order to prevent the government from reaching the necessary quorum, all of the other GERB and Ataka MPs had left the legislature. Ataka supported the government in other parliamentary votes, but not on the basis of a formal agreement (Kostadinova and Popova 2014, 2015; see also Karasimeonov 2013a, 2013b; Avramov 2015). Apparently, BSP and Ataka were not ready for closer

cooperation, which would have meant overcoming the bipolar opposition in the Bulgarian party system.

The other two conditions in the first solution path also contributed to Ataka's exclusion from government. In the divided Bulgarian party system of 2013, the low number of parliamentary parties ( $\sim$ FRAG) severely limited the available parties for coalitions within each camp. None of the four parties was ready to cross the gulf between the camps and formally cooperate with the other camp. Ataka went furthest and enabled the formation of a government. Ultimately, however, the bipolar opposition remained intact, which was aided further by the lack of socio-cultural proximity between Ataka and the BSP ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX). Thus, joining a BSP-DPS government did not promise Ataka substantial policy concessions regarding the party's socio-cultural core issues.

The 2010 parliamentary elections in Slovakia were won by Smer, the prime minister's party from the incumbent coalition which had also included the radical right SNS and Mečiar's HZDS. Under the rule of this coalition from 2006 to 2010, a strong bipolar opposition had resurfaced in the Slovak party system, similar to the one from the late 1990s. This opposition was primarily based on ideological polarisation along reinforcing socio-economic and socio-cultural divides (Haughton, Novotná, and Deegan-Krause 2011; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2012; see also Chapter 5.4). Even though the SDKÚ-DS came in second in the 2010 elections, the party became the formateur of the government that was to assume office in the same year. Here, the policy-based bipolar opposition ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE) that coincided with the absence of socio-cultural ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX) (and socio-economic) proximity between SDKÚ-DS and SNS ruled out cooperation between these two parties. Moreover, the 2010 elections saw only 4.0 effective parties enter parliament ( $\sim$ FRAG), which also limited the number of potential coalition partners. In particular, the HZDS failed to cross the five per cent threshold for the first time since 1992, leaving the two remaining parties in the national-protectionist camp, Smer and SNS, short of a majority.

In the remaining five cases covered by this solution path (the Polish LPR in 2001 and 2003, and the Romanian PRM in 2000, 2004, and 2007),  $\sim$ SAMESIDE denotes the absence of bipolar opposition in the party system. Prior to LPR's electoral breakthrough in 2001, the Polish party system had been structured by the regime divide. After the 2001 parliamentary elections, however, this divide had receded to such an extent that coalitions between the two camps became possible for the first time ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE) (Millard 2010, 113–14). The 2001 Polish parliament consisted of only 3.6 effective parties, which was mainly due to the strong position of the SLD ( $\sim$ FRAG). The party held 43.5 per cent of the seats and was so close to a majority that even the seats of the LPR—the smallest parliamentary group—would have sufficed. Despite the relatively similar socio-economic positions of the two parties, such a coalition was never an option because on the GALTAN dimension, the parties were separated by almost eight points, the largest distance between a radical right party

and a formateur in all of the cases covered by this study ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX). This huge socio-cultural distance between the SLD and the LPR, together with the strong position of the SLD in a relatively compact parliament, prevented the radical right from being included in government in either 2001 or 2003.

Electorally, the Romanian PRM was in a much better position than the LPR in the 2000s. The PDSR won the 2000 general elections in Romania, but the PRM reached its all-time high and secured almost a quarter of the seats in parliament. Hence, the former allies could have formed a two-party majority government quite comfortably. Yet, compared to the early 1990s when both parties governed together, the PDSR had moderated its nationalist positions and accepted Romania's transformation into a market economy in order not to jeopardise the country's EU accession (Pop-Eleches 2008, 470; Vachudova 2008, 871; see also Ștefan 2019). These positional shifts increased the socio-cultural distance between the PRM and the PDSR ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX), although both parties were still located in the nationalist end of the GALTAN spectrum. Furthermore, the PDSR joined the cordon sanitaire intended to separate the radical right party from participating in government (Cinpoș 2015, 288). This decision was certainly helped by the erosion of the bipolar opposition, which no longer limited the parties' potential partners to the radical right, as it had in the 1990s ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE). In fact, the Hungarian minority party, UDMR, and the liberal PNL ultimately supported a PDSR-led minority government. Moreover, the 2000 Romanian parliament comprised only 3.6 effective parties ( $\sim$ FRAG) and the electoral alliance led by the PDSR held so many seats that any one of the four remaining parties could have provided the government with a parliamentary majority.

In the 2004 elections, the PRM suffered heavy losses but remained relatively strong. Bipolar opposition was still absent from the Romanian party system ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE), and the fragmentation fell to 3.4 effective, and four actual, parliamentary parties—or electoral alliances ( $\sim$ FRAG). However, the bargaining situation was more complex than these numbers suggest because the electoral alliance of PDSR and PUR formed separate groups in parliament. Therefore, the number of possible minimal winning coalitions was higher than it would have been with only four parliamentary groups, and the parties ultimately formed a four-party minority coalition, a rather uncommon format in compact party systems. In 2007, two parties dropped out of government, leaving a two-party minority coalition in office following this mid-term re-formation. In both 2004 and 2007, the National Liberal Party (PNL) served as the formateur. The PNL had distanced itself from the PRM in the 1990s, when it was part of the oppositional alliance, CDR, and the party had no intention of changing this course one decade later. In addition, the ideological distance between the PNL and the PRM regarding socio-cultural (and socio-economic) issues was much more pronounced than between PDSR and PRM ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX). Hence, the PRM's exclusion from government in the 2000s is mainly a result of the party's the socio-cultural distance to the formateur that

culminated in the cordon sanitaire, which, in turn, had been enabled by the erosion of the regime divide and its constraining effect on government formation.

The second solution path ( $\sim$ LRECON\* $\sim$ GALTANPROX\* $\sim$ SAMESIDE) involves only ideological factors. As for the cases that are also covered by the first path, the PRM in 2004 and 2007 and the SNS in 2010, this configuration underlines that the distances on both ideological dimensions inhibited the radical right from joining the government. The Slovak SNS in 2010 lacked ideological proximity to the SDKÚ-DS on the socio-economic ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX) and socio-cultural dimensions ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX). In a party system characterised by bipolar opposition based on the congruent alignment of these two conflict dimensions, this path highlights that the SDKÚ-DS would not have cooperated with the ideologically distant radical right party from the opposite camp ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE) regardless of either the party system's level of fragmentation or the party's parliamentary strength. The situation in the two Romanian cases was somewhat similar: Ideological proximity between the PRM and the PNL existed neither on the socio-economic ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX) nor on the socio-cultural dimension ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX), but in the absence of a bipolar opposition in the party system ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE), the ideological distance was further reinforced by a cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis the PRM.

In the remaining three cases uniquely covered by this solution path, the mainstream political parties had established a cordon sanitaire against the radical right. In the Czech Republic, the cordon sanitaire had existed since the fall of Communism and, thus, already contributed to the exclusion of the SPR-RSČ from government in the 1990s (see Chapter 8). The same happened to Tamio Okamura's new radical right party, Úsvit, in 2013. Due to multi-polar oppositions in the party system, the formation of the 2013 government was not limited to coalitions within two competing camps ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE). The social democratic ČSSD won the election and subsequently led the process of government formation. In contrast to the radical right Úsvit, the social democrats positioned themselves clearly on the left in terms of socio-economic policies ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX) and on the GAL end of the socio-cultural dimension ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX) (Havlík 2014, 46; Koubek and Polášek 2017, 16). Thus, in case of the ČSSD, the cordon sanitaire is the logical consequence of this ideological distance, particularly on the socio-cultural dimension. Moreover, Úsvit stayed true to its anti-establishment appeal and ruled out participation in government itself (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 132).

After its electoral breakthrough in the 2015 parliamentary elections, the Estonian radical right party EKRE faced the neoliberal ER as the formateur. After the turn of the millennium, the ethno-linguistic divide in the country had become less polarised ( $\sim$ SAMESIDE) (Lagerspetz and Vogt 2013). Although EKRE and the ER were mostly elected by the Estonian majority in the country, the parties' positions regarding the ethno-linguistic divide and other socio-cultural issues, such as immigration or gender equality, diverged significantly ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX). On the socio-

economic dimension, the ER's neoliberal economic programme was not compatible with EKRE's national-protectionist positions either, although they were less radical than those of other radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe (~LRECONPROX) (see Chapter 6.1). As in the Czech Republic, the ideological distance between the radical right party and the formateur inhibited cooperation between the two parties in government, and the presence of a cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis EKRE ensured the party's exclusion from government (Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019, 439).

In the last case covered by this solution path, Marian Kotleba's LSNS faced the populist anti-establishment party OĽaNO, led by Igor Matovič, as the formateur after the 2020 parliamentary elections. The bipolar opposition in the Slovak party system in 2010 had splintered into multi-polar oppositions by 2020, and this was essentially due to the rise of anti-establishment parties, including OĽaNO and the LSNS (~SAMESIDE) (Rybář and Spáč 2016). While these two parties were united in their anti-establishment appeal, they were not particularly close on either the socio-economic (~LRECONPROX) or the socio-cultural dimensions (~GALTANPROX). Matovič and his party expressed support for liberal socio-economic policies, whereas the LSNS advocated a clear national-protectionist course. On the socio-cultural dimension, OĽaNO rather belonged on the conservative end of the GALTAN dimension, but the party kept a distance to Kotleba's racist and nativist positions (Mesežnikov and Gyárfášová 2017; Havlík et al. 2020, 218; Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 107–8). Matovič also endorsed the cordon sanitaire, which can be seen as the culmination of the ideological distance of all parties from the LSNS, particularly on the socio-cultural dimension (see Chapter 5.4).

Even though the first two solution paths are quite similar, they refer to different patterns that explain the exclusion of radical right parties from government. The case-based analysis reveals that there are not only differences between, but also within, these two solution paths. This variation stems primarily from the different situations captured by ~SAMESIDE. If this condition refers to radical right parties competing in party systems characterised by bipolar opposition, then this represents a clear disadvantage for the radical right, as did their socio-cultural distance to the formateur. These two factors, in conjunction with socio-economic distance and/or low levels of fragmentation, explain the exclusion of Ataka in 2013 and the SNS in 2010. In the Slovak case, the SNS' socio-cultural and socio-economic distance from the SDKÚ-DS is deeply intertwined with the parties' membership in antagonistic camps. Here, the combination of ~SAMESIDE, ~GALTANPROX, and ~LRECONPROX clearly reflects the ideological polarisation in the party system. In the Bulgarian case, where polarisation between oppositional camps is rather affective, the lack of socio-cultural proximity is not so closely related to the bipolar opposition. Hence, these two cases confirm the above conclusion that the nature of bipolar opposition affects its relation to ideological proximity and, thus, its impact on government formation. If ~SAMESIDE refers to the absence of a bipolar opposition in

the party system, then this condition does not constrain government formation, as has been illustrated in the Romanian cases. In such situations, socio-cultural distance between radical right parties and the formateur played the most pivotal role in preventing the radical right from entering government.

The second variation of explanatory patterns within these two solution paths concerns the presence of a *cordon sanitaire*, which existed in all cases except the Polish ones. In Romania the emergence of the *cordon sanitaire* was facilitated by the erosion of the regime divide, enabling the Communist successor party, PDSR, to form coalitions with parties of the former opposition and to distance itself from the radical right. Hence, the absence of a bipolar opposition in the party system had an impact on the exclusion of the radical right from government, even though it did not constrain government formation to coalitions within the same camp.

The third solution path (LRECONPROX\*~SEATS\*FRAG\*~SAMESIDE) is quite different from the previous two. The GALTANPROX condition is absent from this path, but with the presence of socio-economic proximity, it includes an ideological condition that, individually, should favour government participation. The two numerical factors refer to small radical right parties (~SEATS) in fragmented party systems (FRAG). ~SAMESIDE here refers exclusively to the absence of bipolar opposition in the party system.

The Bulgarian Ataka was only a few months old when entering parliament in 2005. By the mid-2000s, the regime divide that had characterised the Bulgarian party system in the first post-Communist decade had already eroded substantially and no longer constrained coalition formation (~SAMESIDE). The absence of antagonistic camps enabled the victorious Communist successor party, BSP, to form an oversized coalition with the other two major parties in parliament, the NDSV founded by the former Tsar, Simeon II Saksokoburggotski, and the DPS. All partners in this oversized coalition shared the primary objective of passing the votes required to conclude Bulgaria's accession to the EU with a broad majority (Karasimeonov 2010). Ataka held only a small seat share (8.6 per cent, ~SEATS) in the fragmented Bulgarian parliament (4.8 effective parliamentary parties, FRAG), which made the party unattractive to a formateur that sought broad political majorities and could draw on larger parties. Hence, Ataka's small seat share and the absence of the bipolar opposition in a fragmented party system prevented the party's inclusion in government.<sup>8</sup> Even Ataka's socio-economic proximity to the BSP (LRECONPROX) could not compensate for this disadvantage.

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8 Ataka's anti-minority and Eurosceptic positions were rather unfavourable for the party's participation in government (Spirova 2006; Marinov 2008; Avramov 2015). Due to the logical minimisation, however, the lack of socio-cultural proximity to the formateur (~GALTANPROX) is not found in the solution path.

The second case covered by this solution path deals with the formation of the 2016 government in Estonia and the radical right EKRE. Here, a government re-formation took place after the previous government, formed a year earlier by the neoliberal ER, the national-conservative Isamaa and the social democratic SDE, fell. More precisely, the incumbent prime minister party, ER, was replaced by its main competitor, the EK while both junior partners remained in power (Mölder 2017). This replacement illustrates that bipolar opposition did not constrain government formation to parties from two opposite camps in Estonia (~SAMESIDE). The EK and EKRE shared similar, centre-left, socio-economic positions (LRECONPROX), but they were not natural allies because EK is the main representative of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonian party politics, whereas enmity towards the Russian minority is one of EKRE's main ideological features. EKRE's small seat share (~SEATS) created another disadvantage. The radical right party was the smallest in parliament and held such a small number of seats that the EK would have needed two additional parties to form a majority with it. In a fragmented party system, such as the Estonian one in 2016 (FRAG), a small seat share does not exclude radical right parties from government per se. What does, however, is the aforementioned cordon sanitaire against EKRE that was still in place one year after the party's electoral breakthrough.

The last two cases covered by this solution path concern the government formations following Marian Kotleba's electoral breakthrough on the national level in the 2016 Slovak parliamentary elections. Of the two radical right parties elected into parliament in 2016, the SNS entered government and Kotleba's LSNS remained in opposition. As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the 2016 Slovak parliamentary elections resulted in a very fragmented parliament (5.7 effective parties, FRAG) which created a complex bargaining situation. Ultimately, Fico's Smer managed to form an ideologically heterogeneous four-party coalition with the SNS, Most-Híd and Siet'. Shortly thereafter, however, the Siet' faction collapsed, which left the remaining three-party coalition with a somewhat smaller ideological range, particularly on the socio-economic dimension. Kotleba's LSNS was close to both Smer and the SNS in socio-economic (LRECONPROX) and socio-cultural terms. Despite the LSNS' small seat share (~SEATS), these three parties could have formed an ideologically homogeneous minimal winning coalition. Under these favourable circumstances, the cordon sanitaire against the LSNS' was the main obstacle for its participation in government.

The third solution path also contains different explanations for the exclusion of radical right parties from government. Ataka remained in opposition due to its small seat share (~SEATS) in a fragmented party system (FRAG) that was not constrained by bipolar opposition (~SAMESIDE) and, thus, left the formateur with better alternatives. EKRE and the LSNS, in contrast, did not enter government because of a cordon sanitaire. While the explanation of the Bulgarian case differs significantly

from the patterns identified in connection with the first two solution paths, the importance of the cordon sanitaire in the Slovak and Estonian cases resembles the explanation for Úsvit's and the PRM's exclusion from government. All these cases are characterised by the absence of bipolar opposition in the party system and the existence of a cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis the radical right.

#### Paths 4 – 5: In the same camp but not in government

Solution paths 4 and 5 describe situations in which radical right parties are in the same camp as the formateur in a party system characterised by bipolar opposition (SAMESIDE). The following discussion of these solution paths examines which factors prevent them from entering government despite this theoretically favourable condition. The fourth solution path ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX\* $\sim$ GALTANPROX\* $\sim$ SEATS\*FRAG\*SAMESIDE) covers Ataka's exclusion from the 2014 and 2016 governments, which included its radical right competitor, PF. GERB won the early elections in 2014 and formed a three-party minority coalition that was supported by the PF. In an attempt to distance itself from its former ally, GERB, Ataka adopted slightly more radical positions, which is reflected in an increase in the ideological distance between Ataka and GERB on the GALTAN dimension. Hence, in 2014 and 2016, both parties were neither socio-culturally ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX) nor socio-economically ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX) proximate to one another despite being members of the same camp (SAMESIDE). The Bulgarian party system was highly fragmented after the 2014 elections (FRAG), leaving GERB with a choice of several junior partners in the conservative camp, including the radical right parties, Ataka and PF. The PF was the more obvious choice for two reasons: First, it was slightly more moderate than Ataka and, second, Ataka controlled less than five per cent of the seats in parliament ( $\sim$ SEATS). In 2014, the GERB-led minority coalition was only two seats short of a majority. Here, Ataka's contribution would have been sufficient for a majority, but when parts of the Reformist Bloc and the ABV left the coalition in 2016, Ataka could not compensate for their votes, even if GERB had considered cooperating with it.

The fifth and final solution path (LRECON\* $\sim$ SEATS\* $\sim$ FRAG\*SAMESIDE) also covers two cases uniquely. The Latvian parliamentary elections in 2010 were the only time when the radical right NA entered parliament but remained in opposition. The NA's ideological position in 2010 was not different than in the following years when the party was included in government. The party was socio-economically close to Unity, the formateur of the 2010 government (LRECONPROX), and positioned on the same side of the bipolar opposition in the party system, which was mainly based on the ethno-linguistic divide (SAMESIDE). This formation of government differed markedly from later ones in the decade with regard to the two numerical factors. After the 2010 elections, the fragmentation of the party system was fairly low by Latvian standards, with only 3.9 effective parliamentary parties ( $\sim$ FRAG). Moreover, in its electoral breakthrough, the NA received only eight of the 100 seats in the Saeima

and was thus one of the smallest parliamentary groups (~SEATS). Nevertheless, the formateur and future prime minister, Valdis Dombrovskis, considered an oversized coalition that included the NA as an additional partner. Yet, one of the constituent parties of the Unity alliance ultimately vetoed this coalition because it viewed the NA's nativist positions as too radical (Auers 2011). Due to the NA's electoral weakness, Unity and ZZS were still able to form a majority government without the radical right in 2010. In the following years, the NA improved its electoral results, thus making it more difficult for the other parties in the ethnic Latvian camp to form majorities without it. Only then did the other parties come to accept the NA as a viable coalition partner, even though its participation led to significantly more heterogeneous coalitions on the socio-cultural dimension.

Following the 1998 Hungarian parliamentary elections, ideological factors clearly favoured including the radical right MIÉP in government. The party was not only on the same side of the bipolar opposition in the Hungarian party system as the formateur, Fidesz (SAMESIDE), but it was also close to that party in socio-economic (LRECONPROX) and socio-cultural terms. However, MIÉP's parliamentary group was the smallest in the relatively compact Hungarian parliament (~SEATS and ~FRAG). Compared to the other parties in the national-conservative camp, MIÉP was thus in a weak position, as it could contribute very little to a parliamentary majority. Similar to the Latvian case, Fidesz and the other parties from that camp could comfortably reach a majority without the radical right party. When taking into consideration, however, that Viktor Orbán ultimately decided to form an oversized coalition, the ideological factors come back into play. In the national-conservative camp, MIÉP was without a doubt the most radical party. Given the comfortable majority of this camp, it is not surprising that Orbán decided to limit even an oversized coalition to his more moderate allies, excluding the most radical party from government.

Even though solution paths 4 and 5 differ in some details, they point to a similar explanatory pattern. In all four cases covered by these paths, the radical right parties were not large enough to make a decisive contribution to the majority of their camp. As their camp had a majority even without the radical right, the formateurs preferred to form governments with the more moderate, ideologically proximate parties. Thus, in the cases examined here, the radical right parties were ultimately too small and too radical to enter government.

## Summary

The analysis of the negative outcome demonstrates that the explanations for the exclusion of radical right parties from government are quite diverse. It is possible, nonetheless, to identify some more general explanatory patterns. First, the presence or absence of bipolar opposition in the party system was critical for distinguishing between broader explanatory patterns. If bipolar opposition existed and

radical right parties were not on the same side as the *formateur*, then they were not included in government. In the observed cases, this constellation was further reinforced by the ideological distance between the radical right and the *formateur*, in particular on the socio-cultural dimension. Sometimes, however, radical right parties were even excluded from government if they were on the same side as the *formateur*. This occurred primarily when the parliamentary seats of the radical right party were not required to establish a majority. In this case, *formateurs* preferred to form governments with ideologically more moderate parties from their camp.

If there was no bipolar opposition in the party system, radical right parties were excluded from government when they faced a *cordon sanitaire* regardless of whether or not other favourable conditions existed. If neither a *cordon sanitaire* nor bipolar opposition existed in the party system, the lack of socio-cultural proximity to the *formateur* was the main reason that prevented radical right parties from entering government, partly aided by their small seat share in a compact party system.

### 9.3 Explaining the contradictory configuration

The last part of the empirical analysis investigates the contradictory configuration (LRECONPROX\*~GALTANPROX\*SEATS\*FRAG\*~SAMESIDE) that covers the Estonian EKRE in 2019 and the Czech SPD in 2017. Both parties controlled a large seat share in parliament and they were socio-economically, but not socio-culturally, proximate to the *formateur*. In both cases, government formation took place in a fragmented party system that featured no bipolar opposition. The two cases are also similar with regard to the existence of a *cordon sanitaire*, because they mark the point when a previously existing *cordon sanitaire* in the country fully eroded. The following comparative case studies explore why, despite the same configuration of the explanatory conditions, EKRE entered government but the SPD did not. The analysis approaches this question from two different perspectives: Can qualitative differences in the explanatory factors used in this study account for the different outcomes, or are additional factors that are not included in the analytical model needed?

In the 2019 Estonian parliamentary elections, only five parties entered parliament. The fragmentation of the party system was at 4.2 effective parliamentary parties (FRAG) because the parties' seat shares were relatively evenly distributed. EKRE showed strongly, winning 18.8 per cent of the seats (SEATS). Most observers expected either a grand coalition between the victorious ER and the second place EK, or a three-party coalition consisting of the ER, SDE, and the national-conservative Isamaa. EKRE's inclusion in government seemed unlikely, because ER and SDE categorically ruled out any cooperation with the radical right (Rankin 2019; Hartleb 2019). The possibility of a grand coalition illustrates that there was

no bipolar opposition constraining the formation of the 2019 Estonian government (~SAMESIDE). However, incumbent EK prime minister, Jüri Ratas, desperately clinging to power, rejected an offer to become the grand coalition's junior partner. Instead, he began unofficial coalition negotiations with Isamaa and EKRE, while ER leader, Kaja Kallas, was still officially tasked with government formation by the head of state. Ratas' negotiations with EKRE sparked criticism from his political competitors and large parts of the Estonian public. Moreover, they also caused massive tensions within his own party. Several party members strongly opposed cooperation with the radical right and one prominent figure even left the party when the coalition agreement was concluded (Vahtla 2019). The prospect of cooperating with the radical right EKRE was particularly difficult for some EK members, such as Yana Toom, who also served as the spokesperson for the Russian-speaking minority (Ehin and Talving 2019).

Apart from the important ethno-linguistic divide, however, the positions of EKRE and EK overlapped in several respects, both on the socio-economic (LRE-CONPROX) and the socio-cultural dimensions. The government coalition including the EK, EKRE, and Isamaa has been justifiably characterised as a conservative coalition (Walker 2019; Mölder 2020, 119). All three parties are clearly located on the TAN end of the socio-cultural dimension, although EKRE and EK are still separated by almost three points and are therefore not considered socio-culturally proximate to one another according to the standards used in this study (~GALTANPROX). Below this level, however, the socio-economic and socio-cultural connectedness of their coalition indicates a certain ideological proximity between the three parties. Indeed, on the socio-cultural dimension, this government was a minimal range coalition.

In the Czech Republic, the party system has been in flux since the beginning of the 2010s. The bipolar opposition between the conservative ODS and the social democratic ČSSD that shaped Czech politics in the 2000s had vanished (~SAME-SIDE). Both parties continuously lost at the polls and this made way for various new parties in parliament (Balík and Hloušek 2016; Mansfeldová and Lacina 2019). Many of these newcomers were populist anti-establishment parties, including the winner of the 2017 parliamentary election, Andrej Babiš' ANO. The radical right SPD—Tamio Okamura's second attempt to gain a foothold in Czech politics—also belonged to this category.

The Czech party system comprised 4.8 effective parliamentary parties and was thus highly fragmented after the 2017 elections (FRAG). In fact, a total of nine parties entered parliament but, with the exception of ANO, none of them controlled more than 12.5 per cent of the seats. Winning 11 per cent of the seats, the radical right SPD was among the strongest of these small parties (SEATS). Due to various accusations of corruption against Babiš, several parties had already ruled out a coalition with ANO during the election campaign (Kudrnáč and Petrušek 2018). Since

the SPD was not among them, Babiš and Okamura held exploratory talks, which marked the end of the *cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis* radical right parties that had existed since the fall of Communism (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 158).<sup>9</sup> The socio-economic platforms of both ANO and the SPD were rather vague but centrist (LRECONPROX). Babiš kept a low profile on the socio-cultural dimension as well. He limited his programmatic appeal to the populist anti-establishment claim that he would run the state like a firm (Buštíková and Guasti 2019; Hanley and Vachudova 2018; Kudrnáč and Petrušek 2018). Okamura and the SPD, in contrast, fully embraced their anti-Roma and anti-immigration agenda (~GALTANPROX). Apparently, though, the shared socio-economic positions and anti-establishment appeals did not provide sufficient common ground for the parties to cooperate. Instead, after failing to form a single-party minority government, Babiš ultimately forged a minority coalition with the ČSSD, which had also ruled out cooperation with ANO initially. The coalition of ANO and ČSSD that assumed office in 2018 did not control a majority in parliament, but it was supported by the Communist successor party, KSČM, which had been, until then, considered a pariah in Czech politics (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 159–61). Without the KSČM, the minority coalition was ideologically relatively homogeneous. When including the support party, however, the ideological range increases significantly and would not have been much different if the parties had opted for the radical right SPD instead.

Both cases are very similar with regard to ideological proximity. The EK and EKRE were slightly closer to each other on the GALTAN dimension than ANO and the SPD, but EK and EKRE disagreed on the ethnic divide. This divide was not as deep in Estonia as it was in neighbouring Latvia, but it was still an essential socio-cultural issue in country. Both EKRE and the EK as well as ANO and the SPD also shared centre-left socio-economic positions, even though they were much vaguer in the case of the two Czech parties. Moreover, despite the absence of bipolar opposition in the party system, there were constraints on coalition formation in both countries, because some parties ruled out cooperation with specific competitors during the respective campaigns.

Greater differences can be found in the numerical factors. Even though fragmentation lay above the threshold of 4.0, which marks the distinction between complex and rather straightforward bargaining situations (see Chapter 7), the Czech party system in 2017 was certainly more fragmented than the Estonian one in 2019. This difference is best illustrated when comparing the actual number of parliamentary parties. The Estonian parliament consisted of 4.2 effective and five actual parties, the Czech parliament of 4.8 and nine, respectively. The seat shares of the two

9 The erosion of the *cordon sanitaire* had already begun earlier when the SPD was included in several governments at the local level following the 2016 regional elections (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 158).

radical right parties showed a similar gradual difference. Both parties were relatively successful at the polls, but EKRE secured 18.8 per cent of the seats in parliament and was, thus, clearly stronger than the SPD, which barely achieved a double-digit result. Hence, from a purely numerical perspective, EKRE's bargaining position was better than the SPD's. The five Estonian parties that entered the Riigikogu in 2017 could form only five minimal winning coalitions, three of them including EKRE. In the highly fragmented Czech parliament, the SPD held enough seats to make a sizeable contribution to a majority, but the fragmentation was so high that more than 20 minimal winning coalitions could be formed, many of them without the radical right.

The cases also differ in the format and ideological range of the coalitions that were formed. The conservative coalition in Estonia was ideologically much more homogeneous than the minority government in the Czech Republic, particularly when including the support party. The format of these governments also corresponds to the dominant patterns in their respective countries. In the Czech Republic, the formation of minority governments is part of the country's political culture and was thus also a viable option for Andrej Babiš after the 2017 elections. In contrast, "the overwhelming preference of Estonian politicians has been to form minimal winning coalitions, and resort to minority cabinets only when absolutely necessary" (Pettai 2019, 185).

In Estonia, ER leader and official formateur, Kaja Kallas, never seriously considered the option of an ER-SDE minority government (Whyte 2019b). Hence, EKRE's strong bargaining position played an important role. Since ER and SDE had ruled out cooperation with EKRE, only two possible majority coalitions remained viable after the EK turned down the invitation to join the grand coalition—the conservative coalition of EK, EKRE, and Isamaa or an alliance of ER, SDE, and Isamaa. Thus, a pivotal role fell to Isamaa, as it was the only party represented in both coalitions. Isamaa had office- and policy-related reasons for choosing the conservative coalition with the EK and EKRE. As a national-conservative party, it was socio-culturally close to EKRE and had previously expressed a preference for a right-wing government. Moreover, the EK offered Isamaa five of the 15 available ministries despite having a seat share of only 12 per cent, reflecting the party's pivotal position (Whyte 2019a; Mölder 2020). Hence, Isamaa also had a strong incentive to join the conservative coalition from an office-seeking perspective.

In the Czech Republic, the ideological preferences of the junior partner, ČSSD, did not play such a vital role, since the parties did not necessarily require another formal coalition partner, given that they had the option of forming a minority government. Yet, if the ČSSD had had a say in the choice of another junior partner, or the support party, it is unlikely that it would have opted for the SPD, since both parties held quite different socio-cultural positions (see Chapter 5.1).

In sum, gradual differences within the explanatory factors included in this study's analytical model and an additional factor, the ideological preference of the junior partner, explain why EKRE entered government and the SPD remained in opposition. EKRE's larger seat share, and the lower fragmentation of the Estonian party system, put the party in a more favourable bargaining position than the Czech SPD. Ultimately, however, the more decisive factor was the preference of the other junior partner, aided by the political culture of government formation, in the respective country.

## 9.4 Summary

The analysis of government formation after the first third-generation elections demonstrates that none of the conditions, or their negations, was singularly necessary, or sufficient, for either radical right parties' inclusion in or exclusion from government. The explanatory patterns of government formation clearly became more diverse in the consolidating decades, and the findings in this period confirm some of the hypotheses and results from the previous analysis, but they also illustrate the need for qualifications and revisions in several respects.

With regard to the two numerical factors—the seat share of radical right parties in parliament and the level of party system fragmentation—the results support the hypothesis that small radical right parties should not enter government in compact party systems (Hypothesis 1a). Ataka's government participation in 2009 shows, however, that even this configuration does not always prevent radical right parties from government participation. If a formateur comes very close to a majority in parliament and considers the radical right a viable coalition partner, even a small seat share can be sufficient for entering government. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, however, it was not predominantly large radical right parties in compact party systems that entered government in the consolidating decades. Radical right parties with large (and even small) seat shares in fragmented party systems were included in government much more frequently. Hence, Hypothesis 1c has not been confirmed.

These results underline that the fragmentation of Central and Eastern European party systems is decreasing, but rather slowly and not consistently across all of the countries in the region. In some states, fragmentation remains above the threshold of four effective parliamentary parties consistently (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2018; Casal Bértoa 2021). When fragmentation is high, bargaining situations are more complex and majority governments usually require at least three parties. Hence, even parties with a low seat share, including radical right ones, have a chance to be considered junior coalition members or support parties for a minority government in fragmented party systems. Radical right parties with a large seat share, however, are in a stronger position still. Thus, a large seat share gives radical right parties an

advantage in government formation, but moderate election results do not necessarily create a decisive disadvantage if party systems are highly fragmented.

With regard to the ideological factors, the analysis largely confirms that the radical right must be socio-culturally close to the formateur and/or on the same side of a bipolar opposition in the party system to enter government during the consolidating decades (Hypothesis 2b). The only outlier was EKRE's participation in 2019 Estonian government. Beyond this confirmation, however, the analysis points to various qualifications of the hypothesis. In the absence of a bipolar divide, for instance, socio-cultural proximity alone was not sufficient for radical right parties to enter government. They also needed to be socio-economically close to the formateur and to control a large seat share in parliament. If bipolar opposition in the party system existed, then the explanatory patterns for government participation differed mainly with regard to the nature of that opposition. If the opposition was based on affective polarisation, the radical right party needed to be in the same camp and hold similar GALTAN positions as the formateur in order to enter government. If the bipolar opposition was result of a socio-cultural divide, as was the case in Latvia, the ideological proximity on the GALTAN dimension became less important. Instead, the government participation of the radical right was aided by socio-economic proximity to the formateur and a high seat share in fragmented parliaments.

These findings highlight that radical right parties and formateurs must share fundamentally similar positions on socio-cultural issues in order to govern together during the consolidating decades. These positions may take the form of ideological proximity on the GALTAN dimension or a position on the same side of a socio-culturally rooted, bipolar opposition in the party system. Researchers refer to concepts that entail multiple expressions of one overarching phenomenon as "higher order concepts" (Schneider 2019; see also Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009). The SOCCUL condition captures the higher order concept related to parties' similar socio-cultural positions in a single set. This condition is present if GALTANPROX is present and/or SAME SIDE is present and based on ideological polarisation that originates from socio-cultural divides. An amended analysis of necessity shows that this SOCCUL condition is a non-trivial necessary condition for government participation in the consolidating decades and over the entire 30-year period covered by this study.<sup>10</sup> The case of EKRE in 2019, which does not fulfil either criterion, prevents the consistency score from reaching 1.00. Even here, however, all three members of the conservative coalition were on the same side of the GALTAN dimension. Thus, this outlier does not fully contradict the set relation of necessity.

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10 In the consolidating decades, this condition reaches a consistency of 0.93, a coverage of 0.78 and a RoN of 0.80. In the whole dataset, these parameters of fit are even higher (consistency: 0.96, coverage: 0.84, RoN: 0.85). For the calibration of this condition, see Appendix III.

Additionally, socio-economic proximity between the radical right and the formateur played a more prominent role in the explanations for their government participation than initially expected during this period. Particularly in party systems where socio-economic issues were highly salient, such as in Latvia or Slovakia, these were often included in the sufficient condition for government participation.

The explanations for the exclusion of radical right parties from government also depended on the presence or absence of bipolar opposition in the party system. In the absence of bipolar opposition, cordons sanitaires and radical right parties' socio-cultural distance to the formateur, sometimes further aided by a small seat share in parliament, explain why they remained in opposition. In fact, the qualitative case-based analysis revealed that the existence of a cordon sanitaire frequently prevented radical right parties from entering government, often under otherwise favourable conditions. Despite the widespread openness to radical right politics in the political mainstream of Central and Eastern Europe, radical right parties faced at least a temporary cordon sanitaire in no less than nine of the 19 cases in which they remained in opposition.

If bipolar opposition existed and radical right parties were not in the same camp as the formateur, which happened only twice, they were not included in government. In some instances, radical right parties were even excluded from government despite their favourable position in the formateur's camp. This was the case if they were too small and too radical or, in other words, if the more moderate parties in the camp controlled enough seats in parliament to form a majority government without the radical right. These results support the argument that parties prefer ideologically close coalition partners within their own camp (Grzymala-Busse 2001).

The final remarks in this chapter concern the hypotheses about the composition of governments with radical right parties. Hypothesis 3a posits that radical right parties should not be included in oversized coalitions, and this can be confirmed by the analysis. They were predominantly junior partners in minimal winning coalitions and, somewhat less frequently, support parties for minority governments. In Estonia and Slovakia, the junior partnership of radical right parties in minimal winning coalitions corresponds to the dominant format of government in these countries, as does the government participation of the radical right in Poland, where minority governments and minimal winning coalitions are the dominant types. In Bulgaria and Latvia, however, the format of governments with radical right parties deviates from the usual pattern. Minority governments were the most frequent type of governments with radical right parties in Bulgaria, but are otherwise rare in the country. In Latvia, the radical right was only involved in minimal winning coalitions, whereas minority governments and oversized coalitions have been more usual in general (Bergman, Ilonszki, and Müller 2019a).

The analysis of the ideological range of governments generates mixed results. Hypothesis 3b holds that radical right parties should be included in ideologically

homogeneous governments, particularly regarding the socio-cultural dimension. However, only the 2006 coalition with the LPR in Poland qualifies as a minimal range and minimal connected winning coalition on both ideological dimensions. The coalition with the radical right SNS that was formed in Slovakia in the same year was both socio-economically and socio-culturally connected, but it does not meet the criteria of the minimal range theory. The coalition that includes the SNS in 2016 is socio-economically connected, but only after the defection of Siet. In Latvia, the coalitions with the radical right NA are socio-economically, but not socio-culturally, homogeneous. The opposite is true for the 2019 Estonian government that includes the radical right EKRE, which is socio-culturally, but not socio-economically, connected. The governments with radical right parties in Bulgaria are heterogeneous, if the support parties are included. Even the two-party majority coalition of 2017, in which the Bulgarian radical right received cabinet posts for the first time, satisfies the criteria for neither a minimal range nor a minimal connected winning coalition. In light of these observations, Hypotheses 3b cannot be confirmed. Moreover, the question whether or not the ideological range of coalitions with radical right parties differs from the usual pattern in the respective country must also remain unanswered because there is no comparative data on the ideological range and connectedness of governments in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s, and it is beyond the scope of this study to generate such an extensive dataset.