

that could be described as the dark side of postcolonial worldmaking. These include, for example, Nkrumah's authoritarian measures at the height of the decolonisation wave, such as the imprisonment of political opponents, who positioned themselves against his call for Pan-Africanism. In fact, what Getachew calls "worldmaking" often has been portrayed by the Ewe and Togoland unificationists as a Nkrumah's continuation of "black imperialism,"¹⁷⁶ which is discussed here and elsewhere.¹⁷⁷

These research approaches unite the conceptual inclusion of different historical experiences, including colonial experiences so as to narrow the dividing line between North and South. According to Julian Go, in doing so, they unite the following insight: "[F]or it to be truly postcolonial, it must move beyond colonial knowledge structures entirely, hence it must strive to transcend the very opposition between Europe and the Rest, or the West and the Rest, which colonialism inscribed in our theories."¹⁷⁸ Postcolonial-inspired historical research must not stop at a mere description of the subject matter but must engage with its object on an analytical level. Therefore, this present thesis endeavours to undertake a theory-driven analysis.

2.1.7 Postcolonial Security Studies

International Relations has been criticised for being overly ahistorical, especially from post- and decolonial scholars.¹⁷⁹ Much of this criticism draws from Dipesh Chakrabarty, who first claimed that the very idea of historicization, which invokes 'disenchanted spaces,' 'secular time' or 'sovereignty,' implies fundamentally Eurocentric assumptions that Europe is the principal subject of world history and therefore needs to be provincialized.¹⁸⁰ More recently, Meera Sabaratnam contended that International Relations "has been trying to transcend its imperial, colonial and racist roots,"¹⁸¹ yet she noted that it fails to do so since it is "constructed around the exclusionary premise of an imagined Western subject of world politics."¹⁸² Therefore, Sabaratnam champions "to challenge the exceptionalist presumption of the West as the primary subject of modern world

176 TNA (London), CO 554/667, *Togoland Administration*, 1953, W.A.C. Mathieson to British UN delegation.

177 Kate Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: Literacy, Politics and Nationalism, 1914–2014*, African Studies 132 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 168–207.

178 Julian Go, "Introduction," in *Postcolonial sociology*, ed. Julian Go, 1st ed., Political power and social theory (Bingley: Emerald, 2013), p. 9.

179 Shilliam, *International relations and non-Western thought*; Gruffydd Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations*; John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); John M. Hobson, "Unmasking the Racism of Orthodox International Relations/International Political Economy Theory," *Security Dialogue* 53, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106211061084>; Gurminder K. Bhambra et al., "Why Is Mainstream International Relations Blind to Racism?," *Foreign Policy*, 03 July 2020.

180 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

181 Sabaratnam, *Decolonising intervention*, p. 4.

182 Sabaratnam, "IR in Dialogue ... but Can We Change the Subjects?," p. 785.

history and international relations.”¹⁸³ Barry Buzan tried to address such objections.¹⁸⁴ Yet, Buzan’s continued use of problematic terms such as “Third World” and thoughts on the “conflictual anarchy of the non-West”¹⁸⁵ continue to be emblematic for the discipline at large.

Regarding International Relation’s subfield at hand, that is, Critical Security Studies, Pinar Bilgin criticised that “‘historical absence’ from security studies of non-Western insecurities and approaches has been a ‘constitutive practice’ that has shaped (and continues to shape) both the discipline and subjects and objects of security in different parts of the world.”¹⁸⁶ Jana Hönke and Markus Müller pose that Critical Security Studies generally suffers from a West-centrism, that is, it has “arguably limited empirical and political relevance for major parts of the non-western world.”¹⁸⁷ Amidst these critiques, Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey demanded a departure towards a “non-eurocentric security studies.”¹⁸⁸ Since the answer to the debate about *what* or rather *who* constitutes security ultimately determines which actors receive analytical attention, they find that an erasure of agency has been untenably ignored. Therefore, Claudia Aradau finds that Critical Security Studies consequently “hid more than helped us to see.”¹⁸⁹ Ironically, the demand for a non-eurocentric Critical Security Studies has been much more vocal than its actual development. To this date, there are only few works addressing the *postcolonial moment* within security studies,¹⁹⁰ making analytical use of postcolonial theories or adopting a non-western historical perspective on security.

In the 1990s, as a rebuttal to the Aberystwyth School’s conflation of security and emancipation, Mohammed Ayoob promoted the idea of “subaltern realism,” which in the maelstrom of the failed states debate considered that the states of the so-called ‘Third World’ were weak states and therefore had necessarily security needs that differed from countries in the ‘developed’ world. But while the ‘realism’ part was based on Ayoob’s assumption that the state still plays a central role in security issues, Ayoob himself admits that the ‘subaltern’ part of his proposition had little to do with the Subaltern Studies Collective,¹⁹¹ which had formed a decade prior using post-colonial theory to study ‘history from below.’

183 Sabaratnam, “IR in Dialogue ... but Can We Change the Subjects?,” pp. 785–86.

184 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (2007), <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcm012>.

185 Acharya and Buzan, “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?,” p. 288.

186 Pinar Bilgin, “The ‘Western-Centrism’ of Security Studies,” *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 6 (2010): 615, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610388208>.

187 Jana Hönke and Markus-Michael Müller, “Governing (In)Security in a Postcolonial World,” *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 5 (2012): 384, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010612458337>.

188 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 02 (2006): 330, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210506007054>.

189 Claudia Aradau, “From Securitization Theory to Critical Approaches to (In)Security,” *European Journal of International Security* 3, no. 3 (2018): 300, <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2018.14>.

190 Barkawi and Laffey, “The postcolonial moment in security studies.”

191 Ayoob, “Defining Security,” p. 141.

This necessary step was undertaken by Julian Go through the idea of the *imperial and subaltern standpoint*,¹⁹² arguing that there is no global absolute sense of security, rather the sense of security is always relational and dependent on one's point of view. Drawing on Judith Ann Tickner's feminist standpoint theory,¹⁹³ which takes feminists' perspectives and experiences in global politics as a basis for theorising global security relations, Julian Go's subaltern standpoint theory reveals how security constructions affect actors of different positionality, especially marginalised groups.

Jana Hönke and Markus-Michael Müller, who focus on contemporary examples of policing worldwide,¹⁹⁴ argue that "taking historical sociology seriously is indispensable for a postcolonial security studies research programme."¹⁹⁵ As a possible approach they propose to recentre the „entangled histories of (in)security governance."¹⁹⁶ One such example is Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey proposition of a historicized reading of what they call the "Imperial Peace," highlighting that zones of war and peace have a mutually constitutive character.¹⁹⁷ A similar take is Connor Woodman's study of the "colonial boomerang effect,"¹⁹⁸ which argues that colonies were a fundamental "laboratories of modernity,"¹⁹⁹ particularly when it comes to such security and surveillance practices, which were primarily developed to manage subject populations. Woodman argues that much of what earlier scholarship understood as endogenously Western derives from practices invented in the colonies. This boomerang effect had considerable impact "on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself."²⁰⁰ Hönke and Müller therefore conclude that the evolution of colonial security/police practices was not a unidirectional processes in which "seemingly all-powerful 'Western' actors and interests simply impose their will and 'domestic' institutions upon 'the rest'."²⁰¹ Instead, the emergence of modern police forces in Europe was in part a result of an entangled 'cross-fertilization' of metropolitan

192 On the imperial standpoint see Go, "Introduction"; on the subaltern standpoint see Julian Go, *Post-colonial thought and social theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

193 Judith Ann Tickner, *Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security*, New directions in world politics (New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1992).

194 Jana Hönke and Markus-Michael Müller, eds., *The global making of policing: Postcolonial perspectives*, Interventions (London, New York: Routledge, 2016).

195 Hönke and Müller, "Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world," p. 390.

196 Hönke and Müller, "Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world," p. 391.

197 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, "The Imperial Peace," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 4 (1999), <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005004001>.

198 Connor Woodman, "How British Police and Intelligence Are a Product of the Imperial Boomerang Effect," accessed 25 May 2021, available from <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4390-how-british-police-and-intelligence-are-a-product-of-the-imperial-boomerang-effect>.

199 Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, eds., *Tensions of empire: Colonial cultures in a bourgeois world* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1997), p. 5.

200 Michel Foucault, *Society must be defended: lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, Lectures at the Collège de France 3 (New York: Picador, 2003), p. 103.

201 Hönke and Müller, "Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world," p. 388.

and colonial police forces. Thus, practices developed and refined in the colonies were not merely applied during late colonialism but ultimately travelled back to the metropole.²⁰² With thematically very heterogeneous contributions, Ruby et al. strive through a diverse array of theoretical references for a historical consideration of security in connection with (intersectional) categories of difference.²⁰³

Postcolonialism & Securitisation

The Copenhagen School has been subject of postcolonial critique, too. Lene Hansen first highlighted its inbuilt silence problem,²⁰⁴ which Ken Booth took as an opportunity to critique that “Those without discourse making power are disenfranchised and therefore unable to join the securitization game.”²⁰⁵ Since then a whole series critics (post- and decolonial ones in particular) claimed that that Copenhagen School struggles to outgrow its reliance on Western conceptualizations of normal politics,²⁰⁶ epistemically underrepresents non-white/western experiences, is politically passive,²⁰⁷ conservative, statist, elite- and Eurocentric, and neither progressive nor radical.²⁰⁸ Vuori applies securitisation to non-democratic/non-Western contexts and argues that even autocratic regimes, such as in China, need to resort to continuous securitisation in order to legitimise themselves, thereby arguing that the Copenhagen School on normal politics is too narrow.²⁰⁹ Looking at the Egyptian revolution in the context of the Arab spring, Ole Wæver himself admits this, by noting that such an exceptional context challenges the ‘theory’ due to its possible Western bias.²¹⁰ Wæver suggested a link between (macro-)securitisation and colonial metanarratives of Western modernity. Similarly, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver point to this connection in a discussion of the War on Terror, which brings “the history

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- 202 Yael Berda, “Managing Dangerous Populations,” *Sociological Form* 28, no. 3 (2013): 628, available from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43653901>.
- 203 Sigrid Ruby and Anja Krause, eds., *Sicherheit und Differenz in historischer Perspektive*, 1st edition, *Politiken der Sicherheit* 10 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2022).
- 204 Lene Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” *Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000).
- 205 Ken Booth, *Theory of world security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 166.
- 206 C.A.S.E. Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe,” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 4 (2006): 455, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606073085>; Martin Holbraad and Morten A. Pedersen, “Revolutionary Securitization: An Anthropological Extension of Securitization Theory,” *International Theory* 4, no. 2 (2012), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971912000061>.
- 207 Bertrand, “Can the subaltern securitize?,” Booth, *Theory of world security*; Bilgin, “The ‘Western-Centrism’ of Security Studies”; Pinar Bilgin, “The Politics of Studying Securitization?,” *Security Dialogue* 42, 4–5 (2011), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611417811>; Claire Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan,” *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (2007), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010607075964>; David Moffette and Shaira Vadasaria, “Uninhibited Violence,” *Critical Studies on Security* 4, no. 3 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2016.1256365>; Saloni Kapur and Simon Mabon, “The Copenhagen School Goes Global,” *Global Discourse* 8, no. 1 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2018.1424686>.
- 208 Booth, *Theory of world security*, pp. 163–69.
- 209 Juha A. Vuori, *How to do security with words: A grammar of securitisation in the People’s Republic of China*, Turun yliopiston julkaisu. Sarja B, Humaniora 336 (Turku: University of Turku, 2011).
- 210 Maja T. Greenwood and Ole Wæver, “Copenhagen–Cairo on a Roundtrip: A Security Theory Meets the Revolution,” *Security Dialogue* 44, 5–6 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010613502573>.

of macrosecuritisation full circle, with the Manichean, zero-sum, rhetoric of the [global War on Terror] resurrecting the civilised vs. barbarian themes of both pre-modern and colonial times.”²¹¹

In 2018, this prompted a Special Issue bringing together the application of securitisation in multiple non-Western contexts.²¹² In it, Edwin Ezeokafor and Christian Kaunert argue that the audience within the securitisation framework, especially in the context outside the West is undertheorized.²¹³ Conceptualizing a securitisation-neo-patrimonialism nexus in Africa, Ezeokafor and Kaunert attempt to make the securitisation framework fruitful for the African context, however, by stating that “patrimonialism in Africa has been practiced in an extreme form, thereby undermining the benefits of the system” they also can’t pull it off without a relapse into the discourse that draws on the shortcomings of the continent.²¹⁴

Sarah Bertrand took the critique of securitisation’s under-theorisation of the audience as an impetus to subject it to a postcolonial reading, shifting the focus from the muteness of the speaker to the power of the audience to silence and exclude.²¹⁵ By combining Fanonian decolonial theory of emancipatory violence with securitisation, Akinbode Fasakin argues that the subaltern is indeed able to securitise, when resorting to protest and violence.²¹⁶ In his conceptualisation of subaltern securitisation, Fasakin is careful not to conflate Fanon’s idea of emancipatory and cathartic violence with Ken Booth’s emancipatory concept of security. Unlike Maria Ketzmerick, who considers the Aberystwyth School connectable to postcolonial theories and the empirical object of decolonisation.²¹⁷ Ketzmerick strives to make the connection between securitisation and postcolonial theories fruitful, for example, by understanding the securitisation audience in terms of Homi Bhabha’s third space.²¹⁸

In 2020, Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit fundamentally accused ‘Securitization Theory’ of a general “civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and anti-black racism.”²¹⁹ Howell and Richter-Montpetit critiqued that when securitisation scholars draw on historical instances of speech acts, they omit instances of colonial nature and therefore consider that “Securitization theory *refuses* to seriously consider the role of

211 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations,” *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 02 (2009): 272.

212 Kapur and Mabon, “The Copenhagen School goes global.”

213 S. Leonard and Christian Kaunert, “Reconceptualising the Audience in Securitization Theory,” in *How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. Thierry Balzacq (London: Routledge, 2011); Edwin Ezeokafor and Christian Kaunert, “Securitization Outside of the West,” *Global Discourse* 8, no. 1 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2017.1412619>.

214 Ezeokafor and Kaunert, “Securitization outside of the West,” p. 90.

215 Bertrand, “Can the subaltern securitize?”

216 Akinbode Fasakin, *Subaltern Securitization: The Use of Protest and Violence in Postcolonial Nigeria*, Stockholm Studies in International Relations 2 (Stockholm: Department of Economic History and International Relations, Stockholm University, 2022).

217 Ketzmerick, *Staat, Sicherheit und Gewalt in Kamerun*, p. 70.

218 Ketzmerick, *Staat, Sicherheit und Gewalt in Kamerun*, p. 160.

219 Dan Nexon and Patrick T. Jackson, writers, “It Isn’t Just About Wæver and Buzan,” aired May 27, 2020, available from <https://www.duckofminerva.com/2020/05/it-isnt-just-about-waever-and-buzan.html>.

modern colonialism and ongoing imperial warfare in ‘failed states.’”²²⁰ Coinciding with the heights of the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests, this controversy found much resonance. A special issue of *Security Dialogue* addressed the debate with contributions on the role of race and white privilege in International Relations and humanitarianism as a Eurocentric practice.²²¹

Whilst these interventions do not necessarily invalidate the Copenhagen Schools explanatory capacity, the controversy is a reminder to consider the broader historical context of relations between the Global North and the Global South and include those voices in our analysis that have been and still are marginalized. Eloquently put, Sabaratnam holds that “traditions of critical thinking in [International Relations] – broadly put, liberal, Marxist, Foucauldian and constructivist [...] can all contribute to project of global justice, without serious attention to the people in whose name justice is being pursued as political subjects and not *mute* objects, they are likely to remain constrained in their vision and analysis.”²²²

In her securitisation analysis of Cameroon’s decolonisation, Ketzmerick deliberately refrains from incorporating Hansen’s and Bertrand’s critique in her postcolonial reading of the Copenhagen School since she does not view the *Union Démocratique du Cameroun* (UPC) as a subaltern securitising actor because, so she reasons, the UPC cannot be considered a subaltern actor because it is capable of speaking.²²³ By attributing subaltern status to an actor merely based on their silence, and conversely defining them as mute due to their perceived subaltern position, she engages in a form of reasoning that is circular in nature. Put differently: If subalternity was defined only by the ability to speak, then the answer to Spivak’s “Can the subaltern speak?” would have been “No” by definition and not by her discursive interrogation of ‘sati.’ Yet, Ketzmerick sidesteps that Bertrand draws precisely from Spivak’s critique that an actor is silenced even though they raise their voice. Bertrand specifically pointed out that “one can be silent while screaming loudly.”²²⁴ On the one hand, one reason for this lies in Ketzmerick’s focus on the *grammar of security*, that is, a functions-focused analysis of securitisation. Although she avowedly seeks to include decolonisation through a contextual reading, the functions-focused analysis of securitisation moves becomes clear in that, like Meridith Terretta before her, she analyses the grievances expressed in the Cameroonian petitions in terms of what discourses they mobilise, what they say about the author and the addressee, but not how they were received. Behind this conceptual choice lies certainly the intention to emphasize the anti-colonial agency and the valorisation of her research’s protagonists, that is, the UPC and its most prominent spokesman, Ruben Um Nyobe. Yet, due to the theoretical reluctance to situate the UPC in a subaltern subject position, Ketzmerick sidesteps a theory-driven interrogation of the silencing effects within the Trusteeship System vis-à-vis the UPC and moves rather away from Julian Go’s *subaltern standpoint theory*, which

220 Howell and Richter-Montpetit, “Is securitization theory racist?,” 8.

221 “Forum on Race and Racism in Critical Security Studies,” *Security Dialogue* 52, 1S (2021).

222 Sabaratnam, *Decolonising intervention*, p. 8.

223 Ketzmerick, *Staat, Sicherheit und Gewalt in Kamerun*, p. 80.

224 Sarah Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern (In)Securitize?,” *European Journal of International Security* 3, no. 03 (2018): 308, <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2018.15>.

Ketzmerick avowedly endeavours to integrate into her post-colonially-informed securitisation perspective.

2.2 Trusteeship & (De)Colonisation

The idea of imperial tutelage, that is, viewing external rule as a form of ‘trusteeship’ in which (colonial) powers act as ‘trustee’ exercising political power for the ‘benefit’ of their subjects, has a long genealogy, written down in resolutions such as the Valladolid Dispute, the General Act of the Berlin Congo Conference, the League of Nations Covenant, and the United Nations Charter.²²⁵ The following literature review will illustrate that historically, the self-authorisation of (colonial) trusteeship was consistently legitimised by varying forms of security speech. In short, trusteeship and security speech have historically always been two sides of the same coin.

2.2.1 Origins of Trusteeship

Bain and Chowdhuri emphasise that the first colonial encounters were central to the emergence of the trusteeship principle.²²⁶ The earliest references date back to the 16th century Conquista and writings by the Spanish theologians Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomé de las Casas on the moral obligation of the Christian world to assume the role of a “trustee of civilization.”²²⁷ De Vitoria claimed that Native Americans were childlike, unfit of running their own affairs, and over whom it would therefore be perfectly lawful and proper for European Christians to exercise authority, but only as long as “everything is done *for the benefit and good of the barbarians, and not merely for the profit of the Spaniards*.”²²⁸ This doctrine was also at the heart of the Valladolid Dispute between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda over the question of whether Native Americans possessed a soul, which in consequence would have prohibited their enslavement. If they had no soul, so the reasoning went, they would be equal to animals and therefore their enslavement would be perfectly lawful. If, however, they had a soul, the Catholic Church would be obliged to the indigenous people to save them from purgatory.

However, according to Chowdhuri, Edmund Burke, the British conservative theorist and politician, can be credited as being the first to widely popularize the concept and to coin the phrase “sacred trust” in his famous speech in the House of Commons, on 15 February 1788, during the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of Bengal.²²⁹ Accusing Hastings of misconduct during his time in Calcutta, particularly

225 Wilde, *International territorial administration*, p. 326.

226 Bain, *Between anarchy and society*, pp. 15–16; Ramendra Nath Chowdhuri, *International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A Comparative Study* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1955), p. 13.

227 Chowdhuri, *International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems*, p. 13. Bain, “Saving failed states,” p. 189.

228 Emphasis in original, Francisco de Vitoria, “On the American Indians,” in *Political writings*, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, Cambridge texts in the history of political thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Vol. .

229 Chowdhuri, *International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems*, pp. 13–14.