
Notes

- 1 See Lima de Miranda and Snower (2020) and Gabriel (2020a).
- 2 See Madsbjerg (2017) and Russell (2019).
- 3 See also Nakajima (2021).
- 4 See also Gabriel (2018).
- 5 See Eshel (2019).
- 6 See Spivak (2007).
- 7 See e.g. Fricker (2007) and Kohn (2013).
- 8 See Ober (2010).
- 9 See e.g. Annas (1993).
- 10 See Zeuske (2018), as a paradigm for humanistic, value-driven scrutiny.
- 11 See Sen (1977).
- 12 See Dilthey (1992).
- 13 See Weber (1988).
- 14 See Habermas (2019a, 2019b, 2015).
- 15 Most recently see Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) and the impressive account of the humanities in Habermas (2019a, 2019b).
- 16 On this notion within the context of a theory of the humanities and social sciences see Gabriel (2020b).
- 17 See Bal (2002).
- 18 See Weber (1904).
- 19 See Weber (1918).
- 20 See Putnam (1981) and Putnam (2004).
- 21 Honneth (1995: 269).
- 22 See Daston and Galison (2007).
- 23 See Srinivasan (2019).
- 24 See Descola (2014) and Latour (2009).
- 25 See Kaup (2021) and Danowski and Viveiros de Castro (2016).
- 26 Such as the classic Chakrabarty (2007) and Spivak (1999).
- 27 See Forst (2020).

28	See Ophir (2005).
29	See the history of universalism in Zhao (2021).
30	See Ricœur (2008).
31	See Kennedy (2014).
32	See Kraut (2018).
33	See the new book series Reality and Hermeneutics (Gabriel et al. 2022). A paradigmatic work in this style is Jessica Riskin's <i>The Restless Clock</i> , which shows with great historical detail how the digital transformation rests on a theological prehistory of voiding the machine world and then the microbiological level from the idea of meaningful agency (Riskin 2016, see also Cobb 2020). This has in turn produced conditions of a machine age where human decision-making is obscured by complex automated processes to such an extent that specialists from the technological field are asking for a recoupling of economics, machine learning, and the humanities in order to create anthropogenic digital systems that promote our well-being, see Russell (2019).
34	See Eco (1990) and Gumbrecht (2004a).
35	See Scanlon (2000).
36	See Ricœur (1992) and Pelluchon (2021a).
37	See Shafer-Landau (2003), Railton (2003) Gabriel (2020a), and Scanlon (2014). The PhilPapers surveys consistently show that most professional philosophers (most recent survey: 56.4% versus 27.7% who endorse the opposite sort of view, moral anti-realism) accept or lean towards moral realism. https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl . Of course, this does not prove that they are right. However, we should neglect the fact that the discipline of metaethics is certainly not predominantly anti-realist, let alone relativist, nihilist, or sceptical about objective moral value, as many people outside of the field might expect.
38	See Pelluchon (2022).
39	On this concept see Forst and Günther (2021).
40	See Korsgaard (1996, 2008, 2009).
41	See Pelluchon (2020).
42	See Pelluchon (2019).
43	See Merleau-Ponty (1960, 1983) and Pelluchon (2021a).
44	See Merleau-Ponty (1960, 1983).

45	See Horkheimer (2013).
46	See Furet (2000).
47	See Lyotard (1984).
48	See Parfit (2011), Leiter (2010, 2013).
49	See Luhmann (2020).
50	See Beckert (2016) and Beckert and Bronk (2018).
51	See Stanley (2016).
52	See Gabriel (2018, 2020b).
53	See Ferraris (2012) and most recently Ferraris (2021).
54	See Bogdandy (2022).
55	See Venzke (2022).
56	See Srinivasan (2019).
57	See Krull (2000, 2011).
58	As cited in Krull (2014).
59	See Krull (2015).
60	See Gordon (2006).
61	See for this section Krull (2009, 2012).
62	See Venzke (2016).
63	For the following paragraphs: see Krull (2009, 2014, 2015).
64	See Foucault (1984c).
65	See Garces (2019).
66	See Pelluchon (2019, 2021a, 2021b).
67	See Sternhell (2009).
68	See Garces (2019), Gabriel and Nakajima (2020).
69	See Derrida (1992).
70	See Lévi-Strauss (2004).
71	See Frevert (2020) and Frevert et al. (2019).
72	See Ricœur (1992).
73	See Ricœur (1992).
74	For a more nuanced view on the social sciences see Mulgan (2021, 2022).