Introduction: 'It's Difficult'

> What is important to study cannot be measured and that which can be measured is not important to study.
> PHILIP CONVERSE (1964: 206)

For this book Philip Converse's words can be modified: sometimes, what is important, or at least valuable and fruitful to study has not (yet) been identified as worth studying – for instance, the striking omnipresence of the adjective *global* in contemporary discourses.

Something curious has been going on over the past two decades: the adjective *global* has invaded and populated public, political and academic discourses. There is hardly anything, which has not been labelled 'global' in one context or another. Late Pope John Paul II was lauded as "the first truly global Pope" (Sells 2014). *The New York Times* (URL) promotes its "new Global Edition" as providing "readers with a 24/7 flow of geopolitical, business, sports and fashion coverage from a distinctly global perspective". In a randomly chosen edition of the UK's *The Guardian*, the one from 21 December 2005, the reader learns about the "global 'war on drugs'", about the "global collapse" of "global civilisation", about Renault's "global motorsport programme", about a consultancy called "Global Insight" and an NGO called "Global Witness", about the need to teach "Britain's global history", the "global positioning system developed by the US Department of Defense", the "damaged global confidence" in the Tokyo Stock Exchange, "football's global village", and, in three different articles, about "global warming".

These days, more and more institutional names, official events and conferences run under a label that contains the adjective *global*, such as "The Global Fund", the "UN Global Compact" and the "Global Alliance for Information and Communication Technologies". In the academy, more precisely in the social and political sciences, 'governance' has become 'global governance', 'civil society' has become 'global civil society', and, of course, 'the market' is time and again referred to as the 'global market'.

In political discourses, US President Barack Obama (2008b) stresses that the world is entering "a new era of global cooperation", the World Bank

makes clear that "a global crisis needs a global response" (World Bank URL), US President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi adjure their two countries' "bilateral global cooperation" (Bush-Koizumi 2001), UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2009a) has the vision of "a world of shared global rules founded on shared global values", his predecessor, Tony Blair (2007), sees the 'war on terror', including the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, as a "battle for global values", and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2004) speaks of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean as a "global catastrophe" that requires a "global response". More generally, the world is in the midst of a 'global war on terror' and a 'global financial crisis', faces 'global warming' and 'global poverty', people are concerned about 'global health' and, as for instance the United Nations (URL) suggest, about the 'global South' …

… the 'global South'?

When, how and why did 'the South' become 'global'? And what does this mean? What is a 'bilateral global cooperation'? Why was the 2004 tsunami for Kofi Annan a 'global catastrophe' that required a 'global response' whereas the earthquake that struck South Asia in October 2005 and affected some four million people was not 'global' and did not 'ask for a global response', though it left Annan (2005) "deeply saddened"? And how did UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008a) manage to use the adjective *global* 47 times in a single speech?

Actually at home in the political studies and International Relations (IR) discourse, I was intrigued by the seeming omnipresence of the adjective *global* and its colourful and somewhat paradoxical *gestalt*. Simultaneously, I was surprised by the fact that the adjective and its striking popularity have attracted but little attention from scholars and commentators. The academic literature is not short of engagements with the *notion* of 'the global'. Yet, there is rarely any engagement with the *word global*. The adjective *global* is widely used but less widely debated or scrutinised.

"Let us assume that we are reasonably clear about what is meant by 'global' and by 'religion'. But what about 'civil society'?",

writes Peter Berger (2005: 11) in his study of religion and 'global civil society' and, with that, provides an apt example of how lightly the adjective *global* is usually taken.

Looking across the many uses of *global* in public, political and academic discourses, the adjective appeared to me to be a "difficult" word, to borrow the language that Raymond Williams (1976) uses in his study of 'culture'. It triggered my interest. I wanted to explore what this popularity, this (quasi) omnipresence of the adjective *global* is about. Is it the manifestation of the fact that we are living in a 'global age', as Martin Albrow (1996: 80-81)

suggests, and/or the indicator of a 'global consciousness'? Does this mean that US President George W. Bush had a relatively more pronounced 'global consciousness' in 2006 than in the rest of his term – given that he uses the adjective in 2006 more frequently in his public communication than in any other year? And, if so, what does this actually mean? What does the linguistic sign *global* refer to?

MY ARGUMENT

In this book I develop the argument that the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* is more than a linguistic curiosity. I argue it is a political phenomenon and, as such, a valuable, albeit 'unconventional', object of study for scholars outside the linguistics discourse. I argue that the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* constitutes the discursive re-production of a web of meanings that is best labelled 'new world'. As such, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* constitutes a distinct dimension of the enduring contestation over the construction of the world. Given the word's current popularity and unscrutinised existence, as well as the loaded nature of the web of meanings 'new world' that it brings out, I argue, this dimension is not just a minor matter but plays an important, hence, research-worthy role in the contemporary symbolic struggle over the world.

My conceptualisation of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as the re-production of a web of meanings 'new world' is grounded in two central insights that arise from my empirical engagement with the adjective *global*. The first of these two insights is the empirically grounded understanding that the contemporary adjective *global* is closely enmeshed with the talk about (different ideas associated with the word) *globalisation*; I call this talk 'globalisation'-discourse. As I demonstrate, the contemporary adjective *global* has come to be used in the sense of 'outcome of globalisation'. This makes the adjective a 'new word'. What is 'new' about the contemporary *global*, I argue, is that it implies ideas that are associated with the word *globalisation*. I develop my argument that the contemporary adjective *global* is best be taken as a 'new word' by building on relevant discussions among lexicographers about when a word is appropriately called 'new', as well as by drawing on a theory of language and meaning, according to which language and meaning are not natural and referential but conventional and 'productive'.

The second central insight that arises from my empirical engagement with the contemporary *global* and that underlies my conceptualisation of the omnipresence of *global* as the re-production of a web of meanings 'new world' refers to the word *globalisation*. It is the insight that all utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, can be seen as constituting a discursive re-production of an object that is best labelled 'new world'. In other

words, my conceptualisation of the omnipresence of *global* builds on my understanding that what all uses of the word *globalisation* have in common – despite and in addition to the myriad of meanings that are associated with this word in whichever context it is used – is that they imply the 'proclamation' of a 'new world that came'.

This insight makes what I call 'globalisation'-discourse different from existing conceptualisations under this label, such as the one by Hay and Smith (2005). Normally, the 'globalisation'-discourse is conceptualised based on a scholarly preconception of what the word *globalisation* refers to, such as market integration or the spread of neoliberalism. In contrast, my suggestion that we understand the uses of the word *globalisation* as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings that is best called 'new world' is grounded in an approach that takes the polysemy of the word *globalisation* seriously. In addition, it builds on an elaboration of the question how and when the concept/s 'globalisation' and the neologism *globalisation* came to be "in the true" (Foucault 1981: 61), i.e. became socially accepted and 'normal' tools to grasp the world.

As I discuss in this book, developments, which have come to be addressed with the word *globalisation*, existed before this neologism became popular at the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s. Given that meaning is not inherent in social reality but conventional, the question arises, why a new word was perceived to be needed and accepted at the end of the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. at that particular moment in time. My answer to this question is that this was because the end of the Cold War was perceived to have brought out a 'new world', for which existing conceptual tools were perceived to be inadequate. This 'new world' was perceived as having produced a conceptual vacuum. This is apparent in assessments, such as that of IR theorist James N. Rosenau (1990: 5), who argued after the end of the Cold War that observers were left "without any paradigms or theories that adequately explain the course of events". I argue, it was this perceived vacuum that opened the discursive door and let the concept/s 'globalisation' and the neologism *globalisation* step in to fill it. Consequently, the use of the word *globalisation* can be conceptualised as re-producing and filling the conceptual space 'new world' with meaning.

It is the synthesis of these two insights that allows me to conceptualise the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a distinct phenomenon, namely, as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings called 'new world'. This phenomenon, I argue in this book, is relevant and interesting in two respects.

First, it is a relevant and interesting phenomenon by virtue of its wide spread but 'untroubled' existence. I put forward that the influential but unscrutinised existence of *global* itself justifies paying critical attention to the word. Second, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* is a relevant and interesting phenomenon because the proclamation of the 'new world', which is implied in the web of meanings that it re-produces, indi-

cates an 'awareness' of the reflexive 'backfiring' of the process of modernisation. I develop this point by comparing the (modern) proclamation of the 'new world' *to come* with the proclamation of the 'new world' that *came*, as well as grounded in a discussion of sociologist Ulrich Beck's theory (e.g. Beck 2006), according to which contemporary social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay.

On the one side, it is shaped by the reflexive 'backfiring' of the process of modernisation, which is constituted by the 'internal cosmopolitisation' of national societies, the existence of 'global risk' and the 'return of uncertainty'. The reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation brings out a social reality, in which not only modern institutions but also modern principles are challenged, outmoded and, in fact, rendered obsolete through the process of modernisation itself. Modern institutions and principles are radicalised as a side effect of modernisation, its institutions and principles, and the actions shaped by them, where this side effect, however, is not the 'dark side' of modernisation but the manifestation of the very *success* of modernisation.

On the other side, contemporary social reality is shaped by the prevalence of what Beck (2006) calls "the national perspective" and "methodological nationalism". This second aspect is a political perspective and a scholarly take on the world that looks through and is grounded in "categories […] that take the nation-state as the norm" (ibid. 73). The 'national perspective' obscures the view at (the reality of) the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation, especially the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies. As I demonstrate in this book, grounded in such an understanding of social reality as being 'reflexive modern', the omnipresence of the adjective *global* is intriguing because its study is a study of historical actualisations of the 'national perspective', i.e. of a central aspect of the contemporary reflexive modern world.

But I do not just argue that the omnipresence of *global* is a *relevant* and *interesting* phenomenon. I argue that it is also a *political* phenomenon, i.e. of interest to scholars, who explore the political world. It is a political phenomenon in that it constitutes a distinct dimension of the symbolic construction of social reality. In general, the omnipresent use of the adjective *global* is a way of making the social world meaningful. I make this argument by building on a theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, according to which the latter is the product of the former. But there is also something particular about the omnipresent use of *global*. I argue that it makes meaningful an important temporal category and conceptual space, namely the 'present'. With that, the omnipresence of *global,* this discursive re-production of the web of meanings 'new world', is a special and noteworthy part of the perpetual contest over understandings of the world. Given that this contest does not just *mirror* a world that exists outside of itself but *brings out* (the) social reality (it is talking about), the omnipresent use of the word *global* constitutes a distinct political phenomenon. Inevitably, the re-produced web of meanings 'new world' makes some things pos-

sible and rules out others – this applies to socially binding decisions, i.e. 'political' decisions in a narrow sense, and beyond. Consequently, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* constitutes an object of study for those who are interested in the contemporary political world – albeit, as I explain, it constitutes an 'unconventional' object of study at the 'unconventional' margins of the political studies and IR scholarship.

THE NATURE OF MY PROJECT

The aim of this book is to develop the argument outlined above and to conceptualise the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a political phenomenon. This is not a straightforward academic exercise. Like the adjective *global*, this exercise, too, is 'difficult'. However, the challenge it poses does not have anything to do with the argument as such; there is nothing particularly 'difficult' about my argument. Rather, the difficulty has something to do with how my argument emerged, i.e. with the nature of the knowledge production process that brought it out.

Normally, a research project in the political studies and IR discourse involves looking at an object of study that already 'exists' in a distinct literature and debate. The aim is to contribute to and push forward the respective debate by engaging with the particular object of study in a value-adding way, e.g. by approaching it from an alternative perspective or guided by innovative, theoretically-grounded research questions, or through a method that promises novel insights. As Nobel laureate Albert Szent-Györgyi suggests, "[d]iscovery consists of looking at the same thing as everyone else and thinking something different" (quoted in Li, Wang, Li and Zhao 2007: 214). In the context of such an endeavour, the 'thing', i.e. the object of study, is automatically legitimised because it comes out of and is located in a clearly identifiable disciplinary field. It is relatively easy to make the case for its study because the parameters of research are pre-set and the audience, which the research addresses, is pre-defined.

In the case of my interest in the adjective *global,* no such a clearly set, discursively confined research environment existed. My engagement with the adjective *global* is not shaped by linguistic interests and parameters, simply because I am not a linguist. Nor is it about the study of an already 'discovered' political studies 'problem' from an 'alternative' perspective. It does not follow the rationale that is implied in Szent-Györgyi's understanding of 'discovery' as something that flows from an original engagement with something that 'everyone else' looks at. The kind of 'discovery' in my project is different from such an endeavour because I was not 'thinking something different' while 'looking at the same thing as everyone else'. I came to see something in something that has not really been looked at so far; I came to see a political phenomenon in the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* that is worth investigating as a way to generate

insights into the political world. In other words, I came to see a (new) object of study in the omnipresence of the adjective *global*.

This does not make my findings more or less original in comparison to other findings, nor does it make my findings more or less a 'discovery'. Yet, it makes my project different in terms of how the research process unfolded. I did not set out by putting an anchor in a particular scholarly debate as a pre-defined point of reference for my 'discovery'. My 'discovery' of the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as a political phenomenon evolved gradually, in many respects inductively, and in an interweaved way. In short, I did not start with the aim of dismantling the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as a political phenomenon. This was because I did not know that this is what it is; that is, I did not start with a research question, such as 'what kind of a phenomenon is the omnipresence of the adjective *global*?'

In fact, initially, my focus was not on the linguistic sign *global* and its omnipresence in and of itself to begin with. Of course, it was not about the word *global* because a focus on a distinct linguistic sign, such as the adjective *global*, adds value to and advances the *linguistics* scholarship; for the scholarship that is dedicated to the study of politics, however, its value is less naturally apparent, if it exists at all. If one is at home in the political studies and IR discourse, the focus on a word is not intuitive and natural (see also Selchow 2016). This does not mean that the study of language is alien to scholars in the field. As we will see in the course of this book, in various ways scholars in political studies and IR take language seriously. Yet, in the study of politics, the analysis of language is normally a means to a distinct disciplinary end that is not about language as such. It is normally a means to gain insight into something 'behind' language. For instance, Gunther Hellmann, Christian Weber, Frank Sauer and Sonja Schirmbeck (2007) study the development of German foreign policy between 1986 and 2002 through the analysis of how the use of the 'key concepts', which they see manifest in the words *Germany*, *Europe*, *power*, *responsibility*, *self-confidence* and *pride*, has changed over time within elite texts. They make the argument that their language-focused analytical approach, which they call 'vocabulary analysis', is a fruitful way of generating novel insights into the issue of German foreign policy and, with that, adds value to existing approaches in this established field of study. Despite the explicit focus on language, their object of study is German foreign policy. The analysis of a handful of chosen words is a methodological means to this end. It is not the linguistic signs and their appearances, which are the centre of interest, but German foreign policy as an established object of study.

At the beginning of my project and reflecting the disciplinary conventions of the political studies and IR scholarship, I had an approach in mind similar to Hellmann et al's. Triggered by the increasing number of works in political studies and IR that speak of and set out to analyse 'global politics', in the sense of politics in a world of fundamental changes concerning the idea of the international system and traditional statist steering media, I was

interested in analysing collectively-held perceptions of 'the global' to see if they play a role in processes of policy formation, and, if so, what kind of role they play. I felt that, although many accounts of 'globalisation' in political studies and IR stress that there is an important ideational side to the contemporary 'global transformations' (e.g. Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003; Robertson 1990), this ideational side has so far only attracted sporadic systematic attention by scholars in the field. Consequently, I became interested in grasping the extent to which contemporary political imaginations are penetrated by ideas of 'the global'. It was in this context, inspired by studies, such as the above mentioned one by Hellmann, Weber, Sauer and Schirmbeck (2007), that the omnipresence of the adjective *global* in contemporary discourses moved to the centre of my interest. Initially, I thought of it as the linguistic manifestation of notions of 'the global', similar to how the above mentioned Albrow (1996) seems to understand the adjective. I thought to study the use of the word *global* in order to gain insights into existing notions of 'the global'. However, what appeared to be a relatively straightforward or 'conventional' research endeavour turned into a tautological trap around questions such as, what am I actually looking for when I am setting out to study perceptions of 'the global'? How do I know 'the global' when I see it without just finding what I set out to look for? And, in turn, what am I actually analysing when I am focusing on the adjective *global*? Is it really valid to take the word *global* as a linguistic materialisation of notions of 'the global'?

Increasingly, I found myself caught-up in tautological dilemmas and felt that, by starting with the presumption that the study of the adjective *global* gives me insights into notions of 'the global', I was only finding what I set out to look for. Of course, nothing ever exists *ex nihilo*. As Rob Pope (2005: xv) puts it, "[t]here is always something 'before the beginning'", which inevitably guides what one is looking for, hence, somewhat predetermines what one is finding. Yet, inspired by those scholars in political studies and IR, who argue that the task of political research needs to be to generate "unexpected insights" (Torfing 2005: 26), to intervene into "conventional understandings or established practices" (Campbell 2007: 219) and to 'make strange' (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) normalised knowledge, I gradually became less interested in the re-production of established theories through empirical explorations and more interested in a more experimental inductive approach to the 'global' political world and to the popularity of the adjective *global*.

Consequently, in the course of my exploration of the notion of 'the global' and the adjective *global*, I gradually moved away from my initial research path and started to explore the various questions and subsequent insights that came up while I was pursuing the path of tracking and thinking about the adjective *global*. I sailed into various different directions, within and beyond the disciplinary boundaries of the field of political studies and IR. I brought together different theoretical readings on language, meaning,

the concept 'discourse', reflexive modernisation, and social constructivism with empirical insights that I generated by looking at the use of the contemporary adjective *global* in various contexts. It was in the process of these tentacle-like explorations into various different cross-disciplinary directions and debates, allowing for a high degree of 'spreading loss', that the 'unexpected' insight arose that the omnipresence of the adjective *global* constitutes a political phenomenon because it is the discursive re-production of a web of meanings that is best called 'new world'.

In this sense, my main argument cyrstallised on an initially relatively 'empty' field and through an exercise that resembles the putting together of a mosaic. It is this mosaic and its individual pieces that I am presenting in this book.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

My conceptualisation of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a political phenomenon unfolds in five main steps. In the first step, in Chapters 2 and 3, I problematise the word *global*. Again using Williams' (1976: 21) words, I add an "extra edge of consciousness" to the contemporary adjective *global* in order to make it 'strange' and lift the 'veil of invisibility', under which it is covered. I do this by highlighting three noteworthy aspects that constitute the contemporary *global*.

In Chapter 2, I focus on two of these three aspects. I first highlight that the contemporary *global* is extraordinary popular & 'free', in the sense of semantically open, and, second, stress that it has what I call a 'disputedly undisputed' existence. I show that, taken together, these two aspects of the contemporary *global* form a seeming paradox between a colourful use of the word and a widening of its meanings, on the one side, and a striking easiness, with which it is taken as if it was obvious, on the other side. Both sides of this paradox account for the discomfort that the word regularly triggers in public and scholarly discourses, where its popularity and diverse uses are perceived – and sometimes dismissed – as a meaningless fad or as a symbolic confirmation and reproduction of hegemonic ('Northern') discourses. At the same time, however, as I show, these concerns have not led to a heightened sensibility or a commitment to a more reflective use of the adjective. Nor have they led to an increased curiosity about or systematic approaches to the adjective *global*. The contemporary *global* seems to be everywhere and, yet, it is 'invisible'. It is causing irritation but does not generate systematic and dedicated critical reflection.

An important part of Chapter 2 is a reflection on the nature of language and meaning as something that is conventional and 'productive', rather than natural and referential. I refer to Ferdinand de Saussure's (2000[1916]) language theory and poststructuralist revisions of it (e.g. Derrida 1976; Eagleton 1983; Hall 1997). Furthermore, by presenting findings from an empirical

analysis of the adjective *global* in the post-9/11 rhetoric of US President George W. Bush, I give a sense in Chapter 2 that a systematic and critical look at the word *global* holds the potential of revealing interesting insights into the 'world making'-practice, which is the use of language.

In Chapter 3, I focus on the third aspect that constitutes the contemporary adjective *global*. This is its enmeshment with the 'globalisation'-discourse. The term 'globalisation'-discourse plays an important role in my book and I have a distinct understanding of it that differs from the way in which it is usually used in the political studies and IR scholarship. I dedicate Chapter 4 to the development of my conception of the 'globalisation'-discourse. In Chapter 3, I use the term without further meta-reflection. For the time being, I use it to refer to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. Building on this, I show in Chapter 3 that the adjective *global* is enmeshed with the 'globalisation'-discourse in two different ways. First, the adjective is used to establish and justify conceptions of the signified that is associated with the word *globalisation*. I argue that since the concept 'globalisation' has come to play an influential role, the adjective *global*, too, plays an important part in the production of knowledge about the contemporary world. At the same time, I suggest that the distinct relationship between *global* and the concept 'globalisation' means that the word *global* largely disappears in the shadow of the debate about 'globalisation'. Second, I show that the contemporary adjective *global* actually *gains* one of its meanings from the 'globalisation'-discourse, that is, from the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. This insight is grounded in my analysis of the contemporary use of the adjective *global* in public, political and academic discourses. This analysis shows that, in addition to all the many other meanings that are associated with the adjective, the contemporary *global* is used to signify 'outcome of globalisation'. Drawing on this second point, I conclude my engagement with the contemporary adjective *global* in the first two chapters of this book by conceptualising *global* as a 'new word'. What is 'new' about it is its close relationship with the 'globalisation'-discourse, that is, with the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. To make this point, I refer to lexicographers' understanding of when a word is appropriately taken as 'new'.

In Chapter 4, I move away from the adjective *global* and focus on what I mean by the 'globalisation'-discourse. I extend and substantiate my conception of the 'globalisation'-discourse as the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation.* My main argument in Chapter 4 is that this web of meanings is best called 'new world'. In other words, I argue in Chapter 4 that – in addition to all kinds of other meanings – the uses of the word *globalisation* bring out an object called 'new world'. This argument is grounded in my critical engagement with the scholarship on 'globalisation' and is an answer to the question why

the concept/s 'globalisation' and the neologism *globalisation* became popular at the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s. In order to develop my argument, I start Chapter 4 with a discussion of the concept 'discourse', in which I refer to Michel Foucault's work (e.g. Foucault 1972, 1981). I present 'discourse' as an analytic tool that captures the "symbolic meaning systems or orders of knowledge" (Keller 2013: 2), which bring out the world. I stress that discourses "systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault 1972: 49). This relates back to my theoretical excursus on language and meaning in Chapter 2.

In the main part of Chapter 4, I then draw a picture of the 'life' of the web of meanings that is re-produced through applications of the word *globalisation*, i.e. I draw a picture of what I call the 'globalisation'-discourse. I do this by recasting Nick Bisley's overview of the development of the concept 'globalisation' (Bisley 2007). I identify and discuss five facets that characterise the 'globalisation'-discourse. One of these facets is that the idea 'new world' plays an important and, I argue, constitutive role in the life of this discourse. Grounded in my critical exploration of the diverse scholarship that deals with (authors' various ideas of) 'globalisation', I demonstrate that it was the notion that the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s brought about a 'new world', which gave birth to the 'globalisation'-discourse; it gave birth to the accepted use of the neologism *globalisation* and, consequently, to the web of meanings that this use re-produces. I argue that it was the conceptual vacuum, which the breakdown of the Berlin Wall (was perceived to have) brought about, that allowed the neologism *globalisation* to enter the language and enabled idea/s called 'globalisation' to come to be "in the true" (Foucault 1981: 61). This insight is the ground on which I label the web of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation,* 'new world'. In other words, I conclude Chapter 4 with the argument that the use of the word *globalisation,* no matter in which context and in which sense it is used, constitutes a moment in the re-production of a web of meanings that brings out an object called 'new world'.

In Chapter 5, I focus on the issue of the 'new world' and carve out what is distinct and interesting about the fact that the 'globalisation'-discourse brings out the object 'new world'. I do this by reflecting on what it means if a 'new world' is (implicitly or explicitly) 'proclaimed'. In order to grasp the characteristics of the proclamation of the 'new world', I contrast it with another kind of proclamation of the 'new world'. This other kind of proclamation of the 'new world' is a familiar component of modern politics. It is the proclamation of a 'new world' *to come* as a result of progressive, active, confident, and targeted action. It is a kind of proclamation of the 'new' that is grounded in the modern fondness (for the striving) for the 'new', which is widely taken as a foundational aspect of societal progress and development. It is a familiar feature of political discourses, in which "a new way forward" (Reagan 1985), a "new thinking" (Brown 2008) and "new approaches to

government" (Cameron and Clegg 2010: 7) are promised. In contrast with this (modern) proclamation of the 'new' *to come*, I carve out the characteristics of the kind of proclamation of the 'new' that is manifest in the reaction to the post-1989 reality and call it a proclamation of the 'new world' that *came*. I show that the latter implies a passive speaking position of an observer, who is confronted with a 'new' reality and whose task it is to *grasp* this reality, rather than to actively shape it(s future development). I conclude this conceptualisation by framing the proclamation of the 'newness' of the world as an aspect of political actors' struggle to legitimise past and future decisions and actions.

In a second analytical move in Chapter 5, I argue that, while the proclamation of the 'new world' *to come* is a manifestation of the modern, optimistic fondness for innovation, progress and development, the proclamation of the 'new world' that *came* is a manifestation of an 'awareness' of the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation. I substantiate this point with reference to sociologist Ulrich Beck's work (Beck 1994, 2004, 2006). This substantiation forms the core of Chapter 5, in which I lay out my conception of the 'reflexive modern' social reality with its two constitutive aspects: the reflexive 'backfiring' of the process of modernisation, which is constituted by the 'internal cosmopolitisation' of national societies, the existence of 'global risk' and the 'return of uncertainty', and the prevalence of the tradition of the 'national perspective', which is a political perspective on the world that is shaped by and re-produces a world grounded in modern and national categories. I conclude Chapter 5 by pointing out the analytical frame that arises from my Beck-inspired conception of social reality. Notably, through this frame the various conceptions of the 'newness' of the world, which are manifest in the re-production of the 'globalisation'-discourse, are to be seen as ways, in which the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation, that is, the 'internal cosmopolitisation of national societies', the existence of 'global risk' and the 'return of uncertainty', are dealt with and negotiated. As such, I argue, their study facilitates insights into the actualisation of the tradition of the 'national perspective' in distinct historical moments.

In Chapter 6, I return to the adjective *global* and present my main argument. Chapter 6 is divided into three parts. First, I bring together and synthesise the insights that I generated in previous chapters. This allows me to conceptualise the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as the re-production of a web of meanings that is best labelled 'new world'. Second, I elaborate on the two aspects that make the phenomenon of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* relevant and interesting; these are its widespread but 'untroubled' existence, as well as, the fact that the proclamation of the 'new world', which is implied in the object that the use of the adjective *global* re-produces, indicates an 'awareness' of the reflexive 'backfiring' of the process of modernisation. Building on this, I go a step further. Rather than 'just' relevant and interesting, I argue, the omnipresence

of the contemporary adjective *global* is also a *political* phenomenon; I frame the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the adjective *global*, as something, the study of which enables insights into the political world. I argue that the omnipresence of *global* is a political phenomenon because it constitutes a dimension of the symbolic construction of social reality, in general, and, in particular, because it makes meaningful an important conceptual space and temporal category, namely the 'present'. In this sense, I frame the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a distinct part of the perpetual contest over the understanding of the world, which does not simply *mirror* a world that exists 'outside' of language but *constitutes*, in the sense of *constructs* this world. Constructions of the world make some things possible and imaginable and others impossible – this applies to socially binding decisions, i.e. 'political' decisions in a narrow sense, and beyond.

Here, my argument is grounded in a distinct theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, which builds on the post-structuralist premises that I sketch in Chapter 2, and on the concept 'discourse' that I introduce in Chapter 4. In Chapter 6, I elaborate on this theory by comparing it with what appear to be similar but are, in fact, significantly different understandings of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, namely speech act-inspired approaches and social constructivist premises in IR. I choose a comparative approach in this context because it allows me to embed and situate my project in the broader political studies and IR discourse. My theoretical elaborations in Chapter 6 include a reflection on the 'unconventional' ideas of 'politics' and 'power' that are implied in the underlying conception of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, where politics is seen as "contests over the alternative understandings [of the world] (often implicit) immanent in the representational practices that implicate the actions and objects one recognizes and the various spaces […] within which persons and things take on their identities" (Shapiro 1989: 12) and 'power' is a discursive product. I conclude Chapter 6 by introducing the study of the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as an unconventional, experimental and 'provisional' scholarly endeavour that demands a certain degree of creativity.

The conceptualisation of the omnipresence of *global* is at the heart of my book; it is its main purpose. Nevertheless, in Chapter 7, I take an initial step into an empirical exploration of the omnipresence of the adjective *global*, understood as the re-production of a web of meanings called 'new world'. In an exemplary study, I generate insights into the web of meanings 'new world' that is re-produced in US President Barack Obama's 2013 public communication. I find a complex picture of a 'modern hyper-cosmopolitised' 'new world' that is constituted of 'pragmatic' national units in an environment shaped by a market, that appears like a second nature and

brings out a distinct 'national'. Overall, I discover that the 'new world' in Obama's 2013 Papers leaves little room for radical re-imaginations of the world beyond the modern, while, simultaneously and forcefully, fueling the process of a distinct cosmopolitisation of 'the national'. I conclude Chapter 7 by positioning my findings as the initial empirical ground for three kinds of future research directions into the study of the omnipresence of the adjective *global*. One of them is about the rewriting and 'radicalisation' of my findings themselves, in an effort to advance the search for and establishment of a language that enables us to capture the reality of the 'reflexive modern' world, rather than to re-produce the modern national idea of it.

In the Conclusion of this book, I position my project in the broader context of 'unconventional' studies in the social sciences, in general, and the political studies and IR scholarship, in particular.