

were held in July 1955, Olympio was not eligible since his conviction on 3 March 1954. Not that it would have mattered because the elections were boycotted by the CUT. Apart from the fact that suffrage was still restricted, the *Conseil de Gouvernement* did neither have a truly representative character nor powers that would have made it a real government. As such, the pro-French parties, UCPN and PTP, won all of the 30 seats.

On 4 July 1955, the new ATT adopted a motion of the PTP, which affirmed to continue the development of the territory in close cooperation with France and to end the trusteeship over the territory. The French government therefore officially declared that it felt obliged to take the request into account and to respond to it by directly consulting the wishes of the population.<sup>580</sup>

### 6.6.2 Action Plan & Internal Security Updates (1955)

Following the Mau-Mau rebellion, Derek Franklin, sent from Kenya by the Colonial Office to assess the Special Branch of the Gold Coast, observed a malfunctioning exchange of security and intelligence reports between Regional Commissioners and Special Branch officers. This issue was particularly pronounced in Togoland:

“Until very lately he [the officer in charge of Special Branch] has not had an officer of his own in T.V.T. Consequently, he has not had much information to go on from that region. The officer just appointed is young and not very experienced in that type of work. It would therefore be of great help if a copy of the [Chief Regional Officer]’s report went to the Special Branch officer.”<sup>581</sup>

But not even a month later, a delicate document was to surface in T.V.T. In January 1955, a British Togoland border officer received a “Final Liberation Plan” and was told “that arms and ammunition dumps have secretly been built,” one on the French and another on the British side.<sup>582</sup> Allegedly rifles and other weapons were being manufactured at the two places by French-trained Africans. Furthermore, the conspirators have allegedly met with members of the Ashanti and National Liberation Movement (NLM), which was formed in 1954 by disaffected Ashanti members of the CPP, that opposed the process of centralisation whilst supporting a continuing role for traditional leaders. The so-called ‘Action Plan’ stated that the “1954 Togoland Unification delegation to the United Nations is the last one. It must be realised that the UNO is a marionette organisation and willing to placate the British and French administering authorities in Togoland.”<sup>583</sup> The plan considered the kidnapping of members of the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, as well as blowing up bridges and cutting telephone wires. The idea was to create tension in Togoland to force the UN to send a mission tasked with transferring power.

<sup>580</sup> See *The future of Togoland under French administration* (T/1274/Rev.1), p. 12.

<sup>581</sup> TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Secret and Personal Letter, Franklin to Arden-Clarke, 12 December 1954.

<sup>582</sup> MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-5, *Politique intérieure*, Confidential Letter, Liberation Movement, 28 January 1955.

<sup>583</sup> MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-5, *Politique intérieure*, Action Plan 1955.

Again, the British saw Juvento's Marxist-Leninist splinter group around Mensah Aithton and Anku Morny behind the plans for armed insurrection.<sup>584</sup> Until then, the French had as well been convinced of the non-violent attitude of the unificationists, especially the AEC, but the French Consul General in Accra, Charles Renner, was now convinced that the divergence in the unification movement was manifesting itself between those around Olympio, who wanted to take the diplomatic route, and those frustrated unificationists around Anku Morny or Alex Odame, who increasingly stressed that the independence and reunification of Togoland could only be achieved by 'direct action' and, if necessary, by violence.<sup>585</sup>

The authenticity of the *Action Plan* was officially confirmed in 1958, when Major Benjamin Awhaitey was court-martialled on suspicion of receiving arms from Mathias K. Apaloo and R. R. Amponsah (both Togoland Congress) to stage a coup. The majority report of the Commission of Inquiry indicated that Antor had plotted with Joe Appiah and Victor Owusu (both former members of the NLM) to install Kofi Busia, the leader of the oppositional *Ghana Congress Party*, as Nkrumah's successor.<sup>586</sup> Faced with the likelihood that British Togoland would become part of an independent Ghana with a unitary constitution, before the arrival of the 3<sup>rd</sup> UN Visiting Mission, Antor sought to establish ties with opposition parties in the Gold Coast that opposed the CPP's plans for a unitary constitution, especially the NLM. In July 1955, Antor attended a conference in Ashanti's capital, Kumasi, held by 'movements and parties other than the CPP.' There he had signed a document entitled 'Proposals for an Independent Gold Coast and Togoland,' which called for a federal constitution instead of a unitary constitution.<sup>587</sup>

The fact that the *Action Plan* did not come to the attention of the British neither by the Special Branch officer nor the Chief Regional Officer of TTVT gave rise to yet another complaint on the executive level, that the information to the CenSeC and LIC from TTVT was disappointing and lacking.<sup>588</sup> Twice complaints were raised that the Chief Regional Commissioner in the TTVT had not sent a single intelligence report from the time the order was first issued in May 1953 until January 1956.<sup>589</sup>

The *Action Plan* was likely taken as an opportunity, by the successor of SLO Kirby Green, Major Hodson, to continue the former's intensification of Anglo-French security cooperation by organizing yet another Anglo-French security conference in Accra for

584 MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-5, *Politique intérieure*, Letter No. 29/TC, Renner to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 15 February 1955.

585 MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-5, *Politique intérieure*, Letter No. 62/SC, Renner to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 3 March 1955.

586 Government of Ghana, "Report: Enquiry into matters disclosed at the trial of Captain Benjamin Awhaitey held on the 20th and 21st January 1959, before a court-martial convened at Giffard Camp, Accra, and the surrounding circumstances," Government White Paper 10 (Accra, 1959).

587 Jean Marie Allman, *The quills of the porcupine: Asante nationalism in an emergent Ghana* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), pp. 113–14.

588 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Secret Letter No. Pol.F.302.Vol.II., Headquarters Gold Coast Police to Russel, 8 March 1955.

589 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Monthly Intelligence Reports from Regions. List of Reports received from Regions until 1.7.1955; TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Note File No. 539 Vol II, G.S., p. 2.

March 1955.<sup>590</sup> Even if the French had doubts about the authenticity of the documents (there was speculation that the unificationists disseminated them deliberately to alarm the Administering Authorities), the alarm must have sounded: France was already deeply involved in the unrest in Algeria, and in May 1955 the unrest in the other trusteeship territory, Cameroon, seemed to be a sign of how things were slipping out of the hands of the French trusteeship power.

### Security Intelligence Advisor

Coinciding with the Visiting Mission, the *Security Intelligence Advisor*, Alex MacDonald, arrived after several stops in British colonial possessions around the world in September 1955 for his audit tour of the Gold Coast. Aware that he would be advising a territory on security and intelligence matters that would be independent in the foreseeable future, by October, MacDonald reported that there was a great “need to provide an adequate number of Special Branch officers, particularly African officers capable of maintaining an efficient intelligence organisation in a future self-governing territory.”<sup>591</sup> The territory’s Special Branch was handicapped by the fact that it was losing experienced personnel either by retirement or by transfer just at a time when their services were most required.<sup>592</sup> Moreover the Special Branch did not comprise a single senior African officer.<sup>593</sup> The entire makeup of the Special Branch for 1955–56 consisted of merely 70 officers, only two of whom were African officers, and eight of whom were stationed in TVT. Regarding the latter, MacDonald noted that:

“Meanwhile the Colony may in the near future be faced with a general election and a plebiscite in Togoland. There is growing dissension between the Convention Peoples Party and the National Liberation Movement and there can be little doubt that during the present transition period accurate intelligence will be of the first importance.”<sup>594</sup>

MacDonald’s report commented on the significant aspect of what safeguards were to be provided to ensure that a future Gold Coast Government would not use the Special Branch as a political weapon. MacDonald was not optimistic:

“There can, of course, be no effective safeguard. As in other Colonies advancing towards full independence we can only try to educate Ministers in the tradition of an independent *non-political* Special Branch and to maintain the link with the Security

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<sup>590</sup> TNA (London), FCO 141/4990, *Gold Coast: Security Liaison Officer, West Africa*, Secret Letter Pol.F.17/1, SLO Gold Coast, 4 February 1955.

<sup>591</sup> TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Intelligence Organisation in the Gold Coast.

<sup>592</sup> TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Intelligence Organisation in the Gold Coast.

<sup>593</sup> TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training*, Gold Coast Dispatch No. 2, Governor, 19 January 1956.

<sup>594</sup> TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Intelligence Organisation in the Gold Coast, p. 1.

Service which by assisting with training and advice can do much to keep the territory within the Commonwealth intelligence.”<sup>595</sup>

Lastly, MacDonald noted like all his predecessors the failure of the Regional Commissioners to provide intelligence reports and, on the other hand, pointed out that before full self-government was achieved there was the need for Special Branch records to be “weeded.”<sup>596</sup> Promptly the Ministry of Interior reprimanded the lapsus of submitting intelligence reports by Regional Commissioners who in turn “felt ‘nothing was done about’ such reports.”<sup>597</sup> On the other hand, it was proposed to set up a committee to devise for the disposal of delicate records.<sup>598</sup> Although not proposed by MacDonald, as a further measure, both the CenSeC and the LIC were immediately placed under the newly formed Defense Committee in November 1955 to assist the Governor in carrying out his responsibilities for the security of the Gold Coast.<sup>599</sup>

### 6.6.3 The 3<sup>rd</sup> Visiting Mission (1955)

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Visiting Mission arrived in Accra in mid-August 1955 and spent six weeks in the two Togolands until the end of September. A novelty, however, was that for the first time a member of the UN Secretariat, namely the Undersecretary for Trusteeship and Information from the Non-Self-Governing Territories, Benjamin Cohen, went along. The membership of the Visiting Mission comprised a representative of the US, Australia, Syria, and India, that is, already of most state representatives whose governments saw favourably towards the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. The Visiting Mission adopted its special report and transmitted it to the Secretary General on 18 October 1955.

The Visiting Mission had received over 200,000 communications,<sup>600</sup> out of which 100,000 spoke out in favour of unification and immediate independence. However, due to the rules of procedure, the Visiting Mission considered less than 100 of these communications as petitions and the remainder simply for its own information.<sup>601</sup>

Yet, overall, the Visiting Mission was presented with two main points of view in British Togoland. On the one hand, the CPP and its affiliated groups, especially the tra-

595 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Intelligence Organisation in the Gold Coast, p. 2.

596 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Intelligence Organisation in the Gold Coast, p. 3.

597 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Intelligence Reports [Ref. 908/17/2], from Secretary CenSec to Regional Officers, 23 May 1957.

598 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training*, Secret Letter (without title), PMC, 7 January 1956.

599 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Organisation of Intelligence, 27 June 1956.

600 These communications contained for the most part slogans and expressions of views favouring the political alternatives concerning Togoland unification and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration.

601 United Nations, “Art. 87,” in United Nations (UN) *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs*, Vol. Vol. II. Also see T/1/Rev.3, Rule 84, para. 2.