

3. The analytical framework: mechanisms and contentious politics through a Gramscian lens

The main argument of this study is that the Korean anti-LGBT movement – in alliance with actors from the Korean Protestant Right, of which it is part – strives for (re)gaining political and cultural hegemony. It does so by rendering contentious certain issues, which centrally include, but are not limited to LGBT-related topics. To support this argument, I apply Gramscian insights on (counter-)hegemony and on political strategizing to the analysis of the anti-LGBT movement. Furthermore, as depicted in the previous chapter, I emphasize the aspect of ‘dynamic continuity’, which also has a Gramscian grounding and which, I argue, is existent in many of the movements’ concrete actions, in its framings and its relations to opponents as well as to like-minded actors.

Mechanisms as basic analytical tools

The question then is how to operationalize these theoretical assumptions so that they can benefit this analysis. The considerations on dynamic continuity above already demonstrate a viable perspective: mechanisms. The mechanism of *bricolage*, for instance, captures well one aspect of the idea of dynamic continuity and at the same time offers the tools for analysis, that is, frame analysis (Benford & Snow 2000). Mechanism-based social scientific research represents an alternative to variable-based, quantitative methods and seeks to explain causality in procedural terms (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Tilly, 2001). Mechanisms and mechanism-based explanations have gained increasing popularity in the social sciences in recent years. There are, however, diverse approaches as to how exactly mechanisms can benefit social scientific research (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, 50f; Mahoney 2001, 580).¹ This study follows the definition of mechanisms proposed by McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow who use mechanisms as the central analytical tool in their *dynamics of contention* research agenda. They define mechanisms as “a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely

1 For a comprehensive overview of the different usages and definitions of causal mechanisms in social sciences, refer to Hedström & Ylikoski (2010).

similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam et al. 2001, 24).² As explanatory tools in social sciences, mechanisms thus open the black boxes of social change and are characterized by the effects they (are expected to) yield (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, 50f). Put simply, a mechanism-based explanation “implies that proper explanations should detail the cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the outcome to be expected was brought about” (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, 51).

Mechanism-based explanations describe change processes selectively. That is, they do not aim at covering all possible details of a causal chain but render an abstracted account of what is relevant for change. “The relevance of entities, their properties, and their interactions is determined by their ability to make a relevant difference to the outcome of interest” (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, 53). The outcome or *explanandum* cannot be achieved through one specific mechanism only. Conversely, one mechanism can render different outcomes under different circumstances (Tilly 2001; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 56). The goal of mechanisms is thus not to predict an outcome (or, vice versa, to identify independent variables) as is common in generalizing, correlation-based methods. In fact, the outcomes to be explained are already known in mechanism-based research models. Mechanisms focus on the *explanans* and its specific properties. However, such intricate methodological issues, especially in terms of measurement of mechanisms, have been largely neglected by scholars (McAdam & Tarrow 2011, 5f). Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, 64) therefore call on researchers to “pay attention to the entities that mechanisms are made of (the agents, their properties, actions, and relations) rather than treating them as opaque entities.”

While scholars agree that mechanisms are difficult to observe, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly maintain that there are ways to detect them, for example, through the use of systematic events data or field-ethnographic methods (McAdam et al. 2008, 310f). I concur with this perspective and will demonstrate how my own systematic protest event analysis contributes to carving out the mechanisms at work in anti-LGBT activism in Korea.³ When reconsidering the main research question of this study – why and how the Korean Protestant Right renders LGBT issues contentious – the usage of explanatory mechanisms is the perfect fit for answering the ‘how’ part in a fine-grained manner. Mechanisms complement and break down the broader Gramscian theoretical perspective outlined above.

Regarding the specifics of this study, three caveats have to be raised when considering mechanism-based explanations. First, as Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) point out, mechanisms possess an element of causation. This begs the question what the phenomena to be caused by mechanisms exactly is. As I have pointed out above, mechanisms – of which there are many – do not generate one single, pre-determined outcome. However, they can be strategically applied by actors to achieve certain goals. These goals, in turn,

2 In a later definition, McAdam and Tarrow speak of “changes” rather than “classes of events”, which renders the definition of mechanism clearer: “delimited changes that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam & Tarrow 2011, 3, original italicized).

3 Protest event analysis (PEA) is a systematic method for data collection on protest and other contentious events which I produced as the main data base of this study. I will explain PEA in greater detail in chapter 4.2.

could be regarded as the outcome, at least the outcome expected or wished for by the actors in question. In the case of the Korean anti-LGBT movement, this outcome may consist of topics as broad and abstract as achieving socio-political hegemony or as narrow and concrete as preventing pro-LGBT measures at the local level. It is then worthwhile to observe potential cases in which certain mechanisms did *not* yield the expected results.⁴

A second caveat concerns one common use of mechanisms in social sciences. Mechanisms form a central part of ‘process tracing’ (Beach 2016; Bennett & Checkel 2015a). Bennett and Checkel (2015b, 7) define process tracing as “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case.” Process tracing with its usage of causal mechanisms is thus well suited for the examination of research puzzles. This study, however, does not aim at explaining such concrete causal paths (e.g., causal mechanisms x_1 , x_2 , etc. lead to y). I make use of social mechanisms rather as descriptive tools to substantiate, as already mentioned, the analysis of the Korean anti-LGBT movement from a Gramscian inspired theoretical perspective. This does not mean that processes are generally excluded from the analysis, though. Quite to the contrary, processes must be naturally included into the analysis since mechanisms often merge into processes. McAdam et al. (2001, 24) note that processes represent “regular sequences of [...] mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations”. I will highlight processes whenever such combinations of mechanisms materialize.⁵

4 However, in these cases the difficulty of measurement comes to the fore again. Can we actually speak of, or observe a mechanism if results fail to materialize? It is also difficult to measure what the expectations of the actors involved actually are. What is more, we need to be cautious not to assume that actors have agency over all different kinds of mechanisms. They might well dispose of the mechanism of framing, in the sense that they create and communicate certain frames which they expect to exert specific influences on (potential) constituents. Concerning other mechanisms, e.g., ‘identity shift’ on the recipients’ end, the actors cannot be sure that the desired outcome actually materializes.

5 The *dynamics of contention* (DOC) research agenda, which will be outlined in greater detail in the next section, also features processes, which conjoin to form what McAdam et al (2000) call ‘episodes’. They define episodes as “continuous streams of contention including collective claims making that bears on other parties’ interests” (McAdam et al. 2001, 24). Kriesi et al. (2019) build upon the idea of episodes in DOC to develop a methodological approach they call “Contentious Episode Analysis” (CEA). CEA aims at applying the rigor of protest event analysis to the analysis of contentious episodes to “decompose the episodes into their component elements—actors, actions, sequences of actions, pairs of actions” (Kriesi et al. 2019, 270). I refrain from applying CEA in this study since I am not so much interested in discerning the dynamics and sequences within specific contentious episodes, but rather try to carve out the mechanisms that can be observed in Korean anti-LGBT activism in general. What is more, I do not have the resources to analyze the sheer number of episodes within the time frame of this study (2000–2020). I use a modified version of protest event analysis as analytical method (cf. chapter 4.2).

Finally, mechanisms are frequently used for comparative purposes.⁶ McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), for instance, build their whole *dynamics of contention* research agenda on such comparative premises. In their paired comparisons of instances of contention, they search for recurrent mechanisms and processes that produce similar effects in the area of contentious politics (McAdam et al. 2001, 35). This study focuses on only one case, that is, the Korean anti-LGBT movement. However, since I examine the movement over a period of over 15 years, the many instances of protest and further activism will render within-case comparisons feasible. Moreover, I refer to similar foreign cases whenever appropriate.

Dynamics of contention

As already pointed out, mechanisms occupy a prominent position in the *dynamics of contention* (DOC) approach developed from the mid-1990s by Douglas McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly & Tarrow 2015). McAdam and Tarrow (2011, 3) state that with the DOC research agenda, “we tried to reach beyond the traditional structuralism of the social movement field by calling for, and illustrating, more attention to agency through a distinct focus on the mechanisms and processes of contentious politics.” The DOC agenda focuses on social phenomena where contention, collective action, and politics coincide, forming what they call *contentious politics*. McAdam et al. (2001, 5) define contentious politics as

episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.

Sidney Tarrow provides a less formalized perspective on contentious politics: “Contentious politics occurs when ordinary people – often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in public mood – join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents” (Tarrow 2011, 6).⁷ The DOC agenda is geared towards taking into account a broader set of collective actions, which of course includes social movements, but may also comprise rebellions, protests, and even revolutions – instances in which contentious collective action takes place. (Tarrow 2011, 7). Tarrow specifies that “[c]ollective action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to representative institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims,

6 Bennett and Checkel (2015b, 19f, 29) emphasize that causal mechanisms (in the context of process tracing) can benefit Mill’s method of comparison, i.e., most-different cases and most-similar cases research designs. In cases of equifinality, i.e., if multiple ways lead to the same outcome, a thorough examination of the mechanisms involved can bear fruitful insights. The authors also recommend adopting comparative designs for process tracing to guarantee a broader basis for inference.

7 This perspective on contentious politics is also reflected in Tarrow’s general definition of social movements, which he defines as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 2011, 9, original italicized).

and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities” (Tarrow 2011, 7).

Governments occupy a prominent role in the above definition of contentious politics. While the advocates of DOC concede that contention may as well involve situations in which non-governmental actors fight against each other, they argue that eventually governments or authoritative institutions form important parts of contentious politics (McAdam et al. 2001, 9; McAdam & Tarrow 2011, 5). McAdam et al. (2001, 6) insist that “the study of politics has too long reified the boundary between official, prescribed politics and politics by other means.” They define the latter as ‘transgressive contention’, in which said non-governmental and non-parliamentary actors (have no other option than to) apply innovative action to reach their goals. These actors often resort to forms of transgressive contention since ‘contained contention’ in the realm of institutionalized politics may not be accessible to them (McAdam et al. 2001, 7–8). What is more, governments or “polity members”, that is, “constituted political actors enjoying routine access to government agents and resources” (McAdam et al. 2001, 12), often represent declared opponents for such challengers. McAdam et al. argue that transgressive contention is thus often rooted in existing contained contention, when, for instance, governments propose a new law that is unacceptable for certain social groups who then mobilize against its adoption. This study will centrally examine the relations between the actors highlighted by the DOC approach: the *challenger* (i.e., the anti-LGBT movement), governments and related institutions (the *members*), *subjects*, i.e., “persons and groups not currently organized into constituted political actors” but addressed for mobilization by the challengers (McAdam et al. 2001, 10), and *outside political actors*.⁸ I will show that the Korean anti-LGBT movement, and by extension the Protestant Right, are characterized by highly ambivalent relations with governmental units (and the state as a whole) due to their specific historical legacies and political ambitions. In addition, I will complement the set of actors as specified in DOC by also taking into consideration the challenger’s challengers

8 The ‘theory of fields’, a recent research agenda developed by Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2012) comprises a similar set of central actors to be investigated. Building on the classification that William Gamson (1975) had introduced into the study of social movements, the two authors emphasize incumbents (which are called ‘members’ in DOC), challengers, and governance units who act within strategic action fields. A strategic action field is defined as “a constructed mesolevel social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the field” (Fligstein & McAdam 2012, 9). Fligstein and McAdam’s theory is a combination of approaches from social movement studies, contentious politics, organizational and institutional studies. While several of their theoretical elements could be applied in this study as well, I argue that the present study can better be executed with the choice of approaches. DOC offers greater possibilities for combinations (e.g., with Gramscian insights). Moreover, DOC – while already representing an ambitious research agenda (cf. McAdam & Tarrow 2011, 5) – provides for more openness for unexpected research results. The ‘theory of fields’, in contrast, predetermines many constitutive elements that, in my view, render theoretical fit complicated. For a short overview of the general premises of the theory of fields, see Fligstein and McAdam (2011), for a more comprehensive coverage, cf. Fligstein and McAdam (2012).

and their relations with state actors, which I will subsume under the movement-counter-movement approach (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; cf. also Dugan 2004).⁹

The DOC research agenda helps lay bare such relations. In fact, relations represent one, if not the central aspect of the contentious politics approach. The proponents of DOC do so by criticizing the traditional social movement agenda – particularly the opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and framing approaches – for their static focus on relationships (McAdam et al 2001, 42, 72). Concerning the opportunity structures perspective, for example, DOC does not regard opportunities as “objective structural factors”, but rather as something subject to attribution (McAdam et al. 2001, 43). In a similar vein, it is argued that specific sites of mobilization have to be actively appropriated rather than just assuming that they are readily available, pre-existing structures. Framing, finally, is not merely a strategic tool for challengers. Rather, frames are interactively created in the very relations of the challengers, be it with the state, (other) opponents, or like-minded groups (McAdam et al. 2001, 44). In short, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001, 22) “treat social interaction, social ties, communication, and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change.”

The DOC agenda does not reject culturalist and structuralist approaches.¹⁰ Rather, DOC points to the dynamics which link these analytical approaches to agency (McAdam & Tarrow 2011, 4). DOC focuses on three kinds of mechanisms which attend to this analytical task:

- *relational mechanisms*, which “alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks” (McAdam et al. 2001, 26),
- *environmental mechanisms*, i.e., “externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life” (McAdam et al. 2001, 25), and
- *cognitive mechanisms*, which “operate through alterations of individual and collective perception” (McAdam et al. 2001, 26).

Bricolage, for instance, is an important cognitive mechanism. In this study, we will come across many more of such mechanisms. I will present some of them in greater detail in

9 Chapter 12 covers in greater detail the complex interrelations between the anti-LGBT movement, its activist opponents, and state actors.

10 McAdam et al. claim that culturalist approaches “attribute causal power to norms, values, beliefs and symbols that individuals experience and absorb from outside themselves. Cultural analysts have given special attention to two sets of circumstances: explicit organization of contentious action on behalf of ideologies or other well articulated belief systems and action based on membership in culturally distinctive communities” (McAdam et al. 2001, 21f). For them, structuralist analyses “impute interests and capacities to whole collectivities – communities, classes, sometimes even those vague collectivities people call societies. They then explain the behavior of individuals and groups primarily through their relation to the collectivities in question.” (McAdam et al. 2001, 21). For extensive perspectives on culture in the context of collective action, see Johnston (1995), for a concise summary of structuralism from the perspective of social and behavioral sciences, see Barbosa de Almeida (2015).

the next subchapters on the analytical framework. Others will be thoroughly covered in the analytical chapters.

Along with its focus on social mechanisms and the broadened set of actors to be considered, the DOC approach allows me to sharpen my argument on dynamic continuity. McAdam et al. (2001, 58) note, for example, that contentious politics “never mobilize without some significant grounding in ties created by previous contention and/or routine social life.” They also claim that the innovative action forms used by challengers were rarely truly new. “Rather they were creative modifications or extensions of familiar routines” (McAdam et al. 2001, 49). Using theatrical metaphors, the originators of the contentious politics approach refer to such action forms as *modular* repertoires and performances (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, 16f). They highlight the model-like character of pre-existing action forms and frames and see the benefit in their generality *and* specificity. “Seen generically, they have features that adapt to a wide variety of circumstances and have meaning to a wide variety of potential participants and audiences” (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, 17). At the same time, such modular action repertoires can be adapted to the respective circumstances in which they are needed. This broadly corresponds to the process introduced above, which Acharya (2004) calls “norm localization” (cf. also Westney 1987). Modularity captures the dynamic and yet continuous processes that I argue underlie the actions of the Korean anti-LGBT movement. This dynamism, however, does not only concern the action repertoires in the way they are used by certain actors. It is the very actors who are constituted and changed through contentious politics as well. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001, 38) summarize this point in the following way: “[...] our ultimate interest lies not in the recruitment of static, unchanging actors into single movements, but in the dynamic processes through which new political actors, identities, and forms of action emerge, interact, coalesce and evolve during complex episodes of contention.” These are also the main interests of the present study: I investigate the Korean anti-LGBT movement as a newly emerging actor who promotes identity shifts and uses innovative action forms in diverse interactions with opponents, governmental institutions, and like-minded groups.

The analytical framework

Building my analysis on Antonio Gramsci’s works on political strategy helps me to answer the first part of my main research question as to *why* the Korean anti-LGBT movement renders LGBT issues contentious. I argue that a main motivating factor for putting this topic on the agenda is to gain or regain hegemony in the political and socio-cultural arenas. The Protestant Right at large does not only do so by actively vilifying LGBTs and those politicians, groups, and institutions (allegedly) supporting them. Right-wing Protestants also turn to other politicizable topics, which often include elements of ‘othering’, for instance when mobilizing against migrants, refugees, Islam, feminists, or left-wing groups (Cho 2011, 307f.; Kim Nami 2016).

Table 1: Analytical framework: factors influencing the hegemonic endeavors and the actions of the anti-LGBT movement

Gramscian concepts	Related social movement / DOC concepts	Examples (of mechanisms)	Confer chapter
Religion	Resource mobilization	<i>Social movement bases</i> : “the social background, organizational resources, and cultural frameworks of contention and collective action” (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, 11)	esp. 7, 8 & 10
	Alliance building	<i>Appropriation</i> : Protestant denomination leaders won for the anti-LGBT ‘cause’	10
	Identity	<i>Identity shift</i> : actively ‘adding’ anti-LGBT attitudes to Christian faith <i>Boundary activation</i> : creating “anti-Christian” enemies (LGBTs, political opponents, public institutions) <i>De-certification</i> : declaring opponents heretical (also: <i>repression</i>)	7.3 7.3 12
	Movement-counter-movement dynamics	- Anti-LGBT movement versus pro-LGBT civil society - Anti-LGBT movement versus pro-LGBT camp <i>within</i> Protestantism	12
(Legacies of) the conservative historical bloc	Members and challengers	Ambiguous relation to the state: anti-LGBT activists are both members and challengers	10 & 12
	Framing	<i>Bricolage</i> : combining nationalism and anti-communism with homophobia	7.4
	Action repertoires	<i>Modularity/emulation</i> : drawing on, and adapting action forms from others	7.4 & 7.5
(Organic) intellectuals	Social movement entrepreneurs	<i>Institutionalization and professionalization</i> : creating numerous rather professional anti-LGBT social movement organizations	10
	Movement leadership	<i>(Norm) brokerage</i> : creating (also new ideational) linkages with Protestant denominations and other (political) actors <i>Diffusion</i> : important role of well-known representatives/‘experts’ to disseminate anti-LGBT arguments	10 10 & 11
	Framing	<i>Attribution of threat and opportunity</i> : claiming that LGBT issues threaten churches, families, the nation as a whole <i>Radicalization</i> (of rhetoric): “gay nazis”	7.2 8.2

Gramscian concepts	Related social movement / DOC concepts	Examples (of mechanisms)	Confer chapter
Education	Learning	- 'Educational' anti-LGBT events - Problematization of certain forms of education: controversies on school textbooks including information on sexual and gender diversity	11
Media and culture	Framing	<i>Diffusion</i> : anti-LGBT movement creates its own blogs and YouTube channels to disseminate its messages; 'traditional' media like Kukmin Daily also join forces	11

In order to answer the second part of my main research question on *how* exactly LGBT issues are rendered contentious, I develop an analytical framework based on the whole range of theoretical and conceptual approaches presented so far. With this analytical framework, I provide an operationalization of the factors which I deem relevant for explaining the concrete actions of the Korean anti-LGBT movement. I derive these factors from Gramscian thought and substantiate them by specifying related mechanisms, as well as social movement and DOC concepts. While I do not lay claim to the completeness of the analytical factors and related concepts, I do argue after thorough data analysis that they possess significant explanatory potential for the special case investigated in this study. The five factors include (1) *religion*, (2) *the conservative historical bloc and its legacy*, (3) *the role of intellectuals*, (4) *education*, and (5) *media and culture*. In the following, I will shortly present each of these factors and complementarily describe mechanisms and further analytical tools which – as already mentioned – represent helpful analytical concretizations and at the same time facilitate the empirical observation of social phenomena in question.¹¹ It has to be noted that these factors do not represent exclusive categories that have nothing in common. On the contrary, overlaps of these categories are the rule rather than the exception as the analytical chapters will show. Table 1 provides an overview of the analytical framework, including concrete examples of mechanisms and concepts observed in this study.

11 From the perspective of quantitative research designs, the factors presented here could be regarded as quasi-hypothetical assumptions on variables influencing a certain outcome. As already mentioned before, however, this study's analytical model mainly relies on mechanisms. This study thus represents a departure from quantitative approaches which address causality using statistical methods. What is more, most of the categories such as 'religion' or the mechanism like 'identity shift' are hardly quantifiable. Finally, this study is not so much interested in specific causal links, but rather aims at providing a broader picture as to why and how LGBT issues are rendered contentious in Korea.

3.1 Religion as a multifaceted resource

As I have shown in chapter 2.3, religion plays a crucial role in the development of Gramsci's political thought. Let me briefly recapitulate Gramsci's take on religion. For Gramsci, religion is an intrinsically political force and *not* an entity detached from politics or increasingly unimportant in the political arena as has been argued by some secularization and modernization scholars in his own time and succeeding Gramsci (Weber 1968; Berger 1967; Habermas 1984: 49–52). Religious actors form part of an array of interest groups in society, which commonly enter into conflict with each other and with the state. While centrally comprising ideological elements, religion for Gramsci is not just a worldview. Its ideological fundament along with its socio-political agency make religion a significant hegemonic force.

Religion and religious ties as resources

In the context of this study, religion therefore serves as an analytical tool in three main respects, which partly intersect: religion as a mobilization resource, as a symbolic resource, and as a source for collective identity. From a resource mobilization perspective, I argue that religion works as a central mobilization basis for the Korean anti-LGBT movement. Tilly and Tarrow (2015, 11) define *social movement bases* as “the social background, organizational resources, and cultural frameworks of contention and collective action.” It has been extensively shown that religious ties and religiously politicized topics can have the potential of mobilizing effectively, for example for electoral campaigns and elections (Nastiti & Ratri 2018; Green et al. 2006; Wilcox et al. 1993). Religion can also be an important basis for social movements in terms of the organizational infrastructure the respective religious environment provides. Kurzman (1998), for instance, examines how “organizational opportunity” – the organizational equivalent of political opportunity structures – influences the mobilization levels of religious movements. Institutionalized Christianity, in fact, provides ample resources in this sense: parishes, Christian associations and clubs, the headquarters of denominations as well as cross-denominational organizations have personnel, skills, material resources and, most importantly, believers that can be mobilized for certain socio-political endeavors. Of course, religious leaders do not have these resources at their free command, but hierarchical cultures of ‘the sheep’ following their ‘shepherd’ may serve such endeavors. This is especially the case in Korea, where charismatic senior pastors occupy powerful positions in their congregations – some of which are mega churches with huge followings and considerable financial means (Lee Easley 2014; Kim, Jin-ho 2012: 69).¹²

12 Scholars point out that in comparison to Catholicism, Protestantism has been characterized by integrating Korean traditions more eagerly ever since its introduction on the Korean peninsula. Baker claims that at least until the 1960s, Korean Catholicism had been indeed more hierarchical whereas Protestantism had introduced a ‘Koreanized’ version of leadership with lay elders also playing important roles. Kim and Kim, however, emphasize that such Confucian leadership models did as well reproduce traditional hierarchies in most Korean Protestant churches where women often do not have access to leadership positions (unlike some evangelical congregations like the

This study analyzes the Korean anti-LGBT movement as a collective actor that mainly emerged from a Christian background (cf. Kniss & Burns 2004, 695).¹³ As the proponents of the contentious politics research agenda have pointed out, however, this latter fact does not mean that the resources of Christian organizations are at the movement's unfettered disposal. Rather, these mobilization structures – Christian organizations, their leadership, and the believers – have to be actively appropriated (McAdam et al. 2001, 44). This study will show how such a social appropriation and active alliance building works in the case of the Korean anti-LGBT movement.

The second – partly interrelated – aspect which shows that religion can serve as a helpful analytical category is situated on the ideological level. Kniss and Burns (2004, 701) emphasize the importance of *symbolic resources* that religion has on offer. As Gramsci rightly observed, religion does not only draw its power from its organizational structure but also from its specific worldviews. In the case of anti-LGBT movements, Christian doctrines and literal interpretations of the Bible on the alleged sinfulness of homosexual sex and on the binary gender order may act as central arguments against granting certain rights to non-heterosexual, transgender and intersex persons. Such a strategy can be subsumed under the framing approach which will play a central role in all of the Gramscian-based topics of the analytical model presented here. Social movements scholars have posed the question whether the usage of religious narratives is done instrumentally, as a means to an end. Snow and Beyerlein (2019, 575f.) take the actions of ISIS in the Middle East as an example to show the intricate task of classifying a movement as purely religious or purely political. While it is true that ISIS has (geo)political goals that this group justifies by grounding them on a religious zeal, observers have convincingly demonstrated that ISIS is in fact a deeply religious organization that does not merely use religion in an instrumental way (McCants 2015; Wood 2015).¹⁴ This study treats religion as an important variable in the Korean anti-LGBT conundrum. However, it will also critically investigate to what extent religion – that is, the Christian faith – actually represents a central factor for the anti-LGBT movement.

Collective identity

Finally, the third aspect of religion concerns the *collective identity* that it potentially produces and sustains. While also interrelated with the previous points, it is necessary to carve out its specifics since collective identity is widely regarded as a crucial factor for the emergence and the persistence of social movements over time (Flesher Fominaya 2019, 430). As Gamson (1991, 27) points out “any movement that seeks to sustain commitment over a period of time must make the construction of collective identity one of its most central tasks.” The empirical evidence “overwhelmingly supports” the assumption of a

Yoido Full Gospel Church where women were actively integrated into leadership ranks) (Baker 2016, 63; Kim & Kim 2015, 218).

- 13 Of course, religion can also serve as a resource for movements that do not have a religious basis per se (e.g., when the environmental movement uses frames like the ‘preservation of God’s creation’).
- 14 This is, of course, not to say that the Korean anti-LGBT movement is similar to ISIS. The example has just been chosen to make clear the need to proceed cautiously when claiming instrumentalization of religion.

close relationship between collective identity and movement participation (Klandermans 2004, 364).

Snow and Corrigall-Brown (2015, 175) define collective identity as a group-based identity including a “shared sense of ‘one-ness’ or ‘we-ness’ anchored in real or imagined attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of ‘others’.” Collective identity scholars disagree over whether collective identity is located within the individual (Polletta & Jasper 2001, 285) or in the collective (Whittier 1995, 16). This study adopts the view that collective identity can be found in both. As Flesher Fominaya puts it: collective identity “cannot exist unless individuals hold it within their self-conceptions. But unless it is expressed through action and interaction, it cannot be generated in the first place, nor can it be constructed, maintained or developed over time” (Flesher Fominaya 2019, 431; see also Flesher Fominaya 2010; Gamson 1991). This relational perspective on collective identity fits well in terms of methodology with the contentious politics approach, which also centrally focusses on social interactions.

Interactions are also important for the question of whether collective identities are products of socialization, rationally chosen, or consciously constructed. Gamson (1991) demonstrates that, in some instances, movements can build their actions upon pre-existing group identities (which partly coincides with the ‘resource’ perspective outlined above) while in other circumstances no such identities are available and thus have to be created from scratch (cf. also Flesher Fominaya 2019, 432). Alberto Melucci (1995) introduced a theory of collective action, which takes a processual view akin to the constructivist perspective. For Melucci, collective identity is not static or monolithic but rather a result of a dynamic process of interactions. “Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at the more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of actions and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place” (Melucci 1995, 44). Collective identity involves three key elements: a shared cognition of goals, means, and the field of action; “a network of active relationships”; and emotional involvement to be able to feel unity (Melucci 1995, 44, 45). Underlying all these elements is the self-identification and identification of ‘others’ (Melucci 1995, 47). A central variable in this context is conflict. Melucci (1995, 47) argues that conflict strengthens internal solidarity, which in turn reinforces and guarantees the self-actualization of collective identity.

In this study, collective identity is taken into consideration both as given and inter-actively constructed qualities of the movement in question. Regarding the analytical category of religion, its importance as a pre-existing identity component can hardly be denied. As already mentioned, however, this does not mean that this given identity automatically leads to, or provides the basis for action (Flesher Fominaya 2019, 432). Kniss and Burns (2004: 696) caution against equating belief and action. When building collective identity on religion, it is important to acknowledge that there is not the one valid notion of religion. Christian denominations, for instance, can have vastly diverging views on certain aspects of their faith. The same is true for believers who all have their individual way of understanding and living their religion – and also of deciding whether they join collective action on a certain religious issue or not.

Therefore, in order to generate collective action, identity work is necessary, which centrally happens through interactions. The dynamic and relational approach towards identities promoted by the DOC agenda links Melucci's processual approach with the one that highlights pre-existing identities. McAdam et al. (2001, 56) present six assumptions on political identities in contentious politics:

1. participants in contentious politics constantly manipulate, strategize, modify, and reinterpret the identities of parties to their contention, including themselves
2. in a wide variety of contentious politics mobilization of identities constitutes a major part of claim making
3. while new identities emerge during contentious episodes, most individuals initially join the fray through interactive appeals to, and successful appropriation of, existing identities
4. the form, content, and effectiveness of identity mobilization strongly affect both collective action and its outcomes
5. creation, transformation, and extinction of actors, identities, and forms of action in the course of contention alter the array of actors, identities, and actions that appear in routine politics and further contention once the particular episode of contention has ended
6. when it comes to explaining contentious politics, the crucial arena for causal mechanisms lies not in individual minds but in social interaction

While I am not going to systematically test these assumptions, I do take into account their general direction for the analysis. First, I show how identity frames play an important role in the claim making of the Korean anti-LGBT movement. Building on this I, secondly, demonstrate how the movement has transformed the collective identity of the Protestant Right to newly include anti-LGBT attitudes. Thirdly, I trace how this identity shift affects the movement and its closer environment but also third parties actors in the routine political arena. Fourthly, drawing on Melucci's insights in particular, I show in which way conflicts (and their construction) form an important element of the movement's actions, for example in the interaction with opposing movements or counter-movements (cf. Dugan 2004; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Finally, I identify the mechanisms that are at work in these processes.

Mechanisms related to religion and beyond: identity shift

Among the mechanisms that this study investigates is *identity shift*. Identity shift has been defined as the "formation of new identities within challenging groups whose coordinated action brings them together and reveals their commonalities." (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, 37). This definition suggests that identity shift is a reciprocal, processual mechanism, in which two or more groups realize that they have common interests – often embodied by the fight against a common opponent – and shift their identities accordingly to facilitate cooperation. I want to slightly modify this definition by bringing in 'appropriation', a concept that I have already introduced before. In the context of identity shift, appropriation involves one newly emerging actor trying to reorient an existing group to a new conception of its collective purpose (cf. McAdam et al. 2001, 316). Interestingly, McAdam

et al. claim that such an appropriation does not necessarily imply a full-fledged alteration of the pre-existing collective identity (ibid.). Taking the example of Korean Protestantism, homosexuality was not an important issue at all up until the mid-2000s but then ‘rediscovered’ as a symbolic resource. Some Protestant actors politicized the topic and gradually succeeded in getting more actors ‘on board’ like whole Protestant denominations (but also non-Protestant actors) who also increasingly turned to anti-LGBT attitudes and actions.

A fruitful approach to explaining such identity changes can be found in Mahoney and Thelen’s (2009) *A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change*. Their approach stems from institutional theory, a conglomerate of theoretical schools which have productive intersections with social movement scholarship (cf. Roose 2016; McAdam & Scott 2005; Campbell 2005). I will, however, not adopt elements of institutional theory in the strict sense here, but only take the basic idea of Mahoney and Thelen’s typology of modes of change for the purpose of explaining, or rather describing different types of identity shift. My approach does thus not refer to institutions or rules as explanandum, but to collective identities.¹⁵ Mahoney and Thelen (2009, 15f.) describe four modes of institutional change which are: *displacement*, “the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones”; *layering*, “the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones”; *drift*, “the changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment”; and *conversion*, “the changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment”. I suggest replacing the term “rules” by “components of collective identity”, but otherwise integrate these definitions in the study’s analytical toolkit.

The above example of anti-LGBT attitudes gradually becoming part of the Korean Protestant Right’s collective identity could be described as either drift or conversion. This change can be regarded as ‘drift’ in the sense that, for example, LGBT issues have gained greater visibility in Korean society and politics, which is why conservative Protestants felt urged to step in and revive the existing but previously (at least in Korea) rather disregarded Christian understanding of the alleged sinfulness of homosexuality. When imputing strategic motives, this phenomenon could also be understood as ‘conversion’. Certain Protestant groups started using the topic of homosexuality instrumentally, for

15 Proponents of institutional theory would probably argue that institutions and collective identities are not mutually exclusive, since, in their view, institutional rules represent the basic underpinning for many social phenomena, of which the collective identity of social movements is one example. Hall and Taylor (1996, 947), define institutions as “symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frame of meaning’ guiding human action.” While I see the value of the institutionalist approach, also in that it stresses the constructed and ‘taken-for-granted’ character of social rules and norms (cf. e.g., Jepperson 1991, 149), I decided against using this approach as a central component of my study. This is mainly due to the focus of institutionalism on formal rules in organizational contexts (rules which can, and in fact often do translate into informal rules). In comparison, social movements – at least in their initial phases – are less formally organized. More importantly, if thinking in institutionalist terms, this study does not understand institutions as a given fact, but rather aims at finding out, first, what these institutions are in the first place and, secondly, how they are strategically employed to reach certain socio-political goals. The latter perspective can better be tackled by a Gramscian approach with its focus on ideology, ‘common sense’, and, ultimately, hegemony.

example to reinforce Protestant unity by creating a new contentious topic – and potentially even purposefully evoking conflicts (cf. Melucci 1995).¹⁶ If we extend our attention beyond the realm of religious groups and include, for example, political parties, ‘layering’ comes into the picture. While homosexuality had never been criminalized on the national level in Korea, except for the military where homosexual acts among men are liable to legal prosecution, homosexuality had for a long time been virtually invisible in Korea’s pervasively heteronormative society (Seo, Dong-jin 2001; Johannemann 2021). One could argue that the Protestant problematization of homosexuality during the last 15–20 years might yield an impact also on other parts of society like, for instance, political circles. In a manner of speaking, ‘active homophobia’ has been added to the already existing, ‘passive’ condemnation of homosexuality in collective identity, which may even bring about effects in terms of mobilization similar to those present in social movements, for example in the context of elections.

Speaking in Gramscian terms, one could regard processes of identity shift – if strategically invoked – as part of the (counter)hegemonic strategy of the anti-LGBT movement.¹⁷ As I have illustrated above, a central strategic move in Gramsci’s theory consists in influencing the ‘common sense’. Common sense, for Gramsci, is of course a broader concept which does not only apply to a limited subset of society like a social movement’s collective identity. Ideally, however, ‘common sense’ is modified and as such influences collective identity and, ultimately, collective action, and vice-versa. The above perspective on identity changes – mediated through social movement activities – provides a tentative conceptualization of how collective identities, and perhaps ultimately also ‘common sense’ as a whole change. Analyzing identity change through the lens of layering, drift,

16 Insinuating a purposeful evocation of conflicts for ulterior reasons is of course a tricky matter – also in terms of measurement and the providing evidence for such assumptions. It is not my aim to expose or ‘unmask’ the Korean anti-LGBT movement. Rather, I want to be open to several possible explanations – including the instrumental usage of certain topics, of which, as I have shown, previous scholarship has yielded theoretical approaches and, more importantly, also empirical evidence.

17 Gramsci has his own perspective how identities come into being. In a passage in which he explains how the personality (not of a collective but of an individual) is formed, he compares the individual to the ‘historical bloc’, a concept that also joins together ‘internal’ elements and ‘external’ legacies (the ‘historical bloc’ as an analytical concept will be introduced in detail in the next section). Gramsci (1971, 360) writes: “Man is to be conceived as an historical bloc of purely individual and subjective elements and of mass and objective or material elements with which the individual is in an active relationship. To transform the external world, the general system of relations, is to potentiate oneself and to develop oneself. That ethical ‘improvement’ is purely individual is an illusion and an error: the synthesis of the elements constituting individuality is ‘individual’, but it cannot be realised and developed without an activity directed outward, modifying external relations both with nature and, in varying degrees, with other men, in the various social circles in which one lives, up to the greatest relationship of all, which embraces the whole human species.”

and conversion¹⁸ has the potential of carving out where exactly in the social process the anti-LGBT movement gets active in their attempt of influencing society and politics.

In accordance with Gramsci, I argue that religion represents an important identity marker which can be strategically mobilized for collective action. The additional mechanisms of identity change presented here are not restricted to the topic of religion, though. I argue that they can also be used for other identity traits or rather ideological affinities which are potentially relevant for the anti-LGBT such as anti-communism and nationalism. I will elaborate on this point in the next subchapter on the ‘historical bloc’. The redeployment of pre-existing elements as seen in ‘drift’ and ‘conversion’ is a way to further conceptualize the ‘dynamic continuity’ approach. Concretely, adding these types of change to the analytical toolkit substantiates the explanatory power of the ‘bricolage’ mechanism outlined above.

Remains the problem of measurement. Collective identity is not easily observable; identity shift even less so. This would require thorough interviewing of movement participants over a long period of time, for which I lack the access and resources. An approximate measure could be opinion surveys that contain questions on the religious affiliation and on the attitude towards homosexuality. What I can demonstrate, however, is the way movement leaders try to actively steer perceptions – and, I argue, by extension also collective identity – concerning LGBT issues. The framing approach will attend to this task. In this context, I investigate how exactly frames are deployed to change existing identities, but I also show how frames themselves change over time (cf. chapters 7 & 8, and chapter 3.3 on movement leaders).

Boundary work

Along with identity shift, another crucial mechanism in the context of collective identity is *boundary work* or what McAdam et al. (2001, 143) call ‘category formation’. Boundary work “involves creating a reciprocal identification between group members that simultaneously expresses commonalities with and differences from reference groups” (Flesher Fominaya 2019, 435). Demarcating boundaries is important for the formation of collective identity in that this practice brings about a collective self as well as collective others through accentuating and attributing differences (Hunt & Benford 2004, 442f.; Taylor & Whittier 1992). Boundary work is not only done vis-à-vis antagonistic groups but also within social movements, when social movement organizations (SMOs) or even activists of one SMO differ, for example, in the preferences for radical or moderate tactics and framings (Flesher Fominaya 2019, 435). “The *us* is solidified not just against an external *them* but also against *thems* inside, as particular subgroups battle to gain or retain legitimate *us* standing” (Gamson 1997, 180).

18 ‘Displacement’ is a mechanism which does not appear in this enumeration because it does not affect the collective identity I am particularly interested in in this study, i.e., that of the anti-LGBT movement, the Protestant Right, its allies and bystanders that might be drawn into the movement. The complete displacement of a collective identity with a new one is, rather, an endeavor of the LGBT movement, which fights for eradicating anti-LGBT attitudes.

In the context of religion, boundary work is straightforward at first sight: conservative Protestant groups distance themselves from LGBT people and those who support LGBT rights. According to fundamentalist interpretations of the Bible and the ensuing understanding of morality, homosexuality and related issues are regarded as immoral if not sinful and thus unacceptable. Here, religion as a symbolic resource and Melucci's take on conflict as a productive force are pertinent. Conflict is, however, also present within Protestantism itself. Korean Protestantism in particular is characterized by a high degree of splintering, including denominations with vastly differing stances on religious and socio-political matters. As Gramsci has rightly observed, religions are highly dependent on unity, or rather, on keeping up appearances of unity in order to sustain power and legitimacy. Conflicts within a faith complicate creating and sustaining an image of unity. This study investigates how boundary work is practiced in such intricate an environment.

Religion is, presumably, not the only factor influencing the practices of the Korean anti-LGBT movement. Protestantism certainly represents an important mobilization basis for the movement, but it is also worth looking at it due to its longstanding eminent position in South Korean power structures. I argue that these historical legacies are influential to this day. In Gramscian terminology, one can say that the Korean Protestant Right forms part of a 'historical bloc'. I will now further explicate the importance of this analytical category.

3.2 The conservative historical bloc and its legacies

Along with hegemony, civil society, and 'common sense', the *historical bloc* is another essential concept of Gramsci's political thought (Portelli 1972). This concept refers to highly influential and powerful – or in Gramscian terms: hegemonic – social groups in the course of history. The concrete constellation of a historical bloc, for Gramsci, is characterized by the congruence of the material bases and the ideological superstructures in a society. "Structures and superstructures form an 'historical bloc'. That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant *ensemble* of the superstructures is the reflection of the *ensemble* of the social relations of production" (Gramsci 1971, 366).¹⁹

Standing in a Marxist tradition, Gramsci emphasizes the importance of controlling the material bases of a society. However, having this control alone does not suffice to actually exert hegemony. Gramsci notes:

[Marx's propositions tend] to reinforce the conception of historical bloc in which pre-simply material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this dis-

19 The interpretation of what Gramsci exactly meant by 'historical bloc' is contested among scholars. Sotiris (2018), for example, regards the historical bloc not as a descriptive or analytical concept, but argues that it is a strategic concept which blends into Gramsci's larger strategic thinking on how to achieve hegemony. Most scholars, however, hold that the historical bloc represents an analytical and descriptive category and interpret it as a social formation in which a specific social group (or alliance of groups) dominates politics, the economy, as well as the ideological underpinnings of a given society (Choi 2020; Gray 2018; Hoare & Sperber 2016; Short 2013; Thomas 2006).

inction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces. (Gramsci 1971, 377; cited in Short 2013, 199)

These two elements – material forces and ideology – are thus not static factors independent from one another. Rather, they interpenetrate each other and are equally important for groups seeking socio-political leadership (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 106). It is important to note that a historical bloc, once it has achieved a position of hegemony, needs to be continuously reproduced to keep its eminent position. “The historical bloc is the arrangement of different historically constructed social elements and the material and ideological logics that govern the reproduction of those arrangements” (Short 2013, 199). In this context, Thomas (2006, 68) points to the centrality of the “hegemonic apparatus” of the leading group, that is, “the various institutions and practices by means of which it [the historical bloc] concretizes its hegemonic project and continues to secure both social and political leadership, that is leadership both in civil society and at the level of the state.” It is then, of course, also possible for counter-hegemonic apparatuses to engage in efforts to become a historical bloc themselves – or rather, to replace an opposing historical bloc (Thomas 2006, 68).

In order to fully grasp the workings of a particular historical bloc, it is crucial to analyze what Gramsci refers to as “the *ensemble* of the social relations” (Gramsci 1971, 366). Hoare and Sperber argue that Gramsci directs the focus on the “social whole” by introducing the concept of the historical bloc. “It is only by comprehending the relations between all of the parts within the whole that any one part can be fully understood” (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 107; cf. also Short 2013, 201). This corresponds also to the understanding of the historical bloc that Gill put forward. According to him, the historical bloc is “an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements” (Gill 2003, 58; cited in Gray 2018, 241). A historical bloc can therefore consist of various sub-blocs. The parties to this alliance remain distinct while following the basic principles of the bloc and benefiting from its formation and maintenance (cf. Gray 2018, 241; Sassoon 1987, 121).

In this study, I argue that the Korean Protestant Right was and still is part of the ‘conservative historical bloc’ – a social formation that I will explain in greater detail below. The anti-LGBT movement, which is, in turn, part of the Protestant Right is thus also involved in this special relationship. As I have shown, the concept of the historical bloc directs the analytical attention to the relations or the alliances between actors. This study investigates the relations among people and groups of the anti-LGBT movement, but it also takes into consideration relations with actors outside the Korean Protestant Right, ranging from non-Protestant political actors in Korea to allies abroad. I contend that these connections are of great importance for the activities of the anti-LGBT movement – not alone on the level of concrete relations between actors, but especially in respect to the ideological legacies a historical bloc leaves behind – “the sedimentation of ‘common sense’” as Gramsci puts it (Gramsci 1992, 173). In redirecting the analytical focus to the relational aspects of the anti-LGBT movement, the concept of the historical bloc contributes to the ‘dynamics of contention’ approach. Moreover, by appreciating the legacies of the conservative historical bloc, this approach to influential social groups further sub-

stantiates the idea of ‘dynamic continuity’. This way, we can better understand where exactly the ‘old’ elements, which get combined with ‘new’ additions, originate from.

The conservative historical bloc in South Korea

On the ideological level, the conservative historical bloc in South Korea exerted great influence by reinforcing nationalist and, in particular, anti-communist tendencies within South Korean society (Choi, Yong Sub 2020, 1710; Gray 2018, 243). The “hegemonic conservatives” (Choi, Yong Sub 2020, 1710) needed such ideological underpinnings since they suffered from a lack of legitimacy. Many of their leading figures had collaborated with the Japanese during the period of colonial rule (Gray 2018, 243). Beyond the actual threat posed by North Korea, they created the image of an external enemy and turned this into a central trope in basically all socio-political circumstances. Anything deemed communist or just left-wing was vilified by conservative actors and demonstrated as potential security threats. In this manner, the consecutive authoritarian regimes of South Korea justified their dictatorial government styles and the oppression of civil society (Choi Yong Sub 2020, 1711). Eun-Jeung Lee refers to such practices as the “politics of fear”, which she claims even endangers South Korean present-day democracy by perpetuating deep socio-political cleavages within society (Lee, Eun-Jeung 2018; cf. also Wodak 2012; Doucette & Koo 2013).

Therefore, it “is no exaggeration to say that South Korea’s post-war history has been profoundly shaped by the conservative historical bloc that emerged following independence” (Gray 2018, 242). Gray (2018) argues that the division of the Korean peninsula along with US influence, first and foremost through supporting the authoritarian regimes led by the first South Korean President Syngman Rhee and his successors, was crucial for the significance of what he calls the ‘conservative historical bloc’ (Gray 2018, 241). Yong Sub Choi (2020) comes up with a similar argument that he builds upon Nak-chung Paik’s famous account of the ‘division system’. According to Paik, the Cold War antagonism on the Korean peninsula has had a profound impact on both political practices and people’s minds in the North and South; and this effect is still present even in the post-Cold War era (Paik 2011; 1992). “This antagonism strengthened internal domestic stability under each of the two governments, which reproduced and reinforced the division system” (Choi, Yong Sub 2020, 1708). Choi therefore uses the term ‘division bloc’ to denote the influential social formation deliberately constructed by authoritarian and conservative governments in collusion with large industrial conglomerates, the so-called *chaeböl*. As I will detail below, conservative Protestantism also forms part of this bloc.

In fact, even after democratization, the conservative historical bloc – and with it the pervasive ideologies of anti-communism and nationalism – retained most of their power. Therefore, Jang Jip Choi (2005, 247–250) speaks of South Korean democratization as a ‘passive revolution’, a Gramscian term which describes fundamental political and systemic changes enforced by the elite groups themselves – who as a result keep much of their power (cf. also Gramsci 1971, 59). The first civilian president elected after democratization, Kim Young-sam (*Kim Yōng-sam*), a former democracy activist, even intensified the usage of anti-communist frames as a way to cope with the pressure from conservative critics (Gray 2018, 248f.). Bleiker argues that until the late 1990s, as a result, anti-

communism has been a leitmotif of every South Korean government and became deeply engraved in people's consciousness (Bleiker 2005, 12f.; cited in Gray 2018, 244). Using yet another Gramscian term, Choi accordingly claims that nationalism represents a "popular religion" in various parts of South Korean society (Choi, Yong Sub 2020, 1716).²⁰ Many observers concur with the perspective that anti-communism and nationalism have been and continue being significant ideologies in South Korea (Sung 2018; Szell 2017; Kim, Söng-il 2017; Kim, Dong-choon et al. 2015; Shin, Jin-Wook 2008; Shin, Gi-wook 2006; Pai & Tangherlini 1999).

The conservative historical bloc faced several crises from the mid-1990s onwards, first, owing to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and, second, due to counter-hegemonic efforts of the liberal Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. The attempts to achieve inter-Korean reconciliation in the course of the Sunshine Policy endangered the power positions and the anti-communist ideological basis of the conservative bloc. Yong Sub Choi argues, however, that the counter-hegemonic social forces failed to end the division bloc because of the tenacious resistance from hegemonic conservatives including conservative media. Furthermore, the counter-hegemonic forces did not manage to establish a material basis independent from the reliance on the powerful *chaeböl* (Choi 2020, 1717).

The Protestant sub-bloc

I argue that the Protestant Right forms a sub-bloc of the conservative historical bloc in South Korea. As I will concisely present now, significant portions of Korean Protestantism have cooperated with conservative forces in the political arena and have promoted right-wing ideology over the course of the history of Christianity in Korea.

The origins of the theological and political conservatism of large parts of Korean Protestantism are manifold. Kang In-Cheol (2004) argues that this conservative tendency is rooted in the so-called *wolnamin*, i.e., Koreans that came to the South during the period between the liberation from Japanese colonialism and the end of the Korean War. The *wolnamin* promoted highly conservative views, also related to anti-communist stances, and exerted great influence on post-war Korean Protestantism. On the religious level, Korean Protestantism's fundamentalist tendencies are grounded in an even earlier period. Taking the example of the Presbyterian denomination, Hwang Jae-Buhm (2008) portrays the strong Biblicism of Korean Protestantism as reflexes of conservative US-American missionaries' influence and of theological anti-modernist stances. The 'Great Revival' in 1907 was of particular importance in this respect (Ryu, Dae Young 2004). Large parts of Korean Protestants rekindled their faith in a conservative fashion through the influence of US missionaries and in face of the increasing geo-political

20 It has to be noted that nationalism in South Korea is not restricted to right-wing actors or their ideology. Many political left-wing groups ground their nationalism in the experience of Japanese colonialism, against which they fought to regain national independence. Koreans who collaborated with the Japanese colonial regime, as well as their conservative successors-in-spirit are therefore often disparagingly referred to as *ch'in'ilp'a* ('pro-Japanese faction') by left-wing actors. Nationalism in Korea (both North and South, and regardless of right or left), in addition, has a strong ethnational component (*minjokchui*) (cf. Yi & Lee 2020; Gray 2018, 243; Shin, Gi-Wook 2007).

uncertainties in the years ahead of the Japanese occupation and colonization of Korea.²¹ It is also in the early 20th century that anti-communist tendencies first emerged within Korean Protestantism, bringing together theological and political conservatism. This was intensified by Japanese anti-communism during the colonial period and especially in the context and aftermath of the Korean War (Ryu 2004).

The first president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee (1948–1960), cultivated Christianity as an alternative to North Korea's communist ideology (Clark 2008, 219). The separation of religion and state was written into the constitution of the First Republic under Syngman Rhee, but Jin Gu Lee (2018, 140f.) argues that, factually, Protestantism played the role of state religion. Chung-shin Park (2007) portrays the Protestant church as a “political training ground” for modern Korea, since many of the leading political figures within and surrounding the Rhee government emanated from Protestant backgrounds. After the military coup in 1961, Korean Protestantism largely continued to support the authoritarian regimes under president Park Chung-hee and his successors. Anti-communist rhetoric remained central for both the regime and its Protestant supporters. This “symbiosis of church and state” became apparent in the annual ‘prayer breakfasts’ in honor of the president, in which leading Protestant figures participated and which were encouraged by right-wing US missionaries as a prime example of Christian resistance against communism (Clark 2008, 219).

In the late 1980s, large Protestant churches discouraged their adherents to participate in democratization demonstrations, citing the separation of state and religion as a reason (Jang, Sukman 2004, 142). They thereby in fact tried to sustain the authoritarian regime but failed ultimately. In the post-democratization period, Protestantism – which had experienced a phenomenal growth in Korea until then²² – lost a great deal of its popularity due to scandals, corruption cases, and resistance to reform (Cho, Kyuhoon 2014: 317). Such ethical flaws of pastors did not fit the emerging democratic attitudes within society. Progressive theological and socio-political perspectives did exist at the margins of Protestantism,²³ but a significant number of people also left their church. This resulted in mainstream churches becoming even more conservative (Kim, Jin-ho 2012, 70f.).

The 1990s then saw an active politicization of Protestantism with new actors trying to actively influence politics, like, for instance, the interdenominational *Christian Coun-*

21 For detailed accounts on the significance of the ‘Great Revival’ – also called the ‘Great Awakening’ – (*taebuhŭng*) of 1907, see Lee, Timothy S. (2010, 15–32) and Choi, Young-keun (2010).

22 For a general history of Christianity in Korea, see Kim & Kim (2015) and Baker (2016). For various perspectives on how Christianity shaped Korea and vice-versa, see the volume edited by Buswell & Lee (2006), on the particular impact of Evangelicalism refer to Lee, Timothy S. (2010). For attempts at explaining the successful adoption of Protestant Christianity in the late-19th and early-20th century Korea, see Kim, Andrew E. (2001) and Kim, Kwŏn-jŏng (2016). For an explanatory account for Christianity's phenomenal growth after the Korean war, see Chung, Byung Joon (2014) and Kim, Byung-suh (2006).

23 Progressive Protestant churches in favor of, and actively fighting for democratization also existed. The National Council of Churches in Korea (NCK) in particular played an important role in promoting democratic values under the consecutive authoritarian regimes. Several of its adherents suffered from repression as a result (Chang, Yun-shik 1998). Nowadays, NCK still represents progressive parts of Korean Protestantism, fighting for human rights in general and increasingly also for LGBT rights (cf. chapter 12).

cil of Korea (CCK, *han'guk kidokkyo ch'ong'yŏnhaphoe*) which was created in 1989. The liberal governments led by Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-Hyun (2003–2008) faced harsh criticism and protests emanating from such conservative Protestant actors (Cho, Kyuhoon 2014, 319). The politicization of Korean Protestantism especially gained traction in the protests against the Sunshine Policy of the early 2000s. Han-jin Eom (2004) argues that these protests reflect a radicalization of conservative Protestantism and that they are part of the struggles of the extreme right in Korea to retain its long-standing hegemony (cf. also Kim, Hyŏn-jun 2017, 82f.). The hegemonic coalition between fundamentalist Protestants and conservative political forces promoting anti-communism, pro-Americanism, and religious imperialism is thus still in place (Kang, Won-Don 2008; on persistent pro-US tendencies see also: Jang 2004, 151–153; on anti-communism: Park, Young Whan 2012, 198–201).

Dae-young Ryu (2004) shows that those Protestants who engage in anti-North Korea protests have peculiar theological views. These views include premillennialism and Manichean dualism, in which the United States (along with its allies) on the one side, and communism on the other figure as the central actors in the fight of 'good' versus 'evil'.²⁴ Ryu claims that the basis underlying the emergence of right-wing Protestantism consists of a power vacuum created by cold-war-period hegemonic groups on the one side and reform-oriented groups on the other. This corresponds to the arguments seen above, according to which the conservative historical bloc as such fights against liberal and progressive forces to maintain its privileged, hegemonic position in Korean politics and society.

Ryu (2004) consequently argues that the newly emerging conservative Protestant political activism in the 21st century has a defensive character rather than being pro-active. Eom (2004), however, rejects the view that the politicization of Korean Protestantism merely represents reactionary reflexes. Despite being rooted in the traditions of conservative anti-communism and pro-Americanism, Eom claims that Korean Protestantism's political endeavors are forward-looking and, in fact, paralleled by similar developments of right-wing mobilization worldwide since the 1980s. Hyŏn-jun Kim (2017, 82f.) provides a similar perspective. According to Kim, conservative Protestants want to restore their social status and strive to achieve cultural hegemony, for which they colluded with the recent right-wing administrations and turned to 'old' anti-communist and 'new' anti-LGBT frames – an example of the *bricolage* mechanism as argued in this study. Through doing this, they have managed to create a powerful right-wing network since the early 2000s and proliferate and mobilize effectively. This study concurs with Eom's and Kim's latter perspectives, which emphasize the continuous and, at the same time, dynamic aspect of right-wing political action. In this context, Hyung Chull Jang (2018) provides a recapitulatory analysis of the Korean Protestant Right which matches the Gramscian bloc

24 Premillennialists believe that there will be a 1000-year-long reign of Christ after his return to earth. This eschatological (i.e., the part of theology that concerns the 'end times') belief is mainly built upon a literal reading of a few Biblical passages and includes a clear juxtaposition of, and battle between good and evil, out of which the righteous will prevail and be resurrected from death (Pak, Ung Kyu 2005, 6f.). For a thorough account on the origins of premillennialism in Korea, refer to Pak, Ung Kyu (2005).

and sub-bloc logic. Jang explains that the organizations of the Protestant Right belong to the conservative superstructure of Korean society and take part in reproducing right-wing ideology. At the same time, they participate in the attempt to strengthen or rebuild right-wing hegemony, thereby showing loyalty to the conservative Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations (2008–2013, 2013–2017). In return, the Protestant Right hopes to maintain their vested interests and obtain further privileges from the respective governments. Chull Lee's (2018) research shows that in these struggles, conservative Christian leaders make use of diverse arguments to justify their active involvement in politics. For example, they claim that the separation of church and state should not be misunderstood in a way that applies this separation too strictly. Others cite a "spiritual war" that has to be fought in society to defeat the devil. Another justification builds on historical precedents, arguing that Christian historical figures like Calvin had also been involved in politics. Moreover, the argument goes, socio-political activism is an effective way to evangelize the masses (Lee, Chull 2018, 143).

Kyuhoo Cho (2014, 320; 322) likens these political activities by Korean Protestantism to those of professional social movement organizations and asserts that conservative Protestant churches have emerged as an active political force in Korea. This politicization, however, is not only restricted to the arena of social movements, i.e., non-traditional political actors. A significant portion of the Protestant Right endeavors to enter politics in the strict sense of the word. This became especially apparent when the conservative camp within Protestantism established the 'Christian Party for Practical Love' (*kidok sarang silch'ön dang*) to run in the general elections of 2004 (Lee, Jin Gu 2018, 157–161). More recently, its successor party, the 'Christian Liberty Party' (*kidok chayü dang*),²⁵ entered political competition, featuring anti-LGBT rhetoric and activism against LGBT rights as central campaign pledges and strategies. It received 2.63 percent of the votes in the 2016 general election, almost reaching the 3 percent threshold necessary for entering the National Assembly. Kim Jin-ho (2016: 10) asserts that the Christian Liberal Party represents the paradigmatic combination of far-right (*kü'gu*) politics with religious fundamentalism that can be found in the Korean Protestant Right.

What becomes evident here is the ambiguous relation of the Protestant Right to the state. To use the terminology of the contentious politics research agenda, one can say that conservative Protestant actors are both members and challengers. They are members of the conservative historical bloc, which, as I have shown, they have actively supported throughout the years. Conservative Protestants have also been keeping close relations with the main conservative parties and governments both before and after democratization. At the same time, parts of the Korean Protestant Right developed their very own political endeavors and projects. They established associations and political parties and eventually entered the political competition – however, without tangible success so far.

25 The Christian Liberty Party was renamed 'Christian Liberty Unification Party' (*kidok chayü t'ong'il dang*) before the 2020 general elections (in which it received 1.83 percent of the votes for the proportional representation seats). In June 2021, it changed names again, running henceforth as the 'National Revolutionary Party' (*kungmin hyöngmyöng dang*). Its present name is 'Freedom Unification Party', but its web address is still the old one: <http://clparty.kr/> (as of 19 May 2023).

While generally sharing the conservative historical bloc's outlook on political and social issues, that is, its values and – perhaps most importantly – its legacy, it seems that the Protestant sub-bloc is partially diverging from its bedrock. This divergence includes, as shown above, an increased thirst for political power, but also, I argue, a newly found role as an agenda setter within the conservative camp. This study concentrates on the way the Protestant Right politicizes LGBT issues. Other issues like anti-feminism or anti-Muslim activities are also part of this (cf. Kim, Nami 2016). In turn, these newly politicized topics affect 'traditional' conservative politics and politicians, who gladly jump on this bandwagon. Protestant Right actors utilize existing organizational structures and ideological legacies in such a way that they are able to build professional and oftentimes effective new organizational structures.

What we can observe here are the mechanisms of bricolage and modularity. The Protestant Right reframes 'traditional' contents of the conservative historical bloc to serve its anti-LGBT endeavors (*bricolage*). These new frames are, in turn, emulated and reused by traditional political actors (*modularity*) (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, 16f). In this sense, both old and new actors and action repertoires serve as models for each other. While the conservative historical bloc in Korea continues to exert a significant influence on its constituting sub-actors, it readily incorporates new additions to its action forms and ideological repertoires. In fact, I argue that such additions from what one might as well call the anti-LGBT *sub-sub-bloc* of the conservative historical bloc may stabilize the whole structure of the conservative historical bloc.

The Korean anti-LGBT movement may even exert influence across borders, in interactions with actors that nurture similar religious and socio-political ideas and endeavors. Such relations form part of what I term the *transnational conservative historical bloc*, a loose but increasingly interconnected network of right-wing actors worldwide who learn from each other, support one another and, ultimately, strive to gain socio-political power. These emerging counter-hegemonic forces build their activism and ideology upon right-wing legacies from their respective local background and use, among other means, modern technologies such as the Internet to disseminate these. I will now briefly present this globalized variation of the historical bloc.

The transnational dimension of the bloc logic

In his seminal article from 1983, Robert W. Cox contemplates the usefulness of Gramscian concepts in the field of International Relations. He mainly occupies himself with the world order and ways to change it. For this purpose, Cox applies Gramscian concepts like hegemony, war of position, and passive revolution to the study of international relations. In Cox' approach, the historical bloc plays a crucial, if not the most important role in the process of changing hegemony in the world order. Cox summarizes: "[...] the task of changing world order begins with the long, laborious effort to build new historic blocs within national boundaries" (Cox 1983, 174). This perspective matches Antonio Gramsci's take on international relations:

Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in the social structure,

through its technical-military expressions, modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the international field too. (Gramsci 1971, 259)

With the term ‘organic’, Gramsci designates long-term and structural, i.e., the fundamental and basic aspects of social phenomena (Cox 1983, 169).²⁶ The basic social relations and structures *within a country* thus have a significant impact on its international relations and on world order at large.

On first sight, this perspective differs from approaches which regard political activism in the national arena as a response to global problems, trends, and developments. John Meyer et al. (1997), for example, turn their attention to the macro-level, global-scale effects that institutional settings exert in a *world society*. Their approach assumes that we can observe a highly pervasive isomorphic diffusion of, and adaptation to universalistic world models, which is done in order to gain legitimacy (Meyer et al. 1997, 148). According to this perspective, the rejection of world-cultural principles is difficult. If certain social groups want to defend local patterns, they are “well advised to invoke universalistic cultural principles of some sort and join with others in generalizing the issue to the world level” (Meyer et al. 1997, 170).

Lechner and Boli (2005) offer a related research agenda with their *world culture* approach.²⁷ They emphasize, however, that world-cultural elements can only be effective when they are embedded in national and local organizations and structures (Lechner & Boli 2005, 235). Moreover, they point out that there is not *the one* world culture that everybody worldwide follows. Rather, different groups promote different kinds of world-cultural elements. One example the authors put forward is Pentecostalism as a global movement (Lechner & Boli 2005, 173–190).

This study does not privilege one theoretical view over the other. Whether the local or the global are more pervasive in affecting national and transnational political activities is not the key to understanding the Korean anti-LGBT movement. Rather, the fact that *there are* nationally embedded transnational networks among ideologically and thematically related groups is important. Such a perspective focuses on those societal groups that strive for power and influence by means of, among others, building globally intertwined networks among (what they hope for) increasingly powerful socio-political actor networks on the local level – or in Gramscian terminology: historical blocs. While Gramsci and Cox regard any historical bloc as necessarily embedded in national contexts, they also acknowledge that “the *ensemble* of the social relations” (Gramsci 1971, 366), which is crucial for building and maintaining historic blocs, also encompasses the level of international and transnational relations. In the context of this study, we can observe the workings of what I refer to as the *transnational conservative historical bloc*.

For a long time, research on right-wing groups had a focus on individual, nationally based organizations. Empirical in-depth studies on populist, radical or extremist right-wing networks which cross borders have been scarce (Caiani & della Porta 2018,

26 Refer also to Gramsci’s usage of the term ‘organic’ in his concept of ‘organic intellectuals’ in chapter 3.3.

27 For an extensive overview of different theoretical approaches to analyzing world culture, see Lechner and Boli (2005), chapter 2, pp. 30–59.

332). Recent years, however, have seen rising attention to such relations, with a special focus on transnational activities and networks of right-wing actors (Caiani 2018; Bob 2013; 2012). The studies deal with topics as diverse as the way groups of the extreme right use the Internet as a means to build networks (Caiani & Parenti 2013), the specific right-wing connections of French and Italian neofascist groups (Mammone 2015), and the proliferation of US-based conservatism through founding and financially supporting ideologically corresponding organizations and networks abroad (Teles & Kenney 2008). The US-American Christian Right – politically and theologically conservative Christian actors – pursue similar strategies when promoting what they frame as ‘family values’ on a global scale and thereby cooperating with local politicians, organizations, and churches abroad – in an effort to especially fight human rights of LGBT people (Oliver 2013; Anderson 2011; Kaoma 2009; Buss & Herman 2003). As I have shown above in chapter 2.2, an inegalitarian version of Gramscian theory itself has become a core strategic element of New Right actors worldwide (Abrahamsen et al. 2020).

Robert Cox’ Gramscian approach to international relations is principally interested in the role of the state and international organizations, which he presents as central mechanisms in hegemonic struggles (Cox 1983, 172f). He does also, however, acknowledge the crucial role of groups which build the institutions and the ideology necessary to achieve or maintain hegemony. “An historic bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic social class” (Cox 1983, 168). Cox does not elaborate much on who these social groups actually are and how they interact in the international arena.

Social movement scholars did develop more detailed elaborations. *Transnational collective action* is perhaps the most basic term in this respect, denoting “coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions” (della Porta & Tarrow 2005, 7).²⁸ While this concept’s narrow focus on states and international organizations as targets of activism needs to be questioned – since transnational influence can also affect other societal actors – it helps us put the analytical spotlight on the linkages between nationally based social movement organizations. Difficulties, however, arise when trying to discern whether transnational collective action is the result of incidental connections and borrowings or whether they actually represent consciously formed, perhaps even institutionalized networks between social movements in different places. For now, it is therefore more productive to concentrate on the circumstances that foster different kinds of transnationalization.

Della Porta and Tarrow (2005, 3–6) discern three types of transnationalization processes that bring about transnationally acting movements (cf. also Desai 2008, 958f.).

28 Further common terms to denote such international coordination among social movements include *transnational social movement organizations* (TSMOs) (Sikkink & Smith 2002; Smith 1997) and *transnational advocacy networks* (TANs) (Keck & Sikkink 1998). The latter concept came first into being as part of the famous “boomerang pattern” conceived by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, according to which weak non-state actors fail to influence domestic politics (e.g., concerning human rights campaigns) and therefore seek connections to other NGOs abroad, which then put pressure on their own governments who, in turn, put pressure on the other state’s leadership (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 12f.). TANs also play an important role in Risse and Sikkink’s (1999) “spiral model of human rights change”, which builds upon the boomerang pattern.

First, movements may get influenced or even come into existence through the *diffusion* of ideas, issues, and frames. Diffusion – if understood not only as a passive process – relates to the mechanism of modularity introduced before. Secondly, *internalization* concerns movements that play out external conflicts domestically. Thirdly, *externalization* can be at work, meaning that supranational and transnational organizations are encouraged to get involved in domestic conflicts (on this last point, cf. also Keck & Sikkink 1998). This study investigates whether these transnationalization processes exist in Korean anti-LGBT activism as well (cf. chapter 7.5).

Marco Giugni (2002) argues that transnationalization processes such as diffusion render movements increasingly similar. According to Giugni, *globalization* has an important effect on the convergence of movements: “the increasing interconnectedness of the world stimulates transnational structures and processes which might simultaneously affect movements in different countries” (Giugni 2002: 15). Furthermore, Giugni introduces the *structural affinity model*, which points to the influence similar structures in different countries can exert on the homogenization of movements. Such structures, in turn, may result from globalization dynamics and serve as *political opportunity structures*, for example in terms of resembling cleavage or conflict structures, similar political systems and opportunities for alliance building (Giugni 2002, 17f.).

In the Korean case, one can accordingly argue that conservative Protestant groups are part of the overall social structure and, hence, a resource or opportunity for people (or factions of said Protestant groups) who wish to mobilize around the anti-LGBT issue. Similar processes may have been ongoing in other countries, where anti-LGBT groups build upon similar conservative Christian foundations. Developing this argument further, one can proceed on the assumption that these movements show resemblances across borders because, from the outset, similar groups tend to cooperate and use similar strategies and frames.²⁹ In the case of religious groups, transnational collaboration may already exist due to denominational ties. If they have the same or similar doctrinal or exegetic traditions, this may minimize the threshold for working together – further undergirding the argument on cooperation among resembling actors. On the level of beliefs, values, and norms, Christian groups – and by extension, similarly oriented right-wing actors – may be particularly eager to share and, importantly, defend their ideology in unison and thus try to influence society and politics. Such groups are then part of what Keck and Sikkink (1998, 1) call a “transnational advocacy network”, i.e., networks of nontraditional political actors like social movements that act on a global level to influence states and international organizations, and – importantly – that are motivated by principled ideas and values.³⁰ The aspect of ‘principledness’ needs to be stressed here:

29 Here again, we come across a ‘chicken or egg’ causality dilemma. What was there first? Anti-LGBT attitudes, e.g., rooted in a conservative or fundamentalist interpretation of Biblical texts or external impulses (domestic or transnational) that problematize LGBT issues and mobilize people to act against sexual and gender diversity – to only then, in a second step, utilize Christian resources (on the ideational as well as on the institutional levels) for the purpose of anti-LGBT activism? This study strives to shed light on this problem, however, without claiming that it can be ultimately solved.

30 “Ideas that specify criteria for determining whether actions are right and wrong and whether outcomes are just or unjust are shared principled beliefs or values.” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 1; see also

What distinguishes principled activists [...] is the intensely self-conscious and self-reflective nature of their normative awareness. No mere automatic ‘enactors,’ these are people who seek to amplify the generative power of norms, broaden the scope of practices those norms engender, and sometimes even renegotiate or transform the norms themselves. (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 35)

This means that values, norms, and ideas are important as resources, indeed, across borders. Keck and Sikkink highlight that transnationally acting social movement organizations consciously make use of ideas – regardless of whether they have local or foreign origins – and do so also through instrumentalizing and, at that, adapting them for their own specific (locally oriented) agenda and gain. This insight may seem paradoxical when considering that right-wing and far-right parties and movements commonly denounce the cultural, economic, and political processes of globalization as having negative consequences for locals (Bornschieer 2018, 220–224).³¹ Despite these nationalist positions, radical right actors themselves engage in transnationalizing processes (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). Thomas Grumke (2013) therefore refers to these actors as “globalized anti-globalists”.

These anti-globalist tendencies notwithstanding, right-wing groups and activists operate both domestically and transnationally, featuring local and foreign interests, influences, and strategies. Sidney Tarrow’s concept of *rooted cosmopolitans* captures this phenomenon, which I argue also works for describing the transnational ambitions of right-wing actors. Tarrow defines rooted cosmopolitans as follows:

individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies (Tarrow 2005, 29, original italicized).³²

Tarrow’s concept complements the mechanisms of internalization, externalization, and diffusion seen above by highlighting both the rootedness of actors in the home country, as well as in an increasingly globalizing environment. It also coincides with Antonio Gramsci’s and Robert Cox’ view that international and transnational relations necessarily originate from domestically based actors, their local networks, ideologies, and legacies.

Goldstein & Keohane 1993, 8–10). An analogous concept to transnational advocacy networks in the field of International Relations (i.e., relations among states and international organizations) is that of “knowledge-based” or “epistemic communities” introduced by Peter Haas (1992), which denotes global networks of scientists and experts who share causal beliefs and try to influence (international) politics in this direction. An extension of Haas’ argument, “epistemic brokers” (Herring 2010) will play a role as an analytical category in chapter 10 on social movement entrepreneurs.

31 On the related issue of euroscepticism, i.e., opposing European integration, see, e.g., Vasilopoulou 2018.

32 It should be noted that Tarrow (2005, 29) defines “rooted cosmopolitans” as not only comprising social movement activists, but also “business executives, lawyers, and international civil servants and the national civil servants in regular contact with them.” This endorses a Gramscian perspective, according to which historical blocs are formed by a diverse range of socio-political actors in order to obtain leverage.

This study investigates in chapter 7.5 in which way the Korean anti-LGBT movement cooperates transnationally with allies abroad and how these instances of cooperation affect their actions, frames, and tactics (and vice-versa). Ultimately, this study contributes to answering the question whether the endeavors of the Protestant Right and its anti-LGBT faction serve to (re)create a conservative historical bloc not only domestically, but also on a transnational, global scale. The next part will focus on the concrete actors – the social movement entrepreneurs or, in Gramscian terms, ‘intellectuals’ – who work to realize such endeavors.

3.3 Social movement leaders as ‘intellectuals’

The analytical categories outlined so far – religion and historic bloc – represent large scale, partly institutionalized entities. But who are the concrete actors on the ground who potentially make use of religion as a resource? What groups build their activism upon the legacies of the conservative historic bloc? While Gramsci acknowledges the central position of the ‘masses’ for achieving hegemony (Gramsci 1971, 393), his strategic outlook on socio-political change leads him to the conclusion that particularly one societal group is of utmost importance to reach fundamental change: the intellectuals.

Gramsci’s take on intellectuals

Antonio Gramsci famously claims that “everyone is a philosopher” (Gramsci 1971, 323). He notes: “There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: homo faber cannot be separated from homo sapiens” (Gramsci 1971, 9). Gramsci here emphasizes that everyone has an intellect that they use, but he does not assume that everyone is intellectual in a professional sense. Gramsci thus adopts an inclusive definition of intellectuals, in the sense that in modern times, one can become or serve as an intellectual also beyond class-bound restrictions that had determined intellectual activity for a long time. For Gramsci, the term intellectual has a functional meaning rather than denoting the result of long studies: “What matters is the function, which is directive and organizational, i.e. educative, i.e. intellectual” (Gramsci 1971, 16).

He differentiates between two kinds of intellectuals: *traditional* and *organic* intellectuals.³³ Traditional intellectuals, Gramsci writes, represent a

noblesse de robe, with its own privileges [...]. Since these various categories of traditional intellectuals experience through an esprit de corps their uninterrupted historical conti-

33 Deirdre O’Neill and Mike Wayne (2018, 171f.) suggest a third analytical category of intellectuals, which they argue reflects the present roles of intellectual working professionally in corporations and state bureaucracies, i.e., *technocratic intellectuals*. Their functions “are neither ‘traditional’ because they are so obviously tied to the dynamic and moving terrain of occupations responding to economic forces, nor are they ‘organic’ in the sense that their agenda is more focused on the smooth functioning of an apparatus rather than the broader project of public persuasion and politics” (O’Neill & Wayne 2018, 171). This typological addition will not be further treated in this study, though, since its main focus is on *organic* intellectuals.

nuity and their special qualification, they thus put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group. (Gramsci 1971, 7)

Emblematic for this kind of intellectuals are, for Gramsci, the clergymen who, for centuries, had occupied a key position in knowledge building, had close ties to the dominant political forces (or were part of them), but at the same time displayed a certain degree of autonomy and developed a class-like self-conscience, loyalty, and pride, what Gramsci calls an “*esprit de corps*”. On the ideational level, traditional intellectuals promote the established ideological basis of the those in power – for example, by fostering the ‘religion of the intellectuals’ as in the case of clerics (see also chapter 2.3). Seen from a temporal-historical perspective, traditional intellectuals are those intellectuals that existed before the emergence of new, (counter-)hegemonic forces (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 35; cf. also O’Neill & Wayne 2018, 170, 172).

Organic intellectuals emerge along with such new socio-political forces (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 34). They are organic in the sense that they come into being ‘organically’, that is, as an integral part of forces that promote new worldviews and, accordingly, aim at establishing new socio-political and cultural realities in a given context. Gramsci describes organic intellectuals as follows:

Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals, which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its function, not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields.” (Gramsci 2000, (ref. 20), 301)

Gramsci’s definition of organic intellectuals is, thus, a pragmatic one, in that he asserts their clear functionality for newly ascending social groups. Organic intellectuals serve the interests of these specific forces and do so by working to obtain popular consensus for a new socio-political agenda (Nieto-Galan 2011, 458). It is not only the consensus that is needed, but also homogeneity, which refers to “the decisive moment when a social group acquires self-consciousness and thus prepares to enter the historical stage as a collective actor” (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 37). The organic intellectuals are the central figures promoting the cultural and socio-political project of an upcoming social group. In Gramscian terminology: they sow the seeds for these groups’ intended ‘intellectual and moral reform’. Ultimately, organic intellectuals are the key agents for reaching hegemony. Gramsci, therefore, denotes organic intellectuals – in contrast to the traditional ones – as the practical ‘organizers’ and, on the ideological level, as the ‘permanent persuaders’.

The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, ‘permanent persuader’ and not just a simple orator. (Gramsci 1971, 10).

Organic intellectuals are the key agents for transforming the common sense in a way that it becomes the *buon senso*, the ‘good sense, i.e., a coherent body of thought that aims at convincing and winning over the general public (Olsaretti 2014, 375). In this process, organic intellectuals are producers of knowledge and culture, which they build upon existing common sense intelligible to the ‘masses’. Organic intellectuals “are able to find intellectual resources through organic integration with the masses, working out the principles and problems which the masses had in their own practical activity, and eventually building a cultural-historical block” (Forlenza 2019, 13). Forlenza argues that this is in stark contrast to traditional intellectuals who denied the general public the knowledge necessary to build a critical conscience and, ultimately, inhibited their socio-political participation (ibid.).

Along with the reliance on common sense, a crucial role of organic intellectuals is to create new ideas, a new *Weltanschauung*, a fresh worldview, or parts thereof (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 37; Olsaretti 2014, 375). Indeed, Gramsci claims that if intellectuals fail to include social change into their schemes “they are but a conservative and fossilized leftover of the social group that has been left behind historically” (Gramsci 1977a, Q11\$16, 1407; quoted in, and translated by Olsaretti 2014, 376). Having one important argument of this study in mind, one can say that organic intellectuals are actors that put dynamic continuity into practice.

Intellectuals as social movement entrepreneurs

Whenever scholars of social movements deal with actors similar to intellectuals as conceived by Antonio Gramsci, they resort to the analytical category of leadership. In fact, movement leaders need considerable intellectual capacities for the many tasks they have to accomplish.

A host of social movement activities – framing grievances and formulating ideologies, debating, interfacing with media, writing, orating, devising strategies and tactics, creatively synthesizing information gleaned from local, national, and international venues, dialoguing with internal and external elites, improvising and innovating, developing rationales for coalition building and channeling emotions – *are primarily intellectual tasks*. (Morris & Staggenborg 2004, 175; my emphasis)

I argue that the Gramscian category of intellectuals can be productively integrated into leadership matters as dealt with in social movement studies. Morris and Staggenborg (2004, 171) define leaders as “strategic decision-makers who inspire and organize others to participate in social movements”. Movement leaders, just like Gramscian intellectuals, try to convince people to adopt or reinforce certain positions for the purpose of mobilizing them for concrete action. As the list of intellectual tasks above suggests, however, movement leaders are not only ideological ‘permanent persuaders’. They also act as organizers when drafting strategies, seeking cooperation partners, and institutionalizing the movement. Building upon Max Weber’s famous ideal types of authority (Weber 1964 [1887]; 1968 [1922]), John Wilson proposed three types of movement leaders: charismatic and ideological leaders corresponding to the persuasion type on the one hand, and prag-

matic leaders, which assume administrative-organizational tasks on the other (Wilson 1973; cited in della Porta & Diani 2006, 142).³⁴

In her seminal study on the pro-choice movement, Suzanne Staggenborg (1988) differentiates between professional and nonprofessional movement leaders who both, in turn, can serve as “entrepreneurs”, that is, “leaders who initiate movements, organizations, and tactics” (Staggenborg 1988, 587). Professional managers, for Staggenborg, are those who get paid for their movement-related work and potentially build careers upon this (*ibid.*: 586). The latter are more likely to create formalized, rule-based social movement organizations (SMOs), while nonprofessional leaders, mostly volunteers, prefer informal structures (*ibid.*: 594). Staggenborg thus presented an empirically based counter-argument to John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (1973; 1977) who had claimed that professionalized social movements were becoming more prevalent because movement entrepreneurs tended to create SMOs (as opposed to maintaining looser movement structures). In furthering their argument within the resource mobilization approach to social movements, McCarthy and Zald (1977, 1215) even suggested that “issue entrepreneurs” were able to fabricate grievances without the need of an actual aggrieving precedent.

Later scholarship has criticized this excessive emphasis on agency as well as an undue focus on structures of political opportunity, claiming that the failure to integrate these two perspectives resulted in a lack of theorization of leadership in social movements (Morris & Staggenborg 2004, 171; Ganz & McKenna 2019, 187). In a similar vein, the question of whether a focus on movement leadership is necessary or appropriate at all has been disputed among researchers. One branch of social movement studies followed Robert Michels’ (1958 [1911]) argument that any movement, organization, or party, in order to be sustainably successful, needs to bureaucratize and concentrate authority in leadership circles – Michels’ famous “iron law of oligarchy” (cf. also Piven & Cloward 1977). Others, however, doubted that this strong argument withstands the empirical test, stressing that what constitutes the very essence of social movements is their nonformalized, nonhierarchical, and grassroots character (e.g., Sutherland et al. 2013; Voss & Sherman 2000).

This study focuses on structural elements of leadership *and* its agency dimension. Leadership is based on previous experiences and cultural traditions, pre-existing organizational structures, and the socio-political opportunities that movements have at a given point in time (Morris & Staggenborg 2004, 173, 180). Without (pro)active leaders, the odds are high that these structural elements would oftentimes be neglected or overlooked. In the case of political opportunities, for example, actors are needed who detect an opportunity, who interpret and translate it so that it appeals to potential adherents (Morris & Staggenborg 2004, 179f.). The *Dynamics of Contention* (DOC) approach stresses this aspect: opportunities are not objective structural factors, but rather something that has to

34 Early social movement scholarship also proposed different kinds of leadership roles or styles, for example charismatic, administrator, intellectual (Killian 1964), instrumental and affective (Downton 1973) (cf. also della Porta & Diani 2006, 142), as well as outward-facing representative and coordinative work (“social movement leadership”) and inward-facing management work (“social movement organization leadership”) (Ganz & McKenna 2019, 185).

be attributed in the first place. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, 43) call this mechanism *attribution of opportunity (or threat)*.

Movement leaders thus occupy a crucial position in the workings of social movements, which is why this study will not hastily discard analyzing their particular agency in greater detail. While the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ (Michels 1958) certainly needs to be put into question – especially in the case of social movements where broad participation plays an important role – I claim that the agentic nature of leaders, their creative and coordinative work is at least just as important. Existing research on movement leadership seems to neglect the fact that different political and socio-cultural backgrounds may bring about different movement structures and action forms. Studies so far have predominantly focused on leadership types and practices in progressive movements. Only a few studies explicitly analyze leaders of conservative movements, concentrating mostly on the role of women leaders in the US-American antifeminist, evangelical and Tea Party movements (Johnson 2018; Critchlow 2018; Deckman 2016) and leader figures of extreme right movements in Serbia and Germany (Lilly & Irvine 2012; Virchow 2013).³⁵ This study contributes to this literature by investigating a case outside the United States and Europe and asking the question whether a specifically Korean leadership culture can be found in the anti-LGBT movement.³⁶ The specifics of this case study include the church background of leaders and, accordingly, particular charismatic or authoritative leadership styles as well as special framing strategies. Another aspect concerns the leaders’ educational background, their “educational capital” (cf. Morris & Staggenborg 2004, 175) – especially in a society where education is held in high esteem. Apart from these analytical foci, this study concentrates on three further, interrelated points: the entrepreneurial character, the framing activities, and the relation-building practices of movement leaders.

The notion of *social movement entrepreneurs* was first introduced by McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) to denote actors who call attention to certain issues to broaden the base for recruiting people to social movements (Staggenborg 2013, 1). Movement entrepreneurs thus have an important role in the context of mobilizing human, but also other kinds of resources. They are the creative forces of social movements, being creative in the sense of imaginative powers but also, literally and ultimately, as the actual creators of emerging social movements. They produce the initial sparks for further developments and, in the long run, contribute to the maintenance of the project, consolidating, institutionalizing, and perhaps professionalizing the movement, for example through founding social movement organizations (SMOs).

35 The literature on – also historical – eminent *political* leaders of conservative or (extreme) right-wing *parties* is more extensive, cf. e.g., on the Dutch Geert Wilders (Vossen 2011), the French Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen (Stockemer 2017), and the Austrian Jörg Haider (Dorner-Hörig 2014).

36 The literature on leadership in Korea mostly focuses on political leadership in South and North Korea (Suh & Lee 2014) and emotion-based leading practices in South Korea (Ha 2011). Cf. also chapter 10 for a more in-depth perspective on particular leadership cultures in South Korean (Christian) conservatism.

Framing as a key task of movement leaders

Like Gramsci's concept of intellectuals, movement entrepreneurs act as producers, adapters, and disseminators of arguments and ideology. The means to do so is *framing*. Frame analysis is an analytical and methodological approach conceived by Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000), now representing, besides political opportunity structures and resource mobilization, one of the three main theoretical schools in social movement studies. Frame analysis "zooms in on how particular ideas/ideologies are used deliberately to mobilize supporters and demobilize adversaries vis-à-vis a particular goal" (Lindekilde 2014: 200), thus looking at the agentic and strategic side of actors' statements and claims. The particular frames analyzed in social movement studies are called 'collective action frames'.

'[C]ollective action frames' function by focusing attention, combining events, situations, and social facts, and transforming the understanding of aspects of social reality, but they put more emphasis on the agentic and innovative side of 'framing' – the conscious signifying work carried out by social movement actors. (Lindekilde 2014: 201)³⁷

Morris and Staggenborg (2004, 183) assert that the framing approach has disregarded the important role of movement leaders in the framing process, as well as how the framers' background influences the way frames get enacted. In a similar vein, while dismissing overly voluntaristic approaches to framing, Stephen Hart (1996) emphasized that pre-existing cultural codes exert significant influence framing processes, particularly so in the case of religion-based movements, which resonates with Gramsci's thoughts on religion. Since leaders commonly emanate from pre-existing organizational contexts (Morris & Staggenborg 2004, 173), their framing practice will also be affected by this legacy. I claim that movement leaders thus represent the personified link between 'old' and 'new' ideational and action-related elements within the dynamic continuity approach, as proposed in this study.

One concretization of the framing practices of movement leaders is Howard Becker's (1963) 'moral entrepreneurs'. Staggenborg aptly summarizes Becker's main argument: "moral rules, and our views about what is deviant or acceptable behavior, do not follow automatically from the nature of the behavior, but are the result of labeling activities by moral entrepreneurs" (Staggenborg 2013, 1). This corresponds to the 'attribution' mechanism of the DOC research agenda and, at the same time, points to the moralizing effect movement leaders, understood as entrepreneurs, can exert. In the context of gender and sexuality issues, which are often regarded as moral matters, this insight may gain particular analytical value.

37 Another definition of collective action frames regards them as "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the campaigns of a social movement organization (SMO)" (Benford & Snow 2000, 614). In very broad terms, Erving Goffman (1974, 21) has defined frames in general as "schemata of interpretation".

(Norm) brokerage as a relational mechanism

Another approach towards the framing efforts of movement leaders is Ronald J. Herring's (2010) concept of 'epistemic brokers'. Epistemic brokers act as conveyors of knowledge claims to support specific framing efforts on contentious issues. They gain legitimacy through their actual or alleged expert status (cf. also Haas 1992) and "command authority from their positions at junctures of networks, enabling the screening, weighting, theorizing and diffusion of contentious empirical accounts" (Herring 2010, 614). Herring highlights the contentious nature of such accounts, in that there are cases of seemingly knowledge-based claims that turn out to be inaccurate or false. In his approach, Herring combines special, i.e., purportedly expert, or 'intellectual' framing practices with a relational perspective. Brokers, however, do not only act in the context of disseminating certain types of frames, they also help build other relations – for example, of an interpersonal or interorganizational kind – to promote their specific socio-political agenda.

'Brokerage', and along with it, *relational* perspectives have been gaining attention and influence in sociology and, particularly, social movement studies over the past decades (cf. Marshall & McKenna 2019, 190; Stovel & Shaw 2012; Vasi 2011; Diani 2003; McAdam et al. 2001; Gould & Fernandez 1989; Marsden 1982).³⁸ McAdam et al. (2001, 142) define brokerage as "the linking of two or more currently unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with each other and/or with yet another site." In contrast to the traditional view on diffusion where information is directly transmitted, brokerage functions through an intermediary, which establishes an enabling connection in the first place (Vasi 2011, 11). "The crucial characteristics of brokers are that (a) they bridge a gap in social structure and (b) they help goods, information, opportunities, or knowledge flow across that gap" (Stovel & Shaw 2012, 141). Brokerage is a mechanism that helps people or groups realize that they have common interests and leads them to interact for the purpose of achieving shared goals (Vasi 2011, 13). Philippe C. Schmitter (1977) and Dieter Rucht (1995) refer to such interest-based linkage-building as "interest intermediation" or "political interest mediation". The brokerage perspective challenges the view that social movements are necessarily decentralized and antihierarchical, since there are central leading figures or SMOs that take charge of dissemination and mediation work (Diani 2003, 105). In methodological terms, brokerage draws from the network analysis tradition, in that it identifies gaps between social groups as well as actors that bridge these gaps (Stovel & Shaw 2012, 141; Gould & Fernandez 1989).

38 Sociologists like Georg Simmel (1950) had dealt with brokerage-like social relations already at an earlier point in time. In his essay "The Triad", Simmel highlights the dualistic structure of social relationship and the important position that 'third elements' may occupy there (cf. also Schroer 2017, 81). For a general overview of different sociological takes on brokerage, see Stovel and Shaw (2012). Antonio Gramsci also recognizes that relations and relation-building are crucial for forming social realities, for example when it comes to intellectuals: "The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked for this criterion of distinction [for the definition of the intellectual] in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations" (Gramsci 1971, 8; cited in Hoare & Sperber 2016, 31).

Brokerage does not only occur between people or groups. Brokers also serve as mediators between people and ideas, as already implied in Herring's notion of epistemic brokers. Phillip M. Ayoub (2016) introduced the concept of *norm brokerage* to analyze processes of norm diffusion in the context of pro-LGBT activism in Europe. Ayoub defines norm brokerage as

the process by which actors endowed with local knowledge mediate between often-divergent new international norms and domestic norms. Norm brokers aid diffusion by framing the international elements of the norm – in a domestically familiar discourse – so that they resonate with the domestic traditions of the society. [...] (Ayoub 2016, 34)

Ayoub's definition mainly focuses on transnational and international diffusion of *norms*, but I argue that this concept is also applicable in country-specific contexts and for ideational or ideological elements in general – without, however, ruling out the possibility that such brokerage may occur through transnational channels as well. Framing certain issues in a way that they resonate with certain publics and their pre-existent ideas again reflects the idea of dynamic continuity. Bricolage is a mechanism that is likely to be applied in this context. But when does brokerage actually happen, and under which circumstances is it effective?

Ion Bogdan Vasi (2011) made an important contribution in this respect. He argues that in order to explain why spreading contention is successful and when and why it fails, one has to take into account the diverse types of brokers and brokerage relationships. An important parameter for evaluation is the degree of what Vasi calls 'miscibility', that is, whether groups or individuals are ideologically compatible and already connected through networks (Vasi 2011, 12). This means that social groups who share similar worldviews can be linked more easily; if, on the other hand, miscibility is low, brokerage efforts have to be more intense, or else may be vain from the outset. Proceeding from these considerations, Vasi comes up with a *prima facie* paradoxical prediction: "Contention spreads faster when brokers connect few groups and when they connect groups that are highly miscible; yet, contention spreads furthest when brokers connect diverse groups and groups with low miscibility" (Vasi 2011, 16, italics in original). Bringing together groups that have similar ideological orientations is of course easier than convincing those groups featuring different or even opposing worldviews. On a large scale, however, the spread of contention will only be successful if diverse groups are addressed, convinced and, ultimately, won over for a new purpose.

In summary, Antonio Gramsci grants great significance to intellectuals, the 'permanent persuaders' who lead the way to counter-hegemony. Social movement studies similarly acknowledge the eminent position that movement leaders may occupy in contentious politics. This study explores the role that leaders play for the Korean anti-LGBT movement, their organizational and ideological backgrounds, purported or actual 'intellectual capital', as well as framing efforts. A special focus of the analysis will lie on creative work of leaders as entrepreneurs, and on their relational practices as brokers, which will be investigated through a network analysis (cf. chapter 10.3). The study will show that (norm) brokerage is an important part of leadership activities in order to set a new agenda, one that puts LGBT issues at the center of problematization. I argue that

the anti-LGBT movement primarily tries to connect to pre-existing, ideologically compatible (in Vasi's (2011) terminology: miscible) arenas such as conservative Protestant denominations and other right-wing actors in politics and society, that is, the conservative historical bloc. However, movement leaders also strive to connect to the public at large in an effort to put their (counter-)hegemonic struggle on a broader basis. The means through which movement leaders and other activists disseminate frames and thus work for the goal of hegemony – education and media – will be treated in greater detail in the next two subchapters.

3.4 Education

The Gramsci-inspired aspects of the analytical framework presented in this chapter – religion, historical bloc, intellectuals, education, and media – are all non-exclusive, intertwined categories. This becomes perhaps most obvious when taking a thorough look at the important role intellectuals play in the context of education. To attain the ultimate goal of hegemony, educating the masses is a key element. The actors fulfilling this task are, in most cases, the intellectuals, who use their own knowledge and education and are thus “able to educate the popular masses and raise their intellectual level, such that, finally, the people are increasingly able to self-educate and become actors in their own right in the new culture that is in the process of formation” (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 39). Gramsci builds this insight upon Marx' famous dictum from the *Theses on Feuerbach* according to which “the educator must himself be educated” (Marx 1976 [1845]). While the educators, the intellectuals, fulfill an important function, Gramsci does not conceptualize education as a top-down, hierarchical – or as he puts it “scholastic” relationship. Gramsci notes:

This problem [i.e., the question of collectively attaining a single cultural ‘climate’] can and must be related to the modern way of considering educational doctrine and practice, according to which the relationship between teacher and pupil is active and reciprocal so that every teacher is always a pupil and every pupil a teacher. But the educational relationship should not be restricted to the field of strictly ‘scholastic’ relationships [...]. This form of relationship exists throughout society as a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals. It exists between intellectual and non-intellectual sections of the population, between the rulers and the ruled, *élites* and their followers, leaders and led, the vanguard and the body of the army. Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilization. (Gramsci 1971, 349f.; cited in Borg et al. 2002, 8)

This passage reveals three main Gramscian insights on education: (1) Gramsci regards education through a relational, reciprocal lens; (2) he considers education something that does not only take place in institutionalized settings like schools or universities; (3) and he sees educational relationship as a core element of any attempts to achieve hegemony,

not just on the micro, interpersonal level, but also in larger, even international or transnational contexts.

Gramsci has a what Borg et al. (2002, 6) call “active or activist concept of education”. That is, Gramsci goes beyond the idea of education as a hierarchical one-way process and learning as mere passive reception, thereby highlighting its potential for the necessary ideological work (the ‘war of position’) and, ultimately, the cultural and concrete transformation of society and state (cf. also Mayo 2014, 388). Education is always political for Gramsci and conversely, politics, in order to be successful, must be educative in nature (Fontana 2002, 32) and not just geared to the youth, but to all people regardless of age or status (Borg et al. 2002, 13ff.; Mayo 2010).

Educators, in turn, need to be open to be educated. This can take the form of actually training new generations of intellectuals, also to raise their educational capital (Morris & Staggenborg 2004, 175). When it comes to a (counter-)hegemonic project, however, this also and importantly means that educators should learn from the popular knowledge, the ‘common sense’, critically reflect it and integrate it into their educational endeavors. Through this reciprocal process, ‘good sense’ is created, that is, coherent, ordered thoughts that can be fruitfully applied in the education for a new hegemony (Kuk & Tarlau 2020, 595). Gramsci describes the basis of this educational process as follows:

To know oneself means to be oneself, to be master of oneself, to distinguish oneself, to get out of chaos, to be an element of order and of one’s own discipline in pursuit of an ideal. And one cannot achieve this without knowing others, their history, the succession of efforts they made to be what they are, to create the civilisation they have created and which we want to replace with our own. (Gramsci 1977b, 13)

Overcoming the “chaos”, being productively educated, thus also entails understanding the opponent’s culture. In his writings, for example, Gramsci concretely analyzes the educational situation of his times, concretely the school system, which had been reformed in 1923 under the Fascist regime (cf. Borg et al. 2002, 9f.). In general terms, he criticizes the bourgeoisie, which Gramsci characterizes as a “closed caste” that does not allow for social mobility but uses state structures to prompt the general public to accept the bourgeois cultural and economic model. Gramsci concludes: “the state has become an ‘educator’” (Gramsci 1971, 260).

Education and learning in and through social movements

Of course, Gramsci is mainly concerned with education as a means for progressive social forces to transform society to their benefit, to raise the educational level and critical capacities of unprivileged people. This has also been an important task of progressive social movements and is, consequently, an area of interest of social scientific research. Studies on the nexus between social movements and education mostly focus on adult education (Kuk & Tarlau 2020; Hall et al. 2006, 6) and can be subdivided into two categories: education and learning in social movements, and studies on the influence of social movements on formal education and education policies (Niesz et al. 2018). Early research has predominantly concentrated on ‘popular education’ in Latin America, a pro-

gressive educational concept promoted and implemented 'by the people' (hence the adjective 'popular'), as opposed to state-led formal education. The Brazilian educational theorist Paulo Freire (1970) significantly contributed to this perspective with his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Freire argues that in the context of social movements, organizing, mobilizing, and educating cannot be separated from each other, they go hand in hand. He also emphasizes the agency of learners, however, without dismissing the important role of educators when acting in a way to promote freedom and critical thinking – similar to how Gramsci conceptualizes education (Kuk & Tarlau 2020, 593–596).

Recent literature on new social movements is predominantly concerned with *social movement learning*, learning figuring as the natural counterpart of education (Kuk & Tarlau 2020, 599–601). Social movement learning, broadly speaking, has two sides: "a) learning by persons who are part of any social movement; and b) learning by persons outside of a social movement as a result of the actions taken or simply by the existence of social movements" (Hall et al. 2006, 6; cf. also Hall & Clover 2005). In this study, *learning* is a central mechanism serving as both a precondition for mobilization of movement participants and as a crucial element of the process of ideological change and, in the long run, the attainment of hegemony. Phillip M. Ayoub provides a definition of learning which will be used in this study:

the process by which individuals and communities reassess their fundamental beliefs, values, and ways of doing things through interacting with new ideas and norms. Learning can refer to the transfer of knowledge between international organizations, governments, societies, and individuals, and it includes both simple learning, which leads to instrumental change, and complex learning, which leads to change in beliefs. (Ayoub 2016, 34)

Empirically, learning cannot be easily observed. On the individual level, in particular, it is difficult to assess whether a person has learned something new and, therefore, may have changed his or her beliefs or values, resulting in movement participation. Another possibility is that this person took part in movement activities due to a pre-existing (collective) identity or organizational ties, for example as a member of a church community whose pastor encouraged the parishioners to participate in a specific protest, for example. Learning can also take place on the level of framing when external frames influence individuals or communities, which then adopt and adapt these frames for the achievement of their own goals. This process of *frame diffusion* (Benford & Snow 2000, 627f.) is more easily observable empirically. Benford and Snow (2000, 627) differentiate between two types of frame diffusion: (1) strategic selection, in which the adopter intentionally borrows and adapts a frame across cultures, and (2) strategic accommodation, where an external transmitter actively engages in fitting a certain frame to the host culture. In both cases, the mechanisms of norm brokerage and bricolage are likely to be observed.

Examining education is especially relevant in the Korean context, where education plays an eminent role in people's lives. For decades now, Korean governments have established a tight control over the educational system and have encouraged its people to invest – both financially and symbolically – in education, which contributed to the country's phenomenal economic growth and rapid social changes over the course of just a few

generations. Educational capital is widely regarded as pivotal for individual success and, in broader terms, also for familial prestige. Educational zeal is therefore pervasive and virtually omnipresent in Korean society (Kim & Bang 2017; Seth 2012). Considering the importance that Korean governments and citizens grant to education, it is also a sensitive topic rife with potential for conflicts, for example regarding curricula, private educational institutions, and regulations to alleviate the negative consequences of the Korean 'educational fever' (*kyoyungnyōl*) such as high rates depression and suicide in young people. Education can thus be expected to represent field of action also for the Protestant Right.

This study is mainly concerned with the way education is exactly done and utilized by the Korean anti-LGBT movement, but it will also touch on its attempts to influence education policies. It will also address the question as to what extent the anti-LGBT movement is actually interested in raising the educational level of people, considering the fact that they also disseminate false information on sexuality and gender issues, using education for anti-emancipatory purposes. In terms of learning, possible instances of frame diffusion are investigated. These adopted and adapted frames may then figure prominently in the movement's educational programs. On the individual level, learning processes and results are hardly observable. However, it is fair to argue that the anti-LGBT movement has the objective of make people 'learn' about its views on homosexuality and gender issues, or reinforce existent beliefs of a similar kind. It is with this lens that the educational activities of this Christian-conservative movement are analyzed in this study, also to find out whether they differ from educative efforts of progressive movements (cf. chapter 11).

3.5 Media and culture

As has been shown, social movements commonly make use of education to get connected to potential adherents and to promote their specific agendas. They do so in informal or nonformal settings beyond the traditional educative sites. For Gramsci, the sites of educational relationships are manifold, including civil society organizations such as political parties, unions, and churches, as well as cultural actors like the print media, the radio, and the entertainment industry (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 40, 45f.). The press, in particular, represents the "most prominent and dynamic part" of cultural production according to Gramsci (1985, 389) and, therefore, can serve as an important element of struggles for hegemony. Gramsci, a journalist himself, did not comment extensively on the emerging new audio and visual media of his time – radio and cinema – but he did recognize their potential, despite his view that thorough ideological change can and should be reached through other means: "spoken communication is a means of ideological diffusion which has a rapidity, a field of action, and an emotional simultaneity far greater than written communication [...] but superficially, not in depth" (Gramsci 1985, 382f.).³⁹

39 Here, Gramsci appreciates that emotions are centrally transmitted through audio-visual media channels. In another part of his writings on tasks that organic intellectuals should ideally fulfill he explicitly emphasizes the importance emotions and feelings to win over people and, ultimately, to

Emblematic of the power of the media was the bourgeois press. Gramsci claims that the bourgeois media outlets, already before the ascent of Fascism in Italy, were crucial for the creation of public opinion, which is why diverse social forces strove to exercise control over them (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 46). “Public opinion is the political content of the public’s political will that can be dissentient; therefore, there is a struggle for the monopoly of the organs of public opinion” (Gramsci 2007, Q7\$83, 213). Public opinion, for Gramsci, denotes the result of a process in which dominant social forces “tend to project and reinforce their own particular and narrow perspectives through an apparently democratic media discourse ostensibly targeted at a universal readership” (Hoare & Sperber, 47). Marcia Landy (2008) builds upon Gramscian concepts to analyze the present-day neoliberal changes in economy and society as a ‘passive revolution’, that is, far-reaching top-down social change that mainly benefits the dominant political and capitalist layers of society. She argues that the media played an important role in this process. The manipulation of public opinion through cultural production does not only happen through journalistic means, though. Literary works such as novels with conservative content can also play their part (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 50f.).

Gramsci is, of course, not interested in the ways the media preserves or reinforces the position of privileged and dominant parts of society. He argues that journalism (and other types of cultural production) can be used for progressive purposes, as well. Journalism, in this sense, needs to be activist and pedagogical, what he calls *integral journalism*. This political kind of journalism “seeks not only to satisfy all the needs (of a given category) of its public, but also to create and develop these needs, to arouse its public and progressively enlarge it” (Gramsci 1985, 408). Hoare and Sperber (2016, 49) describe integral journalism as relying on a dialectic, in that journalistic practice should be based on the given aspirations within a certain populace to then create organized and enriched knowledge out of this, which is then again disseminated to the people. In short, such a journal-

create a historical bloc. However, he does not make a direct connection between these two areas, as the following quote shows. “The popular element ‘feels’ but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element ‘knows’ but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel. [...] The intellectual’s error consists in believing that one can know without understanding and even more without feeling and being impassioned (not only for knowledge in itself but also for the object of knowledge): in other words that the intellectual can be an intellectual (and not a pure pedant) if distinct and separate from the people-nation, that is, without feeling the elementary passions of the people, understanding them and therefore explaining and justifying them in the particular historical situation and connecting them dialectically to the laws of history and to a superior conception of the world, scientifically and coherently elaborated – i.e. knowledge. One cannot make politics-history without this passion, without this sentimental connection between intellectuals and people-nation. In the absence of such a nexus the relations between the intellectual and the people-nation are, or are reduced to, relationships of a purely bureaucratic and formal order; the intellectuals become a caste, or a priesthood [...] If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion in which feeling-passion becomes understanding and thence knowledge (not mechanically but in a way that is alive), then and only then is the relationship one of representation. Only then can there take place an exchange of individual elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders and led, and can the shared life be realized which alone is a social force – with the creation of the ‘historical bloc’” (Gramsci 1971, 418).

ism should be integrated into the people's needs and wishes. Gramsci applies a similar argumentation to literary forms of cultural production. He envisages the ideal of activist and political *popular literature* as “sink[ing] its roots into the humus of popular culture as it is, with its tastes and tendencies and with its moral and intellectual world, even if it is backward and conventional” (Gramsci 1985, 102; cf. also Hoare & Sperber 2016, 50f.). These processes are related to Gramsci's concepts of ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’, the latter of which being developed based on the former by intellectuals (here: journalists or producers of cultural products) and then broadly circulated. Gramsci's perspective stems from the early 20th century and thus does not include modern forms of communication technologies such as television or social media. Rusa Jeremic (2019), however, claims that Gramscian thinking also matters in the digital age, suggesting that digital activists play an important role as organic intellectuals in transformational processes through the means of social media.

The relevance of media for social movements

Existent literature has extensively covered the ways in which social movements make use of, appear in, and create their own media. Overviews of the field focus on the role mass media play in influencing public opinion and mobilizing new crowds (Gamson 2004), the strategies of using mass media for movement purposes, also across borders (Rohlinger & Corrigan-Brown 2019), and how relatively new *information communication technologies* (ICTs) like social media impact social movements (Earl 2019). Right-wing movements also prominently use established media channels in their socio-political activism (Abrahamsen et al. 2020, 103–104; White 2018; Ellinas 2018; Hemmer 2016) and establish their own, ‘alternative’ media outlets (Holt 2019).

William A. Gamson (2004, 243) considers the mass media as the “master arena” of public discourse. Mass media have a huge reach and are thus “*the* major site of contests over meaning because all of the players in the policy process *assume* its pervasive influence” (Gamson 2004, 243). In this context, journalists act as gatekeepers, but also as political players themselves since they get to decide whom to quote or which frames to use to cover a specific topic (ibid.). In this context, Gamson discerns three goals that different framing strategies for mass media can or should achieve:

- (1) Increase the readiness to act collectively on the part of one's primary constituencies;
- (2) increase mobilization potential among bystanders who are possible supporters;
- and (3) neutralize and discredit the framing efforts of adversaries and rivals, keeping their potential supporters passive. (Gamson 2004, 250)

In their *strategic choice model*, Rohlinger and Corrigan-Brown (2019, 133) argue that “activists use different mediums for different purposes”. They do so depending on the target of communication, that is, whether they want to reach external mass audiences or internal and sympathetic audiences. Aside from the media target, the two scholars also consider the relative openness of the media system in a given state as important for the strategic decision-making of activists (Rohlinger & Corrigan-Brown 2019, 133). Since this study deals with South Korea, a democratic political system with a relatively high degree

of freedom of press and expression, this latter category of openness is of minor importance for the analysis.

Activists normally target general interest media like newspapers, radio, and television news to reach large audiences in an effort to shape political debates and potentially mobilize individuals to action. They also increasingly use the digital sphere to achieve the same goals, for example, by creating websites and social media channels. These self-created, Internet-based communication technologies are attractive to activists since they keep control over how they frame their content (Rohlinger & Corrigan-Brown 2019, 136f.). When activists use media to target their primary constituencies, they often do so to foster collective identity. This is important to stabilize participation, to guarantee continuity, and to create a sense of unity (Gamson 1991, 27; Klandermans 2004, 364; Snow & Corrigan-Brown 2015: 175).

Some obstacles come to the fore in the attempts to get media attention. For example, the access to mainstream media is not guaranteed. Especially in early phases of a movement, getting media attention is an intricate matter. Gamson points out that movements or individual activists first need to garner a certain 'standing' with journalists; however, they also compete over such standing with other, often adversarial movements (Gamson 2004, 251). In this context, Hilgartner and Bosk argue that a strategy akin to this study's 'dynamic continuity' may be conducive to prevail in competition: "In all public arenas, social problems that can be related to deep mythic themes or broad cultural preoccupations have a higher probability of competing successfully." (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988, 71, cited in Gamson 2004, 254). Media bias is another potential constraint. The discursive opportunity structure may be more favorable for activists if their socio-political views coincide with those of media outlets (Rohlinger et al. 2012, 53).⁴⁰ If a movement event is chosen to be reported on, this coverage validates the importance of movement demands. In the case, however, that no coverage can be achieved mobilization is in vain and tantamount to a nonevent (Gamson 2004, 252). Finally, negative media attention could pose problems to social movements. For instance, radical or violent tactics (or also unintended occurrences of this kind) during protest events could backfire and be met with journalistic problematization and, consequently, disapproval from the general public (Rohlinger & Corrigan-Brown 2019, 139).

As already mentioned, such obstacles of general interest media can be circumvented by creating one's own media outlets or using ICTs. While early research on Internet usage for activism was skeptical as to its effectiveness, arguing that ICTs were not able to establish strong social ties necessary for sustained mobilization (Diani 2000; Tarrow 1998), recent literature unanimously acknowledges the importance of ICTs for social movements. Earl and Kimport (2011), for instance, argue that a huge benefit of online activism is its reduced costs for both organizers and participants and that, in order to engage in activism, there is less need for actually being physically together. ICTs can be driving forces to propel new movements into existence (e.g., the Arab Spring and #MeToo), to reach and

40 Rohlinger et al. (2012, 56), however, point out that "opposing movement organizations may get as much coverage in partisan venues as those groups with which partisan journalists are sympathetic", but, in fact, partisan journalists also cover opposing parties to vilify their positions.

mobilize people difficult to win over through traditional means by providing personalized content, and to diffuse frames, tactics, and insights on potential opportunities (Earl 2019, 295–297; for the last point cf. also Castells 2012; for personalization, see Bennett & Segerberg 2013). While recognizing the increasing importance of social media, scholars also point out that digitally informed activism is often combined with offline activities, using the digital sphere for connective action to link physical groups (Bennett & Segerberg 2013). Andrew Chadwick (2013) argues for hybridity, too. He claims that older and newer media are interdependent and influence each other and that these new relationships bring to the fore, and at the same time reshape power structures in media and politics.

Another aspect of – traditional *and* digital – media and communication strategies that needs to be mentioned concerns the focus on eminent, *charismatic* movement figures. Gamson (2004, 252f.) notes that commercial media outlets have a bias towards entertainment content, therefore preferring to cover what Gamson calls “celebrities” – charismatic movement spokespersons stemming from the movement leadership circle. Movements themselves may include this bias towards charismatic figures into their media strategy, promoting such ‘celebrities’ while making sure that they articulate frames in the movement’s interest. If charismatic media representation becomes a key strategic element of activism, one can speak of an institutionalization of charisma – or, to use the Weberian term: ‘routinization of charisma’ (Turner 2015, 351; Weber 1968).⁴¹ Originally, charisma is a theological term, which has found its way into sociology. It is, however, still relevant to the analysis of Christian contexts, especially of Christian charismatic renewal movements. In the context of industrialization and urbanization, “charisma is also associated with religious forms that are a response to personal alienation, isolation, and meaninglessness in the developed, industrial world” (Turner 2015, 351) – a feature that fostered the phenomenal growth of Christian, especially Protestant and evangelical churches in South Korea (Chung, Byung Joon 2014; Kim, Byung-suh 2006). Finally, charisma is also a common research topic in studies on right-wing or radical right movements and political parties. Right-wing charismatic leaders can be characterized by having a radical mission, being omnipresent, featuring an unquestioned leadership status while at the same time expressing the thoughts and speaking the language ‘of the people’, and by using Manichean demonization tactics (Eatwell 2018, 253–256). There is, however, also criticism of the concept of charisma, or rather its application on social sciences. Roger Eatwell (2015, 263f.), for example, finds fault with scholars who use unclear or overly stretched definitions of charisma. It is also questionable whether the charisma ascribed to certain people can be considered authentic at all when, for example, the term is just used to describe “the fleeting popularity of political leaders whose social appeal is constructed by campaigns in the media” (Turner 2015, 352).

41 The use of the term ‘routinization of charisma’ here should not be misunderstood as strictly following Weber’s concept of charisma. Weber uses the notion of routinization in the context of succession issues. He argues that charismatic leadership or authority is unstable, for disciples would disband after the demise or disappearance of a charismatic leader. This is why there is a need to institutionally guarantee succession or establish a system that upholds authority (Turner 2015, 250f.).

Charisma shall not figure prominently as a mechanism in this study's analysis. It is, however, a common denominator of the Gramscian perspectives on intellectuals who might as well be designated 'charismatic' and, as presented here, on the role old and new media play for the Korean anti-LGBT movement. The South Korean media landscape is very much polarized, being dominated by the three traditionally conservative newspapers *Chosun*, *JoongAng* and *Dong-a Ilbo* – a potentially fertile soil for news coverage on conservative movements. In general, however, mainstream media – with the exception of television – enjoy very little trust among the public (Kwak 2012, 121f.; data as of 2008). Online media and social media, which are commonly referred to as 'SNS' (Social Network Service) in Korea, have been on the rise in recent years. They are used for political communication by both political parties and civil society (Kwak 2012, 115–131; Kang, Seok et al. 2018; Tak 2016), mobilizing young people into social movements (Kang, Jiyeon 2016; Yun & Chang 2011), creating counter(-hegemonic) publics, for instance, through the creation of citizen journalism platforms (Yoon, Kyong 2018, 290–292; Choe & Cho 2017; Kern & Nam 2009), as well as for thematic activism as in the case of the feminist movement (Jeong & Lee 2018). The ways old and new media serve conservative movements in Korea has not yet been investigated, though.

This study sets out to fill this gap by analyzing how the anti-LGBT movement uses media, whether they benefit from the goodwill of established conservative media outlets (which might figure as political actors themselves), and by asking the question in what way the movement leadership plays a crucial role as explicitly political and activist 'organic journalists' and influencers. This study will also cursorily look into other areas of cultural production to find out how the anti-LGBT movement deals with novels, movies, and media coverage that they deem worth fighting against.

