

CHAPTER 3

KREUZBERG 36:

A DIASPORIC SPACE IN MULTICULTURAL BERLIN

Turkish migrants in Kreuzberg have constructed a social space of their own – a diasporic space where they have developed a web of social institutions, norms and values. This diasporic space has provided the Turkish population with a ground to acquire a set of positive and resistant articulations of identity in a country such as Germany that previously had an exclusionist ideology towards the immigrants. Resistance to exclusion in the Turkish diaspora context can take the form of distinct national and religious aspirations. I do not want to claim that diasporic cultural politics are somehow free of nationalist, religious and chauvinist agendas, but one should also remember that, as Clifford (1994: 307) has put it, such discourses are usually weapons used by relatively weak groups.

In modern diaspora experience that is facilitated by transnational circuit of communications and transportation, identities are constructed in a way that bends together both global and local, roots and routes, inheritance and politics, past and present. As I pointed out in the former chapters, modern diasporic identity is formed and articulated in both particularist and universalist axes. Kreuzberg 36, as a typical example of diasporic space, gives the individual the sense of simultaneously being ‘here’ (diaspora) and ‘there’ (homeland). What are the main constitutive entanglements turning this urban space into a diasporic space? What are the components of the particularist dimension of the modern diasporic identity? To what extent do the transnational Turkish media contribute to the construction of a distinct diasporic consciousness? What kind of discourses do the major Turkish ethnic organisations articulate to partake in the social and political life in multicultural Berlin? What kind of multicultural institutions have

emerged in Berlin to incorporate the ethnic minorities into the mainstream? And how do the Turkish ethnic associations respond to the dominant discourse of multiculturalism? Accordingly, this chapter will primarily aim to answer these essential questions as well as to expound the principal features of Kreuzberg 36 as constituting a diasporic urban space for Turkish migrants.

A Turkish Ethnic Enclave

Kreuzberg is a densely populated area located in the centre of Berlin. It is full of various social and cultural undercurrents. On the one hand, it is the ever-lasting dream of many left wing, or liberal, Germans to buy a flat by the picturesque *Landwehrkanal* that crosscuts Kreuzberg;¹ on the other hand, it has been the main quarter of the working-class cultures throughout history. Kreuzberg has always been defined as a working-class area since the mid 17th century. It provided immigrants, guestworkers (*Gastarbeiter*) and asylum-seekers with shelter. In the seventeenth century, French Protestant refugees (Huguenots) found asylum there. In the nineteenth century, indigent, landless immigrants from Silesia, Pomerania, and eastern Prussia came in for the search of work. At the turn of the last century, the district served as home to industrial workshops and small factories, as well as to the workers employed in them (Mandel, 1996: 149; Knödler-Bunte, 1987: 219-238). Until the division of Germany in the aftermath of the World War II, Kreuzberg was situated adjacent to the district of *Mitte* that houses many historical monuments and the bureaucratic settlement of the Second Reich, Weimar Republic and Third Reich. After the division, it has become the very periphery of the West Berlin, hosting the ‘*Gastarbeiter*’ from Turkey, Greece, Lebanon and Portugal. Reunification has brought a new outlook to the district. Recently, it is becoming one of the new centres of the expanding metropolitan city of Berlin. In this section, I will explore the social-cultural geography of Kreuzberg, but only with a limitation to Kreuzberg 36 and Kotbusser Tor where I conducted most of my field research.

The topography of the ethnic minorities in Kreuzberg has entirely changed since the reunification in 1991 (Table 2). For instance, the positioning of the Turkish minority has undergone a drastic shift. While the ‘*Gastarbeiter*,’ who are predominantly Turkish and Kurdish, were previously dwelling in the south-eastern periphery of West Berlin,

they have suddenly found themselves in the centre of the city with the reunification. Kreuzberg 36 resembles a kind of ‘*Kleines Istanbul*’ (Little Istanbul), which is surrounded by the images, signs, rhythms, music, foods, shops, banks, traditional *cafés*, and major political issues of Turkey: a Turkish diaspora. Beyond that, in many senses, it resembles a cultural island within the urban landscape. With the ethnic minorities, working-class groups, left wing political groupings, anarchists and marginal youth, Kreuzberg represents a permanent state of *festivity*. It is literally a multi-cultural neighbourhood.

Table 2: *Demographic Structure of Kreuzberg, 25.07.1996*

Country of Origin	Population	Percent
Turkey	28,913	18.70
Ex-Yugoslavia	3,211	2.06
Poland	1,681	1.07
Greece	1,497	0.95
Italy	995	0.64
Croatia	1,320	0.85
Ex-Soviet Union	538	0.52
Iran	620	0.34
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1,611	1.04
Lebanon	740	0.47
Others	10,864	7.02
Germans in Total	102,553	66.34
Kreuzberg in Total	154,543	100.00

Source: *Statistisches Landesamt, Einwohnerregister*

Kreuzberg is surrounded by the districts of Neukölln in the south, Schöneberg in the west, Tiergarten in the north, and Mitte in the east. Traffic connections to Kreuzberg have extensively increased in time. Traffic has gradually been diverted towards Kreuzberg after the reunification in order to provide an efficient link between the east and west. As the youngsters express, Kreuzberg is no more a peripheral district where the children used to freely play in the streets without traffic. Now, it is a central place where there is constantly a traffic jam.

The metro is the main form of public transportation. U1 and U15 are the regular trains connecting Kreuzberg to the rest of Berlin. The metro railway crosscuts the district through the bridges built just after World War I. There are also regular public busses passing through Kotbusser Tor such as No. 129 and No. 141.

For the Turkish population, Kreuzberg, or Berlin, is better connected to Turkey than to the other cities of Germany. Kreuzberg is full of Turkish travel agencies offering both regular and charter flights to various cities in Turkey such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Trabzon, Antalya and Adana. *Onur Air*, *Pak Tur*, *Pegasus Air*, *Öger Tur*, *Turkish Airlines*, and *Türk Tur* are some of these agencies. Sometimes, it is possible to find a return ticket to Istanbul with a price of 250 DM (approximately £ 100). This price may well rise to 800 DM in the summer vacation periods. Since the internal war commenced in the country once called Yugoslavia, these agencies have also provided ferryboat tickets to people who want to travel to Turkey by their own private cars. The boats generally depart from the Italian harbours in the Adriatic and arrive at the Turkish harbours in the Aegean Sea. As far as domestic transport is concerned for the Berlin-Turks, Kreuzberg is not efficiently connected to the other parts of Germany. It is almost out of question for them to travel by German Railway because it is not easily affordable, or by cheaper travel alternatives such as coaches and *Mitfahrzentralen*.² Turkish migrants, from time to time, visit their friends and/or relatives who live in the west. Almost all the members of the family join these kinds of visits; it is like a reaffirmation of family rituals. As this is a kind of family ritual, they prefer driving to their destination using their own cars.

Berlin-Turks have multiple links with their country of origin. The growth of modern communication and transportation networks has given rise to the Berlin-Turks' orientation to Turkey. TV channels, video tapes, newspapers, Internet facilities and charter flights facilitate and increase the pace of the communication between Germany and the homeland. To give an example: a commercial in the window of a travel agency in *Kotbusser Damm* was advertising "Weekend Shopping in Istanbul: 395 DM, 3 Days + Hotel." These modern constituents of globalism allow the Turkish migrants to construct a local network, which is sustained by the images of homeland. At first glance, Kreuzberg is like a very condensed copy of Istanbul. Restaurants, banks, mosques, *cafés*, music shops, *döner kebab* kiosks, graffiti, tagging and

billboards on the walls, dressing style of the residents, and the faces around the district, they were all reminiscent of the atmosphere of Istanbul. On the walls of Kreuzberg one can see all kinds of political graffiti from various groups, radical left to radical right. Also one can witness various political organisations' buildings standing side by side, although they are ideologically quite oppositional in their groupings. While playing *tavla* (backgammon) in one of the traditional Turkish *cafés* in Kreuzberg occupied by the middle-aged and elderly males, I had the impression that I was in a time tunnel that took me back to the Turkey of the sixties. The clothing type of the men, the way they shave their moustache, and the way they speak reminded me of a very secular section of people raised by the young republic of Turkey. That was an unchanging view in Berlin since the beginning of the migration: a frozen moment, or a picture in time.

Turkish migrants have set up their own community networks in all respects. They not only have *döner kebab* kiosks and bakeries, but also many other special services such as dentists, accountants, printing houses, TV stations etc. The bilingual telephone guide is an indication of such a community network.³ From catering to mechanics, from pet shops to doctors, the 190-pages of the Berlin Yellow Pages (*Altin Sayfalar*) provides a wide variety of services to the Turkish-origin residents of Berlin. Another indication of the community network is the Turkish Guide for Advisory Centres (*Türkçe Danisma Yerleri Kılavuzu*) that was published by the *Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg* (Berlin-Brandenburg Turkish Community) in 1996.⁴ The guide provides an extensive network of advisory centres where Turkish residents of Berlin could apply in case of necessity. From employment to housing, from anti-racist initiatives to sheltering for women, the guide aims to compensate for the lack of information for the Turkish migrants and their children.

'Kleines Istanbul' (Little Istanbul)

Most of my research took place around Kreuzberg 36 and *Kotbusser Tor*, which literally constitute the centre of the Turkish ethnic enclave in Kreuzberg. Thus, in this section, I will precisely concentrate on the social-cultural mapping out of this quarter rather than the other parts of Kreuzberg. A mix of late 19th century *Gründerzeit* houses and post war 'modern' buildings surrounds Kotbusser Tor.⁵ Leaving the train

at *Kotbusser Tor U-Bahn* station, the first thing that confronts one is a newsagent whose owner is Turkish. A journey then starts through the heart of Kreuzberg. At the *U-Bahn* exit to *Adalbertstraße*, is another Turkish store selling flowers. Stepping out on the *Adalbertstraße*, one faces the *Mevlana Camii* (mosque) on the right hand, and a Turkish open market on the left hand. *Mevlana Camii* is quite different from the classical mosques in that it does not have a minaret.⁶ It is located just over the *Kaiser's* shopping centre, which is popular among the Turks due to its lower prices. *Mevlana Camii* is the factual centre of the *Berlin Milli Görüs Vakfi* (Berlin National Vision Foundation), which has organic connections with the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party) in Turkey.⁷ On the left side is the open market selling food, vegetables and fruits, mostly imported from Turkey. Further on, a passageway under a building permits the *Adalbertstraße* to continue. This 'bridge' is called *Galata* in remembrance of the historical *Galata Köprüsü* (Bridge) in the old centre of Istanbul. Above the passage there are situated two 'traditional' Turkish *cafés*: the centre of the conservative *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*, and the meeting point of the extreme left wing '*Emek, Baris ve Özgürlük Bloğu*' (Labour, Peace and Freedom Block). This corner of Kreuzberg mirrors the diversified nature of the Turkish population. While the small *café* is the meeting point of the adult *Alevi* community, the big one is popular for men of every age. Under the passage there are two *döner kebab* kiosks (Imbiss), a Turkish bakery called *Misir Çarsisi*, and a Turkish bookstore. *Misir Çarsisi* literally refers to Egyptian Bazaar. The name again springs from the historical *Misir Çarsisi*, which is located near the *Galata Köprüsü* in Istanbul.

Another stimulating phenomenon was previously represented by the posters and billboards stuck onto each leg of the *Galata Bridge*. Most of the posters were political slogans from the far right to the far left. The left wing slogans mostly denounced the illegitimacy of the political order in Turkey which bans the existence of Marxist, Leninist and Maoist organisations, which remained silent about the 'massacre' of the *Alevi*s, and which had no peaceful alternative solutions to the Kurdish question. On the other hand, the right wing slogans consisted mainly of the messages of the Turkish Grey Wolves and religious groups. Sometimes, some concert and festival posters might have been seen here as well, e.g. 'Live Music: Trio from Istanbul at *Kestane Bar*,' or 'Concert: Baris Manço and *Cartel* at Tempodrom.' Lately, the

Kreuzberg Municipality renovated the Galata Bridge: the form of the legs was so restyled that it is no longer possible to stick any poster on. In doing so, the Municipality aims to ban the announcement of those political messages.

Walking along through *Adalbertstraße*, one comes across many *döner kebab* kiosks, travel agencies, groceries, bakeries, banks, glassware stores, and music stores; they are all Turkish. The classical Berlin buildings facing each other around an inner courtyard surround the street. In Kreuzberg, a particular form of building structure was erected to serve the working and living needs. This multi-layered, structurally dense and complex configuration was known as the *Hinterhaus* (back/rear house, or building), designed around a series of *Hinterhöfe* (back/rear courtyards). This living/working arrangement distinctly delimited a highly stratified social ordering, in brick and mortar, of classes and functions. The rear buildings, unlike those in front, were built of plain brick, lacked direct access to the street and sunlight, had no private toilets, and were invariably noisy and crowded (Mandel, 1996: 149).⁸ The courtyards are the playground of children and the meeting place of youngsters when the youth centres are closed.

Adalbertstraße previously used to terminate at the Berlin Wall in the northern part. The street is cut across by three streets, i.e. *Oranienstraße*, *Naunynstraße* and *Waldemarstraße*. The first, *Oranienstraße*, is a quite popular place both for German and Turkish youngsters. On the left side of the street many modern *cafés* run by Kurds and Turks may be found. The customers of these *cafés* are very mixed, which is not the norm in Berlin generally. On the right side of the street, there are many German stores selling books, trendy clothes, tapes and CDs for the German rockers, hip-hop fans, and techno youngsters. Sometimes, in this corner of the street, a few multicultural carnivals and festivals are organised by either *Haus der Kulturen der Welt*, or *SFB4 Radio Multikulti*. These carnivals have recently reached extensive populations. The latest one in the Summer of the year 2000 had almost half-a-million people all around Germany. In these organisations, Turkish music groups also perform their pieces, such as the rappers *Islamic Force* and *Azize-A*. In such *festivals*, it is common to see some Turkish faces around, interacting with Germans, but most Turks prefer watching the *festival* through the windows of their houses facing the street.

The second street cutting across *Adalbertstraße* is *Naunynstraße*

where the *Naunyn Ritze* youth centre is located. Opposite the youth centre is *Ballhaus* where some small size concerts and theatre plays are put on stage. This street is mainly occupied by the residents themselves. They are mostly Turkish and Kurdish *Alevis* from Erzurum and Erzurum. The third street is *Waldemarstraße*, which is also composed of Turkish and Kurdish residents. On the right part of the street is a kindergarten in which there is one Turkish youth worker. The kindergarten, *Çivili Park*, is combined to *Naunyn Ritze*. Next to *Çivili Park*, is *Bethanien* that is a monumental building with yellow bricks. The building, which resembles a Middle Ages feudal castle, used to be a hospital, but is now composed of various sections providing public services for the Kreuzberg people. The *Bethanien* consists of a Casino, a *Künstlerhaus* (art school), a Turkish language library called *Namik Kemal Kütüphanesi*, a music school, and a print house. The library is quite essential for the Turkish residents. There are daily papers, magazines and quite new scientific and literary books from Turkey in the library.

Taking the other exit at the tube-station, one arrives at *Kotbusser Damm* and *Reichenberger Straße*, which are parallel to each other and cut across by the *Landwehrkanal*. *Kotbusser Damm* is also surrounded by houses, a Turkish bank, Turkish stores and offices. *Orient Bazaar* is the most popular of the stores. It faces the *U-Bahn* station. It consists of a *bakka* (Turkish mini market), a bakery, a music store, a jewellery store and an *Imbiss* (small kiosk). *Kotbusser Damm* leads to *Neukölln*, which is a neighbouring district where there is also a dense Turkish population (Table 3). Further on, the *Maybachufer* cuts across the *Kotbusser Damm* just after the bridge on the canal. There is an open Turkish market in this street on Fridays. It is very similar to its equivalents in Turkey. The sellers advertise their mostly Turkish goods through various screams. There is a large variety of goods in the market from vegetable to sea foods, and from glassware to clothing. Right across the open market in the *Kotbusser Damm*, there is a Turkish shopping centre opened in August 2000. On the other hand, *Reichenberger Straße* is dominated by the residents whose ethnic origins are Turkish, Kurdish, German, Lebanese and Portuguese. Unlike *Naunynstraße*, it is an ethnically mixed neighbourhood. *Chip*, which is the other youth centre where I conducted my research, is located in this street.

Table 3: Turkish Population in Berlin District, 30.06.1996

District	Population	District	Population
Mitte	440	Tempelhof	4,752
Tiergarten	8,623	Neukölln	26,904
Wedding	24,332	Treptow	361
Prenzlauer Berg	523	Köpenick	158
Friedrichshain	527	Lichtenberg	304
Kreuzberg	28,913	Weißensee	76
Charlottenburg	7,547	Pankow	340
Spandau	8,829	Reinickendorf	6,499
Wilmerdorf	2,176	Marzahn	175
Zehlendorf	845	Hohenschönhausen	106
Schöneberg	12,051	Hellersdorf	106
Steglitz	3,087	Total	137,674

Source: Statistisches Landesamt, Einwohnerregister

The social-cultural mapping out of Kreuzberg 36 is very similar to that of some other townscape examples which exemplify a different kind of diasporic space such as Southall, London (Baumann, 1996), Rinkeby, Stockholm (Ålund, 1991, 1996), and 32nd Street, Chicago (Horowitz, 1983). Diasporic characteristics of a particular townscape mainly spring from the way cultures are reified by its sojourners. Diasporic communities tend to reify culture at the same time as making and remaking it. Departing from the critical judgements of the youngsters about, for instance, the way their parents dress up, one could conclude that there is a strong 'cultural conservatism' amongst the first generation migrants living in Kreuzberg. Knowing both modern Turkey and Kreuzberg, the youngsters imply that some people are still living a life of twenty years ago. Looking at the dresses of the people going to the Friday Turkish bazaar in Kotbusser Tor, it is highly possible to see many women wearing very colourful eastern Anatolian clothes including traditional scarf, or black veil, and *shalvar* (baggy trousers); or else to see many men wearing religious robes with full sleeves, long skirts and turban.

For many in the Turkish diaspora, the cultural baggage brought

from home is an absolutely vital element in the negotiation of identity, but it comprises a renovated set of practices and discourses, too. Reification of culture serves as a social strategy for the diasporic individual. There is no doubt that Turkish migrants are better off in Germany compared to their pre-immigrant social-economic status in Turkey. Representing pre-immigrant lifestyles as in their dressing styles and recollecting the hardships of the past as in their daily discourses, immigrants tend to justify their act of immigration as the right option. By reifying culture, maintaining pre-immigrant social networks (*hemsehrî* bonds) and familial connections, those immigrants attempt to adopt themselves in the diasporic context where they find themselves alone and without the traditional support systems they were brought up with.

As stated before culture is a continuous process of change, whereas the first generation immigrants transform it into a heritage in the diaspora. In other words, as Baumann states in Southall (London) example (1996: 192), for diasporic communities cultural processes become transformed into cultural heritage, that could be reified in order to enculturate the young generations and to construct a cultural fortress of their own in relation to that of the majority culture. The process of cultural reification among the first generation Turkish migrants is also strengthened by the Turkish media. What follows in the next section is the impact of the Turkish media on the construction of a distinct Turkish diasporic identity, which partly invests on the preservation of culture as a heritage.

Interconnectedness in Space

For at least a decade, the presence of Turkish language mass media in Germany, and particularly in Berlin, has become so salient that the Berlin Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs, Barbara John, even spoke of the dangers of '3T': easy access to Turkish language *television*, cheaper costs in *telecommunication*, and long-distance *travel* (Faist, 2000a). The Commissioner raised her concerns that the permanent spread of transportation and communication facilities between diaspora and homeland contribute to hinder the integration of immigrants in Germany. As seen from the statement of the Berlin Commissioner, the volume of the Turkish language media has reached an extensive level. The development of tele-communication technology

has made the reception of almost all the Turkish TV channels and newspapers in Berlin possible. Turkish media in Berlin have achieved a remarkable cultural hegemony throughout the Turkish diaspora. To understand this one has to examine the rising interest of the Turkish media industry in the Turkish population living in diaspora. The major Turkish TV channels have had their own European units making special programmes for Turks living in Europe. TRT International (state channel) is the first of these channels. Then come Euro Show, Euro Star, Euro D, Euro ATV, TGRT, Kanal 7, HBB and Satel. All these TV channels apart from the TRT International can be received via satellite antennas. TRT Int is already available on cable (Table 4).

Table 4: Turkish TV Channels in Germany and the Rate of Audience

Turkish TV Channels	Percent
TRT-INT	47.0
Euroshow	22.0
HBB	0.5
Eurostar	7.0
ATV	2.0
TGRT	1.0
Kanal 6	0.5
Others	20.0

Source: Türkiye Arastirmalar Merkezi – Zentrum für Türkeistudien, Bonn 1995

The programme spectrum of all these channels may differ greatly from each other. TRT Int tends mainly to give equal weight to entertainment, education, magazine, movies and news. Since it is a state owned channel, it tries to promote the ‘indispensable unity of the Turkish nation’ by arranging, for instance, money campaigns for the Turkish armed forces fighting in the South Eastern part of Turkey. There are also many programmes concentrating on the problems of the European Turks. This channel can also be widely received in Turkey. Thus, in a way, it also informs the Turkish audience about the happenings of the European-Turks, mainly that of the German-Turks, whilst connecting the modern diasporic Turkish communities to the homeland.

Euro Show, Euro D, Euro Star and Euro HBB are private channels making secular based programmes. The majority of the programmes are composed of old Turkish movies, American movies, comedy programmes, dramas, Turkish and European pop charts, sport programmes, reality-shows and news. On the other hand TGRT and Kanal 7 are the religious based TV channels. Besides the actual programmes, these channels give priority to the dramas and movies with religious motives. Traditional Turkish folk music programmes are also a part of the policy of these two channels. Satel is another channel giving the Turkish and European pop charts. It is the favourite channel of the Turkish youngsters who have satellite antennae.

Apart from these satellite channels, there are a few more local Turkish TV channels in Berlin. TD1 is one of them. Turkish video movies, local news and sport programmes are the major components of the programme. It also provides news and some dramas from Turkey, previously copied from Turkish channels. There are also some other channels, which can be watched on the *Offener Kanal* (Open Channel) and *Spree Kanal*. They are both free channels to rent. *Aypa TV*, *TFD* (*Türkisches Fernsehen in Deutschland*), *Alcanlar TV*, *Ehli Beyit TV* are some of these TV associations.⁹ Recently, there is also a new radio channel broadcasting 24-hour in Turkish: *Radio Metropol 94.8*. This channel was founded in the year 2000, and has a wide variety of programmes ranging from local and international news to Turkish music.

Most of the major Turkish newspapers are also printed in Germany to be distributed in Germany as well as in the rest of Europe. *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Evrensel* are some of the Turkish papers printed in Germany. There are also many other sports and magazine papers from Turkey. Although the content of the papers is extremely limited in terms of the news about the homeland, they offer a wide range of news about Turkish diasporic communities in Europe. *Hürriyet* has its own Berlin supplement each Wednesday, providing community news (Table 5).¹⁰

Cultural hegemony of the Turkish media partly shapes the 'habitats of meaning' of the diasporic subject living in the West.¹¹ Turkish media mostly attempt to provide a stream of programmes, which is considered to suit the 'habitats of meaning' of the diasporic subject. For instance, the German-Turks are perceived by the Turkish media industry as a group of people who resist cultural change. This percep-

Table 5: *Turkish Newspapers Printed in Germany*¹²

Newspaper	First Publishing Date	Tirage (pcs) in 1995	Tirage (pcs) in 1997
Hürriyet	1971	107,634	107,000
Milliyet	1972	25,000	16,000
Sabah	1996	-	25,000
Türkiye	1987	40,000	40,000
Cumhuriyet*	1995	-	5,000
Milli Gazete	1973	11,000	12,000
Zaman	1990	4,000	13,000
Tercüman	1972	19,000	-
Yeni Günaydin	1991	14,000	-
Özgür Gündem	1993	8,000	-
Emek-Evrensel*	1996	-	8,000
Dünya*	1991	2,500	2,500
Ordadoğu	1996	-	3,000
Total		231,134	231,500

* Weekly newspaper

Source: *Zentrum für Türkeistudien, Bonn 1995 and 1997*

tion, for instance, is the main rationale behind the selection of the movies and dramas. A high number of the films on each channel are the old Turkish films, which were produced in the late sixties and seventies.¹³ The performance of the old Turkish movies, which touch upon some traditional issues such as Anatolian feudalism, bloodfeuds, migration (*gurbet*), desperate romance and poverty, reinforces the reification of culture within the Turkish diaspora. As Michel Foucault noted such films attempt to 're-programme popular memory' to recover 'lost, unheard memories' which had been denied, or buried, by the dominant representations of the past experienced in the diaspora (Quoted in Morley and Robins, 1993: 10). Hence, identity is also a question of memory, and memories of home in particular (Morley and Robins, 1993: 10). Before the private TV channels were opened, it was the VCR industry, which used to provide the Turkish diaspora with those kinds of movies.¹⁴

Berlin-Turks, whose 'habitats of meaning' have been extensively

nurtured by the Turkish media, have also a different sense of place within the diaspora. The Turkish media play a very crucial role in the formation of a more complex form of belonging for the Turkish diaspora. The media create, for the diasporic communities, a symbolic bond to the homeland, a symbolic bond to various diasporic Turkish communities in Europe, and conversely also persuade the diasporic subject to become a sojourner in the country of settlement. Feeding the ethnic flame of Turkishness and Turkish culture, the Turkish media tend to create a distinctive Turkish identity in diaspora. The construction of such a distinct identity is indeed quite relevant to what the discourse of multiculturalism aims to do in Berlin. In the coming section, I will elaborate some of the Turkish ethnic organisations in Berlin and their discourses prior to the institutions and dominant discourse of multiculturalism. Subsequently, I shall expose the impact of the official ideology of multiculturalism on the culturalisation and minorisation of the *Alevi* community in Berlin.

Major Turkish Ethnic Associations in Berlin

The conventional notion of diaspora presupposes the existence of a homogenous community that had been forced to leave the homeland. This relatively homogenous community tends to exclude the majority society rather than diffusing into it. In fact, it would be misleading to name the Turkish communities living in Germany as a homogenous diaspora. While there are some communities such as the religious groups of *Süleymancis*, *Nurcus* and *Kaplancis* that might suit the definition of old diasporas as a social category, most of the Turkish-origin sojourners in Germany contradict this old notion.¹⁵ Turkish religious communities (*cemaat*) having fundamentalist beliefs are built around what Salman Rushdie (1990) calls ‘the absolutism of the Pure.’ “The apostles of purity,” he argues, are always moved by the fear that “intermingling with a different culture will inevitably weaken and ruin their own.” What they believe is that communicating with the ‘unbelievers’ does not strengthen their spiritual belief system. A seventy-year-old Turkish *Sunni hodja* (religious leader, teacher, or preacher) of the *Rufai* sect in the Mevlana Camii, hints at the rationale behind the construction of a Islamic diasporic identity:

We [Muslims] prefer the company of the believers (*mümins*). It is not enough

to be Muslim. Muslim means to surrender to the will of God, but surrendering does not prove that someone is a trustful believer who has faith in God. There are three strata in an Islamic community: *Avam* (ordinary people), *Has* (Faithful people) and *Hasin Hasi* (most faithful people). The Holy Book, *Koran*, says we must stick together with the believers to strengthen our faith in God, and to progress spiritually against the material world. Thus, we tend to distance ourselves from the *Avam*. It gives us spiritual inspiration to be together with the trustful believers (Personal interview, 25 January 1996).

The Islamic man whom I talked to was a retired carpenter, and was not able to speak German at all, although he had come to Germany almost twenty-five years ago. His main concern has always been to keep the Islamic purity without intermingling with the majority society, most of whom he called unbelievers. The interview was accompanied by a German researcher friend of mine for whom I was doing simultaneous translation. In the end of the interview, the *hoca* fulfilled his mission by inviting my friend to convert to Islam (*irshad*). Like many other Turkish *Sunnis* his main intention is to remain in Europe until the last European Christian has been converted to Islam.

The elite of those religious groups had to immigrate to Germany after the 1960 military *coup d'état* in Turkey. The practice of migration has gained a mystical meaning for these religious groups. They constructed a resemblance between their experience and that of the prophet Mohammed. The prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina in order to be able to free his Islamic community from the oppression of the non-believers. It is believed that the experience of migration (*hijra*) gave the believers the chance to test their faith in God. Thus, by doing so, the Muslim immigrants believe that the act of migration has strengthened their faith (Atacan, 1993: 57). These groups have formed their own cultural and religious islands in Germany. What they form is a kind of relatively homogenous Islamic Diaspora (with a capital 'D').¹⁶

These separate religious groupings resemble archipelago islands, which do not have surface connections to each other. They spring from various schools in Islam and always have different interpretations of the holy book *Koran*, but their common denominator is their relation to the receiving Christian society. They prefer sticking together within their own closed religious communities and distance themselves from the Christian society. Although most of the religious communities are loyal to the universal Islamic binarism between *Dar'ul Islam*

(Land of Islam) and *Dar'ul Harb* (Land of War), they are not able to free themselves from their particularist and national understanding of the Islamic religion. For instance, religious Turkish communities do not consider the Indian-origin *Wababbis* a valid form of Islam.

The conflict between various Islamic schools prevents the existence of a homogenous Islamic Diaspora: it is extremely diversified. Some of the groups have an universalist vision of Islam that is, to a certain extent, independent of nationalist connotations. *Süleymancis*, *Nurcus* and *Kaplançis* are the Islamic sects (*tarikats*) having a relatively universalist discourse. They attempt to disconnect themselves both from the country of origin and settlement. On the other hand, some other groupings have a powerful orientation to Turkey in their understanding of Islam, e.g., *Avrupa Milli Görüş Teskilati*, AMGT (Association of National Vision in Europe).¹⁷ AMGT has a wide network in Berlin as well as in Europe. The organisation has a modern youth cultural centre in Kreuzberg, where some of the Turkish youngsters go for leisure activities such as watching religious plays, playing billiards and watching cable TV. The group also opened an officially recognised public school in Kotbusser Tor, Kreuzberg in 1981. They run the school covertly, since they are still considered an illegal organisation. Recently they succeeded to get financial support for the school from the Berlin Senate. The School of Islamic Sciences consists of primary and secondary schools. German is the medium of education in the school, Turkish, Arabic and English are the other languages the students are supposed to learn. The organisation also covertly runs some Koran teaching courses in its own mosques.

All of these religious organisations are considered illegal in Germany. The only official religious organisation is *Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*, DITİB (Turkish-Islam Union, Religious Affairs). DITİB is the official religious representative of the Turkish government. It has the biggest Islamic audience in Berlin. DITİB has a nationalist vision of Islam. It has a community school in Kreuzberg, where the students are taught Turkish history, Turkish geography, Turkish and Arabic. DITİB has thirteen mosques in Berlin out of almost fifty. In these mosques, Koran courses are conducted. Deriving from various sources of Islam, all these religious communities have separately constructed Islamic Diasporas as a social practice and category.¹⁸

Besides the religious-based ethnic associations, Turks have founded some other ethnic organisations in Berlin that are based on the ideo-

logical and political cleavages in Turkey. The first group of organisations can be gathered under the umbrella of the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* (TGB). The concept of *Türkische* here means ethnic *Sunni*-Muslim-Turk, so it excludes other Anatolian peoples like Kurds, *Alevi*s, Circassians and Assurians. These groups have a conservative, nationalist and religious basis, and have attachments to the right-wing political parties in Turkey such as the True Path Party (*Dogruyol Partisi*, DYP), the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP), and the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP). They also have connections with the conservative parties in Germany like CDU and CSU. Their preference for the conservative Christian parties stems from their traditional opposition to the left in Turkey, and from their political choices in the homeland. As an ethnic organisation they have two principal discourses, i.e. culture discourse and minority discourse.

These groups celebrate the authentic and mythical Turkish culture that they trace back to the very early ages in Central Asia in contrast to the relatively new German culture which can only be traced back two hundred years. The former head of TGB, Mustafa Çakmakoglu, for instance, underlines the cultural difference between Turkish and German societies:

We [Turks] have got a strong culture, which goes back two thousand years, whereas Germans have a two hundred-year culture. Their history consists of unification [in the nineteenth century], nationalism, enmity towards France, warfare, Marshall Plan and power. But we have culture (Personal interview, 2 February 1996).

By saying so, Çakmakoglu attempts to reify Turkish culture as a discrete unity. His use of the notion of culture resembles what Clive Harris (1997) calls CULT(ure). This holistic and essentialist notion of culture grants a privilege to cultural authenticity, which is a process of self-awareness arising from the discovery and recognition of traditional local-cultural formations in their own historical settings. His discourse also underlines the conventional differentiation between 'culture' and 'civilisation' in a way that celebrates the former.

TGB also claims to be the most important representative of the Turkish minority in Berlin before the other German and Turkish bodies. The largest Turkish ethnic-political grouping apart from TGB

is *Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg* (TBB). Some other groups of people have come together through their own nuclear organisations under the umbrella of the TBB. These nuclear organisations are, for instance, some specialised organisations like doctors, academics, students, students' parents, *Alevi*s and some left-wing organisations etc. Here, the concept of *Türkische* literally refers to '*Türkiyeli*' (people from Turkey) in Turkish. It is an attempt to include both the left-wing and Kurdish-origin people that feel themselves in a kind of exile. Although they have a more universalist vision compared to the other Turkish communities, they also have a visible political orientation to the homeland. They run some political activities showing that these groups of people have become the sojourners and have interest in the internal politics of the receiving country. For instance, in the parliamentary elections in Berlin (October 1995) three Kurdish-origin Turkish citizens were elected for the Berlin Provincial Parliament (2 from the *Grünen* and 1 from the *PDS*), and 10 other Turkish citizens were elected to the municipality parliaments. These groups of organisations are also in favour of the acquisition of German citizenship for the Turkish citizens. Yet, the elite of the TBB is against the acquisition of an ethnic minority status in the German society because they believe that such a political shift would increase the xenophobic sentiment in Germany towards the Turks. So they are quite sceptical about the notion of ethnic minority.

Whatever their political orientation is towards the country of residence or to the homeland, it is very clear that each type of organisation tends to form interest groups that can mobilise Turkish minority in social, political and economic respects. The setting of the earlier Turkish migrant organisations in Berlin used to be defensive: in order to resist the feeling of exclusion and loneliness they constructed a local solidarity network. Whereas the contemporary ethnic organisations seek to promote the political participation of the Turks in a way that leads to a bridge formed between the majority and the minority. Thus, while these groups in contrast to the religious groups prefer interacting with the majority society, it is misleading to believe that these diversified groups constitute a homogenous Turkish diaspora.

All these organisations indicate that the diversified Turkish ethnic minority, apart from those segregationist religious groups, prefers incorporating into, and interacting with, the majority society. They tend to incorporate themselves into the political interest groups like

political parties and labour unions. This is the indication of the construction of a *Gesellschaft* network, rather than a traditional *Gemeinschaft* network. The institutionalisation of the Turkish minority in the form of *Gesellschaft* can be observed in the economic sphere (free enterprise, investment in Germany), the political sphere (political organisations which are oriented to Germany, to Turkey, or to both), and the leisure time activities (music courses, family tea gardens, folklore courses). While the Turkish minority attempts to mobilise itself by means of interest groups formed to interact and negotiate with the German political institutions, Berlin administration has recently produced some multicultural organisations to answer the new incorporatist demands raised by the Turkish minority. Accordingly, I will now briefly explore these multicultural initiatives, and scrutinise the dominant discourse of multiculturalism in Berlin.

Institutional Multiculturalism in Berlin

Multiculturalism is one of the prevailing notions and/or institutions of the present time. Parekh defines multiculturalism as numerical plurality of cultures that is creating, guaranteeing, encouraging spaces within which different communities are able to grow up at their own pace. At the same time it means creating a public space in which these communities are able to interact, enrich the existing culture and create a new consensual culture in which they recognise reflections of their own identity. According to Parekh, “multiculturalism is possible, but only if communities feel confident enough to engage in a dialogue and where there is enough public space for them to interact with the dominant culture” (Parekh, in Parekh and Bhabha 1989: 27). One way of promoting this ideal is to provide forms and manifestations of ethnic diversity with greater public status and dignity.

In Western European context, for instance in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, the ideology of multiculturalism serves as a new way of public incorporation, which the modern nation-state has put into play *vis-à-vis* migrants and their descendants. The form of multiculturalism, which was put into words by Parekh remains to be an ideal. As I will demonstrate below, the dominant ideology of multiculturalism aims to imprison minority cultures in their distinct boundaries, even closing up the channels of dialogue between cultures.

Berlin is one of the world cities where there is an extensive infrastructure promoting multiculturalism in one way or another. Berlin has always been a world city, which has housed various cultures. There are some initiatives attempting to embody a pluralist and multicultural city in which all the constitutive components of Berlin could co-exist in harmony. *Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats* (Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs), *das Haus der Kulturen der Welt* (House of the World Cultures), *SFB4 Radio Multikulti* and *Werkstatt der Kulturen* (Workshop of Cultures) are some of these multicultural initiatives.

Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats is an office that was founded in 1981 as a part of the Berlin Senate administration to co-ordinate policies in the areas of the health, family, housing, education, welfare and police departments, and to take care of the groups with particular problems.¹⁹ Its primary function, though, is to act as a liaison agency between the local government and various ethnic associations established in the city. The other function of the office involves public relations including publishing a monthly, 100-page magazine (*Top-Berlin International: Ein Informationsforum*), and offering an extensive list of videos and publications on specific ethnic communities in Berlin,²⁰ legal procedures and material encouraging children's and youth activities, vocational guidance for youth and etc. Recently, the office has initiated a set of poster-billboard campaigns with slogans such as '*Miteinander leben in Berlin*' ('live together in Berlin') and '*Wir sind Berlin: wir sind Helle und Dunkle!*' ('We are Berlin: We are light and dark!') in order to be able to recapitulate the ideas and perceptions of the Berliners on the co-existence of differences (Vertovec, 1996a).

Haus der Kulturen der Welt serves as an exhibition venue, conference and seminar centre, concert and festival venue. It was built in 1957 as the Congress Hall (*Kongreßhalle*). In 1989, it was given a new name. It is the stage where the non-European cultures have been introduced to the Berliners by means of exhibitions, conferences, movies, concerts and festivals. It aims to strengthen the roots of multicultural Berlin. Since Turks and Kurds compose approximately more than one third of the minority population living in Berlin, recent developments in Turkey have always been on the agenda of the *Haus*. Islam is at the core of contemporary interest. Berlin is trying to understand the current revival of Islam through the prism of Turkey.

SFB4 Radio Multikulti was founded in September 1994 as the fourth

station of *Sender Freies Berlin* (SFB), which is the local public broadcasting corporation. “The whole world is at the end of the scale: FM 106.8 Mhz” is the motto of the non-stop radio channel. It was initially planned to be a three-year-project financed by SFB and Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Services, whereas the radio is still broadcasting. It broadcasts ethnic music programmes in eighteen different mother tongues, including German as a foreign language (Vertovec, 1996a).²¹ The channel broadcasts none of the western music forms. Turkish is one of the languages represented amongst the ethnic music samples. Turkish pop music, Turkish rap and Turkish art music cover the biggest space in the Turkish language programmes. The programmes are set up by three producers of Turkish-origin. Aras Ören, who is a popular novelist and has been living in Berlin since the sixties, is the supervisor of the Turkish programmes for the SFB. However, a recent public survey carried out among the Berlin-Turks indicates that 12 percent of the Turks are aware of Radio Multikulti, and only 4 percent of them regularly listen to it. The same survey also depicts that the radio could not be received well in Kreuzberg and Wedding (Meseeth, 1996).

SFB4 also organises cultural carnivals and festivals in collaboration with *Haus der Kulturen* in Kreuzberg and in some other parts of Berlin. In these carnivals, all the ‘ethnic’ components of Berlin are represented with their music and folk dances. These carnivals and festivals might give us some clue about how the state attempts to represent the ‘ethnics’ to the ‘dominant’ culture. Carnival-type activities define ‘ethnics’ as possessing ‘folk culture’ and not the culture of distinction. It can also distract attention away from the central problem of structural inequalities in access to resources (Bottomley, 1987: 5).

Werkstatt der Kulturen was opened in October 1993 in the district of Neukölln where there is a large Turkish population. It has been designed as a *Begegnungszentrum* (encounter centre). It is financially supported by the *Ausländerbeauftragte* of the Berlin Senate and governed by a board of trustees elected every two years from local organisations. The *Werkstatt* attempts to promote understanding between the cultures of the area and to try new ways of togetherness (*Miteinander*), especially among youth. It promotes exhibitions and conferences; coordinates projects, training courses (photography, painting, ceramics, video-making and music-making) and seminars concerning matters surrounding expressive arts, inter-cultural dia-

logue, the plight of refugees, and violence against minorities in the city (Vertovec, 1996a).

Despite the existence of such strong multicultural initiatives in Berlin, it is quite doubtful to claim that the minorities living, for instance, in Kreuzberg or Wedding are widely aware of them. When asked, most members of the Turkish minority reply that they are not aware of the existence of these initiatives and their works. On the other hand, those who are aware of these initiatives, do not trust the 'multicultural' policies. What they believe is that, these kinds of initiatives are nothing but a 'face-saving' effort by the Berlin government. Yet, this does not mean that these initiatives do not have any impact on the ethnic minorities. Those diasporic subjects, who are attached to Turkish ethnic organisations in one way or another, are culturally being shaped by these initiatives. In what follows, this issue will be raised.

Essentialising and 'Othering the Other'

In fact, the representation of a wide variety of non-western cultures in the form of music, plastic arts and seminars is nothing but the reconfirmation of the categorisation of 'the west and the rest.' The rationale behind the representation of the cultural forms of those 'others' in these multicultural initiatives inevitably contributes to the broadening of differences between the so-called 'distinct cultures.' The ideology of multiculturalism tends to compartmentalise the cultures. It also assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes attached to ethnic groups (Çaglar, 1994: 26). Essentialising the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group, multiculturalism risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasising their boundedness and mutual distinctness; it also risks overrating the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimise repressive demands for communal conformity.

Furthermore, all these so-called multicultural institutions apparently embody a process of *culturalisation*. Culturalisation – a culture-related smoothing out of social inequality, social anomalies and discrimination – occupies a prominent place in the process of change currently affecting European society (Ålund, 1996; Ålund and Schierup, 1991). Social differentiation, segregation, institutional racism, discrimination and class differences are all reduced to, and legitimised in,

culturalisation of differences. Thus, actual multiculturalism in both Germany and Europe happens to represent a form of integration of cultural diversity into a system of structural inequalities (Ålund and Schierup, 1991: 139).

This type of constructed multiculturalism in Berlin permits the supposedly ‘distinct cultures’ to express themselves in some public platforms such as *Haus der Kulturen der Welt*. Multiculturalist meta-narrative might, at first glance, seem to be a ‘friend’ as John Russon (1995: 524) stated. These multicultural platforms, in a way, sharpen the process of ‘othering the other’ in the imagery of self, or in other words, leads to a form of ethnic ‘exotification.’ Russon (1995: 524) explains that:

Now, it is fairly common gesture, in the name of pluralism, to insist that we treat others as others, and accept their ways as, perhaps, ‘interesting,’ ‘private’ to them, and especially not the same as ours. [T]his exotification which ‘tolerates the other’ is another product of the alienating gaze of the reflective ego, and it fails in two important ways. First, it makes the other a kind of lesser entity open to our patronising support, despite our complete rejection of its value as analysing other than the cute contingencies of someone else’s culture; thus there is an inherent power relation here in which the other is made subordinate to our benevolence and superior reason. Second, it fails to acknowledge that, just as *our* program of tolerance has implications for the other – it contains that other in its view – so too does the ethnicity of the other contain us. Our so-called ‘democratic’ and pluralistic ideal is as much an ethnic expression as that of the other is an ethnicity [...].

Russon’s remarks on ‘tolerance’ remind us of the way in which public and private spheres are highly differentiated by the ideology of multiculturalism. This ideology, as John Rex (1986, 1991) has described, involves nurturing commonality (shared laws, open economy and equal access to state provisions) in the former and ensuring freedom (maintain the traditions of ethnic minorities) in the latter. Russon, first, prompts us to think that multiculturalism tends to promote the confinement of cultures in their own private spheres with a limited interaction with other cultures. In other words, the distinctions between private and public, or between politics and culture “can relegate the contentious differences to a sphere that does not impinge on the political” (Taylor, 1994: 62).

The differentiation between public and private has always contributed to the reinforcement of dominant class or group's hegemony over the subaltern groups. The cultures that hardly interact with other cultures are tempted to become a static heritage. Thus, Russon, here, draws our attention to the point that the official discourse of multiculturalism contributes to the reification of cultures by the minority communities. Secondly, he underlines the issue of power relations between the dominant culture and the others. This is the clientelist side of the policy of multiculturalism – a point to which I shall return shortly. Clientelism tends to petrify the existing social conditions without making any change in the power relations between 'master' and 'disciple.'

Renato Rosaldo also raises what Russon attempts to criticise by the notion of 'tolerance' in a slightly different way. Searching the correlation between culture and power, Rosaldo (1989: 198-204) rightly claims that power and culture have a negative correlation. In saying so, he refers to the examples of the Philippines and Mexico. In the Philippines and Mexico, for instance, full citizens are those who have power and lack culture, whereas those most culturally endowed minorities, such as Negritos and Indians, lack full citizenship and power respectively. Thus, having power refers to being postcultural and vice versa: "the more power one has, the less culture one enjoys; and the more culture one has, the less power one yields. If *they* [minorities] have an explicit monopoly on authentic culture, *we* [majority] have an unspoken one on institutional power" (1989: 202).

Rosaldo takes the discussion further, and concludes that making the 'other' culturally visible results with the invisibility of the 'self.' Thus, the policy of multiculturalism attempts to dissolve the 'self' within the minority. Dissolution of the 'self' is also related to the celebration of *difference* by minorities because the notion of difference makes culture particularly visible to outside observers. Hence, not only the multiculturalist policies, but also minorities themselves contribute to the process of dissolution of the 'self' as well as of the institutional power within the minority. In the following section, as an attempt to illustrate this theoretical framework I will explore the construction and articulation of *Alevi* ethnicity and culture in Berlin, in relation to the dominant discourse of multiculturalism.

The Case of Manifest Alevism in 'Multicultural' Berlin

Alevism is a heterodox religious identity that is peculiar to Anatolia. It is practised by some Turkish and Kurdish segments of the Anatolian society. Turkish *Alevi*s used to concentrate in central Anatolia, with important pockets throughout the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal regions and the European part of Turkey. Kurdish *Alevi*s were concentrated in the north-western part of the Kurdish settlement zone between Turkish Kurdistan and the rest of the country. Both Turkish and Kurdish *Alevi*s have left their isolated villages for the big cities of Turkey and Europe since 1950s.

Alevism itself is the main source of identity for the *Alevi* youngsters. Previously, the *Alevi* youngsters of Turkish ethnic origin in Germany, used to identify themselves with their Turkishness. They used to carry Turkish ethnic symbols to express their ethnicity as a response to the rising racial attacks and discrimination in Germany: e.g. a Turkish flag on their belt buckles. Although most of the urban *Alevi*s have always had to dissimulate their identities due to the supremacy of the *Sunni* order in the public sphere (*Takiyye*), they continued with their rituals in their private spheres. Their children had to play with the *Sunni* children in the streets without giving out any clue, which might reveal their *Alevism*. In a way, they had to assimilate to the dominant ideology of *Sunni*-Turkism. And then what happened? Why did they suddenly need to express their *Alevi* identity publicly? While they were celebrating their Turkishness against the racial attacks, why did they turn to celebrating their *Alevism*?

*Alevi*s have started to radically declare their religious identity publicly after the recent tragic incidences in Turkey, like the massacre of 37 *Alevi* artists in Sivas (July, 1993) and of 15 *Alevi* people in a densely-*Alevi*-populated neighbourhood of Istanbul (*Gaziosmanpasa*, March 1995). When the *Alevi*-leftist-oriented *Pir Sultan Abdal* association organised a cultural festival in Sivas – a central Anatolian City that is historically divided between *Sunnis* and *Alevi*s – in July 1993, numerous prominent *Alevi*-origin artists and authors, including Aziz Nesin (not an *Alevi*), attended. The festival was picketed by a large group of violent right-wing demonstrators who were clearly keen on killing Aziz Nesin. The author, Aziz Nesin had previously provoked the anger of many *Sunni* Muslims by announcing his intention to publish a translation of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*. Throwing stones

and burning rags through the windows of the hotel where the participants of the festival were staying, the demonstrators succeeded in setting fire to the hotel. Thirty-seven people were killed in this fire, due to the indifferent attitude of the police forces of the ‘*Sunni*’ Turkish state. This was a very crucial incident leading to the radicalisation of the *Alevi* movement in relation to the sluggishness of the state apparatus.

Relations between *Alevi*s and the Turkish state reached even lower depths with clashes between the police and *Alevi* demonstrators in the *Gazi* neighbourhood of Istanbul in March 1995. *Gazi Mahallesi* is a ghetto that is dominated by *Alevi* residents. The hostilities started when an unknown gunman in a stolen taxi fired a number of shots against a group of men sitting in a *café*, killing one *Alevi*. Police were remarkably slow in taking action, and the rumour soon spread that the local police post might have been involved in the terrorist attacks. The day after, thousands of *Alevi* people from the *Gazi* neighbourhood went on to the streets to protest about the murder. The police and the demonstrators clashed, and the police killed fifteen *Alevi* demonstrators (Bruinessen, 1996b: 9-10). These incidences have opened a new era in *Alevi* revivalism both at home and in the diaspora.

Similarly, the diaspora context, to a certain degree, alleviates the already deep-set antagonisms, suspicion, and animosity between *Sunni* and *Alevi* youths. In fact, many *Sunnis* become still more hostile towards *Alevi*s. The unchecked politicisation of mosque-centred religious preaching that proliferates in Germany is often directed against ‘infidel’ and ‘immoral’ Germans, communists, and by extension, *Alevi*s (Mandel, 1996: 157). The separate *Sunni* and *Alevi* value systems and histories are, to a large extent, reproduced among the diasporic youth in a way that reflects different patterns of socialisation in each group. These different patterns of socialisation influence the overall future orientations of *Sunni* and *Alevi* youths towards Turkey and Germany (Mandel, 1990: 167).

Diasporic *Alevi* youngsters have experienced something different from their *Alevi* counterparts living back home. After those crucial incidents happened in Turkey, their Turkishness, which they used to celebrate in reaction to the notorious racist incidents in Mölln and Solingen, no longer offered a refuge for them. The homeland Turkey, which has become a land of repression and sorrow, has turned into a ‘lost homeland’ for *Alevi* youngsters. The orientation of the *Alevi*

youngsters to homeland differs from that of the *Sunni* youngsters. While the *Sunni* youth may keep alive their orientation to the homeland, the *Alevi* youngsters may well be in search of homing in Berlin. Another aspect reminding them of the 'bitter' reality of homeland is the conditions of their counterparts in Turkey. Since the milieu they visit in the summer vacations is either in the ghettos of the big cities or in the small towns and/or villages, they have a restricted vision of youth in Turkey. What they describe, when asked, is mainly the working-class youth in the homeland. They suppose that all the youngsters in Turkey are suffering, and have to work all the time.

The incidents of *Sivas* and *Gazi Mahallesi* have become the pillars of the political *Alevi* revivalism both in and outside Turkey. They have recently founded some political-cultural organisations in Berlin and Germany. Anatolian *Alevi*s' Cultural Centre (*Anadolu Alevileri Kültür Merkezi*, AAKM), Democratic *Alevi*s Association (*Demokratik Aleviler Birliği*), *Ehl-i Beyt* Path (*Ehl-i Beyt Yolu*) are just some of those organisations established in Berlin. The AAKM is the most popular one of those *Alevi* organisations centred in Berlin. This organisation was founded in 1989. It is run by a committee of people and financed by the Berlin Senate and the *Alevi* population in Berlin. A mix of Zaza-Kurdish *Alevi*s and Turkish *Alevi*s constitutes the members of the AAKM.²² The centre is located in Wedding that is another Turkish enclave in Berlin. There is a '*Cemevi*' in the centre. *Cemevi* literally means communion house where the co-religious people meet up and have their religious ceremonies. The religious ceremony is called *ayn-i cem* (Mass), which springs from the word *cemaat* (community).

The authentic style of the *cem* rituals taking place in the Anatolian *Alevi* villages are very small-size social and religious gatherings where the *Alevi* residents of the village meet up, worship and solve their mutual social problems in the presence of a holy communal guide. The spiritual guide is called *Dede*, or *pir*. The *Dede* is considered to be descending from holy lineage. They typically wander much of the year, travel from one group of his *talip* followers to the next, and lead *ayn-i cems*. In these mystic *ayn-i cems*, love of god, which is reflected on the human being, is celebrated. According to the teachings of *Alevism*, human being is the reflection of the beauty of God. Unlike the *Sunnis*, who turn towards the *Kaaba* during the pray, the *Alevi*s face each other in a circular position. Human being is the *Kaaba* in the *Alevi*

teaching. Facing the other refers to seeing the spiritual light of saintliness (*nur*), which is considered to be appearing on the other's face. Besides being the platform of worship, *Cem* is also the place where the public court (*halk meclisi*) is organised to solve communal and individual problems in a very democratic and egalitarian way. In the court, everybody has equal right to speak.

There are two other very important elements of the *Alevi* teaching. The first one is '*ser ver, sir verme!*', which literally means 'better die than give away a secret.' This element of *Alevism* is not only an ethical value. That is also a political manoeuvring that springs as a result of the need for *takiyye* (dissimulation). Another determinant of the *Alevi* matrix is '*eline, beline, diline sahip olmak*', which means 'to control one's hands, tongue and sexual needs.' This is the very ethical motto of the *Alevi* teaching that is inevitably taken in childhood.²³ *Alevism* has a strict set of social control norms and rules, which defines the framework of 'correct behaviour.' In case of violation of these rules, sect members might be penalised by exclusion from all group activities and payment of fines. No one could escape from the judgement at the major annual rites called *görgü* or *ayn-i cem* where the *Alevi* creed is renewed and reviewed, and serious offences are admitted publicly before the community. The *Dede*, in these communal gatherings, aims to maintain peace and harmony between sect members by helping them reconcile their differences. These rituals have always been carried out in closely-knit village units throughout history. After the migrations from rural to urban areas in Turkey and abroad, *Alevi* communities faced the danger of losing those rituals. Recently, new *Alevi* organisations have been set up in the urban spaces to provide the *Alevi* people with community services. By doing so, *Alevi*s tend to restructure their rituals and institutions in accordance with the urban needs.

Other activities conducted by the AAKM include the organisation of *sema* dance courses for the *Alevi* youth and public concerts. *Sema* dance is a ritual signifying the love of God. The audience dances *sema* in small mixed groups, an atmosphere of dignity and restraint prevails. Each dancer takes his or her place according to traditional choreography with an air of detached, deep concentration and without any suggestion of bodily contact. The *sema* dance is accompanied by an authentic Turkish musical instrument with strings, called *saz* or *baglama*. The *sema* courses have a social function besides being a cultural teaching. These courses attempt to get the children of the

community away from the 'dangerous' streets, and to give them self-respect.

The Centre also organises public concerts for the *Alevi*s in Berlin. 'Alevi Cultural Night' is one of those gatherings. This organisation is very illustrative for the purposes I want to scrutinise further. This is why it will be beneficial to expose the main features of this festival. The gathering was held on the 28th of September 1996 in the Berlin Erika-Hess-Stadion, Wedding. It was a huge event with approximately two thousand people in the audience. Most of the participants were *Alevi* folk singers who were invited from Turkey for this special occasion. They sang *Alevi* poems (*Degis*) from the Turkish folk poets (*halk sairî*). Amongst the guests were Barbara John (Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs), Hans Nisblé (mayor of Wedding, SPD), Franz Schulz (mayor of Kreuzberg, *die Grünen*), Ismail Hakki Kosan (member of the Berlin Senate, *die Grünen*), the members of the *Türkische Bund*, and the Turkish and German media. The way the AAKM members represented themselves in the programme was very instructive. The speakers of the AAKM stressed the killings of the *Alevi*s in *Sivas* and *Gazi* neighbourhood. They reconfirmed, or reconstructed, the fact that these incidences have become two crucial landmarks of the *Alevi* mythology. Since this was a chance for the AAKM members to represent themselves in front of the high-ranking German politicians and media, they also stressed the difference between *Alevism* and *Shiism*.²⁴ They, in a sense, attempt to make a distinction between themselves and the orthodox version of *Shiism*.

The speeches of the German politicians were also very instructive in their own respects. Barbara John emphasised the pluralist structure of the city of Berlin, and the place of the *Alevi*s in this scene. She stated her willingness to see the *Alevi*s freely expressing their cultural identity in the public space. The dubious *culturalist discourse* raised by Barbara John tends to relegate social conflicts to the domain of culturalised iconography (Schierup, 1994: 38). Her discourse of multiculturalism raises three crucial aspects. Firstly, it reveals the negative correlation between culture and power in the context of minorities, which I previously touched upon (Rosaldo, 1989: 198-206). Secondly, *Alevi*s as well as many other minority groups such as Iranians, Kurds and Chinese are allowed by the institutional power to express their difference in the 'public sphere.' The expression of 'difference,' although, has the advantage of making culture particularly visible to outside

observers, it posits a problem because such differences are not absolute. Thirdly, her discourse hints that the majority society might benefit from the appearance of *Alevi*s in the public space, because the *Alevi*s have developed a stronger subjectivity like many other minorities living in a permanent turmoil. Thus, she attempts to reproduce and strengthen the binary opposition of ‘us’ and ‘them.’

A minor group among the German liberals such as Barbara John and Hans Nisblé are aware of the differences between *Sunnis* and *Alevi*s. They are quick to appropriate the *Alevi*s for their own political project and to use them as an example of Turks who ‘successfully integrate’ (Mandel, 1996: 156). Similarly, Hans Nisblé attempted to place *Alevism* as a political balance of power against Islamic revivalism. In the concert, he called the German people to stand by the *Alevi*s against the challenge of ‘radical Islam within’ prevailing over Europe and Germany. Nisblé’s speech was very illuminating in the sense that he was announcing a general view that is quite dominant in the western way of thinking. The favourable perception of *Alevism* by the German intelligentsia and media is, of course, highly related to the Western textual reading of the contemporary Turkey, which was, at that time, governed by a religious based coalition. This view conceives *Alevism* as a shield of secularist regime in Turkey against the radical Islam. Such an interpretation of *Alevism* has become the dominant paradigm both in Turkey and Europe. This paradigm inevitably contributes to the radicalisation of *Alevism* in political sense. Accordingly, the way *Alevi*s are defined by the German media and politicians also encourages *Alevi*s to form a community discourse.

It is not only the institutional power of multiculturalism encouraging *Alevi*s to develop a community discourse, but it is also the fact that, paraphrasing Hall (1992), speaking from margins sometimes could make more echo. It is evident that *Alevi* organisations tend to construct a community discourse by reifying some aspects of the *Alevi* culture. Mobilising many *Alevi*-origin people by those public concerts and mass ceremonies, for instance, provides, to use Gilroy’s words, “important rituals, which allow its affiliates to recognise each other and celebrate their coming together” (Gilroy, 1987: 223). Thus, in diaspora, highly effective informal networks forge a community of a sort that has never existed at home, as it attempts to worship and celebrate in concert (Mandel, 1996: 161). Habitual adherence to the rituals, as Russon (1995: 514) rightly posits, allows us to recognise

ourselves as an 'us,' as a 'we.' Borrowing the Hegelian terminology, the demand for self-consciousness is met in a dialogue of mutual recognition taking place in a collective process. Thus, there only remains a singular space for the individual at the margin to form his/her self-consciousness, i.e. the communal acts of mutual recognition. In this communal life, rituals and customs define who 'I' is. It is the *Alevi* communality offering the individual a ground to achieve self-consciousness.

As Mandel (1996: 162) has rightly put it, some *Alevi* groups in Germany have taken advantage of Western freedoms to adopt a more conservative, inward, communal orientation, unfettered by past political and social constraints. The highly politicised group of *Alevi Gençliği* (*Alevi Youth*) – a faction in the AAKM – is an illustrative example for this radicalism. In July 1996, there were many posters on the walls hung by the *Alevi Youth* to commemorate the massacre of the *Alevi* intellectuals in July 1993 in Sivas to the *Alevi* residents of Kreuzberg. Those posters, which were written in a '*Kanak Sprak*'²⁵ – a point to which I shall return shortly, were overtly interpreted as a challenge to the 'others' who were not *Alevi*.

The way the *Alevi*s are represented in the diaspora by themselves, politicians, and media does nothing but increase the cleavages and the polarisation among the Turkish minority in Berlin. Such a representation of *Alevism* also contributes to the reduction of social problems to essentialist ethnic and religious clashes. This polarisation within the Turkish community is also reflected in Turkey because these *Alevi* organizations have strong links with their equivalent partners and political organisations in Turkey. Thus, the rising cleavages and competition between the diversified Turkish groups is directly transferred to Turkey. This is how diaspora has an influential impact on the homeland political affairs. To illustrate the case, the AAKM had organised free flights for *Alevi*s to attend the opening ceremony of an *Alevi*-based political party (Democratic Peace Movement) in August 1996, in Ankara. It is an example of the impact of the diasporic subjects on the homeland politics.²⁶

On the other hand, although the youngsters in *Naunyn Ritze* and *Chip* are quite distant from the political loading of religion, *Alevism* and *Sunnism* have become the main determinants of the matrix of youth ethnicity (youthnicity). The *Alevi* youngsters in *Naunyn Ritze* rarely talk about the differentiation and conflicts between themselves

and the *Sunnis*. On the other hand, the *Sunni* youngsters usually raise this conflict by saying that *Alevi* youngsters are discriminating against the *Sunnis*. The girls whom I interviewed in *Chip* were all *Sunnis*. They have *Alevi* friends from *Naunyn Ritze*. Although they sometimes meet these friends, they complain about the differentiation that the *Alevi* friends have made against their *Sunni* friends. They argue that their friends advance this differentiation to exclude them. In fact, it would not be surprising to hear exactly the same discourse from the *Alevi* youngsters *vis-à-vis* their *Sunni* friends. It seems quite normal for the *Alevi* youngsters to distance themselves from the *Sunnis* and to re-establish the boundaries after those incidences in Sivas and Gaziosmanpaşa. Thus, they do not think that they are discriminating, whereas the *Sunni* youngsters, who have a majority consciousness and who have been raised by the official doctrine, cannot yet accept the fact that the *Alevi* minority is declaring its identity publicly by threatening the previously existing order.

Some graffiti samples that I saw nearby *Chip* in *Reichenberger Straße* were giving some essential clues about the conflicting temperament of the *Sunni* and *Alevi* youngsters in Kreuzberg. The first example of graffiti was

Alevileri S. K. M

that means “I fuck the *Alevis*.” ‘S.K.M.’ is a kind of hidden expression of ‘fuck’ in Turkish. Above the same graffiti, there was another example that was most probably written by the same person, saying

C
Bozkurt C
C

that means ‘Grey Wolf – three crescent.’ Three crescents are the symbol of the extreme right wing grey wolves in Turkey. The nationalist Turkish mythology depicts that it is the grey wolf (*Bozkurt*) that accompanied and guided the Turkish nation all the way through the massive migration from Central Asia to Anatolia. The grey wolf is considered by the Turkish nationalists to be the mythological guide of the Turkish nation. These two examples of graffiti written on the same wall are quite complementary. It signifies that Turkish nationalist

ideology excludes the *Alevi*s. The clash between the *Sunnis* and *Alevi*s has also been carried onto the symbolic level. As I shall point out in the coming chapters, ethnic symbols are extensively used by the Turkish youngsters as a constituent of their identity.

As far as the construction of ethnic-based political participation strategies (migrant strategy and minority strategy) is concerned, *Alevism* in the diaspora conveys a similar process to the other Turkish diasporic communities that I outlined in the previous chapter. Yet, *Alevism* nowadays corresponds to a further radicalised community discourse due to the recent incidences in Turkey. Investing in the cultural differences, this radical *Alevi* revivalism can be contemplated as one of the new social movements in the sense that Alain Touraine and Alberto Melucci mentioned earlier (Touraine, 1977; Melucci, 1989). The common denominator of contemporary social movements such as the peace movement and the ecology movement is that they are not directly involved in struggles focused on production and distribution of material goods and resources. Instead, they are increasingly concerned with debates about symbolic resources. Moreover, participation in these movements is no longer simply a means to an end but it is considered a goal in itself.

The contemporary metanarrative of multiculturalism has something to do with the transformation of the recent social movements. Multiculturalism tends to transform social conflicts into ethnic and religious ones. Radtke (1994: 32-37) points out that this transformation takes place under the hegemony of the state, which forms a kind of neo-clientelist system:

The clientele of the state are organizations, which have a clientele of individuals themselves. In both cases the dependency is reciprocal: The institutional or individual client will try to present himself as fitting into the programme of the patron; the patron will only continue to exist if he has the lasting support and trust of his clientele [...] The liberal model of competing interests ends up in patronage, lobbyism and paternalism [...] The effect of Multi-Culturalism in connection with clientelism is not ethnic mobilisation but self-ethnicisation of the minorities. As long as they do not have any political rights and as long as there is no policy of affirmative action, Multi-Culturalism inevitably ends up in folklorism. Minorities in Germany are kept away from the public sphere and invited by the legal system to form apolitical communities (*Gemeinschaften*) in the private sphere instead of interest groups [...] Multi-Culturalism

translates the concept of plurality of interests into a concept of plurality of descents [...] Multi-Culturalism is only a reversal of ethnocentrism [...].

Thus, Radtke identifies the political practice of multiculturalism in Germany as clientelist and its effects as a 'folkloric' self-ethnicisation of minorities.

Accordingly, the AAKM can be interpreted as a clientele organisation fulfilling the requirements of the ideology of multiculturalism. As an obedient subject of the state, the AAKM, thus, reaffirms the hegemony of state whilst reifying *Alevi* culture and tradition. Furthermore, it seems to imprison the social reaction of a subordinated working-class group in a cultural cage that is offered by the state. Multiculturalist metanarrative gives a chance to the masses to represent, vocalise and narrate their own ethnicities and cultures freely without undergoing any change in the relations of production and distribution. The policy of multiculturalism gives 'space' to the minorities to express themselves, but not 'rights' such as political rights. In other words, as Gillian Bottomley (1987: 4) stated in the Australian context, multiculturalism has tended to obscure the primacy of economic and political structures in determining the limits of possibilities for migrants to Germany. They have concentrated on culture and have, in doing so, made the cultural field an important terrain of struggle.

Similarly, having restrictive regimes of incorporation for the migrants and 'foreigners,' Germany attempts to give the Turks a sense of belonging by means of multiculturalism. The ideology of multiculturalism provides the German government with a form of what Michel Foucault (1979) called *governmentality*. *Governmentality* refers to the practices characterising the form of supervision a state exercise over its subjects, their wealth, their misfortunes, their customs, their souls and their habits. Foucault's modern 'administrative state' is based on the idea of a 'society of regulation' differing from 'the state of justice' of the Middle Ages that was built on the idea of a 'society of laws' (Foucault, 1979: 21). According to Foucault the modern state regulates our bodies, souls, habits and thoughts by giving us a sense of *freedom*. In the modern societies freedom has become a fruitful resource for government. Accordingly, the policy of multiculturalism enables minority cultures to represent themselves 'freely.'

* * *

To summarise, Turkish migrants living in Kreuzberg have created a new home away from their homeland. This diasporic space reflects various snapshots, discourses, images, rhythms, narratives, social networks (*hemsebrilik*) and familial connections from the pre-immigrant life-worlds of the migrants. The formation of a diasporic space through images, sounds, symbols and traditions from the homeland has served the migrants as a 'fortress' protecting them against institutional discrimination, assimilation and racism. The presence of the networks of transnational communications and transportation connecting the diaspora to the homeland has also strengthened the construction of a diasporic identity. Thus, the diasporic identity that has been built by the migrants as a social strategy has been reshaped and reinforced through transnational networks extending the official ideology of Turkishness.

In this chapter, I also claimed that multiculturalism assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes belonging to ethnic groups. Although having promised to include and incorporate ethnic minorities into the main stream, the contemporary ideology of multiculturalism has done nothing but excluding and imprisoning ethnic minorities in their own isolated cultural islands. Thus, it would be misleading to argue that multiculturalism serves as a policy of inclusion *vis-à-vis* ethnic minorities. Rather, the ideology of multiculturalism has led to the further minorisation and culturalisation of ethnic minorities in Berlin. Having been guided by multiculturalism, ethnic groups in Berlin such as *Alevi*s have made attempts to invest in their 'authentic' rituals rather than intermingling with the other cultures. Correspondingly, these various cultures have created their own static and essentialist cults refusing to infuse with the others. Thus, multiculturalism, in fact, creates separate 'CULTures' that are distinguished from each other with distinct boundaries. This is a serious obstacle before the process of cultural bricolage as well as leading to cultural reification and essentialism. Therefore, it would not be a mistake to rename multiculturalism as 'multi-CULT-uralism,' which means the sum of distinct cultures, or actually of cults.

The major Turkish ethnic associations in the diaspora have developed a culture discourse that is based on the holistic notion of 'CULTure.' This demotic discourse of the ethnic minority associations, in fact, parallels the dominant discourse of multiculturalism aiming to locate the minority cultures within discrete and fixed bound-

aries (cf. Baumann, 1996). The policies of multiculturalism in Berlin have mainly encouraged the ethnic minorities to organise themselves along culture lines. The mobilisation of ethnic associations along culture lines has limited their prospects in undertaking political initiatives for any structural change. This chapter has also outlined the social, political, economic, ethnic and demographic structure of Kreuzberg 36 to provide us with a broader perspective in order to scrutinise the diasporic consciousness of the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth. The next chapter will examine the sense of place and 'homing' for the Turkish hip-hop youth in the diaspora.

Notes

- 1 Günther Grass (1981) has described Kreuzberg as an 'utopia' of ethnic admixture and internationalisation. In this sense, Kreuzberg has exotic connotations with its multi-ethnic demography in the imagery of left/liberal Germans.
- 2 *Mitfahrzentralen* are private travel agencies providing the customers with a service to travel by private automobiles to many different destinations, sharing the cost of petrol with the driver.
- 3 *Berlin-Brandenburg Is Rehberi: Altın Sayfalar* (Berlin: Karma Verlag & Werbeagentur, 1995).
- 4 *Türkçe Danışma Yerleri Klavuzu: Beratungsführer für Türkische Berliner/-Innen* (Berlin: Karma Verlag & Werbeagentur, 1996).
- 5 The urban renewal and housing rehabilitation projects in Kreuzberg have been carried out with massive public aid and a host of regulations and laws enforced by the offices of the Senate for Housing and Construction and the Senate for Social Affairs since the mid 1970s. All urban renewal and housing rehabilitation projects have been pursued in close cooperation with private property owners, the tenants, the State and other public and private non-profit development cooperatives (Holzner, 1982).
- 6 Considering the architectural unity and order, the local authorities have rarely permitted the foundation of a mosque with a minaret in Berlin. Also, the petitions of the neighbourhood are taken into consideration by the local government in evaluating the applications of the Islamic groups to construct a mosque. That is why, the Muslims are allowed to worship in converted mosques,

which are not supposed to change the original architectural style of the city. For the discussion about minaret in Berlin and Germany, see “Gebetsrufe? – Ja bitte!” *die Tageszeitung (Taz)* (7 January 1997); “Einübung in mehr Toleranz” *Taz* (6 March 1995); “Gurke des Tages: Moschee in Bobingen” *Taz* (4 December 1992); and “No Rest in the Ruhr” *Time* (24 February 1997).

- 7 The Welfare Party was banned in January 1998 by the Turkish Constitutional Court. The reason for closing the Party was the justification that it was based on religious ideology and that its fundamentalist activities and statements were against the secular republic. Immediately after the Welfare Party was closed, the Virtue Party was founded to inherit it.
- 8 The majority of apartments occupied by Turkish migrants used to be substandard. For instance, in the district of Kreuzberg as a whole, seventy-one percent of all housing units were constructed before 1918, twenty-eight percent had no bath, twenty-seven percent had neither bath nor toilet, and seventy-four percent had individual room stove heaters only. Through their insecure status in Germany most Turkish immigrants preferred to invest in Turkey rather than spending on housing in Berlin. As a result, they continued living in the cheapest, oldest and least desirable apartments. After the rehabilitation of the housing units in Kreuzberg, Turkish tenants could not, or did not want to, afford to pay the rising rents. Thus, some of them had to find cheaper places outside Kreuzberg. A big proportion of those rehabilitated housing units have attracted the liberal intellectual individuals or families of upper income levels who consider it chic to live in modern comfort amidst the charm of 19th century *Gründerzeit* housing such as the apartments by the *Landwehrkanal*, Spree river (Holzner, 1982). *Waldemarstraße* and *Naunynstraße*, on the other hand, have remained occupied by the immigrants from Turkey.
- 9 *Aypa TV* is a secular-based news channel, combining the news both from Turkey and Germany; TFD is a religious-based channel, representing the view of *Milli Görüş*; and *Alcanlar TV* and *Ehli Beyit TV* are *Alevi*-based channels, representing different views.
- 10 For further information about the reception of the Turkish language media in Germany see, Heinemann and Kamcili (2000).

- 11 The notion of 'habitats of meaning' belongs to Ulf Hannerz (1996). Hannerz has developed the notion in relation to the co-existence of local and global at once. TV and print media have an important impact on the formation of our habitats of meaning. As some people may share much the same habitats of meaning in the global ecumene, some other people may have rather distinct and localised habitats of meaning.
- 12 *Yeni Günaydin* (liberal) and *Özgür Gündem* (left-wing) were shut down afterwards. *Sabah* and *Evensel* have recently entered the market.
- 13 Before the hegemony of the American film industry prevailed over the world market, the Turkish film industry produced a vast amount of film until the early eighties.
- 14 J. Knight (1986) states that 80 percent of the German-Turks used to watch Turkish videos daily.
- 15 For further inquiry about *Süleymancis*, *Nurcus* and *Kaplancis*, see Schiffauer (1997).
- 16 Diaspora with capital 'D' implies the form of diaspora in which the community attempts to preserve its own 'distinctive' culture.
- 17 AMGT is an illegal political organisation in Germany. According to the figures of the *Verfassungsschutz-Bericht* (1995), they have 3,000 members in Berlin. AMGT has a wide institutional network all around Europe. The organisation has organic links with the Islamic Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) in Turkey. For the origins of the Welfare Party, see Toprak (1981) and Çakir (1990).
- 18 For a detailed explanation on the religious organisations in Germany, see Trautner (2000). Trautner, in his work, rightfully claims that Islamic resurgence has rather a situationalist and contextualist nature in Germany, rather than having an essentialist substance.
- 19 Barbara John – a member of the Christian Democratic Party – has held the office since its inception in 1981 through successive governments of Social Democrat – Alternative List coalition of 1989-1991 and the grand SPD-CDU coalition.
- 20 Most of the publications and videos are on Turks. Some of the other ethnic communities on which publications and videos have been prepared are Indians, Africans, Chinese, and Iranians.
- 21 These languages are as follows: Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian, Greek, Italian, Croatian, Kurdish, Macedonian, Persian, Polish,

- Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovenian, Spanish, Turkish, Vietnamese and German.
- 22 Kurds are divided into two main tribes: *Zazas* and *Kirmanchis*. *Zaza*-Kurds are mostly from Dersim, Tunceli. Unlike the *Kirmanchis*, they are predominantly *Alevi*. *Kirmanchis* belong to the *Sunni* Islam, which is the 'official' religious school in Turkey. Although there is an overwhelming Kurdish nationalism blowing in Turkey and all around Europe, the *Zazas* have recently tended to identify themselves distinctively from the rest of the Kurds. Most of the *Zaza* populations in diaspora recently have a tendency to give priority to their *Alevi* identity rather than to their Kurdishness. Their identification of themselves might differ, depending on their political or religious orientations. The dominant ethnic identities that the *Zazas* employ in diasporic conditions are either *Alevi* or *Zaza*, or *Dersimli* (being from Dersim). Since the *Zazas* are mostly centrifugal Kurdish-*Alevi*s, they have got a peculiar history of their own. Dersim rebellion against the young Turkish Republic in the late 1930s is considered as an *Alevi* and *Zaza* uprising (Bruinessen, 1996a).
 - 23 This parental teaching is what Bourdieu calls the 'ideology of virility' which adults tend to employ towards young generations as a way of keeping wisdom – and therefore – power for themselves (Bourdieu, 1993: 94).
 - 24 *Alevism* is also known as Anatolian version of *Shiism*, but it is a much more hybrid form of belief consisting of many different rituals and religious undertones such as Sufism, Shamanism, Christianity, Judaism as well as Islam. For the heterodox nature of *Alevism* see, Ocak (2000).
 - 25 '*Kanak Sprak*' is the creole language spoken and written by the working-class Berlin-Turkish youth.
 - 26 Another example would be the religious based *Milli Görüş* association centred in Berlin transporting its own audience to Turkey to vote in the early general elections held in 1995. The flight was free of charge, and also the vote-goers were paid extra on top of their travel expenses.

