

Repudiation, Reinvention, and Reconciliation: Ātmārām and Haribhadrasūri's other Readers on other Gods

Anil Mundra

In modern languages, one of the most frequently quoted texts of all Sanskrit Jain literature is the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* (LTN) attributed to Haribhadrasūri, the great Śvetāmbara polymath who probably flourished in the eighth century CE. The long and complex life of this text, though, cannot be understood merely in terms of transmission by quotation. Indeed, it has lived many lives through various classical and modern transcreations—reuses, recastings, rewritings, and translations in various contexts for different purposes. In fact, its most popular passage, on which I will focus in this paper, is itself a transcreation that may have been composed first as a Buddhist hymn: almost twenty of the LTN's most famous verses occur almost identically in the *Devatāvīmarśastuti* or *Devatīśayastotra* attributed to a certain Śaṅkarasvāmin.¹ But whereas the short Buddhist version is focused more narrowly on praise of the lord (*deva-stuti*), as its title announces—in this case, of course, the Buddha, whose name appears instead of the Jain “Vīra”—the LTN expands roughly eightfold not only to praise the Jina but to compare his excellences with the characteristics of the various gods described in non-Jain texts. Haribhadra's essay, in brief, is concerned to critically evaluate and draw some conclusions (*nirṇaya* or *nigama*) about various “popular principles” (*loka-tattva*)² about divinity in comparison with the nature of the Jinas. Just what those conclusions are is at the crux of the transcreative variations that I will discuss below, but all agree that it is an endeavour of religious comparison.

This comparative aspect of the LTN is the pivot of the various ways it has been interpreted and transcreated. Although it is uncertain whether

¹ Edited and translated in Hahn 2000 and Schneider 2014. Although there has been wild dissensus on the dating of the *Devatāvīmarśastuti*, ranging from the first to the tenth century CE (see Krishan 1991), the existence of a commentary on it from the second half of the eighth century (Schneider 1997: 47-48), likely during Haribhadra's own lifetime, suggests that it precedes him.

² The opening verse (LTN 1.1) announces the text as a *nṛ-tattva-nigama*, which phrase is sometimes taken as an alternative title.

Haribhadrasūri is the original author of all of its verses—and there are indeed larger unresolved questions about his identity and authorship (cf. Dundas 2019)—the text has been attributed to Haribhadra’s comparative project at least as far back as Guṇaratnasūri’s fifteenth-century *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, the major commentary on Haribhadra’s famous *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*. Guṇaratna reads the LTN as showing how the respective essences of various doctrines are to be determined,³ and how to apportion philosophical truth and untruth between them—in short, as an exercise in the differentiation and adjudication of doctrines. In contrast, the popular understanding of the LTN among post-independence Indian Jains tends to cast it in distinctively modern terms as emblematic of a sort of liberal irenic ecumenism, universalism, or even perennialism that reconciles the apparent differences between doctrines by asserting their essential identity. We will encounter two of the most prominent representatives of this modern reinvention, Muni Jina Vijaya and Sagarmal Jain, in the first section below.

The rest of this essay will closely examine a seminal moment in this text’s transcreation to modernity. One of the central vectors for the LTN’s modern reception has been the oeuvre of the major revivalist of the Tapā Gaccha Samvegī Mārga, Ātmārām (also known as Ācārya Muni Ānanda Vijaya, Vijayānanda Sūri, or Ātmānanda), who was arguably the most important Śvetāmbara Mūrtipūjaka reformist of any sort at the end of the nineteenth century. Ātmārām was born into a Hindu Kshatriya family in which he was given essentially no grade-school education (Muni Navīnacandra Vijaya 1993: 3). Although initiated as a Sthānakvāsi mendicant in his adolescence, he eventually became disillusioned with their *sola scriptura* anti-intellectualism and began to read beyond the confines of his sect’s sanctioned canon (ibid.: 7ff.). He would become a prolific commentator and essayist, often blending these two genres in unique ways. We will examine his Hindi translation and commentary on the LTN in one such work, the monumental *Tattvanirṇayaprāsāda* (TNP). In this text—his swan song and arguably his *magnum opus*, written in 1894 and published in 1902, six years after his death—Ātmārām’s scholasticism, which hews closely to traditional Jain learning, is on full display.

But it is in one of Ātmārām’s other writings for other purposes that we will find the most pregnant moment for the transcreation of the LTN. Owing to his stature, Ātmārām had been invited to represent Jainism

³ TRD §35 ad ṢDS v. 1 (1970: 32): *anekē vādino vidyante. eṣāṃ svarūpaṃ loka-tattvanirṇayāt hāribhadrād avasātavyam.*

at the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago, an epochal event for the globalisation of Asian religions. Not willing to violate his monastic vows to travel, though—and due also to his advanced age and “some other private reasons” (CP 1918: 4)—he sent as his proxy a London layman named Virchand Gandhi and prepared a Hindi catechism for his training entitled the *Chicago Praśnottara* (Cort 2020: 262 n37). Published posthumously in 1905, the *Chicago Praśnottara* (CP) is a transitional text in which much of Ātmārām's traditional scholasticism is on display, while at the same time pushing and broadening the application of premodern Jain thought to some of the exigencies of the modern cosmopolis at the end of the nineteenth century. As we will see beginning in the second section below and continuing in the final section, the CP transcreates the LTN in several ways, from utilising LTN verses in its epigraphs to redeploying its ideas and arguments for a modern, global, multi-religious audience. In between, the section entitled “Repudiation” will calibrate Ātmārām's interpretation of the LTN with reference to his definitive *Tattvanirṇayaprāsāda* commentary on it. This gives us a baseline against which to evaluate the transcreations of the CP as well as, in the penultimate and final sections (“Reinvention” and “Reconciliation”), its 1918 English translation by Babu Kanno Mal, M.A. (about whom I have been able to find no definitive biographical information). I will argue that while Ātmārām's writings are firmly rooted in traditional scholastic apologetics for the superiority of Jainism, the CP and especially its English translation effect small but significant transformations of the LTN's message from a repudiation of non-Jain theologies toward the exercise in irenic reconciliation that it is standardly taken for today.

The Clarion Call

We begin with one of the LTN's most famous couplets:

I have no partiality for Mahāvīra, nor hate for Kapila, et al. He whose words are rational is the one who should be accepted.

(*pakṣa-pāto na me vīre na dveṣaḥ kapilādiṣu | yuktimaḍ vacanaṃ yasya tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ || 1.38 ||*)

The passage from which these lines come is often cited as a “clarion call of Jaina philosophy,” in the words of one J. P. Jain (1977: 163). The popular understanding these days tends to cast it as a sort of indifferent religious universalism, as if its proclaimed stance of impartiality (*niṣpakṣapāta*) means that all the figureheads and deities of the various religions are identical or at least equally venerable. This idea was given

typical expression by one of the most important modern transmitters of Haribhadrasūri, Muni Jina Vijaya, writing in Hindi in 1963:

“All philosophical teachers like Kapila, etc., are similarly to be revered, because all of them have attained the state of dispassion in the same way” (*kapila ādi sabhī dārśanika pravartakoṃ kā samāna rūpa se ādara karanīya hai, kyomki ve sabhī samāna bhāva se vītarāga-pada ko prāpta the*) (1963: 2).

Jina Vijaya’s pronouncement is not presented as a translation of LTN verse 1.38, but it arguably counts as a transcreative version of the latter: it is clearly inspired by the LTN, recurring to the text in some of its ideas and even proper-name references. It comes in Jina Vijaya’s foreword to Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi’s monograph *Samadarśī Ācārya Haribhadra*, and apparently intends to explain why Haribhadra qualifies for the title of “one who views things equably” (*samadarśī*). Indeed, Sanghavi himself (1963: 53) will proceed to treat this titular “equity” (*samatva*) as equivalent to “non-partisanship” (*niṣpakṣatā*), something very close to the operative concept in LTN 1.38 above. Just what this equitable non-partisanship entails, however, is contestable. Note that, unlike Jina Vijaya, the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* does not anywhere claim that all the various teachers have indeed attained dispassion and that they therefore equally *do* deserve reverence. It only says that if they *had*, they *would*. And as we will see shortly, the basic thesis of Haribhadra’s essay is that the Jina is uniquely dispassionate.

In a late-twentieth century eponymous transcreation of Sanghavi’s text, Sagarmal Jain pushes the universalistic reading of Haribhadra further into a contemporary idiom. Jain finds in Haribhadra a call to avoid disagreements between religious philosophies by transcending their merely nominal differences in favor of their fundamental commonalities (1998: 100–101). He summarises this approach as a certain magnanimity or liberality of mind (*udāratā* or *udāra-cetā*) and a conciliatory or harmonising habit (*samanvaya-śīla*) (ibid.: 95). Neither of these terms occur in Haribhadra’s own texts or (to my knowledge) in premodern Sanskrit commentaries upon them, but they do resonate strongly in the social-political milieu of twentieth- and twenty-first century South Asian communalism and global cosmopolitanism. This irenic reading of Haribhadra as promoting a reconciliation of religions participates in a wider discourse that Brian Hatcher (1994) has characterised as a rhetoric of Hindu humanism, instantiated most conspicuously in what he nicely calls the “*bījamantra* for most modern interpretations of Hinduism as a universalistic and tolerant religious philosophy” (ibid.: 149)—namely, *ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti* (*R̥g Veda* 1.164.46), commonly translated “Truth is one; the wise speak of it by many names”—as well as in

the notion that “the cosmos is one family” (*vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam*). In its original context, in fact, the idea of the world as one family is what is supposed to be held by an *udāra-carita*, ‘a person of magnanimous conduct’. These are the values that modern commentators from Sukhlalji Sanghvi to Sagarmal Jain have latterly found in Haribhadrasūri.

Chicago Calling

To understand the LTN’s transcreation into the modern “clarion call of Jain philosophy” participating in an irenic discourse of “Hindu humanism,” it is natural to look back at a pivotal moment for Jainism’s entrance onto the global stage as well as for Hindu humanism and modern discourse about religious diversity generally: the 1893 World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago. This setting is a tremendously novel context for Jainism, and this novelty is reflected in Ātmārām’s *Chicago Praśnottara*. The text’s novelty is not in its catechistic form, but in the content that it cloaks within traditional garb. Comparing Ātmārām’s with premodern *praśnottara* texts such as the *Praśnottararatnamālikā* attributed to the ninth-century Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Amoghavarṣa—a text itself transcreated throughout the Indian subcontinent by Shaivas as well as Jains and even in the Tibetan Tengyur—Sarah Pierce Taylor (2022) has observed that this is a genre of translation repeatedly revisited in far-flung times and places to make complicated Jain tenets accessible in specific worlds and communities. In the rest of this essay, I will show how the CP translates the thought of the LTN for its modern audience through its various acts of quotation, variation, juxtaposition, unattributed paraphrase, and original extrapolation—transcreative acts that will be compounded by the English translation of its Hindi text.

The epigraph of the CP is an untranslated Sanskrit verse from the same “clarion call” of the LTN:

This Lord is not our kinsman, nor are the others our enemies. We have not directly seen any one of them any more than the others. But hearing of his various distinguished words and good conduct, we betake ourselves to Mahāvira out of enthusiasm for the eminence of his moral virtues.

*bandhur na naḥ sa bhagavān arayo 'pi nānye sākṣān na dṛṣṭatara ekatamo 'pi
cāiṣām | śrutvā vacaḥ sucaritaṃ ca pṛthag-viśeṣam vīraṃ guṇātīśaya-lolatayā śrītāḥ
sma || 1.32||*

This verse well expresses the thesis of the LTN and just what its impartiality (*niṣpakṣapāta*) means: that it is not on the basis of prior

prejudices or tribal loyalties but rather a critical evaluation of the various deities that determines the Jina as being uniquely worthy of worship.

The body of the handbook then begins with another pithy verse that nicely encapsulates the two (1.32 and 1.38) that we have already seen. This one, though given untranslated from Sanskrit in Ātmāram's original publication, is translated in the English edition:

“Salutation be to Him who is devoid of all blemishes and full of all virtues, whether He be Brahmā, Vishnu, Shiva or a Jina” (1918: 16).

yasya nikhilās ca doṣā na santi sarve guṇās ca vidyante | brahmā vā viṣṇur vā haro jino vā namas tasmai || (1905: 1; cf. LTN 1.40)

This verse might seem to go a good way toward Jina Vijaya's assertion of the equality of the various religious figureheads, and indeed toward the popular current reading of the LTN as propounding a sort of indifference that sees only nominal differences between religions, quibbles about mere names given to fundamentally identical deities. And this reading is encouraged by Ātmārām's juxtaposition of it with another famous verse that is not associated with Haribhadra:

“He whom the Shaivaites adore as Shiva, the Vedāntins as Brahma, the Buddhists as Buddha, the rationalistic Naiyāyikas as creator, the learned Jainas as Arhat, and the Mīmāṃsikas as Eternal Action: may such a one, the Crest-jewel (Supreme one) of the three worlds, realise our hearts' desire” (1918: 16).

yaṃ śaivās samupāsate śiva iti brahmeti vedāntino | bauddhā buddha iti pramāṇa-ṣaṭavaḥ karteti naiyāyikāḥ || arhant ity atha jaina-śāstra-niratāḥ karmeti mīmāṃsakāḥ | so 'yam no vidadhātu bāṃchita-phalaṃ trailokya cūḍāmaṇiḥ || (1905: 1).

This verse is not traceable to a single origin, and has circulated widely in many variants—Elaine Fisher, for example, found one in a fourteenth-century inscription on the wall of a Vaishnava temple in Karnataka (2017: 32). Clearly, it can be read with various meanings in its various historical contexts, like the verses of the LTN. Many will hear it as offering, in Fisher's words (*ibid.*), an “irenic tolerance or universalist pantheism,” promoting the “essential unity of all Hindu traditions” (and Buddhism and Jainism as well). In Sudipta Kaviraj's understanding, “It not merely tolerates other religious paths” and “does not merely recognise the value of all religious paths, but turns all forms of the divine into various names of one single God, who is worshipped by all” (2014: 243), an approach to god that Kaviraj notes has been “carried on in modern times most obviously by figures like Ramakrishna Paramhansa and Gandhi” (*ibid.*: 264n23). But Fisher sees in this unifying move an argument for “the supremacy of Vaishnavism and of the god Vishnu as the telos of all religious practice” (2017: 32). This would quite resemble

the LTN's advocacy for the supremacy of the Jina, but it is subtly different: the LTN never says that the Jina in fact *is* the telos of all religious practice, only that the Jina *should* be. It often marks that thesis with optatives, like *namasyet* (1.28, which I will discuss later). And even when the mood is indicative, the purport is clearly prescriptive, stating how Jains do worship the Jinas and how others therefore ought to as well. But Ātmārām's juxtaposition of this verse, which more explicitly than those of the LTN says that all of these various names and conceptions of the deity are in fact ultimately aiming at the same object, suggests a significant shift in how to read the LTN's own statements of indifference about divine names. This, we could say, is an act of transcreation by juxtaposition. Whereas the LTN only professes indifference about names without claiming that they all denote the same deity or seeking to obviate dispute about the qualities of true divinity, its juxtaposition with this verse pushes toward the sort of stance that we saw in Jina Vijaya and Sagarmal Jain according to which the various deity names produce false disputes obscuring an essential agreement between religions and philosophies.

One might find comfort for such an irenic view in some of Ātmārām's other writings as well. For example, in the opening pages of the 1884 *Jainatattvādarśa*, Ātmārām cites Mānatuṅgasūri's *Bhaktāmara Stotra* verse twenty-four, which applies the names and descriptions of various deities like Brahmā and Īśvara to the Jina (Cort 1995: 599). However, the thesis of the *Bhaktāmara Stotra* is not that they're all the same—it is that the Jina too qualifies as a deity as well as the others, thus acquitting Jains of the common charge of atheism. That is, the focus of this discussion is to delineate the qualities qualifying a being as divine, and to show that the Jina does pass muster. This project is entirely compatible with the LTN's claim of the Jina's divine supremacy.

Indeed, as Torkel Brekke observes: "Ātmārāmji was clearly not interested in the ecumenical questions that occupied a number of Jain leaders at the end of the nineteenth century" (Brekke 2002: 141). Unlike other influential figures such as Muni Vijaya Dharma (not to mention non-Jains such as Vivekānanda) who insisted on "the unity of all religions of the world and the superficiality of their differences" (ibid.: 137), his primary "concern was to define Jainism" over against religions like Hinduism and Christianity (ibid.: 141). Although it is tempting for contemporary sensibilities to read his re-casting of the LTN as advocating for an irenic religious universalism, this would be out of step with the overall tendencies of his oeuvre.

Repudiation

Ātmārām's work is generally preoccupied with the exegesis of Jain theological texts and especially with defending Jainism against the charge of atheism (cf. Cort 2020: 240). As part of this exegetical project, he not only enlists the LTN for epigraphs to frame the catechism of the CP but also composes a complete Hindi translation and commentary upon it in his swan song, the *Tattvanirṇayaprāsāda* (TNP). This tome—the last he would write, two years before his passing—displays how he understands the LTN and reveals some subtle but significant differences with how he (and his translator Mal) had presented it for a foreign audience in the CP the year before.

To begin with, his translation of LTN 1.32 (the epigraph of the CP) is quite literal, except that to the phrase “hearing of [Mahāvīra's] various distinguished words and good conduct” he adds the clarification “according to the Jain scriptures” (*jaināgamānusāra*)” (1902: 138). This little phrase intimates how firmly entrenched in Jain textual tradition Ātmārām is. His commentary and writing reads very much like premodern scholastic Sanskrit. He is steeped in that tradition and its terms, concerns, and the structure of its dialectics.

The next thing to notice is that the TNP opts for a variant of verse forty that omits the Jina from the list of deities that might merit salutation (*brahmā vā viṣṇur vā maheśvaro vā*). This is, in fact, the standard reading. The CP variant mentioning the Jina (*brahmā vā viṣṇur vā haro jino vā*) is, according to Lynna Dhanani (2019), the final hemistich of a forty-four-verse version of the *Mahādevastotra* attributed to the twelfth-century Hemacandra,⁴ and appears also in Merutuṅga's fourteenth-century *Ṣaḍdarśananirṇaya*.⁵ The CP, then, interpolates into the LTN a phrase that positions the Jina as one among several candidates for worship, allowing for an insinuation of his essential identity with the other gods (whether or not that is the intent of Hemacandra, Merutuṅga, or even Ātmārām). The standard reading given in the TNP, on the contrary, sets the Jina apart, suggesting his *sui generis* uniqueness with respect to the various other gods as well as the justification of the Jina's supremacy that the argument of the LTN demands. The TNP substantiates this supremacy by listing the virtues (*guṇas*) that a venerable deity

⁴ Dhanani mentions that this 44-verse hymn is most likely an expanded version containing interpolated verses set in an older 33-verse *Mahādevadvātrīṃśikā* that Hemacandra actually wrote (see also Dhanani 2022).

⁵ *bhava-bijānkura-jananā-rāgādyāḥ kṣayam upāgatā yasya | brahmā vā viṣṇur vā haro jino vā namas tasmai ||* (Shah 1973: 9).

should possess—“unsurpassable qualities of knowledge, vision, conduct, energy” (*anaṃtajñāna, anaṃtadarśana, anaṃtacāritra, anaṃtavīryādi anaṃta guṇa*) and the faults that such a one would lack, namely, “lust, hate, delusion, ignorance, and the rest of the eighteen faults” (*rāga, dveṣa, moha, ajñānādi aṣṭādaśa dūṣaṇa* [1902: 146]). We know who fits this description: these qualities happen to exactly track canonical Jainology. That is no coincidence, of course, because it is just the point of this essay that the Jina’s qualities are uniquely laudable.

The LTN emphasises the Jina’s supremacy with repeated rhetorical questions contemplating who is worthy of worship (*kaṃ pūjayāma* [1.23].... *samyag-vandyatvam arhati tu ko vicārayadhvam* [1.26]). In light of the myriad faults of the various non-Jain gods as described in the *purāṇas*, the LTN asks, “What thinking person would worship them?” (*kas tān namasyed budhaḥ* [1.28]). Ātmārām, in good scholastic commentarial style, glosses and answers this question, in case there should be any doubt: “What thinking, judicious person would worship them? None would” (*kaun budha prekṣāvān namaskāra kare? apitu koi bhī na kare* [TNP 129]). Ātmārām’s reading of the LTN leaves no room to think that all of the various gods under consideration are equal to the Jina. That is not, at least, what any “judicious person” would think. This Hindi term, *prekṣāvān*, comes from an important Sanskrit figure that Haribhadra himself valorises in various places. In Sara McClintock’s explanation, the *prekṣāvān* is a person who is “anti-dogmatic, in that he or she will necessarily accept *any* position that is established through reasoning” (McClintock 2010: 60). This very well expresses the stance of impartiality (*niṣpakṣapāta*) proclaimed in the LTN, which consists in rational discrimination among various positions rather than indiscriminate conflation of them. Ātmārām’s TNP clearly reads the LTN as advocating for the superiority of the Jina and the inferiority of competitors, as determined by a process of undogmatic critical reasoning.

Reinvention

This brings us back to the *Chicago Praśnottara* which, while not explicitly referencing the LTN outside of its epigraphs, does clearly transcreate the LTN’s call for critical interrogation of the various divinities without partiality or prejudice (*pakṣapāta*):

“My dear Sir, leaving aside prejudice, read the lives of Arhats and other *avatārs* etc. and see their images noticing their conduct, thoughts, and appearance; from this, you would learn which of them was faulty and which faultless” (1918: 171).

pakṣapāta choḍke arihaṃtādi māne hue sarva avatāroṃkī sarva zimdagī ke karma, jo jo unhoṃne kiye haiṃ unko paḍho, aur unkī mūrṭiyeh dekho, ki unkā ācāra vicāra aur ākāra kaisā thā usse tumko āp hī mālum ho jāvegā ki dūṣaṇoṃvālā kaun thā aur dūṣaṇoṃ rahita kaun thā (1905: 98).

It is clear in the CP's call to leave aside *pakṣapāta* that the recommendation is not indifference between the various exalted or divine personages like *arhats* and *avatāras*, but is rather discrimination of the truly worthy ones from the rest. Evaluating the various candidates for worship is one of the central projects of the CP, mirroring the agenda of the LTN. Like the LTN, the CP contains extensive polemics against certain theistic views, particularly those of a creationist and interventionist god, and it transcreatively rewrites many of the very same arguments.

One of Ātmārām's various complaints against the coherence of this sort of theism (*īśvara-vāda*), though, is an argument that is not explicitly visible in the LTN but does appear to undercut any insinuation of the unity of religions: the argument from dissensus, that there is no apparent agreement between the various religions.⁶ He says:

“O Believer in God, if, according to you, everything has been created by God, then the scriptures of all faiths have been created by Him and these scriptures are contradictory to one another. Most of them are true and others untrue. God would, therefore, be considered as the preacher of both right and wrong. He is, therefore, Himself setting one against the other in religion” (1918: 75).

he īśvara-vādin! tere kehene se jab īśvara ne hī sarva kuch racā hai, tab to sarva mata ke sarva śāstra bhī īśvara hī ne race haiṃ aur sarva śāstra āpas meṃ viruddha haiṃ | aur avaśya kitneka śāstra satya aur kitneka asatya haiṃ, tab jhūṭh aur satya donoṃ kā upadeśaka īśvara hī ṭhaharā, tab to īśvara āp hī sarva matāṃtariyoṃ ko āpas meṃ laḍātā hai (1905: 40).

Here again, Ātmārām is clearly not expressing an equivalence or indifference between the claims of various religions. However, note a small but significant change that has crept into Mal's 1918 English translation. Ātmārām's Hindi does not say that “most of them are true”—rather, it says that “many are true, and many untrue” (*kitneka śāstra satya aur kitneka asatya haiṃ*), which would entail what he sees as the very unreasonable portrayal of God as teaching both truths and falsehoods. The English phrase “most of them are true” is a small but unmistakable irenic step, a transcreative translation that moves in the direction of a universalism of religions not in Ātmārām's original text.

⁶ The LTN phrase “*teṣāṃ evānirjñātam asadrśam*” (2.1) may conceivably name this argument; more likely, however, it simply asserts that they are ignorant and unseemly.

Reconciliation

Thus far, we have seen that Ātmārām tends to remain quite firmly within the bounds of traditional Jain apologetics, maintaining the supremacy of the Jina that is the thesis of the LTN. Intimations of any sort of irenic universalism have mostly been the result of his English translator's subtle transcreation of his Hindi text. However, Ātmārām's original composition itself does attempt significant strides in expanding Jain arguments against other gods beyond the parameters of traditional Sanskrit apologetics into the global context of modernity. For example, he has his interlocutor ask about contemporary views of the existence of God (*vartamāna-kāla meṃ īśvara ke hone ke viṣaya meṃ lokoṃ kā kyā khyāl hai?* [1905: 66]). Nevertheless, despite the framing of the question, the answer does not track contemporary views, at least not ones that would have been familiar to his Chicago audience: it is an entirely classical description of *Īśvaravādins* ('theists') and *Nāstikas* ('deniers') utilising fully traditional scholastic categories. But he does expand his discursive repertoire when he has his interlocutor ask about the modern scientific view of God in Question Sixty (*vartamāna-kāla kī jo padārthavidyā hai us vidyānukūla īśvara kā varṇana kis prakāra se ho saktā hai?* [1905: 56]). This is one place where Ātmārām overtly says that Jainism is right and the others wrong; and he makes this judgment on the basis of modern scientific theory, a source of authority that was of course not available to Haribhadra. He pronounces that:

“modern science is not opposed to the Jain scriptures; it is in harmony with them.... If the forces of matter are to be considered God, then the Jains have no objection to it.... According to the modern science the view of God as held by other religionists is found invalid” (1918: 102–104).

vartamānakāla kī jo padārtha-vidyā hai so jaina-mata ke śāstromṃ se pratikūla nahīṃ hai, kintu jaina-mata ke śāstrānukūla hī hai (1905: 56).

This line of thought partly coheres with the agenda of the World's Parliament of Religions in which, according to Brekke, “the key issue was the conciliation of religion with the discoveries and the attitudes of science”; and yet, it does not quite yield to prevailing expectations “that comparative studies of all religions would reveal a common core on which to base the religion of the future” (2002: 108).

Another way in which Ātmārām broadens beyond classical categories is by taking into account religions that were generally not acknowledged in premodern Sanskrit literature. But—to return to the central issue of this paper—this widened scope does not come with an irenic increment, and he still discusses these in terms of what classical Jain intellectuals

like Hemacandra have articulated as the marks of right faith (*samyaktva*) such as *deva*, *guru*, and *dharmā* (Williams 1991 [1963]: 41 and Folkert 1993: 122). So in Question Eighty-Nine he asks:

“What have Judaism, Christianity and other religions done for mankind?” (1918: 162).

manuṣya jāti ke liye yāhudī, īsāī, aur śeṣa dharmoṃ ne kyā kiyā hai? (1905: 93).

And the answer is:

“These religions have done *limited* good to mankind by preaching through their religious books to mankind the worship of God, mercy, charity, [etc.]. But the religions referred to above have done great harm to mankind in as much as they have not told mankind the true attributes of *Deva* (God), *guru* (teacher), and *dharmā* and have teachings to the contrary. The Jaina religion shows for mankind *ekant hit* (wholesome good) and the true path of *mokṣa* and nothing perverted. Hence it has done all good without harm” (1918: 162–163).

manuṣya jāti ke liye ek jaina-dharma ke vinā śeṣa dharmoṃ ne ekāṃśī sudhārā, arthāt apne apne dharmā pustakoṃ ke upadeśa se manuṣya ko īśvara bhakti, dayā, dāna.... parameśvara, guru aur dharmā kā satya svarūpa nahīṃ batalāyā kiṃtu viparyaya bodh karāyā hai, so baḍā bhārī manuṣya jāti kā nuksān kiyā hai. aur jaina-dharma ne manuṣya jāti ke vāste ekāṃṭa hita aur satya mokṣa mārga hī batalāyā hai, paraṃ viparyaya nahīṃ batalāyā hai, isliye ekāṃṭa upakāra hī kiyā hai, paraṃtu nuksān nahīṃ (1905: 93).

Mal would better have translated *ekāṃṭa* as ‘wholly’ instead of ‘wholesome’, as correctly reflected in his phrase “all good without harm.” The contrast that Ātmārām is drawing is between better and worse religions—and not only as a matter of degree, but as a comparison between the one that is *absolutely* good (*ekāṃṭa hita*) and the others that are all harmful to some degree or other. It is quite clear here that Ātmārām does not think the differences between Jainism and other religions are only verbal or nominal. He is staking a strong claim that others are faulty. And their faults are intrinsic to their views of divinity (*deva* and *guru*), just as the LTN insists. Ātmārām presses that point in his answer to Question Ninety-Five:

“No one in the world (except Jainas) believes in such god as *arhat* who has been free from 18 defects and who possessed such qualities as infinite knowledge etc., real happiness, etc. Consequently the *arhat* himself is Parmeshwar and none else” (1918: 170).

jaise aṣṭādaśa dūṣaṇa rahita, anamṭa jñānādi guṇoṃkī sahaajānamḍa svarūpa ṛddhi ke īśvara arihaṃṭa hue haiṃ aiśā jagatkā mānā koī bhī īśvara nahīṃ huā hai, isvāste arihaṃṭa hī parameśvara hai, anya nahīṃ (1905: 98).

It would have been preferable for Mal to end his translation of this passage with the word “is,” since it reads as possibly making only the claim that the Jina (*arhat*) is in fact none other than the supreme deity

(“Parmeshwar”)—allowing that other deities may also be supreme as well—while the passage as a whole is clearly asserting that no other deities qualify. The Hindi delimiter “*hī*” is applied to the *arhat* “himself,” which Mal might as well as have translated as “the *arhat* only,” since “none else” is “Parmeshwar”. In case there were any uncertainty in that claim of uniqueness, Mal has clarified that no one “except Jainas” believes in such a perfect deity.

To be sure, it is not that Ātmārām ignores any theological convergence between various religions. For example, Question Sixty-One asks:

“In what respects do statements about God found in different religious books agree and in what do they differ?” (1918: 104).

hareka dharma ke pustakoṃ meṃ jo jo īśvara viṣayaka kathana hai so kis kis viṣayameṃ miltā hai, aur kis kis viṣayameṃ bhinna hai? (1905: 65).

Incidentally, notice the use of the term *dharma* as a ruling doxographical category, translated here as “religion”. Despite this terminological choice, however, Ātmārām approaches this question not in terms of what come to be generally conceived in his period as religions or *dharms* (cf. Brekke 2002: 28–32), but according to entities belonging to the somewhat different category of *darśana*, what is now more commonly understood as a school of philosophy (cf. Halbfass 1988; Folkert 1993: 113–123). Ātmārām is following the general doxographical approach of Śvetāmbara scholiasts at least as far back as Haribhadra’s *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* by comparing and contrasting classical *darśanas* including Jains, Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Pātañjalas, and Vedacists (1918: 104–105). And he comes around to speaking of *matas*, a category that Mal translates as “religion”—and is indeed often used in writings of this period to compare things like Jainism and Christianity (the *Īsāi-mata*)—but is classically also coextensive with *darśana* (Mundra 2022: 39) and can thus be understood to encompass *dharma*, *darśana*, and religion. Ātmārām concludes that there is indeed substantial agreement between the various *matas*:

“In respect to the following attributes of God, all religions hold a common view, subject to differences now and then in the meanings of these words. The attributes are:...” (1918: 105–106).

...ityādi svarūpa viśeṣaṇoṃ se to sarva matoṃ meṃ ek sariṣā īśvara mānā hai, paramtu arthāṃś se kiśi kiśi sthān meṃ bheda paḍ jātā hai (1905: 66).

Ātmārām lists twenty-eight descriptors that he finds all religions to attribute to their deity (*īśvara*). The list includes, interestingly, *parameśvara* (“Parmeshwar”), the label that we have seen him bestow exclusively upon the Jina in his answer to Question Ninety-Five. There are also a number of terms such as *brahma*, *yogīśvara*, and *parameṣṭhī*,

concepts which are really only shared among classical Indian belief systems, and not even among all of those. Ātmārām's assessment of agreement between the *dharmas/matras*, then, sits a bit uneasily with the expansion of his comparative endeavour to include non-Indian religions and modern science in its purview.

Still, we have here a rare moment in which Ātmārām is indeed displaying something close to what Sagarmal Jain calls a harmonising or conciliatory habit (*samanvaya-śīla*). He appears even to be ascribing differences to semantics. This leaves open the possibility of the differences between deities being purely nominal, discrepancies in manners of speaking that do not correspond to differences in their referents. But it is also consistent with the contrary thought that the coinciding attributions are purely nominal and conceal substantial differences in theological opinions. Which theology is correct depends at least partly on Ātmārām's theory of linguistic reference; but even if he has worked out such a philosophy somewhere, it would take us too far afield to excavate it here.

In any case, it is clear that Ātmārām's general tendency, quite like Haribhadra's, is to take avowed differences seriously and to interrogate them critically. He does not shy away from repudiating what he takes to be wrong views. And yet, there are glimmers of the twentieth-century tendency toward reconciliation in his transcreation of Haribhadra's polemics and especially in the work of his translator, Babu Kanno Mal. Ātmārām accomplishes this balancing act of repudiation and reconciliation at what can be read in his oeuvre as a complex moment of transition from classical to modern, moving back and forth between various discourses and approaches and audiences, still strongly rooted in classical Sanskrit philosophy but making overtures toward modern science and religions without Sanskritic intellectual histories. It will require the twentieth century and its movements of nationalism and globalisation to fully reinvent Haribhadra's repudiation of other gods into an approach of irenic universalistic reconciliation. But Ātmārām's transcreations exhibit some of the small but crucial acts of reuse, recasting, rewriting, and translation that help to make possible the more radical transcreation of Haribhadra in circulation today.

Abbreviations

- CP = *Chicago Praśnottara* of Ātmārām (Ācārya Vijayānandsūri). See Ātmārām 1905 and 1918.
- LTN = *Lokatattvanirṇaya* of Haribhadrasūri. See Suali and Haribhadrasūri 1905.
- ŠDS = *Šaddarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri. See Haribhadrasūri and Guṇaratnasūri 1970.
- TNP = *Tattvanirṇayaprāsāda* of Ātmārām (Ācārya Vijayānandsūri). See Ātmārām 1902.
- TRD = *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* of Guṇaratnasūri. See Haribhadrasūri and Guṇaratnasūri 1970.

Bibliography

- Ātmārām (Ācārya Vijayānandsūri). *Tattvanirṇayaprāsāda*. Edited by Muni Śrī Vallabha Vijaya. Mumbai: Induprakash Giantstock, 1902.
- . *Śikāgo Praśnottara*. Edited by Jasvantarāya Jainī. Lāhaura: Lālā Lālamana Jainī, 1905.
- . *The Chicago Prashnottar, or Questions and Answers on Jainism for the Parliament of Religions Held at Chicago, USA in 1893*. Translated by Babu Kanno Mal. 1st ed. Agra: Atmanand Jain Pustak Pracharak Mandal, 1918.
- Brekke, Torkel. *Makers of Modern Indian Religion in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Oxford Oriental Monographs. Oxford: University Press, 2002.
- Cort, John E. “Jain Questions and Answers: Who Is God and How Is He Worshipped?” *Religions of India in Practice*. Ed. Donald S. Lopez, 598–608. Princeton Readings in Religions. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- . “Defending Jainism against Christianity and Colonialism: Jains and Presbyterian Missionaries in Colonial Gujarat.” *Cooperation and Competition, Conflict and Contribution: The Jain Community, Colonialism and Jainological Scholarship*. Eds. Andrea Luithle-Hardenberg, John E. Cort, and Leslie C. Orr, 229–70. Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2020.
- Dhanani, Lynna. “The Anekāntatā of Anekāntavāda: The Dialectic of Non-One-Sidedness in Hemacandra’s Philosophical Hymns.” Presented on panel *Jain Philosophy: Perspectives on Non-One-Sidedness* (co-sponsored by the Jain Studies Unit, Hindu Philosophy Unit, and the Philosophy of Religion Unit), American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, 2021.
- . *Polemics of Dispassion and Production of Wonder: Argumentation and Devotion in the Praise Hymns of Hemacandra (1089–1172)*. PhD thesis, Yale University, 2022.

- Dundas, Paul. "Haribhadra." *Brill's Encyclopedia of Jainism Online*. Eds. John E. Cort, Knut Jacobsen, and Kristi L. Wiley, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1163/2590-2768-BEJO-all>
- Fisher, Elaine M. *Hindu Pluralism: Religion and the Public Sphere in Early Modern South India*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2017.
- Folkert, Kendall W. *Scripture and Community: Collected Essays on the Jains*. Ed. John E. Cort. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1993.
- Hahn, Michael. "Śankarasvāmin's Devatāvimarśastuti." *Vividharat-nakaraṇḍaka: Festgabe Für Adelheid Mette*, 313–29. Swisttal-Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 2000.
- Halbfass, Wilhelm. "Darśana, Ānvikṣikī, Philosophy." *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*, 263–286. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988.
- Haribhadrasūri and Guṇaratnasūri. *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya of Ācārya Haribhadra Sūri (With the Commentary Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā of Guṇaratna Sūri and Laghuvṛtti of Somatilaka Sūri and an Avacūrṇi)*. Edited by Mahendra Kumar Jain. Jnanapith Moortidevi Jain Granthamala, Sanskrit Grantha 36. Calcutta: Bharatiya Jnanpith Publication, 1970.
- Hatcher, Brian A. "'The cosmos is one family' (vasudhaiva kutumbakam): Problematic mantra of Hindu humanism." *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 28.1 (1994): 149–62.
- Jain, Jyoti Prasad. *Religion and Culture of the Jains*. 2nd ed. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 1977.
- Jain, Sagarmal. "Samadarśī Ācārya Haribhadra." *Śrī Yatīndra Sūri Dīkṣā Śatābdi Smārak Granth*, Ed. Jyotiṣācārya Munipravara Jayaprabhavijaya Śramaṇa, 90–114. Bhesvāḍā, Rājasthān, India: Śrī Saudharmabṛhattpogacchīya Tristutika Jaina Śrīsamgha, 1998.
- Kaviraj, Sudipta. "Modernity, State, and Toleration in Indian History." *Boundaries of Toleration*. Ed. Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
- Krishan, Y. Review of *Devātīśayastutih: Supra Divine Praise of Śankarasvāmpāda*, by Losang Norbu Shastri. *The Tibet Journal* 16.3 (1991): 78–80.
- McClintock, Sara L. *Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason: Santaraksita and Kamalasila on Rationality, Argumentation, and Religious Authority*. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2010.
- Mundra, Anil. "No Identity without Diversity: Haribhadrasūri's Anekāntavāda as a Jain Response to Doctrinal Difference." PhD thesis, The University of Chicago, 2022.
- Muni Jina Vijaya. "Saṃcālakīya Nivedana." *Samadarśī Ācārya Haribhadra*, Vol. 68. Ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, 1-3. Rājasthāna Purātana Granthamālā. Jodhpur: Rājasthāna Prācyavidyā Pratiṣṭhāna = Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, 1963.

- Muni Navīnacandra Vijaya. *Śrīmad Vijayānand Sūriḥ: Jīvana Aur Kārya*. Bombay: Śrī Vijayānand Sūri Sāhitya Prakāśana Foundation, 1993.
- Sanghavi, Sukhlalji (Ed.). *Samadarśī Ācārya Haribhadra*. Vol. 68. Rājasthāna Purātana Granthamālā. Jodhpur: Rājasthāna Prācyavidyā Pratiṣṭhāna = Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, 1963.
- Schneider, Johannes. “Three Ancient Buddhist Apologetic Hymns: Viśeṣastava, Sarvajñamaheśvarastotra, & Devātīśayastotra.” *Glimpses of the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature*, Ed. Kāmeśvaranātha Mīśra, 47–56. Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1997.
- . *Eine buddhistische Kritik der indischen Götter: Śamṅarasvāmins Devātīśayastotra mit Prajñāvarmans Kommentar*. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde; Heft 81. Wien: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 2014.
- Shah, Nagin J., ed. *Collection of Jaina Philosophical Tracts*. 1st ed. L.D. Series 41. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1973.
- Suali, Luigi and Haribhadrasūri. “Il Lokatattvanirnaya Di Haribhadra.” *Giornale Della Societa Asiatica Italiana (Firenze)* 18 (1905): 262–319.
- Taylor, Sarah Pierce. “Jainism’s Jeweled Garlands: From India to Illinois.” Inaugural Jain Studies Lecture, University of Chicago Divinity School, May 6, 2022.
- Williams, Robert. *Jaina Yoga: A Survey of the Mediaeval Śrāvakācāras*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1991 [1963].

