

4. Cultural Diversity, Inclusion Policy, Intercultural Dialogue

Since the mid-2000s, promoting cultural diversity has been one of the priorities of cultural policy in Germany. This was the result of two consecutive cultural-political decisions. The UNESCO 2005 Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was an essential aspect of advocacy for diversity. The main objective of the convention is to strengthen the creation, production, distribution/dissemination, access, and enjoyment of various cultural expressions transmitted via cultural activities and goods (UNESCO, 2006). Fostering cultural diversity has been the primary cultural policy paradigm since Germany ratified the UNESCO 2005 Convention in 2007.

Prior to this development, the enactment of the Immigration Act in 2005 brought about the public acknowledgement of Germany as an immigrant country. Hence, the cultural integration of immigrants gained importance for the first time. Although (cultural) integration merely encompassed compulsory language and integration courses for immigrants from non-EU countries, the Immigration Act, “as Germany’s first comprehensive immigration law ever, marks a symbolic threshold in the country’s legislative and political history” (Immigration Act, 2007, p. 190). In 2006, the federal government announced that integration was a cross-policy task of all levels of politics and policy (Bendel, 2014, p. 6). With this declaration, policymakers recognised that integration is a rather complex process connected to cultural identity. Consequently, taking measures to integrate immigrants has become one of the main tasks of all cultural policies (CoE & ERICarts, 2016). From 2006, the federal cultural policy has been dealing with matters including:

(...) cultural interests and rights to participation and self-organisation of ethnic communities in line with the *National Plan for Integration* in 2007 and the *National Action Plan for Integration* in 2012 in which federal government and the *Länder* agreed on goals for the first time, including an increase in the number of people with a “migrant background” [emphasis added] in the public services on the federal and state level. (CoE & ERICarts, 2016, p. 29)

This turn of events sparked discussions on the requirements of a more diverse cultural scene; particularly in the case of public theatre (Bicker, 2009; Mundel & Mackert, 2010; Schneider, 2011, 2013c; Sharifi, 2011a, 2013; Terkessidis, 2010), which was and still is at the forefront of the debates on theatre reform since the (public) theatre landscape is far from reflecting cultural diversity.

The research argues that the cultural policy discourse “constructs the figure of a ‘particular’ [emphasis added] immigrant as a problem” (Hage, 2000); hence, the goal of “promoting diversity” is associated with the notion of inclusion. Inclusion is formulated and promoted along with other policy objectives such as cultural integration, intercultural dialogue, and exchange. The tasks of strengthening cultural diversity and inclusion are intertwined within a discourse that calls for social cohesion and policy measures that respond to the urgency of the so-called “issues/challenges” of immigration. Cultural diversity is treated as the panacea for societal problems. Diversity is something to be valued; it enriches society and contributes to safeguarding community cohesion.

Nevertheless, the perception of cultural diversity from this point of view is ambivalent. On the one hand, a remarkable significance is attributed to the phenomenon of diversity because of its intrinsic value. On the other hand, it is offered as a universal formula for addressing all social issues. Cultural diversity is regarded as a unifying phenomenon and its potential as something not yet entirely unveiled. Hence, diversity is a destination and it is conditional; it can only be obtained if “issues and challenges” are resolved (Ganyürek, 2019a, p. 404).

Puwar claims that “in policy terms, diversity has overwhelmingly come to mean the inclusion of the ones, marked as different” (2004, p. 1). The addressee of diversity and inclusion policies are often ethnic and religious groups. Notwithstanding that a nation is an imagined political community – imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson, 2006, p. 6) – in the case of Germany, the targets of these policies are “culturally distant” immigrants and refugees, perceived as being integrated into “German culture” through the strategies and actions of policies, including cultural policy. Those “culturally distant” immigrants are perceived as strangers; “through a set of hierarchies of inclusion, they become included differently” (Puwar, 2004). Thus, within a conditional framework of inclusion, cultural diversity moves away from the notion of cultural democracy. Sarah Ahmed argues that “the arrival of the term ‘diversity’ involves the departure of other (perhaps more critical) terms, including ‘equality’, ‘equal opportunities’, and ‘social justice’” (2012, p. 1). Likewise, fostering diversity through inclusion policies overshadows the essence of cultural diversity. The context of conditional inclusion is far from enhancing cultural pluralism and initiating framework conditions for negotiating “Germanness” in an intercultural society and for a collective future.

Before examining federal incentive programmes in the following chapter, the research in this section analyses some key cultural policy documents. The goals of this analysis are:

- to identify which instruments of cultural policy determine the frame of “promoting diversity” regarding immigration,
- to demonstrate how cultural-political actors construct and regulate a conditional inclusion discourse for “culturally distant” immigrants, and
- to underscore how and to what extent specific values and ideals of cultural-political bodies produce outsiders within the nation.

4.1 Politics and Cultural Policy

Culture and politics converge through the objectives, regulations, and implementation strategies of cultural policy. Hence, an analysis of the influence of politics on cultural policy is fundamental for a profound understanding of how federal policy actors perceive immigration-generated cultural diversity and how the values and reflexes of decision-makers are inscribed on plans for diversity promotion. Despite the crucial relevance of the intersectionality of politics and culture, “cultural politics is a field of political practice rarely analysed by scholars of cultural studies either in Germany or in English-speaking countries” (van der Will & Burns 2015, p. 198). In spite of the growing establishment of cultural policy as a self-contained field of politics, it is hardly given attention in political science research and teaching (Klein, 2009, p. 9), and “cultural policy” is predominantly used by cultural scientists as an overstretched term (von Beyme, 2014). Moreover, within the German political science realm, immigration has been a marginal field of research focusing mainly on the social situation and the organisational and institutional integration of immigrants (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2005, p. 12). Also, the immigrants’ involvement in diversity discourse is a sub-field of cultural policy that has not yet been adequately explored from the aspect of cultural politics.

That being the case, this research recognises the impact of the interconnection between polity, politics, and policy in terms of determining: (a) how national cultural policy incorporates cultural diversity, (b) accordingly, how polity and politics are involved in constructing the policy discourse on diversity, and (c) how the underlying “normative ideals, values and beliefs” (Béland, 2009) of cultural politics, implemented through policy, define and sustain the position of the citizens with a “particular migrant background” (i.e., non-European, non-Western, non-Christian, Black people, POC) and confine them to conditional inclusion or a cultural integration framework. The investigation of cultural diversity as part of

the dispositive, thus understood in this work, also entails examining the political dimension of policy by exploring the cultural policy field through the lens of political science.

In the German political system, the federal government cannot (directly) intervene in the cultural sphere due to its federal structure in which the *Länder* retain their cultural sovereignty to safeguard cultural decentralisation. Nonetheless, the central government still plays a vital role in terms of shaping the discourse on “promoting diversity”.¹ Furthermore, paradoxically, culture is seen as a task of the national and federal state governments, although Article 5.3 of the Basic Law ensures the autonomy of the arts by preventing the state from regulating the field of arts.

The author considers that the interference of federal cultural policy and its institutions in the cultural sphere is strongly connected to the politics of culture. Thus, cultural politics is an indispensable part of the dispositive analysis this study undertakes, as political science deals with the entire structure from “the decisional system (*politics*) to the material results of politics in *policies*” (von Beyme, 2014, p. 103). Considering “the intertwinement of policy and the politics of culture in Germany which refers to the production and distribution of policies and their representation of ideas, symbols and values” (Wesner, 2010, p. 435), an examination of the central concepts of cultural politics is essential as they are substantially reflected in cultural policy. The investigation of these concepts also sheds light on the perception of and support for immigration-related cultural diversity. These ideas and cultural values are deeply interlinked with the notions of *Kulturnation* (cultural nation) and *Kulturstaat* (cultural state). Both embody particular ideas and beliefs which stem from a value system belonging to an intellectual, progressive, and democratic society. Even though the substance of *Kulturnation* and *Kulturstaat* was revised over time and the terms gained new meanings, “values leave traces as finger-prints do; they change but remain recognisable over centuries” (Wesner, 2010, p. 433).

Before exploring these concepts in regard to the cultural identity of a unified Germany, it is necessary to clarify what this study refers to when addressing polity, politics, and policy. Certain aspects of polity, politics, and policy are taken into consideration, following the approach of Anglo-American political scientists described by cultural scholar Armin Klein (2009, pp. 29–30):

1 As van der Will and Burns state “the development of culture in the Federal Republic is predicated on structural specificities defined by the constitution, which assigns different tasks and responsibilities at three administrative levels: federal government, the *Länder*, and municipalities, and according to the Article 30 of the *Grundgesetz* [Constitutional Law/Basic Law], the exercise of governmental powers and the discharge of governmental functions is the task of the *Länder*, except where otherwise provided for in this Basic Law” (2015, p. 201).

- Polity encompasses the structural, formal, and institutional dimensions of politics, i.e., the framework conditions under which cultural policy occurs in concrete terms. In other words, polity decides on the structures within which its objectives are to be implemented (cultural institutions, funding bodies, etc.) and within which political decision-making takes place (Scheytt, 2008, p. 30).
- Politics refers to the processual dimension of political procedures, e.g., election procedures, voting, lobbying, and influence in the political process. Here, the focus is on political actors, interests, conflicts, and their resolution. The political process of decision-making is based on political bodies (such as parliaments, city councils, county councils, cultural committees, ministries, heads of cultural departments) and the political actors, social groups, and associations that work together (Scheytt, 2008, p. 31).
- Policy refers to the content dimension of politics, i.e., the “political line”, the concrete content of politics (i.e., concepts, objectives, guidelines).

Concerning the convergence of cultural politics and policy, the following sections examine national cultural policy and other key policy documents responding to an urgency (the inclusion of “particular” immigrants for strengthening social cohesion) and the statements of federal policy bodies and actors regarding the task of “promoting diversity”. The empirical investigation is utilised through a dispositive analysis as a research perspective of the Foucauldian discourse analysis introduced in detail in Chapter 1.

4.2 Value-Based Cultural Policy and the Construction of Hierarchised Diversity

The materialisation of politics in German federal cultural policy and the key policy literature on the promotion of cultural diversity provide valuable knowledge on the underlying principles of the cultural values implied. German cultural policy recognises the arts and culture as progressive instruments with transformative powers on individuals and society; hence, cultural policy acts as a keeper/organiser/developer of cultural values of a certain kind (Wesner, 2010, p. 434). These values, based on a particular understanding of culture formulated as “the arts and culture”, contribute to individual and societal development (CoE & ERICarts, 2016; Deutscher Bundestag, 2007).

The idea of a culture-defined nation, *Kulturnation*, is believed to be the cement of national unity. The Unification Treaty provided the primary legal basis for “cultural policy in transition”, in which the *Kulturnation* is presumed to have remained undivided for over 40 years despite the existence of two states (Knoblich, 2018, p. 138). The first sentence of Article 35 of the Unification Treaty states that during the

years of division, the arts and culture were the basis for the continuing unity of the German nation (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1991). The arts and culture were seen as the substance of the reconciliation between the two German states until 1990 and in the following decades as the remedy for overcoming difficulties of different cultural traditions, cultural politics, and cultural policy approaches in East and West Germany.² In this context, the *Kulturnation* was considered at best a cultural-political front against the national socialist culture of the German Democratic Republic (GDR; Knoblich, 2018, p. 136).

The *Kulturnation* as a prevailing principle is greatly emphasised in vital national policy documents. It is considered a commitment to Germany as it replaces the lack of state unity, and the Federal Republic of Germany adhered to this tradition during its aspirations for reunification (von Beyme, 2012, p. 107). Hence, the *Kulturnation* – in various forms – signifies cultural unity and is still a powerful concept in cultural policymaking (Bloomfield, 2003a; van der Will & Burns, 2015; Wesner, 2010).

Culture has always been at the heart of Germany's self-definition (van der Will & Burns, 2015), and this national self-image, *Kulturnation*, is the reflection of the "*Land der Dichter und Denker*" (the land of poets and thinkers; Schulte, 2000, p. 45) idea of the 20th century, which is a robust articulation of a strong nation-state in an increasingly connected and globalised world. The researcher claims that safeguarding the concept of *Kulturnation* as a policy objective draws a binary division between "us" (the nation) and "the other" ("particular" immigrants). Furthermore, it defines top-down culture in a disguised manner. It produces a hierarchically ordered distinction of values between the "German" (European, Western, civilised, universal) and the "non-German" (non-European, non-Western, uncivilised, uncultivated). In this context, coloniality, described by Walter Dignolo (2011) as the "darker side of the Western modernity" to denote the matrix of power that underlines Western modernity and civilisation, is still in force in German policymaking circles.

The following subsection explores how the outdated concept of *Kulturnation*, redressed in a new format in line with the notion of neoliberal democracy and the latest European understanding of nation, still shapes the direction of national cultural policy. It also sheds light on how this concept operates as a distinctive

2 Before the unification, while in West Germany cultural sovereignty of the *Länder* had been developed into a cornerstone of the federal system, cultural federalism was unknown in East Germany since the promotion of culture and funding of the arts and cultural institutions in the GDR were run centrally, directed by state and party authorities (Wöhlert, 2009, p. 1). Today, not only is politics decentralised in the federal country, but culture is even more so (von Beyme, 2012, p. 106). Nonetheless, almost 30 years after the unification, a cultural divide continues to exist between the East and West, and the priorities and financial schemes of cultural policies still differ in East and West Germany in terms of preserving their cultural heritage and strengthening the arts and culture.

marker of the construction of hierarchised diversity and its different application in (a) Germany from the labour migration in the 1950s until the reunification and (b) Germany after the unification. Federal policy actors differentiate two presumably distinct communities/societies as internal (“German”) and external (“the other”) diversity. They also distinguish immigrants from one another as “valued” and “devalued” immigrants (Fernandes Sequeira, 2015). “Devalued” immigrants and refugees are conceived as “the other”; they are recognised as new diversity. Only new diversity is subject to inclusion/integration policies. This view echoes in the formulation of the policy objective of “promoting cultural diversity”. In the ethnically and religiously diverse contemporary German society, cultural politics and policy, with their conditional inclusion framework, affirm the exclusion of those “devalued” immigrants from the national space.

As Alana Lentin (2008) powerfully argues, otherness in the form of race (replaced with other indicators such as culture, ethnicity, religion, nationality) functions as an abstract signifier for separating human groups and strictly outlining the boundaries between German/European/Western and outsiders. In this sense, “promoting diversity” through an inclusion/integration framework becomes a “coping mechanism for dealing with a conflicting heterogeneity” (Bannerji, 2000, p. 37).

4.3 New Diversity as a Challenge: The Problematisation of Immigration

In 2007, a parliamentary working group titled the *Enquete-Kommission* published an extensive report on the cultural landscape, *Kultur in Deutschland* (Culture in Germany). The commission made various policy recommendations on numerous subjects and suggested immediate action areas, including legislative and administrative proposals.³ The report is still considered one of the most significant documents in the inventory of cultural policy, expressively strengthening the role of federal cultural policy (CoE & ERICarts, 2016; Deutscher Kulturrat, 2017). Given that the report was produced around the time when immigration started receiving attention from cultural policy at all levels, the document exhibits noticeable hesitation in tone and an ambivalent expression of views regarding immigration-

3 The *Enquete-Kommission* on culture was set up for a limited period in 2003; comprised of 11 members of the parliament and 11 independent experts, with the task of examining a broad range of issues related to cultural policy in general and the support of culture in particular (CoE & ERICarts, 2016). The final report of the parliamentary working group was published in 2007. The experts disagreed on critical conceptual issues; among various objections to federal cultural policy, legal experts were concerned about constitutional regulations being a threat to the principle of federalism (von Beyme, 2012, p. 186).

generated cultural diversity. Under the heading “Culture Today – New Challenges”, members of the commission highlighted that culture and cultural policy play a vital role in reinforcing the conditions for peaceful coexistence in a democratic society by connecting citizens with one another and with society (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 43). Under the next heading, “Cultural Diversity and Identity”, they stated that the arts and culture shape and mark the identity of a community and its members, with an emphasis on European culture and identity:

The basic ideas about society, state, and religion, about social responsibility and solidarity are based on these [Judaean-Christian] traditions. This cultural heritage is still in constant development today due to the influence of the Enlightenment and modernity. Other religions and cultures bring new diversity to social discussions and debates. (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 44)

German culture is described in terms of European values and ideas rooted in the Enlightenment, modernisation, and industrialisation. However, the federal cultural policy acknowledges that there is no binding definition of culture that could serve as the basis for cultural programmes and measures in Germany (CoE & ERICarts, 2016). The above statement indicates that in addition to the culture that constitutes German culture, perceived as “European”, historically grounded in the paradigm of modernisation and the values of Western democratic society, there is presumably a contrasting new diversity due to the religious, ethnic, and cultural differences of its members. Those differences are de facto classified as new diversity, an entity culturally and religiously distant and external from the shared “European identity” and Western civilisation.

4.3.1 *Kulturation* and *Kulturstaat*: A Binary Division Between “Us” and “The Other”

The *Kulturation* signifies the German unification, a cultural unity through history, language, and cultural heritage. The spirit of this 20th-century concept of a unified cultural identity as the cement that binds the nation together is prevalent in the *Kultur in Deutschland* report. In the introduction of the document, it is underlined that “the Federal Republic of Germany sees itself as a *Kulturation*⁴ and *Kulturstaat*⁵

4 The concept of *Kulturation* was first introduced by theologian Otto Zöckler in 1879. It refers to the notion of culture and language holding Germans (German-speaking communities) together without a nation-state, i.e., without the involvement of political power.

5 According to Armin Klein, the history of the *Kulturstaat* is the history of permanent political and social problems that have arisen in the last three centuries or so, and the idea that they should above all be solved culturally (2018, pp. 331–332). Klein defines three levels of meaning in terms of cultural policy: (a) the cultural state as a normative postulate (a content-related goal orientation of the public sector, i.e., federal government, the *Länder*, and

(Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 43). In Germany, “culture” was and still is a central element of the self-image of the state, which is historically rooted (Klein, 2018). Despite their regional and local cultural differences and cultural-political traditions, 16 *Länder* are seen as parts of a whole through the arts and culture that generate the *Kulturnation* (Wesner, 2010; Wöhlert, 2009). The *Kulturstaat* is also part of the rhetoric of cultural politics that designates culture as a state task. Many cultural-political statements and documents repeatedly mention the *Kulturstaat* without sufficiently clarifying what it means (Klein, 2018, p. 329).

Max Fuchs stresses the indisputable role of the concepts of *Kulturnation* and *Kulturstaat* in cultural policymaking and points out that they are used synonymously despite the fact that the latter originates from an authoritarian ideology; he explicates the different meanings they signify:

If you take a closer look at the terms, you will see that they can be distinguished. Moreover, they lead to entirely different ideas of cultural policy. The concept of *Kulturstaat* emerged in the 19th century, in which Germany was a politically constituted nation-state. If the “nation” was an already strongly culturally motivated form of integration of a community (e.g., by reference to language, art, or history), then this *Kulturnation* Germany existed long before the state with the same name. In this new state, Protestantism played a decisive role, especially “cultural Protestantism” with rather rigid ideas of authoritarian top-down ideological socialisation: The state as an instance of giving meaning and Protestantism as an official state ideology. This anti-democratic origin of the concept of *Kulturstaat* alone causes constant discomfort, to me at least; although one must admit that the concept has a history of its own and is used quite loosely today in most different contexts. (2008, p. 96)

Oliver Scheytt offers a new meaning to the term in light of globalisation and demographic changes due to immigration. Scheytt (2008) describes an “*aktivierende Kulturstaat*” (activating cultural state) as a new model of cultural policy that redefines the role of the state, providing it access to management and action mechanisms in terms of political, institutional, and infrastructural conditions. He claims that with the task of *Kulturstaat*, the cultural policy aims at *Kultur im Staat* (culture in the state) rather than *Kultur des Staates* (culture of the state; 2008, p. 94). Accepting its historical, legal, and political dimensions, which are interrelated,

municipalities), which emphasises the particular significance of the arts and culture as so-called “merit goods”, (b) the cultural state as social reality (the existence and influence of a nationwide range of high-quality public art and cultural institutions), and (c) the cultural state as an organisational principle (the funding, i.e., financing as well as sponsorship of cultural institutions is predominantly in the hands of the state and not primarily in the hands of society or private individuals, such as in the USA or Great Britain; Klein, 2018, pp. 334–336).

he points out that the decisive factors in this context are: what role/what self-understanding the state has in relation to culture, how culture is (co)formed by the state, what is expressed by using terms such as protection, care, promotion, service, neutrality, identity, integration, cultural sovereignty, or cultural autonomy (2008, p. 95).

Regardless of how the *Kulturstaat* is (re)conceptualised, in a country where the primary concern of cultural policy is to support “the arts and culture” that unite the former East and West Germany with an ideological connection, the essential question is how the *Länder* fulfils this responsibility in an intercultural society whose members have different expectations and interests. To what extent could “White” German cultural politics and policy give a more inclusive meaning to *Kulturstaat*? What “culture” will they protect and promote? In the absence of a transparent discussion among diverse stakeholders and a consensus on how and what will be supported, the task of the *Kulturstaat* carries the risk of turning into “structural conservatism” (Klein, 2009); furthermore, preserving and promoting a particular culture endangers cultural pluralism at a time when right-wing extremism, xenophobia, and racism are already alarmingly on the rise in the country.⁶ Fuchs reminds of the potential danger of the concept:

Since cultural policy also entails a discourse about our self-understanding, ideas of everyday life, and the appropriate social order, the debate about the meaning of *Kulturstaat* will easily lead us to fundamental questions of meaning and values. Especially since the *Leitkultur* [leading/guiding culture]⁷, which is once again being discussed, semantically fits well with the authoritarian source of the concept of *Kulturstaat*. (2008, p. 96)

The *Leitkultur* refers not to the culture of the many, but rather the culture of the elite setting the tone (Fuchs, 2008, p. 37). In 2005, Norbert Lammert, president

6 A recent survey conducted by the University of Leipzig reveals the severity of the increase in racist views in Germany. According to the study, extremist ideologies have become more acceptable in mainstream German society, leading to growing support for the radical right-wing party *AfD* and the anti-immigration and anti-Islam movement *PEGIDA* (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident; Decker et al., 2016). In the federal election of 2017, the *AfD* became the third biggest party, gaining 12.6% of the votes, with the strongest support in the east and south of the country.

7 The term “*Leitkultur*” was first introduced in 1998 by Bassam Tibi. In his book, *Europa ohne Identität* (Europe Without Identity), he defined *Leitkultur* as a representation of the Western values of Europe, which include democracy, the Enlightenment, human rights, and secularism. In 2000, Friedrich Merz, chairman of the parliamentary group of both conservative parties (*CDU* and *CSU*) at the time, used the concept against the notion of a multicultural society, calling attention to the mandatory integration of immigrants into the German *Leitkultur*. Since then, the term has become a national political issue.

of the German *Bundestag* from 2005 to 2017, attempted to redefine *Leitkultur* as a “guiding European idea” that draws on common cultural roots, history, and traditions (Scholz, 2017). In 2010, the Christian Democrats adopted a resolution claiming that Germany is based on “Judaean-Christian heritage” which should be considered the country’s *Leitkultur*; this decision should be understood primarily as a political tool in the struggle against Islam (Wasmer, 2013, p. 174). No matter how the concept of *Leitkultur* is defined, whether as a German or European leading culture, it is highly controversial not only as it recognises “German” or “European” culture as inherently superior to others, but also considers this German/European culture “entirely self-generated, hermetically sealed off from any outside influence” (El-Tayeb, 2015, p. 286).

Although both concepts are ridden with ideology and cannot escape the *Leitkultur* discussions, the report of the *Enquete-Kommission* repeatedly stressed the significance of culture as a national and state goal (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007). It particularly underlined the *Kulturnation* in the European context regarding European integration. Hence, the notion of *Kulturnation* reached another dimension in the 21st century as Wesner writes:

The emphasis shifted from the nation itself to Europe. Although, as in many European countries, the debate focuses on the rich cultural diversity, a search for a common European conceptual framework is gaining momentum in Germany. The concepts of Enlightenment, the occidental-Christian tradition and the humanitarian idea of man are discussed as unifying themes for a European identity. (2010, p. 442)

This tendency of focusing on a European identity and culture is explicit in the design of the *Enquete-Kommission* report. It discusses cultural diversity and identity in terms of the “roots of European culture” and “culture and European integration”. In the introduction, just under the subheading of cultural education, the immigrant nature of the country is implied obscurely. Cultural education is understood as the key to social development for strengthening the awareness of cultural diversity and cultural differences between regions, milieus, ethnicities, and genders (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 45).

Lammert criticised the members of the *Enquete-Kommission* for unanimously declaring Germany a *Kulturnation* and a *Kulturstaat*, without questioning the relevance of the two notions for the future of the country, and remarked that they might be dusty formulas in a globalised world (2016, p. 144). Lammert believed that the concept of “Germany as a *Kulturnation* in Europe” is not as harmless as it seems and he expressed reservations about attaining an agreeable version of the term and its suitability as a concept for describing the framework conditions of our world, which had undoubtedly changed radically in recent years and decades (Lammert, 2016, p. 143).

Moreover, the current conceptualisation of the *Kulturnation* is far from fulfilling the task of being inclusive. The concept not only neglects to signify the core values of cultural democracy, but also fails to comprehend the post-war demographic changes resulting from immigration and displacement. Accordingly, it fails to recognise various ethnic and religious identities and traditions as parts of its own. The notion of *Kulturnation* overlooks the intellectual and artistic contribution of immigrants to Germany's future. It clearly and rigidly defines the boundaries of "Germanness".

The *Enquete-Kommission* considered various cultural identities in Germany that resulted from regional differences and the forty years of division (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 45), and then described culture and identity at present impacted by globalisation and internationalisation:

In the age of globalisation and internationalisation, the arts and culture must have an identity-building effect. (...) Their significance in personal development, in the sense of one's own creative practice and the ability to see, hear, experience, and adopt other perspectives, gives the arts and culture their socialising power. (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 45)

Immigrants, more often seen as "guest workers" for an extended period, who have been living in Germany since the late 1950s, are not mentioned under the heading "Cultural Diversity and Identity". The reader has to be patient in order to discover what constitutes this vaguely mentioned new diversity and if "particular" immigrants (i.e., non-European, non-Western, non-Christian, Black people, POC) were determined as the main component of this new diversity. Nevertheless, towards the end of Chapter 3 of the report, immigration is treated as a separate area of attention. It is reviewed on six pages in a 500-pages-long report.⁸

Globalisation and internationalisation as mentioned by the *Enquete-Kommission* are considered to pose the risk of uniformity and losing national identity. The repositioning of the term *Kulturnation* in this context means shifting towards

8 The outline of the report provides an explicit insight into how culture and cultural diversity are perceived by the members of the parliamentary working group. Chapter 3 of the report is titled "Public and Private Promotion and Financing of the Arts and Culture – Structural Change". In Section 3.5, under the subheading "Funding Areas of Particular Importance", immigrant cultures and intercultural (Section 3.5.5) are combined into one phrase. In the next subheading, the "Culture of Indigenous Minorities in Germany" is examined as another significant cultural domain of interest. This chapter ends with the assessment of the "Cultural Effects of Demographic Change". In the introduction, four subjects are highlighted: "Commitment to Democratic Communities", "Culture Today – New Challenges", "Cultural Diversity and Identity", and "Safeguarding Cultural Promotion in All Its Diversity". Not a single sentence about immigration from the 1950s onwards or how society was marked by the cultural impact of labour migration.

advocacy for European identity and Europe-oriented values. In this concept, the impact of the multicultural character of Europe on the change of the European identity is not taken into account. By pointing out the current multicultural essence of Europe and Germany – with its diverse cultural orientations and traditions – Lammert raised the question of whether and how the identity of a society, a state, and a nation could be determined based on formulations such as the *Kulturnation* and *Kulturstaat* (2016, pp. 146–147). Instead, Lammert proposed engaging with the European/Western identity by reassessing what is German and what is European or Western, as a future task for cultural policy (2016, p. 148).

The goal of culture as a state and nation prevailed in federal cultural policy in the following years (CoE & ERICarts, 2016). The core objectives of federal cultural policy were: protection and preservation of the cultural heritage of the reunified Germany, fostering European identity concerning European integration, and promoting cultural education implemented within the current agenda. On the one hand, a policy with these as its central goals treats culture as a phenomenon that “is unquestioned or taken for granted, built on the underlying assumption of culture being something good for the individual and society as a whole” (Wesner, 2010, p. 436); on the other, it stipulates the outlines of “the good culture” that presumably contributes to personal and social development. Hence, the protection and promotion of the cultural heritage of this “positive culture” are understood as a fundamental task of the policy; additionally, cultural education is instrumental for the dissemination of this heritage to future generations.

This perception fabricates a distinct partition between the past (the German reunification in 1990, regarded as the core of European identity) and the present (the demographic changes following labour migration). In this sense, the policy still emphasises the narrow concept of culture and history mediation – the “inner unity” for building bridges between the former East and West Germany – but not the demographic changes that have been taking effect since the 1950s. This late immigration and displacement thus allude to a new diversity perceived as “a challenging task for policy” that triggers divergence from the “main path” of the *Kulturnation*.

4.3.2 The Making of Strangers Through Inclusion Policies

Since 2001, the *KuPoGe* and its organisation *Institut für Kulturpolitik* (IfK; Institute for Cultural Policy) have been organising federal cultural policy congresses every two years, and both institutions are actively involved in shaping the discussions around cultural diversity.⁹ In her opening speech at the 8th *Kulturpolitische Bundeskongress*

9 The *KuPoGe* is partly subsidised by the federal government. The *IfK* is entirely funded by the BKM.

(Federal Congress on Cultural Policy) in 2015 titled “Transformational Cultural Policy”, the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media Monika Grütters highlighted how the meaning of culture has gained significant importance due to diversity.¹⁰ Grütters described two types of diversity and identified cultural institutions as intermediaries for the unified nation:

Germany is a country of immigration – and thus, it has become more ethnically heterogeneous, more pluralistic, simply more colourful over the past 25 years. This presents a wealth of challenges and opportunities, especially for our cultural institutions to distinguish themselves as collective anchors in diversity and as lighthouses in the complexity of the situation. The new cultural diversity has also changed the *Einwanderungsgesellschaft*¹¹. (Grütters, 2016, p. 24)

She underlined that the ethnicity dimension, in the timeframe she was referring to, pertains to the heterogeneity after the reunification. Cultural institutions were expected to become spaces that would unite the *Länder* under a common understanding of culture and (cultural) values. Labour migration and the “refugee influx” were perceived as new diversity, a second layer of the *Einwanderungsgesellschaft*.

On its website, the *IfK* states that through federal policy congresses, it aims to set the main themes and focal points in German cultural policy discourse, bring together the actors of various cultural policy (decision-making) levels and contexts, and give them a forum. Accordingly, “Cultural Policy and Globalisation” was the topic of the 9th federal congress in 2017. The intention of this specific focus was not to make a programmatic statement but to indicate a code for the dimensions within which cultural policy matters should be discussed (Blumenreich et al., 2018, p. 18). By focusing on the globalisation aspect, the *IfK* emphasised the role and importance of a global cultural policy, one that withdraws from traditional perspectives and develops a new framework for achieving cultural democracy:

10 In order to bring together the responsibility for the cultural and media policy of the Federal Government, in 1998, the position of federal government commissioner for culture and the media was introduced in the Federal Cabinet. The commissioner post was held by Michael Naumann (SPD) from 1998 to 2001, Julian Nida Rümelin (SPD) from 2001 to 2002, Christina Weiss (independent) from 2002 to 2005, Bernd Neumann (CDU) from 2005 to 2013, and Monika Grütters (CDU) since 2013.

11 The term *Einwanderungsgesellschaft/Migrationsgesellschaft* is used in certain German-speaking discourses to refer to the societal significance of migration, and is not directly reducible to English-language concepts such as “migrant societies” or “multicultural societies”; it refers to the fact that society is affected by migratory processes on every level – in the fields of economics, politics, culture, education, and beyond – and the fact that privilege is distributed by order of belonging (Ziese & Gritschke, 2016, p. 37).

If a cultural policy is to be oriented towards models such as “cultural democracy” and a more open society, it must not only take note of social realities such as increasing poverty, environmental damage, or growing right-wing populism; it should also take sides. In addition to the “everyday” practical design of funding policy, it is essential to initiate a discourse on the future of culture and thus our ways of life, and define concrete steps towards change. (Blumenreich et al., 2018, p. 14)

In spite of this affirmative reading of the global context and the intention to demand a repositioning of cultural policy concerning global challenges, the question of how cultural policy should be formulated as a democratic policy to adequately address diversity remains unanswered.

In the federal cultural policy congress of 2017, the minister of culture reflected on the duality of fear and enrichment triggered by the phenomenon of diversity in Germany. Her statement not only reveals that diversity is hierarchised but also the way the notion of “us/we” is superior:

The diversity of cultures, religions, lifestyles, and world views can sometimes be as frightening and disturbing as it is undoubtedly inspiring and enriching. Diversity remains a challenge – for some, even a threat. To integrate those who have taken refuge in the past years in Germany and those who have been searching for a while or perhaps even stay forever is a task for years, if not decades. (...) Against this background, I understand “world cultural policy” as a cultural policy for a cosmopolitan, pluralistic society. My main concern is a cultural policy for a culture of understanding. (...) On the one hand, understanding requires an awareness of one’s own identity – clarity about what makes us different as Germans and as Europeans. Only those who know and value their own can give space to a “foreigner” [emphasis added; *Fremde*] without feeling threatened by him/her. Only those who can make a well-founded distinction are capable of defending their own (democratic) values. (Grütters, 2018, pp. 23–24)

Grütters makes an explicit distinction between German/European culture and the cultures of new diversity, expanding on it by specifying people seeking refuge in Germany. The required mutual understanding Grütters describes, perceived as a prerequisite for a plural society, is the crucial aspect of the “inspiring and enriching diversity”. However, the integration of the ethnically and religiously “distinct communities” is presented as the formula for reaching this “inspiring and enriching diversity” in order to overcome (cultural) conflicts. In this context, it is unclear how or to what extent this positive pluralist recognition of ethnic difference enables “the coexistence of the plurality of cultural groups without domination” (Toffolo, 2003) in light of the culturally exclusive notion of *Kulturnation*, which instead corresponds to “structurally conditioned pluralism” (Gordon, 1970)

or “uneven pluralism” (Melotti, 1997). Rather than announcing the prerequisites of a plural society without negotiation, as Chantal Mouffe expresses, “what is always necessary for a democratic society to function is a set of institutions and practices which constitute the framework of a consensus within which pluralism can exist” (1992, pp. 13–14).

In the cultural-political context, culture often operates as a distinct line that separates Europeans from the non-European others on the grounds of the democratic values of modernity. Hesse (2007) describes the European construction of modernity as “racialised modernity”: “modernity is racial; whiteness, Christian, the West, Europeanness comprise a series of racial tropes intimately connected with organicist and universalist metaphors so frequently assumed in various canonical accounts of modernity” (pp. 643–644).

Some elements of (cultural) identity that unite “Germans” and “Europeans” are based on the presumption of mutual cultural values, while regarding other members of society as “strangers/outsideers”. In this ideological construction of European culture, portrayed as a “culture of cultures”, the underlying assumption is that there is a consensus for a “European model” of society, a model that does not exist in practice (Shore, 2001, p. 115). In this perspective, “particular” immigrants are recognised as “strangers” (Ahmed, 2000). “Strangers” are the “internal others” (Walzer, 1992) within the nation, those who are included in society through a set of policy measures. Then the figure of the “stranger” is “no longer seen as a threat to the community; the ‘stranger’ [emphasis added] becomes a reminder of the differences we must celebrate” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 4). Ahmed (2012) claims that the politics of stranger-making perceives some as “strangers” more so than others, and some as the norm.

This study argues that in the case of Germany, those who are “German/European” are considered the norm; “particular” immigrants (i.e., non-European, non-Western, non-Christian, Black people, POC) and refugees are constructed as “strangers”. The introduction of inclusion/(cultural) integration-oriented cultural policy measures that target only “culturally distant” groups and individuals in order to strengthen social cohesion is a clear sign of a political outlining of the figure of “internal others”. Stuart Hall describes these groups and individuals as being “in but not of Europe” (2002, as cited in Lentin, 2008). The predominantly White “us” is not conceived as part of the diversity discourse. This perception already indicates that the White “us” is presumed as the norm, and through the measures of inclusion ethnic and religious groups “become incorporated into the ‘we’ of the nation, at the same time as that ‘we’ emerges as the one who has to live with it (cultural diversity) and by implication with ‘them’ (those ‘specific ethnic groups’)” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 95). Hage claims that this sort of positioning of diversity “does not affect the nature of the white ‘we’; it remains extrinsic to diversity” (2000, p. 140). Moreover, these “culturally different

immigrants belong to the category that Ahmed refers to when pointing out that those “who do not fit into a standardised pattern must still fit into the nation: they fit, not by being the standard, but by being defined in terms of their difference” (2000, p. 96).

4.4 Intercultural Dialogue for a Successful Cultural Integration

Since the second half of the 2000s, interculturality as a concept of fostering diversity has gained significant importance at all levels of cultural policy in Germany (see Section 3.3) and has been supported by the actions of various umbrella organisations (e.g., the *Bundesfachkongress Interkultur* [Federal Congress Interculture] from 2006 to 2017). Another turning point for the federal cultural policy in bringing intercultural understanding into focus was the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008. In 2012, a survey, the first *InterKulturBarometer* (Intercultural Barometer), was conducted to analyse the cultural interests and attitudes of people with and without a “migrant background”.¹²

At the national level, interculturality is approached from several perspectives: (a) reinforcing social cohesion through intercultural exchange and dialogue (referring to cultural integration programmes for people with a “migrant background”), (b) enhancing intercultural cooperation (referring to practices at the international level), (c) establishing intercultural funding programmes (e.g., the 360° – Fund for New City Cultures [360° – *Fonds für Kulturen der neuen Stadtgesellschaft*] of the KSB, the *Homepage* Programme of the Performing Arts Fund [*Fonds Darstellende Künste*], various incentives of the Socio-Culture Fund [*Fonds Soziokultur*]), (d) fostering intercultural competencies and skills, (e) demanding the development of strategies for the intercultural opening of cultural institutions, and (f) urging for the framework conditions for intercultural education (e.g., the policy paper, *Interkulturelle Erziehung – eine Chance für unsere Gesellschaft* [Intercultural Education – A Chance for Our Society], presented by the *Deutscher Kulturrat* in 2007).

Despite a broad range of interests, internal intercultural strategies of the federal policy mostly aim to further social cohesion outlined by the CoE through measures supporting intercultural dialogue (CoE & ERICarts, 2016, p. 33).¹³

12 The first *InterKulturBarometer* was carried out by the *Zentrum für Kulturforschung* (Centre for the Cultural Research), funded by the BKM, the *Länder* of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia in cooperation with the University of Hildesheim and the University of Friedrich-Alexander.

13 The CoE (2010) defines social cohesion as a society's capacity to ensure the well-being of all its members – minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation – with the aim of managing differences and divisions, and ensuring the means for achieving welfare for all members.

Intercultural dialogue is seen as a vital component of cultural policy for the cultural integration of those with a “migrant background” into the majority society, which is evident in announcing the first *Deutsche Islamkonferenz* (German Islam Conference) in 2006 as an example of internal intercultural dialogue with Muslims in Germany (CoE & ERICarts, 2016, pp. 32–33).

The link between intercultural dialogue and cultural integration is elaborated in policy documents. For instance, the experts of the *Enquete-Kommission* considered that immigration, interculturality, and intercultural education have a cross-sectional character; therefore, they should be handled jointly as areas of particular importance:

By intercultural, we mean the coexistence and the exchange between cultures, mutual dialogue, and a learning process. Immigrant cultures encompass the socio-cultural expressions and collective identities developed in the different milieus of immigrants and evolved through new experiences and exchanges with the host community/environment. (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, pp. 210–211)

Although the working group did not provide a comprehensive definition of interculturality, in this view, the intercultural is understood in terms of European interculturalism, which focuses on dialogue and exchange between different cultural groups as a means to reduce prejudice (Cantle, 2012; James, 2008). Interculturality and intercultural dialogue are understood as synonymous concepts (see Chapter 3 for the discussion on interculturality/interculturalism and intercultural dialogue). It is assumed that immigrants only have group/community identities in which ethnicity and religion are decisive factors. However, these cultural identities are perceived as dynamic entities; they interact with the majority society. Cantle argues that “interculturalism is much more demanding than intercultural dialogue and involves the wider community, structural and political processes” (2012, p. 157). In that regard, this type of approach concentrates on intercultural dialogue between ethnic minorities and the “host society”, and it does not address structural issues of racism, poverty, and power (Cantle, as cited in James, 2008, p. 3). This perspective also fails to take into consideration the structural inequalities and power regime that generates a hierarchy between community identities and unfair access conditions to culture. However, contrary to this view, “interculturalism requires the redistribution of political and economic power and the eradication of racism and all other forms of discrimination” (James, 2008, p. 13).

The interplay between the intercultural approach and immigration becomes more evident in the following paragraphs of the report. Intercultural dialogue and exchange are understood as a policy strategy for cultural integration. Intercultural dialogue is recognised as a key for strengthening social cohesion, which can be reached through the integration of people with a “migrant background”:

The integration of people with a “migrant background” [emphasis added] presents a major social challenge and opportunity, the dimensions of which are being recognised more and more in recent years. (...) Successful integration means peaceful coexistence in mutual respect. Public and private actors as well as the third sector (organisations that do not belong to either the public or the market sector) must take on this task together. (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 211)

In this perception, culture is essential for tackling the “conflicts” resulting from immigration. Thus, for the *Enquete-Kommission*, the integration debate should also include the cultural dimension of immigration and its effects on society and the right of residence, social policy, right to vote, education, and as such (2007, p. 211). However, the members of the commission expressed that integration must be based on the principle of mutual respect:

Integration policy can only be sufficiently employed if the majority society actively accepts living together in an immigration society, which is necessary for integration. The basis for this is the Basic Law and the existing legal system. Therefore, the “host society” [*aufnehmende Gesellschaft*; emphasis added] must offer immigrants orientation on German law, culture, history, and the German state, as well as language support. Many immigrants see the lack of self-assurance on the part of Germans as a deficit. (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 211)

However, the report did not explain in detail what the learning process entails. Instead, immigrants were described as being in the position of learners of how “German society” functions. The report did not contemplate whether federal cultural policy should introduce strategies to improve the intercultural competencies of the majority society. Nonetheless, the “host society” was advised to acknowledge confrontation and to have “tolerance” since “confidently dealing with ‘foreigners’ [emphasis added] requires confidently dealing with oneself” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 211). The differentiation of the position of “stranger” still exists even after 60 years of labour migration history. The ethnic marker rationalises the construction of “the other”, understood here as “particular” immigrants who are not European, Western, or Christian (see Section 2.5 for a comprehensive analysis of the othering process of the non-European/non-Western).

On the one hand, the report underlined that it is wrong to reduce immigrants to particular ethnic groups since culture is dynamic and it changes through different processes (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 211). On the other, it determined that only “particular” immigrants should go through these processes of “change” (to fit into the defined criteria for integration); the majority society is not expected to “change” (to adapt to the migratory processes). “Immigrant cultures” are welcomed but on a condition: their very differences are perceived as deficits if not adapted to the prescribed national integration plans, as the *Enquete-Kommission* expresses: “despite

many positive examples – even in the second and third generation, people with a ‘migrant background’ [emphasis added] show significant integration deficits” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p. 212). In short, they refuse to embrace the values of Western society and democracy. Lentin warns that fierce insistence on social cohesion and integration into a unilaterally defined narrative causes even more detachment of the immigrants the policy aims to reach (2008, p. 490). This view on integration in Europe, according to Lentin, is one-sided and ill-defined:

Rather than being inclusive, integration is seen as assimilation with a different label because it is unidirectional: integration *de facto* signifies an inward process, rather than an outward one that is transformative of the so-called ‘host society’. Immigrants and their descendants are promised that by integrating, they will no longer be treated as outsiders in the countries in which they live. However, this promise is increasingly tempered by conditions for citizenship that place the assimilation of what in the global age are increasingly indefinable national ‘values’ at the centre of the ‘integration process’. (2008, p. 490)

The federal cultural policy reflects a similar concern about the disproportionate advocacy for social cohesion:

Another focus of research and debate has been on the question of whether it is necessary to promote social cohesion even more than prescribed in the Constitution and laws of the country. The latter states the values of society, including the tradition of Christianity and the Enlightenment. (CoE & ERICarts, 2016, p. 34)

Likewise, in the national cultural policy, immigrants, cultural diversity, and intercultural cooperation are dealt with together under one category, and listed as one of the policy priorities (CoE & ERICarts, 2016, p. 15). In Section 4, the “improvement of the situation of people from other cultures and countries living in Germany” (CoE & ERICarts, 2016, p. 28) is discussed under the subheading of “Cultural Diversity and Inclusion Policies”:

For some years, integration of people of different ethnic backgrounds, religious orientations and cultural traditions has been regarded not only as a central task of society but increasingly also as a significant challenge to cultural work and cultural policy. Meanwhile, a very diverse intercultural practice has evolved, but in this field, there is still a considerable need for further development in many large cultural institutions such as theatres, museums and symphony orchestras. The same is true of cultural policy. (2016, p. 29)

To overcome the difficulties of inclusion policies, cultural policy needs to approach “becoming intercultural” as a condition of “celebrating diversity”, which recognises everyone as the subject of change. In this view, in becoming intercultural, cultural

institutions are seen as inclusionary spaces for encounter/dialogue/exchange with ethnically and religiously different others. However, public cultural institutions are particularly distant from the idea of intercultural opening in terms of staff and repertoire schemes (see Section 2.4.1 for the discussion).

In light of the perceived superiority of Western Christian values, a constructive debate on an agreeable value consensus is fundamental for cultivating diversity through intercultural dialogue and exchange.¹⁴ For a democratic and open society, cultural politics is called upon to create framework conditions for people to find meaning and orientation in an increasingly complex world in which different cultural values collide, and the search for their own cultural identity becomes more and more urgent (Scheytt, 2018, p. 398).

Furthermore, the context of a democratic society brings the question of cultural rights to the fore. The way the interrelation between culture and society is understood has an implication on the perception of citizenship (Stevenson, 2003, p. 16). Cultural citizenship, as a new set of citizenship claims, framed in the language of citizenship rights, involves:

(...) the right to be 'different', to re-value stigmatised identities, to embrace openly and legitimately hitherto marginalised lifestyles and to propagate them without hindrance. The national community, in other words, is defined not only in formal-legal, political, and socio-economic dimensions but also increasingly in a socio-cultural one. (Pakulski, 1997, p. 83)

Cultural citizenship is thus a prerequisite for a democratic and open society since it is concerned with "who needs to be visible, to be heard, and to belong" (Rosaldo, 1999, p. 260) without being reduced to "the other" (Stevenson, 2003). As Klein writes: "where, if not within the framework of the arts and culture – and accordingly within the framework of a committed cultural policy – can a society enter a permanent dialogue with itself, 'reconsider' itself again and again" (2009, p. 245) without setting a barrier, a hierarchy between German ("us") and "particular" immigrant ("the other"). A constructive dialogue process rests upon the perspective that "cultural contact today is not an 'intercultural encounter' that takes place between German culture and something outside of it but rather is

14 Despite the firm insisting on the Christian character of the country by conservative politicians and other political actors, according to a survey on religious orientation in Germany, the number of people who declared Christianity as their faith dropped from over 90% in 1970 to under 60% in 2010 (Forschungsgruppe Weltanschauungen in Deutschland, 2019). Many people have left the Catholic and Protestant churches in the last 10 years. Specified by the same survey, in 2018, around 53% of the population are still members of one of the two churches (28% Catholic, 25% Protestant), 5% Muslim, around 4% other religious communities, and almost 38% of the total population have no religious beliefs and are not affiliated with any religion.

something happening within German culture, between the German past and the German present" (Adelson, 2001/2007, p. 268).