

Dennis Dierks

University of Jena, Germany
dennis.dierks@uni-jena.de

Mediatising Violence and Renegotiating Commonality: Bosnian Muslim Press Reporting on the Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912)

Abstract

This article presents a case study concerning Bosnian Muslim press reporting on the Italo-Turkish War in 1911 and 1912. It discusses the impact of mediated violence and emotions on the imagination of space, commonality and future. The case under scrutiny is situated at the Eastern European margins of what was, during the course of the long nineteenth century, increasingly conceptualised and perceived as the ‘Muslim world’. This process of imagining the Muslim world as a politically meaningful entity engendered the constitution and transformation of mental maps which played, as this article argues, a key role in local processes of *making modernity in a Transottoman setting*.

Keywords: multiple modernities, media history, transimperial history, Transottoman entanglements, Italo-Turkish war, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Habsburg Empire, Ottoman Empire

1. Introduction

In all regions of post-Ottoman Europe, the end of Ottoman rule implied redefining loyalties¹ and scopes of action. Local populations had to deal with new border regimes that cut off established communication paths, and new administrations that redefined social and cultural hierarchies, entailing new concepts of commonality, belonging and otherness.² However, transboundary connectivity persisted in post-Ottoman Europe, even though it was being reshaped. As recent research has shown, this holds especially true for those Muslim communities that were not affected by forced de-Ottomanisation.³ Focusing on Habsburg Bosnia in the early twentieth century, this article examines how the processes of renegotiating imaginations and practices of solidarity and belonging were impacted by press reporting on events outside the local community. In so doing, it examines the role of the press in creating new patterns of translocal relationality. These novel patterns of relationality, which transgressed newly created borders in post-Ottoman Europe, also had, as this article argues, local repercussions.

1 For ‘loyalty’ as a concept analysing belonging and commonality in late imperial societies, see Grandits 2008; Grandits, Clayer and Pichler 2011; Osterkamp and Schulze Wessel 2017.

2 See Stefanov 2017.

3 See Giomi 2008; Ağuıçenođlu 2012; Immig 2015; Amzi-Erdogdular 2017; Bougarel 2018; Bandžović 2019; Buljina 2019.

The approach applied in this article draws on the findings of classical studies on modern history, pointing at the role of print capitalism in shaping imagined communities, creating public spheres, and promoting ‘modern’ concepts of how to organise politics, society and economy, as well as one’s own private life.⁴ At the same time, it reflects recent research on global and media history, examining the impact of the press on creating transnational and transimperial spheres of communication and propelling global flows of ideas during the first globalisation of the long nineteenth century.⁵ And, finally, this approach integrates findings on the role of media, when giving orientation in situations that are both presented and experienced as extraordinary.⁶

Such a research design aims at a *praxeological approach to the study of modernity*,⁷ which goes beyond a mere reconstruction of the textual surface of discourses, as it also studies their social framing and impact. What is more, such an approach tries to understand the communicative practices of redefining social relations that transformed imaginations of solidarity and belonging. This implies examining techniques of persuasion, aiming at creating comprehensibility and credibility, which was the precondition for messages being understood and internalised. As outlined here, such an approach to media history draws likewise on what Roger Chartier framed, in the late 1980s, as *histoire culturelle du social*,⁸ and what Philipp Sarasin more recently conceptualised as a history of knowledge, resuming classical social history.⁹ Besides that, it tries to operationalise Nick Couldry’s and Andreas Hepp’s considerations on the ‘mediated construction of reality’ for historical research.¹⁰

The setting of this case study is *Transottoman*, that is, the point of departure is trying to detect, describe and understand figurations of transimperial connectedness with the Ottoman realm that have, until recently, been ignored by traditional nation-state centred research. Applying such a Transottoman perspective basically implies two things: first, avoiding any *a priori* assumptions concerning spatial scopes of social interaction, as they are suggested by analytical frameworks such as *national history* or the concept of *historical regions*. And second, analysing the dynamics of translocal connectedness that eschews any simplistic terms of description. Instead, a Transottoman approach is based on an awareness that figurations of connectivity are subject to dynamic change: they may temporally intensify or weaken; they may condense in structures reproduced by social actors; or they may diminish and, after diminishing, be revived.¹¹

4 See the two classical studies of Anderson 1983/1991 and Habermas 1989 (first published in German in 1962), and, reflecting the further discussion of Habermas’ concept of the ‘public sphere’ and its application to the late Ottoman Empire, Özbek 2005 and Özbek 2007.

5 See Wenzlhuemer 2020; Osterhammel 2014; and with a focus on the Middle East, Ayalon 1995; Herzog, Motika and Pistor-Hatam 1995; Pistor-Hatam 2001; Cole 2002; Hamzah 2013; Şiviloğlu 2018; Kateman 2019; Gorman and Monciaud 2019.

6 Bösch 2010a.

7 Reuter and Hörning 2004, 9–15.

8 Chartier 1989.

9 Sarasin 2011.

10 Couldry and Hepp 2017.

11 See Conermann, Fuess and Rohdewald 2019.

In this paper, the Transottoman approach will be applied to post-Ottoman Bosnia. The case study presented here is part of a large-scale research project investigating reform discourses of Eastern European Muslims in a translocal perspective.¹² The setting of the research project is experimental. Its starting point is to systematically examine Muslim periodicals, in order to detect events that were accompanied by media coverage that stimulated the processes of renegotiating belonging and reshaping spatial imaginaries. One such event, as the article will show, was the Italo-Turkish War of 1911 and 1912, the mediated experience of which was a key event informing Muslim perceptions of global politics and shaping imaginations of Muslim globality, which themselves became functionalised in local contexts. Unlike in the case of media coverage in most of Europe, for Bosnian Muslim periodicals, reporting on the war in North Africa did not mean reproducing well-known patterns of centre and periphery, at least not in the first place. For Christian Europe, the mental geography was quite clear: it imagined Europe as the centre of the world and most other world regions as areas either of imperial expansion or of escapist daydreams, or, mostly, of both. If there was some criticism of the Italian expansion into North Africa in 1911, it was only in terms of international law (which Italy most obviously broke), but it failed to question the normative geography of allegedly civilised, less civilised, or uncivilised people, that is, of those who were to rule and those who were to be ruled. In the case of Muslims in post-Ottoman Europe, the matter was different. For them, writing about these events implied employing a set of different mental geographies that were still in flux, and the hierarchy of which was still to be negotiated. This paper argues that for Muslim audiences in Habsburg Bosnia, reporting on the Italo-Turkish War and making it a media event was an important stage in this process of reshaping spatial imaginaries and feelings of belonging that transgressed the local: it was crucial in establishing the idea of global Muslim connectivity, as part of what was to be imagined as the ‘Muslim world’.

In Habsburg-Bosnia, very much the same as in other regions inhabited by Muslims, establishing the mental geography of the Muslim world was a long-term process. As Cemil Aydın has demonstrated in his ground-breaking study,¹³ during this process, the Koranic concept of *umma* as the religiously defined community of all Muslims was transformed into a new concept of Muslim globality, gaining the political meaning that it lacked before. Hence, this politicised imagination of Muslim globality was far from being ‘just there’. It was not already encoded into traditional local habits and belief systems but had to be evoked and steadily reproduced by those elites who were in favour of it. This said, Pan-Islamism,¹⁴ as the imagination of Muslim globality had been labelled by contemporary Western discourse, would – just like nationalism

12 For the analytical concept of translocality, see Freitag and v. Oppen 2010.

13 Aydın 2017.

14 See Landau 1994. The concept was also introduced in its Western coining – *panislamizam* – into political discourse in Habsburg Bosnia during the first decade of the twentieth century, equating it with the Ottoman notion of *ittihād-ı İslām*, see Dierks 2021.

and socialism – be one of the grand narratives of belonging that emerged during the long nineteenth century.

Therefore, for Bosnian Muslim audiences, the perception of the Italian invasion of Ottoman North Africa was different from that of most readers in the ‘Western world’ (including non-Muslim audiences in imperial Russia), who experienced (if at all) the war in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as just another bloody conflict somewhere far away from the centre of their world. For Bosnian Muslim audiences, reading about the war in North Africa meant getting involved with events in a – more or less central – region of what was now presented to them as the Muslim world, Bosnia being situated on its fringes. Framed this way, the war was perceived as an aggression against Muslims by an imperialistic European power.¹⁵ What is more, pointing out that Italy ignored the established norms of international law by invading an Ottoman province without any legal basis whatsoever, and denouncing the brutality of her warfare, had the potential to invert the Eurocentric conceptions described above: in the eyes of Muslim observers, the Italian invasion raised the question of who in fact was civilised and who was not; such an approach to the events in North Africa had the potential to ‘provincialise Europe’ *avant la lettre*.¹⁶ It contributed to reshaping mental maps and emancipating Bosnian Muslims from Eurocentric world views, as they were reproduced in the Habsburg monarchy and disseminated within the newly established imperial institutions of education, namely those aiming at the formation of loyal local elites.¹⁷ At the same time, such novel imaginations of Muslim globality, solidarity and civilisation reshaped the imaginations of the local, and the question how it should be organised politically, socially and culturally, as will be shown in this article.

Retracing Bosnian Muslim media coverage on the Italo-Turkish War allows us to understand how such imaginations of civilisation, progress and belonging got consolidated and popularised, or to be more precise: how the authors of the media coverage tried to get them consolidated and popularised. The article argues that mediatising violence and techniques of emotionalisation played a key role in this process.

2. Translocality, the Production of Space and the Making of Modernities

Long before the term had been introduced into scholarly discourse, or even been coined, the making of politicised public spheres had been described as what recent scholarship would label as the production of translocality. When Jürgen Habermas reconstructed the emergence of a ‘reasoning public sphere’ in eighteenth-century Europe as a space where political views were exchanged and knowledge circulated, he showed that this process was not only taking place at concrete, materialised places of sociability, but also, and even more so, through media consumption transgressing lo-

15 McCollum 2018.

16 Chakrabarty 2009.

17 For such orientalisng perceptions of Habsburg Bosnia, see Feichtinger, Prutsch and Csáky 2003; Ruthner and Scheer 2018; Ruthner 2020.

cal boundaries.¹⁸ Newspapers and journals connected readers across long distances and brought them together as a single reading audience sharing mediated experiences and knowledge. At the same time, these processes of translocal knowledge circulation created new imaginations of the local, and of space in general, the most important of these being mental maps of North and South, and East and West, as well as territorialised imaginations of the nation.

In this context, the production and reproduction of translocality seem to be crucial in the making of the one, modern, globalised world and its multiple modernities¹⁹ and the fact that these processes can be generally described in terms of translocality can be considered a basic assumption of recent global history. Integrating approaches of social and cultural history, global historians have shown that this applies both to imaginaries of the social and to the social fabric itself. Analysing the making of the global Middle East, Cyrus Shayegh has described this process as ‘transpatialization’, when local urban and regional societies were simultaneously moulded both into a globalised economy and the expanding and solidifying state structures of the modernising Ottoman Empire.²⁰

Late Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina also witnessed manifold transformations that caused new experiences of spatial relationality. From the 1860s Ottoman state-driven modernisation policies intensified in Bosnia, which implied the building of new infrastructure and the transformation of the urban space: Sarajevo became connected with the imperial capital, Istanbul, via telegraph, and new roads were built, together with the foundations of a railroad. In Bilād aš-Šām (‘Greater Syria’), which is at the centre of Schayegh’s analysis, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, cities became the centres of imperial integration policies, which introduced new practices of co-opting local Muslim and non-Muslim elites into processes of political decision-making. In Sarajevo and Mostar, state-run printshops were established and issued newspapers that were aimed at providing information about the administrative measures of the Ottoman authorities, political developments in the empire and abroad, and fostering feelings of imperial belonging.²¹ At the same time, the urban centres of the province witnessed the rise of new trading bourgeoisies, mostly Orthodox and Jewish families, whose lifestyle was inspired partly by late Ottoman models that reflected European patterns of modernity and partly by models of bourgeois culture taken over directly from ‘Europe’. All this created manifold patterns of translocal connectivity.

After the Austro-Hungarian occupation of 1878, the process of transpatialisation attained a new quality. Habsburg integration policy aimed at implementing a new dynastic loyalism (now oriented towards Vienna) and the gradual integration into the

18 Habermas 1989.

19 Eisenstadt 2000.

20 Schayegh 2017, 1–27.

21 See Amzi-Erdogdular 2017, 916–917, and, with a focus on the press, Kruševac 1978, 27–65; Memija 1996. Regarding modernising measures in Sarajevo, see Donia 2006, 57–58.

markets and – to a certain extent – the state structures of the Dual Monarchy.²² This challenged both local economies and traditional patterns of loyalty. Hence, it met with resistance, especially among the Orthodox and Muslim populations. For those parts of the Orthodox elites – mostly merchants and politicised members of the lower clergy – who wanted Bosnia to become a part of the independent Serbian national state, the occupation was a setback, while considerable parts of the Muslim population felt uneasy about being ruled by a Christian emperor. The migration of the mostly Catholic population from all parts of the Dual Monarchy into Bosnia-Herzegovina fuelled fears among both groups about the prospect of becoming marginalised.²³

The Habsburg administration implemented a set of measures that aimed at channelling loyalty and suppressing any serious resistance to its rule. This also implied policies of mastering translocality, namely, supporting patterns of translocal connectivity that stabilised Habsburg rule, and suppressing those which were suspected of undermining it. The Habsburg administration inaugurated a set of measures that aimed to integrate the members of the Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic and Sephardic elites, as long as they pledged loyalty towards the emperor and his local representatives.²⁴ This meant saving the property rights of the Muslim landowners and distributing career opportunities to the representatives of all (ethno-)confessional groups, especially those having attended the newly established educational institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, in some cases, one of the universities in the Habsburg Monarchy, particularly in the imperial capital Vienna.²⁵ At the same time, the regime implemented a strict, yet often ineffective, regime of censorship with a suspicious eye on every kind of ‘greater Serbian’ irredentism or any other agenda that was supposed to be subversive.²⁶ Besides this, regulations concerning the religious communities aimed at cutting off, or at least reducing, the bonds with the old imperial metropolis Istanbul: in the case of the Orthodox church, this involved a gradual replacement of the Phanariot high clergy, and in the case of Bosnian Muslims, creating local hierarchies and supporting and establishing local institutions to provide professional training for imams, muftis and qadis.²⁷

The results of this policy were ambivalent. It undoubtedly created typical imperial biographies²⁸ and a certain degree of dynastic loyalism among members of the local notables, regardless of their confessional background and national orientation. In addition, there were existing and newly evolved patterns of translocality, which could hardly be controlled by the Habsburg administration. An example is the second biggest confessional group in Habsburg Bosnia: the Muslims. Customary patterns of translocal connectedness, generated by the religious practice of hajj or the networks

22 See the groundbreaking studies of Sugar 1963 and Hauptmann 1983.

23 Okey 2007, *passim* and esp. 55–73.

24 For the cooption of Muslim elites, see Donia 2000, 51–81.

25 For elite formation, see Džaja 1994, 65–80.

26 For practices of censorship, see Kraljačić 1987, 149–174; Okey 2007, 82–87.

27 Džaja 1994, 46–64.

28 For the analytical concept of imperial biographies, see Rolf and Buchen 2015.

of Sufi orders, persisted during the Austro-Hungarian rule. Furthermore, permanent and temporary migration played an important role in keeping bonds with the Ottoman Empire and its capital, Istanbul.²⁹ There were different reasons for these patterns of mobility: to protest ostentatiously against the new Habsburg administration, as was the case with land-owning notables forming a prominent exile circle in the Ottoman capital (as well as in the Serbian capital Belgrade); to evade conscription to the Habsburg army, which was introduced after the occupation; to avoid contact with a new administration that appeared foreign both in the way it proceeded and in the way its representatives communicated; as a result of religious doubts over whether Muslims were allowed to live under Christian rule; to seek career opportunities, especially in the booming imperial metropolis Istanbul; or to study. A prominent example of the latter reason was Džemaludin Čaušević (1870–1938), the last Grand Mufti (*reis-ul-ulema*) of Bosnia to be appointed during the Habsburg rule, who attended educational institutions both in Istanbul and Cairo.³⁰ Following the example of their fellow countrymen, who had founded the students' association *Zvijezda* ('Star') in Vienna in 1904, Bosnian Muslim students in Istanbul also established an association named *Nada istoka* ('The Hope of the East') in 1909. News of this regularly appeared in the Mostar- and Sarajevo-based newspaper *Musavat* ('Equality').³¹

This last point illustrates the role played by the press in the process of keeping, reviving and consolidating transboundary connectivity with the Ottoman Empire and other parts of post-Ottoman Europe, especially after 1900, when the members of the Muslim intelligentsia began to establish their own, independently run periodicals. While the first generation of periodicals addressing Muslims in Habsburg Bosnia, namely the provincial yearbook *Bosna ve Hersek sâhnâmesi* and the newspapers *Vağan* and *Bošnjak* (the first two were published in Ottoman Turkish, the latter in Bosnian), were considered mouthpieces of the regime, as they were either issued or sponsored by the Habsburg administration, this new generation of periodicals displayed a higher degree of emancipation, due to their independent ownership structure and the government's (slightly) more liberal press policy, especially after 1907, when preventive censorship was abolished.³² These new periodicals created *figurations of Transottoman connectivity* in different ways and for different purposes: partly by publishing texts in Ottoman Turkish, as was the case with the literary periodical *Behar* in 1906 and 1907, and the almanac *Gajret* in 1906, both of which contributed to preserving and (re-) establishing a Transottoman communicative sphere based on the Ottoman Turkish *koine*, by translating key texts of Ottoman reform discourse and making its central ideas such as *medeniyet* (civilisation) travelling concepts and shared knowledge of the late and post-Ottoman oecumene; and finally, by reporting on the life of Muslims

29 For practices of temporal migration and resistance, see Donia 2000.

30 A short biography can be found in Karić 2002, 17–35; Buljina 2019, esp. 13–27.

31 Buljina 2019, 172.

32 For Muslim press, see Popovic 1986, 285–289; Kraljačić 1987, 187–189; Džaja 1994, 100–102; on subventions for *Bošnjak*, see Okey 2007, 140.

outside Bosnia, which implied establishing, consolidating, reproducing and redefining imaginations of the Muslim world.

Here, journals and newspapers produced different text genres, applying different narratological strategies: while in cultural magazines such as *Bebar*, treatises, essays, travelogues and reports were the most prominent non-fictional text genres (besides belletristic ones), which implied certain narrative and temporal structures, newspapers are generally characterised by different approaches concerning both temporality and the question of how to tell a story. The fact that they are issued daily (or at least several times a week) and that they report about events imply a different mode of constructing reality. By reporting about events, they not only contextualise them, but they also *make* them, as media theory argues: it is only media coverage that makes an incident an event – by the very fact of labelling it as event.³³ This also implies simulating both spatial and temporal proximity. Focusing on newspaper reporting, as I do in this article, we can go even further: if we take seriously what performative studies postulate, as regards literary texts, that they, too, are speech acts that create what they are about – by speaking about it³⁴ (which very much reflects Berger and Luckmann's famous 'Social Construction of Reality') – we can also apply this approach to the analysis of newspaper texts. Understood this way, newspapers create reality by writing about it.

In our case, this would imply the following: Muslim newspapers created and popularised 'the idea of the Muslim world' (Aydın) by writing about it. And what is more, by writing about events far away from the reader's home, newspaper reporting was capable of making the reader participate in these events – almost in real time. This was even more the case when there were applied techniques of emotionalisation: by creating emotional involvement, press reporting could unmake distance – both in emotional and spatial terms. How this was done, and the types of repercussions this had among Bosnian Muslims, shall be analysed in a case study focusing on the newspaper *Zeman*.

3. The newspaper *Zeman* and the Local Community of Bosnian Muslims on the Eve of the Italo-Turkish War

The Bosnian Muslim newspaper *Zeman* ('The Times') was first issued in September 1911 and continued to be published until 1914. Its genesis and development reflect the complexity of *politicising Islam*³⁵ and constructing collective identities in Habsburg Bosnia. When *Zeman* was founded, it first existed in parallel with another newspaper, *Musavat* ('Equality'). However, when the latter came to an end in 1911, *Zeman* became the biggest Bosnian Muslim newspaper. The shift from *Musavat* to *Zeman* as the leading Muslim newspaper was a result of a reorientation of Bosnian Muslim political elites in

33 Bösch 2010b; Hepp and Couldry 2010.

34 Fischer-Lichte 2013, 136–137.

35 Karpat 2001.

1910, which implied a compromise between the small group of Habsburg loyalists, mostly intellectuals trained in the Western-style imperial institutions of education, and the dominating group of landowners and ulema (Muslim scholars), who were the leading figures in the autonomy movement and whose mouthpiece was *Musavat*.³⁶

This rapprochement was preceded by a period of confrontation and rivalry among the two groups. Previously, the Bosnian Muslim autonomy movement of the years 1899 to 1909³⁷ had propelled the political self-organisation of those segments of the Bosnian elites that kept a critical distance towards the Habsburg administration and claimed a more important role for the Ottoman metropolitan institutions in regulating Bosnian Muslim affairs, which, according to them, would more accurately reflect the regulations of the Berlin agreement from 1878. The autonomists' newspaper *Musavat* even went so far as to pronounce Bosnia-Herzegovina as a province of the Ottoman Empire and Sultan 'Abdü'l-Hamîd II as its true sovereign. It would be misleading to describe this group as reactionaries, who had somehow got lost in modernity and were now seeking refuge in diffuse nostalgia, as both the Habsburg administration and several generations of Yugoslav historiography have tended to do. When starting to become organised as a political formation, the leaders of the autonomy movement had quite a precise idea of their political goals: a rigorous defence of Muslim landed property against any attempt of changing ownership structures or the asymmetric dependencies between the landowners (*beg* and *aga* in Bosnian) and their serfs (called *kmet* in the local Shtokavian varieties), restoring full control over the Muslim endowments, the *vakuf* (from Arabic *wakf*), which were under Habsburg supervision, and bringing back Istanbul by conceding the *Şeyb'ül-İslâm* the right to confirm the Bosnian Grand Mufti, the *reis-ul-ulema*. The more radical wing of the autonomy movement around the Mostar-based mufti and renowned Arabist Ali Fehmi-efendi Džabić (1853–1918) went further, demanding autonomy for Bosnia-Herzegovina under Ottoman rule.

What is even more important, the autonomy movement not only had a political agenda, but its representatives also knew how to organise broad popular support and how to get themselves heard in the different political arenas of the Dual Monarchy and the diplomatic theatre of the 'oriental question'. They sided with the leaders of the Serb autonomy movement, who supported the Muslim cause for tactical reasons. This cooperation facilitated using the knowhow and infrastructures of the Serb autonomy movement and its networks throughout the Dual Monarchy and beyond. This mattered when fashioning the protest and demands in accordance with the legal traditions of the Habsburg Empire. Besides this, the representatives of the Muslim autonomy movement also knew how to manipulate political and public opinion in the Dual Monarchy, and especially in Hungary, where they appealed to pro-Ottoman sentiment and presented themselves as members of a local gentry, an institution of high esteem in Hungary's political life at the time.³⁸ And finally, being well connected to Bosnian Muslim émigré communities in Belgrade and Istanbul, they knew

36 Popovic 1986, 288–289; Bougarel 2018, 26–28.

37 Hauptmann 1967; Šehić 1980; Kraljačić 1987, 400–429; Bougarel 2018.

38 Okey 2007, 132–133.

about the international dimensions of Bosnian domestic politics as part of the ‘oriental question’. All this attests to a high degree of adaptability to the new framework of Habsburg rule, which was facilitated by a long record of negotiating local affairs with imperial authorities dating back to Ottoman times.

Founding a political party and publishing a newspaper was part of adapting to the new conditions of political life in early twentieth-century Habsburg Bosnia. A key date in this process was the year 1906, when both the *Muslim Narodna Organizacija* (MNO) and its newspaper *Musavat* were founded. The party’s name can be translated as ‘Muslim People’s Organisation’ or ‘Muslim National Organisation’. Deciding on which translation to adopt implies a choice of how to interpret Muslim politics of identity-building at that time. When it was established, the actual meaning of the party’s name reflected both: ‘Islamic people’ (*islamski narod*) was the term usually used by MNO representatives when addressing their fellow Muslim countrymen. It is the translation of what was also called *ebli islam* in Bosnian, reflecting the Ottoman Turkish term *ehl-i islām*, which refers to the classical Arabic expression *ahl al-islām* and one of the traditional notions of describing Muslims as a group. At the same time, both in contemporary Ottoman Turkish and the different Shtokavian varieties used in Bosnia, terms from the traditional political lexicon underwent a semantic change, which demonstrates most impressively the change of meaning of *milla/millet* or *watan/vaṭan* in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish, now with the new meanings of *nation* and *fatherland*. This is why the second meaning of *narodni* in terms of *national* seems to have become increasingly relevant, both in the context of the party’s designation and the ongoing process of Muslim identity-building, which has been described as proto-nationalism.

This conceptual shift reflects a broader process of redefining commonality and belonging among the Muslim population in Habsburg Bosnia. It was accompanied by shifting factionalism among the Bosnian elites and changing political alliances in the political arenas of imperial Bosnia, which is also reflected in the foundation of *Zeman*. While the older MNO paper *Musavat* advocated Muslim-Serb collaboration, *Zeman* supported a Muslim-Croatian rapprochement in Bosnian domestic politics. This new orientation was basically the result of three events: the Young Turk Revolution, the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the introduction of parliamentary representation in Bosnia. While the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, and the subsequent abdication of sultan ‘Abdü’l-Ĥamid II, in 1909, bereaved the Bosnian Muslim elites (and, as we can only guess, also a broader strata of the local Muslim population) of an attachment figure to which they were emotionally bonded, due to both his role as caliph and as model of an independent, effective and – despite his bad reputation among Christian European audiences – ‘modern’ Muslim ruler, the annexation in 1908 definitively destroyed any hopes of a smooth return under Ottoman rule. And finally, the proclamation of a Bosnian constitution in 1910, and the election for a regional parliamentary representation in 1911, demonstrated the necessity of forming new strategic alliances in order to realise the political agendas. This all demanded a redefinition of political loyalties and collaboration. After a split of the MNO, the major faction of the MNO, namely, the political grouping that was the driving force of

the autonomy movement, and the *Muslimanska samostalna stranka* (Muslim Independence Party), the party of the Habsburg loyalists who saluted the annexation in 1908, formed a new party in 1911, the *Ujedinjena Muslimanska Organizacija* (United Muslim Organisation, UMO). This realignment implied terminating the cooperation of the former MNO representatives with Bosnian Serb elites. Instead, the newly established UMO formed an alliance with the Croat representatives in the Bosnian diet, in order to pass a law on land reform to reflect the interests of Muslim landowners.³⁹

4. The Italo-Turkish War as a Transottoman Media Event and *Zeman's* Reporting on the War

As the paper of the newly formed party UMO, *Zeman* advocated this reorientation of Bosnian Muslim party politics, which was also reflected in the composition of its editorial board, comprising leading figures of the autonomy movement, such as Šerif Arnautović (1847–1935), as well as Habsburg loyalists, such as the poet, orientalist and sitting president of the Bosnian diet, Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870–1934).⁴⁰ Its editor-in-chief, Ali-fendi Raljević, had already been editing *Musavat*.⁴¹ As a newspaper, *Zeman* was far from writing exclusively about Bosnian domestic politics, but also informed its readers about political developments in the Dual Monarchy and abroad. The first event of global outreach reported by *Zeman* was the Italo-Turkish War of 1911 and 1912.

The establishment of *Zeman* and the Italian preparations of war happened simultaneously. Having been a target of expansionist aspirations since the 1870s, the Italian government initiated concrete preparations to occupy Ottoman Tripolitania, in August 1911. In so doing, it took advantage of a favourable external situation and reacted to internal social tensions, which it attempted to neutralise by means of settler colonialism, that is, by occupying the Ottoman province, in order to make it the new home of an impoverished rural populace, especially from Southern Italy.⁴² *Zeman* was founded in September 1911, so it informed its readership about Italy's warlike preparations almost from the start.

If we accept the definition of media events as 'key events propelling societal communication processes' focusing on the big issues of the day and contributing to the evolution of 'transnational spheres of communication',⁴³ we can proclaim the Italo-Turkish War as a global media event. However, as already mentioned at the start, in different societies around the globe, this implied different things. While in Christian Europe the preparation of war and the war itself were in the first line experienced as a diplomatic event and – after the First Moroccan Crisis in 1905–06, the Bosnian Annexation Crisis in 1908–09, and the Second Moroccan Crisis in spring 1911 – a re-

39 Džaja 1994, 218–228; Bougarel 2018, 26–28.

40 Pejanović 1949, 71.

41 Pejanović 1949, 62.

42 Stephenson 2014, 30–52.

43 Lenger 2008, 8.

peated crisis of the international system, the intervals of which seemed to become shorter, Muslim audiences around the world experienced the war as an attack on Islam.⁴⁴ For them, the Italian invasion of Northern Africa was just another event enforcing the feeling that Islam was in peril and enhancing transboundary Muslim solidarity. Both feelings were driving forces in the formation process of the idea of the Muslim world as a concept of political emancipation. For Bosnian Muslim audiences, the war had an additional dimension. The provinces under attack belonged to the realm of the Ottoman sultan, whom the leading figures of the autonomy movement had still considered the legitimate ruler over Bosnia, when they protested against the Austro-Hungarian annexation by sending a delegation to Istanbul in 1909. Only in 1910 did the MNO accept the annexation.⁴⁵ What is more, in post-Ottoman Bosnia, the knowledge of Ottoman Turkish was still wide-spread among members of the Muslim elite, who were able to follow the events in the Ottoman Empire from Ottoman sources such as newspapers. For *Zeman*, too, Ottoman papers such as *Ṭanin* ('Resonance'), the mouthpiece of the *Committee of Union and Progress*, were, as well as Western newspapers, important sources of information, as will be shown in the following.

Therefore, in the case of the Bosnian Muslims, the Italo-Turkish War can also be proclaimed as a *Transottoman media event*. Reporting on the war contributed both to fostering feelings of Muslim solidarity and to consolidating a *Transottoman communicative space* of shared information, concepts and emotions. This not only implied emotionalised concepts of friend and foe, but also cultural self-images, especially concepts of progress and civilisation. Both were key notions of Muslim modernisation discourses, as they increasingly materialised from the 1890s and in which Bosnian advocates of Muslim reform often explicitly or implicitly referred to Ottoman models of modernisation.⁴⁶ When reporting on the war, such models could be both contextualised and popularised. This shall be analysed in the following section, by, first, focusing on how the reporting on the war informed images of civilisation and barbarism, which came along with the idea of international law as a new normative frame of reference⁴⁷ and mediatising violence by reporting on war atrocities; and second, by asking how reporting on the war fostered patterns of solidarity in a situation of political reorientation.

4.1 Barbarism and its Opposite: Inverting Orientalist Geographies of Civilisation

Zeman started reporting on the looming conflict in September 1911. Italy's actions from the very beginning were depicted as unlawful. Such an aggressive and belligerent attitude might have been understandable 'in the age of the crusades' (*za [vrijeme] krstaških ratova*), but it was totally inadequate 'today in the twentieth century' (*danas u XX. vijeku*), *Zeman* commented on 30 September, the day after Italy had declared war

44 McCollum 2018.

45 Bougarel 2018, 27.

46 Dierks 2021.

47 McCollum 2018.

on the Ottoman Empire. However, according to *Zeman*, this hostile stance was typical of the Great Powers, among which Italy rated, as they had guaranteed ‘a hundred times’ (*stotinu puta*) to respect and to protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, ‘but had never ever kept only one of these promises’ (*ali nikada nijedna svog obećanja održala nije*), even during times when the Ottomans gave themselves a constitution, as *Zeman* writes, alluding to the military actions of 1876.⁴⁸

Yet again, *Zeman* informs its readers, Italy showed unambiguously that she was only interested in power politics and territorial expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁹ When reporting on the Italian declaration of war some days later, *Zeman* describes this action as being not only contrary to international law, but also to any civilisational norms whatsoever.

Today we will not predict anything regarding the outcome of this conflict. What we will do instead is look at this most recent assault on the Muslim world [*muslimanski svijet*] at the hands of ‘modern and educated Christian Europe’ [*sa strane ‘moderne i obrazovane krišćanske Evrope*’].

Up to this day, there have often been historical events in European high politics and international relations that have brought dishonour to European civilisation, its culture and much-acclaimed humanity. It was most often when Turkey or another Muslim people was involved that Europe forgot about all its achievements of civilisation. We do not have to cite historical examples in order to prove this; it is a fact known to every man of at least some education.

There were unlawful and violent situations in previous conflicts between the Muslim and the Christian world, but the present conflict surpasses them all. It not only surpasses the recent actions of the European states towards Turkey, but also the medieval crusades. Italy is ready – despite all previous statements of her ministers that they do have nothing against Turkey – to attack a Turkish province just like hajduks [*hajdučki*] – and this in the very same year that she celebrates the fiftieth anniversary of her liberation and when the whole of Europe had to listen to her deafening clamour about her civilisation and cultural progress. What is more, today we received a cable from Turin where, during the world fair that is dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of the Italian liberation, they set fire to the Turkish pavilion, in which the Turks exhibited their cultural achievements. This Italian crime mirrors their barbarism and attitude towards the Turks. All the ado about culture is in vain, as culture includes tolerance. However, in ‘civilised’ Italy there is no such thing as tolerance.

When other states intend a campaign of conquest into Muslim territory, they at least scheme ‘causes’ and ‘reasons’ for many years. However, Italy proceeds in a totally different way, and she will pay dearly for it.

In the whole of Tripoli and in the whole of Turkey there has been no harm done to any Italian citizen; nowhere have Italian interests been in peril at all; but despite

48 *Zeman*, No. 12, 30 September 1911, 2. All translations are my own.

49 *Zeman*, No. 12, 30 September 1911, 2.

this, the whole of Italy mobilises and sends her fleet to the shores of Tripolitania in order to occupy this Turkish province.⁵⁰

This article sets the tone of *Zeman's* further reporting on the war: the true barbarians are the Italians, but their barbaric actions will not prevail.

According to *Zeman*, the Italian invasion would not only fail because of its strikingly missing legal basis; it would also fail, as Italy was totally misjudging her enemy. Once again, she was ignoring who was really civilised – and who was not – while overrating her own resources and capacities. On 5 October, *Zeman* presents to its readers a comment on the Italian ultimatum, republishing a text from the Bosnian Croat newspaper *Hrvatski dnevnik* ('The Croatian Daily Paper'):

In her cynical ultimatum Italy says that she was forced into this measure [i.e. the invasion of Tripolitania, D.D.] because Turkey was unable to keep order in the provinces of Tripolitania and to lead them towards progress and culture. It is civilisation that imposes upon Italy the duty to occupy Tripolitania and to introduce basic culture.

Here, Italy really makes a fool of herself. So, Italy is to cultivate and civilise an African country? It would be somehow understandable and perhaps also acceptable if Turkey tried to occupy Southern Italy, the most neglected and most barbaric region in Europe, in order to help it overcome its barbarism and lack of culture. However, a country like Italy is not qualified to bring the light of civilisation to foreign countries and peoples. He who is incapable of eliminating the darkness of ignorance and to overcome economic deprivation and decline on his own native soil, cannot take up the burden to be the torchbearer of enlightenment in foreign countries.⁵¹

Alluding to events in the Calabrese town of Verbicaro, which witnessed, in 1911, an outbreak of cholera and turmoil, in the course of which public buildings were set on fire and three people killed,⁵² the article continues:

Verbicaro! This word is enough to shed light on the stage of present Italian culture, to reveal Italy's cultural and economic misery. This is a country of destitution, hunger, ignorance superstitious and depravity. And this Italy sets out to Africa to bring culture and civilisation! The whole of Southern Italy is abandoned and neglected, perhaps even more than Tripolitania; it is a region without roads, without water – a whole single cemetery; it is the home of decay, hunger and death. San Giuliano⁵³ should send his civilising expeditions, which are heading to Africa, there.

50 *Zeman*, No. 14, 05 October 1911, 1. The original excerpts in Bosnian can be found in the annexe.

51 *Zeman*, No. 14, 05 October 1911, 3.

52 Lorenzo 1991.

53 Antonino Paternò Castello, Marchese di San Giuliano (1852–1914), the acting Italian foreign secretary in 1911.

The heart of Italian life, Italy's pride and joy, is Naples. In this big city there are 30,000 school-age children who attend no school whatsoever. Still, Italy is ready to spread education in Africa!⁵⁴

It is also the leftist Italian press itself that points, 'with sarcastic words' (*sarkastičkim riječima*), to the 'absurdity of Italy's 'civilising mission' (*absurdnost ove talijanske 'prosvjetne' ekspedicije*), *Zeman* explains to its readers, citing from the socialist newspaper *Avanti*.⁵⁵

As *Zeman* argues, it was not only an absurd notion that Italy could accomplish a civilising mission abroad, but also that she could defeat the Ottomans by military means. Even the Belgrade paper *Novo vreme* ('The New Time') acknowledged the military strength of the Ottoman Empire, *Zeman* says, extensively citing an article from this newspaper. Here, the Ottoman Empire appears as a modernised and vigorous state with a powerful army:

If we take a closer look at the progress that the Turkish army made over the last two years and if we bear in mind the type of rubbish [*iz kakvog je blata*] and stagnated despair from which the Turkish army turned into a meaningful force, we will have to praise such a success. Under these circumstances we have to be most optimistic regarding the future of the Turkish army. The main reason for this sharp recovery is the Turkish people's natural ability for war. We still regard 1682 as a famous example of this ability, when the Turks were even able to threaten Vienna. Fear is unknown among them. Being healthy, modest (the vice of alcohol is unknown to them) and having grown up in the heights of Anatolia and Albania, they do not need much. They are used to marching and are hardened against fatigue – they are the best soldiers in the world.⁵⁶

Although the text also reproduces some negative stereotypes, such as the soldiers' lack of education and their 'passive nature', it draws a positive picture of the Ottoman army, which clearly differs from contemporary Orientalist discourse 'othering' Muslims as culturally or even racially inferior.⁵⁷

Another reason for the strength of the Ottoman army, *Novo vreme* quotes, are the reforms which the Ottoman Empire underwent:

Crucial to the reform was adopting the so-called Tanzikat [sic, recte: Tanzimat] law. With its help the Augean stables were cleaned out. [...]

The people salute these reforms with great enthusiasm and willingly bear heavy burdens. During the course of the last years, all available money has been spent on the army. The result is that the equipment and armament of the Turkish are entirely modern.⁵⁸

54 *Zeman*, No. 14, 05 October 1911, 3.

55 *Zeman*, No. 14, 05 October 1911, 3.

56 *Zeman*, No. 15, 07 October 1911, 2.

57 Said 1978; Aydın 2017.

58 *Zeman*, No. 15, 07 October 1911, 2.

In these articles quoted from *Zeman*, we see what Jan Assmann has described as the technique of *narrative inversion*.⁵⁹ The well-known story of the Ottoman Empire as the ‘sick man of Europe’, whose actions are doomed to fail and for whom it is only a matter of time before he dies, is turned upside down: the empire is presented as a modern state and the Turks as a patriotic, energetic and physically strong people. Presenting the Ottoman Empire this way implied appropriating central discourses that were at the core of nineteenth-century Europe’s conceptualisation of culture and society. Now, these discourses, such as *civilisation*, *progress* and *race*, are associated positively with the Ottoman Empire and its population. While comparing Italy’s military aggression with the medieval crusades meant activating a trope that had been well established both in Ottoman and Bosnian Muslim discourse before the war,⁶⁰ articles underlining both the unlawfulness of Italy’s actions, as well as her inability to exercise a civilising mission, were mostly taken from non-Muslim newspapers published outside the Ottoman Empire.

A crucial role in this process of inverting mental maps of civilisation played the mediatisation of war atrocities in *Zeman*’s reporting. The newspaper created literally a geography of violence when describing, in detail, the advance of the Italian troops, the local resistance and Italian war atrocities, when Italian troops massacred several thousand civilians and executed alleged ‘traitors’ after an Ottoman counterattack on the oasis of Tripoli, on 23 October – the first time the Italian troops met with serious military resistance. *Zeman*’s sources for these detailed accounts were British newspapers, such as the *The Daily Telegraph* or *The Westminster Gazette*, which provided information gathered by experienced war correspondents based in Tripoli, for instance the Irish-born journalist Francis McCullagh (1874–1956), who had already reported from the battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War.⁶¹ Under the title ‘Inhuman Acting of the Italians in Tripoli’ (*Nečovječni postupak Talijana u Tripolisu*), *Zeman* published, on 14 November, a report penned by McCullagh for the liberal British paper *The Westminster Gazette*, in which he tells about 4,000 people executed by the Italian army, 400 Arab women and children slaughtered, and photographs proving these barbarian acts.⁶² A first eyewitness account on war atrocities entitled ‘The Italians’ Atrocities in Tripoli’ (*Barbarstva Talijana u Tripolisu*) had been published in *Zeman* five days earlier. In this account, a British volunteer in the Ottoman army, a certain Lieutenant Montague, reports on 120 women and children, who were killed and mutilated by Italian troops, their hands and feet being cut off.⁶³

Again, *Zeman* frames these horrifying reports by putting them into a discourse of civilisation and barbarism, when it comments:

Yes indeed, the Turkish have fought bloody wars, more than any nation in Europe, from the very moment they set foot on European soil, but the Turkish regular ar-

59 Assmann 2000.

60 McCollum 2018, 54; Dierks 2021.

61 Horgan 2009, 171–173; Stephenson 2012, 74.

62 *Zeman*, No. 32, 14 November 1911, 2–3.

63 *Zeman*, No. 30, 09 November 1911, 1.

my – even 500 years ago – has never caused harm to any child, old man, or woman. Turkey has saved and defended them as if they were her own children, and for the Turk and the Turkish soldier there could not be any greater infamy than to kill a woman, not to mention a child. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible that such barbary could have occurred among the ‘uncivilised’ Turks ‘untouched’ by European culture.⁶⁴

4.2 Making Solidarities: Western Public Opinion, Muslim Humanitarianism and Renegotiating Political Alignments in Habsburg Bosnia

Pointing to Italian ‘barbarism’ went along with presenting the public opinion in ‘Europe’ as being favourable towards the Ottoman cause. Important sources for such accounts were two flagships of the German-speaking liberal press, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the Viennese *Neue Freie Presse*. On 11 November, for instance, *Zeman* published the translation of an article criticising the annexation of Tripoli, which Italy had proclaimed on 5 November, when it did not yet have control over the province. The source of this article, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, was introduced to *Zeman*’s readers as one of the ‘biggest and best German papers’.⁶⁵

During the first month of the war, *Zeman* told its readership again and again about anti-Italian sentiment in ‘Europe’: on 17 October, it reported on British boycotts of Italian products that were aimed at forcing Italy ‘to make peace with Turkey’;⁶⁶ and on 24 October, it summarised the purport of German press reporting as follows: ‘Nearly all German newspapers condemn the immorality of Italy’s actions against Turkey’.⁶⁷ In the lead article of the next issue, *Zeman* differentiates between European diplomacy, whose attitude towards the conflict it condemns, and public opinion in ‘Europe’:

The Italian diplomacy succeeded before the outbreak of the war in securing support in other European countries that promised her they would not interfere in her actions in Tripoli. However, considering the attitude of the populace in nearly all European countries, European diplomats clash with their people over the Italo-Turkish conflict [...]. The whole of the British press clearly condemns Italy’s provocative actions for which there are no examples in the history of the European countries. In other European countries the mood is similar, and this is completely natural. Also, in Austria and Hungary the entire public rejects Aerenthal’s policy in this conflict and demands a new orientation.⁶⁸

64 *Zeman*, No. 30, 09 November 1911, 1.

65 ‘Donosimo ovaj članak po jednom od najvećih i najboljih njemačkih listova’; *Zeman*, No. 31, 11 November 1911, 1.

66 *Zeman*, No. 19, 17 October 1911, 2.

67 ‘Skoro sve njemačke novine oštro pišu protiv rgjavog postupka Italijana u ratu sa Turskom.’; *Zeman*, No. 24, 29 October 1911, 2.

68 *Zeman*, No. 25, 31 October 1911, 1.

According to *Zeman*, there were only a few ‘European’ papers not condemning the Italian aggression, among others the two leading ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina – the Sarajevo-based *Srpska riječ* (‘The Serbian Word’) and the Mostar-based *Narod* (‘The People’). On 14 November, *Zeman* even published a synopsis of the latest reporting of *Srpska riječ* and its Bosnian Croat counterpart *Hrvatski dnevnik*, attacking *Srpska riječ* for siding with the Italians and pointing out *Hrvatski dnevnik*’s favourable attitude towards the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁹ Such press reporting underpinned the redefinition of political alliances in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the annexation of 1908. When Ali-efendi Raljević was still editor-in-chief of *Musavat*, the paper regularly denounced *Hrvatski dnevnik* as the chief promotor of Catholic proselytism in Habsburg Bosnia and the mouthpiece of Jesuit reactionaries around the Sarajevo archbishop Josip Stadler (1843–1918), while calling *Srpska riječ* ‘our fellow combatant from Sarajevo’ (*naš sarajevski saborac*),⁷⁰ and painting a harmonious picture of Muslim-Serb relations within and without Bosnia. After the political realignment of the former protagonists of the autonomy movement, these roles were reversed: *Hrvatski dnevnik* was now depicted as pro-Muslim and pro-Ottoman, while *Srpska riječ* was presented as an enemy of the Muslim cause. *Zeman*’s reporting on the Italo-Turkish War played a key role in this process.

Besides underlining the lawfulness of the Ottoman cause, *Zeman* tried to create hope that the Ottoman army had a real chance of winning the war. During the first weeks of the war, success messages from Istanbul papers such as *Tanin*, *İkdam*, *Tercüman-ı Hakaikat*, or *Şabâh* had a prominent place in *Zeman*’s reporting on the war and were published in the section ‘The Turko-Italian War. The Latest News’ (*Tursko-talijanski rat. Najnovije vijesti*). Obviously, the source of these news were agency reports transferred by telegraph. This seems to be the way most content from Istanbul papers found its way into *Zeman*. While *Zeman* translated articles from local and Western newspapers, such explicit references are not to be found in the case of Ottoman papers.

On 2 November, *Zeman* reported on its front page, in an article entitled ‘A Special Celebration’ (*Rijetko slavlje*), on celebrations in ‘Istanbul [*Carigrad*], Izmir, Thessaloniki [*Selanik*], Bursa, Kairo, Bombay and other cities’, as well as festive illuminations of the Dolmabahçe Palace, after the arrival of the ‘joyful news’ ‘that the united Ottoman forces together with the Arabs gained a splendid victory over the Italians outside the city of Tripoli, that they pushed back the Italian troops, and that over the Misirbaba fortress in the capital of Tripoli the red flag with the white crescent flies again’,⁷¹ as the partly successful Ottoman counterattack of 23 October was framed. However, after two months of reporting on the war, *Zeman* began to show more reservation towards success messages from the Ottoman press, which were now briefly noted in the

69 *Zeman*, No. 34, 18 November 1911, 1.

70 *Musavat*, No. 12, 20 March 1908, 1.

71 ‘S velikim zakašnjenjem i dugim putem stigla je u prijestolnicu osmanlijskoga carstva radosna vijest, da su ujedinjene turske čete s Arapima pred gradom Tripolisom odnijele sjajnu pobjedu nad Talijanima, da su suzbile talijanske čete u posadi i da su na tvrđjavi Misirbaba glavnog grada Tripolisa vije opet crven barjak [sic!] s bijelim polumjesecom.’; *Zeman*, No. 27, 02 November 1911, 1.

less prominent section *Telegrami* ('Telegrams'). This might also illustrate *Zeman's* problem of failing to provide reliable, first-hand information. Given this situation, it had to reproduce messages from the Istanbul-based *Agence télégraphique ottomane*, as well as Ottoman, British, German, Austrian and even Italian papers and the Italian press agency *Agenzia Stefani*, depicting the latter as notoriously unreliable, since 'one must never trust it' (*kojoj ne treba ništa vjerovati*).⁷²

At the same time, *Zeman's* shift in reporting on the war shows growing disenchantment, as there was no sight of an Ottoman victory or an intervention of the European Great Powers stopping the Italian aggression. This frustration with 'Europe's' passivity was clearly articulated in a letter addressed to *Zeman* by İsmâ'il Hakkı Bey, an Ottoman lieutenant being trained at the Prussian Staff School in Berlin at that time, in which he states:

We Muslims all over the world must help each other in these difficult times, as the current aggression is directed not only towards Turkey, but the whole of Islam. Today, Christianity attacks Islam. If Tripoli were the possession of a Christian state, the other [Christian] states would get involved and prevent Italy from invading it without reason.

However, as Christian Europe showed no interest in supporting an illegally attacked Muslim country:

The only independent Muslim state – the caliphate – becomes weaker and weaker; it loses territory piece by piece, and all this is observed and tolerated by the Christian states. Crete – Tripoli! Kuwait, Egypt [*Misir*] and Syria will be next! And then they will divide Persia; Morocco is no longer independent; Oman is under English influence, and even Afghanistan will be able to resist no longer if things carry on this way. If Muslims from all over the world were to now help Turkey with money and the boycott [of Italian goods], then the Christian states would not attack a Muslim state that easily in the future, as they would meet with resistance not only from the attacked state but also from the whole of Islam.⁷³

The intensity of how the basic ideas of pan-Islamic solidarity were put forward in this article, was new to the Bosnian Muslim press. Although the term – both in its Ottoman and Western coinage – had been introduced into Bosnian Muslim periodicals during the first decade of the twentieth century, and although, from the very start, it was linked to the idea that Muslims must stand together due to the aggressiveness of Christian European expansionism,⁷⁴ the feeling of being endangered acquired a new quality during the Italo-Turkish War, as *Zeman's* reporting clearly shows. The fact that Italy seemed to go unpunished for breaking international law and massacring civilian Muslim populations had frustrated any hope that the reintroduction of the constitution after the Young Turk Revolution would result in accepting the Ottoman Empire

72 *Zeman*, No. 47, 23 December 1911, 3.

73 *Zeman*, No. 40, 07 December 1911, 2–3.

74 Dierks 2021.

as an equal partner in international politics. This last point had been at the centre of *Musavat's* reporting on the developments in the Ottoman Empire after 1908.

Now, in the situation of the war, *Musavat's* successor *Zeman* focused on reporting on acts of solidarity all over the Muslim world (*muslimanski svijet*). It told its readers about religious ceremonies, remembering the fallen Ottoman soldiers in Bosnia;⁷⁵ moral support provided by telegrams sent from other parts of the Muslim world, such as British India; committees of solidarity, in some cases also supported by female Muslims; and Muslim volunteers from Egypt and the Russian Empire. As already mentioned, *Zeman* also turned celebrations of Ottoman 'victories' all over the Muslim world into shared experiences in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This rendering of the Muslim world as an 'emotional community'⁷⁶ was accompanied by discovering it. This implied reporting about its inhabitants in a region hardly known to the Bosnian readership. The special issue on *bajram* (i.e., *kurban bayramı* or *ʿidu l-aḏḥā*) in 1911 contained, for example, a detailed report on the North African Senussi order depicting it as a bulwark of resistance against the Italian invaders.⁷⁷

The evocation of emotions at which this article aimed, that is, the feeling of solidarity with Muslim brethren exposed to acts of collective violence, created and consolidated not only images of self and of others, but also translated into concrete social action. This might result in spontaneous support of refugees from the war zone, as was the case with 150 children who were evacuated from Tripoli on a French steam boat now lying at anchor at the harbour of Gruž in Dalmatia: as *Zeman* tells its readers, a group of around 50 Muslims from the nearby Herzegovinian town of Trebinje decided to go to Gruž, in order to help the 'naked and barefooted, hungry and thirsty' (*golo i boso, gladno i žedno*) children, by donating food, money and clothes.⁷⁸ Besides this, *Zeman* informed its readers – as early as 7 October, that is, eight days after Italy's declaration of war – that the UMO planned to raise money for wounded Ottoman soldiers, once the Habsburg administration allowed such a campaign to be organised. This money was meant to be donated to the Ottoman Red Crescent (*Hilāl-i Aḥmer*), the organisation of which had been revived on the eve of the Italo-Turkish War and which should play a crucial role in providing support from all parts of the Muslim world during the war.⁷⁹ From November 1911, *Zeman* printed lists of male and female Muslims who donated money for the victims of war and violence in Northern Africa. In Habsburg Bosnia, as in other parts of the Muslim world, anti-Muslim violence catalysed and accelerated the processes of social and political self-organisation that were often perceived as acts of Muslim self-defence. In the case of Bosnia, this resulted in establishing local committees supporting the Red Crescent, called *Hilali Aḥmer* in the local vernacular. Documenting the fundraising soon occu-

75 *Zeman*, No. 34, 18 November 1911, 2.

76 Rosenwein 2006.

77 *Zeman*, No. 39, 01 December 1911, *Bajramski prilog*, 4–5.

78 *Zeman*, No. 34, 18 November 1911, 2.

79 McCollum 2018; Akgün and Uluğtekin 2020, esp. 29–147; Möller 2020.

pied a larger place in *Zeman* than reporting on the war itself.⁸⁰ The success of the fundraising campaign would also prove that the UMO had public support, as a controversy with *Zeman*'s competitor *Samouprava* shows, the latter claiming to be the 'real' initiator of the fundraising campaigns.⁸¹

Besides this, the Bosnian fundraising campaign was resonated in the Ottoman press, such as in the Istanbul paper *Tercümân-ı Hâkikat* ('The Interpreter of the Truth'), which noted on 16 January, 1912: 'The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina raised a total sum of 190,000 Crowns for the Red Crescent, of which 50,000 were collected in Sarajevo and 40,000 in Mostar.'⁸²

More detailed information was provided by the almanac of the Ottoman Red Crescent, which listed donations from the Ottoman Empire and abroad, informing its readers that in relation to the latter, the greatest amount was donated 'from the Islamic world' (*âlem-i İslâm'dan*), rating Bosnia-Herzegovina sixth among the donating communities and countries after British India (*Hindustân*), 'the Muslims from Russia' (*Rusya Müslimânları*), French Algeria (*Cezâ'ir*), 'the Muslims from South Africa' (*Afrika-yı cenûbi İslâmları*), and Egypt.⁸³

The Bosnian support for *Hilâl-i Ahmer* is one of the numerous examples of how imaginations of the Muslim world beyond the local motivated and directed action at a local level. Although, in the case of *Hilâl-i Ahmer*, this can be described in terms of a grass-roots movement, media coverage penned by intellectual elites played a key role in such processes. In this context, the appeal to the feeling of pan-Islamic commonality was crucial.

5. Conclusion

This article applied a Transottoman approach to analysing conceptualisations of the collective self in a post-Ottoman community in South-Eastern Europe: the Muslims in Habsburg Bosnia during the early twentieth century. In this context, the Transottoman approach implies asking for figurations of translocal connectivity, that is, for connectivity that, first, transgressed the local, while at the same time reshaping perceptions of the local, and that, second, was in some way related to the Ottoman Empire. Hence, in the context of this case study, 'Transottoman' – just as translocality – refers both to an analytical approach and to a phenomenon that is at first to be detected and then analysed and understood.

80 For these fundraising campaigns and the ways in which they were documented in the journal *Mişbah* ('Lantern') in Ottoman Turkish from 1912 onwards, see Geçer 2012 and Amzi-Erdogdular 2017, 937. For *Mişbah*, see also Buljina 2019.

81 See Buljina 2019, 204.

82 'Hilâl-i Ahmer Cem'iyeti için Bosna-Hersek İslamları arasında cem' edilen i'âneniñ miqdârı 190000 koron'a baliğ olmuştur. Bunuñ elli biñi Sarây Bosna'da kırk biñi dağı Mostar'da cem' edilmiştir.'; Küçükateş et al. 2018, 208.

83 *Hilâl-i Ahmer Cem'iyeti 1329–1331 Sânuamesi*, 312. See McCollum 2018, 93–94.

The examination of the first issues of the Bosnian Muslim newspaper *Zeman* has shown that reporting on the Italo-Turkish War played a prominent role in this paper. The systematic analysis of *Zeman's* media coverage has demonstrated that reporting on the war contributed to a redefinition of spatial relationality, commonality and of images of the self, which can be described as the Bosnian Muslim discovery of world politics. This politicised imaginations of Muslim globality and practices of Muslim translocality, which had already existed before. As in other Muslim societies at the time, this process implied a growing awareness of Muslim globality, namely, that Muslims all around the world shared a destiny of being the object of Christian European expansionism, based on imaginations of Muslim inferiority. At the same time, this process implied the perception of Islam as a global political factor, with Muslims from all over the world supporting the Ottoman cause during the war, by sending messages of solidarity, by raising money for war casualties, or by volunteering in the Ottoman army. In the case of the Bosnian Muslims, the Ottoman sultan was not only perceived in his role as caliph, as was the case with Pan-Islamic solidarity, but also as a worldly ruler who, until the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1908, kept *de jure* the suzerainty over Bosnia-Herzegovina (albeit with no concrete consequences, regarding the administration of the province), and for whom large parts of the local Muslim population still shared sentiments of affinity and loyalty. Therefore, reporting on the war also meant redefining *Transottoman sympathies and solidarities*.

As can be seen from the analysed articles, this implied remodelling the image of the Ottoman Empire, shifting from a paternalistic image to a modernist one and presenting it as a promoter of modern statehood and an abode of civilisation that was being attacked by an unlawfully and barbarically acting European power: Italy. Although *Zeman* uses the notion 'Muslim world' (*muslimanski svijet*) to both describe and evoke transboundary Muslim solidarity, this Muslim world is rarely qualified with religious attributes, but largely with terms taken from the lexicon of modernisation. This meant *inverting the stereotypes of Orientalist discourse*: those who are depicted as inferior and even barbaric, the Muslims, are now depicted as the true carriers of civilisation, while a European power is depicted as barbaric, ignoring any norms imposed by international law and humanity. However, it is largely not a European-Muslim antagonism that is evoked as such, although we can find historical references to the medieval crusades and general criticism of European imperialism and hypocrisy concerning diplomacy and foreign relations. The imagological construction of Europe is more complex: voices of criticism against the Italian attack on the Ottoman Empire are cited extensively, in order to prove once again the unlawfulness of Italy's actions. In this context, *Zeman* masterfully combines accounts of Muslim solidarity and Ottoman heroism taken from Ottoman newspapers, liberal legalist discourse as it materialised in German-speaking papers, conservative criticism of contemporary Italy expressed in the local Bosnian Catholic press and discourses and practices of humanitarianism as they intensified both on a global level and in the Ottoman Empire at that time.

This did not aim only at delegitimising the Italian course of action: modelling a modernist image of the Ottoman Empire also helped to provide the local Bosnian Muslim population with a positive modernist self-image as part of a redefined identi-

ty of ‘Bosnianhood’ being both part of the Habsburg Empire and the wider Muslim world. Apart from this, it helped to argue for the realignment of Bosnian party politics: the fact that the leading Bosnian Serb newspaper, *Srpska riječ*, showed open sympathy for Italy, while its Bosnian Croat counterpart, *Hrvatski dnevnik*, sided with the Ottoman Empire, seemed once again to justify the new Muslim-Croat collaboration in the Bosnian diet.

Another narrative technique applied in *Zeman’s* reporting is *emotionalisation*, when describing Italian war atrocities; mediatised violence aimed at evoking solidarity with the Ottoman cause. Organising solidarity by raising money could also prove the efficiency of the UMO, whose mouthpiece was *Zeman*, while other Bosnian Muslim factions failed to organise humanitarian help. This helped to consolidate the role of the UMO as an advocate of the Muslim cause: be it by defending Muslim property rights and control of religious institutions in Bosnia, be it by supporting Muslims abroad, who were exposed to brutal warfare.

Annexe

Turska i Italija (Zeman, No. 14, 05 October 1911, 1)

[...]

Ne ćemo danas ništa proricati o konačnom rezultatu ovoga boja nego se i mi osvrnuti na ovaj najnoviji atentat sa strane „moderne i obrazovane kršćanske Evrope” na muslimanski svijet.

Bilo je do danas u višoj državničkoj politici i u međunarodnim odnošajima Evrope često historičkih događaja, koji su služili na ruglo evropskoj civilizaciji, njenoj kulturi i toliko izvikanom humanitetu. Ovi momenti, gdje je Evropa zaboravljala na sve tečevine svoje civilizacije ponavljali su se najviše onda, kad se je radilo o Turskoj ili o kojem drugom muslimanskom plemenu. Nije nam ni potrebno dokazujući ovo da se služimo istorijom, ovaj je fakat poznat svakome iole obrazovanijem čovjeku.

Bilo je u dosadašnjim sukobima muslimanskog i kršćanskog svijeta momenata bespravni i nasilničkih – današnji ih je talijanski sve pretjerao. Pretjerao je ne samo novije akcije evropskih država proti Turske, nego i srednjevjekovne krstaške ratove. Italija je spremna – usprkos prijašnjih izjava svojih ministara, da nemaju ništa proti Turske – da napadne hajdučki jednu tursku provinciju i to u onoj istoj godini, kad slavi pedesetgodišnjicu svoga oslobogjenja kad je zaglušila čitavu Evropu vikom o svojoj civilizaciji i kulturnom napredovanju. Šta više, danas smo dobili jedan brzovaj iz Turina, gdje su na tamošnjoj međunarodnoj izložbi, koja je priregjena u slavu pedesetgodišnjeg oslobogjenja Italije, zapalili turski paviljon, u kojem su Turci izložili svoje kulturne tečevine. Ovo je talijansko nedjelo pravo ogledalo njihovog barbarstva i raspoloženja prema Turcima. Uzalud sva buka o kulturi, koja bi trebala da nosi toleranciju, u „kulturnoj“ Italiji toga se zelja ne može naći.

Druge bi barem države, kad bi htjele da poduzmu kakovu osvajačku akciju na islamskom teritoriju, na godine pripravljalje „povode i razloge“ za napadaj. Italija to čini posve drukčije i to će joj se morati osvetiti.

U čitavom Tripolisu, čitavoj Turskoj ni jednom talijanskom podaniku nije se apsolutno ništa dogodilo, nigdje talijanski interesi nijesu bili ni mrvu ugroženi i uza sve to Italija ustaje i bez ikakva povoda šalje svoju flotu na tripolitanske obale, da onu tursku provinciju okupira.

[...]

Tursko-talijanski rat (Zeman, No. 14, 05 October 1911, 3)

[...]

U svom ciničkom ultimatumu veli Italija, da je ona prinuđena na taj korak, uslijed toga, što Turska nije znala da drži u redu tripolske pokrajine i da ih povede k napretku i prosvjeti. Civilizacija nalaže Italiji dužnost, da okupira Tripolitaniju i da ju privede općoj kulturi.

Ovo je najveće ruglo, što ga je mogla Italija da počini. Italija zar da kultivira i civilizuje jednu afričku zemlju? Bilo bi donekle razumljivo i možda takogjer podesno, kada bi pokušala Turska da okupira južnu Italiju, tu najzanemareniju i najbarbarskiju zemlju u Evropi, pa da joj pomogne iz njezina barbarluka i nekulture. Ali jedna Italija nije pozvana, da donosi luč prosvjete stranim zemljama i narodima. Tko nije kadar, da svoju rogienu grudu izvede iz tame neznanja i iz gospodarske bijede i propasti, taj se ne može nametati stranom svijetu za lučonošu i prosvjetitelja.

Verbicaro! Ova jedna riječ je dostatna, da osvijetli stepen sadašnje talijanske kulture, da otkrije svu kulturnu i gospodarsku mizeriju, u kojoj se Italija nalazi. Zemlja bijede, gladi, neznanja, sujevjerja pokvarenosti. I ova Italija polazi u Afriku, da joj donese kulturu i civilizaciju! Sva južna Italija zapuštena i zanemarana, više možda, nego Tripolitanija; zemlja bez cestâ i bez vode, jedno groblje, domovina umiranja, gladovanja, smrti. Ovamo bi trebao San Giulino da pošalje svoje civilizatorne ekspedicije, što ih je namijenio Africi.

Središte talijanskoga života, dika Italije i njezin ponos je Napulj. I u tom velegradu ima danas 30.000 za školu dorasle djece, koja ne polaze nikakovu [sic!] školu. A Italija se sprema, da u Africi širi prosvjetu!

[...]

Sitne vijesti o tursko-talijanskom ratu (Zeman, No. 15, 07 October 1911, 2)

[...]

Kad se bolje zagleda u napredak, koji je turska vojska učinila za ove dvije posljednje godine, i kad se bolje zagleda iz kakvog je blata i iz kakve se očajne stagnacije turska vojska razvila do značajne sile, onda se ne može dovoljno nahvaliti ovakav uspjeh i kod onakvih okolnosti moraju se izvesti najoptimističniji zaključci za

budućnost turske vojske. Glavni razlog za takav nagao polet leži do duše u prirodnoj turskoj sposobnosti za rat. Slavni primjeri te sposobnosti poznati nam još iz 1682, kada su Turci svojom moći prijetili i samom Beču. Kod njih je nepoznata plašljivost. Jakog zdravlja, skromnih navika, (alkoholni porok nepoznat), odrasli su u anatolskim i arbanaskim visočinama, njima ne treba mnogo. Naviknuti su na marševanje i očvrslili spram umora – oni su najbolji vojnici na svijetu.

[...]

Od velikog značaja za reformu bila je primj[e]na tako zvanog Tanzikat [sic!] zakona. Njime sje očišćena Augijeva štala. [...]

Narod propraća ove reforme velikim oduševljenjem i svojevrijedno podnosi teške terete. Sav novac, koji je stajao na raspoloženju, dat je posljednjih godina na vojsku. Kao posljedice toga je to, što su oprema i naoružanja turske vojske sasvim moderna. [...]

Barbarstva Talijana u Tripolisu (Zeman, No. 30, 09 November 1911, 1)

[...]

Jest, Turci su ogrezli u krvi i ratuju, od kako su se pojavili u Evropi, gotovo više nego i jedan evropski narod, ali još primjera nema, da je turska redovna vojska, pa čak ni prije 500 godina na žalost učinila ni djetetu, ni starcu, ni ženi. Turska ih je vojska štitila i branila, kao da su to njezina djeca i za Turčina i turskog vojnika nije bilo veće sramote i rugla, nego ubiti ženu, a o djeci nije bilo ni govora, da bi se ovako barbarstvo u opće moglo učiniti kod „nekulturnih“ i evropski „neizobraženih“ Turaka. [...]

„Šetnja u Tripolis“ (Zeman, No. 25, 31 October 1911, 1)

[...]

Talijanskoj je diplomatiji pošlo za rukom da prije početka rata osigura sebi zalege u evropskim državama, koje su joj obećale, da neće smetati u njezinoj akciji u Tripolisu. Nu [sic!] sudeći po raspoloženju širokih masa naroda skoro u svim evropskim državama, evropske su se diplomate svojim držanjem u tursko-talijanskom sporu stavile u najveću opreku sa svojim narodima [...]. Sva engleska štampa osugjuje na najžešći način provokatorski postupak Italije, kojemu u istoriji evropskih država nema primjera. Slično je raspoloženje i u drugim državama, a to je i sasvim prirodno. I u Austriji i u Ugarskoj osugjuje čitava javnost Aerenthalovu politiku u ovom sporu i traži promjenu pravca. [...]

Bojkot protiv Talijana (Zeman, No. 40, 07 December 1911, 2–3)

[...] Mi se muslimani na čitavom svijetu moramo u ovim teškim vremenima međusobno pomagati, jer današnja borba nije upravljena samo proti Turskoj nego

već proti čitavom Islamu. Kršćanstvo danas navaljuje na Islam, jer kad bi Tripolis pripadao kojoj kršćanskoj državi, ostale bi se države zauzele i Italiju bi spriječile, da bez razloga ne navaljuje. Na ovaj način jedina nezavisna muslimanska država – halifat – malo po malo slabi, otkida joj se komad po komad zemlje, a sve gledaju i trpe kršćanske države. Kreta – Tripolis! Onda će doći Kuveit, Misir i Sirija. Još malo pa će Perziju dijeliti; Maroko nije više samostalan, Oman je pod engleskim uplivom, a ni Afganistan se neće moći držati, ako ovako potraju prilike. Ako sada muslimani čitavoga svijeta pomognu Tursku novcem i bojkotom, onda će se kasnije koja kršćanska država teško odlučiti da napadne muslimansku državu, jer se njoj ne će oduprijeti samo napadnuta država već čitav Islam. [...]

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