

2. A strategic 'war of position' for hegemony: 'Dynamic continuity' and right-wing Gramscianism in Korea

This and the next chapter provide a theoretical and analytical framework that, I argue, is better suited than others for the analysis of conservative and religious right-wing movements, and for the Korean anti-LGBT movement in particular. In addition, I argue that the main research question of this study – *why and how the Korean Protestant Right renders LGBT issues contentious* – can be best answered using a Gramscian lens. More specifically, Gramsci's conceptual take on how to achieve cultural and political hegemony, his conception of civil society and recognition of historical blocs, and the important role he grants to intellectuals, education, and media outlets contains all the key analytical building blocks necessary for the analysis of anti-LGBT activism and its embeddedness in transnational – and indeed global – networks of right-wing Protestantism. This chapter will discuss, first, the applicability of Gramscian theory to the analysis of religious right-wing movements. In a second step, it evaluates key concepts and ideas of Gramscian thinking and links them conceptually with contemporary concepts drawn from social movements studies. Finally, Gramsci's endorsement of historical legacies and their importance for concrete conscience and action will be considered in synopsis with other, conservative thinkers' takes on the relation between conservation on the one hand, and change on the other. This leads to a proposal for partial conceptual innovation, in which I posit the descriptive and analytical term of 'dynamic continuity' as a dialectical means of overcoming this seeming contradiction.

2.1 Applying Gramscian thinking to the study of religion-based right-wing movements

It may seem paradoxical to use a left-wing thinker and outright Marxist like Antonio Gramsci¹ for analyzing phenomena of right-wing activism.² Therefore, a caveat seems in order before proceeding to discuss Gramsci's take on religion and civil society. I argue that applying Gramscian analytical concepts to the study of religious right-wing movements makes sense for four main reasons: first, Gramsci's non-prescriptive conception of 'civil society' transcends the inclination of political sociology to predominantly analyze so-called *progressive* movements. Secondly, his extensive dealings with religion offer valuable insights for the study of religiously based social movements. Thirdly, right-wing movements and political actors themselves have borrowed freely from Gramscian strategic thought to disseminate rightist worldviews – strategies that have been adopted by many right-wing actors worldwide, exemplifying the increasingly transnational interconnectedness of conservative and extreme right movements. Finally, Gramsci's rather undogmatic theoretical approach will serve, in turn, as a guideline for applying his key concepts in a 'pragmatic' way.

This study employs Gramscian thought in a non-Marxist way, employing the basic concepts of Gramscian thinking without its normative inscription. It analyzes religious right-wing movements "going beyond Gramsci's letter, but following his spirit", as Carlos Nelson Coutinho (2014, 74) aptly puts it. In fact, Gramsci's writing is – despite its astute socio-political and historical analyses – not very straightforward. He rarely provides clear definitions of his concepts and, in other instances, works with partially conflicting definitions at the same time.³ Rather than as a shortcoming, Fredric Jameson regards this characteristic of Gramscian thought as an asset and argues that "it is precisely the

-
- 1 Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) was an Italian Marxist, co-founder of the Communist Party of Italy (*Partito Comunista Italiano*), its party leader 1924–1927, and a member of parliament from 1924 onwards. The Fascist regime under Benito Mussolini arrested and imprisoned Gramsci in November 1926 despite his parliamentary immunity. During his imprisonment, Gramsci wrote the so-called *Prison Notebooks* (*Quaderni del carcere*), which would lay the foundation for his fame as an eminent Marxist thinker. Gramsci was released from prison in 1935 and transferred to a clinic to treat his ill health, which had plagued him his whole life. He would not recover from his condition and ultimately died on 27 April 1937 (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 7–23). For a detailed account on Antonio Gramsci's life, see, e.g., Pearmain 2020.
 - 2 Conversely, political philosophers with a leaning to the left have utilized elements of right-wing thought. Chantal Mouffe (2005), for example, builds on the conservative political theorist Carl Schmitt's understanding of 'the political' as the distinction between friend and enemy to argue for the importance of partisan (Left/Right) conflict for the parliamentary system and for instilling political passion in people. Mouffe, however, criticizes Schmitt's rejection of pluralism and his following argumentation on the political, according to which adversarial political relations can and, if need be, should be played out using violent means.
 - 3 Gramsci's partly incoherent development of thought is of course also due to the extremely difficult situation in which he ventured on his vast philosophical project, being a captive of an inimical Fascist regime for years, always fearing (and also being forced to anticipate) censorship. What is more, for his *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci did not have access to other writings and often quoted passages from his memory (Hoare and Sperber 2016, 21).

ambiguity of Gramsci's analyses of this or that issue or topic that makes for the richness of his work and its urgent relevance for us today" (Jameson 2020, xii). He continues:

[Gramsci's ambiguity] renews old problems in new ways, it restructures the historical contexts against which political and cultural positions are to be read, and last but not least, it makes Gramsci's texts available for parts of the world in which, once unknown or only representative of a single, univocal position, they have now come to have their own history no less complex and interesting than that internal to the West and its various national components. (Jameson 2020, xii)

Another useful aspect of Gramscian conceptual language is that it can be fruitfully applied in the analysis of non-western contexts. The concepts redirect our perspective towards the particularities of historical legacies and present-day power structures, and they have the potential of transcending the left-right spectrum, as I will argue and elaborate in greater detail below.

Gramsci himself may be called a rather unorthodox Marxist. It is true that his approach also entailed a certain determinism: attaining communism was the ultimate goal of his actions and philosophical thought. Unlike other Marxist thinkers and political figures of the Third International of his time, though, Gramsci was a critic of dogmatic economism and naïve historical fatalism. While acknowledging the great importance of the material basis of society, it was highly doubtful for him whether the economic structure was the one and only determining factor for all social relations, including cultural and political power relations. Gramsci also criticized the class-based reductionism⁴ and the high level of abstraction of traditional Marxist theory, which he tried to remedy by integrating a context-sensitive, historical perspective on power structures in capitalist societies, as well as a nuanced outlook on the complex conflicts present in civil society (Bieling 2015, 450f; Hoare & Sperber 2016, 100).

Along with Gramsci's non-dogmatic usage of Marxist thought, his non-normative conception of 'civil society' also contributes to the applicability of his approaches to the analysis of rightist religious movements. There are two main understandings of civil society in the various fields of social sciences. While one group of scholars highlights the normative aspect, with civil society seen as peaceful social interactions aiming to achieve the 'common good', the other side emphasizes an empirical conceptualization of the term, according to which civil society is defined as the sphere of organized groups that act either beyond the state or interact with the state and the economy in the interest of specific groups (Kopecký 2003, 7; Teune 2008, 18; Putnam 1993). Gramsci's conceptualization of civil society broadly corresponds to the latter, non-normative definition:

Civil society is understood by Gramsci to comprise all social relations and organizations that do not participate either in the economic reproduction of society or the life of the State. Thus, civil society is the 'private' institutions of a given society, including

4 While applauding Gramsci for overcoming Marxist economic determinism, post-Marxist authors have, in turn, criticized Gramsci for retaining a privileged role for the working class and thus essentializing the polarity between the latter and the bourgeoisie (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Bieling 2015, 470f).

religious organizations (such as the Catholic Church), unions and political parties, cultural institutions (such as the media or publishing houses) and in general any freely formed association of citizens. Gramsci conceives of civil society as a social terrain on which rivalries and struggles of a cultural and ideological nature are played out and decided among social groups. (Hoare and Sperber 2016, 56)

Gramsci defines civil society as the ‘playing field’ where conflicts over which cultural and political agendas prevail take place. His conceptualization goes beyond normative definitions of civil society as the arena where people and organizations fight for desirable, ‘good’ causes. Civil society for Gramsci is not neutral. As Hoare and Sperber (2016, 57) point out: “Gramsci rejects the liberal assumption of the political neutrality of civil society; Gramsci instead starts from an affirmation of the political substance of all social life.” Therefore, the scope of civil society actors is very broad in Gramscian terms. Progressive actors, but also conservative, right-wing extremist, or fundamentalist religious groups can be part of civil society – and thus also be analyzed using Gramscian concepts.

At this point, it becomes evident that Gramscian conceptual language offers great potential for social analysis. Broader interpretations and developments of Gramscian approaches have indeed proven productive in diverse fields of social inquiry. Neo-Marxist and post-Marxist scholars, for example, have built – not necessarily in uncritical ways – on Gramsci’s pioneering advancement of Marxist thinking (e.g., Poulantzas 1978; Laclau 1977; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). But also beyond strictly political affinities, Gramsci’s oeuvre and concepts have impacted social scientific scholarship. In political science, ‘Neo-Gramscianism’ finds application in the fields of international relations and European integration theory (Bohle 2005; Gill 1993; Cox 1983). Social movement scholars also acknowledge Gramsci’s contribution to their field, especially regarding the contentious politics approach (Tarrow 2011, 19f). They have applied Gramscian concepts in manifold ways on diverse cases of social movements worldwide, benefitting from the analytical strength that these concepts provide (cf. e.g., Dainotto & Jameson 2020; Søndergaard 2020; Meek 2011).

Gramscian approaches have also found their way into studies on Korea, even though they represent a late theoretical addition to analyzing Korean historical, socio-political and economic phenomena. Kevin Gray (2018), for instance, takes a look at Cold War legacies and traces the reaction of the conservative *historical bloc* to democratization and efforts for reconciliation between the two Koreas – taking his cues from Gramscian analytical tools. Relatedly, Yong Sub Choi analyzes the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s as an *organic crisis*, which resulted in failed counter-hegemonic efforts by liberal nationalists to substitute the ‘division bloc’ (Choi, Yong Sub 2020; 2017a). Other investigations focus on the Korean economy. Kevin Gray (2011), for instance, investigates the neoliberal transformation of South Korea as a *passive revolution* and Kyung-Pil Kim (2019) shows how Korean large industrial conglomerates (*chaeböl*) undergo a crisis of authority, an authority which they try to reestablish using a *hegemonic strategy* to instill the belief in people that *chaeböl* interests are everyone’s interest. And Yong Sub Choi (2017b) investigates how the North Korean regime exerts *hegemonic rule* through Juche (*chuchie*) ideology and through the communist party in times of economic crises (Choi, Yong Sub 2017b).

Struggles for hegemony, historic bloc, organic crisis, passive revolution – the above overview illustrates that Gramscian concepts have been employed for numerous national and international contexts in order to analyze diverse historical and socio-political phenomena. Many of these concepts are also material for this study. I will explicate them in detail below and show how they can, and why they should be used as the conceptual backbone of this study. Prior to this, though, let me insert an important parenthesis: Gramscian concepts have not only been used for analytical purposes in social and historical sciences, but also as a political strategy – not only by Marxist or left-wing politicians and activists, but increasingly also by those on the right-wing political spectrum.

2.2 New Right activism and the usage of Gramscian strategies

Since the 1970s, ideologues of the New Right have appropriated Gramscian thinking, starting from the French *Nouvelle Droite* in the 1970s (Bar-On 2013). The French right-wing thinker Alain de Benoist, in particular, has called for working towards a “cultural revolution” emanating from the rightist political spectrum (Benoist 1975). Proponents of such ‘right-wing Gramscianism’ argue that fundamental changes only happen after preceding changes in thought and culture.

Like Gramsci, they hold that revolutionary change occurs not through traditional parliamentary or extraparliamentary confrontation (a ‘war of movement’) but rather through ‘a war of position’ – a more protracted, deeper process of constructing a new ideology that resonates with, and yet modifies, ‘common sense’ [...], forming the basis for a counterhegemonic project. (Abrahamsen et al. 2020: 96)

Such a counter-hegemonic strategy is referred to as ‘metapolitics’ by French right-wing thinkers. Guillaume Faye, a co-founder of the French right-wing think tank *Groupement d'Études de Recherches de la Civilisation Européenne* (GRECE, Research and Study Group for European Civilization),⁵ describes ‘metapolitics’ as “the social diffusion of ideas and cultural values for the sake of provoking profound long-term, political transformation” (Faye 2011, 190; cited in Abrahamsen et al. 2020, 96).

Such ‘metapolitical’ endeavors have not only been developed by borrowing freely from Gramscian thinking. The French *Nouvelle Droite* has also been influenced by intellectual currents as diverse as the New Left and the so-called ‘Conservative Revolution’. The latter is a term coined by the rightist philosopher Armin Mohler to denote a form of German

5 GRECE was established in 1968 by Alain de Benoist and 40 other extreme right nationalists as the principal think tank of the French *Nouvelle Droite*. Tamir Bar-On delineates four main goals of the think tank: first, a reorientation of the notoriously disunited French ultra-nationalists; second, a rejection of the dominant political strategies of the right; third, seizing power through a right-wing Gramscian strategy; and fourth, rethinking the extreme right’s ideological legacy, which was, in the view of GRECE, overly focused on ethnic nationalism and militaristic expansionism back then (Bar-On 2011, 203–204). For a more detailed account of the early history of GRECE, see Duranton-Crabol 1988.

non-Nazi fascism in the period between the First and Second World Wars. The Conservative Revolution was an ideology combining “German ultra-nationalism, defence of the organic folk community, technological modernity and socialist revisionism, which valorized the worker and the soldier as models for a reborn authoritarian state superseding the egalitarian ‘decadence’ of liberalism, socialism, and traditional conservatism” (Bar-On 2011, 200; cf. also Mohler 1972). At the same time, the *Nouvelle Droite* has also been influenced by ideas of the New Left. With Alain de Benoist leading the way, the *Nouvelle Droite* argues that one has to transcend the traditional right-left political divide. Bar-On (2013, 49) gives an example of such thinking: “Right and left meant very little, reasoned the ND [Nouvelle Droite], if both right and left supported liberal multiculturalism.” In fact, the *Nouvelle Droite* and the New Left have several positions in common, for instance their disdain of political elites, a rejection of unrestrained global capitalism and neo-liberalism, as well as a geopolitical anti-Americanism (Bar-On 2013, 55).

Of course, this is an account of the intellectual basis of new right thinking and strategizing in France. While many new right intellectuals and activist groups across Europe, for example, the *Neue Rechte* in Germany or the *Nuova Destra* in Italy have adopted similar ‘metapolitical’ strategies (Abrahamsen 2020, 96), it has to be stressed that these strategies depend on country-specific and, in fact, group-specific contexts, and its ideological elements thus take effect in diverse ways. Stuart Hall (2017 [1979]), for instance, argued that a distinctive feature of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom consisted in using Gramscian strategies to gain political hegemony. Hall thus showed that ‘metapolitical’ tactics can not only be applied in extra-parliamentary settings but also in the arena of ‘traditional’ politics, at the heart of parliamentary democratic systems. What is more, not all ideological elements fit all contexts. Consider the *New Right* in the United States, which has been engaging in metapolitical struggles against what they regard as the liberal hegemony promoted by the political establishment (Abrahamsen et al. 2020, 96), however, of course *without* the French version’s anti-Americanism. Quite the opposite, fierce nationalism has been a common denominator in US-American right-wing politics ever since. In a similar vein, the outspoken secularism of the French *Nouvelle Droite* is out of question for religion-based right-wing actors like the Christian Right in the USA.

Such caveats are due also for the context of this study, the Korean Protestant Right and its anti-LGBT branch. As in the case of the US-American New Right, faith is an important element of their activism and mobilization strategy. Moreover, unlike the French *Nouvelle Droite*, the Korean Protestant Right displays staunch pro-American convictions, given its historically strong ties with their Protestant and evangelical US brethren and the importance of the United States as a political and military ally. I will detail these aspects in the analytical chapters of this study. Suffice it to say at this point that transnational connections between right-wing actors not only do exist, but they also become manifest in the strategies applied by these actors. Along with the strategy of constructing a common enemy (Abrahamsen et al. 2020, 99f),⁶ an inegalitarian version of the Gramscian ‘war of position’ represents the strategic core of large portions of right-wing activism worldwide.

6 See also chapter 12 for a more detailed account on the “power of enmity” (Abrahamsen et al. 2020, 95).

A Gramscian lens is helpful for understanding the innovative role of right-wing movements within the greater arena of conservative politics as set out in the introduction. As a matter of fact, right-wing ideologues are well aware of the mobilizing potential of 'metapolitical' strategies. In this context, Greg Johnson, a US-American right-wing thinker, provides an astute description of metapolitical actors:

We metapolitical radicals must think of ourselves as the vanguard of our people, as a political avant-garde. We are the ones who must summon our courage, take the risks, blaze the trails, and lead our people toward their salvation. Vanguardism must be repeatedly emphasized, because the instinct of every politician seems to do the exact opposite. Politicians are inveterate panderers and flatterers of the public mind, which unfortunately has been completely moulded by our enemies for generations. Politicians follow the people. Vanguardists seek to lead them. Politicians take public opinion as a given. Vanguardists seek to change it. (Johnson 2018, 74; cited in Abrahamsen et al. 2020, 96f)

While the concrete goals of such right-wing 'vanguardists' differ from country to country, and not all of them build on the 'philosophical' basis of the French *Nouvelle Droite*, the New Right does share core elements that transcend purely national concerns. As argued by Abrahamsen et al. (2020, 97), these elements are (1) a similar "international political sociology" which serves as an "analytic framework, strategic guide, and rhetorical device", and (2) a fierce conviction of one's own superiority and a keen will to power – even though power would only be seized after long-term efforts, through 'metapolitical' detours.

However, the fact that right-wing actors actively and consciously adopt Gramscian political strategies is not the main reason for choosing Gramscian analytical concepts. As I have outlined above and will continue to do so in greater detail below, there are good methodological reasons for applying a Gramscian-inspired analytical framework to the study of anti-LGBT activism in South Korea. At the same time, it would be wrong to prematurely discard the possibility that Korean anti-LGBT activists themselves adopted Gramscian strategies. In fact, the Gramscian 'war of position' was mentioned by an anti-LGBT activist during one of my research interviews (Interview 7). Be that as it may, I do not aim to 'unmask' or expose the right-wing's use of originally left-wing strategies. Rather, I apply Gramscian concepts for their actual analytical value irrespective of whether they have been chosen as a political strategy by the Korean Protestant Right or not. Following Abrahamsen et al.'s (2020) insights concerning the international political sociology of the New Right, though, I investigate the adoption of Gramscian strategies by Korean right-wing actors as an instance of transnational diffusion of ideological elements and strategic ideas among increasingly interconnected and globally active right-wing actors.

2.3 Gramsci on religion

The relevance of a Gramscian analytical toolkit for this study also becomes manifest in Gramsci's writings on religion. For a long time, these have largely been disregarded due

to the preponderance of the secularization thesis in the field of sociology of religion and the resulting underestimation of religion. It was, moreover, uncritically assumed that Gramsci, as a Marxist, was a proponent of the famous assertion that religion was “the opium” of the people, that is, a false consciousness that needs to be eradicated (Forlenza 2019, 1f).⁷ The strong anti-clerical attitudes of the Italian Communist Party leadership after World War II also further influenced the neglect and misreading of Gramsci’s writings on religion (Fulton 1987, 201). Gramsci himself displayed a critical stance towards religion, especially concerning Roman Catholicism in Italy. His early writings in particular have a pronounced anti-religious tone to them. But as Fulton (1987, 201) highlights, “as with most of the subject matter Gramsci treats, this represents one end of a spectrum of comments”.

Religion, in fact, plays an important role in Gramsci’s thinking.⁸ Gramsci develops many of his central concepts by building on an astute analysis of Christianity or, more precisely, Roman Catholicism. Paradoxical as it may sound, for Gramsci, Catholicism represents a model for reaching his ultimate goal, the introduction of Marxism. John Fulton elaborates this point:

[Gramsci] admires religion for two reasons: he esteems the Roman Catholic Church’s historical organization and long enduring hegemony in European society, to the extent that there are aspects of it which he sees as models for Marxist praxis; and he sees religion as a *rival* to socialism precisely because it is itself *a form of total social praxis*.” (Fulton 1987, 202)

Gramsci conceived of Marxism as a ‘secular religion’, which, so he thought (or wished for), would ultimately replace Christianity (Forlenza 2019, 3–5). This conception corresponds to his wider definition of religion as “any conception of the world that puts itself forward as an ethic” (Gramsci 1995, 352) and “a conception of the world which has become a norm of life” (Gramsci 1971, 344).⁹ These secular definitions of religion encompass tradi-

-
- 7 One has to be cautious, though, to not misunderstand Marx’s famous statement from his *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* as an analysis of religion as mere alienation. When reading the dictum in its textual context, it becomes clear that Marx regards religion rather as a – potentially positive or at least functional – means to deal with the hardships of life: “The wretchedness of religion is at once an expression of and a protest against real wretchedness. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.” (Marx 1994 [1844], 57; cf. also Forlenza 2019, 18, endnote 1)
- 8 Already in his early writings, Gramsci acknowledges the importance of religion, while at the same time pointing towards his actual goal of replacing religion with a functional equivalent, i.e., Marxism, as the following quote shows. “The religious indifference of normal times, the absence of cultic practice, is not independence or liberation from idolatry. Religion is a need of the spirit. People feel so lost in the vastness of the world, so thrown about by forces they do not understand; and the complex of historical forces, artful and subtle as they are, so escapes the common sense that in moments that matter only the person who has substituted religion with some other moral force succeeds in saving the self from disaster.” (Gramsci 1975, 71, translation taken from Fulton 1987, 202)
- 9 Gramsci also provides a definition of religion closer to the ‘traditional’ religious core. He writes that religion “presupposes the following constitutive elements: 1) belief in the existence of one or more personal divinities that transcend earthly and temporal conditions; 2) man’s sense of dependence

tional forms of religion as well as modern political ideologies. Gramsci here builds on the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce's idealistic project of replacing traditional religions with a secular humanism, which Croce called the 'religion of liberty'. Gramsci, however, rejects Croce's version of liberalism since, he argues, it remains rooted in impractical intellectual abstractions that would not have the potential of seriously challenging Catholicism and of convincing the masses of the need for concrete political struggles (Gramsci 1971, 393; Forlenza 2019, 6f; on Croce, cf. also Copenhaver & Copenhaver 2015). It is exactly this element of struggle, of politics, which distinguishes Gramsci's take on religion from Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, other early sociologists of religion (Forlenza 2019, 3).¹⁰

As Fulton claims, "religion is always political for Gramsci" and gains its appeal from the potential of being a "considerable hegemonic force" (Fulton 1987, 202, 199). Forlenza (2019, 2) concurs with this perspective, stating that "Gramsci places his sociology of religion within a conflictual view of society in which classes (interest groups) constantly struggle for power and hegemony." For Gramsci, religion is not only a forceful ideology, but also a socio-political player, a "social movement" (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 95). Gramsci deals with "the problem of religion taken not in the confessional sense but in the secular sense of a unity of faith between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct" (Gramsci 1971, 326). In his analysis of religion, key elements of strategic thinking come to the fore: the role of hegemony and, relatedly, the nexus between ideology (or in Gramscian terminology *Weltanschauung*, i.e., worldview), disseminators of such worldviews, and practical action. Gramsci illustrates this interdependent relationship by referring to Jesus Christ and Paul the Apostle.

Christ – *Weltanschauung*, and St. Paul – organiser, action, expansion of the *Weltanschauung* – are both necessary to the same degree and therefore of the same historical stature. Christianity could be called historically 'Christianity-Paulinism', and this would indeed be a more exact title. (It is only the belief in the divinity of Christ which has prevented this from happening, but the belief is itself an historical and not a theoretical element.) (Gramsci 1971, 382)

Religion, as an organized form of social interactions, provides and perpetuates the rules and norms of conduct (and, in fact, of thinking and believing), which create a sense of belonging, but also a sense of hierarchical order. Rosario Forlenza aptly summarizes this social – and power – relationship: "The *Notebooks* suggest, time and again, that religion and faith are not additional factors of human societies, but rather the structural cement

on these superior beings, who totally govern the life of the cosmos; 3) the existence of relations (a cult) between men and gods." (Gramsci 2007, 32)

- 10 In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim focuses his analysis on the general attributes and functions of religion, which he sees in serving basic human needs and differentiating between the profane and sacred parts of life (Durkheim 1968 [1912]). Max Weber's famous essay collection *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, concentrates, as the title suggests, on how the Protestant (particularly Calvinistic) work ethic centrally influenced the development and consolidation of capitalism in Northern Europe (Weber 2010 [1904/1905]). Both sociologists, Durkheim and Weber, thus disregard the role religion or religious organizations can (and in fact did and still do) play as concrete actors in politics and socio-political struggles – a gap that their contemporary Antonio Gramsci fills.

that renders a multiplicity of individuals into a cohesive social group.” He continues: “Persons and institutions in which human beings have faith, and whose cultural values are followed spontaneously and without constraint, are people and institutions that, possessing prestige and inspiring trust, exert hegemony” (Forlenza 2019, 4).

For the purpose of this study, these basic Gramscian insights on religion are crucial in at least two regards: first, while Gramsci aims at paving the way for his ‘philosophy of praxis’, i.e., Marxism, it is of course possible that his stratagems prove popular with non-Marxist circles as well – and even anti-Marxist ones, as the previous subchapter on the right wing’s usage of Gramsci has shown. This wide applicability with diverse actors comprises also religious actors. To make my point clear: Gramsci advises to take religion – especially Roman Catholicism – as a model for achieving counter-hegemony, also in an effort to overcome the hegemony of that very religion. In the case of this study, though, I argue that religious forces themselves use Gramscian strategies to gain or recreate cultural and political hegemony – an irony which can hardly be denied.

Secondly, and relatedly, Gramsci’s analysis of hegemonic rule in religious contexts provides the – also metaphorical – basis for many of his central concepts and strategic thoughts. Among them are, for example, the ‘intellectual and moral reform’, the ‘religion of the people’ and the ‘religion of the intellectuals’. Several attributes of religion and religious actors as outlined by Gramsci have to be taken into consideration. Gramsci observes these attributes in Italian Catholicism but recognizes that they represent potential assets in any struggle for hegemony.¹¹

One important attribute of organized religion is its focus on unity in terms of doctrine and faith. Religious leaders in fact go to great lengths to preserve such unity in order to maintain hegemony over exegesis, and, ultimately, over the faithful. Religion, from a Gramscian perspective, however, is not a monolithic entity but represents itself as “a field of tension in which beliefs, symbolism, and practices are open to antagonistic interpretations, and so, to a struggle for meaning and power” (Forlenza 2019, 2). Such conflicts are of course problematic since they may endanger the ideological unity of the religion (Gramsci 1971, 420). Religious groups, therefore, face the task of

preserving the ideological unity of the entire social bloc which that ideology serves to cement and to unify. The strength of religions, and of the Catholic Church in particular, has lain, and still lies, in the fact that they feel very strongly the need for the doctrinal unity of the whole mass of the faithful and strive to ensure that the higher intellectual stratum does not get separated from the lower. (Gramsci 1971, 328)

11 John Fulton argues that Gramsci’s insights on Roman Catholicism in Italy can be fruitfully applied for the investigation of other countries and religious actors (Fulton 1987, 198). Gramsci’s analysis does not focus so much on doctrinal particularities, but rather on the general attributes of religions and religious institutions, and especially on their inherent power structures and strategies, which is why I argue that the analysis of similarly organized groups such as Protestant churches will benefit from a Gramscian perspective.

It is one assumption of this study that a similar pursuit of unity can also be observed in the anti-LGBT endeavors of the Protestant Right in Korea.¹²

Key actors for preserving the ideological unity are the representatives of the 'religion of the intellectuals', as Gramsci called the official religion. The religion of the intellectuals consists in "the religion of priests and theologians, dogma and liturgy, institutions and organization" and "is a detailed intellectual system and, consequently, a source of hegemony and domination over the members of a society" (Forlenza 2019, 10). On the other side, there is the 'religion of the people', "the beliefs, morals, and practices which express in a religious way the needs and experiences of various groups of people [...]. It is thus 'spontaneous' also in the sense of being 'obvious'" (Fulton 1987, 203). According to Gramsci, the religious intelligentsia must be committed to active preaching, teaching, and persuasion in order to keep the religion of the people under control.

Religion, or a particular church, maintains its community of the faithful (within the limits imposed on it by the necessities of general historical development) in so far as it nourishes its faith permanently and in an organised fashion, indefatigably repeating its apologetics, struggling at all times and always with the same kind of arguments, and maintaining a hierarchy of intellectuals who give to the faith, in appearance at least, the dignity of thought." (Gramsci 1971, 340)

The strategy of incessantly repeating certain convictions to maintain one's 'flock' or win over people for one's goals is of course also practicable for non-religious actors, since "repetition is the best didactic means for working on the popular mentality" (Gramsci 1971, 340).

The fact that socio-political mobilization against LGBT rights in Korea actually has a religious, that is, a Protestant background makes Gramsci's insights all the more relevant for this study. If religion-based actors want to politicize relatively 'new' issues like homosexuality, they can, on the one hand, rely on existing organizational structures and, more importantly, human resources for mobilization. On the other hand, they can – and in fact *must*, according to Gramsci – build upon, and be compatible with the beliefs, norms, and ideological bits and pieces existent among the faithful and people at large. In the case of homosexuality, for example, certain interpretations of Bible passages are commonly used to suggest that homosexuality and homosexual sex represent immoral acts running counter to God's creation order,¹³ a strategy which may especially appeal to devout Christians. But it is also secular elements like a deeply rooted anti-communism or nationalism, as mentioned before, which may serve the purpose of relating to the 'popular religion' and, relatedly, to 'common sense' and 'folklore', important Gramscian concepts that will be explained in the next subchapter. Thus, the dissemination of certain world-views through social movement entrepreneurs – or intellectuals, as Gramsci would call these functional equivalents – to 'lower strata' does not function without frictions.

12 The aspect of conflicts over LGBT issues internal to Korean Protestantism and, relatedly, the apparent need of preserving unity will be investigated in detail in chapter 12.

13 Such literal or fundamentalist interpretations of Biblical texts have been challenged by liberal theology in recent decades. For more details, refer to footnote 9 in the introduction, p. 5.f.

In the Gramscian elaboration, the religion of the people does not simply mechanically articulate and reproduce the religion of intellectuals at a lower level. People on the ground are not simply passive recipients but also active appropriators and re-creators of elite culture and religion, which they combine freely with an eclectic range of sources that are rooted in their mentalities, world-views, and lived experiences – thus with bits and pieces of common sense and folklore. (Forlenza 2019, 10)

Concerning this intricate process of aligning the popular religion with that of the religious leadership, Gramsci points to an important difference between Marxist practice and that of Catholicism.

Whereas the former maintains a dynamic contact and tends continually to raise new strata of the population to a higher cultural life, the latter tends to maintain a purely mechanical contact, an external unity based in particular on the liturgy and on a cult visually imposing to the crowd. (Gramsci 1971, 397).

Gramsci's remark suggests that it is impossible for traditional religion to educate people so that they develop critical thinking and a free mind since this would endanger their superior position and privileges (Hoare and Sperber 2016, 97). It is questionable, though, if present-day religious movements still pursue such a strategy of preventing people from gaining a 'higher conscience'. As I will show in chapters 7 and 8, the Protestant anti-LGBT movement in Korea, rather on the contrary, makes their adherents believe that it is actually them who engage in critical thinking. Activists depict anti-LGBT sentiments and activities as 'rational' resistance against purportedly 'ideological' pro-LGBT activists, politicians, and governmental institutions.

The great merit of Gramsci's perspectives on religion consists in acknowledging religion as a thoroughly political entity and, as such, a strong hegemonic – and importantly – counter-hegemonic force.

[T]he religion of the people contains [...] the seeds of resistance and opposition to the dominant culture. The lived and unstructured religion of the masses is fragmentary and incoherent, but it is intrinsically political and, in specific conditions, can challenge dominant hegemonies and create an oppositional and confrontational culture. Religion, in other words, possesses a counter-hegemonic, revolutionary, and transformative potential as an incentive to action and mobilization. (Forlenza 2019, 12)

Gramsci's insights on religiously infused political strategies will benefit the analysis of Protestant anti-LGBT activism in a number of ways. For example, they play an important role in the analytical framework which will be outlined in the next chapter. Before going into the details of the concrete analytical framework, however, I will now outline in some detail the central Gramscian concepts and political strategies that he deems important for achieving cultural and political hegemony. The actors and specific tools involved in this process will be explicated as well. All these aspects inform the analytical framework of the present study.

2.4 Cultural and political hegemony, and how to achieve it

As noted before, one of Gramsci's central philosophical endeavors consisted in paving the way for an eventual Marxist seizure of state power. Writing in times of great socio-political upheavals, during and after the First World War, Gramsci wondered why socialist revolution was successful in Russia, but failed in other European countries such as Italy and Germany. He blames Marxists for relying too heavily on historical determinism and revolutionary spontaneism (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 79). More importantly, Gramsci argues that the main reason for the failure of Marxist revolutions lies in insufficiently taking into account the structural differences between 'the East' (read: Tsarist Russia) and 'the West', i.e., modern industrialized states. The strength and development of the civil society in the West as opposed to the virtually absolute power of the coercive state in the East are factors that, according to Gramsci, have to be duly considered when striving for state power (cf. Coutinho 2012, 93).

In the East, the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relationship between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying – but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country. (Gramsci 1971, 238)

This perspective is noteworthy in two respects. First, Gramsci juxtaposes civil society and political society. "As opposed to civil society, which is an open field for debate and the exercise of persuasion, political society is the domain of coercion, constraint, naked domination and the exercise of military, police and juridical-administrative force" (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 56). The interplay of civil and political societies is important for the achievement of hegemony, as will be outlined below. Secondly, Gramsci makes use of military metaphors. He elaborates on civil society:

at least in the case of the most advanced States, where 'civil society' has become a very complex structure and one which is resistant to the catastrophic 'incursions' of the immediate economic element (crises, depressions, etc.) [...] the superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare. (Gramsci 1971, 235)

Gramsci here introduces two distinct concepts to differentiate between the strategic options available in 'the East' and in 'the West'. In Russia, Gramsci claims, a 'war of movement' (also called a 'war of maneuver'), that is, a strategy using frontal attacks and active class struggles was successfully used to initiate the revolution and overthrow the Tsarist empire. In the West, however, Gramsci argues that a 'war of position' would be more conducive to seize state power: "battles must be fought first within the context of civil society, aiming at obtaining positions and spaces [...], politico-ideological leadership, and the consensus of major groups of the population" (Coutinho 2012, 93; cf. also Gramsci 1971,

229–238). Winning this politico-ideological and cultural leadership in the arena of civil society is key for subsequently conquering concrete political power.

[T]he supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate’, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to ‘lead’ as well. (Gramsci 1971, 57–58)

As Gramsci notes, in contrast to a ‘war of movement’, this strategy of first winning the “intellectual and moral leadership” is “complicated, difficult, and requires exceptional qualities of patience and inventiveness” (Gramsci 1971, 239), but it is worth the efforts, since “the ‘war of position’, once won, is decisive for once and for all” (Gramsci 1971, 239). Even though this last claim may seem far-fetched and is, in fact, contradicted by Gramsci himself in other parts of his vast oeuvre, it does point to the importance Gramsci accords to the ‘war of position’ strategy within his theoretical writings on the conditions of the seizure of power.

The arguably most fundamental Gramscian concept in this context is that of *hegemony*. In Gramscian terms, hegemony is the pre-condition and, once political power has been captured, the underlying requirement for political domination, as the above quote from the *Prison Notebooks* suggests (Gramsci 1971, 57–58). Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony thus goes beyond the traditional understanding of hegemony as the result of successful coercion in the political arena.¹⁴ “Gramsci sees hegemony not just as the exercise of leadership but also as a fundamentally cognitive and moral process” (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 125). Hegemony, for Gramsci, is procedural in the sense that it needs to be reproduced consistently in order to retain effectiveness – or to achieve hegemony in the first place (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 127). Moreover, hegemony mainly operates on the ideological, or in Marxist terminology, on the superstructural level. For Gramsci, however, ideology does not represent a ‘false consciousness’ or distorted knowledge. It is, rather, “an active part of political praxis” (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 92), and as such, “something that transcends knowledge and connects itself directly with action that aims at influencing the behavior of other people” (Coutinho 2012, 72). In short, “ideology is the *medium* of hegemony” (Coutinho 2012, 73).

As indicated above, the arena in which ideology gets enacted and where hegemony is pursued is civil society. But who or which entities do actually exert hegemony? In the pre-

14 ‘Hegemony’ derives from the Greek *hēgemonía* (ἡγεμονία) and traditionally denoted the predominance of one of the ancient Greek city states over the other. In modern political science, the term ‘hegemony’ is mainly used in international relations (IR) to refer to a similar constellation, i.e., the predominance of one actor (mainly states) over others. Gramscian ideas have also influenced IR theory. Robert Cox founded the so-called neo-Gramscian IR school, taking a materialistic perspective on IR and conceiving the state-society complex as the central actor rather than the state alone (Overbeek 2011; Cox 1983).

vious subchapter, the Catholic church was presented as a considerable hegemonic force to the extent that Gramsci took Roman Catholicism as a model for his theoretical-practical insights on hegemony. As we have seen, in religious contexts it is the clerics who try to impose their 'religion of the intellectuals' on the lay people to exercise control and, ultimately, remain in a position of power. In other contexts, such as the state as a whole, Gramsci speaks of the ruling class in governing functions taking up this role. Having control over the governmental apparatus, however, is not sufficient for possessing and exercising power. For this purpose, also the control over the "private' apparatus of 'hegemony'" within the civil sphere is indispensable (Gramsci 1971, 261). In a famous passage, Gramsci defines the state in the following, algebraic manner: "State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion" (Gramsci 1971, 263). If political society (domination) and civil society (consent) coincide, Gramsci speaks of the 'integral state' (*stato integrale*), a definition of the state that makes it almost synonymous with power itself (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 57). The integral state thus includes "the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only maintains its dominance but manages to win the consent of those over whom it rules" (Gramsci 1971, 244). Gaining consent from the ruled, the "auxiliary forces", is an essential condition for achieving hegemony (Hoare and Sperber 2016, 122).

The ruling social groups' hegemonic position as well as their ideology are not engraved in stone, but rather themselves part of a dynamic process. We need to remember that Gramsci did not only embark on analyzing existing power structures. His principal objective was to substitute hegemonic forces and thus pave the way for communism. Gramsci's goal is in fact a full-fledged "recomposition of culture" (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 126, original italicized), an "intellectual and moral reform" (Gramsci 1995, 24–27; 1971, 132f.),¹⁵ for which he provides strategic guidelines. Such substituting efforts are often referred to as 'counter-hegemonic', a term which Gramsci himself had not used. It was coined by Gramscian scholar Carl Boggs (Boggs 1984, xi) and was readily adopted in neo-Marxist and social scientific research and theorization.

For Gramsci, the central counter-hegemonic actor is, of course, the communist party, to which he – in a way to circumvent fascist censorship, and based on Niccolò Machiavelli's *Il Principe* – generally refers to as the "Modern Prince" (Gramsci 1971, 132f). The communist party needs to win "auxiliary forces", the "subaltern element", that is, the working class if it wants to be successful (Gramsci 1971, 336f).¹⁶ However, as noted before,

15 Gramsci here borrows again from the religious world when aiming for an "intellectual and moral reform". In his *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci explicitly refers to the Lutheran Reformation and to "British Calvinism" (apparently following Max Weber's account on *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*) when stating – with regret? – that such an "intellectual and moral reform" had never taken place in Italy (Gramsci 1995, 24). Gramsci took the idea for such a "transformation of popular consciousness" (Fulton 1987, 199) from the French scholar Ernest Renan's book *La réforme intellectuelle et morale* (1967 [1871]) who, in turn, adopted this concept from the French economist and sociologist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (Gramsci 1995, 26; cf. also Fulton 1987, 199f).

16 However, it is not sufficient to just win over subaltern groups. They also need to be educated and trained to actually become protagonists of their own: "if yesterday the subaltern element was a thing, today it is no longer a thing but an historical person, a protagonist; if yesterday it was not responsible, because 'resisting' a will external to itself, now it feels itself to be responsible because

Gramsci's strategic thinking can also be fruitfully applied to other contexts of counter-hegemonic endeavors. Gramsci calls the strategy for achieving hegemony the 'philosophy of praxis' – yet another code word which Gramsci often used to denote Marxism. Gramscian scholars, however, agree that the philosophy of praxis is not just another pseudonym necessitated by censorship, but that it is a theoretical and strategic concept in its own right, representing a departure from traditional Marxism (Haug 2000, 5–7).

The philosophy of praxis centrally comprises the critique and subsequent recomposition of 'common sense' (*senso comune*). Gramsci sees common sense as a kind of popular conception of the world, which includes all the ideas, opinions, superstitions, and folklore that affect people's lives (Gramsci 1971, 419f). Common sense consists of the "heterogeneous beliefs people arrive at not through critical reflection, but encounter as already existing, self-evident truths" (Crehan 2016, x). It includes "that comforting set of certainties in which we feel at home, and that we absorb, often unconsciously, from the world we inhabit" (Crehan 2016, 118). Common sense is not a unified or immutable concept: "Common sense' is a collective noun, like religion: there is not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of the historical process" (Gramsci 1971, 325f).¹⁷ Common sense in a Gramscian sense is thus distinct from its general usage in the English language: "The English term, with its overwhelmingly positive connotations, puts the emphasis, so to speak, on the 'sense,' *senso comune* on the held-in-common (*comune*) nature of the beliefs" (Crehan 2016, x). The 'religion of the people' encountered in the previous subchapter is also part of common sense. Common sense is highly significant because if certain (political, philosophical, moral, etc.) ideas 'make it' into common sense they become "deeply-embedded in the fabric of social relations and national traditions" (Boggs 1984, 161). In short, they become hegemonic.¹⁸

Whoever sets out to influence common sense as part of their counter-hegemonic efforts has to engage with people and try to build a political and collective self-consciousness. Such a consciousness must be critical of the existing circumstances: "A philosophy of praxis cannot but present itself at the outset in a polemical and critical guise, as superseding the existing mode of thinking and existing concrete thought (the existing cultural world)" (Gramsci 1971, 330). If the establishment of collective and political iden-

it is no longer resisting but an agent, necessarily active and taking the initiative" (Gramsci 1971, 337). This point will be explicated further below.

17 In the original Italian, Gramsci writes about "*un divenire storico*", i.e., "a historical becoming", which has been translated to "historical process" here (Gramsci 1971, 326, footnote 419).

18 In the social sciences, there are similar concepts to the one of *senso comune* as proposed by Gramsci. The concepts of 'institutions', for example, was developed in the organizational studies. While putting different emphases depending on the institutionalist school of thought (rational choice, historical, sociological, and discursive institutionalisms), a common denominator is that institutions influence human thinking and behavior in social settings (cf. North 1990; Mahoney 2000; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Schmidt 2010). According to Jepperson (1991: 149) "institutions are socially constructed, routine-reproduced [...] program or rule systems. They operate as relative fixtures of constraining environments and are accompanied by taken-for-grantedness accounts." Of the different institutionalisms, Mahoney and Thelen's (2009) theory on gradual institutional change will be used in chapter 7.3 to help explain the mechanism of identity shift, or rather, the way that the anti-LGBT movements strives to achieve a certain identity shift.

tities proves successful, encouraging people to engage in concrete political practice and activism is the next step.

Critical understanding of self takes place therefore through a struggle of political 'hegemonies' and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one's own conception of reality. Consciousness of being part of a particular hegemonic force (that is to say, political consciousness) is the first stage towards a further progressive self-consciousness in which theory and practice will finally be one. (Gramsci 1971, 333)

This unity of theory and practice is crucial for counter-hegemonic projects. While Gramsci grants an important political and strategic role to the intellectuals, the "permanent persuader[s]" (Gramsci 1971, 10), he also famously acknowledges that "everyone is a philosopher" (Gramsci 1971, 323) and has to be taken serious in this capacity to modify common sense through their practices. "Every man, in as much as he is active, i.e. living, contributes to modifying the social environment in which he develops (to modifying certain of its characteristics or to preserving others); in other words, he tends to establish 'norms', rules of living and of behaviour" (Gramsci 1971, 265).

Gramsci deserves praise for highlighting the importance of 'winning the hearts and minds' of people when striving to influence socio-political affairs and to seize political power. Hegemony is, in this context, a crucial concept which Gramsci describes as an end rather than a means of politics (Hoare & Sperber 2016, 119). Influencing hegemony requires efforts on various levels. It includes diverse actors, it necessitates sophisticated strategic planning and perseverance, and it has an important ideological element. In summary,

[h]egemony is thus for Gramsci a truly multidimensional concept. It serves to denote not just the political leadership of a social group, but also the strategy of alliance vis-à-vis the auxiliary group or groups, the symbiosis of coercion and consent as the fundamental mechanics of power, the recasting of the ideological landscape and of cultural life, the formulation, expression and construction of a political project in a universalistic and 'ethical' form, an original educational relationship and the moral and cognitive mutation of consciousness. (Hoare & Sperber, 132)

Adopting Gramscian insights for the study of the Korean anti-LGBT movement

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, one of my main arguments is that the Korean anti-LGBT movement acts in a way that – so they assume or hope for – would lead them (back) to a dominant position in Korean society, which, subsequently, would grant them political leverage and power. Speaking in Gramscian terms, Korean anti-LGBT activists engage in a 'war of position' to influence public opinion, the 'common sense' in relation to homosexuality and related issues. They strive to render anti-LGBT positions mainstream in the general public to then exercise influence. This intended influence is aimed, first, at preventing concrete LGBT-related legislation (cf. Kim, Ol Teun 2021), but, secondly, also has the purpose of getting hold of political power in general.

This study focuses on the anti-LGBT endeavors of the Korean Protestant Right. This is only one aspect of this collective actor's vast array of political concerns such as trying to retain the religion-related legal privileges and fighting against migration, refugees, Islam, feminism, communism, the left-wing in general – to name only a few 'external enemies' (Kim, Nami 2016; Cho, Min-ah 2011). As I will show in the analytical chapters, these politicized topics are not mutually exclusive. Rather, we can observe frequent overlaps. The case study of anti-LGBT activities, which have been particularly strong, well organized and sustained over the past 15 years, will shed a light on the general strategies of the Korean Protestant Right. In particular, this study will show how certain issues are made contentious in the first place, and how this process builds upon 'traditional' political elements as well as new additions that are being adopted – also from abroad, highlighting the transnational impact of anti-LGBT endeavors.

South Korea is a highly industrialized country which developed into a liberal democracy featuring a rather strong civil society (Oh 2012; He 2010).¹⁹ Given these conditions, a Gramscian 'war of position' is a viable strategy to gain hegemony and political power in the long run. It is not so obvious, however, that one can call the Protestant Right's political struggle a counter-hegemonic fight. Even though these religio-political actors are not in governing positions and, in fact, actively fight politicians in power as well as government institutions and policies that they, allegedly, promote, I argue that one should not situate the Protestant Right outside the hegemonic complex. This is because, historically, the Protestant Right held a powerful or at least privileged position during the authoritarian regimes of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee and his successors (Park, Chungshin 2003, 202; 2007). While one can observe a certain degree of socio-political and demographic decline of Korean Protestantism after democratization (Cho 2014, 317f.; Lee Easley 2014), Protestant denominations and affiliated organizations are far from being underprivileged or even oppressed parts of Korean society. Compared to other religious affiliations in Korean society, for example, Christians have been overrepresented in the National Assembly and often hold high political offices (Kang, In-Cheol 2009). As I will argue in the context of this study's analytical framework, the Protestant Right forms part of what Gramsci would call a conservative 'historic bloc' which still possesses considerable political clout. This begs the question whether one can actually label the Protestant Right's socio-political endeavors counter-hegemonic in the strict sense of the word. 'Re-hegemonizing' efforts may be a more fitting designation.

It would be overly simplistic to regard the Protestant Right's activities as an evidence of reactionary bigotry. I argue that – even though right-wing Protestant actors seem to miss the 'glorious past' – they also and importantly have forward-looking goals and strategies. While relying on ideological elements of the past, they also turn towards new

19 Even though civil society struggles existed even before democratization in South Korea, many scholars point out that Korea's history was first and foremost characterized by a strong and dominant state unfavorable of civil society (Koo 1993; Choi, Jang Jip 1993). Civil society was only able to sustainably develop after democratization. This does not mean, however, that civil society is always politically successful. Kalinowski (2020), for example, argues that the Korean environmental groups have been rather weak and therefore also unsuccessful in the political arena.

ideas and thus 'modernize' Protestant political activism. In this respect, I perceive potential synergies of scholarship on conservatism and conservative movements, including their religious components on the one hand, and Gramscian insights on the other. I will now introduce this perspective in greater detail.

2.5 'Dynamic continuity': Historical legacies, present challenges, and future visions of conservative activism

As I have outlined in the introduction, defining conservative movements and conservatism at large is an intricate matter (Müller 2006, 359). While some regard conservatism as a disposition which highly estimates the status quo (Oakeshott 1962; Beckstein 2015) and, relatedly, advocates the preservation of vested privileges (McVeigh 2009, 32), other perspectives focus on conservatism as a political program or ideology, for example, in favor of free market capitalism or of a certain moral order (Femia 2015; Gross et al. 2011, 328f; Blee & Creasap 2010, 270). Others again claim that, rather, a lack of political ideals as well as risk aversion lie at the heart of conservatism (Clarke 2017). Michael Freeden argues that conservatism is marked by a distinct "mirror-image characteristic", in that conservatives "develop substantive *antitheses* to progressive core concepts" (Freeden 1996, 336).²⁰ These approaches are not mutually exclusive, but the authors here clearly display different emphases on what the essence of conservatism is, and on which level it manifests itself. I do not aim at contributing to this scholarly debate on the essence of conservatism. I call attention to one aspect which I argue is important for the analysis of conservative *movements* in particular, especially when adopting a Gramscian analytical perspective.

One could say that a common denominator for most of the above approaches is the critical attitude that conservatives take in respect to social change.²¹ Edmund Burke, an Irish-born British politician and early precursor of conservative thought and politics, laid the ground for such a positioning in his *Reflections on the French Revolution* (Burke 1993 [1790]). While passionately rejecting the revolutionary ongoing in France, Burke himself had been a reform-minded Whig politician before (Ballestrem 2007, 364; Bourke 2015). This perhaps explains his famous argument that "a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation" (Burke 1993, 21). Other thinkers of conservatism argue in similar ways, in the sense that even though the status quo should ideally be preserved (some) change is inevitable. In his essay *On being Conservative*, Michael Oakeshott accordingly claims that a conservative person "will find small and slow changes more tolerable than large and sudden; and he will value highly every appearance of continuity" (Oakeshott 1962, 170).

20 Freeden (1996) also discerns two further core features of conservatism. First, he claims that conservatives show a preference for "organic change" (333) rather than man-made changes and, secondly, conservatives share "a belief in the extra-human origins of the social order, i.e. as independent of human will" (334).

21 This observation is well reflected in the etymology of the term 'conservative'. It derives from the Latin verb *conservare*, which means 'to keep', 'preserve', 'guard'.

The fact that conservative politics are not manageable without change may appear to be a truism when seen from a common knowledge perspective. This insight, however, is important for the argument that I want to make. I argue that the Korean anti-LGBT movement (1) is not entirely fixated on a certain status quo, nor rooted in irrational reactionary bigotry (cf. Alexander 2016, 223). On the contrary, (2) the movement is very much interested in change and, more importantly, in being in charge of how this change exactly looks like and comes about. It is a misconception to regard the movement as a passive on-looker who merely reacts to changes. Rather, it actively tries to influence the pathways social change takes. In order to successfully exercise influence, then, (3) the movement embarks on a strategy that builds upon *existing* ideas, ideological elements, as well as structures and networks. The “appearance of continuity” as proposed by Oakeshott (1962, 170) is thus not only important for actors with a conservative disposition themselves, but also as a strategic element for convincing people about certain issues and mobilizing them for socio-political struggles.

I call this strategic and procedural phenomenon *dynamic continuity*. I introduce this conceptual lens to overcome a seeming contradiction. While the conservative actors in question do promote political issues that are commonly regarded as conservative such as a heteronormative sexual morality and the protection of vested interests, I argue that they do so in rather dynamic and innovative ways. They refer back to established frames and thus, on the outset, appear like traditional conservatives. At the same time, they try to create new connections, for instance, between ‘old’ anti-communist impulses and rather recent LGBT issues. The conservative actors do so in a strategic move to actually advance a future-oriented political program, a vision of politics and society that serves their purposes and worldviews. They are thus not mere ‘agents of continuity’, but also – somewhat surprisingly from a common knowledge perspective – ‘agents of change’, a term commonly utilized in social sciences (e.g., Spaargaren & Oosterveer 2010; Ghorashi 2005; Doh 2003).²² As I will show below, Antonio Gramsci’s strategic thought on how to reach socio-cultural hegemony also centers on combining ‘old’, existing elements with ‘new’ ideas in order to persuade and win over people.

Further scholarly and literary reflections on dynamic continuity

For the US-American context, Didi Herman (1997) came to similar conclusions regarding anti-LGBT activism in the 1990s and before. In *The Antigay Agenda*, she describes the theological roots, as well as the depictions of lesbian and gay sexuality by the United States’ Christian Right. Herman departs from stereotypical perspectives of anti-gay activism as

22 Regarding conservative actors as potential agents of change complicates the view on conservatism as promoted by Oakeshott. His famous characterization of conservatism is in fact in conflict with such a perspective. He writes: “To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to Utopian bliss. Familiar relationships and loyalties will be preferred to the allure of more profitable attachments; to acquire and to enlarge will be less important than to keep, to cultivate and to enjoy; the grief of loss will be more acute than the excitement of novelty or promise” (Oakeshott 1962, 169).

homophobic “religious bigotry” (Herman 1997, 7). While keeping a critical overall stance, Herman carves out that anti-gay debates rather rely on ‘reasonable’, secular arguments. It is therefore wrong to merely frame the Christian Right as proponents of backlash. Quite to the contrary, Herman argues that the Christian Right is a historically embedded entity belonging to the establishment rather than representing a counterforce of any sort. She notes: “demands for lesbian and gay equality are an attack upon the hegemony of heterosexual culture” (Herman 1997, 196), which the Christian Right tries to defend. At the same time, the Christian Right has its own future vision of what represents the good life (Herman 1997, 194–200). Herman here presents an analysis which I claim contains several elements of Gramscian thought but does not build a consistent analytical model – a lacuna which I strive to fill with this study.

An important perspective on the nexus between dynamism and continuity has been developed by German sociologist Hartmut Rosa and collaborators. In his book *Alienation and acceleration – towards a critical theory of late-modern temporality*, Rosa (2010) observes a phenomenon in modern societies which he terms “dynamic stabilization”. Rosa argues that acceleration is at the core of many social developments and takes diverse facets in modern times, e.g., in terms of technology and social change. It is the capitalist imperative to increase which causes most of the acceleration. Paradoxically, though, all this acceleration is happening just so that we can keep the status-quo of our human development. Rosa calls this odd state a “high-speed standstill” (*rasender Stillstand*), which ultimately leads to the alienation of individuals, who become increasingly unable to orient themselves in an ever-accelerating world and fail at leading meaningful lives as a consequence (cf. also Rosa et al. 2017, 59). The approach promoted by Rosa et al. has a very broad scope, featuring an analysis of modern, capitalist societies and the effects recent socio-political and economic developments exert on individual lives. This is of course not applicable to the analysis of religiously influenced conservative movements. However, it shows in an analogous manner that the seeming contradiction of dynamic continuity is being observed and analyzed in other social scientific contexts as well. The focus of Rosa et al. on stabilization will not play a huge role in this study, though. It is the dynamics, the actual (attempts at) change that this investigation is most concerned with.

The literary world has also contributed to the idea of dynamic continuity: Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s famous dictum from his novel *The Leopard*, in which the 19th century Sicilian aristocracy – desperately and vainly – tries to defend its vested privileges in the turmoil of Italian unification, at first sight concisely summarizes the notion of dynamic continuity: “If we want things to stay as they are, everything must change.” (Tomasi di Lampedusa 2007: 28). Here, Tomasi di Lampedusa’s literary character, the young aristocrat Tancredi, acknowledges the centrality of change, even for conservative-minded people fearful of losing their basis of existence. In this sense, change is not so much a phenomenon to be ‘suffered’. Rather, it is regarded as innovation which can be actively influenced and forged (Oakeshott 1962, 169). Tomasi di Lampedusa’s dictum, however, does not fully do justice to the notion of dynamic continuity promoted in this study. He focuses on the desire that things “stay as they are”. My approach stresses the dynamism rather than continuity. Continuity is the strategic background variable that certain conservative actors hope helps them reach their minor and major political goals. Viewed from this angle, I propose that we can adapt Tomasi di Lampedusa’s statement in the fol-

lowing manner: *Everything must change, but we need to make sure that it appears as if nothing changes at all.* Or, put in less absolute terms: *The changes we strive for need to give the impression of continuity.* In a sense, the ‘we’ in these phrases, the conservative actors – or rather the strategy they adopt – could be regarded as ‘conservative in name only’, as ‘make-believe conservative’. With this claim, I do not want to suggest that there is actually no consolidated conservative disposition or worldview underlying their activism. In the case of this study, for example, I do not claim that the anti-LGBT movement is merely exploiting the topic for other purposes. I believe that many anti-LGBT activists are very much convinced of the ‘wickedness’ of homosexuality. Rather, I want to draw attention to the way they approach politics in many cases. That is, taking instrumental recourse to historical legacies, to existing structures and conservative ideas to actually conquer ‘new frontiers’. These frontiers can include single topics such as the LGBT issue, but they do not foreclose a broader socio-political agenda and consequential attempts at fundamental political transformation.

Dynamically towards a regressive transformation?

In an extension of Oakeshott’s definition of conservatism as a disposition, James Alexander (2016) delineates a dialectical perspective which captures the contradiction inherent to conservatism. Starting from Oakeshott’s definition, he states: “Conservatism is holding onto what we have, where what we have is of the past as well as of the present” (Alexander 2016, 220). He then focuses on how conservatives deal with socio-political ruptures and argues: “Conservatism involves an acceptance of the rupture; but it also involves a denial of the rupture” (Alexander 2016, 223, original italicized). While Alexander’s focus on ruptures, i.e., revolutions and fundamental political transitions rather than change in general is questionable, his main insights support the postulation of dynamic continuity. He continues:

This ambivalence runs throughout conservatism. It accepts the rupture, and does not attempt to overturn it; yet it is committed to the ideals – the only ideals it has – of an uninterrupted, an unoverturned world, and so, vestigially, and perhaps only imaginatively, and possibly only unconsciously, holds onto the ideal of overturning the established order for the sake of return to an older one. (Alexander 2016, 224)

Applied to the Korean case, one might claim that the Protestant Right accepts the rules and processes of the political order established after democratization in the late 1980s. At the same time, it holds on to the privileges as well as the values and ideology it had cherished already under the authoritarian regimes, like anti-communism, nationalism, and ethno-centrism. Such a conservatism

tacitly accepts the enlightened ideals which justified the rupture; however, in its practical politics, it attempts to hold onto as much of the *status quo* as possible and this means opposing the parties which are in favour of a politics carried out in terms of the same enlightened ideals and which in the name of those ideals favour further reform or revolution. (Alexander 2016, 231, original italicized).

Very much like Gramsci's 'war of position', Alexander here highlights that actors have to come to terms with the systemic conditions surrounding them. Gramsci, however, also takes the next step and describes how exercising influence, fundamental change, and the seizure of power can actually take place under such circumstances. Alexander emphasizes the importance of ruptures, but does not fully consider the possibility that conservatives themselves can aspire to such socio-political ruptures.²³

At this point, terminological problems arise. The definitional intricacies concerning conservatism and the right-wing political spectrum in general have already been covered above. The openness for rupture, for fundamental political changes, however, begs the question whether it would be more appropriate to define the Korean Protestant Right as a whole, and the anti-LGBT movement in particular, as belonging to the radical right-wing within the political spectrum rather than 'just' calling them conservative. The designation 'radical' would be fitting in a sense that – at least so I argue – they aim for ample socio-political changes while working within the existing democratic system to achieve this goal (cf. Griffin 2000; 1999). They do not – by all appearances as far as my research shows – strive for a complete overthrow of the constitutional and democratic order, which would be an extremist rather than a radical position (Carter 2017, 30–32, 35).²⁴ The observation that the phenomenon at hand is a 'radical' one certainly holds analytical value. As regards the notion of dynamic continuity, however, the exact political and ideological allegiances of the actors involved are not that important at this point. I want to emphasize that conservatism, be it as an ideological, dispositional, or relational basis of action, includes both preservation and innovation. Whether conservative activism involves the pursuit of extensive socio-political ruptures is of secondary importance to my argument. Rather, the topics of radicalness and innovation are especially important for the study of social movements as I will elaborate now.

Dynamic continuity and social movements: towards a typology of dynamic continuity

Social scientists have highlighted the innovative potential of social movements in many areas and on diverse levels of society and politics. Social movements can, for example, provide innovations for deepening democracy (della Porta 2020), they give new impulses

23 This is surprising insofar as Alexander, in another research paper, claims – somewhat in accordance with Clarke (2017) – that conservatism is actually a blank slate and that "it can conserve anything" (Alexander 2013, 603). Interestingly, then, conservatism can ultimately mean to even preserve progressive achievements. Fear (2020, 198f) criticizes this argument for ignoring the ideological contents commonly associated with conservatism.

24 Roger Griffin argues that the contemporary *radical* right makes "a conscious effort to abide by the democratic rules of the game and respect the rights of others to hold conflicting opinions and liver out contrasting value systems" (Griffin 1999, 298). According to Elisabeth Carter, the *extreme* right is defined by two elements: "(1) a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state (a feature that makes right-wing extremism extremist); (2) a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality (a feature that makes right-wing extremism right wing)" (Carter 2017, 31).

to policy areas like educational systems (Maldonado-Mariscal 2020) as well as to companies to become more sustainable (Carberry et al. 2019), and they instill innovation into religious groups (Ozzano 2019). Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani (2006, 31) summarize this insight: “Movements represent innovative, sometimes radical, elements both in the way in which the political system works, and in its very structure.” These perspectives, however, predominantly focus on progressive social movements. I argue that conservative movements indeed play a similar role within the conservative or right-wing spectrum as a whole. They also come up with new issues suitable for politicization as well as innovate action repertoires and frames for rendering these issues contentious.

At the same time, social movements relate this innovation to existing elements of institutionalized culture in a given social context: first, they draw inspiration from cultural heritage in their respective country. Secondly, movements make reference to their own heritage, and thirdly, they adopt elements from oppositional movements while recreating them for their own purposes (della Porta & Diani 2006, 83). Ann Swidler, in this context, coined the perspective of culture as a ‘tool kit’: “culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct ‘strategies of action’” (Swidler 1986, 273). Culture here figures as “the cognitive apparatus which people need to orient themselves in the world”, rather than just consisting of values which people uncritically abide by (della Porta & Diani 2006, 73).²⁵ Social movements, also those on the right-wing spectrum, thus possess diverse cultural resources that can enhance their concrete struggles. Dynamic continuity is a mode of action also present in social movements. Della Porta and Diani (2006, 84f.) point out:

collective action is both a creative manipulation of new symbols and a reaffirmation of tradition. The insurgence of a new wave of mobilization does not, in fact, represent simply a signal of innovation and change, in relation to the culture and the principles prevalent in a given period. It is also, if to a varying extent, a confirmation of the fundamental continuity of values and historic memories which have, in recent times, been neglected or forgotten.

The perspective on ‘dynamic continuity’ is thus nothing new to social movement studies. It has, however, not yet been spelled out in detail as an analytical concept to apply to the study of collective action. This study seeks to remedy this, at least in part. While the general properties of the dynamic continuity perspective certainly apply to progressive movement as well, this study focusses on conservative movements to carve out the particularities that these collective actors display in their both dynamic and continuous socio-political struggles.

25 The role of values in political and social processes has been stressed in the area of modernization theory. Particularly, the shift from material (in the sense of economic and physical self-preservation) to postmaterial values (i.e., e.g., self-expression, autonomy, equality) has found considerable scholarly attention. This perspective on value change also affected social movement studies, which increasingly turned their interest toward ‘new social movements’ promoting said postmaterial values (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; cf. also della Porta and Diani 2006, 67–73).

Dynamic continuity, in summary, consists of three broad bases upon which conservative movements build their concrete actions:

- 1) *temporal-congruent combination*: relating one's arguments and frames to ideologically compatible elements, parts of 'common sense' that have been influential in the past and still promise to be powerful;
- 2) *relational-congruent adoption and adaptation*: borrowing action repertoires, strategies, and frames from ideologically analogous actors at home and abroad and adjusting them according to one's needs, for example, drawing on the strategies of what I will call a 'transnational conservative historical bloc';
- 3) *relational-incongruent adoption and adaptation*: making use of strategic elements and action repertoires originally used or developed by oppositional forces, commonly the political left.

The first, and perhaps most evident, category of dynamic continuity presented above is situated in the temporal level. 'Old', longstanding narratives represent the continuous element, which gets enriched with new discursive aspects bringing in the dynamism. The second and third aspects of dynamic continuity, that is, borrowing and adapting strategies and action repertoires from ideologically congruent, but also from oppositional actors are situated on the relational level of collective action. The second category is continuous on the ideological level and dynamic concerning the adaptation of these foreign elements according to the movement's domestic needs and interests. Reversely, the dynamic part of the third category is the adoption of oppositional frames, while the continuous one consists of piggybacking on such pre-established framing strategies proven to be effective. This third category reflects Freedman's (1996, 336) "mirror-image" perspective on conservatism. The *contentious politics approach* (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly & Tarrow 2015) highlights, among others, the relational mechanisms at work in contentious socio-political interactions and will thus benefit the analytical framework of this study. I will present this research agenda in greater detail below in the chapter on the analytical framework.

All the categories build upon the cognitive level of collective action, that is, the way perceptions influence concrete actions, but also, in turn, how beliefs, convictions, and ideas can be actively influenced. I make use of the *framing approach* to cover this cognitive level of social movement activism. In this approach, frames are defined as "schemata of interpretation" (Goffman 1974: 21). Within social movements studies, frames have been specified as 'collective action frames', that is, "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the campaigns of a social movement organization (SMO)" (Benford & Snow 2000, 614). Frame analysis takes into account that strategic, discursive, and diffusion processes play a central role in generating movement-specific collective action frames (cf. Benford & Snow 2000, 623–628). Thus, it fits in well with the theoretical framework of this analysis in general and will benefit the analysis of dynamic continuity in particular. The strategic processes of frame alignment are, as I will show, of special importance in this context (cf. Benford & Snow 2000, 623–625). Chapters 7 and 8 will delve into the details of the framing approach and into the concrete frames deployed by the Korean anti-LGBT movement.

Let me point out four important caveats at this point. (1) The three aspects of dynamic continuity should not be understood as exclusive categories. In fact, overlaps between the first and second aspects in particular seem to represent ‘natural’ combinations when, for example, the Korean anti-LGBT movement adopts action frames from foreign actors who have built said frames on an ideological fundament similar to the one their Korean allies have. (2) Concerning the third category, it becomes evident that ‘opposing desires’ are present in dynamic continuity as well. The opposing desires concern, in the antagonistic sense, the fact that right-wing actors adopt left-wing strategies – for instance Gramscian tactics for obtaining hegemony, but also specific frames. At the same time, the contradiction of making use of left-wing strategies as a conservative actor brings to light an internal conflict, yet another kind of opposing desire. This contradiction is, however, normally not openly addressed by the right-wing activists since this would endanger their credibility – and, by extension, their mobilization potential. Taking the risk of ideological inconsistency is, I argue, more acceptable for right-wing actors when the strategic level is concerned, not so much if the ideological core itself were affected.²⁶ (3) Relatedly, even though right-wing activists borrow frames, strategies, and action forms from external actors – be they oppositional or not – they do not do so uncritically and without adapting them according to their specific circumstances and needs. Acharya (2004), for instance, observes that “norm localization” takes place when domestic actors adopt and simultaneously adapt foreign elements (cf. also Westney 1987). Dynamism – when it comes to adopting left-wing or external actors’ strategies – is only compatible with right-wing or conservative movements’ actions if they manage to guarantee and uphold the image of consistency and, ultimately, continuity. (4) Finally, dynamic continuity can also be observed in other aspects of collective action. One is identity, for example when adherents’ collective identity changes in a way that builds upon or reorients pre-existing identity elements but also inserts new aspects (cf. chapter 7.3). This type of dynamic continuity is, however, rather an effect – also of the categories presented above – and not an action repertoire in the strict sense, which is why it is not included in this typology.

Dynamic continuity through a Gramscian lens

Antonio Gramsci’s insights on ‘common sense’ along with his emphasis on historical legacies, affiliations, constraints – but also opportunities – provide a perspective on how elements are adapted and adopted in socio-political struggles. As will become clear, the Gramscian approach also supports the idea of dynamic continuity, namely, in the shape of the two aspects introduced above: cognition and relations. At this point, I focus on the cognitive, ideational side and will shortly outline how Gramsci conceives of the *senso comune* in a way that is dynamic and at the same time embedded in its historical legacies. I will address the second aspect, i.e., the historically grown and ideologically based concrete relations with other actors, in the chapter on the analytical framework below,

26 Several scholars have done research on the question which effects opposing movements wield on each other. Whittier (2004), for example, provides a general summary on the consequences social movements have for each other. Tina Fetner (2008) has an explicit focus on how the Religious Right in the United States shaped gay and lesbian activism.

namely when elaborating on the concept of the 'organic intellectuals' as coined by Gramsci (chapter 3.3).

As elaborated above, common beliefs, opinions, and conceptions of the world – or 'common sense' as Gramsci refers to them – are not immutable facts cast in stone, but rather malleable ideational ensembles. In the course of history, common sense has been subject to diverse influences.

Every philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of 'common sense': this is the document of its historical reality. Common sense is not something rigid and static; rather, it changes continuously, enriched by scientific notions and philosophical opinions which have entered into common usage. (Gramsci 1992, 173)

In order to gain hegemony common sense needs to be influenced. Modifying common sense requires a smart strategy and long-term efforts. However, Gramsci claims that it is not sufficient to just criticize the existing common sense or elements thereof. On the contrary, one has to positively refer back to parts of common sense to establish a dialectical bond between 'old' and 'new'. As a consequence, people can identify more easily with a certain socio-political issue or project and perceive themselves as active parts of a political struggle.

A philosophy of praxis cannot but present itself at the outset in a polemical and critical guise, as superseding the existing mode of thinking and existing concrete thought (the existing cultural world). First of all, therefore, it must be a criticism of 'common sense', basing itself initially, however, on common sense in order to demonstrate that 'everyone' is a philosopher and that it is not a question of introducing from scratch a scientific form of thought into everyone's individual life, but of renovating and making 'critical' an already existing activity. (Gramsci 1971, 330f)

In other words, "a counter-hegemonic movement needs to work from within the common sense itself, rescuing those elements of it which are familiar and which can be progressive, in order to make them coherent" (Rose 2013: 66). The term 'progressive' fits the context of conservative movements as well, since, as I have shown, it is also conservative actors who pursue future-oriented, potentially far-reaching socio-political changes.²⁷ Forlenza explains Gramsci's take on the dynamic potential of past elements within common sense akin to the cultural 'tool kit' argument seen before (Swidler 1986): "The past cannot be easily set aside or escaped; instead, it is to be engaged with fully as the material to transform and elaborate through a free act of will in the present, which critically

27 The term 'progressive' is, in fact, a rather ambivalent one. Of course, it can take the meaning of espousing modern, i.e., non-traditional socio-political ideas and advocating such ideas in the political realm. 'Progressive' can, however, also imply that a process of change is happening gradually. In this sense, it incidentally fits quite well the Gramscian 'war of position' strategy. Yet another meaning of 'progressive' can be found in linguistics: in terms of grammar, 'progressive' means 'continuous' (e.g., the present progressive tense in English). This latter meaning makes evident the contradictory, and yet dialectical quality of 'progressive' politics in the guise of conservatism and vice-versa.

evaluates the past through the philosophy of praxis” (Forlenza 2019, 5). The great potential of referring back to familiar bits and pieces of common sense to actually promote a political project of a different kind then lies in the agency evoked through this strategy. When Gramsci claims that “everyone’ is a philosopher” he grants a similar importance to the convictions of the people as to those of the intellectuals (cf. also ‘the religion of the people’ and ‘the religion of the intellectuals’ elaborated above). In fact, these observations describe the central aspect of what Gramsci names ‘the philosophy of praxis’, his ultimate strategy for achieving socio-political transformation.

The philosophy of praxis presupposes all this cultural past: Renaissance and Reformation, German philosophy and the French Revolution, Calvinism and English classical economics, secular liberalism and this historicism which is at the root of the whole modern conception of life. The philosophy of praxis is the crowning point of this entire movement of intellectual and moral reformation, made dialectical in the contrast between popular and high culture. It corresponds to the nexus Protestant Reformation plus French Revolution: it is a philosophy which is also politics, and a politics which is also philosophy. (Gramsci, 1971: 395).

Dynamic continuity, understood as the recognition and usage of history as important elements of (counter-)hegemonic strategies, is thus an important concept, also from a Gramscian perspective. It is a strategic move combining the ‘philosophical’, i.e., the ideological and cognitive aspects of meaning-making with concrete political practice. This adoption of past and/or existing elements of common sense would, however, hardly be successful without wise adaptation. In an analysis of the nexus between ideology and hegemony in Gramsci’s writings, Chantal Mouffe (1979, 193f.) coined the term “rearticulation” for such an adaptive process. Forlenza characterizes rearticulation as

a crucial process that operates by liberating existing cultural forms and practices (or superstructure) from historical fixity and from a hegemonic system cemented by a common ideology, by combining them into new patterns, and by giving them radically new and potentially revolutionary connotations and meanings (Forlenza 2019, 12).

In the social sciences, a concept similar to rearticulation is known as *bricolage*. I will now introduce this important social mechanism,²⁸ which further elucidates how the concept of dynamic continuity can be understood and deployed for the analysis of social movements.

A mechanism to grasp dynamic continuity: bricolage

Bricolage is French for ‘do-it-yourself’ (‘DIY’) and has first been introduced to social sciences by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966). For Lévi-Strass, bricolage is the practice of a *bricoleur*, “a practical problem-solver who uses only the materials and tools

28 Mechanisms will be defined and explained in greater detail below in the chapter on contentious politics and on the concrete analytical framework of this study, where mechanisms will play an important role.

he has at hand. He operates with and redeploys heterogeneous 'fragments' from the past" (Samuels 2003, 7). Richard Samuels (2003), in turn, redeployed Lévi-Strauss' concept of bricolage for the analysis of large-scale political transformations in Japan and in Italy from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Samuels highlights the role of political leadership in these transformative processes and observes that, rather than plotting radical changes through revolution, combining traditional and modern themes is a – indeed very effective – method for achieving change espoused by political leaders. But why do leaders choose to pursue this strategy? Samuels argues that political actors expect to garner legitimacy by referring back to traditional elements. He elaborates:

In the political world, where transformational leaders stretch constraints, those fragments of the old can be extremely valuable as repositories of the acceptable. They contain *legitimacy* as well as constraints, and are tools of creative reinvention and change. Political bricoleurs reassemble and deploy fragments of legitimate action as they search for a useable past. Indeed, because legitimacy is so precious and elusive, the deeper and more ably the political bricoleur reaches back to secure a serviceable history, the surer may be his grip on the future. (Samuels 2003, 7f)²⁹

The concept of bricolage has also been adopted in social movement studies (Tarrow 2011, Clemens 1996, 206–208). In the context of collective action, bricolage serves as a mobilization mechanism, which, according to Sidney Tarrow, can attract diverse constituencies due to the ambiguous and multivalent meanings created (Tarrow 2011, 146). "Familiar themes are arrayed to entice citizens to become supporters; and new themes are soldered onto them to activate them in new and creative directions" (Tarrow 2011, 146). Bricolage is of particular importance in the framing efforts of social movements. "Bricolage pulls together accepted and new frames to legitimate contention and mobilize accepted frames for new purposes (Tarrow 2011, 146). Bricolage thus legitimates not only the political leaders who promote dynamic and coincidentally continuous frames. It serves also to legitimate collective action and its content itself.

Snow, Tan, and Owens (2013) set out to refine the concept of bricolage and at the same time provided a new take on what I describe as dynamic continuity. They offer a framework to analyze the framing efforts of social movements to reach change. The authors argue that social movements do so by altering and, simultaneously, reaffirming certain cultural elements. Snow et al. argue that two kinds of change processes can be observed in this context: *cultural revitalization* and *cultural fabrication*. "Revitalization involves the

29 In stressing the important role bricolage can play for political leaders, Richard Samuels refers to Niccolò Machiavelli who "had warned against the sudden rejection of the past in the construction of the future" (Samuels 2003, 8). Machiavelli's position thus reflects the central properties of dynamic continuity as outlined in this study, in particular from a leadership perspective: "He who desires or proposes to change the form of government in a state and wishes it to be acceptable and to be able to maintain it to everyone's satisfaction, must retain at least the shadow of its ancient customs, so that institutions may not appear to its people to have been changed, though in point of fact the new institutions may be radically different from the old ones. This he must do because men in general are as much affected by what a thing appears to be as by what it is" (Machiavelli 1986, 175). The role of the leadership of the Korean anti-LGBT movement and its application of dynamic continuity will be treated in greater detail in chapter 10.

resuscitation of forgotten or buried cultural elements and their linkage to current issues or events” (Snow et al. 2013, 225). Dynamic continuity is apparent in cultural revitalization, but it only comes to fruition when combined with fabrication – which is, according to Snow et al., frequently the case. “Fabrication involves the melding together of different cultural elements in a *bricolage* fashion to create new ones. While conceptually distinct, the two often work in tandem” (Snow et al. 2013, 225). As seen above with bricolage alone, these two processes also serve to create cultural resonance and legitimacy (Snow et al. 2013, 238). The mechanisms through which these changes occur include, according to Snow et al., *frame articulation* and *frame elaboration*. Frame articulation is the ‘bricolage’ mechanism, consisting of “the connection, or splicing together, and coordination of issues, events, experiences, and cultural items, including strands of one or more ideologies, so that they hang together in a relatively integrated and meaningful fashion” (Snow et al. 2013, 229). Frame elaboration “involves the process by which some issues or topics are accented and highlighted in contrast to others, making them more salient in the array or hierarchy of group-relevant topics or issues” (Snow et al. 2013, 232). This latter mechanism can, for example, be measured through analyzing how much “discursive space” a certain topic takes up, in other words, how frequent a specific frame is used (Snow et al. 2013, 232).

In summary, one can say that dynamic continuity is not a completely new idea in the study of conservative thought and activism. However, it is still quite unclear which processes and mechanisms it exactly involves. I aim at providing an analytical model which will help understand conservative movements from such a ‘dynamic continuity’ perspective. In this context, the bricolage perspective and its elaboration by Snow et al. will serve as an important tool to analyze dynamic continuity. Dynamic continuity represents, however, only one component of the analytical framework that I promote for the study of the Korean anti-LGBT movement. In the following chapter, I delve further into the details of my analytical framework, which builds upon Gramscian insights and on the contentious politics approach.