

# Jean Monnet's Grand Design for Europe and its Criticism

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Honoured as 'Father of Europe' and 'First European Citizen', Jean Monnet continued contributing to European integration for more than twenty years after publication of the Schuman Plan in May 1950. Though he was a man of action and never intended to be a theorist, Monnet spent much time developing his own doctrines on European affairs between 1950 and the 1970s, which ultimately constituted a complete design for Europe. This design aimed not only at building a unified Europe, but also establishing a permanent alliance and partnership between the US and a unified Europe in world politics. Furthermore, Monnet presented a picture of a world of blocs managed by a concert of powers, where the US and unified Europe constituted a pre-dominant holy alliance. This world concert of three powers, Monnet believed, could guarantee far better than the US alone or the US-Soviet Union conflicting relationship the modern civilization and world peace.

With the objective of analysing Monnet's grand design for Europe, I will first explain in detail his motivations before presenting his tripartite plans – composed of a European Federation, a US-Europe alliance and a world concert of three powers in section two. I then present a critical review of Monnet's design in section three before embarking on drawing some conclusions, including an evaluation of this paper's probable contribution to Monnet and EU studies.<sup>1</sup>

## I. Monnet's main arguments:

### *to solve the 'Deutsche Frage'*

Like the majority of Europeans, and particularly the French, who experienced the two world wars, Monnet began thinking of the post-1945 Europe with the '*Deutsche Frage*' in mind. The core question was how to contain German power, keep France from another military invasion and avoid the outbreak of war on the continent. In a note written on 5 August 1943 in Alger, Monnet imagined creating a 'unified' Union in Europe and put the German Ruhr under the control of this new European authority. This Europe shall be

“unified, not only by cooperation, but also by the transfer of sovereignty from European nations to some kind of Central Union. This is a union that would have the power to lower

1. This paper is an updated, revised and enriched version of parts of the author's dissertation on «Jean Monnet face à la politique européenne du général de Gaulle 1958-1969» at the Université de Paris-Sorbonne. It was earlier presented at the International Symposium of the International Political Science Association RC-3 at University of Hokaido in Japan on 6 September 2008.

the customs barriers, to create a general European market, and to prevent the comeback of nationalism”.<sup>2</sup>

This note is in general regarded by many historians as the starting point of Monnet’s future battle for European integration. However, only two months later, in his talk with general Charles De Gaulle, Monnet presented a totally different proposal to resolve the German question. He preferred

“a disintegration of the Reich, in which each German state would constitute a unit in the entire Europe, all of which would share the same rights and other elements as [the other nations.]”.

Moreover, in order to transform the fundamental nature of Germany, Monnet suggested stripping Germany of its heavy metallurgical industry. The German states of the Ruhr, the Saarland and the Rhineland should be separated from post-war Germany and constitute a new polity with Luxembourg, which would become a new industrial state in Europe. However, “this new state, whose natural sources shall be exploited by all European nations for the sake of all of Europe instead of itself, cannot enjoy equality with other European nations”.<sup>3</sup> According to Gérard Bossuat, Monnet’s idea of creating a new industrial state in Europe might be inspired by the Americans.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, at this moment, Monnet’s journey towards the publication of the Schuman plan seemed still far off!

These two contradictory notes make it clear that the German question was the starting point, as well as the core concern, of Monnet’s European thinking. Even if he declined to accept integrally the American Morgenthau Plan, his core concern during and in the aftermath of WWII was how to reduce German industrial strength to the extent that any German aggression would become improbable in the future.<sup>5</sup> At the very beginning, European integration, or unity, was only one among several options that Monnet was considering as a means to resolve the German question.

### *to avoid the nationalist trap*

In Monnet’s jargon, nationalism is the original sin and responsible for the catastrophic wars in Europe over the past centuries. However, it seems that he was not seriously worried about nationalism until the rearmament of Germany appeared on the agenda after the outbreak of the war in Korea. In correspondence with Georges Bidault and

2. Note de réflexion de Jean Monnet à Alger du 5 août 1943, citée par H. RIEBEN (ed.), *Des guerres européennes à l’Union européenne*, Fondation Jean Monnet, Lausanne, 1987, p.279.

3. Compte rendu de la conversation du dimanche 17 octobre 1943 à Alger, chez le general de Gaulle, cité par H. RIEBEN (ed.), op.cit., pp.286-291.

4. G. BOSSUAT, *L’Europe des Français*, Publication de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1994, pp.31-32.

5. W.D. GRUNER, *Der Platz Deutschlands in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg aus der Sicht Jean Monnets (1940-1952)*, in: A. WILKENS (ed.), *Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Bouvier, Bonn, 1999, p.50.

Robert Schuman between 1949 and 1950, Monnet proposed several ideas and projects to help the French government resolve the Ruhr issues without underlining the nationalist danger.<sup>6</sup> His main concern was how to formulate a proposal on this subject that could not only be agreed on by the Americans and the British, but which would also be acceptable to Konrad Adenauer.

It was the war in Korea, and particularly the following proposal for German rearmament, that forced Monnet to deepen his arguments for European integration and link the German question to the danger of a revival of nationalism in Europe as a whole. As German participation became indispensable to any European integration programs, Monnet probably intended to formulate concerns with the German question with reference to the threat of German nationalism. Monnet changed tack, returning to his argument that European integration was necessary to contain nationalism. “The reconstruction of a German sovereign state with a German national army”, he said in early 1951, “is inclined to wake up the German nationalism, which itself will in turn revive the nationalism among the French and other European peoples against Germany”.<sup>7</sup> From that moment, Monnet became the anti-nationalist flag-carrier in the campaign for European integration and focus on integrating this anti-nationalist spirit into his European designs. In his viewpoint, nationalism was the most serious enemy of liberty, as it “always put emphasis on domination, leading to the threat of war”.<sup>8</sup> Nationalists sought to build a national security infrastructure in pursuit of superiority, which cannot but lead to catastrophes, “for there is no limit to this pursuit of superiority”.<sup>9</sup> “Throughout the past nearly thousand years” noticed Monnet, “the development of nationalism in Europe forced European countries to experience bloody but useless efforts in search of hegemony over others”.<sup>10</sup> In the end, Monnet believed, if nationalism had obliged Europeans to pursue conflicting national glories, European integration could now encourage Europeans to work together for their common future. Nationalism was the cause of all inter-state conflicts in the past, while integration could now supply Europeans with healthful, peaceful competition and collective progress.<sup>11</sup> To avoid war, Monnet concluded, Europeans must contain nationalism, which could only be achieved through European integration.

### *to reverse European decline*

Monnet never made any effort to pursue grandeur or glory for Europe. Instead he proposed concrete and workable programs to solve urgent problems. If he admired

6. Archives de la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe (FJM), AML 227/6 and AMF 14/1.

7. FJM, AMG 49/2/42.

8. FJM, AML 192/56.

9. FJM, AML 209.

10. FJM, AMG 49/2/42.

11. FJM, AML 171/9.

the United States, it was its immense market and entrepreneurship that impressed him most.

“Industrialization was born in European countries. Nonetheless, owing to Europe’s social structure and attitude deeply planted in its rural civilization before the industrialization, industrialization did not exploit all its possibilities in Europe. The aristocracy-mastered hierarchical society, the small and medium-sized states, and the ceaseless efforts to conquer between Europeans all contributed to prevent the full development of modern technology. It was in the United States, an immense country characterized by equality, that industrialization has accomplished its highest success”.<sup>12</sup>

Accordingly, it was not until the mid-1950s, when he became a leading figure of European integration and Europeans began building a common market while losing their colonial empires that Monnet added a worldwide dimension to his European designs. European integration was now not only a defensive work program to solve the German question and contain Europe’s nationalist ghosts but could also be an ambitious project to help Europe as a whole compete with other powers in global politics. In brief, European integration could reverse European decline resulting from the two world wars.

As Monnet supposed, the division of the old continent into small- and medium-sized countries gave birth to nationalism and ceaseless wars and conquests. This division also prevented European countries from working together in pursuit of progress, a definitive disadvantage in an era in which no European nation could, on its own, afford to fund the massively expensive research projects and enterprises which required ever more resources. “Those great European nations”, he said, “who once enjoyed immense rich sources and influence around the world, now find themselves weakened and stripped of wealth”.<sup>13</sup>

“In the Suez crisis, French and British influence proved to be quite limited. Today, the worldwide powers are the United States and the Soviet Union.”<sup>14</sup>

To further persuade his European contemporaries, Monnet began using the so-called ‘China card’. As early as in the mid-1950s, he warned that some Asian countries would one day surpass European nations in political and economic terms.

“Asia has changed. China and India, which represent together half of the global population, are now working hard for their own industrialization and modernization”.<sup>15</sup>

Monnet’s formulation was not an exception among pro-European advocates of integration after Indian independence and Mao’s victory in China. “Today the US and the USSR; tomorrow China and India” was a very popular slogan employed to persuade Europeans to support the integration movement. Only slightly different from those European militants, Monnet indicated at the same time that even Japan would surpass European nations if the latter fail to integrate their resources to fund their

12. FJM, AML 171/10.

13. FJM, AML 239.

14. FJM, AML 132.

15. FJM, AML 239.

continued development.<sup>16</sup> European integration was thus also seen as a means to reverse European decline and allow the Europeans to compete with other powers in the world.

### *to liberate Europe from the East-West conflict*

During the cold war, Europe was divided and became the central battlefield and buffer zone between America and the Soviet Union. A new outbreak of military conflict seemed quite probable in the early 1950s. Under such circumstances, Monnet once advocated that Europe would not be free of the influence of the US-Soviet military conflict until the continent was unified. In an interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, Monnet explained his logic.

“Once European nations decide to work together toward the unification, they will obtain energy and determination that they can never have while separated. This energy and determination will permit Europeans to contribute more actively and substantively to the peaceful coexistence between East and West. Then Europe will be no more the battlefield between the United States and the Soviet Union that it suffers today”.<sup>17</sup>

Did Monnet mean to create a third force outside of the US and the USSR in world politics as de Gaulle once imagined? He seemed reluctant to go so far, conceding only that a unified Europe could play an intermediary role between the superpowers. “A unified Europe”, he said, “will become an immense bridge between the US and the USSR, which will be the only chance for peace”.<sup>18</sup> Rather Monnet insisted that even a unified and independent Europe would need alliances in world politics.

## II. Monnet's tripartite design

In parallel with his contribution to the movement towards European integration, Monnet was completing his grand design for Europe. This design consisted of three pillars: a European federation, a holy alliance with US, and a world concert of powers.

16. FJM, AML 271/22.

17. FJM, AML 111.

18. FJM, AML 298/62.

### *A European federation*

Monnet was no doubt a federalist favouring the creation of a United States of Europe, in which all European states would pool their sovereign rights, resources and burdens to create a European super-state. To achieve this nearly impossible project, Monnet proposed a federalist but flexible approach.

First, he insisted that all participant states delegate their rights to the common authorities. However, Monnet never emphasized the voting rules inside the common authorities, which could adopt a number of forms: unanimity, qualified majority or simple majority. It was the irreversibility of this delegation that distinguished Monnet's design from those of other federalists. Monnet agreed and even advocated that this delegation or pooling of sovereignty be limited to certain fields. But once a sovereign right was delegated, no participant state could revoke that delegation. "As the European member states have already established their common rules, institutions and procedures", he explained to de Gaulle in 1962, "they [the member states] cannot but implement them".<sup>19</sup>

Second, Monnet preferred to begin this pooling in the economic field lest political quarrels disturb integration. Instead of a general integration, he advocated 'sector integration', meaning that integration in one sector would stimulate neighbouring sectors, which would accumulate over time and result in a general integration. Studying Monnet's efforts in the construction of the European Coal and Steel Community, American scholar Ernst Haas labelled this approach 'neo-functionalism', in which the 'spill-over' constitutes the core concept. Haas' scholarly work was inspired by Monnet's achievements, not vice versa. Labelling Monnet as neo-functionalism, scholars must be reminded that, first, Monnet never believed that sector integration would happen automatically as Haas' neo-functionalism implies. Monnet insisted that sector integration be well organized and managed, which could not be achieved without the creation of common institutions and rules. These rules and institutions should be established with a vision of serving future economic unity. "It is these common rules and institutions that distinguish the common market from the classic customs union".<sup>20</sup> Second, though advocating sector integration in economic field, Monnet was later persuaded that a general economic integration could replace sector integration as the engine of European integration when conditions permitted it. Once insisting on the creation of Euratom in the aftermath of the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC), Monnet was first fascinated by atomic energy in his talks with Max Isenbergh, then legal advisor of the American Commission of Atomic Energy in November 1954.<sup>21</sup> He then met Paul-Henri Spaak, resulting in the latter's proposal that the ECSC be extended to all matters of energy and transport and a new

19. FJM, AMK C 140522.

20. FJM, AML 166.

21. Interview with Max Isenbergh on April 20, 1981. Série d'interviews, FJM.

Community for civil nuclear power be created.<sup>22</sup> According to Max Kohnstamm, Monnet had no confidence in the Common Market Project until he was told that Adenauer gave his full support to this project and French people might agree to it owing to the economic benefits in October 1956.<sup>23</sup> Once persuaded, Monnet mobilized all his resources and influence via the Action Committee for the United States of Europe and modified his approach.

Third, though Monnet preferred to begin integration in the economic field, he seized any opportunity to leap on political unification without waiting for the mature development of economic integration as Haas proposed. For Monnet, it was the timing that oriented his strategy. "As regards my action", Monnet said in 1971, "I was only sensible to the timing, which is decided by the context outside of me. I am just conscious when the moment is coming and I act".<sup>24</sup> That was why Monnet never ceased to propose beginning political integration when he judged that the context might permit it. Accordingly, he proposed the Pleven Plan only months after publication of the Schuman Plan. As early as 1957, Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe adopted a resolution that urged the six member states of the European Community to assemble all the common institutions and create a 'European District' of 30-40 hectares.<sup>25</sup> On the eve of the Eisenhower-Kroushchev summit in 1959, Monnet wrote to de Gaulle that France and Germany should announce to adopt a common foreign policy and constitute a "Council of Foreign policy composed of a very limited number of ministers directly concerned".<sup>26</sup> In 1962, during the negotiations over the Plan Fouchet, he wrote once again to de Gaulle that France should now create, jointly with Adenauer, a political union in Europe. For "Adenauer is finishing his career and his successor is quite uncertain".<sup>27</sup> In early 1970s, Monnet proposed to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing that the European Community should create a 'European government' as the starting point of political integration. To achieve this goal, Monnet agreed that the rules and institutions that formulate a common foreign policy might be different from those governing the economy.<sup>28</sup> But this intergovernmental cooperation could not but serve as a transitional arrangement, which must develop into a fully political integration. For "cooperation itself can never create any union".<sup>29</sup>

How big would this European federation be? Monnet never made clear his ideas on the limits and frontiers of this new polity while repeating the core criteria for membership: "The Community is as large as those states accepting the same rules

22. F. DUCHÊNE, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence*, Norton & Company, New York and London, 1994, p.268.

23. Interview with Max Kohnstamm on September 24, 1984. Série d'interviews, FJM. Interview by the author on March 6, 1998.

24. FJM, AML 313/113.

25. FJM, AMK 8/4/34.

26. FJM, AMK C 14/5/12.

27. FJM, AMK C 14/5/22.

28. FJM, AMK C 14/5/22.

29. FJM, AMK C14/5/22.

and institutions as the others”. Accordingly, the future European federation would be open to all those who agreed to accept its rules.<sup>30</sup> Among those rules, democracy was without doubt the golden one. Approached by Spanish delegates Mato Palli and Soler Padron in June 1972, Monnet refused Spanish accession and insisted that “Europe must be democratic, dictatorship has no place”.<sup>31</sup> Following the same logic, all of the Central and Eastern European countries under Soviet communist control should have full legitimate rights for the membership of the European Community only once they were liberated and established democracies. Monnet said “for me, there is no Western Europe or Eastern Europe. No matter where they come from in Europe, those who accept the same rules can enter”.<sup>32</sup>

One day, could a unified Europe accept a democratic Russia and a certain westernised Turkey as members? Monnet seems to have refused de Gaulle’s idea that Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Ural. Though never participating in the debate about whether Russia belongs to Europe, he replied that Russians would not accept the same rules as Europeans even as he agreed that the Soviet Union might evolve in nature.<sup>33</sup> As regards Turkish membership, Monnet never discussed it in public; however, as he repeatedly emphasized the common civilization among Europeans as the basis of European integration, it can be deduced that Monnet would not have supported Turkish membership if the issue had arisen in his time.

“We all witnessed the birth, development and expansion of one civilization. It is not true that European nations, which once contributed essentially to the world, are incapable of building up one fraternal and peace-loving people”.<sup>34</sup>

### *A holy alliance for democracy*

According to Monnet, even a unified Europe would fail to guarantee security in Europe and maintain world peace. A European federation should therefore be allied with the United States for two reasons. On the one hand, from Monnet’s viewpoint, the two sides of the Atlantic share a common civilization. In the communiqué published by the Action Committee in July 1962, Monnet declared solemnly that

“a partnership between the US and Europe is natural and ineluctable because people in America and Europe share the same civilization that is based upon freedom, and organize their public affairs according to the common democratic rules”.<sup>35</sup>

On the other hand, both sides had common interests in all fields and particularly in economic affairs.

30. FJM, AML 157.

31. FJM, AML 323/7.

32. FJM, AML 313/113.

33. FJM, AML 207.

34. FJM, AML 248.

35. FJM, AML 192/55.

“There exist now problems that neither Europe nor America alone can resolve. They include monetary stability, management of agriculture in an industrializing world, supply of aid to less developed countries, and negotiations for a freer world trade”.<sup>36</sup>

This alliance was to be constituted in a classical intergovernmental manner. Curiously, Monnet refused to set out on integrating the development of this trans-Atlantic alliance.

“We do not pursue integration with the US. The form of organization between Europe and US shall be definitely different from that of the European common institutions”.<sup>37</sup>

Accordingly, in the building of the Europe-US alliance, Monnet preferred a very classical cooperative approach in spite of the different denominations he had proposed, such as ‘Trans-Atlantic community’, ‘US-Europe association’, or ‘Europe-US partnership’.

In the process of constituting this alliance, Monnet insisted upon two principles. In those fields where Europeans had already established common institutions, rules and representatives, Monnet advocated that a new structure be established between the US and Europe, in which unified European institutions should enjoy total equality with their US counterparts. In 1962, in his proposal to establish the trans-Atlantic Community, he suggested a constitution firstly of an ‘Entente Committee’ between the US and European Communities, which would manage jointly all of the issues in which member states had transferred their sovereign rights to the European Communities.<sup>38</sup> As regards alliances in those fields where European countries had not yet been integrated, Monnet accepted the existent cooperative model in which America enjoyed *de facto* leadership. The fact that Europe was not yet unified should not prevent Europe and America from starting to build their alliance. As divided European countries could not possess the same forces as the US, Monnet supposed it natural to recognize America’s status as a superpower and accepted American leadership. This attitude was made clear in the debate over the MLF (Multilateral Force) in 1960s. He told the SPD leaders that a MLF could serve as a starting and temporary arrangement towards future collective strategic organization between the US and Europe, even if the MLF recognized explicitly American predominance in nuclear armaments.<sup>39</sup> He also wrote to de Gaulle, saying that even if the general’s firm support for Berlin was highly appreciated by all political leaders in Germany, the latter still regarded the US with its military power as the only guarantor of German security, a duty that France could never assume.<sup>40</sup> Monnet surely did not accept this unequal dependency on the US as an eternal condition. On the contrary, he planned to see a unified Europe emerge as a power capable of re-balancing this dependency because only a unified Europe could build and wield the same power as the US. Before this unification was achieved, Monnet proposed the establishment of a ‘European

36. FJM, AML 192/55.

37. FJM, AML 264/7.

38. FJM, AML 233/33.

39. FJM, AML 208/21.

40. FJM, AML 218/8.

group' inside those cooperation organizations where America was dominant, i.e., OECD and NATO.

How could the Americans accept this alliance based upon absolute equality with a future unified Europe? In his talks with American elites, Monnet enumerated two reasons. First,

“it is very solitary and dangerous to be the most and only powerful country in the world for it represents almost unlimited responsibility for others, which in turn arouses jealousy and suspicion”.<sup>41</sup>

This argument echoed Paul Kennedy's conclusion in his research of rise and fall of great powers over the past five-hundred years. That unlimited responsibility could lead to an overstretching of the dominant powers, which could then be brought to an end unexpectedly. At the same time, America needed competition with other nations to continue its consistent progress.<sup>42</sup>

Second, since the mid 1960s, Monnet believed that the US alone could no more assume full responsibility for maintaining world peace, economic growth, monetary stability and political order. An over-burdened US, maintaining a presence in all fields around the world, contributed substantially to the devaluation of the dollar. The US alone could not save its own currency. It was occidental solidarity that was needed to resolve the international monetary crisis, confirming that Monnet's strategy for a US-Europe alliance would serve even the interests of the Americans.

This US-Europe alliance should work together to defend occidental civilization, help people in developing countries and maintain world peace. To work together, Monnet insisted, US and Europe must make decisions collectively, meaning that the US should consult or even seek consent from the unified Europe before acting. “It was natural that European be asked to participate in the decision on nuclear affairs”, Monnet told Americans in 1963, “for these affairs were directly threatening existence of European people”.<sup>43</sup>

### *A world concert of three powers*

Always a man for integration, Monnet always resisted the division of the world into hundreds of states, arguing that a world of blocs should be more easily governed than a world separated into numerous small- and medium-sized states. “Peace shall be more easily maintained in a world of big blocs, which are equal to each other and decline to search for superiority over the others”.<sup>44</sup> In his European design, Monnet drafted a world concert, evidently inspired by the European concert and balance of

41. FJM, AML 268.

42. FJM, AML 283/21.

43. FJM, AML 192/56.

44. FJM, AML 292.

power in the nineteenth century, wherein the US-Europe holy alliance would enjoy the dominant position. This world concert should be composed of the US, unified Europe and non-Western powers. This trio would discuss and work together to maintain world peace and resolve conflicts on all corners of the globe. According to Monnet, it was exactly this Western unity around the United States that forced the Soviet Union to withdraw missiles from Cuba, which was a “historical development”.<sup>45</sup>

European strategy in this world concert would therefore evolve in parallel with the process of unification. In issues touching on integration, Europe should act energetically to ally with the US and to deter non-Western powers. “The partnership between America and a united Europe must be a relationship of two separate but equally powerful entities”, Monnet declared in 1962, “each bearing its share of common responsibilities in the world”.<sup>46</sup> In those issues where Europeans still failed to integrate their sovereign rights, Monnet seemed to prefer that European countries adopt a low profile, support American strategy vis-à-vis non-Western powers, and pay more attention to its own integration processes. Following the same logic in his project to create a trans-Atlantic alliance, he believed that a divided Europe could not only fail to have equality with the US in the bilateral alliance but would also carry no weight in the trio of powers. Under such circumstances, a divided Europe had no choice but to accept American leadership in the alliance and follow American policies in the world concert. Accordingly, he dissuaded European contemporaries from paying too much attention to the former Soviet Union.

“I am sure if we pay all attention to our own work, we will complete the European unity including the British and create a partnership with the Americans. When these works are accomplished, many problems that we are worried about today will be then solved automatically”.<sup>47</sup>

In his grand design, European unity was the starting point and a key factor that might modify global geopolitics.

### III. Criticism

#### *Supranational elitism*

Monnet was evidently a federalist whose ambition was to create a European super-state dominated by a supranational administration since the Schuman Plan had been presented.<sup>48</sup> To govern this new super-state, Monnet preferred, in early 1950s, to

45. E. ROUSSEL, *Jean Monnet*, Fayard, Paris, 1996, p.766.

46. J. MONNET, *Memoirs*, translated by Richard Mayne, Collins, London, 1978, p.443.

47. FJM, AML 292.

48. F. DUCHÊNE, op.cit., p.369.

establish a “constraint administration composed of a few competent elite-officials”.<sup>49</sup> His original blueprint for this super-state resulted in some criticism that he attributed to the accumulative ‘democratic deficit’ in the European Union. According to Pierre Bordeaux-Groult, the former vice president of the European Movement, Monnet agreed that the European parliament might develop into an elected parliament, which nonetheless “is never important”.<sup>50</sup> Another European movement, the *Jeunesse Europe*, also blamed Monnet for having neglected public opinion on European integration, against its advice.<sup>51</sup> “By almost any measure”, concluded an American scholar, “the Commission fails the test of democratic legitimacy. Whilst it has a high profile, public opinion often seems not to understand its role nor to accept a primary leadership role for it”.<sup>52</sup> “Monnet’s networks were an ‘elitist’ phenomenon”, concluded François Duchêne, “but it was hard for Monnet to see how a more ‘popular’ approach would have worked”.<sup>53</sup>

Nonetheless, Monnet adapted his program to these demands as early as his Action Committee adopted a series of resolutions that called for the direct election of members of the European Parliament and an enlargement of the latter’s budgetary power.<sup>54</sup> In the early 1970s, he reiterated that the European Communities should reinforce the European Parliament through the introduction of direct elections and redistribution of powers to the Parliament. For Monnet, the European Parliament could never play a leading role in the European integration; however, parliamentary development was to be correlated to the integration as a whole. In other words, the parliament would be empowered as Europe integrated.

In response to attacks on the European Community, Monnet countered,

“I do not think that we can say that the European construction is anti-democratic, though evidently the parliamentary participation is absent in the decision-making of the Communities. For the Council of ministers is a sovereign institution but the Parliament is only consultative”.<sup>55</sup>

To integrate European nations, Monnet’s parliamentary design is justifiable. Master of the working group rather than an orator performing before a mass, Monnet preferred to develop small- and medium-sized working teams to implement his program. Masses as large as the European Parliament were never at the centre of his designs for Europe. In particular, his detractors have neglected to note that the contribution of parliaments could not hold up any action projects any more efficient than Monnet’s.

49. Y. CONRAD, *Jean Monnet et les débuts de la fonction publique européenne*, Louvaine-la-Neuve, CIACO, Bruxelles, 1989, p.90.

50. P. ROUSSEL, *Jean Monnet. Témoignages à la mémoire de Jean Monnet*, FJM, Lausanne, 1989, p. 133.

51. FJM, AMK 3/2/120.

52. K. FEATHERSTONE, *Jean Monnet and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ in the European Union*, in: *JCMS*, 2(June 1994), p.162.

53. F. DUCHÊNE, *op.cit.*, p.357.

54. Déclaration commune du 1er juin 1964 de l’onzième session de la réunion générale du Comité d’action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe. FJM.

55. FJM, AML 313/113.

Neither the Congress at the Hague nor the European Movement were able to begin the movement towards integration in spite of their militant efforts. It is therefore unwarranted to blame Monnet for the 'democratic deficit' in the European Union.

### *Pro-Americanism*

Throughout his efforts to create a unified Europe, Monnet depended much upon the support from German political parties as well as upon his network of influence in America. In his design for Europe, America played not only the role of supporter and catalyst but it also served as a paradigm for the future European federation. This Americanism facilitated his campaign for European integration and helped make him a well-known statesman for European unity. But it also cast some shadow over his ambitious plan for European integration.

First, while the US served as a paradigm in Monnet's grand design for Europe, fear of Americanization spread as legitimate concern among those opposed to European integration. Individualism, entrepreneurship, market-oriented economy, and an emphasis upon competition were all factors welcome by Monnet, but which could nonetheless displease his European contemporaries. If the United States developed successfully owing to the fact that an elite group characterized as WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) mastered this process, who could play a similar role in European unification?<sup>56</sup> According to demography, it is the German people, despite the presence of concerns over their containment at the core of European integration and Monnet's European design.

Second, as Monnet supposed that America contributed positively to European integration and that the US and Europe shared the same civilization and interests, his design of a holy alliance between the two sides of the Atlantic was static. According to his logic, vis-à-vis yesterday's Soviet Union or today's China, the US and the unifying Europe should ally on all fronts and in all fields. "From the very beginning", concluded Eric Roussel, "Monnet believed that Europe must be integrated not in opposition to the US, but along with the US in order to fortify the Western unity".<sup>57</sup> Such a static holy alliance might force the unifying or unified Europe to follow blindly the American policy and strategy against its own interests and even the common interests of the world community. For example, in negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol, the Statute establishing the International Criminal Tribunal and the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines, the European Union allied with those non-Western countries and overcame American opposition. The US and the European Union may share a majority of fundamental values such as human rights, democracy and market economy, but they do diverge in such fields as environmental protection, foreign aid, and the role of international organizations in world politics.

56. Interview with André Fontaine on 18 July 1983. Série d'interviews, FMJ.

57. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., p.764.

Third, a holy alliance designed by Monnet would also prevent a unifying Europe from allying with powers other than the US when it served European interests and the general interests of the world community. Then the holy alliance would be transformed into a ‘hyper-power’ dominating world politics. Such a ‘hyper-power’ might guarantee the security of the West as a whole, which would create insecurity in those non-Western powers and provoke a nationalistic response. In the end, Monnet’s design to contain European nationalism might ironically provoke nationalistic responses outside of Europe, leading to a clash of civilizations.

Last but not least, like many pro-America leaders in Europe, Monnet seems to have overestimated his personal influence and the impact of a unifying or unified Europe on Washington’s foreign policy. In order to obtain American support, he was following American policy in Europe between 1950 and 1970s. He drafted the EDC project, echoed Kennedy’s project creating a ‘Trans-Atlantic Community’, and worked hard to support the MLF in spite of increasing hostility even inside his own Action Committee. He seems to have intended to support these American policies, in which European leaders quite often failed to reach consensus, in exchange for Washington’s support of his grand design. He might also manipulate these American policies as temporary and transitional developments in the future hoped for trans-Atlantic alliance. Unfortunately, loyalty and friendship alone would not constitute effective influence on the superpower. John F. Kennedy’s project creating the Trans-Atlantic Community disappeared immediately in the aftermath of his assassination. The MLF plan was dropped by the Johnson government without any consultation with Monnet or European governments. Unilateralism seems to be the rule in adoption of foreign policy by superpowers while consultation is an exception. As regards equal partnership, the concept does not exist in a superpower’s dictionary. Though Monnet and some American elite advocated the creation of the Trans-Atlantic partnership in early 1960s, they failed to adopt a consensual approach to its implementation. Even between Monnet and George Ball, one of his closest and most influential friends in American politics, the divergences were evident.<sup>58</sup> “Who wants to share power?” said a former member of president George H.W. Bush’s Security Council, “nobody”.<sup>59</sup>

### *Anti-intergovernmentalism*

Monnet’s anti-intergovernmentalism was illustrated by his well-known motto: “We are not forming coalitions between States, but union among people”.<sup>60</sup> Insisting upon the integration of sovereign nations, Monnet criticized much intergovernmental co-

58. Ibid., p.765.

59. This was quoted from a former member of the Security Council of George Bush at the workshop of LSE on 13 February 1998.

60. J. MONNET, op.cit., p.1.

operation which, according to him, was not useless, but was insufficient to guarantee the security of nations and contain a revival of nationalism. First, intergovernmental cooperation was based upon national sovereignty. Accordingly, such cooperation stopped “when national interests of member states were in conflict, which was then leading to wars”.<sup>61</sup> In order to justify his criticism, Monnet employed David Mitrany’s functionalism developed in the 1930s without denominating it. According to functionalism, the Nation-State’s dominance in human progress was over as more and more problems could not be solved without international cooperation. Then, contrary to Mitrany, Monnet did not believe that any intergovernmental cooperation could solve those trans-national problems in an efficient and effective way for this cooperation was by nature a national solution. The only escape was multinational integration with sovereign transfer. “The nation-state once played an irreplaceable role but its role was put into question in the modern world”.<sup>62</sup> Second, intergovernmental cooperation could not but make decisions with unanimity. Without any integrated institutions, this consensual rule would result in either a frequent immobility in striving for cooperation, or a ceaseless power struggle among participant states.<sup>63</sup>

Nonetheless, Monnet did not oppose intergovernmental cooperation outside of European integration or between a unifying or unified Europe and third countries. He even accepted intergovernmental cooperation among European countries in political affairs provided that this cooperation would lead to future integration, which explains why Monnet had once supported de Gaulle’s Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s. But Monnet began condemning intergovernmental cooperation as early as he judged that this cooperation would be established at the price of the European integration. “Why did France”, he asked in his Memoirs, “try to bring back into an intergovernmental framework what had already become a Community”?<sup>64</sup> If Monnet tolerated the Fouchet Plan, he never hesitated to prevent the Elysée Treaty from entering into effect for this bilateral treaty was signed outside of the Community and was interpreted by Monnet to invalidate and even replace the European Community. Before Adenauer’s visit to Paris, Monnet wrote to the German chancellor to put the Franco-German cooperation inside the existent Community and to support the British membership in spite of de Gaulle’s hostility. On the eve of the signature of the Elysée Treaty, Monnet again went to the German embassy to meet Adenauer to reiterate his insistence in vain.<sup>65</sup> After the signature, Monnet began working with a CDU fraction in the Bundestag to adopt a preamble in its ratification of the Elysée Treaty in order to ‘mitigate’ or even invalidate the newborn Franco-German cooperation.<sup>66</sup>

61. FJM, AMG 49/2/42.

62. FJM, AML 338/21.

63. FJM, AML 285.

64. J. MONNET, *op.cit.*, p.439.

65. Archiv der Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Jean Monnet to Konrad Adenauer, 16.01.1963.

66. Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Max Kohnstamm to Kurt Birrenbach, 15.02.1963.

## Conclusion


Monnet did not intend to develop a theory for European integration, which was presented as an immediate solution to contain Germany's reviving power and European nationalism. However, as he was devoted to European integration, he was not only involved in all the political debates throughout the development of European Communities between 1950 and 1970s but was also obliged to formulate more and more arguments to justify his campaign for European integration. Little by little, Monnet systematized his arguments and presented a theory and blueprint for European integration. This integrated movement could resolve the German question, contain nationalism, reverse European decline since WWII. It could also liberate Europe from the East-West conflict at some time in the future. Furthermore, a unified Europe would become an equal partner of the US, both constituting a solid alliance that could manage world affairs. An alliance composed of US and unified Europe on the basis of common civilization and shared interests would be strong to the extent that all the other powers inclined to disturb world order could be deterred and contained. However, before Europe was unified, Europeans could not but accept the American leadership in world politics, and even in European affairs. As a result, Monnet believed European unification would imply independence and equality for Europe. European unity was the key factor that would change European destiny, transform the trans-Atlantic relationship and consolidate world peace. In brief, the future of the world depended on the success of European integration.

Monnet's design was surely constituted with the aim of persuading his European contemporaries and particularly the elites to support European integration. His design evidently suffered from some contradictory arguments and questionable feasibility. His administration-mastered integration was criticized as 'anti-democratic' or 'democratic deficit'. His pro-American policies failed to obtain full support from the American government or elites. His hope for the constitution of a permanent US-Europe alliance might have prevented Europe from adopting policies against American interests even if they would benefit the Europeans and the world as a whole.

Nonetheless, Monnet's design could contribute abundantly to today's debate over the future of the EU. As the European Union has accomplished the original goals aimed at maintaining internal peace and ensuring common prosperity on the continent and achieved reconciliation between European nations, Europeans are now bewildered. European integration has been more successful than intended. Accordingly, Europeans find themselves deeply in debate. According to European barometers, general support for the European Union has never ceased to decline since the mid-1990s. The debate in the European Union now focuses more and more on institutional, economic and social subjects in detail. But Europeans need a political debate over where European integration is moving, what kind of Europe they need, what form of alliance they intend to establish with the US, what relations they aim to establish with those non-Western powers, and which role they want to play in the rapidly evolving world. Monnet's design may not be the future of the European Union

but it can inspire debate on the future of Europe. From this point of view, the Father of Europe really is an inspiration for Europe even now, thirty years after his passing.

# Festschrift für Reimund Seidelmann



## Nachdenken über Europa

Probleme und Perspektiven  
eines Ordnungsmodells

Festschrift für Reimund Seidelmann

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Quo vadis EU? Die Zukunftsaussichten des Projekts Europa stellen sich sehr ambivalent dar, wie der Band belegt. Die EU befindet sich in einer Identitätskrise zwischen Vertiefung und Erweiterung, in der sowohl die Zukunft der politischen Integration als auch die Frage ihrer Grenzen ungelöst ist. Im Außenverhältnis sieht sich die EU mit ihrem multilateralen Ansatz einer global governance, dem konkurrierenden Ordnungsmodell einer multipolaren Welt(un)ordnung, gegenüber.

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