

5 A Coding Paradigm of Belonging

In Pierre Bourdieu's overall conception of human action I have found a useful basis to identify the dimensions of empirical analysis. The present chapter aims at providing a theoretical-operational framework for the analysis of the interview material in order to find answers to the questions raised in the introductory chapter. At the end of the chapter, I will suggest an integrated framework of Pierre Bourdieu's concepts as an extension of Strauss's coding paradigm. Yet at the same time it is more than this: namely an alternative different approach to immigrant adaptation from the angle of the immigrants' "subjective positioning", which recognises the individual as actively constructing their *sense of belonging*. This does not mean that the structural factors of immigrant adaptation will be left out; on the contrary, I suggest a holistic approach here.

5.1 BOURDIEU'S CULTURAL THEORY OF ACTION

Bourdieu's central themes circle around the issues of an individual's belonging, or, sense of place, legitimisation, and symbolic power. His sociological thinking has been described, depending on the purpose the various authors claim for using Bourdieu's ideas, for example as an "economy of practices" (Smart 1993: 388), a "dispositional philosophy of action" (Savage/ Silva 2013: 112), or as a means for the analysis of social inequalities and the "subtle inculcation of power relations" (McNay 1999: 99). Bourdieu's social actors, actively (re-)produce the social world they live in. In his overall work, Pierre Bourdieu developed five interconnected concepts in order to understand and analyse the relation between the

individual and society, between subjective and objective structures.¹ This notion is nicely described with the formula “[habitus x capital] + field = practice” (Bourdieu 1987: 175).

In order to make Bourdieu’s rather theoretical concepts applicable as categories for the analysis of interview material, I suggest here to integrate Bourdieu’s concepts with methodological approaches from discourse analysis. The objective structures are grasped analytically with the help of a sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD) (e.g. Keller 2011a); SKAD particularly takes into consideration collectively shared knowledge, e.g. in the form of patterns of interpretation. Social practice is understood as discursive practice and analysed with reference to Helen Haste’s lay theory approach (Haste 1992). Among other things Haste emphasises the impact the situational context has on the individual’s argumentative strategies.

In the following, I will briefly discuss Bourdieu’s concepts with regard to my research interest and suggest an operational framework to (re-) integrate these concepts with different approaches from discourse studies.

5.1.1 Social Space and Symbolic Order

Social space, i.e. a given society, is the entity of objective structures or cultural codes. Lamont and Lareau define culture as “institutionalised, i.e. widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviours, goals and credentials), used for social and cultural exclusion” (Lamont/ Lareau 1988: 156). Individual “sets of properties” (Bourdieu 1985: 724) constitute the social world (Bourdieu 1985: 723). Social actors are positioned within these objective structures along dimensions of the accumulation of capital, in particular the overall amount of capital, its composition of the various forms of capital, as well as individual trajectories or past experiences (Bourdieu 1986; also Atkinson 2010: 2). Against the background of their objective position in a given social space, individuals develop a set of dispositions to act, reflecting the “central structural elements (political instability, kinship rules, and so on) of their society” (Nash 1999: 185). These dispositions guide the individual’s social

1 According to Silva and Warde, Bourdieu most systematically integrated these concepts in his *Réponses pour une anthropologie réflexive* (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996), (Silva/ Warde 2010: 5).

interaction. Through their actions they “necessarily reproduce those structural elements although in a modified form” (Nash 1999: 185). Accordingly, Bourdieu conceives the social space as a “space of relationships” (Bourdieu 1985: 725) between social actors. In other words, the material order of possession of relevant forms of capital mirrors the symbolic order of power relations in that given society (Bourdieu 1985: 723). The relationships between social actors in a particular social space are determined by the distribution of power among them: the composition of an individual’s capital, his or her resources, determine his or her objective position in a given society. Their objective position, again, determines their “chances of achieving legitimation” (Crossley 2001: 85). The social group in power, in turn, determines which forms of capital are considered valuable at a certain time, i.e. what kind of composition of an individual’s capital is required for achieving a legitimate objective position to exercise power. Members of a given society usually do not question this power. It is rather generally accepted as a means of guidance about what is regarded legitimate and valuable by those social groups—Bourdieu rather speaks of social classes in order to emphasise the relative stability of a given social hierarchy—who are more distant from power.

5.1.2 Forms of Capital

The concept of capital is central in Bourdieu’s theoretical framework of social action; and it has already been mentioned with regard to social space. Depending on its particular form, capital needs to be individually acquired, or embodied, over time rather than being transmitted directly within the family.² Accordingly, Bourdieu speaks of capital as “accumulated history” (Bourdieu 1986: 183). The accumulation of capital occurs against the background of an individual’s “respective distance [...] from the realm of material necessity” (Crossley 2001: 85). In other words, an individual needs to have the time and opportunity to accumulate non-economic forms of capital. In this context, Prieur and Savage speak in this regard of capital as “accumulated advantage” (Prieur and Savage 2011: 569). In order to illustrate this, Bourdieu compares the social world to a *game* (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996 [1992]): the amount and composition of a social actor’s

2 The exception from this rule is economic capital.

capital—one's *stakes* in the *game*—defines one's chances to pursue one's interest of improving one's objective position in a given society (Bourdieu 1985: 724). This means the composition of a social actor's capital gains particular importance in a concrete field; here, capital is both the product of and the resource for individual agency (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 129). It is important to mention here that social actors, according to Bourdieu, do not see what they do as a *game* as such, as something they are not necessarily involved in, but as a meaningful and important (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 148).

Bourdieu distinguishes four forms of capital: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic; to a certain degree each of them can be converted into the other forms (Bourdieu 1986; Siisiainen 2003):³

Cultural capital Cultural capital—or “Informationskapital [informational capital]”, as Bourdieu refers to it from a backward perspective (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 151)—is closely linked to formal and informal education both in Bourdieu's writing and the concept's application in empirical studies. Cultural capital is divided into its three sub-forms: inherited or embodied (e.g. particular cultural skills and knowledge), objectified (e.g. school certificates), and institutionalised (e.g. titles) cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986). It involves particular cultural competencies, skills, and habits, cumulating into “the cultivated naturalness” of particular social classes (Bourdieu 1987). Thus, cultural capital is by definition a struggle over cultural codes, over “legitimate culture” (Prieur/ Savage 2011: 568).

Critics mainly refer to ambiguities and gaps in Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital. Lamont and Lareau describe the development of the concept in Bourdieu's writings: being introduced as an “informal [...] competence” (Lamont/ Lareau 1988: 155), through being an institutionalised feature, mirrored in the possession of formal knowledge e.g. in the form of diploma

3 In the empirical literature, in different research contexts further, sub-forms of capital have been introduced: e.g. “socio-political capital” (Fanning et al. 2010) in the context of political opportunity structures for immigrant candidates in Ireland, or “discursive capital” as suggested by Gavriely-Nuri (2012) studying “cultural codes” in Israel. However, I agree with Smart (1993) to reduce the operationalisation of existing forms of capital to the basic forms Bourdieu had suggested in order to prevent confusion.

(ibid.), then becoming an “indicator and basis of class position [...] being mobilized for social selection” (ibid.), and finally becoming “a power resource” (ibid.). In this context Kingston criticises that, due to the vagueness and ambiguity of the concept, “too many conceptually distinct variables have come to be placed under the big umbrella of cultural capital, creating a distorted sense of what accounts for academic success” (Kingston 2001: 89). Finally, Bennett and Silva argue that in particular cultural capital became practically applicable only after Bourdieu had added a specification of the sub-forms of cultural capital (cf. Bennett/ Silva 2011). In order to deal with these points of criticism, Lareau and Weininger stress that Bourdieu’s concept of (embodied) cultural capital contains particular “techniques and ‘skills’” (Lareau/ Weininger 2003: 593), or, as Edgerton and Roberts put it, “adaptive cultural and social competencies” AND the “possession of relevant intellectual and social skills” (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 4). In a similar vein, Erel applies migrants’ cultural capital as “adaptive [...] competencies”: “first, migrants do not only unpack cultural capital from their rucksacks, instead they create new forms of cultural capital in the countries of residence. They use resources they brought with them and others they develop in situ to create quite distinct dispositions. Second, migrants engage in creating mechanisms of validation for their cultural capital” (Erel 2010: 649) “as capital alternative or oppositional to frameworks of national belonging” (Erel 2010: 643).

Social capital According to Bourdieu, social capital is “the aggregate of the actual and potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or, in other words, to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word” (Bourdieu 1986: 51; see also Smart 1993).

As mentioned above, most empirical studies employing the concept of social capital refer to Putnam’s version. While Putnam constructs social capital, in particular the aspect of social trust in social relationships, as a necessary dimension for social integration, Bourdieu uses the concept, together with other forms of capital, to describe social conflict (e.g. also Siisiainen 2003; Braun 2001).

Symbolic capital Symbolic capital can be translated into social prestige or standing—as an individual, but also as a would-be member of a particular social group. The purpose of symbolic capital is to produce a “meaningful *distinction*” or legitimate social hierarchy, and the question of what is legitimate is subject to constant social struggle (Bourdieu 1986; 1985). This form of capital in particular is linked to collectively shared cultural codes; these codes define the possession and composition of other forms of capital that an individual needs to transform these into symbolic capital (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 146). The general recognition of the value of symbolic capital is a prerequisite for the transformation of other forms of capital into symbolic capital. Over time, as culture may change, the particular composition of symbolic capital may change. The direct link to a concrete cultural context reveals, or, rather, puts a veil on the arbitrariness of who has a high standing in a given society (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 151).

5.1.3 Habitus

Bourdieu introduces the concept of habitus in order to bridge the conceptional gap between the abstract notion of society and the individual that actually lives in that society. The individual’s objective position in social space—the social and cultural context—deeply influence his or her ways of perceiving the social world. From Bourdieu’s cultural perspective, the process of an individual’s socialisation is the “situated internalisation of cultural schemes” (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 15), of embodied experiences connected to this position. By linking objective and subjective structures, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is able to put individual action into context: habitus refers both to an individual and a collective history (Bourdieu 1986; see also Reay 2004; Webb et al. 2002; Nash 1999; for empirical examples see Rapoport/ Lomsky-Feder 2002; Reay 1997). In the process of socialisation, the individual generates power resources (habitual dispositions, including the different forms of capital) in the various fields of social interaction; these power resources, again, can be mobilised later on in current fields of action. Habitus is an “objective opportunity structure” (Bourdieu 1985: 726-7), an “interplay between [an individual’s] past and present” (Reay 2004: 434), and at the same time it structures what an individual expects of his or her future through “embodied structures of expectation” (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 7). Bourdieu developed his idea of

the habitus providing social actors with a “practical sense” (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 154) as a critique of the overly intellectual conception of human action (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 153; see also Edgerton/ Roberts 2014; Crossley 2001). In contrast to assumptions made by Rational Choice Theorists, for instance, habitual dispositions guide individual actions as an underlying, mainly unconscious basis. As Sweetman put it: “as the embodiment of social structure, habitus allows us to act” (Sweetman 2003: 532).

As a reply to critics who see Bourdieu’s conception of individual action as a “mere reduction of an individual to his or her positions in social space” (Lahire 2003), I agree with Crossley that it is a “matter of emphasis” (Crossley 2001). The objective position in social space is only one side of the coin—the individual’s subjective positioning and representation is just as important. In this context, I argue that by using all of Bourdieu’s concepts in an integrated framework, one avoids such a “reduction”. In this sense, an individual’s habitus is not only a “structured structure” but functions also as a “structuring structure”, actively reproducing the existing social order in daily interaction, or social practice. The perception of an individual’s position is hence a central “contribution [...] towards constructing the view of the social world” (Bourdieu 1985: 727).

Apart from general critique of Bourdieu’s concept, many authors state the ambiguity not only of the habitus but also of all of Bourdieu’s concepts throughout his work. However, especially his conception of individual action has been under attack. There are three main points of critique of the concept: the first point is that there is little innovation in the habitus, but that dispositions learned through the socialisation process in early childhood remain unaltered. Bourdieu meets this criticism by arguing that the habitus enables the social actor with a “practical sense”, and that besides it is understood as a “dynamic” and “generative principle” (McNay 1999: 101).⁴

4 In Jenkins’s reading of Bourdieu (2006), habitus or the subjective perception of one’s social environment and subsequent action is completely determined by external conditions. As a result, the individual expects of his or her life only what seems probable from past experiences, and thus simply reproduces the status quo in a given society. Certeau even speaks of Bourdieu’s habitus as a “prison house” (Certeau 2008: 84; cited after Webb et al. 2002: 58), lacking “any possibility of a self-conscious, dynamic cultural literacy” (Webb et al. 2002: 59) that would

A second major point of criticism is that Bourdieu states that there is a temporal dimension in the acquisition of a habitus (Noble/ Watkins 2003: 525; see also McNay 1999). As mentioned above, Bourdieu states that the early years of socialisation are formative; in the process of socialisation

include a “self-reflective understanding of the person’s own position and resources” (Webb et al. 2002: 57), an “awareness of the rules, regulations, values and cultural capital” (ibid.). I share the point of view that—despite that critics—Bourdieu opened up his concept of habitus to subjective reflexivity by introducing what he calls “hysteresis effect” and “socio-analysis”. Nedelcu states that “Bourdieu [...] has pointed out, however, that habitus ‘is not destiny’, but rather the product of socialisation; thus, it tends to reproduce past behaviour within a familiar context but gives way to innovation when faced with novel situations.” (Nedelcu 2012: 1345). Once internalised, the individual actually uses repertoire of rules most of the time unconsciously to act and react in common situations and is at the same time able to creatively, i.e. consciously adapt it to new situations (Krais/ Gebauer 2010; e.g. also Noble/ Watkins 2003). In this context, Sweetman hints to the “generative capacities of dispositions” not only in times of crisis as suggested by Bourdieu, but as the post-modern result of a demand for reflexivity in various spaces of everyday life, such as the workplace, the community, or consumer culture, in order to understand the “habitus as a continuum of actions”, ranging from rational or strategic choices through routinised to unconscious forms of action (Sweetman 2003: 538). In other words, dispositions are either being reinforced through encountering similar situations, or they are being transformed, adapted, if necessary. Several authors stress in this context the “negotiated [or discursive character of a] situation at the ground [i.e. interpersonal] level [of communication or interaction]” (Crossley 2001: 82; see also Bourdieu 1985). In the same token, Nash’s empirical description of an “educated habitus” (2002a), which he defines as a “set of mental dispositions to process symbolic information” (Nash 2002a: 45) must be understood as a reflective aspect of the habitus. However, it would definitely help the concept to stress more the “generative role of agency” (Crossley 2001: 96), i.e. to introduce the whole continuum of actions, ranging from rational making of plans and strategies through routines to completely autonomous because embodied forms of action, which would meet the need to take into account the “new demand for reflexivity” (Sweetman 2003; Atkinson 2010; Crossley 2001) in changing and interwoven societies.

individuals unconsciously adapt and internalise the culturally accepted ways to act (in terms of structural categories of class, gender or the various social fields). In Noble and Watkins's critique, this internalisation remains a "passive process" through "transmission, internalisation, inculcation and conditioning" (Noble/ Watkins 2003: 525; e.g. also Lahire 2003). A third criticism—related to the question of whether a change in the individual habitus is possible—concerns the possibility of social change. Most authors accept that "socio-analysis" implies a possibility to make actions conscious to the habitus, namely in situations where it is necessary to develop new facets (Crossley 2001; Bourdieu 1985). Thus—the argument goes—on the biographical level it might be correct that objective structures are reproduced, but on the ontological level this circular process can lead to social change: Crossley argues here that the current status quo in a given society is the "outcome of a historical process" (Crossley 2001: 92). This implies that Bourdieu's ideas on the reproduction rather than the innovation of objective structures, or social change, are, again, a "matter of emphasis" (ibid.) rather than ignorance of determinism.

5.1.4 Social Field and Practice

A social field is the concrete social sphere where action takes place; it is governed by objects of particular value or "power resources", particular "formal and informal norms" (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 3), whose entity forms a given social space. However, what is valuable, however, in a particular field is negotiated through power relations. But these power relations are naturalised, and thus accepted as pre-existing and taken for granted by the individual (Bourdieu 1986; e.g. also Savage/ Silva 2013; Crossley 2001). Thus, a social field can be defined as a "set of objective historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital)" (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 16). According to Bourdieu, fields are semi-autonomous, but there are homologies between them: in order to pursue their goals or strategies within a certain field, agents have to be capable of mobilising the forms of capital valuable in that specific context (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 127). At the same time, all fields are subordinate to the *field of power*, or the "field of symbolic or ideological production" (Bourdieu 1985: 731). In this particular field, social actors fight over the hierarchical order of subordinate fields as well as the resources

needed there (Softic 2016: 136). Bourdieu introduces the term in order to empirically grasp his observation that some social actors are able to apply their power resources; in particular symbolic capital not only in a particular social field but across all social fields and thus occupy particular powerful objective positions at a given time (Barlösius 2011: 112).

In line with one of his central issues, the distribution of power, Bourdieu denies altruistic behaviour: social actors pursue these strategies to maximise their possession and composition of capital in order to increase their chances to define what is valuable or legitimate in a particular field or the given social space as such. The interviewees' civic engagement takes place in the political field. Softic defines the political field as the „arena, in which the intrinsic value of resources, but also their distribution is at least negotiated” (Softic 2016: 139). In this context, Bourdieu states that—as in any other social field—in the political field, borders between established and lay social actors preventing the latter from reaching dominant positions in the respective field (Bourdieu 2013: 42). With regard to immigrants entering the political scene, it can be assumed that they face obstacles with regard to the forms of capital, the required experience and the knowledge they own, i.e. their particular habitus. As outlined above, social fields provide the arena for struggles over the legitimacy of these distinctions (Bourdieu 1985). The social order can be challenged within the schemes and expectations available to a particular individual or practical social group (Bourdieu 1985: 734; cf. also Dumais 2002) by applying subversive strategies in order to call the existing social order into question.

A main point of criticism regarding the concept of field is, again, its vagueness and, at times, its interchangeable use as both structure and mechanism (cf. Savage/ Silva 2013: 115), depending on the purpose it serves in the specific context. In the present study, I conceptualise the field as a structure and mainly concentrate on the social field as the actual arena where social struggles—i.e. struggles over an individual's or social group's objective position—are fought.

The habitus realises itself in a particular field, and in relation to that particular field by drawing on embodied dispositions as the basis for agency or social practice. Dispositions are understood as a general repertoire of options to act which the individual adapts to the concrete situation by filling them with content in every particular situational context (cf. Haste 1992: 30). By means of their power resources, social actors are provided with a “feel

for the game” (Bourdieu 1985: 727), because they accept the basic cultural principles or “objective structures” as given (ibid.). This *practical sense* comes with a “sense of place” (ibid.) or a “sense of limits” (Savage/ Silva 2013): learned dispositions function according to a practical logic, pre-consciously excluding unfamiliar or “unthinkable” practices from the repertoire of possible actions and reactions (Reay 2004). Because social actors “play” according to the “rules of the game”, they become accepted members of a social group; or, as Savage and Silva (cf. 2013: 113) put it, the realisation of an individual’s habitual dispositions is thus central to the maintenance of social space—“the game itself”. As a result, a qualitative distinction, a social hierarchy, between the different positions in a particular field can be established in social interaction because individuals “recognise [...] [them] as significant” (Bourdieu 1985: 730): social actors “*make* [emphasis added] the distinctions” (ibid.) through their actions.

5.2 THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

According to Bourdieu, a social actor occupies an objective position in relation to other social actors in a given society, the social space, depending on the different forms of capital they have at disposal. These resources are acquired in various contexts or fields in the life course and to a large extent their composition is determined by the individual’s objective position. However, an individual’s subjective positioning, again in relation to others, is not necessarily identical with their objective position in social space. However, the individual may present their position differently in the various contexts. Against this background, Bourdieu states that social actors aim at improving their objective position, and the field is the social arena to do so. In order to illustrate this, Bourdieu applies the metaphor of social actors playing a game, and their resources are their stakes. The social actors reproduce or modify their resources while playing that game, the social practice.

The analysis of habitual dispositions aims at understanding which power resources the interviewees—being immigrants or children of immigrants—have and perceive themselves to have at their disposal for taking part in everyday social interaction. The field analysis aims at understanding which of these power resources they regard as valuable, i.e. which resources they

mobilise in a particular (thematic) field. The analysis of social practice, finally, aims at revealing the interviewees' strategic use of their power resources in claiming a subjective position within a given field, and consecutively, a given social space, here: Israeli society. In the concrete social practice of the interview, the interviewees reproduce, yet, also modify their power resources.

In the present study, I assume that the interviewees, against the migration background of their families, refer to more than one cultural system when adapting to the objective structures of Israeli society referring to the cultural system they have been socialised in in their families. Their resources can be analysed along different dimensions: as it is the case with objective structures, there are also subjective structures, or power resources—habitus and forms of capital—that the interviewees have embodied prior to migration or in their immigrant families and in the Israeli context. These resources may be experienced as contradictory and mismatching or compatible. I assume that the interviewees bring the issue of resources up in their narratives as they reach the level of consciousness. In this context, I further assume that contradictions between the two cultural systems will at times rise to consciousness in the narratives. How the interviewees handle those contradictions and present them in their narratives is the content of analysis of social practice.

Bourdieu's concepts form the theoretical-methodological frame of the present study; they are not being applied separately but as an integrated framework. This integration aims at applying a holistic approach to the position of talking, as taken by the participants in the study. A framework of Bourdieu's concepts shall help to show that the interviewees do not act independently but in the context of their existence within a particular social space, Israeli society. Apart from Bourdieu and Wacquant (1996 [1992]),⁵ Nash (2002b) applies a "realist" framework examining habitual dispositions against their realisation in particular fields of practice. His framework aims at looking at the individuals, and their habitual dispositions in a given social

5 In this context, I am aware of the ambiguities and disruptions in Bourdieu's overall work. However, as Wacquant (1996 [1992]) argues, the development of the overall conception covers a period from the 1960s onwards and is dynamic in integrating new empirical insights as well as critique from colleagues (see Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 22-3).

space and from a holistic perspective. In a critique of education research, which in their eyes concentrates solely on Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital in order to better understand socio-economic inequality through the education system, Edgerton and Roberts refer to Nash's "structure-disposition-practice explanatory framework" (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 2) as an alternative approach.

In the present study, I have also decided to take a holistic approach. I will provide an analysis of the cultural context (objective structures) and of the individual dispositions (subjective structures) of the participants. Yet I will pay particular attention to how the two levels become linked in the particular situative context (social practice), i.e. which resources and strategies the interviewees apply and which goals they aim to achieve. The interviewees' subjective positioning can be contrasted with the analysis of their objective position in Israeli society. As a final step of the analysis, I aim at making statements about how they discursively construct their "sense of belonging" against their objective position as well subjective positioning. In other words, I will take the perspective of the interviewees and provide an analysis of how they actively position themselves in order to make sense of their position in Israeli society.

5.2.1 Analysis of Cultural Codes

A central issue in Bourdieu's concept of social space are cultural codes. As I have stated before, I claim that the analysis of (public) discourse in this context is of growing importance, or, as Adele Clarke and Keller put it, to look "beyond the knowing subject" (Clarke/ Keller 2014: para. 57). To determine the cultural codes in the form of public discourse the interviewees have embodied analytically in the interview material, I suggest here to apply a sociology of knowledge approach. Recent developments in the tradition of a sociology of knowledge have shifted the construction of knowledge from social to communicative (Keller 2011b). The approach provided by a sociology of knowledge allows to make statements about social processes of the (re-)production and institutionalisation of knowledge on the societal level and also about power relations in these processes. Gavriely-Nuri (2012) makes a similar suggestion with what she terms "discursive capital".

The Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) is based, among other things, on Foucault's theory of discourse,⁶ aiming at the analysis of the "discursive constitution of knowledge or [...] [analysing] regimes of power and knowledge" (Keller 2007: 1). Keller points here to the "emphasis on the active and interpretative efforts of social actors in the (re-) production and transformation of symbolic orders in discourses" (Keller 2011a: 36). Discourse is defined here as "statements and respective practices of statements [...] following the same principle of formation" (Keller 2007: 1); it is a "strategic game [...] [or] a battle" about the interpretative power" (ibid.)—a definition very similar to Bourdieu's definition of social space. In this regard, the approach also adapts Bourdieu's idea of symbolic battles over "the legitimacy of symbolic order" (Keller 2011a: 35). SKAD aims at capturing "contested social reservoirs of knowledge", in contrast to subjective sense-making; and it aims at capturing the "inter-discursive context", in contrast to looking at closed [...] semantic structures of text-based approaches (cf. Keller 2011a: 78). In detail, SKAD aims at making statements about social actors and their "subjective positions" (Keller 2011a: 73), their "power resources" (Keller 2011a: 74), their "ways of incorporation [of discourses]" (Keller 2011a: 73), "social contexts" (ibid.), "power effects in their everyday representation" (ibid.) as well as "[their] updating" (Keller 2011a: 74) through "processes of collective knowledge production" (ibid.).

In the present study, I will focus on the cultural codes the interviewees use as references to what they present as being common sense in Israeli society as well as the cultural codes they refer to as an alternative cultural system of reference against the migration background of their families—the reasons to do so will be analysed as suggested below. This includes an analysis of the interviewees' objective position, i.e. the position they talk from about the symbolic order of Israeli society. I will analyse the interviewees' subjective embodiment of objective structure along categories in order to "reconstruct[...] typical or typecasting elements of structure" (Keller 2011a: 79):

- the public discourse(s) the interviewees engage in,
- "patterns of interpretation" and
- "topoi" (ibid.), as well as

6 For an introduction into SKAD see e.g. Keller 2007.

- individual interpretation of these patterns.
- In a second step, I will analyse whether, and if so, how the interviewees reproduce these patterns of interpretation in practice, i.e. the interview situation, and for what purpose.

5.2.2 Analysis of Power Resources

Referring to the points mentioned above, I operationalise habitual dispositions as power resources. Those resources may then be applied by the interviewees in a particular field to claim a certain social position for themselves and to distinguish themselves from other individuals or social groups.

Previous empirical studies are generally rather vague in their operationalisation or practical application of Bourdieu's concepts. This is particularly true with regard to the exploration of habitual dispositions. However, there are a number of reasons for this vagueness. On the one hand, Bourdieu himself made very few comments on how to actually apply the concept in empirical research. To overcome this conceptual vagueness, some authors argue in favour of employing his concepts as a method rather than a theory (Reay 2004; 1995; Nash 1999; Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]).⁷ Reay, for example, sees the potential to "reveal the taken-for-granted inequalities embedded in everyday practices" in the concept of habitus (Reay 1995: 353). Accordingly, she defines it as a "method for analysing the dominance of dominant groups in society and the domination of subordinate groups" (Reay 2004: 436). Nash suggested applying the concept in order to "name [...] forms of classification, perception and discrimination", and thus try to explain social practice (Nash 1999: 177) to show the "ways in which the social world is in the body" (Reay 2004: 432). In a similar vein, Barlösius emphasises that Bourdieu's habitus functions as a system of classification in order to establish social distance or "distinction" (Barlösius 2011: 67; see also Bourdieu 1987 and Bourdieu 1985). Bourdieu's very conception of the habitus suggests that it is not derived from direct observation but rather indirectly: e.g. from the observation of practice and thus the realisation of habitual dispositions in a particular situation (Reay 1995; Nash 2002b; Rapoport/ Lomsky-Feder 2002). In doing so, the concept of habitus is being

7 This solution would erase at least some of the critique on the concept (see above).

made applicable through the analytical distinction between an individual's habitus and his or her lifeworld as the "stream of incoming experience" (Atkinson 2010: 8) which can be observed.

With regard to capital, Bourdieu suggested analysing the forms an individual owns in three dimensions: the individual's overall amount of capital, the composition of the various forms of capital and the time needed to accumulate this specific composition (Bourdieu 1987: 195-6).

Social capital is operationalised as more or less durable personal relations the interviewees are able to rely upon or hope to rely upon in the future. For the present study it is interesting to determine who the people behind these relations are, in particular what their objective position in Israeli society and relative position to the interviewees is, and what exactly the interviewees expect from being acquainted with these people, i.e. how the interviewees present their relationship with these individuals.

Cultural capital is operationalized as its three sub-forms: inherited or embodied (e.g. particular cultural skills and knowledge), objectified (e.g. school certificates) and institutionalised (e.g. titles) cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986; Bennett/ Silva 2011). Because of the migration background of the participants' families, I will place particular emphasis on embodied cultural capital.⁸ With regard to Bourdieu's remark about this being "Informationskapital" (see above), I will look at adaptive strategies (cf. Erel 2010) the interviewees may apply in order to make value of their families' cultural capital. I will also look at processes of incorporation of Israeli cultural codes made visible in the interviews. Guiding categories for the analysis of the interviewees' power resources are:

8 An alternative concept to cultural capital in the respective literature is literacy. Literacy is either conceptualised as "cultural literacy" (Schirato/ Yell 2000) or "political literacy" (Cassel/ Lo 1997), in the context of civic engagement understood in terms of particular "civic skills" (Verba et al. 1995). However, I prefer Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital to that of skills, mainly because this way I can show that and how this particular resource can be and is used by the interviewees in a strategic way.

- narratives about relevant past and present experiences,
- forms of capital,
- reflections about their objective position,
- future expectations,
- moments including socio-analysis: reflexivity, talking about unknown situations, qualifications etc.

In a second step, I will focus particularly on the analysis of how the participants in the study use these resources in the discursive practice of the interview situation. In this context, I will also look at how the participants position themselves in Israeli society as the social space under observation.

5.2.3 Analysis of the Field and Discursive Practice

As outlined above, habitual dispositions are realised in a particular field. Field analysis according to Bourdieu should be performed in three steps (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 136):

- relation of the field at hand to the field of power,
- objective position of actors and institutions in the field at hand,
- analysis of the social actors' dispositions.

I am particularly interested in how the interviewees apply their power resources against the background of their objective position in Israeli society and also in the strategies they pursue with the application of these resources in a particular context. I will analyse the use of resources with the help of Haste's considerations on lay theory (Haste 1992). The methodological strength of Haste's concept is linking a motivational approach with the discursive nature of arguments while speaking about this motivation. She argues for an approach which takes into account that and how meaning is negotiated in dialogue and discourse and against the background of a concrete social situation (Haste/ Torney-Purta 1992; see also Billig 1997; 1989). In this context, Haste criticises a concept which understands a person's belief —e.g. as suggested by approaches of authoritarianism— as a pattern that, once formed, is constant and more or less unchangeable and informed by an underlying principle (Haste 2004). Haste adapts Bourdieu's thinking as well as ideas from discursive psychology and suggests

understanding belief —similar to Bourdieu's habitual dispositions—as providing a “set of schemata and scenarios of how the world works and how the individual is located in that world” (Haste 1992: 28), which is actively developed and modified through social practice. She states that belief is not fixed, but relates to a) the situational context, and b) the public discourse in which the speaking individual is situated (Haste/ Torney-Purta 1992). A person's belief is, thus, seen as dialogue and discourse: people hold contradictory views and act within a social and cultural context that is negotiat(ed)(able) (*ibid.*; see also Billig 1989; Potter/ Wetherell 1987). Haste and Torney-Purta argue that those usually unquestioned or, as Bourdieu would say, “doxic” dispositions are brought into the sphere of discourse in the context of an interview situation. The particular situational context more or less forces the interviewees to justify their arguments.⁹

Social practice is operationalised as discursive practice in the context of the study. Haste (1992) argues on the basis of Bourdieu's thinking that the individuals can fill their dispositions with varying and even contradictory content—depending on their current goal in a given social interaction. The social actor's representation or line of argumentation thus has to be viewed against the background of the development of this repertoire of dispositions in the process of the development of the *habitus* (early and recent personal experiences and their individual processing) as well as the situational context (current events, the actual situation of realisation, argumentative goals or, to speak with Bourdieu, strategies, etc.).

In agreement with Bourdieu, I assume that by way of argumentation and justification the interviewees are more or less forced to consciously reflect upon those resources taken for granted in everyday life. I further assume that the interviewees strategically use these resources discursively as different communicative strategies—e.g. making a statement, justifying a past action, post-rationalising a past decision—in order to position themselves. I operationalise discursive practice as the line of argumentation presented in the interview narratives, including the analysis of justifications and possible contradictions between different sequences about the same issues or when speaking about different issues in the course of the interview. Guiding categories of analysis are:

9 As Haste (1992) shows with her study on lay theory, this must not necessarily be a discursive interview (Ulrich 1999).

In the present study, I aim at developing a material theory of how Israelis with an FSU family background who engage with an extreme right political party lingering between the discursive images of being a mainstream or a sectoral party, construct a *sense of belonging* to Israeli society.