

ward and, at the same time, possess the authority to terminate that status at its own choosing.”⁴⁶

Grasping the international system from the perspective of the English School, Bain essentially concludes that the application of a trusteeship principle may only find a place in a *universitas* of states, that is, states united around a common purpose, in pursuit of a recognised material objective, or in furtherance of a particular enduring interest. Yet given that some states rather resemble ‘a state of nature,’ Bain doubts their worth as arrangements of security.⁴⁷ In contrast, a *societas* of states, that is, states united in recognition of their mutual authority rather than the pursuit of a common substantive purpose (which according to Bain is where world affairs are more likely to be at present), offers little room for the application of the trusteeship principle *per se*. Therewith, Bain indirectly critiques the English School, including the Aberystwyth School’s conception of ‘security as emancipation’ and its associated responsibility of the community of states, as he concludes: “in a world where the fundamental ends of life remain unsettled, persons who are determined to act as if international society consists in a *universitas* of states are more likely to engender the insecurity that all too often accompanies moral crusading rather than lasting peace.”⁴⁸

2.1.3 The 2nd Generation: From Peace-Keeping to State-Building

The literature of the early 2000s notes that the first generation of UN missions in the 1990s was generally successful in terms of peace-keeping,⁴⁹ yet largely failed to achieve their goal of successfully transforming state institutions, which were hoped to ensure building *lasting* peace.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the debate gained momentum with the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent *War on Terror*, shifting the focus on ‘failed’ or even ‘rouge’ states as source for insecurity.⁵¹ The 9/11 attacks reinforced the underlying perception that poorly governed states constituted weaknesses in the fabric of international society. The ‘failed state’ shifted security thinking from focusing on concentrations of state power to

46 Bain, “Saving failed states,” p. 201.

47 Bain, “Saving failed states,” p. 198.

48 Bain, “Saving failed states,” pp. 203–4.

49 Virginia Page Fortna, *Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents’ choices after civil war* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008); Michael J. Gilligan and Ernest J. Sergenti, “Do UN Interventions Cause Peace?,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 2 (2008), <https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00007051>; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

50 Roland Paris, *At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790836>; Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave over?,” *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (1996).

51 Holger Stritzel and Sean C. Chang, “Securitization and Counter-Securitization in Afghanistan,” *Security Dialogue* 46, no. 6 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010615588725>; Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August (2005); Stephen van Evera, “Bush Administration, Weak on Terror,” *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 4 (2006), <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2006.00268.x>; Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005), <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00500.x>.

worrying about zones of state powerlessness, so-called “areas of limited statehood,”⁵² where threats such as transnational terrorism can incubate, transit, and exploit the interdependence of a globalized world for attacks.

According to Paul Roe, there was a need for ever greater engagement and expansion of the UN mission from limited peace-keeping missions to comprehensive peace-building interventions. This was based on the notion of the *internal security dilemma*,⁵³ that is, if peace-keeping missions failed, it was likely that former conflict parties (due to the mutual uncertainty about motivations) were likely to relapse into violent confrontation.⁵⁴

Roland Paris noted that in Angola, Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, or Bosnia, the rapid introduction of democratic elections either exacerbated old or sparked new conflicts. He noted, on the one hand, that the end of the conflicts in Croatia and Namibia was not brought about by the introduction of liberal institutions but by the withdrawal of Serbia and South Africa, respectively. On the other hand, in Latin America, such as in Guatemala, Nicaragua, or El Salvador, discontent grew as the economic liberalisation programme of the Bretton Woods institutions led to more poverty and inequality, thus reproducing the causes of the original conflict.⁵⁵

Overall, these setbacks were not attributed to intervention being the wrong approach *per se*, but to corruption or an overly traditionalist society hindering the preconditions for a functioning market democracy, such as good governance, a stable social and political order, the rule of law, accountability, a vibrant civil society, and responsible political parties.⁵⁶ In short, scholars and policymakers put it down to the fact that the conflict-ridden societies were much less “developed” than their Western role models.⁵⁷

This ‘insight’ led a second wave of failed states scholars, such as Roland Paris or Francis Fukuyama, to conclude the “Imperative of State-Building,”⁵⁸ that is, these conflict-ridden societies needed a more comprehensive approach to reconstruction. As the primary objective, international interventions still had to provide security, some degree of transitional justice via war crime tribunals and truth commissions, but after all they had to build robust administrative governance structures, mobilise civil society, provide justice and reconciliation, fight corruption, change political culture – basically, produce a completely new society. The state-building concept of this second generation carried two assumptions that, on the one hand, all states are ultimately functioning in the same way and, on the other hand, that an accomplished state would somewhat resemble the Western role models.

52 Thomas Risse, *Governance Without a State: Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

53 Heather Marquette and Danielle Beswick, “State Building, Security and Development,” *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 10 (2011), <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610565>.

54 Paul Roe, “The Intrastate Security Dilemma,” *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (1999).

55 Paris, *At war's end*, pp. 63–147.

56 Paris, *At war's end*; Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?”

57 Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000057>.

58 Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State-Building,” *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (2004), <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0026>.

To achieve those goals, Fukuyama argued that the order of peace-building had to be reversed: economic development and state structures had to be promoted first before political freedom could be introduced. Peacebuilders had “to abandon liberalization as a core element of peacebuilding in favour of establishing authoritarian regimes with international military and financial backing” and suppress “certain forms of political expression” in the target countries.⁵⁹ Thus, peace-keeping missions soon turned into *state-building* missions, which were understood to be more comprehensive: the growing conviction to transform state institutions, building stable political institutions of failed states were conceptualised as an Weberian approach,⁶⁰ relating to the “essence of stateness as the monopoly of the means of legitimate violence.”⁶¹ While earlier peace-keeping missions were regularly described as occurring on an ad hoc basis,⁶² the comprehensive transformation programmes for peace- and state-building required a much longer-term commitment than was envisaged for the first-generation of UN peace-keeping missions.⁶³

Moreover, the argument for more engagement seemed to be a simple solution to the debate on whether too much or too little state threatens human security: on the one hand, it was argued that a *deficit of statehood*, that is the collapse of state and controlling institutions would directly lead to insecurity in form of threats to the ‘human security’ of domestic populations and potentially to the security of the international community. On the other hand, it was argued that ‘too much state,’ in the form of power concentration in the hands of (semi-)authoritarian regimes with a lack of term limits and the absence of a functioning civil society would lead to threatening human security. Both perspectives, that is, whether too much and too little state was the cause, were based on the same underlying assumption: they deviated from its Western role model.

The ‘lessons learned’ of the second generation were applied to peace-building missions, such as the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES, 1996–1998), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999–today), and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999–2002), all of which exercised *full* administration functions. The new approach in these three transition missions was furthermore fundamental to the elaboration of Security Sector Reform (SSR), which was based on the belief that the necessary preconditions for human security are a

59 Paris, *At war's end*, 180, 209.

60 Jahn, “Liberal Internationalism,” p. 34. Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, “Rethinking Weberian Approaches to Statebuilding,” in Chandler; Sisk, *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding*, Vol. p. 10.

61 Wesley, “The state of the art on the art of state building,” p. 377.

62 Neta Crawford, “Decolonization Through Trusteeship,” in *Trustee for the Human Community: Ralph J. Bunche, the United Nations, and the Decolonization of Africa*, ed. Robert A. Hill and Edmond J. Keller (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010), p. 109; Tom Parker, *The Ultimate Intervention: Revitalising the UN Trusteeship Council for the 21st Century* (Sandvika, 2003), accessed 29 July 2019, available from www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/centre-for-european-and-asian-studies/pdf/03-03the_ultimate_intervention.pdf, p. 3; James Crawford, *The creation of states in international law*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), p. 601.

63 Paris, *At war's end*, p. 177.

functioning state and accountable institutions.⁶⁴ At the same time, SSR suggested that security is after all a political interdependent process that goes beyond the traditional spheres of security such as the military and the police. Thus, what had begun as a series of UN peace-keeping operations turned into a debate on peace-building, only to become a discussion on market- and state-building missions,⁶⁵ in the belief that a strong civil society and a developed economy was the path to stability.⁶⁶ Though state-building interventions (both as a principle and as a means to achieve their goals) remained highly controversial, in practice, they were considered a necessity without an alternative.⁶⁷

2.1.4 The 3rd Generation: Colonial Reminiscence

The hope that state-building missions would lead to a permanent transition to market democracy and, consequently, establish enduring peace ultimately proved to be a disappointment. Barnett Rubin noted that even long-term commitments such as in Afghanistan never managed to put an end to insurgency to establish sustainable market democracies or hamper the influence of the Taliban.⁶⁸ Similarly, the intervention in Iraq led to insurgency, increased crime and insecurity, and political instability – not only in the domestic sphere but for the entire region.⁶⁹ Similarly, David Lake holds that interventions neither led to an increase in state capacity,⁷⁰ nor in the durability of those states in the future.⁷¹ In the mid-2000s, this insight was the focus of a third generation of scholars and policymakers, whose criticism was directed at the Western-centric normativity of interventions.

Post-Liberal Critique

The United Nations' guiding principles, which served as a blueprint for a wave of peace- and state-building missions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, received much criticism

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- 64 See Paris' review of the literature at Roland Paris, "Human Security," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001): 91.
- 65 Oliver P. Richmond, "Rescuing Peacebuilding? Anthropology and Peace Formation," *Global Society* 32, no. 2 (2018): 224, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2018.1451828>.
- 66 Crawford, "Decolonization through Trusteeship," pp. 106–7.
- 67 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*, Security and governance series (London: Routledge, 2010).
- 68 Barnett Rubin, "Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006).
- 69 Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States in a World of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2002), <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033245>; Jennifer Milliken, ed., *State failure, collapse and reconstruction*, Development and change book series (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003); Bain, "Saving failed states."
- 70 David A. Lake and Christopher J. Fariss, "Why International Trusteeship Fails," *Governance* 27, no. 4 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12066>.
- 71 David A. Lake, "Coercion and Trusteeship," in *The Oxford handbook of governance and limited statehood*, ed. Thomas Risse, Tanja A. Börzel and Anke Draude, 1st ed., Oxford handbooks (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 304; Lisa Hultman, Kathman Jacob D., and Megan Shan-non, "United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Civil Conflict Peace," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33, no. 3 (2016).