

region. A dozen newspapers run by Kashmiris or refugees from Jammu and Kashmir had offices located in the border districts of Punjab, which are within Punjab. This made timely news collection impossible. Bhat (1956) records how strict censorship was enforced on newspapers and how the non-conformists were tactically punished.

Puri (2009) writes that even today, candidates desirous of contesting elections must sign a declaration reaffirming their commitment to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. A report from Amnesty International records that thirty-two JKLF leaders were barred from contesting the polls for refusing to sign the declaration and were arrested while holding a protest rally. Economic and political underdevelopment, weak political institutions, and legal restrictions on freedom of association have undermined the development of civil society. The sensitive geography of the state is often used to limit the state for democratic reforms of contention. The maintenance of public order ordinance, which prohibits activities prejudicial to public safety, is frequently invoked to deter and suppress opposition.

Asif (2007) argues that Islamabad's relationship with Muzaffarabad is based on control rather than autonomy, with negative consequences for political and economic development. Although the patron-client nature of the relationship has structured political competition and rewards political compliance from local political actors, the relations between Islamabad and Muzaffarabad are far from frictionless.

Pakistan and Kashmiri Nationalism

The Pakistani position on Kashmiri nationalism is exceedingly determined by ethnic nationalism, determined through a rigorous religious commonality and filtered through socio-cultural traditions of the past and the present. The mainstream Pakistani position takes heavily from the group's common origin and connections formed by blood ties and relies heavily on the sense of uniqueness. This is done by valorising particular Islamic cultural attachments to capture the social base of the group, in this case, Kashmiris.

Thus, religion is used to reinforce the unity of commonality of statehood and nation.

In the case of Pakistani nationalism, the national consciousness developed outside the rational, political units of modernity. The resulting national conscience was all-encompassing religious. On the other hand, Kashmiri nationalism was evolving more as a fluid apolitical consciousness, where national consciousness arose first, only to be enclosed in the politico-territorial form later. There is a marked difference in expression, with Pakistani nationalism hugely relying on mutually exclusive forms of cultural homogeneity.

In civic Kashmiri nationalism, cultural standardisation was achieved through a particular level of communication and education. However, the Pakistani state ensured cultural standardisation was not achieved through education-oriented high culture. So, the political elite developed a populist language driven by a seduction of myths and memory, curating a shared memory and a shared destiny. The more the repression against the high culture, the more it compensated with an overzealous insistence on popular culture. Hence, cultural standardisation was achieved through overtly religious ethnie to ensure homogeneity.

The control dynamics are thus manifested and prolonged through cultural values, in this case, religion. Therefore, ethnicity influences nationalism and determines the nature and character of a particular nationalism. The commonality of religion lends a widespread appeal to nationalism, and appealing to the elements unique to the group gives the entire situation an emotional nature. The Pakistani state was created through a preexisting territory, and nationality was embodied in the territory. However, the provision for creating a new territory doesn't exist. Nationality is wholly embodied in the individuals who cannot move in and out of the preexisting national space.

To legitimise its presence in PCK, the Pakistani position has strategically imposed that the relationship between the two units is bounded by genealogical descent. Thus, national identity is defined as a perennial feature within the theory of Pakistani nationalism and reflects the populist nature of ethnic nationalism. Like other ethnic nationalisms, the Kashmiri population was kept out of the high culture. Only the Punjabi

elite could participate in manipulating the masses for mobilisation. As such, mobilisation could only occur with the tools available or via methods that would compensate for the tools unavailable, such as the necessary economic and political institutions. Using compensatory tools often meant the uniqueness of the people themselves – characteristics they regarded as distinguishing themselves from others. The peripheral elites had no option but to try and satisfy such demands by taking things into their own hands. Elite manipulation then served to crystallise mass discontent.

At every step, the relationship of Pakistani nationalism to Kashmiri nationalism is that of repressed existential envy and negativity. As it is, nationalisms born out of reaction are marked by profound ambiguity and ambivalence. This forced relation also meant that the elite group had to fit their social character in a desired social form to make their involvement natural and legitimate. This required mobilising the masses to meet a narrative, not just their demands. Just as they needed a shortcut toward a high culture, they also needed a shortcut to a history that would legitimise this nationalism. Forcing this process of development and creating a high culture and history due to necessity suggests that the role of the elite in more ethnic-oriented nationalisms was more conscious and manipulative. This further indicates a requirement to rise above the law, which is why ethnic nationalism is seen to sometimes act as a bulwark to liberal democracy and lend itself more readily to authoritarian rule.

Pakistan's Irredential Claim and Kashmiri Nationalism

This section focuses on how Pakistan's Kashmir policy works as an external factor for Kashmiri nationalism. The policy is primarily embedded in the context of negative imagery. The basis of Pakistani nationalism was never territorial; rather, it emerged from community separatism and religiously derived nationality. The proponents of Pakistan neither occupied the land they demanded nor had ever lived together in the past. At the time of the formation of the Pakistani state, the state power was re-