7. Calibration: Preparing the data for the cross-national analysis

The aim of this chapter is to transform the raw data presented in the previous two chapters into a binary dataset, a prerequisite for analysis using csQCA. To do so, it is necessary to define thresholds of set membership for all conditions and the outcome, in particular the so-called threshold of indifference, which demarcates set membership from non-membership. In the dataset, membership and non-membership are coded as 1 and 0, respectively.

7.1 The outcome: Government participation

In most cases, it is rather obvious whether a party is in government or in opposition. The definition of government coalitions presented in Chapter 4, however, shows that the situation can be less clear when it comes to support for minority governments. This study has established that parties which endorse minority governments should also be considered as members of the government if their support is permanent, publicly acknowledged, and mutually agreed upon. Hence, the outcome (GOVPART) is coded as present if radical right parties are either junior partners in a government coalition or they meet these criteria while supporting a minority government. If they do not fulfil these criteria, then radical right parties are considered non-members of the set of radical right parties in government, regardless of whether or not they back the government in individual parliamentary votes. Table 7.1 provides an overview of radical right parties' participation in government in Central and Eastern Europe and the corresponding membership score.

Between 1990 and 2020, the radical right has entered government in almost every country where it gained representation in parliament. The only exception is the Czech Republic, where none of the three radical right parties have participated in a coalition so far. In 22 out of a total of 48 cases, the radical right is in the set of government participants. Thus, once Central and Eastern European radical right parties gain seats in parliament, they participate in government almost half of the time. These data dispel the common knowledge that radical right parties are pariahs.

Table 7.1: Government participation of radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe (GOVPART)

Country	Formation year	Party	Status	Set membership
Bulgaria	2005	Ataka	Opposition	0
	2009	Ataka	Support party of a single-party minority government	1
	2013	Ataka	Opposition	0
	2014	Ataka	Opposition	0
		PF	Support party of minority coalition	1
	2016	Ataka	Opposition	0
		PF	Support party of minority coalition	1
	2017	UP	Junior partner in a majority coalition	1
Czech Republic	1992	SPR-RSČ	Opposition	0
	1996	SPR-RSČ	Opposition	0
	2013	Dawn	Opposition	0
	2017	SPD	Opposition	0
Estonia	1992	ERSP	Junior partner in a majority coalition	1
	2015	EKRE	Opposition	0
	2016	EKRE	Opposition	0
	2019	EKRE	Junior partner in a majority coalition	1
Hungary	1998	MIÉP	Opposition	0

Latvia	2010	NA	Opposition	0
	2011	NA	Junior partner in minority coalition	1
	2014a	NA	Junior partner in majority coalition	1
	2014b	NA	Junior partner in majority coalition	1
	2016	NA	Junior partner in majority coalition	1
	2018	NA	Junior partner in majority coalition	1
Poland	2001	LPR	Opposition	0
	2003	LPR	Opposition	0
	2005	LPR	Support party of a single-party minority government	1
	2006	LPR	Junior partner of a majority coalition	1
Romania	1992	PRM	Support party of a single-party minority government	1
		PUNR	Support party of a single-party minority government	1
	1994	PRM	Support party of a minority coalition	1
		PUNR	Junior partner in a minority coalition	1
	1996	PRM	Opposition	0
		PUNR	Opposition	0
	1999	PRM	Opposition	0
		PUNR	Opposition	0
	2000	PRM	Opposition	0
	2004	PRM	Opposition	0
	2007	PRM	Opposition	0

Slovakia	1992	SNS	Junior partner in a majority coalition	1
	1994	SNS	Junior partner in a majority coalition	1
	1998	SNS	Opposition	0
	2006	SNS	Junior partner in a majority coalition	1
	2010	SNS	Opposition	0
	2016a	SNS	Junior partner in a majority coalition	1
		ĽSNS	Opposition	0
	2016b	SNS	Junior partner in a majority coalition	1
		ĽSNS	Opposition	0
	2020	ĽSNS	Opposition	0

Source: Own compilation.

7.2 The context factors: Bipolar opposition and fragmentation in the party system

Bipolar opposition describes a situation where two political camps are so deeply divided that including a party from the opposing camp in a government coalition would be impossible. The impact of bipolar opposition on government formation is determined by whether or not the radical right and the formateur are in the same camp. The condition SAMESIDE combines both aspects. If bipolar opposition is present and radical right parties are in the same camp as the formateur, then they are coded as members of the SAMESIDE set. Thus, if there is no bipolar opposition or if bipolar opposition exists but the radical right party is not in the formateur's camp, then the set membership is 0. Empirically, the calibration of this condition builds on the qualitative assessment of party system configurations derived from the secondary literature discussed in the country case studies (see Chapters 5 and 6).

The second contextual condition accounts for the fragmentation of party systems (FRAG). The data for this condition is available on a metric scale, but there is no commonly used, qualitative threshold to delineate fragmented party systems from compact ones. In such cases, the calibration of set membership must resort to using the empirically observed data, which is the least preferable option. The distribution of the data as well as the mean or median can serve as starting points for the calibra-

tion. They should not be used as the only source for defining the threshold of indifference, however, since this would make thresholds very sensitive to case selection. Instead, the empirical data should be examined in light of the concept it is supposed to measure (Berg-Schlosser and Cronqvist 2012, 197–98; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 33–35).

In this study, the fragmentation of party systems serves primarily as an indicator of the complexity of the bargaining environment from a numerical-structural perspective. The fragmentation in the empirically observed cases ranges from a minimum of 3.2 to a maximum of 6.4 effective parliamentary parties (see Table 7.2). The median and the mean are both at 4.4, which is a rather high value in the context of European party systems (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2018). This observation suggests that the line between fragmented and compact party systems should be drawn below, rather than above, this value. The data shows that there are only two cases with a value near four effective parties. Apart from these two cases, there is a relatively large gap between 3.6 and 4.2 effective parliamentary parties in the data. The complexity of the bargaining situation in the cases in this area shall be examined in more detail. This investigation will assess the bargaining situation from a purely numerical perspective based on the effective and total number of parliamentary parties. The analysis starts with the cases that constitute the lower and upper boundaries of the gap. These include Poland in 2001 and Romania in 2000, as well as the Czech Republic in 1996 and Estonia in 2019. It then turns to the cases within the gap, Latvia and Slovakia in 2010.

The 2001 Polish parliament and the 2000 Romanian parliament show a fragmentation score of 3.6 effective parliamentary parties. The winner of the 2001 Polish parliamentary elections came very close to a majority and could have chosen between any of the five other parties to form a two-party majority coalition. A majority government without the dominant party would have required all of the other parties to cooperate. The result of the 2000 Romanian parliamentary election created a similar bargaining situation. The five-party parliament was dominated by a single party that controlled almost twice the number of seats as the runner-up and could have formed a majority coalition with any of the other parliamentary parties. Despite five and six potential minimal winning coalitions, respectively, the value of 3.6 effective parliamentary parties reflects a moderately complex bargaining situation in both cases. Hence, the threshold of indifference should be set above this value.

The two cases with 4.2 effective parties, the Czech Republic in 1996 and Estonia in 2019, constitute the upper boundary of the gap. The 1996 Czech parliament consisted of six parties, two of which were relatively strong and able to form a majority coalition, either with each other, or with at least two of the smaller parties. In total, the parties could have formed eight different minimal winning coalitions, leaving every party with two or more options to enter government. In the Estonian case, there were only five parties in parliament but the seats were distributed more evenly

with 34, 26, 19, 12 and 10, respectively. Thus, the strongest party could have formed a majority coalition with either the second or third strongest party. The parties in second and third place, however, did not control enough seats to form a majority without one of the two small parties. Thus, even though there were only five possible minimal winning coalitions, most parties had more than two options for getting into power. Thus, the fragmentation score of 4.2 reflects rather complex bargaining situations, suggesting that the threshold should be set below this value.

Therefore, the focus turns to the two cases that lie within the gap. In 2010, Latvia elected a five-party parliament with a fragmentation score of 3.9. Three of the parliamentary parties were relatively strong, holding 33, 29 and 22 seats out of a total of 100, while the other two were small with eight seats each. This constellation creates a moderately complex bargaining situation with only three possible minimal winning coalitions: The strongest party could form a majority coalition with either the second or the third strongest party, or the second and third strongest parties could govern together. All other coalitions are either short of a majority or oversized. Even though the distribution of seats is somewhat similar to the case of Estonia in 2019, the bargaining situation in Latvia is less complex because, from a purely office-seeking perspective, the two small parties are irrelevant for government formation. Thus, the fragmentation score of 3.9 effective parliamentary parties reflects a moderately complex bargaining situation.

In 2010, Slovakia had 4.0 effective and six actual parliamentary parties. One of the six parliamentary parties was relatively close to a majority, holding 62 of the 150 seats, and one very small party held only nine seats. All of the remaining parties were large enough to form a two-party majority coalition with the strongest party. Thus, the strongest party could choose between four possible partners to form a majority government. Alternatively, a coalition of all four medium-sized parties could have controlled a majority, thus allowing for a total of five possible minimal winning coalitions, which makes the bargaining situation somewhat more complex than in the Latvian case. However, it resembles the situation in Romania and Poland in 2000 and 2001, respectively, where coalition bargaining involved two scenarios and thus only a moderate level of complexity, suggesting that the Slovak case should not be considered as a member of the set of fragmented party systems.

Hence, cases are members of the set of fragmented party systems (FRAG), if the number of effective parties exceeds 4.0. Cases with four or less effective parliamentary parties are considered non-members of the set. Table 7.2 presents the data and the membership scores of the individual cases in the sets of the two context conditions (SAMESIDE and FRAG). The table shows that the calibration has resulted in a rather uneven distribution of both conditions. Radical right parties are on the same side of a bipolar opposition as the formateur in only 15 of the 48 cases, and the party systems show a low level of fragmentation in only 13 cases. Nevertheless, the

diversity of the observed cases with regard to both conditions is still high enough to include them in the analytical model.

The table also reveals that there are somewhat stable patterns in the configuration of the party systems in some countries. All four Czech cases, for instance, are characterised by the absence of a bipolar opposition and high levels of fragmentation, even though they refer to different radical right parties in different periods. The Estonian party system shows a similar configuration, even though the absence of a bipolar opposition is based on different reasons than in the Czech Republic. Almost all Latvian cases, in contrast, are characterised by high levels of fragmentation and the radical right is located on the same side of the bipolar opposition in the party system as the formateurs. Hence, it might well be that the explanatory patterns to be analysed in the following chapters reflect these country-specific patterns to some degree (Müller, Bergman, and Strøm 2008, 19–20).

Table 7.2: Configuration of the party system: Bipolar opposition and fragmentation

Country	Formation year	Bipolar opposition in the party system (SAMESIDE)		Fragmentation (FRAG)	
		Description	*Set membership*	*Effective number of parties*	*Set membership*
Bulgaria	2005	Regime divide has largely disappeared; government formation was not constrained by bipolar opposition	0	4.8	1
	2009	Emerging bipolar opposition between BSP and GERB based on affective polarisation; coalitions across camps were already impossible	1	3.3	0
	2013	Strong bipolar opposition between BSP and GERB based primarily on affective polarisation; coalitions across camps were impossible; radical right party and formateur not in the same camp	0	3.2	0
	2014	Strong bipolar opposition between BSP and GERB based primarily on affective polarisation; coalitions across camps were impossible	1	5.1	1
	2016	Strong bipolar opposition between BSP and GERB based primarily on affective polarisation; coalitions across camps were impossible	1	5.1	1
	2017	Strong bipolar opposition between BSP and GERB based primarily on affective polarisation; coalitions across camps were impossible	1	3.4	0
Czech Republic	1992	Socio-economic divide was most salient, but other salient divides existed; no clear-cut bipolar opposition and ODS as a dominant party	0	4.8	1
	1996	Socio-economic divide was most salient, but other salient divides existed; no clear-cut bipolar opposition	0	4.2	1
	2013	Multi-polar oppositions in the party system	0	6.1	1
	2017	Multi-polar oppositions in the party system	0	4.8	1

Estonia	1992	Unipolar party system; most parties held similar positions on the dominant ethno-linguistic divide	0	5.9	1
	2015	Opposition along aligned socio-economic and socio-cultural divides in the party system, but coalitions across camps were possible	0	4.7	1
	2016	Opposition along aligned socio-economic and socio-cultural divides in the party system, but coalitions across camps were possible	0	4.7	1
	2019	Opposition along aligned socio-economic and socio-cultural divides in the party system, but coalitions across camps were possible	0	4.2	1
Hungary	1998	Bipolar opposition between national-conservative and left-liberal camps; coalitions across camps were impossible	1	3.5	0
Latvia	2010	Strong bipolar opposition along primary ethnic divide and reinforced by congruent socio-economic divide; coalitions across camps were impossible	1	3.9	0
	2011	Strong bipolar opposition along primary ethnic divide and reinforced by congruent socio-economic divide; minor trend towards coalitions across camps, but they remain impossible	1	4.5	1
	2014a	Strong bipolar opposition along primary ethnic divide and reinforced by congruent socio-economic divide; coalitions across camps are not possible	1	4.5	1
	2014b	Strong bipolar opposition along primary ethnic divide and reinforced by congruent socio-economic divide; coalitions across camps are not possible	1	5.1	1
	2016	Strong bipolar opposition along primary ethnic divide and reinforced by congruent socio-economic divide; coalitions across camps are not possible	1	5.1	1
	2018	Strong bipolar opposition along primary ethnic divide and reinforced by congruent socio-economic divide; coalitions across camps are not possible	1	6.4	1

Poland	2001	Regime divide was decreasing but still present; emerging multi-polar oppositions in the party system; radical right party and formateur not in the same camp	0	3.6	0
	2003	Regime divide was further decreasing; multi-polar oppositions in the party system are increasing	0	3.6	0
	2005	Rapidly increasing affective polarisation between PO and PiS; coalitions across camps were already impossible	1	4.3	1
	2006	Consolidated bipolar opposition between PO and PiS based on affective and ideological polarisation between the parties; coalitions across camps were impossible	1	4.3	1
Romania	1992	Bipolar opposition based on the regime divide; coalitions across camps were impossible	1	4.8	1
	1994	Bipolar opposition based on the regime divide; coalitions across camps were impossible	1	4.8	1
	1996	Bipolar opposition based on the regime divide; coalitions across camps were impossible; radical right party and formateur not in the same camp	0	4.3	1
	1999	Regime divide began to thaw; coalitions across camps became possible	0	4.3	1
	2000	Regime divide began to thaw; coalitions across camps became possible	0	3.6	0
	2004	Regime divide had largely disappeared; no bipolar opposition	0	3.4	0
	2007	Regime divide had largely disappeared; no bipolar opposition	0	3.4	0

Slovakia	1992	Federal question was dominant, but not polarised; government formation was not constrained by bipolar opposition	0	3.2	0
	1994	Moderate bipolar opposition between pro- and anti-Mečiar camps, involving issue-based and affective polarisation; coalitions across camps were still an option for some parties	0	4.4	1
	1998	Strong bipolar opposition between a pro- and anti-Mečiar camps, involving issue-based and affective polarisation; coalitions across camps were impossible; radical right party and formateur not in the same camp	0	4.8	1
	2006	Moderate bipolar opposition along reinforcing socio-economic and socio-cultural divides; coalitions across camps were possible	0	4.8	1
	2010	Strong bipolar opposition between a national-protectionist and liberal-conservative camp, reinforced by an affective dimension resulting from Fico's controversial personality; coalitions across camps were impossible; radical right party and formateur not in the same camp	0	4.0	0
	2016a	Multi-polar oppositions in the party system	0	5.7	1
	2016b	Multi-polar oppositions in the party system	0	5.7	1
	2020	Multi-polar oppositions in the party system	0	4.4	1

Source: Own compilation; for data on bipolar opposition, see Chapters 5 and 6; data on fragmentation: Casal Bértoa 2021, amended by the author.

7.3 Characteristics and preferences of radical right parties

The last step is to calibrate the party-level factors, which include the socio-economic and socio-cultural distance between radical right parties and the formateur, and radical right party's parliamentary strength. The seat shares of the radical right parties in the dataset range from 3.6 per cent for the Hungarian MIÉP in 1998 to almost 25 per cent of the seats in case of the Romanian PRM in 2000 (see Table 7.3). The median is 8.7, the mean 9.5 per cent of the seats, which reflects the radical right's modest, average electoral results in Central and Eastern Europe. The literature identifies single- versus double-digit electoral results as a criterion for distinguishing large radical right parties from their less successful counterparts (Fagerholm 2021). While ultimately one seat more or less may not make much difference from a mathematical perspective, crossing this barrier serves as a certain landmark for small parties and strengthens their bargaining position at least psychologically. Therefore, radical right parties are considered to be members of the set of large parliamentary parties (SEATS) if they control at least ten per cent of the seats in parliament. Below that threshold, they are not considered to be members of this set.

The socio-economic and socio-cultural positions of radical right parties and formateurs are measured with a similar indicator—the LRECON and GALTAN party scores in the CHES (see Chapter 4.4). Therefore, the calibration of the two conditions of socio-economic (LRECONPROX) and socio-cultural proximity (GALTANPROX) between radical right parties and the formateur can be discussed together. The CHES scores range from zero to ten and entail a qualitative threshold at a value of five, which separates the socio-economically left from the right and the socio-culturally liberal from nationalist-authoritarian positions, respectively. Therefore, one option would be to consider radical right parties and formateurs ideologically proximate, if they are positioned on the same side of this qualitative threshold. When doing so, however, even a difference of almost five points between a radical right party and a formateur could still be regarded as ideological proximity if the formateur is positioned just above five and the radical right party close to ten. Conversely, two parties that hold centrist positions but are situated on either side of five would not be regarded as members of the set of ideologically proximate parties. Hence, calibrating set membership only on the basis of this threshold could lead to membership scores that do not adequately reflect the ideological distance between radical right parties and the formateur.

Table 7.3: Parliamentary strength and ideological positions of Central and Eastern European radical right parties

Country	Formation year	Party	Parliamentary strength (SEATS)		Socio-economic proximity (LRECONPROX)		Socio-cultural proximity (GALTANPROX)	
			Seat share	*Set membership*	*Ideological distance* (0–10)*	*Set membership*	*Ideological distance* (0–10)*	*Set membership*
Bulgaria	2005	Ataka	8.6	0	0.00	1	3.34	0
	2009	Ataka	8.6	0	**3.37**	0	2.36	1
	2013	Ataka	9.6	0	0.97	1	3.71	0
	2014	Ataka	4.6	0	**4.50**	0	2.74	0
		PF	7.9	0	**3.00**	0	1.40	1
	2016	Ataka	4.6	0	**4.50**	0	2.74	0
		PF	7.9	0	**3.00**	0	1.40	1
	2017	UP	11.3	1	**2.26**	0	2.43	1

Czech Republic	1992	SPR-RSČ	7.0	0	**4.00**	0	**5.50**	0
	1996	SPR-RSČ	9.0	0	**3.50**	0	**5.00**	0
	2013	Dawn	7.0	0	**2.62**	0	**3.28**	0
	2017	SPD	11.0	1	0.17	1	3.64	0
Estonia	1992	ERSP	9.9	0	1.00	1	1.00	1
	2015	EKRE	6.9	0	**3.56**	0	**5.54**	0
	2016	EKRE	6.9	0	0.81	1	2.91	0
	2019	EKRE	18.8	1	0.92	1	2.91	0
Hungary	1998	MIÉP	3.6	0	0.62	1	1.54	1
Latvia	2010	NA	8.0	0	1.45	1	**4.00**	0
	2011	NA	14.0	1	1.56	1	**4.50**	0
	2014a	NA	14.0	1	0.78	1	**4.50**	0
	2014b	NA	17.0	1	0.78	1	**4.50**	0
	2016	NA	17.0	1	0.44	1	0.86	1
	2018	NA	13.0	1	1.09	1	**3.68**	0

Poland	2001	LPR	8.3	0	2.25	1	**7.87**	0
	2003	LPR	8.3	0	2.25	1	**7.87**	0
	2005	LPR	7.4	0	0.83	1	1.00	1
	2006	LPR	7.4	0	0.83	1	1.00	1
Romania	1992	PRM	4.7	0	0.50	1	2.00	1
		PUNR	8.8	0	0.50	1	1.50	1
	1994	PRM	4.7	0	0.50	1	2.00	1
		PUNR	8.8	0	0.50	1	1.50	1
	1996	PRM	5.5	0	**4.00**	0	4.00	0
		PUNR	5.2	0	**3.00**	0	3.50	0
	1999	PRM	5.5	0	**4.00**	0	4.00	0
		PUNR	5.2	0	**3.00**	0	3.50	0
	2000	PRM	24.3	1	1.18	1	3.46	0
	2004	PRM	14.4	1	**5.30**	0	**5.40**	0
	2007	PRM	14.4	1	**5.30**	0	**5.40**	0

Slovakia	1992	SNS	10.0	1	0.50	1	1.50	1
	1994	SNS	6.0	0	0.50	1	1.50	1
	1998	SNS	9.3	0	**3.83**	0	**4.27**	0
	2006	SNS	13.3	1	2.14	1	2.14	1
	2010	SNS	6.0	0	**3.30**	0	4.07	0
	2016a	SNS	10.0	1	0.94	1	1.06	1
		L'SNS	9.3	0	1.00	1	1.93	1
	2016b	SNS	10.0	1	0.94	1	1.06	1
		L'SNS	9.3	0	1.00	1	1.93	1
	2020	L'SNS	11.3	1	**3.50**	0	2.84	0

Source: Own compilation; data on seat share: Nordsieck 2021; data on ideological positions: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Jolly et al. 2022), amended by the author's qualitative assessment based on secondary literature (see Chapters 5 and 6).

* Bold print indicates that the radical right party and the formateur occupy positions on opposite sides of the socio-economic or socio-cultural dimension, respectively.

Therefore, in addition to this qualitative threshold, the distance between these parties will be used to calibrate the LRECONPROX and GALTANPROX sets. If the radical right and the formateur are positioned on the same side of the socio-economic or socio-cultural dimension, respectively, they are considered to be members of the set of proximate parties if no more than 2.5 points separate them. If they are not positioned on the same side, the relative distance required to speak of ideological proximity is reduced to a maximum distance of 1.5 points in order to ensure that both parties indeed occupy centrist positions. Following this logic, the smaller range also applies if the radical right party, or the formateur, are positioned exactly at 5.00.

The distribution of cases in the SEATS set reflects the relative electoral weakness of radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Only in one-third of the cases did a radical right party control at least ten per cent of the seats in parliament. With the exception of Poland and the individual case in Hungary, set membership also varies within countries over time, even though certain country-specific patterns emerge. The Latvian NA, for instance, has controlled a large number of seats for most of its time in parliament, whereas radical right parties in Bulgaria usually remained below this threshold.

Membership in the LRECONPROX and GALTANPROX sets is more evenly distributed. Socio-economic proximity between the radical right and the formateur exists in 28 out of 48 cases and socio-cultural proximity in 19 out of a total of 48 cases. Given the radicalisation of mainstream parties and the dissemination of radical right politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Minkenberg 2013, 2017; Mudde 2018; Pytlas 2018), the relatively low number of cases in the GALTANPROX set is somewhat surprising. The membership scores in Table 7.3 also indicate that ideological proximity on one dimension does not necessarily coincide with proximity on the other, supporting the argument that these dimensions are best studied separately.

Now that the calibration of set membership is complete, the study can continue with the comparative causal analysis using QCA. As discussed in Chapter 4, this analysis will be performed separately for the period before and after the first third-generation elections.