

The Roles of Anger in Moral Courage

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Word of Gratitude

We were fortunate to work at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn, with Prof. Christoph Engel as director, from 2017 to 2022. During this time, as part of the Moral Courage Research Group at the institute, we devoted much of our research to understanding the roles of anger in moral courage. Our work was shaped by the intellectual environment that Prof. Engel created. His commitment to methodological rigor inspired us to employ economic games as a central tool for investigating moral courage, and his insistence on stringent theoretical formulation guided us in striving for precision and clarity in our work. These influences have left a lasting imprint on our approach and continue to shape the way we develop and conduct our research.

A. Introduction

Standing up against others' violations of social norms and moral principles can avert harm from individuals and contribute to the well-functioning of society. Yet, such displays of *moral courage* are rare (Baumert et al., 2013, 2024; Goodwin et al., 2020; Kemper et al., 2022). Accordingly, there is great scientific and applied interest in understanding the psychological barriers to moral courage and under which conditions individuals overcome them. Empirical work across disciplines has highlighted key roles that anger plays in moral courage (Eriksson et al., 2017; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Halmburger et al., 2015; Niesta Kayser et al., 2010; Sasse et al., 2022): First, anger experienced in reaction to an observed wrongdoing is a causal factor that “fuels” moral courage. Experienced anger is thought to shape information processing and decision making in ways that facilitate overcoming barriers to moral courage. Second, anger expression has been proposed as a low-cost form of intervention which might be employed strategically by witnesses of moral violations. Third, anger expression can accompany morally coura-

geous action, and these expressions are thought to shape its interpersonal effects, particularly how the action is judged by others.

In the present chapter, we (selectively) review existing evidence, discuss potential mechanisms for how anger exerts its influence on moral courage, and highlight open research questions. In sum, the research on the roles of anger in moral courage fosters our understanding of moral courage, but also refines how we think about anger as a functional emotion.

B. What is moral courage?

Moral courage (also termed “civil courage”, “Zivilcourage” or “courage civique”) manifests when initially uninvolved observers act to stop or redress the violation of social or moral norms committed by others despite risking incurring costs from intervening (Baumert et al., 2020; Osswald et al., 2010; Skitka, 2012). Examples of situations that afford moral courage are the unfair treatment of individuals, racism, sexual harassment, bullying, or corruption (Dungan et al., 2019; Goodwin et al., 2020; Kemper et al., 2022; Fischer et al., 2006; Pouwels et al., 2019). Morally courageous actions can take various forms, including verbal or physical confrontation, sanctioning the perpetrator, moving a victim to a safe space, or calling on authorities. Intervening in such ways can be costly for the individual who might experience physical harm, social isolation, or financial loss due to the perpetrator or others who react negatively to the intervention. Yet at the level of democratic societies, acts of moral courage by initially uninvolved witnesses are considered key for maintaining societal norms (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Yamagishi, 1986).

There are several related and partly overlapping concepts, such as high-risk helping (Fischer et al., 2006), social control (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005), and second-party punishment (Molho et al., 2020). Critically, in partial distinction from these concepts, moral courage pertains to situations that involve a norm violation perceived as unfair or immoral (rather than violations of descriptive norms) and reactions from initially uninvolved third-parties (rather than victims). As a core element, moral courage refers to acts of *defending* moral principles and social norms (Skitka, 2012), and is thereby distinct from helping, caring or other ways of *adhering* to moral principles (e.g., donating or volunteering; Greitemeyer et al., 2006).

The empirical investigation of moral courage often proves challenging. Assessing moral courage through self-reported intentions seems ill-suited since intentions do not necessarily translate into action (e.g., Kemper et al., 2022). Directly observing morally courageous behavior, instead, is difficult due to ethical constraints. Notably, moral courage is directly compatible with the concept of third-party punishment, and the so-called Third-Party Punishment Game (3PPG) provides a behavioral paradigm for studying (a variant of) the phenomenon. The 3PPG consists of a classic dictator game in which one person – under full anonymity – allocates resources between themselves and a recipient, with the addition of a third person who can intervene against the dictator’s decision through costly punishment. The 3PPG setting incorporates some of the defining features of a situation affording moral courage: If a dictator allocates resources very unequally, this is typically perceived as a violation of a fairness norm (Krupka & Weber, 2013), and, per design, the third person is not themselves affected by the dictator’s (unfair) allocation, but intervening is associated with costs. While the 3PPG lacks several features of “real-life” norm violations, such as the dynamic unfolding of social situations, ambiguity of the norm violation and uncertainty of possible costs (Toribio-Flórez et al., 2023), or a wide range of behavioral options (Pedersen et al., 2018), it offers a high degree of experimental control. This makes it an ideal starting point for investigating behavioral manifestations of moral courage and much of the work reviewed here on the roles of anger has relied on the 3PPG.

C. A causal role of anger in “fueling” moral courage

As an early indication of a potential key role of anger in the punishment of social norm violations, Fehr and Gächter (2002) demonstrated that participants in a public goods game tended to punish free-riders, even though punishment was costly and without any possible individual benefit to the punisher. Importantly, they found that participants reported more anger when free riding was more (vs. less) extreme, and anger was also generally expected as a reaction to free-riding. Based on these findings, Fehr and Gächter proposed that anger could be a proximate mechanism for the altruistic punishment of norm violators.

Addressing reactions from the perspective of an observer more specifically, several studies found a positive association between angry

reactions to an unfair allocation in a 3PPG and costly third-party punishment (e.g., Jordan et al., 2016; Molho et al., 2017). For example, Lotz and colleagues (2011) asked participants in the role of the third person to write a message to the (unfair) dictator, and the intensity of anger in these messages, as judged by independent raters, correlated with the level of costly punishment applied by the writer. Further studies in more complex “real-world” settings yielded similar findings. Using behavioral observation paradigms, for instance, we found unique positive associations between experienced anger and intervention against (staged) norm violations in the lab (Halmburger et al., 2015; Sasse et al., 2022). In a similar vein, dispositional anger proneness was found to distinguish between people who engaged in morally courageous action and those who did not (Baumert et al., 2025; Niesta Kayser et al., 2010).

Critically, these correlational studies cannot establish causality: Anger and punishment could be independent products of other psychological processes, such as perceptions of unfairness or harm. Experimental manipulation of anger is necessary to rigorously test for causality, but such manipulation poses exciting challenges. Emotion induction procedures can be grouped into two broad clusters: incidental and integral (Ferrer & Ellis, 2021). *Incidental emotion induction* rests on the assumption that emotional states “spill over” from one situation to a subsequent, unrelated situation. Some studies used incidental anger induction and found effects on third-party punishment (Gummerum et al., 2016; Rodrigues et al., 2020), yet only under certain (unpredicted) conditions. In our own research (Sasse et al., 2025), across five highly powered experimental studies, we were unable to replicate a causal effect of incidentally induced anger on punishment in the 3PPG.

In *integral emotion induction*, in contrast to incidental, a naturally occurring emotion is experimentally intensified or attenuated through modifications of situational features. It thus allows a close approximation of naturally occurring emotional processes in the situation of interest. At the same time, there is a risk of confounding other psychological processes with the target emotion. For instance, Nelissen and Zeelenberg (2009) manipulated anger in the 3PPG by varying the intentionality of an unequal allocation. Anger and punishment were higher when the act was intentional (vs. unintentional). Critically, an unequal allocation without intentional decisions might not be perceived as a norm violation, thereby confounding appraisals with the anger reaction. In three experimental studies, we aimed to overcome these challenges by manipulating anger

while holding the norm violation identical. For this purpose, we employed emotion regulation instructions (Sasse et al., 2025). Before presenting an unfair dictator decision to participants in the role of the third person in the 3PPG, we instructed them to regulate their emotions in specific ways: In one condition, they were told to focus on their emotional reactions and intensify them. In the other condition, they were told to focus on the facts and to retain a neutral mood. Results showed that in the former (compared to the latter) condition, anger was more intense, and third-party punishment was heightened. Notably, this induction procedure keeps the characteristics of the situation, most critically the unfairness, equal between conditions. Our analyses further confirmed that the effects of anger remained robust when perceived unfairness was statistically controlled for.

In sum, these experimental studies provide evidence for a causal role of anger in enhancing third-party punishment of unfair allocations. Interestingly, the pattern of results suggests that being angry does not lead to punishment in situations unrelated to the object that triggered the emotion. In other words, the motivational impact of anger does not seem to “spill over” to other situations. Rather, anger seems to motivate punishment in a goal-oriented fashion: rectifying the norm violation that has triggered the anger reaction.

D. How does anger facilitate moral courage?

With convincing evidence for a causal effect of anger on intervention against norm violation, the question follows how exactly anger exerts its impact. What are the psychological mechanisms by which anger “fuels” moral courage?

Existing process models of moral courage have not incorporated emotions explicitly. Several authors have built on the seminal model of helping in emergencies by Latané and Darley (1970) and proposed that in reaction to an observed norm violation, once it is detected and interpreted as such, processes of taking responsibility, choosing effective means, and appraisals of costs and risks should determine whether a witness intervenes or not (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014). Accordingly, *high* ambiguity, *low* perceived responsibility, *low* perceived efficacy, and *high* perceived costs and risks of intervening should be critical barriers to moral courage.

Integrating anger in process models of moral courage can be achieved based on the general assumption that emotion, information processing, and motivation are inherently interconnected. The characteristic appraisal pattern of anger involves the perception that standards of “what ought to be” are violated (Frijda, 1986; Ortony et al., 1988). A characteristic motivation consists of wanting to rectify such violation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007), even when the violation affects others rather than oneself (Hechler & Kessler, 2018). The theoretical and empirical background on anger suggests that anger functions to overcome barriers in the pursuit of rectifying a situation. For moral courage, this means that anger should facilitate intervention against norm violations, especially in situations that involve situational barriers.

At present, rigorous tests of the exact mechanisms of anger in “fueling” moral courage are still missing. We can only speculate that there are three plausible ways in which anger could exert its behavioral impact: First, anger could directly activate intervention behavior. Second, anger could modulate subjective appraisals such that situational barriers to intervention are perceived to be low. Third, anger could modulate the subjective relevance assigned to situational barriers in decision making. In other words, when deciding whether to intervene, angry (vs. less angry) individuals might be just as aware of barriers but weigh them less. Future experimental research could scrutinize how anger shapes or interacts with perceived barriers to intervention against norm violation. Such studies will work toward establishing a comprehensive understanding of the causal mechanisms of anger in moral courage.

E. Anger experience and anger expression in moral courage

To this point, we have discussed that *anger experience* can arise from the perception of a norm violation and provide the motivational “fuel” to act against it. Next, we want to turn to the roles of *anger expressed* in situations affording moral courage. While emotion expression is linked to and can follow spontaneously from emotion experience, this link is not perfect. For example, in an observational study in which participants were confronted with a norm violation in the lab (Sasse et al., 2022), we found that their anger experience (as assessed through in-situ self-report) and their anger expression (as assessed through video ratings) were only weakly associated. Possibly, anger expression sometimes oc-

curs in deliberate and strategic ways, rather than being a mere side-product of anger experience. Furthermore, in our study, anger expression and behavioral intervention against the norm violation were also weakly associated (Sasse et al., 2022). These findings suggest that anger expression can at times accompany explicit intervention, such as verbal or physical confrontation or sanctioning of a transgressor, but at other times, anger expression can occur as an only response to a transgression, potentially intended as a subtle form of intervention. In other words, anger expression might be employed in a social-communicative function intended to signal disapproval to other witnesses and the transgressor.

Here, we address two questions that follow from this line of thinking: First, do individuals sometimes choose anger expression deliberately as response to others' norm violations, and if so, with what goals? Second, what are the interpersonal effects of anger expression?

F. Anger expression as a subtle form of moral courage

Moral courage is usually operationalized through explicit behavioral reactions to norm transgressions, such as verbally or physically confronting a transgressor or sanctioning them financially. This approach disregards more subtle forms of communication that are characteristic of human interaction, where emotion expression plays an important role. The notion that emotion expression is regularly used for communicative purposes in human interaction is rooted in the social function of emotions. Expressed emotions carry information that others are able to decode. Others attribute emotion expressions to dispositional or situational origins, and these attributions shape how they think about and react to such expressions (Hareli & Hess, 2010; van Kleef et al., 2011). As such, expressed emotions fulfill an important role in social interactions that goes beyond the content of spoken words or behavioral acts. It stands to reason that emotions are – at times – expressed strategically, intended to communicate with and influence others (Sasse et al., 2018).

In the context of moral transgressions, uninvolved witnesses might express anger, not (just) because they feel angry, but because they want to signal to others (i.e., the perpetrator, the victim, or other bystanders) that they disapprove of the observed behavior. Moreover, if we consider anger expression in response to others' wrongdoings as a subtle form of moral

courage, witnesses might express anger with the intention to redress the norm violation or change a perpetrator's future behavior.

To explore potential intentions with which anger is expressed by witnesses of others' norm violations, we modified the 3PPG such that participants in the role of the third party could choose to react to an unfair allocation by imposing financial sanctions and/or by expressing anger by sending an emoji to the dictator (Sasse et al., 2024). Our results indicated that anger expression was more than a mere reflection of anger experience but was predicted by the perceived unfairness of the dictator's decision. Moreover, anger expression and financial punishment were associated with distinct goals that participants reported: Financial punishment was best explained by the goal of restoring fairness, whereas anger expression was tied to the goal of motivating behavioral change in the dictator.

These findings lend some support to the idea that anger expression may indeed be a distinct and subtle form of moral courage, but further empirical work, involving experimental designs and a broader range of potential goals is warranted.

G. Interpersonal effects of anger expression in moral courage

Since anger plays an important role in fueling moral courage, and could even be expressed strategically as a subtle form of moral courage, we need to ask: What are the interpersonal effects of anger expression in reaction to others' norm violations? So far, research has started to address this question with regards to the judgements of uninvolved people who learn about the situation.

In a study employing hypothetical descriptions of norm violations in which the perpetrator was confronted by a witness, Eriksson and colleagues (2017) found that participants judged the witness' behavior as more aggressive and less appropriate when the witness was described as angry (vs not described as angry). By contrast, a recent line of studies (Shen et al., 2025) revealed reputational gains for witnesses of moral violations who displayed anger. When a witness was described as displaying anger in these studies participants judged the witness to be more moral and trustworthy.

These diverging findings might be reconciled when considering the severity of the norm violation as a key boundary condition. Indeed, Eriksson et al. (2017) found that negative judgements of angry interveners

only occurred when transgressions were mild, but not when transgressions were perceived as more severe. In a similar vein, Shen et al. (2025) reported that the witness of a norm violation was judged more favorably when feeling angry in response to a moral norm violation, but more negatively when angry feelings occurred in a situation without any violation. So, potentially, morally courageous interveners might not incur reputational costs, or even have reputational gains when expressing anger towards severe, morally-relevant transgressions.

In our own work, we asked how angry intervention behavior would be judged if information on the initial transgression was incomplete. Think of the dynamic unfolding of social interactions in everyday life: You might join into a conversation among colleagues, when one colleague responds to the other, possibly in an angry tone “Hey, that’s not ok to say”. Obviously, you missed parts of the conversation in which a norm violation might have occurred, but you don’t know what exactly had been said. How do people make sense of and judge such behavior – and what role does anger expression play? Could anger expression serve as additional information to disambiguate that a norm violation has occurred?

To address these questions, we used an auditorily presented scenario and experimentally varied the ambiguity of the norm violation as well as anger expression during intervention. Participants overheard a conversation between two colleagues, similar to the example above. In the low ambiguity condition, participants heard how one colleague makes a homophobic statement and how the second colleague reacts to it. In the high ambiguity condition, participants only heard the second colleagues’ reaction; the actual norm violation was thus ambiguous for them. Depending on the anger expression condition, the second co-worker’s reaction consisted in a verbal reprimand that was emotionally neutral or in a very angry tone, or in a third variant there was no verbal reprimand at all. As expected, the colleague’s reaction shaped how participants judged the situation and determined in turn their support intentions. However, the perception of the situation as constituting a norm violation and support for the second colleague depended primarily on whether or not this colleague reprimanded, not how (i.e., whether in an angry or neutral tone), and this pattern of results was largely unaffected by ambiguity. At the same time, participants evaluated the colleague who reprimanded angrily as more aggressive and less positive than the colleague who did so in a neutral fashion or who did not reprimand at all. This suggests that the mode of intervening against a transgression (expressing anger or not)

might primarily affect how the intervener is judged, rather than how the situation is interpreted.

Further research is needed to gain a clearer understanding of the role of anger expression in morally courageous acts. Existing evidence suggests that there may be a fine line between reputational gain and reputational loss for an intervener who expresses anger, with outcomes depending on situational characteristics such as the severity of the transgression. Other potentially relevant factors include the social status of the transgressor relative to the intervener, the interpersonal relationship between perpetrator and victim, or shared group memberships among the people involved.

Notably, the studies reviewed here focused on the judgements of uninvolved others who learn about or overhear a situation. Yet, it seems plausible that individuals involved in the situation in other roles, such as the victim or the perpetrator of a norm violation may respond quite differently to angry intervention. For instance, for victims of norm violations anger expressed by third-parties might be a source of comfort and validation, and for perpetrators, it might lead them to reconsider their behavior or, to the contrary, react defensively and further escalate the situation. Previous research has addressed reactions to morally courageous intervention considering the perspectives of victims, perpetrators and uninvolved others (e.g., Jordan et al., 2016; Mahon, 2022). However, so far, research has not comprehensively addressed the specific role that anger expression could play for the effectiveness and reputational consequences of moral courage.

H. Conclusion

Our selective review in this chapter illustrates that anger plays multiple key roles in moral courage. First, there is ample correlational evidence that anger is a common emotional response in situations affording moral courage. Importantly, experimental studies demonstrate that anger experienced in response to norm violations can indeed causally contribute to promoting third-party punishment. Second, beyond anger as a motivational fuel, we also reviewed evidence suggesting that anger expression may constitute a subtle form of moral courage. In these cases, anger may serve goals distinct from those of behavioral intervention, such as communicating disapproval and prompting behavioral change in perpetrators. Third, anger expression in response to others' norm violations

shapes the interpersonal consequences of morally courageous intervention. Research on how such expressions of anger are judged and reacted to by others has mainly focused on further uninvolved bystanders and suggests that anger first and foremost shapes the perception of the intervener rather than of the situation, but also that effects may be highly context-dependent.

Thus, while our review shows the marked advances we have made in our understanding of the roles of anger in moral courage, it also provides a roadmap for future research: After having established a causal role of anger in “fueling” moral courage, more research is needed to understand the exact mechanisms through which anger exerts this effect. Furthermore, experimental research is needed to understand when and why anger expression is chosen as a means of intervention. Lastly, the contextual factors that shape judgements of and reactions to anger expression in situations affording moral courage need to be investigated to better understand when it helps and when it hurts.

The 3PPG has provided an ideal starting point to study costly third-party punishment of unfairness as a variant of morally courageous action, under high experimental control. To mimic aspects of “real-life” situations affording moral courage, the 3PPG lends itself to modifications, such as introducing ambiguity of the norm violation (Toribio-Flórez et al., 2023) or anger expression as an alternative behavioral option (Sasse et al., 2024). Nevertheless, on the road towards a comprehensive understanding of the roles of anger in moral courage, it will be necessary to scrutinize the generalizability of effects of anger experience and expression to the broad array of situations that afford moral courage in everyday life.

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