

Chapter II Ukraine's West as "Another Europe"

In this chapter our main focus is western Ukraine, with the city of Lviv as the perfect epitome of a peculiar and strong Galician identity. In particular, we analyse the cultural underpinnings of the 2012 European Football Championship as an illuminating manifestation of the multiplicity of cultural meanings, emanating from the westernmost part of Ukraine, along with European policy practices adopted at the local level. Our data consists of 25 in-depth expert interviews conducted in 2013–2014 with Lviv-based policy experts, municipal servants, cultural managers, journalists, intellectuals, artists, and entrepreneurs either involved in the organization of EURO 2012 or experienced in other EU–Ukraine projects in the past few years.

Western Ukraine is a good example of a borderland identity that embodies an authentic territorial spirit grounded in a strong European cultural legacy, while simultaneously proclaiming its "Ukrainianness". Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has called western Ukraine "the basis for Ukrainian statehood",¹²⁷ but what exactly stands behind this assessment?

Lviv: Playing with Multiple Meanings

There exist certain perceptual gaps between how international viewers perceive Lviv and its existence in domestic discourse. In the West, Lviv has a reputation as the home of Ukrainian nationalists who "try to push Ukraine toward another 'civilizational space' by promoting Polish culture, the Greco-Catholic Church, and anti-Byzantium discourse".¹²⁸ Some experts contend that, for example, the "Svoboda" party which originated in western Ukraine "combines a radical nationalism with elements of neo-Nazi ideology".¹²⁹ Others argue that western Ukraine's gravitation to, and self-identification with, Europe is not necessarily consistent with the key

127 *Gazeta.ru*, Poroshenko schitaet galichan osnovoi gosudarstvennosti Ukrainy.

128 *Korostelina*, Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine, P. 298.

129 *Katchanovski*, The Politics of World War II in Contemporary Ukraine, P. 214

tenets of democracy and the free market as "western nationalists have supported statist policies internally and protection externally, and there is no evidence that corruption is lower in western Ukraine than in the east".¹³⁰

Yet Ukrainian experts themselves see things differently. In their interpretation, Galician nationalism is a derivative of democratic traditions of the region dubbed "Europe in Ukraine"¹³¹. It has a "civically engaged political culture",¹³² including higher levels of voter turnout than in the rest of the country and active volunteerism, which was one of the main reasons that Lviv to became the historical centre of Ukrainian civic, – rather than ethnic, nationalism. The basis for this nationalism is "greater social capital, higher political awareness, more trust...and a greater degree of optimism in the future...Western Ukrainians are more interested in politics and are the best informed about Ukraine's political and electoral system".¹³³ From a variety of local perspectives, the key threat to the unity of Ukraine is the Soviet–nostalgic Stalinist political culture in the eastern provinces.¹³⁴ In this sense the nationalist project can claim its rightful democratic credentials, since advocates see themselves as fighting against the remnants of Communist rule, which left many painful traces in the collective memory of all Ukrainians, including *Holodomor* (the mass famine of 1932–33) and political repressions.

Yet domestic discourses are far from unified and consistent. The specificity of Lviv's positioning in a wider Europe boils down to its immanent hybridity, which in this particular context means balancing between the accentuation of the European (in particular, Austro–Hungarian and Polish) roots of the local identity, and its deployment in the context of East–West cultural distinctions. "In cultural and historical terms, the western part of the country is a part of East Central Europe and can be compared to Poland, Slovakia, and Lithuania".¹³⁵ Yet at the same time, "for Vilnius, Warsaw, Budapest, Krakow or Vienna Lviv is an eastern city. Perhaps, the

130 *D'Anieri*, Ukrainian foreign policy from independence to inertia, P. 451.

131 Rasevitch, *Fantazii na temu Galichini*.

132 *Polyakova*, From the provinces to the parliament: How the Ukrainian radical right mobilized in Galicia, P. 214.

133 *Kuzio*, Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution, P. 288.

134 *Morgun*, Rishuche 'Ni' stalinizmu i separatizmu.

135 *Riabchuk*, Ukraine: Lessons Learned from Other Post-Communist Transitions, P. 63.

last stronghold of normality and European civilization in the Orient...It is the place where eastern Ukraine starts – Byzantine, barbaric, chaotic, corrupt, violent...”¹³⁶

The peculiarity of the Galician political culture is manifested in the boundaries it constructs to distinguish this part of Ukraine from both “the East” (Russia) and “the West” (Europe). In the Lviv nationalist discourse, Russia is overwhelmingly portrayed as an external Other, a country of Finno-Ugrian and Tatar historical legacies which borrowed civilization from Kievan Rus.¹³⁷ Even a hypothetically democratic Russia will not give up its imperial ambitions towards the entire post-Soviet space,¹³⁸ which leads to the conclusion for Ukrainian nationalists that Ukraine needs its nation building project based on a strong sense of national identity. Reference points for this project are in Europe (ranging across a wide spectrum of countries, from the “old” Western Europe like Germany or France, to central and eastern Europe, and the Baltic States), while Russia in this context is given the status of Ukraine’s external other, if not an enemy.¹³⁹

Yet these anti-Russian feelings do not transform into acceptance of Ukraine’s subaltern status vis-à-vis Europe. In Lviv intellectual circles there is a clear understanding that the European aspirations of Ukraine can be contested by its strong historical attachment to the Russia-dominated East. Historically “we saved Europe by blocking the pathways for savages westwards, but then ourselves became savages”.¹⁴⁰ In this context Europe is understood not as a source of cultural domination from a single centre, but rather as an inclusive space in which Ukraine ought to play a role because of its important axis at the crossroads between civilizations. It is positioned between East and West, North and South, Europe and Asia, yet in the discourse it is important that Ukraine keeps its political neutrality. More messianic narratives view Ukraine as a country capable of contributing to the century-long project of the reunification of Europe, remaining “neither pro-Russian nor pro-Western”.¹⁴¹ Interestingly, this type of discourse matches the post-colonial momentum in Poland

136 *Liubka*, Lviv, misto skhodu.

137 *Dyakivsky*, Semeniyuk, Shtepa, Moskali – ne ‘russkie’ i ne sloviani.

138 *Bagan*, Fatal’niy imperializm Moskvyy, P. 19.

139 *Pavliv*, Galichina yak avangard ukrains’koï evrointegratsiï.

140 *Lemko*, Lviv i evropeiskist’, P. 4.

141 *Moseichuk*, Ukrain’ska natsional’na ideya, P. 39.

expressed through the reluctance to submit to either of the two neighbouring great powers, Germany and Russia, as well as the EU whose policies are perceived in this type of narrative as neoimperial.¹⁴²

More radical voices from western Ukraine portray their country as a victim of a "Russian–Jewish chauvinism", nationalism and authoritarianism, on the one hand, and on the other powerful global actors, such as the International Monetary Fund and NATO. Poland too may be perceived as a potentially expansionist country.¹⁴³ This type of discourse makes no substantial differentiation between Ukraine's eastern and western neighbours. This is corroborated by drawing direct historic parallels between the Nazi regime in Germany and Stalinism, an argument that characterises Putin's rule as a combination of the two.¹⁴⁴ Paradoxically, in many respects this sort of anti-Putin narrative reproduces key tenets of Kremlin's discourse premised on sovereignty, mythical spiritual bonds, a strong sense of statehood and protection against multiple external enemies.

It is this precarious balancing act between admiration for Europe and the knowledge of strong non-European elements in western Ukrainian identity, which have influenced local debates in Lviv on its role in nation building. In the EURO 2012 promotion campaign Lviv positioned itself not only as a city with a European urban cultural legacy, but also as a meeting point for East and West.¹⁴⁵ In other contexts this could be viewed as a source of vulnerability and liability rather than as a practical advantage for place promotion.

The borderland balancing act, with all the due comprehension of the dangers of peripherality, was the basic point for the branding strategy of Lviv's EURO 2012, which promoted it as an 'open' urban space ("*Lviv open to the world*"), with a modernized Ukrainian identity symbolically "approved" by Europe. From a sociological viewpoint, the cultural meanings of this strategy are manifested in the logics of blurring and reducing the importance of borders. The motto "*Ukraine: Moving on the Fast Track*" reflects the spirit of a Ukraine eager to integrate with Europe as soon as possible. Europe was a key reference point for branding Lviv as a

142 *Snochowska-Gonzalez*, Post-colonial Poland–On an Unavoidable Misuse, P. 709–710.

143 *Natsional'ny Interesi*, Part 37.

144 *Chobit*, *Fashizm Yanukovicha i Putina*.

145 *Lviv: Euro 2012*.

peculiar European city of Ukraine (“*Another Ukraine*” and “*The last unknown treasure of Europe*”).¹⁴⁶

EURO 2012 was an important element in the policy chain that intended to tightly associate Ukraine with Europe, to undo its Soviet image, and show the vitality of its national statehood as being closely embedded in the European context. The event was originally designed as a de-bordering project. It aimed at demonstrating the opportunities for co-hosting a mega-event between a EU member state (Poland) and a neighbour eager to move closer to the European normative order (Ukraine). Ukraine and Poland were considered to be a good match. Ukraine was identified with the “Orange revolution”, and Poland served as a successful example in how to “return to the West. Working together on a joint project of pan-European visibility, they were expected to prove themselves as efficient and modern states. It is within this semantic framework that the transformative potential of this sporting event can be understood.

Yet this politically inclusive logic was counter-balanced by a different attitude to Ukraine as a country, which had problems with Europeanization. In early 2012 the sharpening of the normative and value-based agenda in EU-Ukraine relations, in particular, the debate on Yulia Tymoshenko’s imprisonment, was ultimately conducive to some European governments boycotting Ukraine. Most prominently the German government boycotted. This was important because German businesses had been investing in infrastructural projects across all the Ukrainian host cities. Ultimately, key EU policymakers, the EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, EU Justice Commissioner Vivian Reding, EU Sports Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou and others, did not show up at EURO 2012 in Ukraine. Due to the divisive issues of democracy and human rights Ukraine, instead of turning into a success story of Europeanization, was largely portrayed in European media and political circles as drifting away from European standards and governed by a corrupt and undemocratic regime. This fortified the symbolic and political contrast between Ukraine and Poland.

Within the Ukrainian context the story of EURO 2012 also unleashed some controversies. One of them concerned the concept of Europe. For Ukraine EURO 2012 was an important element for the country’s strategy of attaining a European future. This can be understood through the

146 Zasadnyy et al., UEFA EURO 2012 in Lviv: best practices in event management.

concept of normalization. In 2012 the then Foreign Ministry spokesman Oleg Voloshyn suggested that "ordinary fans have discovered that Ukraine was a pleasant and normal European country".¹⁴⁷ For Lviv this idea had strong connotations with 'Ukrainianness' as it stemmed from this city's borderland position between Europe and a loosely defined East as its cultural opposite. In this light Lviv is widely considered as a hotbed of Ukrainian Europeanization, "almost everything that we call advances of civilization, and what we implement in Ukraine, has been started, established, grounded and built in Lviv, since it was a part of Europe for a long time".¹⁴⁸ The overall idea for EURO 2012 was to show that Lviv as Ukraine's westernmost city corresponds to the most important elements of a "normal" European city, comfort, safety, hospitality, openness, a multi-language environment, and quality cuisine.

The characterization of Lviv *as already* being a part of Europe, yet representing "another Europe" due to its borderland position, was a point shared by most of our informants. However there remained some nostalgia for post-colonial sentiments which were quite discernible as well:

"Lviv is like a sponge...it is an open city not only in terms of its hospitality, smiling, good service in hotels, but also open to different cultures and people, to the Other. This concept (open to the world – A.M., A.Y.) ought to demonstrate that our culture does not look like a hermetically packed anchovy, but is an organic part of the current European culture. It is a place where cultural trends absolutely harmonious to those in Poland, Austria, Germany and Sweden...[I would like] to boost this equivalency, to understand others without translation, to understand that all of us are hosts here. [I would like] to know that I have the right and a French person has the right to come to this city, as he feels the signs of his nation being present here."¹⁴⁹

By the same token, feelings of disappointment at the European policies towards Ukraine were quite strong, both in the case of EURO 2012 and later due to the EU's insufficiently tough, in Ukrainians eyes, position on the annexation of Crimea and the commencement of a Russia-backed military insurgency in east Ukraine. As one of interviewees mentioned:

"There is much dissatisfaction here about Europe... Europe often behaves strangely indeed... It can't imagine that sometimes you need to pay a price for your values. My message to Europe is that you should not compromise your

147 See Harding, Ukraine may discover Euro 2012 politics is a game of two halves.

148 Lemko, Lviv i evropeiskist', P. 6.

149 An interview with an art and theatre curator and restaurant owner, Lviv, 2013.

values for energy or even military security, since you run the risk of losing it all. Retrieving your values would be too costly... Yet on the other hand, there are mechanisms that neighbours can use to influence Europe. It remains attractive, even if by no means it is a club of altruists. No, this is a company of rather selfish countries that are concerned with their own interests, but in the meantime understand that these interests can be achieved only through cooperation with others.”¹⁵⁰

In local discourses Europe is not a fixed point of reference, but rather a moving target:

Poland’s membership did not change the configuration of the EU, but should countries like Ukraine or Turkey become its members, the EU would need to change... The problem is that should Europeans – in countries such as Germany or France – face a dilemma of relinquishing their usual morning yoghurt or letting Turkey in, would prefer yoghurt.”¹⁵¹

In the meantime, local discourses in Lviv seem to be rather sensitive to attempts at restricting the concept of Europe to the limited number of the EU’s current founding fathers:

“It seems that we are on the verge of a new emerging Europe. Now Europe is run by pragmatists who calculate how to keep the status-quo. Europe needs leaders like Adenauer, civilization makers. So far Europe lives in a post-Second World War paradigm dovetailed basically to Western Europe. New countries come in, yet the old model remains intact. Soon Europe will have to find a new *modus vivendi*, however painful this might be.”¹⁵²

Against this blend of uncertainty and scepticism, Europe is mostly reduced to two countries, Germany and Poland. *Germany* is viewed in mostly positive tones, despite this country’s campaign for the political boycotting of EURO 2012:

“From Soviet times up until now there are voices who would claim that we lack Germany’s order... The Germans were here until 1944, and many remember how orderly their rule was... In the meantime, today we do have some hard feelings toward Germany that didn’t let us in NATO and nowadays continues with this... We know that our people are not as disciplined as the Germans... I guess they (the Germans) treat us correspondingly... We might

150 An interview with a prominent staff member at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, a former Ukrainian dissident and a Soviet era political prisoner, Lviv, 2014.

151 An interview with an editor of a local journal, Lviv, 2014.

152 An interview with a leading staff member at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, a former Ukrainian dissident and a Soviet era political prisoner, Lviv, 2014.

have political troubles with Germany, but there is no psychological alienation between us."¹⁵³

A similar approach is discernible in a different context:

"We don't face problems with Germans (as we do with the Poles – A.M., A.Y.). On the contrary, our attitudes are kind of sentimental: Galicia was part of Austria, and the language here was German. Almost everybody here has ancestors who served in the Austrian army; thus Germans here are culturally perceived as ours. Franz Joseph is remembered here as our *kaiser*, we love him, and this is part of our identity."¹⁵⁴

As for *Poland*, it is perceived as a country that can share a lot with Ukraine in terms of everyday practices of governance, and even as a "window to Europe"¹⁵⁵. The two countries went through a period of mutual rapprochement and pacification of their relations in the 1990s. On the one hand, there is a strong gravitation towards Poland as a successful example of integration with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

"After the fall of the Soviet Union borders disappeared, you could move wherever you wished, but there were large queues for moving out. After Poland's accession to the EU, the border-crossing became more ordered, and there were less people travelling in and out. At a certain point Poland realized the dangers of this slow-down...To avoid the repetition of historical atrocities, Poles and Ukrainians have to contact each other, drink vodka, marry each other, even punch each other, but for all this the border has to be open. In this respect Poland squeezed as much as possible from the EU... On the Ukrainian side people might get a card from the Polish government that allows crossing the border without a visa. By the same token, the Polish consulate in Lviv is the largest Polish consulate in the world, and it issues more visas than the German and Russian consulates taken together. If people effectively take advantage of their borderland location, they can easily get a 5 year visa."¹⁵⁶

On the other hand, there are many historical issues that still remain sensitive:

"Historically, both Poland and Russia in different ways questioned our Ukrainian identity, and we've had to react. For example, the Poles formed here, in Ukraine, scout groups to promote their identity, and we've had to create our own scouts, though based on the Polish example. Polish nation-

153 An interview with an expert of the Ukrainian Galician Society, Lviv, 2014.

154 An interview with an editor of a local journal, Lviv, 2014.

155 An interview with an expert of the Ukrainian Galician Society, Lviv, 2014.

156 An interview with an editor of a local journal, Lviv, 2014.

alism grew very strong, and to survive we've had to cultivate our own nationalism, borrowing much from the Poles.”¹⁵⁷

This oftentimes translates into the articulation of political distinctions between the two nations:

“Ukraine is too different intrinsically, and it can't imitate the Polish model of constructing a homogenous society from which many groups were excluded...We've never had deportations in Ukraine, it's impossible, and our nationhood has to be built on different grounds.”¹⁵⁸

Against this backdrop, projects with Poland should be based on the principles of symmetry and equality:

“We are implementing a project named “Common Heritage” with our colleagues from the Polish Ministry of Culture. They have a department dealing with the Polish cultural legacy beyond Polish borders. Of course, the Poles used to live in Lviv for centuries...For example, we have moved a wooden church from a village where it is not needed by anyone, to the museum of people's architecture...We do it in parallel with the Poles who similarly moved a Ukrainian church from a countryside locale where no Ukrainians remain anymore.”¹⁵⁹

Pragmatic interests are also part of bilateral relations:

“Since the German fans were advised not to stay overnight in Ukraine, the Polish strategy was to offer them an alternative, a cheaper lodging to be paid in Euros; this is how the Poles took advantage of their border location.”¹⁶⁰

This explains the intricacies of identification with Poland in Lviv:

“I don't think that EURO 2012 has boosted the feelings of togetherness with Poland. Initially it could be the case, when Poland gave us its hand and assumed that we can be together in Europe. But then practical issues became prominent in the agenda, such as who is more ready. Poland was less and less talked about; instead people here tried to convince Europe of their European identity. They wanted to explain that here nobody attacks others, that this is a tolerant and hospitable city. This was a reaction to negative media coverage of Lviv as a city with fascists and Neo-Nazis, or as a city where animals are

157 An interview with a prominent staff member at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, a former Ukrainian dissident and a Soviet era political prisoner, Lviv, 2014.

158 An interview with an editor of a local journal, Lviv, 2014.

159 An interview with an expert from the Department of the Preservation of the Historical Heritage in Lviv, 2014.

160 An interview with a EURO 2012 manager in Lviv, 2013.

killed. The message was clear, don't go there...It explains why the locals were eager to simply demonstrate their normalcy and conviviality.”¹⁶¹

Another controversy concerns the vision of whether Ukraine is a nation-in-the-making. “Open, blurred, fluid, shifting, multiple, ambivalent, weak, mixed, dual, situational – all these adjectives have been used by scholars to depict the characteristics of national identities in Ukraine”,¹⁶² which fuels political debates about “proper and improper Ukrainians”. Western Ukraine is usually referred to as a region possessing the strongest and the most particular sense of “real” Ukrainian identity which is not necessarily in harmony with the vision of Ukraine that emanates from Kyiv.

Yet in the meantime, there are dissenting voices as well:

“I disagree that Lviv is the hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism. The idea of national self-identification of Ukraine as a unified modern nation comes from Kharkiv where a German University was established at the end of the 18th century and where ideas of German romanticism found fertile ground. At this time Lviv was a provincial city...It was not until the middle of the 19th century that the national resurrection commenced, basically as a reaction to bans on Ukrainian language and books in Russia. All the culture then moved to the free city of Lemberg, with the ensuing maturing of the national life modelled after the Czechs, the Croats and then the Poles. For instance, Czechs created the “Sokol” sport society, and Ukrainians copied it...And then, after the Ukrainian People's Republic and the disintegration of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires...the Bolsheviks created the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic which reassembled regions that were dispersed and lacking in unity.”¹⁶³

Another version of a critical narrative was invoked in a different context:

“It would be an exaggeration to believe that Lviv is the most important intellectual centre of Ukraine, perhaps, one of them. At a certain point it lost momentum, since many gifted intellectuals moved out either to Kyiv or abroad. Those who remained are beer lovers, TV watchers and entertainment addicts.”¹⁶⁴

161 An interview with an eminent staff member at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, a former Ukrainian dissident and a Soviet era political prisoner, 2014.

162 *Zaharchenko*, Polyphonic Dichotomies: Memory and Identity in Today's Ukraine, P. 246.

163 An interview with an editor of a local journal, Lviv, 2014.

164 An interview with an organizer of the annual forum of writers and publishers in Lviv, 2014.

It is telling that in some of our interviews in Lviv the Ukrainian capital was mentioned as a negative reference point, which betrays a complex structure of Lviv's identity discourse. On the one hand, the city tries to underpin its Ukrainian identity to counter at times unamicable European partners, for example, Germany which orchestrated a political boycott of EURO 2012 in Ukraine. On the other hand, Lviv's identity might, vice versa, show solidarity with an external reference point (an abstract Europe) in an attempt to symbolically distance itself from the rest of Ukraine.

“Ukrainian identity in Lviv is competitive...We are open to the world and eager to show how cool our identity is...Yet after the decision on EURO 2012 was taken in 2007, the first two or three years the whole of Ukraine was doing its best to kick Lviv out of the group of host cities. This all dates back to the 1990s, with Lviv being treated as an “alien body”, as it was considered to be too European for Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk. We stayed on the list only thanks to the Poles who said that without Lviv there is nothing to talk about whatsoever...At EURO 2012 we worked for ourselves...Kyiv was more interested in money laundering...Our municipal bodies started mobilizing volunteers and the creative class to make us known in Europe. We hosted the summit of presidents of Central European countries in 1999, it was a little step forward; the Pope visited us in 2001, well, this was also at least something. If we don't sustain all this, we'll be forgotten.”¹⁶⁵

A similar discursive line of distinction with other parts of Ukraine is noticeable in the following statement:

“Lots of our people from Western Ukraine work in Europe, and they don't take too much time to start living by European rules. This is not the case for people from eastern or central Ukraine who would need to seriously readjust themselves to Europe.”¹⁶⁶

Interestingly, the tragic situation of the external security threats that Ukraine has faced since regime change in 2013–2014, after the “revolution of dignity” has not erase these domestic lines of distinction. In October 2015 one of our respondents in Lviv confessed that

“Vienna is more understandable to me than Kyiv. Mentally I am in my capital city as a visitor, I feel tension, and would like to run away.”¹⁶⁷

165 An interview with an expert of the Ukrainian Galician Society, Lviv, 2014.

166 An interview with an expert of the Ukrainian Galician Society, Lviv, 2014.

167 An interview with a former member of the Lviv city administration, Lviv, 2015.

With the annexation of Crimea and especially the military insurgency in Donbas, many of the internal gaps and ruptures became even more salient. We shall return to these at the end of the chapter.

External Impacts

In this section we address a collision of different policies and strategies initiated, pursued and implemented by EU member states towards Ukraine as a co-host of EURO 2012. Two countries are of particular interest for this study, Poland as the co-organizer of this mega-event, and Germany as the most powerful European country, which most actively engaged with Ukraine along many policy lines.

Lviv is the westernmost of the four cities that hosted the Ukrainian part of the championship. As we have argued earlier, being one of most distinctive urban centres in Ukraine, Lviv is located at the intersection of different cultural traditions and divergent policies of EU actors, which contain elements of border-locking and border-unlocking, inclusion and exclusion, engagement and disengagement. On the one hand, due to its geographical location Lviv is a frontrunner of Ukraine's ongoing Europeanization, a process of moving closer to the European normative order, which reached its highest point in Ukraine-EU Association Agreement (AA) signed in 2014. Yet on the other hand, Ukraine in general and Lviv in particular are objects of exclusionary policies based on the multiplicity of European reactions to cases as different as the Yulia Tymoshenko affair, corruption, electoral fraud, racist attitudes among football fans, and other issues that complicate the acceptance of Ukraine in Europe.

These controversies can't be properly approached through traditional tools of political science and international relations analysis, which treat states as more or less well established actors possessing consistent identities and coherent interests. We treat the duality and ambiguity of EU member states' policies towards Ukraine not as deviations from the alleged standards of governance or symptoms of the EU's bad quality of governance, but as manifestations of the "disjunctive nature of power"¹⁶⁸ and the impossibility to reduce "the exercise of power to a single logic".¹⁶⁹

168 *Widder*, Foucault and Power Revisited, P. 417.

169 *Rosenow*, Decentring Global Power: The Merits of a Foucauldian Approach to International Relations, P. 517.

EURO 2012 from the outset was based on a political logic that had much to do with the ideas of Ukraine's Europeanization. In December 2010 the Ukrainian Football Association chief, Grigoriy Surkis, said that Poland and Ukraine "share the same ideas".¹⁷⁰ Yet this politically inclusive logic was counter-balanced by a different type of discursive attitude to Ukraine as a country that so far had problems with being considered a fully-fledged European nation. Apart from the obvious political connotations, this turn in the dominating public discourse on Ukraine was intertwined with a variety of cultural narratives represented in documentaries (for instance, see "The Other Chelsea: A Story from Donetsk", 2010, directed by Jakob Preuss), the mass media and social networks. EURO 2012 added a new dimension to the imagery of Ukraine as a country severely constrained both politically and economically in its European drive.

Germany

In the framework of EURO 2012 Germany played different roles, one as a pragmatic investor, a source of transferrable experience to Ukraine, and secondly as a bulwark of democratic normativity.¹⁷¹

One of the logics behind German policies can be grasped as a peculiar interpretation of body politics. The idea of boycotting EURO 2012 was publicly articulated as a response to Yulia Tymoshenko's daughter's plea "to save the life" of her mother who was being denied treatment for back problems in prison. The whole context of this discourse was replete with medical language, "prison guards punched her in the stomach and twisted her limbs while taking her to the hospital against her will to be treated for a chronic back problem. Bruises on her right arm, elbow, hand and stomach have been documented in photographs".¹⁷² The issue of Tymoshenko's body politics extended across national and international politics. Evgeniya Tymoshenko portrayed her mother as the epitome of fundamental political issues that were at stake, stating that "If she dies,

170 Keating, European leaders consider Euro Cup boycott over Tymoshenko.

171 See *Handl and Paterson*, The continuing relevance of Germany's engine for CEE and the EU.

172 *Connolly*, Angela Merkel plans Euro 2012 boycott if Yulia Tymoshenko kept in jail.

democracy dies with her".¹⁷³ This argument was effectively appropriated by Angela Merkel and became a key driver for the pro-boycott position, sustained by the campaign for politically othering Ukraine in the European media. On the eve of EURO 2012 an activist of Amnesty International described Ukraine as a country where "police are torturing people... because of the ethnicity or sexual orientation of the person that they have in custody".¹⁷⁴ Comparisons with the 1978 World Cup in Argentina were justified by the repressive nature of the two regimes, which made German environment minister Norbert Roettgen assume that the Ukrainian "dictatorship" must not be allowed to exploit EURO 2012, and that EU leaders should not give Kyiv "legitimacy for the torture" (see *NewEurope*, 2012).¹⁷⁵ This discourse represented an attempt to boost German national identity as a liberal power retaining the right to build its foreign policy on a normative basis and using this background in dealing with other nations.

These debates triggered security effects all across Europe. The BBC Panorama documentary "Stadiums of Hate" portrayed both Poland and Ukraine as countries overwhelmed with racist displays among football fans. The soccer historian David Goldblatt maintained that there have been "unbelievable levels of racism in Ukrainian football for years, with fans unveiling banners with the iconography of the SS and Ku Klux Klan, anti-Roma and anti-Semitic gestures, white power narrative, etc.". ¹⁷⁶ In particular, graffiti with Celtic crosses and displays of swastika flags were reported among the ultras of the "Karpaty" club in Lviv.¹⁷⁷ The public effects of these accusations were strengthened by the British football player Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain whose family stayed at home during the European Championship for fear of being victims of racial abuse in Ukraine.¹⁷⁸ Ultimately in September 2013 FIFA established several racist and discriminatory incidents perpetrated by local supporters during a match played in Lviv, in particular by displaying neo-Nazi banners and making "monkey noises and gestures" as well as Nazi salutes. FIFA

173 *Connolly*, Angela Merkel plans Euro 2012 boycott if Yulia Tymoshenko kept in jail.

174 *Ridgwell*, Leaders Threaten Euro 2012 Boycott Over Alleged Ukraine Abuses.

175 *NewEurope*, European leaders to boycott Ukrainian part of Euro 2012 over Tymoshenko.

176 *Nehamas*, Will Europe boycott biggest soccer tourney of the year?

177 *Radley*, Euro 2012: Reality of life in Ukraine.

178 *Lawton and Barlow*, Euro 2012: Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain's family fear racism.

decided that the Ukrainian national would be banned from playing in the Arena Lviv for the whole duration of the qualifying competition for the 2018 FIFA World Cup.¹⁷⁹

By the same token, the debate about Tymoshenko touched upon issues of national identity, implying a strong opposition between the European Self and the Ukrainian Other. The political boycott of EURO 2012 was expected to prove that Ukraine cannot build an authoritarian system without burning bridges to the EU, and that there is a cost for violating basic European norms and values. Since the Yanukovych government had passed laws enshrining accession to the EU as the country's top foreign-policy goal, it allegedly gave the EU leverage to seek a change of behaviour with EURO 2012 as a good place to start for the EU to use leverage.¹⁸⁰

In particular, some boycott campaigners claimed that a transfer of games from Ukraine to another European country would be the right political signal to the undemocratic government in Kyiv and would generate domestic pressure against Yanukovich.¹⁸¹ Following bombings in Dnipropetrovsk that left 27 people injured, Spanish Football Federation president Angel Maria Villar reportedly told UEFA that Spain would step in if required to host the tournament.¹⁸² At a meeting more than a year before the tournament, representatives of UEFA, the German Football Association and Germany's interior minister discussed a Plan B for a crisis situation, according to Bernhard Witthaut, the head of the GdP police union.¹⁸³

The political logic of all parties involved in the debate was sustained by positioning Ukraine at a historical crossroads, which explicated its sensitivity to external pressure. It was illustrative that both the German government and its opponents used this type of logic, but with drastically different conclusions. For Angela Merkel and her supporters the boycotting campaign would be instrumental for pushing Kyiv closer to European norms, while for their opponents EU pressure could only drive

179 *FIFA.com*, Sanctions of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee against Ukraine and Peru.

180 *Valasek*, Soccer Boycott Could Kick Ukraine Toward Reform.

181 *SportWitness*, Germans want Euro 2012 moved from Ukraine to their country, or they'll boycott it.

182 *TheSoccerRoom*, Call for Euro 2012 boycott getting louder and louder.

183 *The Local*, Calls grow to relocate Euro 2012 from Ukraine.

Yanukovich into the hands of Russia.¹⁸⁴ Having challenged the position taken by Angela Merkel, a number of high-profile figures such as Michael Vesper, the general director of the German Olympic Committee, and Joachim Löw, the coach of the German national football team, suggested that attendance is a better instrument to foster change in Ukraine.¹⁸⁵

The Timoshenko case, which was widely assessed all across the EU as a politically motivated case, unleashed a negative political reaction within certain parts of the German political class, who called to suspend the AA negotiations. Ironically, later it was the government of Viktor Yanukovich that under heavy pressure from Russia suspended the AA with the EU, a decision that triggered mass-scale protest rally in Kyiv known as Euro-Maidan and ended in the fall of Yanukovich. Bearing in mind the later dramatic events, the loss of Crimea and the Russia-supported military insurgency in Ukraine's east, EURO 2012 might be viewed as an important element in the policy chain that intended to tightly associate Ukraine with Europe, but brought very controversial upshots. As future developments demonstrated, EU member states never spoke to Ukraine with one voice, thus creating multiple zones of uncertainty, a situation that EURO 2012 nicely illustrated before the current Ukrainian crisis made a possible return to a new Cold War more likely.

Poland

EURO 2012 was a strong challenge to Poland. The Polish government had to find a delicate balance between a close engagement with Ukraine, on the one hand, and keeping its own role identity as a member of the EU. Unlike Poland, Ukraine could only aspire to join the EU in the distant future.¹⁸⁶

Since joining the EU, Poland was consistently trying to raise its policy profile by playing the role of a country with great experience and expertise in eastern policy. Yet Poland's intentions to become a useful EU member were not always met with due sympathy in the EU. Therefore, the Polish idea of the Eastern Dimension, a program modelled after the Finland–

184 *Rattiman*, Poland: Euro2012 boycott based on ulterior motives.

185 *Allmeling*, Calls for Euro 2012 boycott increase in Germany.

186 *Longhurst*, Where from, where to? New and old configurations in Poland's foreign and security policy priorities.

designed Northern Dimension, as well as Polish proposals on “energy solidarity” vis-à-vis Russia were not accepted by the EU. Besides, due to its support for the US during the Iraq war Poland’s reliability in “old European” countries, especially France and Germany, had been questioned. All this explains the intricacies of Poland’s relations with other EU member states.

The strategy of politically ostracizing the Yanukovich regime met a fierce Polish counter-reaction who, as one of the co co-organizers of EURO 2012, had many reasons to see appeals to boycott Ukraine as tantamount to undermining the whole project’s cooperative spirit, in which Poland had invested significant effort and resources. In spite of all the negative effects of Timoshenko’s imprisonment, the Polish government was critical of the German policy of politically boycotting the competition in Ukraine and called for maintaining dialogue with Kyiv.

Polish critics of the pro-boycott propositions were keen on deploying the EURO 2012 issue in a wider temporal context. By using historical analogies, they claimed that the Cold War experience of boycotting Olympics, Moscow in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1984, failed to achieve the stated political goals, which had been the reason for the boycott. By looking to the near future, they asked whether Germany was ready to take the same normative stand towards Russia as the host of the 2014 Sochi Olympics and Belarus as the host of the 2014 World Ice Hockey Cup.¹⁸⁷ The assumption that Germany might selectively use boycotting for Warsaw put it in the same position with the Ukrainian government and therefore Germany, like Kiyv, could be accused of practicing selective justice. It is noteworthy that a year after EURO 2012, with the domestic conflict in Ukraine and a crisis in Ukrainian–Russian relations, Poland and Germany’s policies diverged again. Warsaw called on the EU to take a unified position in support of Ukrainian independence and integrity, while Berlin’s priority was to avoid both irritating Moscow and making excessive commitments to Kyiv. This illustrates the degree of diplomatic divergence between EU member states and subsequent political conflicts that might entail. The pursuit of nation–state–based policies toward a non-EU neighbour is always prone to disagreements between individual EU members.

187 *Coalson*, EU Calls For Euro 2012 Boycott Leave Poland In The Lurch.

Governmentality: Agendas for Change

In this section we turn to different modalities of governmentality, a concept mainly applied to the analysis of administrative and managerial toolkits at a micro-political level. It is our intention to use this concept for analysing a complex social milieu that stretches beyond nation state borders and includes international and subnational actors.

In the previous section we singled out the controversies and inconsistencies in Germany's policies towards Ukraine in the context of the EURO 2012 tournament. On the one hand, there are political frameworks constitutive of key actors' identities, which shape their relations with each other. On the other hand, there is a different layer of interaction that involves non-state and sub-state actors. At this level, communication is predominantly grounded in technical projects aimed at transferring best practices and stimulating spill-over effects. This combination of diverse strategies constitutes an interesting research puzzle.

The EURO 2012 project tells much about the mechanisms of external influence on borderland countries. The sporting mega-event industry is gradually but steadily shifting from the West to the East, which raises a set of new questions related to the specificity of those countries that are newcomers in the international market of mega-events. Our hunch is that in Eastern Europe, globalization develops on the basis of mega-projects, which generate a series of impulses and incentives for countries to modernize and adjust to global norms. Against this background, Ukraine as a co-host of EURO 2012 found itself under the double influence of UEFA, on the one hand, and European partners, Poland and Germany primarily on the other. The case represents an intricate knot of strategies of politicization and depoliticization, as well as inclusion and exclusion, pursued by these actors. As we have mentioned, on the one hand, the German government and business invested many resources for supporting projects to bring Ukraine closer to European economic and normative standards. On the other hand, Germany was a frontrunner in a Europe-wide campaign for politically boycotting Ukraine on human rights grounds. This duality reflects the ambiguous nature of wider German, as well as European, policies toward Ukraine within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) programme. The core of the debate is whether Ukraine is "sufficiently" European to be included in the highest political priorities for the EU, or can it be discursively relocated beyond the boundaries of "real Europe" and thus delinked from the ongoing European identity debate.

The answer to this question largely depends on the selection of the analytical frame. In terms of the dominating political meanings in identity debates, Ukraine can be discursively marginalized, while in the categories of governmentality it, on the contrary, is a very important element of the projection of EU external governance techniques.

As we have mentioned in the first chapter, governmentality is a depoliticized and mostly technocratic form of power that presupposes enabling and empowering, rather than domination. Therefore, promoting rational self-conduct is the kernel of governmentality that constructs social settings for rational choice. This is how governmentally-promoting actors intended to act towards Ukraine, not imposing their power, but helping Ukraine to constitute its subjectivity and ability to act independently through optimizing its resources.¹⁸⁸ This strategy is effectuated on both the micro-level, with the urban policies of GIZ as a case in point, and the diplomatic level where independence means the avoidance of external Russian pressure. In this respect one may claim that both the Ukrainian population and the Ukrainian state are subjected to different strategies of European governmentality.

However, the question of whether governmentality works beyond the liberal West remains an open debate for those who claim that this technique of governance “fails in many parts of the world because it is unable to operate effectively outside of the social conditions of advanced liberal capitalism”.¹⁸⁹ The case of Ukraine certainly adds new food for thought in this regard as an example of a country that was the object of European governmentality policies, which failed to reify its European aspirations and were unable to prevent the bloody conflict in the eastern part of the country.

In a practical sense, the EURO 2012 Organizing Committee in Lviv, in reaction to the European media’s negative campaign against Ukraine, tried to demonstrate the city’s normality in post-political/managerial terms. The organizing committee attempted to provide more than a kernel of truth in the branding of the city for EURO 2012. It promoted Lviv’s coffee, chocolate, cheese, and beer, thus providing an enticing perspective of a city no longer beholden to its Soviet past. Developing this argument, “European

188 *Dîrdală*, After Vilnius: the European Union’s smart power and the Eastern Neighbourhood.

189 *Joseph*, Governmentality of What? Populations, States and International Organizations, P. 425.

culture with its shared and truly humanistic values" is contrasted to its non-European, imperial, and based on "quasi-values"¹⁹⁰.

Against this background, the idea of a conflation of Lviv's governmental practices with global post-political management represented by UEFA can be deployed in a controversial context. Commenting on the UEFA operation in Lviv, some of our interviewees emphasized its irrelevance to the city's discourse. In the view of many, universalized and over-standardized procedures might be in disharmony with the authentic culture of the city. As a cultural manager notes,

"such a monopolist as UEFA is only marginally interested in city residents, it supports what it considers right. The city didn't have money to organize a huge cultural programme [of the EURO 2012 – A.M., A.Y.], especially to meet the interests of its residents. The main thing was to provide security and ensure that all are happy...UEFA is a global business project."¹⁹¹

Nevertheless, the impact of EURO 2012 on the urban development and extraordinary promotion effect of this event, including on the tourist industry, is undeniable. However, the most important legacy of the event was the growing domestic understanding of the importance of everyday practices of good governance, with smiling police, the publishing of dialogues of the city council and local NGOs and business groups, or an experience of globally promoting the city's cultural practices. This is exactly what fits the concept of governmentality, an improvement of self-conduct, grass-roots cooperation, and a civil dialogue. As the head of the EURO 2012 Committee in Lviv points out,

"Unlike, let's say, in Kenya, when people dress in their national costumes only for tourists, and after work they take them off, here in Lviv people wear their national clothes on holidays for themselves. It says a lot about our national pride as an integral domestic point, and tourists feel that it looks like people really live their lives, as opposed to simply performing... This explains why we have not exceptionalized EURO 2012 and did not detach it from normal life."¹⁹²

190 An interview with a theatre director, Lviv, 2013.

191 An interview with a cultural manager, Lviv, 2013.

192 An interview with the head of the EURO 2012 Committee in Lviv, Lviv, 2013.

De-bordering and new spaces of inclusion

There were two kinds of practices of governmentality that impacted on EURO 2012. These were the policies of UEFA and projects supported by German foundations, foremost among them was the GIZ (Society for International Cooperation). Obviously, these institutions have different statuses and roles in the framework of EURO 2012. UEFA had at its disposal some instruments of indirect control over the Ukrainian authorities during the preparation and hosting of the tournament, while GIZ operated on the micro level through its projects. With all these dissimilarities in mind, both UEFA and GIZ were sources of administrative practices and regulations, and both can be analysed through the prism of the idea of governmentality.

GIZ in Lviv

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is an agency working worldwide on behalf of four German ministries, the European Union and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). In Ukraine, GIZ programmes focus on sustainable development, energy efficiency, and HIV/AIDS. More than 90 national and international staff are deployed in 20 locations. After the annexation of Crimea GIZ has strengthened its support for projects aimed at combating corruption, reforming justice, and decentralisation in Ukraine.¹⁹³ A special programme for opening a “stronger EU integration” prospect for Ukraine has been designed.

Despite the appeals of many German politicians to boycott EURO 2012 in Ukraine, GIZ actively partook in the preparation for the Championship, mostly transposing European managerial norms through technical practices in the field of urban development as exemplified by upgrading urban cycling infrastructure, quality catering service, ecologic public transport, and government-to-citizen cooperation. It provided advisory services for the municipal administrations of host cities,¹⁹⁴ including Donetsk whose image has been traditionally associated with Soviet times.

193 GIZ, Ukraine.

194 GIZ, Advisory Services for Municipal Administrations of EURO 2012 Host Cities.

Thus, in 2012 GIZ assisted in bringing the European Cultural Festival "The Night of Industrial Heritage" to Donetsk and Lugansk¹⁹⁵ which only two years later became the centres of pro-Russian armed rebellion against the central authorities in Kyiv.

A visitor opinion poll conducted by GIZ after EURO 2012 demonstrated a high satisfaction with security during the event, the attractiveness to tourists of the host cities, and transportation. Lviv was placed at the top of other host cities in terms of security (67 per cent), comfort (83 per cent), service (86 per cent) and fan zone management (66 per cent). Most of the EURO 2012 attendants wished to come back to Lviv again (68 per cent).¹⁹⁶ According to the 2013 data, the number of tourists who visited Lviv increased to almost two million people, twice as much as in 2011, while the total number of entries to Ukraine and its European partner cities reached a record of 25,7 million. This success of the Ukrainian tourist industry was partly caused, according to the GIZ report, by the effective application of the umbrella brand "All about Ukraine".¹⁹⁷ Our interviews have shown that openness to European practices of governance and the readiness of the local administration for cooperative experience sharing were key factors to the successful implementation of GIZ programmes. Yet the intention of the authorities and GIZ to develop the urban milieu was not the top priority of their joint projects. Rather, their major goal was changing the Soviet-style mentality, mostly based on citizens' dependence on the state.¹⁹⁸ As the head of GIZ office in Lviv clarifies:

"In the beginning, we drafted a big questionnaire about urban renewal, relations to the city administration, and people's own living situation - how much money they would spend to restore their flats... One of the questions was "Are you aware of the UNESCO heritage program in Lviv?", and we were surprised that actually many people knew about it: "Yes, we know and the city administration should do something to improve our heritage". Our approach was that actually not the city administration, but you and us should do something. Our case is not about the main churches or public buildings, it's much more about everyday life and architecture, so it's about your own surroundings: what you do with your street, house, windows, entrance door, staircase... This is the heritage we are talking about. So we tried to turn their

195 *Zmina*, Noch industrialnoi kultury. Vtoraya smena.

196 *Zasadnyy*, EURO 2012: ochjukovannja ta rezultaty.

197 *GIZ*, Advisory Services for Municipal Administrations of EURO 2012 Host Cities.

198 An interview with the head of the City Department of the Protection of the Historical Environment, Lviv, 2014.

opinions, to start paying attention to their own environment and being aware of their own chances as well.”¹⁹⁹

This kind of work, the application of instruments for building horizontal networks between neighbours, is deemed to be the core of the GIZ-promoted campaign to improve the quality of everyday life:

“we set up such an instrument as a co-financing support programme. It means that if you invest money you would look for something of a better quality, to gain from your building much more... If you invest into the restoration of your front door, then you should keep the quality that you will otherwise never obtain. The entrance door is the nodal point for everybody's identity in the building. Once you improve the front door by co-financing, it sets up a kind of ownership group....t is a very small topic but brings a lot of different directions into our project...Co-financing always means responsibility sharing.”²⁰⁰

A common responsibility in European terms means sharing experiences with others through routine practices of everyday life and people caring about their neighbourhood and city. By giving people a sense of pride in their city these GIZ-administered projects were consonant with the strategy of preparing Lviv for hosting EURO 2012, which included its branding as a frontrunner of Europeanization and inclusion in the domain of European norms.²⁰¹

UEFA

UEFA's policy towards Ukraine as a co-host of the EURO 2012 represented an intricate combination of different strategies, such as political and administrative, as well as inclusive and exclusive.

According to the head of UEFA Michel Platini, the very decision to hold the championship in Poland and Ukraine was largely political, since technically the Italian bid was of a higher standard. For some commentators the organisation of the championship in Ukraine was a sign of Europe's good will,²⁰² which only corroborated the hierarchical context of

199 An interview with the head of the GIZ office in Lviv, 2014.

200 An interview with the head of the GIZ office in Lviv, 2014.

201 Zehner, Born and Vojtova, *Off the Beaten Track: Urban Regeneration of Hidden World Heritage in L'viv (Ukraine)*.

202 *NewEurope*, European leaders to boycott Ukrainian part of Euro 2012 over Tymoshenko.

this decision. Yet the logic behind the decision taken in 2007 was to embrace "other political realities" and "open doors to the East".²⁰³ These were arguments that correlate with the German *Ostpolitik*, as well as the EU-supported EaP programme announced in 2008 and promoted by Poland. In this context, Platini assumed that in terms of its infrastructural conditions Ukraine lagged far behind the most developed European countries (Germany, France, the UK, and Italy) and thus shares similar problems with a different category of mega-events hosts, such as less developed economies like Brazil and South Africa. The very placement of Ukraine (along with Poland) in one category with these countries suggested that the co-hosts of EURO 2012 were supposed to adopt standards and practices of more experienced football countries and learn from them.

The co-hosts of EURO 2012 came up with their own, yet equally political, interpretations of the UEFA decision. For example, Grigoriy Surkis, the head of the Ukrainian Football Association, dubbed it "a historical choice" that would allow Ukraine to fully reap the fruits of its independence.²⁰⁴ His Polish counter-part Michał Listkiewicz added that the UEFA decision is a "victory of all Eastern Europe".

In the meantime, Platini saw a difference between the two hosts. In particular, he mentioned that the "financial situation in Poland was much better, and I was not worrying. It was Ukraine that we have discussed repeatedly. At that time this country faced domestic political troubles, and we did not feel support from the government".²⁰⁵ At certain times, he confessed, UEFA wanted to admit that including Ukraine was a mistake and to drop Ukraine. The then President Viktor Yanukovich also admitted that once Platini had mentioned to him that 'Ukraine has no chance' to host the tournament.²⁰⁶

The Yulia Tymoshenko controversy reignited scepticism about Ukraine in Europe. A group of European politicians signed an open letter to Platini asking him to publicly raise issues of political repression and injustice in

203 *CensorNet*, Platini: provedenie Evro v Ukraine – eto khoroshee reshenie.

204 *Korrespondent.net*, Surkis: UEFA sdelala istoricheskiy vybor.

205 *Metro*, Michel Platini. Euro 2012 – bol'shoe prikluchenie.

206 *NovostiUA*, Yanukovich: Mir izmenit svoyo otnoshenie k Ukraine posle Evro-2012.

Ukraine.²⁰⁷ The German ombudsman, Markus Lening, accused Platini of refusing to directly engage with pressurizing the Ukrainian government over the Timoshenko affair.²⁰⁸ These debates were paralleled by an appeal for boycotting EURO 2012 that came from Ukrainian women's group FEMEN, which had staged a topless protest against what they called UEFA's plans to turn economically weak Ukraine into a destination for sex tourists from around the globe.²⁰⁹

The inevitable politicization of the EURO 2012 project was due to the ongoing AA discussions between the EU and Ukraine. Many in the EU were eager to use this important document as a tool for pressuring the Yanukovich regime to relinquish political practices incompatible with the European normative order. However, UEFA's engagement with political discourses was rather limited. Platini stated that "UEFA never gets involved in politics... We're not going to be politicians. We're never going to talk about religious politics; we're never going to talk about racial politics".²¹⁰ Indeed, most of UEFA's practical interventions were technical rather than political. Thus, Platini called on the Ukrainian authorities to keep hotel prices in host cities reasonably low, while in Poland he demanded a better substitution to the grass in all stadia.²¹¹

In the meantime, UEFA did have its say in easing certain regulatory practices. A good example is UEFA's lobbying for a visa-facilitation agreement between the two co-hosts, which would make it easier for football fans to travel from one country to another. In this context, Platini referred to the positive experience of the Champions League final which was held in Moscow, when the Russian government allowed visa-free travel for all tourists with a valid ticket for the game.²¹²

Ultimately, UEFA gave a very high assessment to the importance of EURO 2012. In the words of Platini, due to the event, Ukraine made a 30-years breakthrough in developing its infrastructure and economy.²¹³ Yet in Europe the success of EURO 2012 even in technical terms appears debat-

207 *UkrInformNews*, European politicians ask Platini to talk more about political persecution in Ukraine.

208 *UaWorld*, "Markus Lening: Platini dolzhno byt' stydno".

209 *RussiaToday*, Topless protests slam Ukraine's future as global football bordello.

210 *Rainbow*, Platini sidesteps the political football as Euro 2012 party begins.

211 *Kartashov*, Pol'skie polia trebuyut zameny.

212 *Football.Ua*, Platini: Ukraina i Pol'sha dolzhny reshit' vopros vizovogo v'ezda.

213 *ProSport*, Platini o Evro-2012 v Ukraine: tyazholie rody dariat prekrasnikh detei.

able. As a participant of the discussion on the future tournaments claimed, "travelling to different cities across Europe could be simpler than the arduous lengths supporters had to endure in Ukraine last summer...For England's group in Ukraine, the travelling was more considerable than it would be, say, to play in Berlin, Amsterdam, Paris and Brussels. There would actually be less travelling. It would be considerably cheaper and easier".²¹⁴ This type of reaction reveals a wider problem that EURO 2012 left behind. It raised issues over where the boundaries of Europe lie, and whether this event was instrumental not only in bringing Ukraine closer with Europe, but also, more importantly, repositioning Ukraine as a part of the wider European market and a full-fledged member of the European social, political and cultural milieu.

EURO 2012 Seen from a Perspective of the Ukraine Crisis

Before EURO 2012 many analysts were wondering whether this mega-event would be a catalyst for reawakening Ukraine's European self-assertiveness and boosting its prospects for further integration with the EU.²¹⁵ However, the political events that happened after 2012, the Euro-Maidan revolt in the fall 2013, the dethroning of Viktor Yanukovich, followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea and support for the military rebellion in eastern Ukraine, give a picture of a deeply divided country whose future, as well as relations with its neighbours, remain far from certain.

Ukraine has indeed faced tremendous difficulties in properly instrumentalizing the positive momentum generated by EURO 2012. In 2013 Lviv was punished by FIFA for the racist behaviour of local football fans, and banned from holding international games until 2018. Due to the hostilities in Eastern Ukraine the Euro-2015 European basketball championship was moved from Ukraine to a different country, and Lviv's bid for the Olympic Games in 2022 was cancelled for financial reasons. As a Ukrainian football writer assumes, after the championship Lviv faces troubles:

The town's team, FC Karpaty, is unhappy with how much the Arena Lviv has cost and has only played a few games there. They are now playing at their old stadium, even citing bad luck as one of the reasons for not playing at Arena

214 *Riach*, Euro 2020 to be hosted across Europe, UEFA announces.

215 *Cooper*, Euro 2012 moves beyond football with boycott challenge on Ukraine.

Lviv. As a result, the 35,000-capacity arena that was built specifically for EURO 2012 is vacant and loaded with debts, reportedly 2m hrivnas (£160,000) just for electricity and water. In addition the construction company that built the stadium claims they are owed 4,3m hrivnas. There have even been media reports that the stadium might be demolished as that would allegedly cost less than maintaining it with no football matches there.²¹⁶

Yet EURO 2012 also raised problems for the EU and its member states, who proved unable to effectively use their policy tools in dealing with the authoritarian regime in Kyiv.²¹⁷ European unity towards Ukraine was tested in 2011–2012, and it still remains the key issue for the EU's policies in Eastern Europe. Ukraine-sceptic arguments that were aired in many European countries before EURO 2012, were reiterated a year later in a completely new political and security situation of growing domestic tensions and open conflict between Moscow and Kyiv. The EU's prospects for Ukraine are limited to the AA signed in 2014, which only actualizes Ukraine's significance for the country's institutional, economic, societal and cultural inclusion in Europe. However this is not necessarily based on the prospect of EU membership.

The crisis in Ukraine–Russia relations and its wider security repercussions for all of Europe have confirmed the significance of borders as a key element of the rising conflict between Russia and many of its neighbours. With fading expectations for a “win-win” solution benefiting the EU, Russia and their common neighbours, it becomes apparent that the whole post-Soviet region, but above all Eastern Europe, is a space of contestation that generates insecurity and even military conflicts. Ukraine not only committed itself (even under the pro-Russian regime of the ex-President Viktor Yanukovich) to the European choice as its foreign policy strategy, but is one of few countries that sacrificed the lives of its citizens for a European future. EuroMaidan and the ensuing loss of Crimea to Russia emphasised clearly this choice. Yet these events also unveiled different perceptions of not only the idea of neighbourhood, but of Europe itself.²¹⁸

Events after 2012 sharpened these many controversial points. The hybrid war launched by Russia in the so-called “Novorossiia” even further complicated Ukraine's relations with Europe. By 2015 it became clear that “the only thing Ukraine can expect from the EU and from its

216 *Boyko*, Euro 2012 one year on - was it worth it for Ukraine?

217 *Kudelia*, When External Leverage Fails.

218 *Snyder*, Ukraine: The war for truth.

member states is a certain amount of financial, technical and political support for reforms in the country at this point in time".²¹⁹ The German public seems to have returned to the same indifferent attitude that it had in the past, perhaps with a little more basic knowledge about Ukraine.

Relations with Poland remain complicated: "It did not go unnoticed in Warsaw that Ukraine's leaders...did not strongly insist on Poland being part of the negotiation format; instead, they opted to depend on Germany. From Kyiv's perspective, Berlin seemed to hold all of the cards".²²⁰ In October 2014 the mayor of Lviv, Andriy Sadoviy, asked for official explanations from the Polish consul about an incident involving a map which depicted Lviv in the borders of Poland. In his Facebook note Sadoviy rhetorically asked what would the reactions of Poland be should the Germans publish maps including parts of Polish territory.²²¹ This demonstrated the sensitivity of the issue in the Ukraine-Poland-Germany triangle. The important thing is that Sadoviy made this statement at the peak of the electoral campaign, meaning, perhaps cynically, that he hoped he would gain more votes by making the map debate public.

As far as Russia is concerned, there is clear evidence of its active encouragement, if not creation, of fringe separatist movements in Transcarpathia and Galicia.²²² In the West there are voices claiming that "if western Ukraine wants to go its own way, Putin may be quite happy to give a tacit blessing to the emergence of a separate state in *Halychyna* (Galicia), breaking apart the Ukrainian national project of the last century, which attempted to encourage its western and eastern portions to identify more with each other and less with their former historical overlords".²²³ Apparently, this only adds to the highly negative reputation of Russia in Ukraine. What is of more importance is the domestic repercussions of the Russia factor, namely that the negative "othering" of Russia in Ukraine is structurally incomplete without bringing up a politically inflammable issue of Moscow's "fifth column" in Crimea and Donbas. This became an important element of the western Ukrainian political discourse after

219 *Potzgen*, No illusions about Europe in Ukraine.

220 *Buras*, Can Poland remain a leader in EU foreign policy? European Council on Foreign Relations.

221 *Sadoviy*, Facebook personal page.

222 *Coynash*, Separatism in Lviv' - For Money and Russian Propaganda. Human Rights in Ukraine.

223 *Gvosdev*, Ukraine's Ancient Hatreds, P. 23.

Moscow-supported separatism grew into the key security problem for the whole country.

By and large, after the clash with Russia Lviv strengthened its special role in the ongoing national building of Ukraine, in particular, by opposing the country's federalization and the subsequent recognition of autonomy for eastern regions, as Moscow insists.

“In recent years some regional identities, both in the west and in the east of Ukraine, have strengthened, but this does not necessarily contravene the national idea. In this sense Ukraine more resembles Germany than Poland which became homogenous and exclusionary. In Ukraine, we didn't have that experience of a monolith statehood, which is why regional distinctions remained intact. Ukraine is a project in a sense that we wish to construct something in the future, since we don't have a past to which we could come back. People realized this and want to participate in a common project regardless language or ethnicity. Most inhabitants of Crimea, in fact, detached themselves from this project. They disengaged for the sake of their pensions. They have no future – and we don't have this region. As for Donbas, it is in disarray, but they have to decide – to live in the future or not.”²²⁴

Against this backdrop, there are voices claiming that “struggling to return Crimea back, Ukraine in fact fights for reintegrating potential traitors... Crimea will always be a powerful burden precluding Ukraine's drift towards the EU and NATO”.²²⁵ The same argument could be extended to Donbas as well:

“Unless the south-east prevents us doing so, Ukraine could already have been a fully fledged member of the EU and NATO, enjoy visa free travel and reap results of reforms. Let's be objective: the south-east is an anchor that all these years immobilized the Ukrainian ship...Fighting for the south-east is tantamount to fighting for permanently staying where we are. In its large majority the south-east will always be pro-Russian, and forget about anything else.”²²⁶

This logic drives Drozdov to ascertain that Ukraine can turn its conflict with Russia into an all-European coalition against Putin that would ultimately destroy his power base.²²⁷

224 An interview with an editor of a local journal, Lviv, 2014.

225 *Drozdov*, *Esli Rossiya zavoyuet Krym, ona poluchit vtoruyu Chechniu*.

226 *Drozdov*, *Da svidaniya, tse ne nasha viyna!*

227 *Drozdov*, *Galichanam potribna viyna z Rosiyu*.

The east–west rupture in Ukraine is often articulated as a conflict between two models of development:

“For “Ukraine A” key priorities are integration with the civilized West, the rule of law, a social contract between elites and the people, and strengthening the values of human individuality. “Ukraine B” either dislikes all this, or views this through the prism of Russian propaganda – with distrust and hidden hope for undoing all the above mentioned...In winter 2013/2014 “Ukraine A” accelerated its drive, while “Ukraine B” backpedalled. As a result we have a conflict with multiple casualties.”²²⁸

The west–east divide was well accentuated in an interview with a former member of the Lviv city administration:

“Of course, after the multiple victims at the eastern front, nobody would dare to say it publicly, yet informally people do converse about whether we need to force others to live with us even if they don’t want to, and see the world differently.”²²⁹

For Lviv the debates on this highly sensitive issue directly touch upon its borderland identity. The image of a “city open to the world” and proud of its multicultural background was initially created for promoting Lviv commercially across Europe. It took advantage of a synthesis of diverse historic, ethnic, religious and architectural traditions. It was the tragic events in Crimea and Donbas that significantly changed the frame of debate forcing Lviv through a reality check, promoting the promises of tolerance, respect for plurality of cultures, and openness. After 2014 Lviv faced the challenge of not only sacrificing the lives of its citizens for the integrity of the country, but also hosting multiple internally displaced persons from the annexed or occupied territories, which substantially changed city life:

“Before that, our multiculturalism was mostly declaratory. Nowadays we have to encounter a different culture in our own premises. You can see this otherness in terms of lifestyles. It’s a test and a menace.”²³⁰

This opinion is corroborated by local discussions on the issues of domestic migration. Experts from Lviv draw a difference between those who came from Crimea because they prefer Ukrainian identity to the “Russian world” ideology, and those who left combat zones because of a fear of

228 Pavliv, *Ukraïna dvokh shvidkostey*.

229 An interview with a former member of the Lviv city administration, Lviv, 2015.

230 An interview with a former member of the Lviv city administration, Lviv, 2015.

being killed. It is the latter category that seems to be the most troublesome, since, in the words of a local writer, their self-assigned status of victim sometimes translates into an insistent demand for material assistance from those whom they consider “neo-fascist” in western Ukraine.²³¹

The situation is complicated by the fact that most domestic migrants in Ukrainian cities live far from the frontline. As a local sociologist put it, “migrants remain socially silent”, which both impedes social interaction and leaves open their role identity, are they victims of the conflict or those responsible for it, fellow countrymen or bearers of irreducible otherness, or perhaps newcomers whose incorporation into the local milieu could bring new opportunities rather than threats? This is a completely new set of dilemmas for cities such as Lviv, which still have a rather conservative and traditionalist mentality among a significant part of the citizenry. “It is in fact for the first time that here in Ukraine large groups of people coming from different regions find themselves in direct communication with each other. We have not known so far much about each other, since our geography was always a matter of a political game ... Yet now we do have this encounter, which might give us a new opportunity for social integration”.²³²

The opening of the Muslim cultural centre in Lviv in June 2015²³³ can be viewed as one of elements of a new experience of real multiculturalism. Another interesting example is the “Shakhtiar” football club from Donetsk, which since 2014 plays in Lviv.²³⁴ This is a particularly interesting case, set against the background of widely spread opinion that “for Ukrainians themselves, Lviv and Donetsk symbolize the social and political schisms within the Ukrainian state”,²³⁵ or what otherwise could be termed “invisible boundaries”.²³⁶ “Shakhtiar” is closely associated with the eastern Ukrainian tycoon Rinat Akhmetov whom many blame for escalating the conflict in Donbas. After one year of playing at the Lviv

231 *Zhadan*, *My duzho shvidko pochali govoriť “mi” i “voni”*.

232 *Mikheeva*, *My viyavili fenomen movchannia pereselentsiv*.

233 *Al'raid*, VAOO “Al'raid” otkroet esche odin Islamskiy kul'turnyy tsentr vo L'vove.

234 *Baziuk*, *Politichny igry u miacha*.

235 *Shulman*, *Asymmetrical international integration and Ukrainian national disunity*, P. 915.

236 *Charnysh*, *Analysis of current events: Identity mobilization in hybrid regimes: Language in Ukrainian politics*, P. 5.

"Arena", the Donetsk team started complaining that local fans support their rivals, which might question the prospects of holding games in a city with strong antipathy towards "easterners". Yet "Shakhtiar" is the only source of revenue for Lviv's stadium, which adds an important managerial aspect to the story again bringing together issues of identity articulation and practices of governance.

It is an everyday life practice of changing from the inside and creating a sense of nationhood that have played the decisive role in Ukraine's nation-building. *"Maidan was a grassroots movement (that proved that – A.M., A.Y.) our people can fight and withstand...But apart from revolutionary romanticism there is a boring routine of peaceful life."*²³⁷ One may agree that "nations are formed not out of talks, but out of experiences of everyday communication",²³⁸ and it is only through communication that otherness can be incorporated in the understanding of the national Self.

Unlike those who claim that the whole story of Ukraine's relations with Europe and Russia can be explained through a geopolitical lens,²³⁹ in this chapter we have taken a more multidisciplinary and nuanced approach to the intricacies of nation-building in this country. We divided our analysis into two segments, focusing, correspondingly, on the content and meanings of identity debates in western Ukraine, and on practices of governance as related to the EURO 2012 championship. We argued that Lviv lacked the technical characteristics required to host a high-profile mega-event, and was subject to influence from its key European partners, Germany and Poland. A political controversy, the Timoshenko affair, was a complicating factor for Ukraine's Europeanization and affected the implementation of the EURO 2012 project.

Based on field research, we found out that this sporting and cultural event was celebrated as a part of everyday city life and as a new step, among a variety of others, to urban development and place promotion. Lviv's policy during EURO 2012 was resident-friendly, grounded in horizontal networks of NGO's, local business and people, with a high level of

237 An interview with an organizer of the annual forum of writers and publishers in Lviv, 2014

238 Hrytsak, Aktual'ne.

239 Goetz, It's geopolitics, stupid: explaining Russia's Ukraine policy, P.3.

acceptance of European practices of governance and governmentality (as exemplified by joint projects with German and Polish colleagues). In the meantime, the policies of individual European countries were viewed as conflictual and even imposing, with some negative historical connotations being part of the debate. In this light, Poland is perceived as a good partner for micro-political projects and pragmatic exchanges, rather than for borrowing innovations or learning from. Germany is valorised as a source of transferable practices of good governance, and not for its politically ambiguous position regarding Ukraine's prospects in entering European/Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The case of western Ukraine illuminates many intricacies of performative identity construction in a borderland region that is both eager to boost its European credentials and faces limitations in the de-bordering policies toward its neighbours. By the same token, Lviv is an important element of Ukrainian internal discourse on nationhood and its representations. These perspectives, external and domestic, are instrumental in deploying Ukraine in two nuanced and variegated contexts. First, our analysis dispels the widely spread belief that Ukraine is happy to amalgamate with Europe at any price and subdue its identity to the hegemonic European discourse. In its stead we discovered a much more complex combination of inclusive and exclusive factors that open new venues for Europeanization but simultaneously maintain, if not sharpen, old divides and ruptures. Second, we came to the conclusion that another widely spread claim, of the consolidation of Ukrainian identity after the country faced the Russian hybrid war machine, needs to be contextualized and definitely should not be absolutized. Consolidation does take the form of ostracizing Russia and Eurasian integration plans, yet political splits within Ukraine remain substantial, especially as soon as it comes to policy debates on Crimea and Novorossiia. The future of Lviv's attempts to speak on behalf of all of Ukraine will to a large extent depend on how successful its practices of accommodating differences and opening up to a variety of domestic others will be.

