

Chapter II. *Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past*

2.1 Poland and Ukraine – neighbours in peace?

2.1.1 Together but still separated

An extensive block of the official documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on reconciliation concerns the Ukrainian-Polish relations. The reasons for the actual hostilities between the Polish and Ukrainian nations can be traced back to the 16th century and the tensions have not ceased, notwithstanding the declarations of reconciliation signed by the Presidents of both countries in 1997 and 2003.

“Any discussion of the post-communist Polish-Ukrainian cooperation has to be set against this background of the past – a past which continues to resonate profoundly in this part of Europe. In fact, cooperative relations at the state level camouflage disquiet within the wider society, where the past still shapes relations.”¹

This phrase describes very precisely what one encountered when trying to map the Ukrainian-Polish relations at the turn of the millennium. To the difficult moments nowadays belong a certain alienation after Poland joined the EU and reinforced its eastern border,² the disparity of the living

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- 1 Katarzyna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, *Poland and Ukraine. A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe?* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002), 29.
 - 2 This question had already been posed in 1998 by the working group of the inter-Church dialogue on reconciliation including representatives of the Churches of Poland, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Germany. (See a report about one of the conferences of that working group from 2001: Rheiner Rinne, „Versöhnung in Europa – auch in der Ukraine“, http://www.ekd.de/international/berichte/2001/reader_2001_24.html (accessed September 10, 2014)). In particular, they asked what would happen when Poland's border with Ukraine and Byelorussia became a border with the EU, whether the strengthening of this border according to the Schengen agreement would influence the reopening of the old wounds between the nations. A legitimate presupposition was expressed that the widening gap between the social and economic development of Poland as a member of the EU and its neighbours could aggravate old disputes, which we are indeed witnessing now some 10 years later. (“Primryeniye v Yevrope. Zadacha Tsyerkvyey v Ukrainye, Byelarusi, Polshye i Gyermanii” {Reconciliation in Europe. A task of Churches in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland and Germany}, in *Dyeyatyelnost rabochyey grupy myezhtsyerkovnoho dialoga “Rol Tsyerkvyey v primiryenii narodov*

conditions in both countries, the hardening of the visa regime for Ukrainians after Poland joined the Schengen agreement in 2007, the drifting of Ukraine towards the Russian zone of influence with the election of Viktor Yanukovich as President of Ukraine in 2010, and Poland's tiredness of being a vehicle that pushes Ukraine into Europe. Typical mass contacts between Ukrainians and Poles occur between scholars, journalists, representatives of the NGOs. Much more interactions between ordinary citizens happen through the cross-border trade or temporary employment of Ukrainians in Poland. Ukrainian gangsters and prostitutes cause the negative attitude of Poles to the ordinary Ukrainians.³ This type of contacts adds to the Ukrainian image in Poland as a poor worker which does not presuppose big respect. For Poland, Ukraine is a county which cannot overcome its institutional pathologies and constantly has problems with democracy.⁴ Ukraine created an image of the country that is not able to transform its economics successfully and with the developments of recent years this image has only been intensified.

At the same time, there were several distinctive attempts to normalise the relations between Poland and Ukraine on the official level. With the contribution of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Polish Roman-Catholic Church the reconciliation between both nations was declared in the presence of the Presidents of both countries during the opening of the Lviv Eaglets Cemetery and the memorial to the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen on June 24, 2005.⁵ Two days later, the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops solemnly celebrated the liturgical reconciliation act. To a great extent this rapprochement became possible due to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine which took place few months before. Poland played a great mediatory role in the settlement of the conflict between the two po-

Tsyentralno-Vostochnoy Yevropy” v 1996-1999 godakh (Minsk: OrthoPress, 1999), 19).

- 3 David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains. Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2007), 231.
- 4 Bogumila Berdychowska, “Polshcha-Ukraina. Duzhe vazhke dozrivannia” {Poland-Ukraine. A very difficult maturation}, *Yi* 74 (2013), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n74texts/Berdychowska_Pol_Ukr_vazhke_dozrivannya.htm (accessed April 11, 2014).
- 5 Ihor Iliushyn, “Aktualni problemy metodolohii ta istoriohrafii ukrainsko-polskykh vidnosyn 20 stolittia” {Actual problems of methodology and historiography of the Ukrainian-Polish relations in the 20th century}, *Problemy istorii Ukrainy: fakty, sudzhennia, poshuky* 16, no.1 (2007): 5.

litical camps revolving around the falsification of the presidential elections and social upheavals that followed. This Polish engagement and the election in the repeated second round of Viktor Yushchenko facilitated the negotiations for the opening of the Polish war memorial on Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv.

In 2006 the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine met in the Polish village Pavlokoma to commemorate Ukrainians killed during the attack of the Polish nationalist underground Armia Krajowa in 1945.⁶ Besides, in 2003 Ukraine and Poland memorialised the 60th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy of Poles when a compromise concerning commemoration activities was reached and a joint parliamentary agreement signed.⁷ Still before those events in 1997, the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine signed a joint statement about agreement and reconciliation.⁸

The efforts to bring about the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation after the communist turn in the early 1990s was among other things greatly inspired by Jerzy Giedroyc (1906-2000), a Polish diaspora intellectual and editor of the émigré journal “Kultura” (“Culture”) in Paris where he was the first to introduce the revision of the Polish-Ukrainian relations.⁹ Giedroyc was interested in the theme of the neighbours of Poland and announced a breakthrough in the Polish attitude to Ukraine which in the 1950s was marked by the absence of cooperation between the official institutions of the Polish and Ukrainian emigration because of the disagreements concerning the issue of the new borders.¹⁰ In that regard Giedroyc went against the common opinion of the time and in 1952 in his journal

6 Ibid., 5.

7 Ibid., 1.

8 Consult the text of the agreement: “Sovmyestnoye zayavlyeniye Pryezidentov Polshi i Ukrainy o soglasii i sblizhenii” {Joint statement of the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine on agreement and rapprochement}, in *Dyeyatyelnost rabochyey grupy myezhtsyerkovnoho dialoga “Rol Tsyerkvyey v primiryenii narodov Tsyentralno-Vostochnoy Yevropy” v 1996-1999 godakh* (Minsk: OrthoPress, 1999), 102-104.

9 More about the role of Jerzy Giedroyc and his journal “Kultura” on setting the foundation for the contemporary Polish-Ukrainia relation, see Myroslav Popovych, “Kultura’ s ukrainskoy tochki zyeniya” {“Kultura” from the Ukrainian point of view}, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/digest/2010/10/18/580/> (accessed January 15, 2014).

10 Khrystyna Chushak, *Nemaie vilnoi Polshchi bez vilnoi Ukrainy: Ukraina ta ukrainsi u politychnii dumtsi polskoi opozytsii (1976-1989)* {There is no free Poland without free Ukraine. Ukraine and Ukrainians in the political thought of the Polish opposition (1976-1989)} (Lviv: Pais, 2011), 82.

“Kultura” published a series of materials on the Ukrainian problem dedicated to the contestable topics in the Ukrainian-Polish relations such as new after-war borders or the history of the division Halychyna.¹¹ In addition to the problem of the borders and the revision of the past, Giedroyc elucidated the leading developments of the time in Ukraine and possibilities to influence them, made efforts to bring the Ukrainian question on the international level as well as presented Ukrainian culture on the pages of “Kultura.”¹²

The widely known ideas of Jerzy Giedroyc were later embodied in post-communist Poland. The core claim of Giedroyc is that “There cannot be an independent Poland without an independent Ukraine.” This argument derives from the presupposition that the continued conflict between Poland and Ukraine ultimately runs against the national interests of both countries. In the opinion of Giedroyc this implies the normalisation of the relations with the Polish eastern neighbour even if Poland has to reconcile itself to the fact of losing its eastern territories.¹³ This vision introduced by “Kultura” defined the geopolitical stand of Poland after 1989 and its eastern politics, which practically means regarding Ukraine as an ally of Poland and helping this state on its way to democratisation. Indeed, post-communist Poland embarked rather successfully on that mission especially during and after the Orange Revolution of 2005 in Ukraine.

Commenting on the results of the empirical studies on the common sentiments between Poles and Ukrainians conducted in 1997, Yaroslav Hrytsak points to the fact that it is mostly Poles who express more a negative attitude towards Ukrainians than vice versa.¹⁴ Generally speaking, Hrytsak claims that with the end of World War II the age-old conflict between Ukrainians and Poles was resolved by the change of the status of

11 Bogumila Berdychowska, ed., *Jerzy Giedroyc ta ukraińska emigracja. Lystywnia 1950-1982 rokiv* {Jerzy Giedroyc and the Ukrainian emigration. Correspondence of 1950-1982} (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2008), 27. Division Halychyna (Galicia) is a Ukrainian military unit consisting of Ukrainians from the western region Galicia that in 1943-1945 belonged to German military troops. This division is the most used argument for the accusation of Ukrainians of collaboration with the Nazis.

12 Ibid., 28.

13 Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, 36.

14 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Jeszcze raz o stosunku ukraincow do polakow (z Rosja w tle)” {Once more about the attitude of Ukrainians towards Poles (with Russia in the background)}, *Wiez* 473, no. 3 (1998): 27.

Ukraine.¹⁵ For the first time in history all Ukrainian lands were united within the borders of one state and especially western Ukraine got a new urgent political task to perform – to build its relations with Russia. The official politics of the Soviet Union aimed at erasing any memory of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict loaded with the threat of nationalism. Because of the Iron Curtain there were just a few contacts between the two peoples possible.¹⁶

From what has been said above it logically flows that in the second half of the 20th century generations grew up mostly ignorant about the events of the wartime years. It was the independence of Ukraine that reopened the whole tragic history of the relations between the neighbouring nations and thus stirred the challenge of reconciliation. At the same time, the memory of the past has always been alive in the case of Poland that has therefore more grounds to express its anti-Ukrainian views. To put it in another way, there is no wonder that a common Ukrainian sees Poland as a nation that has made an extremely successful economic jump and integrated into the EU and NATO, and for a common Pole Ukraine is now an underdeveloped country with violent nationalist bandits from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the history. Until recently, these have been old historical conflicts concerning the events in Volyn in 1943-1944 and the Operation Vistula of 1947 that were evoked, which was especially evident with regard to Stepan Bandera's proclamation as a hero of Ukraine by President Yushchenko in January 2010.¹⁷ The Polish side reacted with a strong condemnation of that title (the fact that it happened without any prior consultations with the Polish side was received with indignation)¹⁸ because of the accusation of Bandera of Nazism and the extermination of the Polish population during the Second World War by the nationalist insurgents under the guidance of Bandera.¹⁹

15 Ibid., 29-30.

16 Ibid., 30.

17 "Stepan Bandera Becomes Ukrainian Hero," <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/57781/> (accessed February 24, 2014).

18 Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Perezavantazhennia chy prodovzhennia – 2" {To reload or to continue – 2}, http://zaxid.net/blogs/showBlog.do?perezavantazhennnya_chi_prodovzhennya_2&objectId=1112675 (accessed January 25, 2014).

19 "U Polshchi orzanizovuiut pikety proty Bandery ta Yushchenka" {They organise pickets in Poland against Bandera and Yushchenko}, <http://www.credo-ua.org/2010/02/13962> (accessed February 24, 2014).

2.1.2 Historically embedded conflicts and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church

Apparently, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has many reasons to lead the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement from the Ukrainian side.²⁰ It is a Catholic Church and as such she can more easily find a common language with Catholic Poland. The majority of the Greek-Catholic faithful reside in western Ukraine, work or have family relations in neighbouring Poland and that intensified contacts between both nations. In their common declaration of the Volyn anniversary the Catholic Churches of Poland and Ukraine maintain that Ukrainians and Poles need good neighbourly relations everywhere they meet or cooperate.²¹

In the discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation three main topics can be distinguished. First, the majority of the documents concern the struggle about the opening of the Polish military memorial on the Lychakiv Cemetery in the early 2000s. The perturbations of that struggle brought to the daylight the existing problems of the Polish-Ukrainian relations and pointed at the need of reconciliation. Second, the climax of the movement towards rapprochement after the Pope's visit to Ukraine in 2001 and the Orange Revolution was reached in 2005 with the act of reconciliation between the Catholic bishops of Poland and Ukraine. Third, the newest developments in the Ukrainian-Polish relations concerning the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre admitted in 2013, which was also reflected in the documents of the Catholic and Greek-Catholic Bishops' Conferences, revealed that the reconciliation between both nations has not been completely realised. The majority of the texts appeared in the years 2002-2006, and they are primarily dedicated to the disputes about the Lychakiv Cemetery memorials and to the accomplishment of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in 2005. Those official pronouncements elucidate the position of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as well as the Polish Bishops' Conference on the issue and can serve as an example of how the Church can contribute to political reconciliation. Hence, her doctrine of the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church developed amidst that

20 Mykola Krokosh, "Prymyrennia: vazhkyi dialoh" {Reconciliation. A difficult dialogue}, interview by Serhii Shteinikov, *Religion.in.ua*, <http://www.religion.in.ua/main/daycomment/22581-primirennya-vazhkij-pochatok.html> (accessed January 20, 2014).

21 No. 2019.

very concrete struggle. The most important document of that group is certainly “Reconciliation between nations is possible,” a message of the Catholic Bishops of Ukraine and Poland on the occasion of a mutual forgiveness and reconciliation act, which was the highlight of reconciliation between both nations on the Church level.

It is striking that in the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Polish-Ukrainian relations the topic of guilt and blame for concrete historical injustices is not addressed at all. The Church leadership adopts the following approach: there was a lot of struggle in the past, but Poles and Ukrainians are neighbours, they have common interests and are united by the common Christian faith, hence, let them leave history to the past and reconcile for the sake of their common peaceful future. The references to the sources of the conflicts and their current stages are not manifold in the documents. The bishops indeed concentrate more on what can unite the two nations and search the ground for reconciliation.

There are no demands or pleas to recognise concrete faults of the past as in the case of the relations between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and the Russian Orthodox Church. There Greek-Catholics would be ready to reconcile with their Orthodox brothers on the condition that those recognise the evil that they were involved in or committed against this uniate Church.²² Obviously, this stance is dictated by the attitude of the Polish Church that recognised the faults of the Polish nation against Ukrainians which is not the case for the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore, in the circumstances of the Polish-Ukrainian relations the language is different. Although Greek-Catholics acknowledge that there was a lot of violence in the past between Poles and Ukrainians and both nations are guilty of it, there are no calls to examine that past and make a detailed list of crimes that one nation inflicted upon another. Let us illustrate that by concrete examples of the painful heritage of the Polish-Ukrainian past.

Conflicts on the Cemetery of the Lviv Eaglets

At the end of World War I, both Ukrainians and Poles got a chance to establish their independent states, the boundaries of which were overlapping in the western region of Ukraine called Galicia with the centre in Lviv. These aspirations resulted in the war that began on November 1, 1918 be-

22 See, for instance, No. 217, 362.

tween the recently proclaimed Western Ukrainian People's Republic and Poland.²³ The victims of that war from both sides are buried on the Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv. The war memorial was destroyed under Soviet rule and the Poles aimed at its restoration in independent Ukraine in its pre-war condition. The renewal of the graves of Polish soldiers and the re-opening of the war memorial on the Cemetery of the Lviv Eaglets were accompanied by burning discussions in both countries, thus bringing the past back into the present-day relations between the neighbouring lands.²⁴

This Polish-Ukrainian conflict is little known in Ukraine except in its western regions and the central Ukrainian government showed little interest in it. Therefore, when Kyiv decided to advance the issue of reconciliation between the two countries, the local Lviv authorities and intellectuals felt dominated by politicians ignorant of the Polish-Ukrainian controversies and boycotted the process.²⁵ This conflict was waged around the details of the memorial's design and the wording of the inscription. The Poles wanted to engrave on the plaque of the military monument "Here lie the soldiers who defended South-Eastern Poland" which was perceived by the Ukrainian side as a symbol of Polish militarism and the Polish claim for the city.²⁶ Consequently, the planned meeting of the Polish and Ukrainian Presidents in 2002 for the official inauguration of the monument was cancelled.²⁷

23 More on the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1918-1919, see Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2000), 367-370.

24 Bohdan Osadchuk, *Polshcha, Ukraina, svit* {Poland, Ukraine, world} (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2001), 312.

25 Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "Memory Wars and Reconciliation in the Ukrainian-Polish Borderlands. Geopolitics of Memory from a Local Perspective," in *History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Memory Games*, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (n. p., Palgrave, 2013), 181-182.

26 Ibid., 182.

27 The struggle over memorials to the Polish or Ukrainian victims of the common conflicts was waged on other memory sites too. One of the conditions of the settlement of the conflict on the Eaglets Cemetery was the erection of the memorials for Ukrainians, victims of the massacre of the Polish nationalists in the Polish village Pawlokoma. The memorial was inaugurated on May 13, 2006. The inscription on the Ukrainian memorial draws attention with its blurred expression as dedicated to the victims who "tragically lost their lives in the village of Pawlokoma on 1-3 March 1945." At the same time, on the cross for the local Polish victims the following inscription was engraved: "To the memory of the Poles, residents of the village Pawlokoma, who in 1939-1945 suffered death from Ukrainian nationalists." The second half of the inscription was intentionally cov-

The breakthrough was initiated by a small circle of Lviv intellectuals and the Church. On 1 November 2002, the Ukrainian dissident Myroslav Marynovych, the historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, the editor of the cultural magazine “Yi” Taras Vozniak and some others invited a group of the Polish intelligentsia for a meeting in the Ukrainian Catholic University that was concluded by a joint prayer on the graves of the Polish soldiers with the participation of the Heads of the Roman Catholic and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.²⁸ This tradition of prayer is still taking place every November 1. It significantly contributed to the agreement on military memorials in Lviv.

The joint document of Liubomyr Husar and his Polish colleague Marian Jaworski, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lviv, issued in July 2002 during the aggravation of the crisis concerning the Polish military memorials, illustrates well that the search for the guilty was not the leading element of discussions between the Churches. In their message both Church officials expressed the mutual agreement for the restoration of the monuments to the Polish soldiers – the Cemetery of the Lviv Eagles. Cardinal Husar and Archbishop Jaworski argued that the inauguration of the Polish war memorial and the memorial to the Ukrainian Galician Army would be a means to end the conflict and would become a symbol of reunion between the two nations. Reconciliation in this case should be built on the understanding that “everyone who sheds blood defending the interests of one’s homeland deserves a due homage.”²⁹ There is no sense in judging who was right or wrong, the only thing to be done is to honour the perished and appeal to consent. The two bishops laid aside any truth claims and called instead to pay homage to the soldiers. The same attitude to the past was adopted in June 2005 in the reconciliation act between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and the Polish Catholic bishops expressed in “Reconciliation between nations is possible.”

ered during the official inauguration ceremony by the Polish national flag. (See *ibid.*, 186-188).

28 *Ibid.*, 183-184.

29 No. 275, 458. Translation from the original source.

The Volyn tragedy

The massacre of Poles in the Volyn regions of Ukraine in 1943 appeared to be even a greater obstacle to the Polish-Ukrainian relations than the conflict about the Lviv Eagles Cemetery.³⁰ This event continues to mutilate the Ukrainian-Polish relations. In the words of historian David Marples, “Volyn is something of a stumbling block to what would otherwise be a complete friendship.”³¹ The fate of the Polish population of the Volyn region occupies a very important place in the Polish memory of World War II, while in Ukraine this is a marginal and widely unknown theme.³²

It deals with the mass liquidation of Polish civilians mainly by the forces of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1943. In the period between the two world wars western Ukraine remained under Polish rule whose authorities introduced a cruel anti-Ukrainian assimilation politics of pacification.³³ In the midst of World War II, Poles and Ukrainians tried to obtain control over the territory of Galicia with the aspiration to include this region into their respective countries after the war was finished and they presumably got independence. The Poles aspired to regain independence in the desired borders and the Ukrainians hoped to finally establish their state. In this light one understands the actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (a military wing of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists) between 1943-1944 when according to different estimations they killed

30 In view of the importance of this theme for the Ukrainian-Polish relations the independent cultural journal “Yi” dedicated a special edition to the topic in 2003 and 2013, on the occasion of the 60th and 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre (see numbers 28 (2003) and 74 (2013)). Both volumes present the most recent scientific and public discussions on the Ukrainian-Polish struggle of 1943 in the two neighbouring countries. The journal “Yi” is probably the leading edition in Ukraine that unites intellectuals and publishes targeted articles examining the Ukrainian relations with Poles, Russians, and Jews.

31 Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 222.

32 Andrii Portnov, “Ukrainski interpretatsii Volynskoi rizanyiny” {Ukrainian interpretations of the Volyn massacre}, *Yi* 74 (2013), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n74texts/Portnov_Ukrainski_interpretacii.htm (accessed April 11, 2014).

33 The newest research about the process of the Polish “pacification” in western Ukraine in the 1930s and its consequences for the further Polish-Ukrainian relations, see Roman Skakun, “Patsyfikatsiia.” *Polski represii 1930 roku v Halychyni* {Pacification. Polish repressions of 1930 in Galicia} (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2012).

between 60,000 and 100,000 Poles in the region of Volyn.³⁴ The aim of this cleansing was to provoke the Polish population to abandon the territory.³⁵ Killings were committed brutally and sometimes also with the help of Ukrainian peasants from neighbouring villages. Hence, there is no wonder that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army remained in the Polish common memory as brutal bandits.³⁶ Responding to the actions of the Ukrainian

34 Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, 33. See also the article of Bogumiła Berdychowska, "Ukraińcy wobec Wołynia" {Ukrainians in the face of Volyn}, <http://www.timeandspace.lviv.ua/index.php?module=academic§ion=session&id=46> (accessed January 26, 2014). The author, a Polish writer and journalist, describes the most important trends of the Ukrainian discussion concerning the admittance of the 60th anniversary of the Volyn events in 2003. In this article the author surveys the Ukrainian publications on the topic and investigates whom Ukrainians consider guilty of the Volyn massacre and which character this event had. The variety of interpretations strikes. For Myroslav Popovych the ideology of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army accounts for the extermination of Poles. Yaroslav Hrytsak believes that not so much the ideology as the politics of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists and its military wing has caused the massacre. Discrimination politics of Poland on its eastern territories is mentioned by Yaroslav Isaievych and Volodymyr Viatrovych (the latter has written an article explaining his misunderstanding why Ukrainians have to ask forgiveness for the Volyn massacres. For him it would be as if Ukrainians ask forgiveness for that they did not let themselves be killed on their own lands and that they recognise as a crime their defence of the fatherland as soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Volodymyr Viatrovych, "Vybachennia za..?" {Asking forgiveness for..?}, <http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/dyskusija/volyn/zayavaOUN.htm> (accessed January 26, 2014)). Yaroslav Dashkevych accused the anti-Ukrainian ideology of Poles, the Nazis, and Soviets. Yaroslav Isaievych additionally considered the Volyn tragedy as the result of the Soviet and the Nazi provocations. It seems, opines Bogumiła Berdychowska, that such a difference in explanation points at the fact that the authors try to find justifications for the Ukrainians for the tragedy.

35 Olszanski, Polish-Ukrainian conflict, 49.

36 In a certain way this is the continuation of the image of Ukrainians as that produced in the 19th century by the outstanding Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz in his novel *Ogniem i mieczem* (With Fire and Sword) where the Ukrainian Cossacks are laughed at as stupid, primitive, uneducated, and extremely cruel betrayers in comparison to noble, merciful, culturally superior Polish soldiers and aristocrats during the Ukrainian-Polish wars of 1648-1654 (Henryk Sienkiewicz, *With Fire and Sword*, trans. Jeremiah Curtin (n. p.: Wildside Press, 2010). See also Danuta Sosnovska, "Stereotyp Ukrainy i ukraintsia v polskii literatury" {Stereotype of Ukraine and Ukrainians in Polish literature}, *Yi* 10 (1997): 88-96; Andrij Pawlyschyn, „Studien zur Entstehung polnisch-ukrainischer Konflikte im 20. Jahrhundert“, *Yi* 11 (1997), <http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n11texts/pavlyshyn-ger.html> (accessed April 11, 2014)).

nationalists Poles exterminated approximately 15,000 to 20,000 Ukrainians.³⁷ The fears of Poles and Ukrainians from the times of war were conserved by the Soviet propaganda which promoted the image of Ukrainians as nationalistic collaborationists of the Nazis.³⁸ The recent discussions from 2010 about the hero title for Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists, reflects this image still present in the Polish mind when “the majority of Poles are convinced that the UPA³⁹ are murderers, arsonists, rapists, and Nazi collaborators, and Ukrainian nationalists belong in the “garbage bin of history.”⁴⁰

On April 11, 2013, at the time of the preparation to the admittance of the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre, a group of Polish parliamentarians registered the draft resolution that recognises the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA) guilty of the crime of genocide against the Polish population in 1939-1947 and accuses them of being in the service of the Nazis.⁴¹ Interestingly, this initiative found support from the Ukrainian side: 148 Ukrainian deputies from the presidential Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine sent an address to the Polish Sejm reporting about the growing anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and neo-Nazi sympathies in Ukraine and asking to condemn the organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists for the genocide of Poles in Volyn.⁴² Łukasz Kamiński, the director of the Polish Institute

37 Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, 34.

38 “Ukrainian patriotism was thus reduced to a kind of mindless collaborationism with fascism, which fitted an older Polish prejudice of believing the Ukrainians to be something less than a nation.” (Timothy Snyder, “Memory of Sovereignty and Sovereignty over Memory. Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939-1999,” in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Present of the Past*, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (n. p.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 51-52).

39 The UPA – abbreviation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (in Ukrainian – *Ukrainska povstanska armii*).

40 Marples, Heroes and Villains, 231.

41 “Polskyi Sejm hotuietsia zasudyty Ukrainku Povstansku Armiiu za henotsyd” {Polish Sejm gets ready to condemn the Ukrainian Insurgent Army for genocide}, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/04/19/121271/> (accessed January 15, 2014).

42 “Patsyfikatsiia po-novomu” {Pacification in a new way}, <http://nastupna.com/news/volyn> (accessed January 17, 2014); Borys Tarasiuk, “Suchasni uroky Volynskoi trahedii” {Today’s lessons of the Volyn tragedy}, <http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/tarasyuk/51e56c43dec8a/> (accessed January 17, 2014).

of National Remembrance⁴³ plainly ascribed the fault for the massacres of Poles to the Ukrainian nationalists repudiating the alternative vision of the events according to which also the Polish side exterminated Ukrainian civilians in mutual actions of ethnic killings.⁴⁴ According to the public opinion polls conducted after the commemoration celebrations of the Volyn massacres in 2013, the majority of Poles (64%) believe in the possibility of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation when the entire truth about the tragedy is revealed.⁴⁵ At the same time around half the population of today's Poland is ignorant of the Volyn events.

The anniversaries of the historical events like the Volyn massacre stir up discussions in the mass media and challenge the relations between Poland and Ukraine. This happened both in 2003 and 2013. On the one hand, this conflict reflects the reluctance of those Ukrainians proud of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to recognise also the less glorious deeds of their heroes. On the other hand, the Poles are unwilling to admit the high estimation of Ukrainian nationalists as fighters for the independence of the land that was for centuries ruled by external aggressors. The Ukrainian historian Myroslav Popovych argues that the attitude of the Ukrainians to Volyn derives from their totalitarian past because communism deprived people of the culture of responsibility:⁴⁶ "In the reappraisal of the Volyn events from 60 years ago appeared in the first place the inability of our society to review critically the communist heritage. And it is the easiest to think as if they are guilty of everything and not we."⁴⁷ The Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak and his Polish colleague Leszek Kolakowski call

43 About the structure, role, and vision in the self-presentation of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, see the article Marta Kurkowska-Budzan, "Power, Knowledge and Faith Discourse. The Institute of National Remembrance," in *The Post-Communist Condition: Public and Private Discourses of Transformation*, eds. Aleksandra Galasinska and Dariusz Galasinski (Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010), 167-187.

44 "Polskyi chynovnyk ne hovoryv pro 'obopolni etnichni chystky'" {Polish official did not speak about "the mutual ethnic cleansings"}, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/01/14/108124/> (accessed January 15, 2014).

45 "Bilshist poliakiv viriat u polsko-ukrainske prymyrennia (opytuvannia)" {The majority of Poles believes in the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation (opinion poll)}, <http://www.unian.ua/news/584669-bilshist-polyakiv-viryat-u-polsko-ukrajinske-prymyrennya-opituvannya.html> (accessed January 17, 2014).

46 Myroslav Popovych, "Volyn: nashe i ne nashe hore" {Volyn. Our and not our grief}, <http://www.kritiki.net/2003/05/02/volin-nashe-i-ne-nashe-gore> (accessed January 20, 2014).

47 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

to the collective moral responsibility about events like the Volyn tragedy. Hrytsak maintains that such a responsibility is very important in the social sphere where people are part of the bigger national or state groups. Consequently, when they feel proud of the achievements of their predecessors, they should equally carry a moral responsibility for their wrongdoings.⁴⁸ Similarly, Kolakowski indicates that if we speak about the spiritual and moral unity of the nation which endures the generations and preserves its sameness, it is reasonable to accept the collective moral responsibility for the faults of the past.⁴⁹

The challenges of dealing with the Volyn issue did not go unnoticed equally on the level of the Churches. In 2013, the Polish Roman Catholic bishops in Ukraine refused to work on a joint message with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as they could not arrive at an agreement concerning perpetrators⁵⁰ ascribing the entire guilt for the Volyn crimes to the Ukrainian nationalists. On June 24, 2013, the Ukrainian Roman-Catholic bishops issued a separate letter explaining their position. Although Polish bishops indeed mention that also Ukrainians fell prey to Poles, this happened in the course of self-defence and revenge strikes. In any case, the Polish actions “were not proportional either in the number of victims of evildoings or in barbarian methods that they were committed by.”⁵¹ The authors talk about the personal responsibility of the executors of the massacres and emphasise that justifications on the ground of ideology, party leaders and the like are not acceptable. Purification of the historical memory as the realisation and confession of guilt is the only way to reconciliation. This recent text differs from the message of John Paul II at the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Volyn massacre in which this Polish Pope declares the principles of the proper Christian treatment of those events.⁵² At the same time, on April 23, 2013, the regional Volyn

48 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Nashe i duzhe nashe hore” {Our and very much our grief}, <http://kritiki.net/2003/07/01/nashe-i-duzhe-nashe-gore> (accessed January 20, 2014).

49 Leszek Kolakowski, “Pro kolektyvnu vidpovidalnist” {About collective responsibility}, *Yi* 10 (1997): 17.

50 “Pastyrskyi lyst rymsko-katolytskykh yepyskopiv Ukrainy z pryvodu 70-i richnytsi Volynskoi trahedii” {Pastoral letter of the Roman-Catholic bishops of Ukraine on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy}, <http://galinfo.com.ua/news/136407.html> (accessed January 20, 2014).

51 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

52 “Poslannia Papy Rymskoho Ivana Pavla II do uchasnykiv urochystosti z nahody vshanuvannia pamiaty zhertv ukrainsko-polskoho konfliktu na Volyni ta v

Council of Churches including the representatives of Orthodox, Catholic, and Greek-Catholic local bishops issued their joint message which is in stark contrast to the one prepared by the Roman-Catholic bishops of Ukraine.⁵³ The message written in the spirit of “we forgive and ask for forgiveness” does not condemn any side but warns against the misuse of this anniversary to make mischief between both nations.

So at first, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church failed to convince the Polish bishops to issue a joint document on the occasion of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Volyn in 2013.⁵⁴ In the message authored only by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the authors plea to consider the Volyn events from a Christian point of view condemning every sort of violence that happened between the two nations.⁵⁵ From the Ukrainian side, the mass killings of the Polish population were to a considerable extent caused by the repressive politics of Poland during those more than 20 years that the Ukrainian Volyn region was part of the Polish state. Hence, the Greek-Catholic bishops raised a plea to condemn both the Polish politics and the Ukrainian liquidation actions. From the Polish side, Archbishop Mieczysław Mokrzycki did not accept such a view of history and demanded the explicit recognition of the fault of the Ukrainian side.⁵⁶ As an

Halychyni u 1943-1944 rokakh” {Message of Pope John Paul II to the participants of the festivities on the occasion of the commemoration of the memory of the victims of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volyn and in Galicia in 1943-1944}, http://warhistory.ukrlife.org/3_4_03_2.htm (accessed January 20, 2014).

53 “Zvernennia Volynskoi rady Tserkov shchodo 70-littia Volynskoi trahedii” {Message of the Volyn Council of Churches on the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy}, <http://www.pravoslavia.volyn.ua/dokumenty/dokument/?newsid=3162> (accessed January 20, 2014).

54 “Reaktsiia Mytropolita Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy na Volynsku trahediiu” {The reaction of the Greek-Catholic Metropolitan on the Volyn tragedy}, <http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2689.0.html> (accessed April 5, 2013).

55 No. 2018.

56 “Trudna wspólna ocena” {Difficult common assessment}, <http://ekai.pl/wydarzenia/x64377/trudna-wspolna-ocena/> (accessed February 24, 2014). This stance of the Archbishop encountered criticism from the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. See for instance, Mykola Khmilovskiy, “Povtornyi kazus Arkhiiepyskopa Mechyslava Mokshytskoho” {Repeated extraordinary case with Mieczysław Mokrzycki}, <http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/blog/~Nicolaus/52008/> (accessed January 20, 2014). Some Polish intellectuals also deplored the position of the Catholic Archbishop of Lviv, for instance, Adam Michnik, “Ne sperechaimosia pro te, khto bilshе zavynyv” {Let us not argue about who is more guilty}, *Yi* 74 (2013), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n74texts/Michnik_Ne_sperechajmosya.htm (accessed April 11, 2014).

alternative, Liubomyr Husar maintained that if both countries decided to concentrate on whose fault was bigger instead of striving to forgiveness it would be difficult to reconcile because the long history of the Polish-Ukrainian relations is full of misconducts from both sides.⁵⁷ Only after Poland and Ukraine place forgiveness in the foreground, will they be able to discuss effectively their common history.⁵⁸ Thus Volyn remains a durable obstacle in the Polish-Ukrainian relations where the issue of victims-perpetrators plays a decisive role.

The Operation Vistula

The key terms to describe the happenings of the 1940s in the Ukrainian-Polish relations are the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the events in Volyn, and the Operation Vistula.⁵⁹ Surprisingly, there are no official texts of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church where the Operation Vistula is mentioned although this event significantly shaped the Polish-Ukrainian relation in the aftermath of World War II. Attempting to finally resolve the Ukrainian question in 1947, the Polish government undertook a forcible deportation of Ukrainians from the border territories to western and northern regions of Poland, which the country had acquired from Germany.⁶⁰

57 Liubomyr Husar, “Musymo vyrishyty, chy hochemo pochaty z proshchennia, chy zh z vyznachennia toho, khto bilshe zhrishyv” {We must decide if we want to begin from forgiveness or from determining who sinned more}, interview, *I-12.org.ua*, <http://1-12.org.ua/2013/05/23/1937> (accessed February 5, 2014).

58 Ibid.

59 A good balanced outline of those events one finds in the article of Grzegorz Motyka, “Od Wolynia do Akcji ‘Wisła’” {From Volyn until the Operation Vistula}, *Wież* 473, no. 3 (1998): 109-133. An excellent overview and assessment of the recent historical discussions on the Ukrainian-Polish conflict are presented in Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 203-237. In that book the author dwells on the contemporary creation of the national history of Ukraine and how historical tensions are treated by different scholars and schools both in Ukraine and abroad. This is an excellent exhaustive monograph on the historical events of the 20th century that are constitutive to the creation of Ukrainian history in times of independence. A substantial part of this book is dedicated to the Ukrainian-Polish relations from a historical perspective.

60 For a detailed account of the fate of Ukrainians in Poland in the 1940s, see Timothy Snyder, “To Resolve the Ukrainian Question Once and for All. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1, no. 2 (1999): 86-120.

Those events are known in history as the Operation Vistula. In addition to the elimination of the support for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army by local Ukrainian population,⁶¹ another underlying reason for the Operation Vistula was the anticipated assimilation of the Ukrainians in the new lands and thus the resolution of the problem of Ukrainian nationalists forever. This intention is proved by the restrictions that Ukrainians faced in their new settlements regarding the possibilities of free movement, maintaining their culture and creating communities.

The fact that the estimation of the Operation Vistula represents an equally dividing point for the Polish-Ukrainian relations demonstrates the escalation of the debate during the historical seminars and deliberations initiated by the World Union of the Soldiers of the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) and the Union of Ukrainians in Poland. 12 seminars were conducted in 1996-2006, each of them dedicated to a certain aspect of the Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II. The whole project got temporarily stuck when it came to the discussions about the Operation Vistula. The Union of Ukrainians in Poland decided to withdraw its support in organising the 9th seminar⁶² protesting against the Polish appraisal of the Operation Vistula when the Poles strived to make Ukrainians recognise the mass killings in Volyn without reconsidering the own Polish views on the mass resettlements of Ukrainians.⁶³ The closing communiqué

61 Yaroslav Dashkevych, "Podzvinne operatsii 'Visla'" {The echo of the Operation Vistula}, *Yi* 10 (1997): 56.

62 *Ukraina – Polshcha: vazhki pytannia: Materialy VIII mizhnarodnoho naukovooho seminaru "Ukrainsko-polski vidnosyny pid chas Druhoi svitovoi viiny," 6-8 lystopada, 2000, Warshawa* {Ukraine – Poland. Difficult questions. The materials of the international scientific seminar "Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II," November 6-8, 2000, Warsaw}, vol. 8 (Lutsk: Volynska Oblasna Drukarnia, 2008), 336.

63 Without attempting to delve deeper into the seminar discussion, it is worth mentioning that contrary to the Ukrainian historians who regarded the Operation Vistula as a deportation and even as a genocide action against the Ukrainian population in Poland, Polish scholars voiced the following arguments: the Operation Vistula was a necessary undertaking in order to fight the Ukrainian Insurgent Army that functioned because of the great support of the population; the Operation Vistula was a legitimate result of the Volyn tragedy of Poles inflicted by Ukrainians in 1943-1944; as a result of the Operation Vistula Ukrainian peasants got much better living conditions in the west and north of Poland, so it was profitable for them (for more information about the 8th seminar papers and discussions about the Operation Vistula issue, see *ibid.*, 117-267). As a matter of fact, the media interest in the joint conferences of the Ukrainian and Polish historians of the initiative "Poland-Ukraine: Difficult Questions" in 1997-2001 was much

of the 8th seminar contained agreements on the reasons for and the implementation of the resettlement programmes of Ukrainians from Poland and Poles from Ukraine in 1944-1946, recognising the communist authorities largely responsible for the undertaking.⁶⁴ However, there was no agreement about the origins and the execution of the Operation Vistula and political, economic, and demographic effects of this event because of the above-mentioned reasons. Consequently, those controversial topics were postponed until the 9th seminar where corresponding agreements and disagreements were to be formulated.⁶⁵

Experts claim that the violent past will not obfuscate the present pragmatic relations between Poland and Ukraine.⁶⁶ Poland is interested in good partnership relations with Ukraine that has to become a democratic country with a developed market economy.⁶⁷ Indeed, during the EuroMaidan in 2013-2014 and the Orange Revolution nine years ago Poland was the first to offer different kinds of support to Ukraine. For Yaroslav Hrytsak the reconciliation between those two countries has an outstanding value: "In the all-European context the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation after the fall of communism has the same significance as the French-German one of the 1950s. Similarly as the latter laid the foundation of the united Europe, the former created a chance to spread this Europe to the East."⁶⁸ Hence, the

bigger in Poland being translated by the leading TV channels and radio stations than in Ukraine where it was only locally covered in Volyn (Andrzej Paczkowski, "Polshcha i Ukraina: vzhki pytannia, skladni vidpovi" {Poland and Ukraine. Difficult questions and complex answers}, in *Yevropa ta yii bolisni mynushyny*, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, trans. Yevhen Marichev (Kyiv: Nika-Tsentr, 2009), 151).

64 Ukraine – Poland. Difficult questions, 337-338.

65 Ibid., 338.

66 In his research on the repercussions of the past on contemporary neighbouring relations between Poland and Ukraine, Nathaniel Copsey maintained that except some radical circles in both countries the historical injustices do not and will not weigh down upon contemporary pragmatic politics in the near future: "It argues that despite sporadic appearances to the contrary, the past is much less important to most political parties than might be assumed." (Nathaniel Copsey, "Echoes of the Past in Contemporary Politics. The Case of Polish-Ukrainian Relations," SEI Working Paper, 87 (Sussex European Institute, 2006), 1, 19, <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-87.pdf&site=266> (accessed April 4, 2014)).

67 Marples, Heroes and Villains, 231.

68 Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Perezavantazhennia chy prodovzhennia – 1" {To reload or to continue – 1}, http://zaxid.net/blogs/showBlog.do?perezavantazhennnya_chi_

major task of the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation is transferring the western ideas of cooperation to the East. One of the initiatives in that regard is the European days of good neighbourly relations for strengthening the cross-bordering cooperation which has been held on the Ukrainian-Polish border since 2004 organised by different NGOs of the two countries.⁶⁹

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not speak about the Operation Vistula. Only once Liubomyr Husar claimed that it belongs to the biggest crimes of the communist dictatorship in Ukraine staying in one line with the destruction of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the Holodomor, and the deportation of the Crimean Tatars during World War II.⁷⁰ A possible ground for the absence of more detailed discussions is that the Church leadership does not want to stir the contest for the Poles' question of the Ukrainian nationalism during World War II. Additionally, there are no broad discussions on the Operation Vistula in Ukrainian society and hence the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church also leaves that issue aside. I consider that when the Catholic Churches of Poland and Ukraine wage a discussion about the painful historical heritage, every page of that history has to be revealed and the Operation Vistula has to be discussed together with the Volyn massacres. The full truth about the past must be discovered. This is the case when only general references to the mutual crimes do not suffice.

2.2 War has finished – war continues

2.2.1 Plurality of war memories

Notwithstanding 20 years of independence, a great part of Ukrainian society still demonstrates an ideological connection to the Soviet and now Russian cultural space. That results in the explosive reaction when part of the Ukrainians who feel connected to the old ideology strives to preserve it and the other part obstinately tries to abandon it.⁷¹ The cleft becomes

prodovzhennya_1&objectId=1112540 (accessed January 25, 2014). Translation from the original source.

69 The website of the initiative explaining the idea behind the history and the programme of the event: <http://www.kordony.net/> (accessed January 26, 2014).

70 No. 213, 354-355.

71 Maryna Dovzhenko, "Mizhetnichna ta relihiina tolerantnist v ukrainskykh zasobakh masovoi informatsii: Ne vse tak pohano" {Interethnic and religious toler-

especially evident when Ukraine officially admits the feasts that are embedded in the Soviet past. One of such anniversaries is the Victory Day over Nazism admitted on May 9. The contesting views in this case are represented, for instance, by the Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Viatrovych who believes that the celebration of Victory Day with its ideology of the winner means that Ukraine lives according to the Moscow ideological system⁷² and the editors of the newspaper “Podrobnosti” who claim that Victory Day is a big feast for the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (82%).⁷³ The representatives of the first group underscore the fact that the Russian President Volodymyr Putin in May 2013 claimed that World War II was won by Russia with her own industrial resources and this would have happened even when Ukraine had not been part of the Soviet Union; Russia won because it is a country of winners.⁷⁴

In contemporary Ukraine there is a plurality of memories of World War II and no consensus concerning a unified narrative of those bloody events of about 70 years ago. The real war finished a long time ago, but the disputes about its meaning continue still nowadays. The principal question is what the defeat of the Nazis signified for Ukraine. Was this a real liberation for Ukraine? How shall the winner, the Soviet Union of Stalin’s epoch, be estimated? It indeed defeated Nazi Germany but in the years after the termination of the war the Ukrainian nationalistic underground was dispersed together with the dreams about an independent Ukraine. The historian Andrii Portnov identified several clusters of the narrative memory of World War II. The dominant cluster is a typically Soviet set of stories where the war is called the Great Patriotic War, it started on June

ance in the Ukrainian mass media. Not everything is so bad}, <http://risu.org.ua/index/projects/tolerance/52682/> (accessed January 15, 2014).

72 Volodymyr Viatrovych, “Maskovskaye vryemya” {The Moscow time}, http://zaxid.net/blogs/showBlog.do?maskovskaye_vremya&objectId=1284703 (accessed January 15, 2014); “Istoryk {Volodymyr Viatrovych}: ‘9 travnia vvažaiut sviatom lyshe krainy, shcho perebuvaiut pid vplyvom Rosii’ {Historian {Volodymyr Viatrovych}: ‘The 9th of May is considered a holiday only in those countries which are under the Russian influence’}”, <http://tyzhden.ua/News/79163> (accessed January 15, 2014).

73 “Prazdnovat Dyen Pobyedy namyeryeny 75% ukraintsyev – isslyedovaniye” {75% of Ukrainians plan to celebrate Victory Day – study}, <http://podrobnosti.ua/society/2013/05/07/903638.html> (accessed January 15, 2014).

74 “Rosiiia peremohla b u Druhii svitovii viini i bez Ukrainy” {Russia would have won the Second World War even without Ukraine}, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2010/12/16/9142/> (accessed January 15, 2014).

22, 1941, and it is believed that due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the united Ukrainian state appeared.⁷⁵ Another aspect is represented by the Ukrainian nationalistic underground during the war that is associated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Finally, although less explicitly, the memory of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars and the Holocaust builds a separate cluster that completes a picture of World War II in Ukraine.⁷⁶

The attitudes of the population of Ukraine in different regions significantly vary with regard to World War II. According to the public opinion survey performed by the Razumkov Centre in 2005, the term Second World War seems to be more appropriate for 31% of the citizens while 56.9% of Ukrainians still support the name Great Patriotic War.⁷⁷ However, one gets an interesting picture while considering the regional distribution of the answers. If citizens of western Ukraine are more reluctant to call the events of 1939-1945 the Great Patriotic War – 36.1% only, 63.9% and 64.1% eastern and southern Ukrainians respectively on the contrary show a high support for this term.⁷⁸ With regard to the name Second World War, the results are the following: 41.2% for the west, 27.9% for the south, and 28.9% for the east in favour.⁷⁹ Those numbers not only illustrate the existing difference in the interpretation of the historical events of the 20th century, but also help determine the worldview of Ukrainians from different regions of the country.

Among the most contesting issues of World War II is the role of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Since 1991 the entire discussion has been cen-

75 Andrii Portnov, “Ukrainski obrazy Druhoi svitovoi viiny” {Ukrainian images of World War II}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?ukrayinski_obrazi_drugoyi_svitovoyi_viyni&objectId=1235328 {accessed August 29, 2012}. This vision is promoted by Dmytro Tabachnyk, Ukrainian Minister of Education and Science in 2010-2014. He argues that the victory in World War II lies at the basis of the Ukrainian national memory because it was a war for the defence of their common fatherland, the Soviet Union. The Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists should be condemned similarly to the Nazis because they used to fight against the Soviet Red Army (Oleksandr Zaitsev, “Viina mitiv pro viinu v suchasni Ukraini” {The war of myths about the war in contemporary Ukraine}, *Krytyka*, 3-4 (2010): 16).

76 Portnov, Ukrainian images.

77 Razumkov Centre, “Sotsiologichne opytuvannya: Z yakoiu nazvoiu viiny proty fashyzmu Vy bilsh zhodni?” {Sociological poll. Which name of the war against fascism do you agree more with?}, http://www.uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=286 (accessed February 24, 2014).

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

tred on whether these military groups have to be recognised as combatants in the war. The positive decision has always been strongly opposed by the communists who continue to portray the insurgents as Nazi collaborators. In western Ukraine where the insurgents were in fact active, they are perceived as fighters for independence. Some regional councils in the west of the country issued a decision to grant them privileges for public transport and communication fees, supplements to pension etc., similar to those that the soldiers of the Red Army enjoy.⁸⁰ However, to spread the western views of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to the whole country is complicated because the main attitude towards them in other regions is either ambivalence or condemnation. Mykola Riabchuk holds that in that question history stands in the centre of the ideological battle that has little chances to be finished peacefully: “The debate on any historical problem fairly easily turns into a kind of “cold domestic war,” into a mere propaganda campaign, in which academic arguments do not have much substance, and in which all nuances are lost; there is no middle ground and only black and white exist.”⁸¹ Obviously, that has an influence on the work of historians because “in such a context, not much scope is left for academic discussion; in particular within one’s own ideological camp. Any doubt or “revisionism” in such a polarised environment is perceived as treason, as defection to the other, “hostile” side of the ideological barricade – for “who is not with us is against us.”⁸²

The Ukrainian narratives of the war contradict each other, they are often exclusive, and one of the tasks of healing the memory of war consists in dealing with them in a way that reconciles people who are bearers of different identities. This is also one of the principal tasks that the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church undertakes.

80 “Naibilshi pilhy veterany Ukrainskoi povstanskoï armii maiut v Ivano-Frankivsku, Lvovi ta Ternopoli” {The biggest privileges the veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army have in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil}, <http://tyzhden.ua/News/39514> (accessed February 25, 2014).

81 Quoted in Wolczuk and Wolczuk, *Poland and Ukraine*, 41.

82 Ibid.

2.2.2 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: reinterpreting the established image of war

The discourse on World War II in Ukraine that is among other things promoted by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is part and parcel of the process of transition. Similar to the Polish case, “Victory Day is an event that encompasses several dilemmas of the transitional period: the construction of new collective identities, re-definition of “us” and “them,” the selection of national history repertoire as well as harmonising it with the repertoires of the new ally – Europe.”⁸³ Although Europe is not yet a complete ally of Ukraine contrary to the case of Poland, a member of the European Union, the new approach to the commemoration of the end of the Second World War shows that at least part of the Ukrainians are oriented towards western values. At the same time – again contrary to the Polish case – the memory of World War II in Ukraine is not homogenous. This is evident both in the official state commemoration ceremonies and in the discourses and actions of Ukrainian Churches.

There are not many documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church completely dedicated to the theme of the healing of memories of World War II. Additionally, having studied those documents, it became evident that this topic has not been explicitly touched by the leadership of the Church until the late years of the ministry of Liubomyr Husar. The first of the addresses was released in March 2005, and was followed a month later by the statement of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the commemoration service in the village Potelych and the subsequent round table on war and reconciliation. The Greek-Catholic faithful had to wait another five years until in 2010 the next text of Husar appeared, and in 2011 Sviatoslav Shevchuk also published his thoughts on the topic of war. For this study I will also refer to some of the most interesting ideas from the available interviews of the Church leadership in which the subject is evoked.

Whereas Liubomyr Husar waited a long time before officially articulating his position on World War II, the present Patriarch Sviatoslav Shevchuk already among his first official documents prepared “Call of His

83 Anna Horolets, “Collective Memory in Transition. Commemorating the End of the Second World War in Poland,” in *The Post-Communist Condition: Public and Private Discourses of Transformation*, eds. Aleksandra Galasinska and Dariusz Galasinski (Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010), 48.

Beatitude Sviatoslav to the clergy and the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and all people of good will to prayer on the Commemoration Day of June 22, 2011.” Still, Husar significantly contributed to the re-evaluation of the legacy of war by supporting and blessing the commemorative activities of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. I will include an account of actions and one address of that Commission in the analysis. The question arises why Liubomyr Husar did not dare to prepare an explicit statement on the clashing memories of war in Ukraine earlier regardless his powerful reconciliation discourse on many topics.

It is easy to speak about perpetrators in the context of World War II. However, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church puts another emphasis on the feast where the contemporary Ukrainian state praises the Soviet Red Army for defeating the Nazis. The Church leadership attempts to find out what World War II meant for Ukrainians then and now. In 2010 Ukraine admitted Days of Prayer on May 9 and May 16. Whereas the former is official Victory Day in Ukraine, the latter is the Day of the commemoration of the victims of the communist repressions. In his address on the occasion of the Days of Prayer in 2010, Husar interconnects both events.⁸⁴ The author avoids a typical term of reference to World War II during the Soviet times, that is the Great Patriotic War. Instead, he links the celebration of Victory Day with the less glorious fact of the Soviet history – numerous victims of the communist regime. In this way Husar sets different accents on the celebration of the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. The novelty of Husar’s interpretation consists in the fact that he portrays World War II as yet another evil for Ukraine which finally did not bring the desired liberation from the external enemy, but merely signified a shift from one totalitarian regime to another.

Furthermore, Liubomyr Husar significantly contributed to the discussion on the interpretation of World War II by unfolding a moral lesson of the war for today’s Ukraine. Husar links the events of 1941-1945 to the outcomes of World War I of 1914-1918. Because of the economic, political and especially moral crisis caused by World War I, the foundation for the spread of the totalitarian ideologies of Leninism, Stalinism, and later Nazism was laid. Those regimes dominated so many events of the 20th century. Additionally, “they differed but also had a lot in common. Both were marked by struggling against Christian moral rules, attempted to de-

84 No. 2005.

stroy human dignity, were extremely brutal in the extermination of their opponents without trial through executions and in concentration camps, through the organisation of artificial famines etc.”⁸⁵ Furthermore, the kinship of those totalitarian regimes was revealed in 1939 when they allied and started the war that has cost millions of lives until the downfall of Nazi Germany in 1945.

The importance of the kinship of both totalitarian regimes is revealed further in the text when the author unfolds his notion of the real victory. Husar underlines that the victory over Nazism was only a partial one. Notwithstanding the joy of success, “there is no feeling that as an outcome of that victory there came a genuine deep and lasting peace because almost the whole second half of the 20th century for Ukrainians and other neighbouring people signified a period of new resistance and severe trials.”⁸⁶ The author comes to such a conclusion because after the defeat of Nazi Germany the allies ended up in Cold War and in the countries, where communist regimes were established, people suffered under repressions.

Sviatoslav Shevchuk argues along similar lines. He denotes the war of 1941-1945 as a “fatal collision of two misanthropic ideologies – Nazism and communism” and “bloody time of unrest.”⁸⁷ The adjectives *fatal* and *bloody* refer to the gravity and tragedy of the events and the nouns *collision* and *time of unrest* describe this struggle as evil. Furthermore, the author names the conflicting parties that started the warfare – the followers of Nazism and communism. By mentioning them directly one next to the other Patriarch Sviatoslav does not make any difference between the two ideologies and condemns both of them.⁸⁸ Therefore, in this interpretation one cannot speak about communism as the triumph over Nazism because both those ideologies brought about endless sufferings. Thus the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church attempts to rethink the meaning of communism and Nazism in the history of Europe contradicting the belief that while Nazism is unilaterally recognised as the pure embodiment of

85 No. 199, 337. Translation from the original source.

86 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

87 No. 2009. Translation from the original source.

88 A similar condemnation of both ideologies of Nazism and Stalinism is found in No. 2017.

evil in Western thought, the Soviet communism is rather perceived as “a good idea that turned out badly” and is submitted to collective amnesia.⁸⁹

This reconsideration of the meaning of victory over Nazism and the equalising of both totalitarian systems which marked the historical way of Ukraine in the 20th century is the principal contribution of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the dispute on the historical memory of World War II. Both systems were evil, but not only that matters. Everybody who allowed the evil of fear, separation, and hatred to take roots in one’s heart is guilty as well. That remarkable evaluation will have implications on how to heal the memory of war that I will elucidate in the next part of the monograph. The most important conclusion at that stage is that not only objective historical evil like Nazism or communism account for human suffering, but the evil inclinations in one’s heart are destructive as well. The problem is to be placed in the domain of the human spirit. The position of the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church coincides with what Waław Hryniewicz noted concerning the Katyn massacre where on Stalin’s order around 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia were killed in the spring of 1940. For decades this communist crime has been silenced by the Soviet Union and later by Russia. Hryniewicz is convinced that equally Ukraine has to purify its war memory from the false idealisation and heroic discourse of the ideology of the winner.⁹⁰

2.3 Divided Church – divided nation

The issue of reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches understandably receives most attention in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. This question immediately touches upon the life of the Church and her mission of evangelisation. There is a variety of documents that treats the topic of the inter-Church relations in Ukraine. I will endeavour now to identify how the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-

89 Alain Besançon, *A Century of Horrors. Communism, Nazism, and the Uniqueness of the Shoah*, trans. Ralph Hancock and Nathaniel Hancock (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007), ix.

90 Waław Hryniewicz, “Katynskiy rozstril ta yoho peredvistia: chy vzhe nastav chas “perehornuty” tsi storinky istorii?” {Katyn execution and its portent. Is it time to “turn” those pages of history?}, http://gazeta.dt.ua/SOCIETY/katynskiy_rozstril_ta_yoho_peredvistya_chi_vzhe_nastav_chas_peregornuti_tsi_storinky_ist_oriyi.html (accessed January 13, 2014).

Catholics evaluates the division between the Churches and whom they deem responsible for that state of affairs. This analysis should help us understand the suggested reconciliation models of that Church.

The wound of division

Similar to other Ukrainian Churches, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church describes the split of Ukrainian Christianity as *the unhealed wound of division* in the body of the Ukrainian nation.⁹¹ This notion is applied by all four traditional Churches and the efforts or means towards rapprochement are often introduced by the term *healing/curing the division*. By presenting the split among the Christians as *a wound*, the Ukrainian Church leaders univocally point at the imperative of unity. If the wound is not healed, a person dies. Similar, if the division between the Churches is not cured, Christianity in Ukraine will fail in its mission of evangelisation.

The sin of pride

The discourse on the guilt of the division between the Churches acquires different accents. Sometimes the Churches are accused of instigating that division, in other texts Christians themselves are reproached with the inability to unite whereas none of the Churches is accused of being the sole protagonist of the split.⁹²

Already in his presentation during the special Synod of the Bishops of Europe in 1991, Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi brought to the fore the reasons behind the split among the Christians in Ukraine. At that time the problem of the redistribution of the sacral buildings was causing unrest. As a solution the usage of the same sacral building in turns was implemented, however, this practice was not successful everywhere. Liubachivskyi contended that mutual distrust and fear, unsubstantiated accusations of each other, the national element as well as the lack of the sense of religious pluralism among Ukrainians complicate the develop-

91 For instance, see No. 40; No. 2010; No. 5003 (No. 4000).

92 No. 40, 74.

ment of genuine ecumenism.⁹³ However, the principal reason for the struggle between the Churches nowadays is the sin of pride that dominates in their relations. Sin belongs to the domain of the spirit; hence the healing must also be of a spiritual nature.

Notwithstanding the glorious firmness of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the epoch of persecution, the disunity and struggle between the Churches started again as soon as difficult times passed into history. The analysis of the period of the Soviet attempts to eradicate religion reveals that people survived because they supported each other and demonstrated their Christian love through the readiness for sacrifice. One can indeed speak about the “ecumenism of the Gulag” that united people of different religions, denominations and nations “into one Body by the cross of Christ; their solidarity came from their common suffering.”⁹⁴ At the same time, the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church realised that human solidarity against the common enemy alone cannot assure genuine unity.⁹⁵ After the fall of the Soviet Union, Churches returned to mutual struggle considering each other adversaries instead of the enemy that disappeared. The Greek-Catholics are aware that they also share responsibility and guilt for the present state of affairs.⁹⁶ Therefore, they must investigate the situation in order to contribute to the restoration of the original unity of the Church. In the opinion of the Greek-Catholic bishops, it is the sin of pride manifested in political interests, human ambitions and the spirit of rivalry between the Churches that is the key reason for separation nowadays.⁹⁷

Intrusion of the state

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church leadership is convinced that the false intrusion of the state authorities into the Church affairs can destabilise the ecclesiastical situation in the country. As a possible threat to the interconfessional relations in Ukraine, Liubomyr Husar considers the transfer of the Saint Sophia Cathedral from the state jurisdiction to the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves that belongs to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church

93 No. 32, 59.

94 No. 219, 371 (No. 3003, 154).

95 Ibid.

96 No. 219, 371 (No. 3003, 153).

97 No. 219, 372 (No. 3003, 155).

of the Moscow Patriarchate. The possibility of such a transfer was studied by the state authorities in 2010 under President Victor Yanukovych who was openly favouring the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Cardinal Husar warns that entrusting the cathedral that represents the spiritual heritage of the whole Ukrainian people and of the entire Kyivan Church only to one denomination could become a stepping stone in the interconfessional relations.⁹⁸ Equally, it is important that at the 1000th anniversary of the Saint Sophia Cathedral all four branches of the Kyivan Church are present and that this event becomes a step towards the Church unity in Ukraine. For that aim the criteria of canonicity, truthful Orthodoxy (that according to certain opinions can be fulfilled in Ukraine only by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) and the like should not be decisive for the invitation of the Churches to take part in the celebrations.⁹⁹

Not only the mission of salvation of the Church is endangered by the Church division. The division between the Churches is often presented as the biggest tragedy of the Ukrainian people. It is especially typical of Cardinal Husar. In his opinion, a number of other problems originated from the split between the Churches that the Ukrainians have been suffering from for centuries.¹⁰⁰ The Cardinal postulates that everyone who cares about the fate of the Ukrainian nation cannot remain indifferent to the tragedy of the Church division¹⁰¹ because it is a manifestation of the social polarisation in Ukrainian society. In a number of documents the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church emphasises the need to restore the Church unity as it would contribute to the societal cohesion. According to the evaluation of the Greek-Catholic Synod of Bishops:

“The next in turn tragedy of our nation is the Church division that was conceived not in our lands. It arrived to us from different sides; we accepted this evil into our hearts and keep up this fire till now. Our fault lies precisely here because religious and confessional fanaticism is the worst form of division among the people. It became the real damnation of our people.”¹⁰²

According to this text, the Ukrainians themselves are not guilty of the Church division in their country; it was caused by external forces. However, the fault of the Ukrainians themselves consists in their readiness to accept evil and cherish it. It is not completely clear whom the Greek-

98 No. 2006.

99 Ibid.

100 No. 83, 152.

101 Ibid.

102 No. 98, 182. Translation from the original source.

Catholic leadership blames for the Church division, whether it is the split between western and eastern Church in the 11th century, the Roman Pontiffs who received the Kyiv Metropolia into the union with Rome on the basis of Latin exclusivism in 1596, or the political games of the Moscow Patriarchate that eventually contributed to the split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy at the beginning of the 1990s. The bishops only conclude that the Church division in Ukraine is a real tragedy of the nation.

The Union of Brest and the Church division

The studied texts confer that none of the Ukrainian Churches can consider herself innocent of the division of the Kyivan Christianity. Therefore, every Church has to recognise her guilt, repent and return to the original unity.¹⁰³ This equally concerns the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church herself. In their “Conception of the Ecumenical Position,” the Greek-Catholic bishops recognise that the way of the creation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church by entering into the union with Rome in 1596 has partly contributed to the split in the ancient Kyivan Church. This particular way of the emergence of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has to be regarded in connection with the crisis of Christianity in the epoch of the Reformation and with the Muslim invasion.¹⁰⁴ Still, this does not level the partial responsibility of the initiators of the union with Rome for the situation in Ukrainian Christianity.

The unacceptance of the union by a part of the bishops of the Kyivan Metropolia, who stressed their adherence to Constantinople, amounted into the creation of a parallel Orthodox hierarchy in 1620. Notwithstanding several attempts at the reunion in the centuries that followed, “the wounds of division on the body of the Kyivan Church remained unhealed.”¹⁰⁵ In his analysis of the new *Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church* “*Christ is Our Passover*,” Mykola Krokosh reproached the leadership of this Church for the missed opportunity to recognise their fault of signing the Union of Brest which was a sin against the unity of the

103 No. 2006.

104 No. 5003, 52 (No. 4000, 116).

105 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

Ukrainian Church.¹⁰⁶ So far this theme has not been elaborated enough in the official discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

“No” to the Soviet methods of struggle

In the letter to the leaders of the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, Husar warns them not to use the methods that the Soviet state applied in order to destroy the Church. Unfortunately, nowadays the Churches refer to such means themselves in order to diminish the influence of a rival denomination by political, administrative or other forms of pressure.¹⁰⁷ As Myroslav Marynovych explained, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as well as the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches with the unrecognised canonical status have to “learn successfully how to overcome all the dangerous syndromes of the recent past – the “martyr complex,” the “conquerors of Communism” complex and also tendencies in the direction of nationalism, excessive politicisation and so on.”¹⁰⁸ That reality has to be recognised by every denomination that originated in the ancient Kyivan Church.

Summarising this analysis, the following elements are worth repeating. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church longs to put a diagnosis to the contemporary situation of the Ukrainian Churches. The analysed texts reveal that Greek-Catholics do not want to interfere into the internal affairs of the Orthodox Churches by commenting on their canonical status. Still, both Orthodox denominations and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church share the responsibility for the division. The Greek-Catholics occasionally indicate that the way the Union of Brest was concluded also contributed to the split of Christianity in Ukraine. However, this theme does not sound loud enough. This does not mean that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considers this step as a wrong one; it rather goes about the false way of reaching the union. Such a recognition is

106 Mykola Krokosh, “Katekhyzm Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy’ v ekumenichnii perspektyvi: krok vpered, dva nazad” {“Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church” in ecumenical perspective. One step forward, two steps backward}, <http://www.religion.in.ua/main/daycomment/12797-katexizm-ugkc-v-ekumenichnij-perspektivi-krok-vpered-dva-nazad.html> (accessed January 22, 2014).

107 No. 216, 359.

108 Marynovych, *Obstacles on the Road*.

potentially valuable for the restoration of the Church unity in Ukraine. Occasionally, external forces and historical circumstances are rendered guilty of the Church division in Ukraine. But it is rather an exception. The leading idea of the Greek-Catholic leadership is that the Churches themselves caused and deepened the division guided by political or non-ecclesial worldly considerations. Ultimately, it is sin of pride that fuels human ambitions and causes divisions. The split among the Churches is seen from the spiritual perspective as a deficiency of the human condition and it should be cured by spiritual methods as well.

The Greek-Catholic Church leadership emphasises that the disunity among the Churches in Ukraine contributed to the East-West regional division and to the social polarisation in the country. Bishops do not believe in human solidarity without spiritual foundation. Because of that Liubomyr Husar promoted the idea of the united Kyivan Patriarchate that would symbolise the unity of the Church in Ukraine bearing potential to consolidate the Ukrainian nation.

2.4 Difficult northern neighbour

2.4.1 Heavy load of historical burden

Contesting issues

In his critical article on January 13, 2014, Antoine Arjakovsky makes a quintessence of what the Russian Orthodox Church owes to Ukraine:

“The Moscow Patriarchate suffers for not having repented, for not having been purified of the long years of compromise with the Soviet power. As demonstrated more and more by Russian Church specialists in France (K. Roussellet) and Russia (N. Mitrokhin), this Church has no sense of history, and does not grasp the new issues in the present time of globalisation... The Moscow Patriarchate continued to accuse Greek Catholic Christians of being traitors, when they should have been starting by repenting for having organised a false council in 1946 in Lviv under pressure from Stalin... The Moscow Patriarchate failed to vigorously condemn the Stalinist power for its act of genocide against the Ukrainian people in 1932-1933: the famous Holodomor which resulted in the deaths of around five million people.”¹⁰⁹

109 Arjakovsky, I Can no Longer Remain Silent.

On December 26, 2013 the Moscow Patriarchate condemned the Ukrainian EuroMaidan calling the protesting groups to cease “civil tensions and revolution which cannot result in anything positive for the people” thus overlooking the desire of the still peaceful protesters “to belong to the great family of European nations that, in spite of all their weaknesses, base their laws on the defence of the dignity of every human person.”¹¹⁰ Evidently, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church suspects that the pro-European aspirations of the Ukrainian people are dictated by external forces because the Moscow Patriarchate warns that Ukrainian choice “should be precisely people’s choice, free and based on the awareness of all the pros and cons, not dictated by any external will.”¹¹¹

Mykola Krokosh, a Greek-Catholic theologian, criticises some anti-ecumenical steps of the leadership of his Church. He calls in question the planned transfer of the relics of Metropolitan Isidore (defender of the union between the western and eastern Church at the Council of Florence and a contesting figure for the Orthodox¹¹²) to Kyiv that Sviatoslav Shevchuk announced in 2013.¹¹³ Further criticism concerns the official Greek-Catholic recognition of the baptism administered in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate as such that destroys the trust of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The announced extension of the pastoral activities of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the eastern traditionally Orthodox regions of Ukraine, the promoted cult of Yosafat Kuntsevych, the saint and martyr for faith in the Catholic Church (perceived by the Orthodox as a persecutor) also belong to the anti-ecumenical gestures of the Greek-Catholics in 2013.¹¹⁴

Myron Bendyk, the rector of the Greek-Catholic seminary in Drohobych, argues that it is not correct to speak about the defeat of the

110 Ibid.

111 “Statement on the Events in Ukraine by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church,” <https://mospat.ru/en/2013/12/26/news96336/> (accessed January 14, 2014).

112 “Plany Hlavy Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy perepokhovaty mytropolyta Isydora v Kyievi vyklykaly zdyvuvannia” {The plans of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to rebury Metropolitan Isidore in Kyiv has provoked wonderment}, http://www.religion.in.ua/zmi/ukrainian_zmi/22982-plani-glavi-ugkc-perepoxovati-mitr-isidora-v-kyievi-viklikali-zdivuvannya.html (accessed January 17, 2014).

113 Mykola Krokosh, “Vse stabilno?” {Is everything stable?}, <http://www.religion.in.ua/main/daycomment/23302-vse-stabilno.html> (accessed January 17, 2014).

114 Ibid.

Orthodox eparchies in western Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s; it did not happen by force.¹¹⁵ The initiative came from the people who in the situation of freedom decided to come back to the Church because they still felt a member of her, even though they perhaps used to attend liturgies at the churches of the Moscow Patriarchate. Thus the faithful simply legalised their faith.

After the Catholic-Orthodox meeting in Vienna in September 2010 Hlib Kovalenko from the Centre of Religious Monitoring wrote:

“The fascination with Moscow is passing. We hope that Rome will turn its attention to a few realities of Russia and Ukraine. On the territory of Russia there are close to 13 thousand Orthodox parishes. On the territory of Ukraine there are close to 17 thousand. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church also exists in Ukraine with over 4 thousand parishes. It seems that the voice of these communities does not matter for Rome or for Moscow. At the same time Kyiv, and not Moscow, is the centre of the eastern-Orthodox civilisation, if such a thing exists. From Kyiv, not from Moscow, one can expect new theological ideas and conceptions, which will be needed by the Church in the 21st century.”¹¹⁶

Those four authors – Arjakovsky, Krokosh, Bendyk, and Kovalenko – bring to the fore the most contesting points in the relations between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and the Russian Orthodox Church. Arjakovsky points at the need of repentance from the side of Moscow for the Lviv Synod of 1946 and the interference of Moscow in the Ukrainian ecclesial and political affairs. Myron Bendyk contests the accusations in the destruction of the Orthodox parishes in western Ukraine. Mykola Krokosh mentions those gestures of the Greek-Catholics which complicates their relations with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Finally, Hlib Kovalenko argues that the voice of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should be heard in the ecumenical dialogue because this Church can produce new ideas for the promotion of the inter-confessional peace. Keeping in mind this complicated picture, let us see

115 Myron Bendyk, “Lvivskiyi psevdosobor 1946 roku i “katolytsko-pravoslavna” problema v dobu vidrodzhennia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy na pochatku 90-kh rokiv 20 stolittia” {Lviv Pseudo-Synod of 1946 and “the Catholic-Orthodox” problem at the time of the revival of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the 1990s}, <http://www.dds.edu.ua/en/home/117-interesting/474-pseudosobor.html> (accessed January 14, 2014).

116 Hlib Kovalenko, “On the Difficulties of the Dialogue between the Orthodox and Catholics. The Inconsolable Results of the Vienna Discussions,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/comments/38322 (accessed January 20, 2014).

what the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church maintains in her relations with the Moscow Patriarchate.

Reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia

The very first official document on our list, dated 22 November 1987, concerns the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Cardinal Liubachivskyi follows the tradition of the well-known mutual letters of reconciliation between the Polish and German Catholic bishops in 1965¹¹⁷ that laid the foundation for the German-Polish rapprochement.¹¹⁸ His “Declaration on the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians”¹¹⁹ is a very important document in at least three regards. First, this declaration proves that still during the Soviet rule the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was aware of the necessity to address the common wounds of history. On the eve of the rebirth of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, her leaders realised that the future relations between both Churches will greatly depend upon the ability of each of them to redress the burdened past, especially the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946 with the assistance of the Moscow Patriarchate. Second, this declaration will be occasionally revoked by the leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the next decades as a tradition and a basis on which this Church grounds her reconciliation efforts towards the Russian Orthodox Church. Finally, the very title of

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- 117 The full text of the pastoral letters of the Polish and then German Catholic bishops on mutual forgiveness and reconciliation can be consulted on “Hirtenbrief der polnischen Bischöfe an ihre deutschen Amtsbrüder vom 18. November 1965 und die Antwort der deutschen Bischöfe vom 5. Dezember 1965”, <http://www.berlin.polemb.net/index.php?document=312> (accessed August 22, 2012).
- 118 To learn more about the circumstances, peculiarities and outcomes of the Letters of the Polish and German bishops on reconciliation, see Basil Kerski, Thomas Kycia, and Robert Zurek, *„Wir vergeben und bitten um Vergebung“: Der Briefwechsel der polnischen und deutschen Bischöfe 1965 und seine Wirkung* (Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2006).
- 119 The declaration was received with incomprehension by the Ukrainian diaspora that could not understand how the Cardinal can ask forgiveness from Russia and the Moscow Patriarchate after all that Ukraine and her Churches experienced from this neighbour country. To those reproaches Liubachivskyi is reported to have answered: “We have to ask their forgiveness for the very simple reason that we do not love them” (“Nous devons leur demander pardon tout simplement parce que nous ne les aimons pas.” Quoted in Arjakovsky, *En attendant*, 508).

“Declaration on the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians” draws attention. Cardinal Liubachivskyi explicitly speaks about the reconciliation between Ukrainians and Russians. It does not strictly concern only relations between the Greek-Catholics and the Russian Orthodox Church but goes beyond that to the relations between the nations. Antoine Arjakovsky claims that the issue of the Pseudo-Synod of Lviv is much broader than merely one more crime of the Soviet regime. It is about the establishment of the national states in the region, first of all Ukraine and Russia, the all-Orthodox unity, and the future of the ecumenical movement.¹²⁰ Here we encounter the idea that the reconciliation between the Churches is closely related with the reconciliation between peoples.

The principal message of the declaration of Cardinal Liubachivskyi is a call to Christian forgiveness between Ukrainians and Russians, brothers in Christ. However, this is not merely a plea for rapprochement. In the commentary to that text that he issued answering the negative reactions to his declaration from Ukrainians in diaspora, Liubachivskyi claimed that very often Ukrainians usually fell victims to their more powerful neighbour.¹²¹ Those injustices, moral and material losses, the blood spilled cannot be simply forgotten or silenced because the Christian duties of truth and justice must be fulfilled.¹²²

Legalisation and property conflicts

The early documents on the relations with the Russian Orthodox Church are almost exclusively dedicated to the legalisation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the registration of her parishes, and the property conflicts.¹²³ The Russian Orthodox Church repeatedly accused Greek-

120 Ibid., 499.

121 No. 5000, 438.

122 Ibid.

123 See two master's theses on the issue of the early conflicts between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: Mariia Kokhanovska, “Peredumovy ta rozhortannia konfliktiv mizh Ukrainskoiu Hreko-Katolytskoiu ta Ukrainskoiu Pravoslavnoi u Tserkvamy na Lvivshchyni u 1987-2007 rokakh” {Reasons and development of the conflicts between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the Lviv region in 1987-2007} (master's thesis, Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008); Iryna Panchyshyn, “Mizhkonfesiini konflikty na Zakhidnii Ukraini v 90-kh rokakh 20 stolittia (na prykladi Ternopilskoi oblasti)” {Interdenominational conflicts in western

Catholics of using violence against her clergy and faithful during the process of registration. Media war, court suits, appeals to the local and state government were the daily reality of that epoch. For some readers it may seem strange that I still pay attention to the official pronouncements that treat the property conflicts of the early 1990s. Such property conflicts have almost entirely disappeared by now from the current agenda of the relations between both Churches. However, by analysing the documents that deal with that issue I aim at revealing the logic of the arguments of the Churches. Perhaps we will come across ideas that could contribute to solving contemporary Orthodox – Greek-Catholic misunderstandings.

For instance, in August 1990, Cardinal Liubachivskyi addressed the Moscow Patriarchate explaining the legitimacy of the claims of his Church to be legalised. He clearly emphasised that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has greatly suffered under the Soviet government and the “brothers-Christians of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church.”¹²⁴ The author of the statement greets the recognition of religious freedom in the Soviet Union both by the state and the Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, Cardinal Liubachivskyi bemoans the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate hinders the application of the principle of religious freedom on the territory of Ukraine.

On December 17, 2013, Kurt Koch, the President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, mentioned to the journalists that both Orthodox and Greek-Catholics have to work for a solution to the conflict in western Ukraine. Both sides are suffering and also the Orthodox have something to repent of. In that way Cardinal Koch answered to the accusation of Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev that the Orthodox were expelled from western Ukraine:

“I agree with Metropolitan Hilarion: the situation in Ukraine is very serious. But from my point of view, it has two sides, and Metropolitan Hilarion willingly speaks only of one. I have visited many parishes in western Ukraine and saw the suffering on both sides. If the blame for what happened just lay on the Greek Catholics, we would have a lot of influence.”¹²⁵

Ukraine in the 1990s (by the example of the Ternopil region)} (master’s thesis, Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008).

124 No. 15, 26. Translation from the original source.

125 “The Vatican Believes the Russian Orthodox Church Should Recognise Her Own Guilt in Addition to Accusing Greek-Catholics in Western Ukraine,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/interchurch_relations/54667 (accessed January 16, 2014).

Therefore, the guilt should be revealed for reconciliation to take place.

Moscow and the Lviv Pseudo-Synod

The evaluation of the Lviv Pseudo-Council of 1946 is among the stepping stones in the relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Basically, two attitudes were adopted by the Greek-Catholic leadership. First, the Moscow Patriarchate has consciously collaborated with the Soviet Union in the liquidation of another Church because of the century-old hostility towards Greek-Catholics. Second, although the Moscow Patriarchate indeed assisted the communist government in the destruction of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, no religious organisation at that time could function completely freely; therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church was herself a victim of the Stalin regime and was forced to collaborate under the circumstances of the epoch. Let us give several examples of both approaches.

Liubachivskyi maintains that both worldly and Church authorities were guilty of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.¹²⁶ The pain of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the cooperation of the Moscow Patriarchate with the Soviet regime in her liquidation was expressed by Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi in his “Letter to Cardinal Casidy.” In this text the author praises the Balamand Agreement but also expresses his disappointment with paragraphs 10 and 11 of the document. Paragraph 10 refers to the phenomenon of anti-uniatism when eastern Catholics were reunited by force with the Orthodox Churches. The text implies that the guilt for such anti-uniatism bears the Catholic Church herself because she provoked the Orthodox to develop her own salvational exclusivism. Paragraph 11 even more releases the Orthodox from the guilt of the suppression of the eastern Catholics because it claims that “certain civil authorities made attempts to bring back Oriental Catholics to the Church of their Fathers. To achieve this end they did not hesitate, when the occasion was given, to use unacceptable means.”¹²⁷ In those lines

126 No. 21, 35.

127 Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Church, “Uniatism, Method of Union of the Past, and the Present Search for Full Communion,” http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ch_orthodox_docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_19930624_lebanon_en.html (accessed February 25, 2014).

Liubachivskyi envisions the inability or unwillingness of the Orthodox to acknowledge at least their partial role in particular cases of the liquidation of eastern Catholic communities.¹²⁸ The author points at the example of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the suppression of which was passively accepted by the Orthodox side. The Russian Orthodox Church is meant here, even though it is not directly mentioned.

Liubachivskyi reminds one of his declaration of forgiveness to the Russian people and the Moscow Patriarchate from 1987 and expresses his sorrow that he has never received an answer from the Orthodox Church which is not capable of dealing with her past. The Moscow Patriarchate follows the easiest way by placing the blame on the communist state authorities and considering themselves victims. Until the Orthodox Church is ready to revise her past, she will “continue to see herself as a victim and will resist the process of internal healing, which is necessary for her to respond positively to the call of preaching the Gospel of Our Lord, and indeed to act as a fair and equal partner in ecumenical dialogue at various levels.”¹²⁹ Thus, we observe that for Liubachivskyi it is very important to undergo the process of the revision of the past and to honestly recognise committed faults. This would release a guilty party from the unhelpful victimhood feeling. Victimhood concerns all the Churches who have not purified their consciences, including the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that “had emerged from years of victimisation, both political and ecclesial, and is undergoing her own difficult healing process.”¹³⁰ This is a remarkable evolution in comparison with the “Declaration of Cardinal Liubachivskyi on the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians” from 1987 where the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church only humbly and unconditionally offered forgiveness to the Russian Orthodox Church. In his “Letter to Cardinal Cassidy” Liubachivskyi goes further and claims that the Moscow Patriarchate has to examine its conscience regarding the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and release itself from the circles of victimisation. It is a more dynamic vision of forgiveness and demands mutual efforts from the conflicting parties.

The interpretation of the common past between the two Churches in moral terms is necessary for their future and for the future of Ukraine and

128 No. 5001, 420.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

Russia. Sviatoslav Shevchuk greeted the declaration on reconciliation¹³¹ signed on August 17, 2012 between the Russian Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church in Warsaw even though the text does not define what both Churches apologise for.¹³² Still the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church hopes that a similar agreement is signed between his Church and the Moscow Patriarchate because the healing of memory through reconciliation should open new opportunities for the constructive relations between the Ukrainian and Russian nations. The fact that Moscow negotiates and signs a declaration with a national Catholic Church instead of solving common misunderstandings exclusively via the Vatican gives hope for Greek-Catholics. Shevchuk maintains that the inability to recognise one's faults, in particular that the structures of the Moscow Patriarchate were misused by the communist regime for the liquidation of another Church at the Lviv Pseudo-Synod is the tangible obstacle to the development of the relationships between the Greek-Catholic and the Russian Orthodox Church.¹³³

The Russian Orthodox Church as a victim

Sometimes the accusations of the organisation of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod of 1945 are first of all directed to the Soviet state. The Russian Orthodox

131 "Sovmyestnoye poslaniye narodam Rossii i Polshi Pryedstoyatyelya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vsyeya Rusi Kirilla i Pryedsyedyatelya Yepiskopskoy Konferyentsii Polshi Arkhiyepiskopa Yuzefa Mikhailika, mitropolita Pyeryemyshl'skogo" {Joint message to the nations of Russia and Poland of the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus Kirill and the President of the Polish Episcopal Conference Archbishop Jozef Michalik, metropolitan of Przemyśl}, <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2411498.html> (accessed January 14, 2014).

132 "Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Ready for Dialogue with Moscow Patriarchate," http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/interchurch_relations/49248 (accessed January 14, 2014). See also a short analysis of the Polish-Russian declaration on reconciliation: Oliver Hinz, „Kirchlicher Aufruf zur polnisch-russischen Versöhnung“, *Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West* 1 (2013): 17-19.

133 Sviatoslav Shevchuk, "Tserkva povynna vyity za mezhi 'ohorozh svoikh khramiv'" {The Church has to step out of "the fences around her churches"}, interview by Viktoriia Skuba, *Day.kiev.ua*, <http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/article/akciya-dnya/blazhennyshiy-svyatoslav-shevchuk-cerkva-povinna-viyti-za-mezhi-ogorozh-svoyih> (accessed January 14, 2014).

Church in such cases is portrayed as an executor of the decisions taken by the government, thus she is not immediately guilty of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.¹³⁴ In the “Declaration of Annulment of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod” only godless worldly authorities are recognised guilty of the act that cannot be legally called a Synod because of the absence of the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.¹³⁵ In their letter to the Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko, the bishops claim that all the material and human resources of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church were amalgamated into the Russian Orthodox Church which has implications on the current relations between those Churches.¹³⁶ However, nowhere in the text is the Moscow Patriarchate accused of the collaboration with the communist regime. Similarly, addressing the Greek-Catholic faithful on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, Liubomyr Husar makes no references to the complicity of the Russian Orthodox Church. Comparing to the very straightforward demands of the letter of Cardinal Husar to the Patriarch of Moscow,¹³⁷ the present address mentions the Russian Orthodox Church only once saying that a number of Greek-Catholic priests were forced to join the Moscow Patriarchate on the order of Stalin.¹³⁸ This might be an intentional step of Husar who wanted to avoid negative expressions concerning the other Church. At the same time, such attitude could mean that Husar intends the anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod to be a feast of gratitude for the grace of God leaving aside the discussions about historical truth and guilt. In their turn, the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church blame the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church for the absence of any gratitude for their care for the Greek-Catholic faithful and priesthood after 1946.¹³⁹

134 For instance, this idea is to be found in document No. 23, 42.

135 No. 35, 63.

136 No. 213, 354

137 See No. 217.

138 No. 218, 364 (No. 4001, 191).

139 This idea was emotionally expressed by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in her address on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Synod of 1946 (by the way, described as the return of Greek-Catholics to the Orthodox Church). The authors of the message claim the Orthodox Church herself has suffered a lot under the Soviet regime. Further, Greek-Catholics nowadays activate efforts to depict the Lviv Pseudo-Synod as “an action of the atheistic regime for the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia with assistance of the Orthodox. Uniates are portrayed as innocent victims and

The texts where the Moscow Patriarchate is not considered directly guilty of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church reveal some nuances. Sometimes, the Russian Orthodox Church is described as but another victim of the Soviet government. For instance, in a letter to the leaders of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches Husar portrays the Lviv Pseudo-Synod as the act of “the liquidation of one of the heirs of the baptism of Saint Volodymyr, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.”¹⁴⁰ This tragic event in the history of Ukrainian Christianity was caused on the initiative of the atheistic Soviet government in its attempt to finally solve the question of the uniates. However, not only the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church fell victim to the Soviet regime. Liubomyr Husar indicates that also other Churches in Ukraine were persecuted. The Orthodox under the Moscow Patriarchate experienced sufferings at the very beginning of the Soviet dictatorship in Ukraine.¹⁴¹ The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was forced to self-liquidation by the regime at the end of the 1920s. Husar believes that this was the first trial of the model of the self-liquidation of a Church that was later applied to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics in 1946. Concerning the Moscow Patriarchate, it was misused by the Soviet regime in the process of the destruction of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The text emphasises that it is the tragedy of the Russian Orthodox Church that she was used by the Soviet regime for its inhuman acts.

The incorporation of the Greek-Catholic parishes into the Russian Orthodox Church is described as an act of proselytism or uniatism that was condemned by the Balamand Agreement. In Husar’s opinion the Moscow Patriarchate played a double role at the Lviv Synod. On the one hand,

Orthodox as co-operators and tools of the godless authorities. Artificially the situation is created whereby Orthodox are placed in the position of those who are forced to justify themselves for the crimes that they have not committed.” (“Zvernennia Sviashchennoho Synodu Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy do pastvy y ukrainskoho narodu z nahody 60-richchia povernennia hreko-katolykyv u lono Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy” {Address of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the faithful and the Ukrainian people on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the return of Greek-Catholics to the Orthodox Church}, <http://archiv.orthodox.org.ua/page-2149.html> (accessed March 2, 2013). Translation from the original source).

140 No. 216, 258. Translation from the original source.

141 It is not completely clear what this passage means. Perhaps Cardinal Husar refers to the early politics of the Soviet government towards the Church in 1917-1920. This question has to be studied more in detail.

Moscow evidently benefited from the destruction of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church because after the Lviv Synod millions of faithful, clergy, and church property ended up in the possession of the Russian Orthodox Church. Liubomyr Husar applies in this context the term proselytism and alludes to the document of the Joint working group of the Roman Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches, a member of which is the Moscow Patriarchate. This document articulates that proselytism includes actions like physical violence, moral or psychological pressure, and application of political, social or economic factors in order to make people change their allegiance from one Church to another.¹⁴² Exactly this happened to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church during and after the Lviv Pseudo-Synod. Thus, Cardinal Husar beats the Moscow Patriarch with his own weapon since the letter repeatedly speaks about the proselytism from the side of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church when she opens new dioceses in the east and south of Ukraine. On the other hand, the Head of the Greek-Catholics recognises that during the communist dictatorship in the former Soviet Union there were no possibilities to act independently for any ethnic, cultural, or religious group including the Moscow Patriarchate. Notwithstanding her privileged position, the Russian Orthodox Church was also oppressed and persecuted.¹⁴³

Current coexistence

Also the current coexistence of both Churches is sometimes problematic. For instance, the Synod of the Greek-Catholic Bishops considers the present-day situation of the faithful of their Church in Russia in the light of the historical experiences of Greek-Catholic parishes in diaspora. Those who migrated to western Europe, the Americas, or Australia and could freely express their faith, were the voice of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the open world. However, those who happened to live in the eastern territories of the Soviet Union in Siberia or the Far East under the totalitarian regime could not enjoy such freedom and remained often without the spiritual support of a Greek-Catholic priest. Nevertheless, even in those territories there are Greek-Catholic parishes nowadays and the Church leadership hopes that it would be able to offer them spiritual

142 No. 217, 362.

143 Ibid.

care. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church can put this desire into practice only when the right of religious freedom would be applied in the territories of the former Soviet Union.¹⁴⁴ Obviously, here the Russian Orthodox Church is implied because she does not allow the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to register her parishes on the Russian territories regarding such actions as proselytism. Summarising this historical section, the Greek-Catholic bishops claim that they have made this recourse in the past not to reproach someone, but to draw lessons for the future.¹⁴⁵

From the very beginning of her legal existence the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church realised the significance of good relations with the Moscow Patriarchate for both the young Ukrainian state and the Churches. Sometimes this latter is portrayed as a victim of the Soviet regime. The Russian Orthodox Church was forced to accept the conditions of the Stalin government in order to secure her own existence. Her cooperation in the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church happened under the pressure of circumstances. However, both approaches to the role of the Moscow Patriarchate in the destruction of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church presuppose that the Russian Orthodox Church admits her voluntary or involuntary cooperation and asks forgiveness.

2.4.2 Reconciliation between nations through reconciliation between Churches?

There are numerous official texts on the reconciliation between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time it is remarkable that the Greek-Catholic leadership does not explicitly develop the topic of the Ukrainian-Russian reconciliation except in the “Declaration on the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians” from 1987. In that text Cardinal Liubachivskyi in the name of the Greek-Catholics reaches out “the hand of forgiveness, reconciliation and love to the Russian people and the Moscow Patriarchate.”¹⁴⁶ Cardinal di-

144 No. 219, 367.

145 Ibid., 368.

146 «Marchant dans les pas de l’Esprit du Christ, nous tendons la main du pardon, de la réconciliation et de l’amour au peuple russe et au Patriarcat de Moscou. Comme dans notre réconciliation avec le peuple polonais, nous répétons les paroles du Christ: «Pardonnez comme nous pardonnons». (Mt 6,12). Nous sommes tous frères en Christ» (No. 5000, 438).

rected his plea for reconciliation to both the people and the Church in Russia.

Such an approach is justifiable. The Churches share the fate of their people and injustices that the nations suffered automatically affect the relation between the Churches. The Polish-German reconciliation started from the letter of the Polish bishops to their German counterparts. The reconciliation act between Poles and Ukrainians also took part due to the efforts of the Catholic hierarchies of both countries. In August 2013, commenting upon the Polish-Russian declaration of reconciliation, Sviatoslav Shevchuk expressed his hope for a similar document to be signed between his Church and the Moscow Patriarchate. Here again, the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation comes on stage. Therefore, it would be legitimate to claim that while searching for the rapprochement with the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church leadership is longing for the reconciliation between the countries.

One notices obvious similarities between the treatment of Ukraine by its northern neighbour and the attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate towards the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. Neither the Russian state nor the Russian Orthodox Church is ready to let their Ukrainian counterparts wage an independent political and religious life. The Ukrainian historian Andrii Portnov has recently written that Russian politics in Ukraine is among other things dictated by the stereotype that both those nations make one people¹⁴⁷ and hence the difficulties to accept the independence of Ukraine. The Moscow Patriarchate does not grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Russian Federation with the help of the initiatives like the Customs Union that excludes for Ukraine all the other possibilities of economic integration except the Russian one¹⁴⁸ or the

147 Andrii Portnov, „Die Ukrainische „Eurorevolution“: Einige Überlegungen“, in *Majdan! Ukraine, Europa*, eds. Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek (Berlin: Edition. foto TAPETA, 2014), 37.

148 Oleksandr Sushko, „Yakoi Ukrainy hoche Rosiia abo “rosiiskyi” proekt” {What Russia wants of Ukraine or a “Russian” project}, *Yi* 31 (2004): 37. Mykhailo Mishchenko considers that the efforts of Russia to make Ukraine participate in the Customs Union is the expression of the contemporary ideology of Russian nationalism that Mykhailo Mishchenko among other things understands in terms of the creation of the union of the post-Soviet countries which are formally independent but economically contingent on and politically ruled from Moscow. (Mykhailo Mishchenko, “Mesiiianizm i natsionalizm u formuvanni suchasnoi rosiiskoi natsionalnoi idei” {Messianism and nationalism in the formulation of the contemporary Russian national idea}, *Yi* 31 (2004): 170).

manipulations of the gas prices tries to preserve Ukraine within the sphere of the political and economic influence of its northern neighbour. All this is blessed by the doctrine of the *Russskiy Mir* which should ensure that the drift of both countries from each other becomes impossible on the spiritual level. Hence, the truthfulness of the words of Mykola Riabchuk that it is a pity that Russia has not got its own Jerzy Giedroyc as it was the case in Poland. The figure of this intellectual and spiritual dimension could help normalise the relations between Ukraine and Russia.¹⁴⁹

This settlement of the historical debts between Ukraine and Russia is highly desirable and has not lost its urgency after the 23 years that passed since both countries have begun their independent histories. At the same time, due to different geopolitical reasons this reconciliation is highly complicated.

The Crimean question has been a factor of instability in the bilateral relationship between Russia and Ukraine. In fact, the Crimean problem should be considered in the context of the transfer of this peninsula as a gift to Ukraine in 1954. However, this issue emerged as a problem only after the independence of Ukraine, partly because Crimea is still a region with a predominantly Russian population.¹⁵⁰ Against such a background it is rather natural that autonomist and separatist movements in Crimea grew up. The insecure situation that emerged in February-March of 2014 after the downturn of President Yanukovych as a result of the EuroMaidan gave Russia the opportunity to enter its military forces on the Crimea under the pretext of the protection of Russian citizens residing on the peninsula. That step, aimed among other things at preventing Ukraine from drifting out of the Russian sphere of interests, put both countries at the threshold of war. In the midst of those events, on March 2, 2014, Ukrainian Churches issued an appeal calling the Russian state authorities “to come to senses and stop its aggression against Ukraine, and immediately pull out Russian troops from the Ukrainian land. All the responsibility before God and mankind for irreparable consequences fully falls on the leadership of

149 Mykola Riabchuk advocates the model of Giedroyc as the way of the Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation that the Russian elites failed to produce (Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, 36).

150 Frank Umbach, *Russia and the Problems of Ukraine's Cohesion. Results of a Fact-Finding Mission*, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 13 (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1994), 35.

Russia.”¹⁵¹ Ukrainian Churches refute the Russian accusations of intolerance and aggression towards the Russians residing in Ukraine or its Russian-speaking citizens and denounce them as propaganda: “There is no oppression by the language, nation and denomination in our country. Therefore we witness that all the efforts of the Russian propaganda to represent all the events in Ukraine as “fascist coup d'état” and “extremists’ victory” do not correspond to reality absolutely.”¹⁵²

The economic factors equally play a great role in the Russian-Ukrainian relations. All too often the government in Moscow uses the energy dependence of Ukraine for securing national Russian interests. Every year gas negotiations are still part of the political and economic life of Ukraine. The situation in the winter of 2008-2009 became especially critical in that regard when as a result of the unsettled agreements about the gas transmission on the territory of Ukraine there were stoppages in supply to European consumers. A more recent example is the new highly criticised agreement between Russia and Ukraine signed in 2010 according to which Russia gets the permission to keep its Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042 in return for lower prices of the Russian gas for Ukraine.¹⁵³ According to the previous agreement on this question signed in 1997, Russia was obliged to withdraw its fleet until 2017. For the majority of observers this agreement, allowing the presence of the Russian fleet in Crimea for the next decades, would mean continuous influence of the northern neighbour on Ukrainian politics. The fact of the factual seizure of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated that those fears were justified.

The reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia is needed for the internal cohesion in Ukraine that was called by Samuel Huntington “a cleft county.”¹⁵⁴ Among other things this points at the present East-West division within the state. The eastern boundary of Western civilisation runs in Ukraine which consequently represents two distinct cultures.¹⁵⁵ There is a civilisational clash between the western part of the country which historically underwent strong Western-European cultural and religious influ-

151 No. 2025.

152 Ibid.

153 Luke Harding, “Ukraine Extends Lease for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet,” <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia> (accessed February 25, 2014).

154 Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 166.

155 Ibid., 158-160.

ences and eastern Ukraine being predominantly Orthodox and a satellite of the Russian empire for centuries. Ukraine not only shares with Russia the same Slavic ethnicity. In modern times Ukraine was part of a political unit with the centre in Moscow. The decisive turn happened in 1654 when Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, the leader of the Cossacks' revolt against the Poles, assumed the allegiance of the Moscow tsar in return for help against the Poles. From this event begins the period of Ukrainian history when it was politically controlled from Moscow. This difference between two Ukraines, "between Europeanized Slavs in western Ukraine and the Russo-Slav vision of what Ukraine should be,"¹⁵⁶ is manifested nowadays in the attitudes of the people, in the way they vote, which political parties they support, and how they see the future of the state. Occasionally the separatist tendencies in eastern and southern Ukraine revive threatening with the split of Ukraine and merging of some of its territories with Russia.

In the early 1990s, except for a socio-economic destabilisation, Ukraine was challenged by the ongoing regionalism and separatist tendencies as well as the threat of the political and cultural division between the pro-European Catholic West and the pro-Russian Orthodox East and South of the country. However, those threats were successfully overcome which is a sign of the successful ethnic policy of the authorities. On the other hand, the situation is not so peaceful. Even though there were no violent clashes between nationalities, western and eastern Ukrainians, there remains an internal distrust among them and one can certainly not speak of the unity of the nation. Old conflicts, different worldviews, heroes,¹⁵⁷ language, views

156 Ibid., 166.

157 One of the particularly interesting and provocative figures for the Ukrainian-Russian relations is Ivan Mazepa. A Cossacks' hetman Mazepa during the Battle of Poltava in 1709, fighting for the Russian tsar Peter I's army, unexpectedly joined the side of the enemy, the Swedish king Charles XII. Being a good friend and enjoying the support of Peter I, Mazepa negotiated with the Swedish king because he considered him a possible ally in getting independence for left-bank Ukraine from the Russian empire. The Russian Orthodox Church anathemised Mazepa in the 18th century and keeps the anathema until the present day. Ivan Mazepa is considered in Russia as a traitor. An interesting fact is that in the summer of 2010 the Mazepa Street in Kyiv was renamed. Some observers believe that this was done on the request of the Moscow Patriarch Kirill (see, for instance, Iryna Shtorhin, "Chomu v Kyievi pereimenuvaly vulytsiu Ivana Mazepy" {Why the Ivan Mazepa Street in Kyiv was renamed}, <http://www.radio.svoboda.org/content/article/2099001.html> (accessed July 13, 2010)). The Monastery of the Caves is situated in Mazepa Street. During his trips to Ukraine Patri-

of the future, continue to divide the country and were very successfully used by the politicians in their strife for electorate. A country that is divided cannot really oppose the ruling oligarchic class. Some rapprochement between different regions of Ukraine one could observe during the Orange Revolution, but the subsequent acts of the authorities shattered this union from developing.

Viktor Yushchenko, the former President of Ukraine, argued that the very complicated history of the Ukrainian-Russian relations has to be reinterpreted. Every nation has its own history. The Russian and Ukrainian histories do not have to coincide, and hence Ukraine has a right to its national heroes even if those heroes are not accepted as such in Russia, for instance, the figure of Ivan Mazepa, viewed as a traitor by the northern neighbour. The politics of memory is so important because “it is not a projection in the past, but a projection in the future!”¹⁵⁸ “Finally, Russia has to understand that Ukraine does not have any other claim for Russia except one... that evil has to be named evil. We have to come to reconciliation.”¹⁵⁹ The former President of Ukraine believes that Russia is not able to ask for forgiveness because of the historical sacralisation of worldly authorities which did not develop a feeling of guilt and consequently a need of repentance.

Commenting upon the possible common Ukrainian-Russian manual of history, Yaroslav Hrytsak maintains that the work on that project is complicated in several aspects. First, Russia still speaks about being one people with the Ukrainians which finds support with a certain part of the Ukrainian population. Additionally, there are no Russian historians or politicians (except some liberal but marginal persons) who would openly say that the principle “We forgive and ask for forgiveness” should be applied to the Ukrainian-Russian relations. Russia is not ready to revise its

arch Kirill has to drive down this street all the time when he is visiting the monastery that belongs nowadays to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Therefore, instead of Mazepa Street we have Lavrska Street, that is the Street of the Monastery of the Caves.

158 Viktor Yushchenko, “Rozmovy iz Putynym pro ukrainsku identychnist, Holodomor ta vzaiemne prymyrennia” {Conversations with Putin about Ukrainian identity, the Holodomor, and mutual reconciliation}, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/2013/11/21/139795/> (accessed January 16, 2014). Translation from the original source.

159 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

own history and does not let the neighbouring nations do that.¹⁶⁰ As already stated in the declaration of Cardinal Liubachivskyi of the mutual pardon between both nations, reconciliation can happen when demands for truth and justice are fulfilled. I think Liubachivskyi would agree that the reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine means that they recognise each other as independent countries and give each other the freedom to choose the own way of development condemning the violence that took place in the past and unfortunately happens in different forms nowadays. The idea of the Ukrainian-Russian reconciliation is not primarily about the agreement on the acceptable vision of their common history but about “working out the directions for the development of community, defining esthetical criteria and social values, asserting behavioural models and moral norms.”¹⁶¹ In the message on the military aggression of Russia in Crimea, on March 2, 2014, Sviatoslav Shevchuk together with other Ukrainian Churches maintained: “The Ukrainian people have only friendly, fraternal feelings toward the Russian people. Do not believe the propaganda that enflames hostility between us. We want and we will continue to build friendly and fraternal relations with Russia but only as a sovereign and independent state.”¹⁶² As the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation showed, the redefinition of the relations between the states on such a basis leads to a mutually beneficial co-existence and only such an attitude of Russia would guarantee peace in that part of the world.

160 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Rosii sama boitsia vidverto hlianuty u vlasnu istoriiu” {Russia is herself afraid to have a frank look on her history}, interview by Pavlo Hud, *Istpravda.com.ua*, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2010/12/24/10687/> (accessed January 15, 2014).

161 Vitalii Ponomariov, “Mizh “zachystkoiu” i spokutoiu” {Between “cleansing” and atonement}, *Yi* 31 (2004): 216. Translation from the original source.

162 No. 2025.

2.5 Struggle between two Ukraines¹⁶³

2.5.1 History, identity, language

History and identity

In his reflections on the testament of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi and Patriarch Yosyf at the Third Social Week of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Myron Bendyk spoke about internal and external reasons for the absence of social cohesion among Ukrainians. Atheisation and sovietisation have caused internal spiritual disunity, whereas the century-long occupation of Ukraine by different neighbouring lands has contributed to competing visions of its political future.¹⁶⁴ This equally accounts for the Church division. The Ukrainian historian Vitalii Nachmanovych speaks about two nations in Ukraine: the Ukrainian European in the West and Ukrainian Soviet in the East. The triangle between Ukrainians, Russians, and other national minorities also contributes to the tensions inside the country.¹⁶⁵ Additionally, what Tony Judt maintained about the crisis of memory in the eastern territories of Europe equally applies to Ukraine. Judt points at the fact of mistrust in social, cultural, and personal encounters which complicates the unfolding of civil society.¹⁶⁶ In view of the social-political crisis after the EuroMaidan, expressed among other things in the separatist movements in Ukraine, some observers maintained that the country will break apart unless its foreign policy, the orientation of the European or Eurasian Union, is decided by Ukrainian themselves in a refer-

163 The title is borrowed from the essay of Hrytsak, Two Ukraines, in *Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti*, 176-191.

164 “Prymyrennia yak dar Bozhyi” – v Kyievi startuvav Suspilnyi tyzhden” {“Reconciliation as a gift of God” – Social Week started in Kyiv}, <http://old.risu.org.ua/ukr/news/reportage/article%3b32594> (accessed January 23, 2014).

165 Vitaliy Nachmanovich, “Etnonatsionalnyye problemy i gosudarstvo – ryealnost i pyerspektivty” {Ethno-national problems and the state – reality and perspectives}, *Forum natsii*, December, 2006, <http://www.forumn.kiev.ua/12-55-06/55-7.html> (accessed September 15, 2013).

166 Tony Judt, “The Past Is another Country. Myth and Memory in Post-War Europe,” in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Present of the Past*, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (n. p.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 173.

endum.¹⁶⁷ The coexistence of different mutually contradicting versions of history also contributes to the societal division.

The official version of Ukrainian history favouring the national-oriented or the old Soviet vision often depends upon political forces at power. For instance, the authorities under President Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) intensified a nation-building politics. Opening monuments and museums, the President wearing the traditional Ukrainian folk shirt *vyshyvanka*, underlying on every occasion the distinct character of the Ukrainian nation as dissimilar from the Russian ethnos, opening the secret Soviet archives, efforts to unite the Orthodox and to create the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church as well as to spread the use of the Ukrainian language were the signs of the fashion for all Ukrainians in the political milieu of the country. The biggest success of President Yushchenko was the international recognition of the famine of 1932-1933 as a genocide of the Ukrainian nation which became a national symbol for Ukrainians.¹⁶⁸ As no one before, Yushchenko managed to draw attention to that page of Ukrainian history and made it to a significant degree acceptable also in the eastern and southern parts of the country.

The same President Yushchenko is criticised for his inability to reconcile Ukrainians despite his best intentions. It is indeed difficult to bring together different approaches to the Ukrainians history. The results of the public opinion polls verify that statement. For instance, the respondents were asked to choose the best way of dealing with the memory of the bloody events of the 20th century when Ukrainians from different camps murdered each other (e.g., during political repressions, World War I and World War II). The answers made it clear: 65% in 2003 and only 46% in 2009 highlighted the need of reconciliation without looking on who was right and who was wrong. Instead 20% in 2003 and 36% in 2009 were of the opinion that the guilty have to be found and condemned.¹⁶⁹ Yaroslav

167 Orlando Figes, „Die Ukraine gibt es nicht“, in *Majdan! Ukraine, Europa*, eds. Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek (Berlin: Edition.foto TAPETA, 2014), 71.

168 Georgij Kasjanov, „Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine“, *Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West* 1 (2013): 17.

169 Razumkov Centre, „Sotsiolohichne opytuvannia: Protiahom 20 stolittia v istorii Ukrainy bulo bahato podii, koly ukrainsi masovo znyshchuvaly odyh odnoho: tse I i II svitovi viiny, hromadianski viiny, politychni represii. Yakyy z navedenykh shliakhiv rishennia vzaïemnykh obraz ye krashchym?“ {Sociological poll. During the 20th century in the history of Ukraine there were a lot of events when Ukrainians en masse exterminated each other: World War I and World War II, civil wars, political repressions. Which of the given ways of solving mutual of-

Hrytsak explains the diminished interest in letting the past go without trial by the wrong historical politics of the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko who overemphasised the western Ukrainian element of the national memory.¹⁷⁰ Further developments confirmed that conclusion.

Nevertheless, this politics of an intensive Ukrainisation proved to be too harsh for the eastern and southern population of the country with still a predominantly Soviet mentality. Combined with the failures of President Yushchenko in the economic sphere and the subsequent financial crisis of 2009, the Ukrainisation politics was interrupted under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich. By declaring a new approach to history, appointing Valerii Soldatenko, a Soviet historian and a current member of the Communist Party of Ukraine, for the office of director of the Institute of the National Memory, and naming Dmytro Tabachnyk with his anti-Ukrainian sentiments¹⁷¹ for the office of Minister of Education and Science, Yanukovich strengthened those political forces in Ukraine whose mentality is

fences is the best?}, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=454 (accessed January 21, 2014).

- 170 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Novi povoroty v ukrainskii politytsi pamiaty” {Recent turns in Ukrainian politics of memory}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?novi_povoroti_v_ukrainskiy_polititsi_pamyati&objectId=1117515 (accessed January 21, 2014).
- 171 Dmytro Tabachnyk, “Opozdavshye na 200 lyet” {200 years too late}, <http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/digest/4a648cef77d22> (accessed February 11, 2011). This is a remarkable article of him published on the official website of the Party of Regions in 2009 when Tabachnyk was still a deputy. This work can be considered as a summary of his main ideas concerning Ukrainian history. The core of the article is the criticism of Ukrainian nationalism and its identification with fascism. Additionally, the author strongly denies that the Holodomor is a genocide against the Ukrainian nation. He continues the old rhetoric of Ukraine as one of the winners of World War II and the legitimacy of calling it the Great Patriotic War. The article finishes by drawing a line between the “Rome-union-Galician and Russian-Orthodox ethnos” in Ukraine which are in a state of permanent conflict. It is on the basis of this distinction that Tabachnyk considered not to recognise western Ukrainians as part of the Ukrainian nation. Furthermore, by calling Ukrainians “little Russians” (a historical name of Ukrainians under the rule of the Moscow tsars) he seems to discard the existence of a distinct Ukrainian nation at all. Even though his warning against pure nationalism is plausible, Tabachnyk’s anti-Ukrainian ideas contribute to widening the division gap between the two parts of Ukraine. See also the analysis of the views of Tabachnyk: Vasyl Rasevych, “Pro “henetychnu pamiat,” abo Tvortsi pamiaty – 2” {On “genetic memory” or creators of memory – 2}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?pro_genetichnu_pamyat_abo_tvortsi_pamyati_2&objectId=1106539 (accessed January 21, 2014).

far from the construction of particular Ukrainian identity. Analysing the achievements of the first year of the presidency of Yanukovych, Volodymyr Viatrovych acknowledged the exploitation of history for political aims and its fine-tuning in accordance with the political conjuncture, in that case with the biggest strategic partner of Ukraine, the Russian Federation.¹⁷² To the peculiarities of the Ukrainian memory politics belongs the treatment of the state archives which were not cleared up still 15 years after the independence. Appointed in 2006 as Secretary General of the State Archives Committee (from 2010 the Head of the State Archive Service), the Communist Party member Olga Ginzburg forbade access to the files that concern possible communist crimes.¹⁷³

Regional divisions exist among Ukrainians concerning the geopolitical orientation of their country on the EU, NATO, or Russia. As for December 2013, 46% of respondents saw benefits from the EU membership of Ukraine, and almost 36% wanted to join the Customs Union with Russia, Bielarus, and Kazakhstan.¹⁷⁴ In 1997, the majority of the population favoured joining the EU and rejected the membership of NATO: 55% of the residents supported the EU-membership and 30% of the Ukrainians believed that the country should join NATO.¹⁷⁵ The reason for the diminished attractiveness of the EU in 2013 is connected to the internal economic-political crisis of that organisation and by the disappointment of Ukrainians to ever join the EU. Distinct regional differences were revealed. The most enthusiasts of NATO live in western Ukraine – 42%, whereas in the East there are just 29% of them and in the South even less – 25%.¹⁷⁶ Instead those regions saw the guarantees of the security in the

172 Volodymyr Viatrovych, “Prezydent ta istorychni torhy” {The President and the trade of history}, *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, February 4-11, 2011. See also Georgij Kasjanov, „Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine“, 18-19.

173 Georges Mink, “Institutions of National Memory in Post-Communist Europe. From Transitional Justice to Political Uses of Biographies (1989-2010),” in *History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Memory Games*, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (n. p., Palgrave, 2013), 162.

174 Razumkov Centre, “Sociological Poll. Which Community Should Be Priority for Ukraine to Enter?” http://www.uceps.org/eng/poll.php?poll_id=919 (accessed February 25, 2014).

175 Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, *Die Ukraine nach der Unabhängigkeit. Nationsbildung zwischen Ost und West*, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 5 (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1999), 19-20.

176 Ibid., 20.

rapprochement with Russia – 65% in the East, 52% in the South and only 17% in the western part of the country. This shows that in general many Ukrainians have not only an incoherent, but also a contradicting picture of their future. They support the EU membership and the union with Russia at the same time, which obviously do not go along with each other.

The events of the EuroMaidan in November 2013 – February 2014 showed that the division in present-day Ukraine does not run so much along the ideological regional line but along the line of values. Here there are no differences between the East, South, and West of the country. The small existing middle class demanded the reorganisation of the country on the principles that permit the people's self-realisation and not only the satisfaction of the basic needs.¹⁷⁷ Mykola Riabchuk believes that in the coming years not the regional division based on identity but the differences between the old-minded Soviet-nostalgic Ukrainians and the young pro-European citizens will be crucial for Ukraine.¹⁷⁸ I consider it to be the big challenging task for the Ukrainian Churches to sustain this movement from identities to values since it is the only chance for that post-communist country.

The answer of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church

During the existence of independent Ukraine, the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church often addressed the division between the east and the west of the country and subsequently the need of the all-Ukrainian reconciliation. Ukraine needs a societal cohesion. This was emphasised already in the greeting telegram of Cardinal Liubachivskyi to the newly elected President of Ukraine in 1994. The roots for the East-West division (equally manifested on the Church level) were to be found centuries ago and they were amplified by the Soviet repressions and the politics of Rus-

177 Yaroslav Hrytsak, „Revolution der Würde“, in *Majdan! Ukraine, Europa*, eds. Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek (Berlin: Edition.foto TAPETA, 2014), 75. See also the interview with the same author: Yaroslav Hrytsak, „Ukraina – yak litak, yakyi zakhopyly terorysty“ {Ukraine is like an aeroplane taken hostage}, interview by Iryna Slavinska, *Life.pravda.com.ua*, <http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2013/12/30/147591/> (accessed January 16, 2014).

178 Mykola Rjabtschuk, „Zerstörte Illusionen“, in *Majdan! Ukraine, Europa*, eds. Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek (Berlin: Edition.foto TAPETA, 2014), 106.

sification.¹⁷⁹ Cardinal Liubachivskyi calls the President to include into his administration the representatives of political circles from different regions of Ukraine to earn trust from the citizens.¹⁸⁰

The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church often emphasises the fact that notwithstanding attempts to stir up misunderstandings between religious, regional, and ethnic groups, independent Ukraine has not witnessed a real outburst of violence in those spheres.¹⁸¹ However, there are forces and groups in society that occasionally attempt to destroy the public peace. More precisely, even the state authorities themselves are accused by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church of being the source of the problem. Certain political forces are fuelling internal Ukrainian struggles, awaking the phantoms of the past and impeding the all-national rapprochement. For instance, this happened during the commemoration of the victims of World War II in Lviv in 2011, when street clashes took place during the parade of the veterans of the Soviet Red Army and the nationally oriented political groups. On that occasion the Greek-Catholic bishops very clearly claimed: “They {politicians} deceive themselves when they hope to pull away attention of the own people from the difficult economic situation by bringing to the daylight those topics and symbols which do not promote the consolidation of society but, on the contrary, deepen divisions and opposition.”¹⁸² The Days of commemoration and reconciliation should unite people in prayer for the victims of the war and for those who laid their lives for the independence of Ukraine; instead, it became a day of struggle between the groups that interpret the past of their country differently. The Greek-Catholic bishops primarily make Ukrainian authorities responsible for stirring up social tensions by misusing the existing latent lines of division in society.

That fact is also apparent to other religious communities in Ukraine. In the address on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the independence of Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations warned against those who try to divide society along religious, national, or political lines.¹⁸³ The regional, cultural, linguistic, national, or

179 No. 53, 100.

180 Ibid.

181 No. 2008.

182 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

183 No. 2012.

religious diversity reflects the true picture of one Ukrainian people and those playing on such differences do evil.¹⁸⁴

One of the most emotional addresses focusing on the internal divisions in contemporary Ukraine is authored by Liubomyr Husar and appeared in January 2011 aiming to explain the absence of the official representatives of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church at the festivities dedicated to the Ukrainian Unity Day (Den Sobornosti) in Kyiv. Husar questions the liability of this feast when members of different political parties and organisations are not able to celebrate on the same square in Kyiv.¹⁸⁵ The Unity Day is deprived of its internal meaning: “The word “sobornist” (spiritual community) means “unity.” Can we celebrate unity if we are not united?¹⁸⁶ Among other things “sobornist” means “the ability to respect the dignity of every person.”¹⁸⁷ Thus except for “cultural, civilisational, and spiritual unity of Ukrainians as an European nation,”¹⁸⁸ “sobornist” equally has a material dimension of practical solidarity in society.

Furthermore, Cardinal Husar rhetorically asks what contemporary Ukrainians are ready to sacrifice for the unity of their country, thus emphasising the significance of this question. While speaking of sacrifice, it usually is about an issue of paramount importance. Finally, Husar draws a link between the all-Ukrainian unity and the unity of the Ukrainian Church: “The word sobornist comes from the word “sobor” (council), that is the Church to which all people come, despite differences that may separate them. Wouldn’t it be good to become one sobor on Ukrainian Unity Day?”¹⁸⁹ Those words reveal another connotation of unity for Husar, namely the unity between Ukrainian Churches that should be a manifestation of the unity of the Ukrainian nation and of the Ukrainian state. Conversely, the unity of the Church in Ukraine would lead to the consolidation of society.

The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church not only investigates external political circumstances that fuel dividing attitudes among Ukrainians, they also attempt to examine the consciousness of Ukrainians themselves. In the address on the occasion of the Great Jubilee Year, the Greek-Catholic bishops endeavour to correct a common prevalent percep-

184 Ibid.

185 No. 2007.

186 Ibid.

187 No. 2024. Translation from the original source.

188 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

189 No. 2007.

tion of Ukrainians of themselves as victims who used to suffer during their history from all their neighbours. Instead, the authors maintain that it would be mistaken to claim that Ukrainians have always suffered but never offended any other nation. Furthermore, although Ukrainians have not committed so many crimes against other peoples as their neighbours, they have often fought the co-citizens starting from the earliest history of the Kyivan Rus. Even nowadays this results in the polarisation of society.¹⁹⁰ Thus, the Synod of Bishops points at the internal Ukrainian enmity during its history, a feature that is often overlooked. One cannot undo history, but the past should be remembered in order that those who feel guilty may confess their faults to God and their neighbours and make a strong decision not to repeat the sins of the past.¹⁹¹

Language

It is presumed that one of the most persistent division lines in Ukrainian society runs along the language issue. In chapter I, I have already written on the issue of languages in different Ukrainian Churches. The language question belongs to the most contestable and the best manipulated issues by politicians. It supports also the thesis about the regional differences in the country and is evident in the election programmes of presidential candidates and political parties. Ukrainian is the only state language in the country, with Russian widely used. While Ukrainian is mostly spoken in the west, Kyiv and the centre of the country, the eastern and southern regions are predominantly Russian-speaking. Consequently, political parties based in the former regions demand the intensification of the efforts for the fostering of the positions of Ukrainian in all the spheres of social life, while candidates of the opposite camp promise the elevation of the status of Russian as a second state language. In the absence of coherent and concrete programmes of political, economic and social reforms, those are questions of language, history that are used to get the votes of the population. The language is a sensible issue for Ukrainian citizens and the manipulations in this sphere give politicians a powerful means to attain their aims.

190 No. 98, 182.

191 Ibid.

In the survey conducted by Razumkov Centre in 2005, the regional differences concerning the status of languages in Ukraine were confirmed.¹⁹² Almost 79% of the population in the west of the country believes that Ukrainian should be the only state language with Russian used as a language of the national minority. At the same time, the south (55%) and the east of the country (58%) find it more reasonable that both Ukrainian and Russian languages are officially established as state languages. If we indicate the numbers in the country in general, then 35% of the citizens back Ukrainian as the only state language and 37% of them would grant such a status to both Ukrainian and Russian. One more significant group of respondents (20%) finds the solution by claiming Ukrainian as a state language and Russian as an official language in certain regions of the country where this is a predominant language of everyday use. Those results demonstrate the actual split of the country along the lines of language and identity. This fact by itself is not dangerous and Ukraine is certainly not the only country with big language groups. However, the way those differences are treated by the state authorities and how they are reflected in the state language politics give us grounds to speak about language as an evidently dividing factor in society. What is even more important, this factor is to a great extent artificially fired up. Critical voices claim that it may seem that the issues of socio-economic and political transition are much more urgent for Ukraine for the moment, however, for a post-genocide and post-colonial country language is not of minor importance; it is all about self-identification and development.¹⁹³

In the opinion of national-democratic political forces in Ukraine, the Ukrainian language should remain the only state language because it is a basis for the state-building and a means to consolidate the country. According to that view, the language is thus a symbol of the independent state and a proof of the existence of the separate Ukrainian nation as dis-

192 Razumkov Centre, “Sotsiolohichne opytuvannia: Yakym chynom povynni spivisnuvaty ukrainska i rosiiska movy v Ukraini?” {Sociological poll. In which way do Ukrainian and Russian languages have to coexist in Ukraine?}, http://www.uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=289 (accessed February 25, 2014).

193 Serhii Hrabovskiy, “Mova – vlada – Tserkva: vyklyky siohodennia” {Language – power – Church. Present challenges}, <http://www.religion.in.ua/main/daycomment/13683-mova-vlada-cerkva-vikliki-sogodennya.html> (accessed January 11, 2014).

tinct from Russian.¹⁹⁴ Ukrainians have many things in common with Russians, that is they both are Slavs, mostly Orthodox and share a common history, and it is only the language that distinguishes them from the northern neighbour. Therefore, this distinctive feature should by all means be supported.

Together with the other Heads of Churches and religious organisations Sviatoslav Shevchuk expresses the awareness of the divisive power of language in the Ukrainian context. After the adoption of the new law on languages in Ukraine in 2012,¹⁹⁵ they issued an open letter asking the President to have the law reviewed. The state authorities have to avoid any political speculation on the issue of languages and prepare a new legislation that would preserve the balance between Ukrainian as the only state language and the languages of minorities.¹⁹⁶ The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate did not join the authors of the message because her leadership holds the opinion that the Church should comment on state laws only when they concern matters of religion and morals.¹⁹⁷ The question of languages does not belong to them.

2.5.2 The trauma of the Holodomor

The absence of the societal cohesion is evident in the attitude towards the Holodomor. Widely recognised in the western part of Ukraine as Stalin's genocide against the Ukrainian people this radical definition gets less support in the Ukrainian East and South. According to the public opinion poll

194 Margrethe B. Sovik, "Language Practices and the Language Situation in Kharkiv. Examining the Concept of Legitimate Language in Relation to Identification and Utility," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 201 (2010): 7.

195 On June 3, 2010, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the changes to the Ukrainian constitution according to which the regions of Ukraine with 10% and more of ethnic minorities can use their native language as a second state language. This law was at first cancelled at the result of the EuroMaidan on February 23, 2014, thus returning to the sole state language in Ukraine ("Rada Cancels Language Law," http://zik.ua/en/news/2014/02/23/rada_cancels_language_law_463972 (accessed February 25, 2014)). However, because of separatist tendencies in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea, the old version of the language law was re-established.

196 No. 2016.

197 "Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate Consciously Reluctant to Comment on Language Law," http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/state/national_religious_question/49050 (accessed January 14, 2014).

conducted in 2010-2012, “80% of western, central and northern Ukrainians and over 50% of southern Ukrainians, one third of eastern Ukrainians and one in four residents of Donbass believe it was a genocide. This statement is believed by people of all ages.”¹⁹⁸ The merit of this high recognition belongs to the efforts of President Yushchenko.

While President Yushchenko invested all his efforts to have the Holodomor recognised as a genocide on the international level, his follower, President Yanukovych portrays the tragedy as a crime of Stalin against his people but not as a genocide against the Ukrainian nation. In this way the President is following the official Russian interpretation where the Holodomor is viewed in the context of the massive forced collectivisation campaign of Stalin. Because Ukrainian farmers were strongly opposing collectivisation, Stalin had to implement stronger measures in order to achieve his aim of controlling the agricultural production and industrialising the country.¹⁹⁹ In this view Stalin was a successful manager and mass deportations and extermination of not only Ukrainians but also Crimean Tatars, Russians, Kazakhs, Kalmyks, and Caucasian nationalities were necessary a means of making the Soviet Union a thriving industrialised country. The Ukrainian society was impressed when on the inauguration day of the new President Yanukovych on February 28, 2010, all the materials dedicated to the theme of the Holodomor were removed from the official website of the President.²⁰⁰ Even though later under public pressure those materials were restored, the fact of the change in the historical policy was more than evident.

The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is of the opinion that the recognition of the great famine as a tragedy for all Ukrainian people will contribute to the national unity in the country: “This tragic page remains to be an unhealed wound in the history of our nation. This memory is actively promoting social harmony and understanding between people with common pain of the past and hope for the future.”²⁰¹ Consequently, the Church condemns those who inhibit that possibility of unity. For instance, in his letter to the Prime-Minister of Ukraine, Liubomyr Husar does not speak about those guilty of the Holodomor but instead re-

198 “Majority of Ukrainians Consider Holodomor Genocide,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/state/national_religious_question/50309 (accessed January 16, 2014).

199 Tabachnyk, 200 years.

200 Viatrovykh, President.

201 No. 2022.

proaches the state authorities with the very humble commemoration ceremony in 2003. The organisers are guilty because they “failed to understand the significance and meaning of the event”²⁰² that could play a great nation-building role in Ukraine.

Obviously, it is easy to name the perpetrators in case of the Holodomor, the man-made famine that took place in Ukraine in the winter of 1932-1933. All the pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the topic accuse the totalitarian regime of Stalin of the organisation of this tragedy. The Holodomor was directly ordered from Moscow; 7-10 million people died of hunger after the Soviet authorities expropriated food products in the autumn of 1932; hence, the Holodomor is an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people and a crime against humanity.²⁰³ The Holodomor is a “terrible crime of the Soviet regime against Ukrainian people.”²⁰⁴ Additionally, the totalitarian regime attempted to erase any memory of the tragedy.²⁰⁵ It is guilty of keeping silence about the tragedy of the famine by trying “to eradicate the remembrance of the Holodomor even among the eyewitnesses and denying its existence.”²⁰⁶

It is worth noting that the opinions of the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine concerning the evaluation of the Holodomor do not completely coincide. Among the joint addresses on the topic of the great famine, only the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate signed the texts where the Holodomor was denoted as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people.²⁰⁷ The Ukrainian Orthodox Church as well as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church did not author such official pronouncements. The only text signed by all four Churches of the Kyivan tradition is “Address of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations on the 75th anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine” that does mention the word genocide for the assessment of the Holodomor but does not accentuate that idea. The artificial famine of 1932-1933 is rendered as one of the biggest tragedies of the history of Ukraine and of the entire world. The text recognised that the Holodomor was deliberately organised by Stalin and was si-

202 No. 172, 300.

203 No. 277, 460; No. 303, 502; No. 319, 520; No. 2003.

204 No. 155, 274.

205 Ibid., 275; No. 319, 521; No. 2003.

206 No. 155, 275. Translation from the original source.

207 No. 2003; No. 2022.

lenced afterwards in the Soviet history.²⁰⁸ I suppose that this address is a compromise variant intentionally avoiding the dividing language in order to unite all the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine around the message of national unity on the basis of the commemoration of the Holodomor.

It seems that the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church tell more in their messages on the commemoration of the Holodomor than just call to national unity and accuse the communist regime of the massive death of people. In the spirit of all the texts on dealing with the burdened memory, I am inclined to postulate that in the example of the great famine, the Church points at the destructive influence of communism on both the physical and spiritual dimension of the person. Hence, the Holodomor has to be considered in the broader context of healing human souls from the communist distortions to the human spirit. Myroslav Marynovych has identified the problem in such a way: the communist ideas were present not only on the political or economic level; they affected the very centre of the human being, the soul. Consequently, paraphrasing Konrad Adenauer, Marynovych postulates that communism cannot be defeated in an economic, cultural, or military way; Christian expertise is absolutely necessary.²⁰⁹ It is plausible to speak about both the crime and sin of communism.²¹⁰ The Holodomor is the example of the former, whilst the moral decadence in private and political life in contemporary Ukraine reveals the latter. The crime of communism concerns only certain people, but the sin of communism is committed by every person who lives according to the destructive rules of the system still nowadays.²¹¹

This conclusion is even more plausible given the fact that Ukraine together with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary constitute a group of countries which demonstrate a controversial interpretation of com-

208 No. 319, 520-521.

209 Myroslav Marynovych, "Spokutuvannia komunizmu" {Purging communism}, in *Vybrane. T. 1, Avtobiohrafichni ta ranni tvory. Lysty* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 247.

210 Ibid., 245-246. Therefore, in his other presentation on the topic, Marynovych calls to condemn communism as the crime against humanity on the legal level. On the moral level, the former communist countries have to repent commonly of their devotion to the communist doctrine (see Myroslav Marynovych, "Istorychna pamiat i moralni vyklyky suchasnosti" {Historical memory and moral challenges of the present times}, <http://maidanua.org/static/mai/1306170491.html> (accessed January 21, 2014).

211 Marynovych, Purging communism, 246-247.

munism.²¹² That totalitarian past exercises a decaying influence on the path to a democratic transition: “The authoritarianism latent in post-Soviet power structures reveals the extent to which an unaddressed criminal past undermines democratic development.”²¹³ Those considerations explain why the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is that much faithful to her major preoccupation about the repercussions of the past on the present stance of Ukrainian society. In all the texts, the tragedies of the past, the current crisis, and its future solution are of a spiritual nature.

The former Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko argued that the reconciliation in society, the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation, is necessary for the development of national unity and then trust. In its turn, trust is necessary for the functioning of society, its economics, and all its institutions. Yushchenko emphasises that in the crime of the Holodomor it is important to remember those who organised it or helped realise it.²¹⁴ It was made by the Moscow communist authorities with the help of Ukrainian collaborators. Ukraine has never had either a trial or a public condemnation of communism, which would be beneficial for the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation. Contemporary Ukrainians do not bear juridical responsibility for the past. However, they can decide upon whether evil will be spread around either by choice or by indifference. We will see later that the thought of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church goes in the same direction – the personal purification from evil as the responsibility of everyone.

212 Claus Leggewie, “Seven Circles of European Memory,” <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2010-12-20-leggewie-en.html> (accessed October 30, 2013).

213 Ibid.

214 Yushchenko, *Conversations*.