



Adrian J. Neumann

# The Rings of Resilience Model

Proposing a New Framework to Build,  
Strengthen and Sustain Strategic Resilience  
in Countries Faced with Terrorism



Nomos

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## Preface and Acknowledgments

Writing this book has been a labour of passion, dedication and resilience. When I first delved into the complex world of building resilience in open societies in 2015, Europe was grappling with an escalating terrorist threat from Daesh. Devastating attacks in France and the UK were a stark reminder of the urgency of our mission. Although Germany had remained relatively unscathed by large-scale attacks until December 2016, the spectre of violence loomed.

I became convinced that in the context of an open society like Germany, traditional defensive measures and target hardening were not sufficient. We needed a paradigm shift to address this threat - a new approach to mitigate the impact of inevitable future dangers. But where was the answer? The search for it was my driving force in embarking on this scientific endeavour - to create knowledge through science, in the belief that true impact lies in understanding and proactive action.

Although I am the sole author of this work, I have not done it alone. Every academic work builds on the knowledge of those who came before us and the wisdom shared by others.

I am deeply grateful to the scholars whose research and insights I have been able to draw upon in my work. Special thanks go to Professor Herfried Münkler and Dr Felix Wassermann for their work on strategic resilience, which paved the way for this work.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my former colleagues at the Institute for Security Policy at the University of Kiel (ISPK), where I found my academic home. Under the academic leadership of my supervisor, Professor Joachim Krause, and the prudent management of Dr Stefan Hansen, ISPK provided a unique research environment. During my time at ISPK, I was inspired by its inquisitive and open, yet distinctively values-based approach, and benefited from the institute's long-standing expertise in the field of radicalisation and terrorism.

My fellow doctoral students became intellectual companions on the journey. Among them, Dr Sebastian Bruns stood out - a seasoned academic and an invaluable sounding board for bold ideas whose wisdom enriched my perspective. In addition, my Austro-American colleague, Dr Jeremy Stöß, played a pivotal role, generously sharing his knowledge and experience.

When tragedy struck - the untimely death of my second supervisor, Professor Edward Keynes – Professor Jan Asmussen stepped in. His generosity with his time and critical feedback ensured that my work progressed despite many challenges including administrative hurdles and the pandemic. His mentorship has been a beacon of light.

The Konrad Adenauer Foundation's fellowship programme "Security and Development in the 21st Century" also played a key role in the preparation of this work. Under the leadership of Professor Beate Neuss, the programme not only provided essential funding but also fostered a vibrant community. Discussions and feedback from experienced academics such as Professor Beate Neuss, Professor Stephan Bierling and Professor Nikolaus Werz, as well as professionals and academics from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Network, enriched my work and broadened my horizons. I would like to also thank the programme manager, Dr Šimon Bačkovský, and especially my colleague, Dr Margarita Cuervo, who gave generously of their time.

Finally, my deepest appreciation goes to my parents, Madeleine and Rolf. Their unwavering support and genuine interest have sustained me throughout this long journey. Cheering me on and encouraging me have helped to fuel my determination, and their eagle-eyed proofreading has measurably improved this work. Without their belief in me and their support over many years, this work would not have been possible.

In writing these acknowledgements, I've tried to capture the essence of everyone who played a role in this work. However, if I've inadvertently missed anyone here, please understand that this was unintentional, and that I am truly grateful.

As you delve into the pages ahead, I invite you to explore the timeless concepts and models discussed here. May they help to shape our understanding and build resilience against the constantly evolving threat of terrorism.

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABTA	Association of British Travel Agents
ACT	Action Counters Terrorism
AED	Automated External Defibrillator
AMLA	Administration of Muslim Law Act
ARS	Asatizah Recognition Scheme
BAKS	Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BID	Business Improvement District
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCA	Civil Contingency Act
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CD	Civil Defence
CEP	Community Engagement Programme
CEPP	Community Emergency Preparedness Programme
CNN	Cable News Network
C2E	Emergency and Engagement Committee
CERT	Community Emergency Response Teams
CFR	Corporate First Responder
COP	Citizens-on-Patrol
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
CPR	Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation
CPS	Centre for Protective Security
CRR	Community Risk Register
CSM	City Security Magazine
CSSC	Cross-Sectoral Security Communications
CSSP	Corporate Safety & Security Programme
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTP	<i>Counter Terrorism Policing</i>
CTPHQ	Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters

## *Acronyms and Abbreviations*

CTSA	Counter Terrorism Security Advisor
DARE	Dispatcher-Assisted First Responder
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	Emergency Preparedness
EPP	Emergency Preparedness Programme
EPC	Emergency Preparedness Centre
GEBSS	Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore
HEART	Human Emergency Assistance and Response Team
HTVN	Home Team Volunteer Network
ICR	Increasing Crowd Resilience
IECPs	Islamic Education Centres and Providers
IEM	Integrated Emergency Management
IPA	Infrastructure Protection Act
IPP	In-Place-Protection
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRT	In-Situ Reaction Teams
IRCC	Inter-Racial & Religions Confidence Circles
ISA	Internal Security Act
iSSWG	Industry Safety and Security Watch Group
LMC	Loss Mitigation Credit
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JWB	Just-World-Beliefs
MC	Managing Crisis Behaviour
MCCY	Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth
MCI	Ministry of Communication and Information
MDA	Media Development Authority
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
Mi5	Military intelligence, Section 5
MoM	Ministry of Manpower
MOH	Ministry of Health
MRHA	Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act
MTFA	Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack

Muis	Islamic Religious Council of Singapore
NaCTSO	National Counter Terrorism Security Office
NCDCC	National Civil Defence Cadet Corps
NDBI	Non-Damage Business Interruption Coverage
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NE	National Education
NFEC	National Fire and Civil Emergency Preparedness Council
NHS	National Health Service
NPC	Neighbourhood Police Centre
NPCC	National Police Chiefs' Council
NSF	Full-time National Service men
NWZ	Neighbourhood Watch Zone
PA	The People's Association
PBIED	Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device
PCRH	Presidential Council for Religious Harmony
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PSA	Public Service Announcement
PSeMS	Protective Security Management Systems
PSHE	Personal, Social, Health and Economic Education Association
OD	Order of Detention
PLO	Police Liaison Officer
PTSD	Post-Traumatic-Stress Disorder
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion
RDTs	Rapid Deployment Troops
RO	Restriction Order
ROW	Riders on Watch
RTW	Return-to-Work
SAF	Singapore Armed Forces
SAFE	Security Awareness For Everyone
SAL	Save-A-Life
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCDF	Singapore Civil Defence Force
SCPB	Step-Change Programme Board

## *Acronyms and Abbreviations*

SCQT	Specialised Certificate for Quran Teachers
SDC	Singapore Discovery Centre
SDQ	Specialised Diploma for Quran Teachers
SFA	Standard First Aid
SG	Singapore
SIA	Security Industry Authority
SME	Small & Medium-sizes Enterprise
SOI	Subject Of Interest
SPF	Singapore Police Force
SRC	Security Review Committee
SSDDM	Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model
SSWG	Safety and Security Watch Group
SWG	Silver Watch Group
TMT	Terror Management Theory
UKCTP	UK Counter Terrorism Policing
VAW	Vehicle As a Weapon (attack)
VSC	Volunteer Special Constabulary

# 1. Chapter: Research Question & Approach

## 1.1. Description of the Problem

Open, complex and networked societies such as the liberal democracies of Europe have unavoidable vulnerabilities.<sup>1</sup> In addition to the threats of natural disasters and diseases, the deliberate exploitation of vulnerabilities by strategically acting adversaries leads to “strategic vulnerability”.<sup>2</sup>

The diffuse, asymmetrical threat posed today by international terrorism as a tactical means of rationally-acting perpetrators from the homeland and from abroad has crossed all dividing lines between internal and external security.<sup>3</sup>

The exploitation of the “strategic vulnerability” of modern, [liberal] post-heroic societies<sup>4</sup> presents these societies with the dilemma of balancing between prosperity and freedom on the one hand, and security on the other hand, in order to meet the society’s demand for protection.<sup>5</sup>

### Immediacy

In Europe, in the recent past, we have been seeing a trend by terrorist groups away from outbidding each other through daring and complex attacks, such as 9/11, towards action-oriented, higher-frequency, low-signature terrorism.<sup>6</sup>

This type of terrorism has increased the field of recruitment because the required skills for participation can be extremely reduced and accelerated by appeals and detailed instructions on social media. Autonomously operating small groups or single offenders (“inspired” perpetrators) without relevant criminal records and without an infiltratable environment offer few opportunities for early detection and for prevention by police and

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1 See Gearson 2012, 193 ; Münkler 2015, 247 ; Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 91.

2 See *ibid.*, 91.

3 See Bakker 2015 See Baban 2014.

4 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 16.

5 See Kaufmann 2015.

6 See Kydd and Walter 2006 ; Fahmy 2017, 736 ; Laqueur 2016.

intelligence services. More comprehensive surveillance of society is politically undesirable in democracies (*Security Policy Vulnerability Paradox*) and would also be financially priceless.<sup>7</sup>

In June 2019, the German domestic intelligence service reports that it observed a shift within the Islamist scene in recent years towards militancy and jihadism respectively.<sup>8</sup> Within the Islamist/Islamist Terrorism spectrum the agency observes, those activists attributed to the Salafist movement alone make up over 11,300 people.<sup>9</sup>

This agency also counts 12,700 right-wing extremists and 9,000 left-wing extremists who show a tendency towards violence (*“gewaltorientiert”*).<sup>10</sup> In France and in UK the picture is not very different, according to MI5 it *“has more than 3,000 subjects of interest (SOIs) on its watch list, more than it is capable of monitoring around the clock, as well as a pool of over 20,000 former SOIs some of whom are thought capable of moving to violent action.”*<sup>11</sup>

France faces a similar challenge of keeping track of over 20,000 suspected extremists.<sup>12</sup> MI5's director is unequivocal that the agency considers *“homegrown Islamist extremists still UK's biggest threat”*<sup>13</sup> as 80% of terrorist attacks which MI5 was able to thwart were IS-inspired.<sup>14</sup> Foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq have further increased the radicalization efforts inside of several European countries due to the *“veteran effect”*<sup>15</sup>: The technical and tactical knowledge these people acquired in the war zone can further increase the effectiveness of future attacks. The failed attacks in the past due to technical inadequacies as in the local train in Cologne 2006 or at Parsons Green Underground Station in London 2017 are more unlikely in the future.<sup>16</sup> Due to a lack of a comprehensive strategy and to a lack of capacity necessary for de-radicalization, young fighters returning to Europe are at best detained and then released into society after serving

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7 See Kaufmann 2015 ; Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 91.

8 Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat Juni / 2019, 177.

9 *ibid.*, 178.

10 *ibid.*, 110 ; *ibid.*, 50.

11 See Gardner 2019, online.

12 See News Wires 2018 online.

13 See Bond 2019 online.

14 *ibid.*

15 See Nesser 2018 ; Holman 2016, 12.

16 See Dearden 2017 online.



their sentence with the stigma of a criminal record and with new, often problematic prison relationships.<sup>17</sup>

## New reach

As the rise of *Daesh* has shown the terrorists have created a powerful non-kinetic weapon through the professional use of social media. They have also cleverly exploited the public media by deliberately escalating violence and brutality, adhering to the rule book of “*mass-mediated terrorism*.”<sup>18</sup>

They use the resulting media content for their propaganda, radicalization and internal recruitment, and even failed missions are transformed by narration and imagery into a powerful appeal for heroism and sacrifice.<sup>19</sup> Most important, however, is the impact of the media on the outside world.<sup>20</sup> The terrorists’ use and public broadcast of acts of extreme violence “*provide the battering ram terrorist need to gain access to the mass media.*”<sup>21</sup> The slick content is precisely targeted and is proof of a profound understanding of today’s infotainment news format that “*thrives on the very images and themes that terrorist incidents offer – drama, tragedy, shock, anger, grief, fear, panic – ideal ingredients [...] to captivate and stir up audiences.*”<sup>22</sup> The global news, web-and TV networks feed the 24/7 news cycle with these stories from around the world with the effect of “*blurred lines between domestic and international terrorism*”<sup>23</sup> in the viewer’s perception, helping the terrorists in achieving their tactical goal to spread fear in the population.<sup>24</sup>

The perpetrators not only want to spread fear among the direct victims.<sup>25</sup> They want more. The *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism* at the University of Maryland describes the perpetrators’ “*intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a*

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17 See Vidino and Brandon 2012.

18 See Schmid 2005 ; Nacos 2007.

19 See Wilner 2011.

20 See Comer *et al.* 2008 ; See Carruthers 2011.

21 Livingstone 1987, 216.

22 Nacos 2007, 37.

23 *ibid.*, 17.

24 See Zimmermann 2003, 49.

25 See Carruthers 2011.

larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims” as important criterion for the inclusion into the Global Terrorism Database.<sup>26</sup>

If the direct target is “well” chosen, an attack on an individual can be a felt by a whole nation.<sup>27</sup> The murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam 2004, the murder of the soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich 2013 or the attack on the editors of the journal Charlie Hebdo in Paris 2014 are examples of this.

*Terrorism works not simply because it instils fear in target populations, but because it causes governments and individuals to respond in ways that aid the terrorists’ cause.*<sup>28</sup>

As attacks create insecurity in the public space this fear, developing as a consequence, has a negative impact on society.<sup>29</sup> It leads to mistrust and stereotyping, overreactions and often to retaliatory attacks.<sup>30</sup> Research shows that on the one hand, this leads to a preference for decisive, action-oriented reactions; on the other hand, simple explanations, such as after 9/11, that can lead to sub-optimal political decisions, risk avoidance behaviour and a culture of fear.<sup>31</sup> This can keep society in a state of fatalism and pessimism.<sup>32</sup> Fear of terrorism as a self-fulfilling prophecy can lead to [even] more terrorism.<sup>33</sup>

## Social relevance

While before the *Attack on the Berlin Christmas Market*, most of the attacks in Germany had been thwarted, the population in Germany had already shown strong signs of vulnerability as it is psychologically touched by attacks abroad. This must not be surprising considering that since 9/11 there has been a tendency by the media and political leaders to frame

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26 LaFree and Dugan 2007, 188.

27 See Rothkopf 2016; See Gearson 2012, 172 ; See Arce and Sandler 2016, 183.

28 Kydd and Walter 2006, 50.

29 See Gautier *et al.* 2009.

30 See Ivandic *et al.* 2019 ; Sikorski *et al.* 2017, 845 ; Hanes and Machin 2014.

31 See Nacos 2007, 180 ; See ; See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 15; See Levine and Levine 2006, 616; See Rothkopf 2016, 11–12; See Sikorski *et al.* 2017, 845.

32 See Furedi 2007, 13.

33 See Rothkopf 2016, 11–12 ; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2007, 16 ; Schmid 2005 ; Zimmermann 2003, 56.

single attacks not as albeit tragic, yet locally limited events perpetrated by a specific jihadi group, but as a declaration of war of Islamic radicals against “the West” as and the values it holds dear, alluding to Samuel Huntington (1996) thesis of the “*clash of civilizations*”.<sup>34</sup> This pattern of a collective European response of horror and solidarity repeated itself after the 2004 commuter train attacks in Madrid and the 2015 attacks in Paris.<sup>35</sup>

A representative study conducted April-November of 2016, found that 80% of Germans were strongly concerned about the global increase in terrorism, with 70% expressing a strong fear of an attack in Germany.<sup>36</sup> Only about a third of the respondents were confident about the government response to the terror threat.<sup>37</sup> These low confidence levels in the official response to attacks may be partially explained with the visible effects of austerity measures in the public services and the lack of judges and prosecutors, as well as massive overtime at state and federal police level. The results are however consistent with a continuously low level of confidence in politicians identified in a long-term study conducted by the R+V insurance group in Germany.<sup>38</sup>

Six months after the *Berlin Christmas Market Attack*, (yet still before the *Manchester Arena Attack*), in a representative study conducted in the election year 2017, 38% of Germans selected terrorism as the number one concern in their country.<sup>39</sup> This is a stark difference to the 2013 election, where the same view was expressed by only 7%.<sup>40</sup> Over time, it can be seen that this value is significantly influenced by terrorist attacks in Europe.<sup>41</sup>

Outside of Germany a similar picture is emerging. The survey results from France for example, collected at the beginning of 2017 suggest that the attacks, the country has suffered in 2015, have left a strong impact.<sup>42</sup> According to a representative survey French society showed signs of *fragmentation* and *uncertainty* and a more pessimistic outlook with 80% of the French saying that they believe in 2017 they *live in a dangerous world*.<sup>43</sup>

34 See Huntington 1996.

35 Truc 2017.

36 Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (IfD) 2016, 1.

37 See *ibid.*, 24.

38 See Infocenter der R+V Versicherung 2019, 3.

39 See Ipsos Public Affairs 2017, 1–2.

40 See *ibid.*, 1–2.

41 See *ibid.*

42 See Hecker and Tenenbaum 2017.

43 See Atkinson 2017.

This anxiety has been echoed across several European nations, whose publics believe immigrants increase risk of terrorism according to a representative *Pew Research Center* survey.<sup>44</sup> While recent research shows that fear of terrorism in Germany has decreased from the high points in 2016 and 2017 in 2019 it is still 100% over the 2001 pre- September-11 attacks level with strong concerns over Islamic influence on Germany and Islamist extremism.<sup>45</sup>

The situation in 2020 is similar across Europe where publics still strongly over-estimate the risk of terrorism according to an *Ipsos MORI* survey.<sup>46</sup> The resultant distrust towards Muslims as a result of a process of co-radicalisation of the majority population is an intended consequence of the Islamist's attacks, a phenomenon seen in the Netherlands, a process that arguably started with a single murder, of Theo van Gogh in 2004.<sup>47</sup> This ensuing hostility can further alienate the fellow Muslim citizens, possibly driving the latter into the folds of radical Islam.<sup>48</sup>

The continuous shift in political and public sentiment against Muslims and Muslim immigration since 2015 and "revenge attacks" like the Finsbury Park Mosque car ramming attack (United Kingdom) 2017 and the firearms attacks in Christchurch (New Zealand) 2019, are indicators of the potential troubles, if the masses were to move into action triggered through the power of invoked images of a new Islamist outrageous terror attack or crime committed.<sup>49</sup>

In his work on mass psychology Le Bon warns that hundreds of small crimes, or a hundred small incidents, might not have the slightest effect on the imagination of the masses; but they may be deeply shaken by a single unprecedented crime, a single great misfortune, though it is much less bloody than the hundred small accidents combined.<sup>50</sup>

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44 See PEW Research Center 2019.

45 See Infocenter der R+V Versicherung 2019, 4-5.

46 See Ipsos MORI 2020.

47 See Eyerman 2008; The murder of Film maker Theo van Gogh, who was shot and had his throat cut with a knife in broad daylight on his way to work by a Dutch-Moroccan man, who took offence with a documentary shown on national television produced by van Goghs in cooperation with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-born female politician, which is strongly critical of the treatment of woman in Islam, send shock-waves through the Dutch society.

48 See Huijnk 2018 ; See Meaker 2017.

49 See Le Bon 2015, 69.

50 *ibid.*, 71.

*Successful terrorist attacks damage morale, weakens public and government confidence in counter terrorism agencies, and can even lead to backlashes against minority populations that in the long run produce more terrorists. Botched raids or the inability to achieve convictions similarly damage morale, while alienating minority populations whose cooperation is crucial.*<sup>51</sup>

## 1.2. Approach Strategic Resilience

In view of these strategic vulnerabilities, the attempt to successfully defend against all possible terrorist threats in the sense of a defence (the attempt to ward off the direct consequences of an attack) does not appear to be a realistic option.<sup>52</sup> If terrorist attacks prove to be so effective, a rational actor would continue to do so.<sup>53</sup> On the same assumption of a rational actor, his cost-benefit equation can be altered through cost-imposing and benefit-denial strategies, and in consequence his behaviour can also be influenced.<sup>54</sup>

*Table 1: In the Deterrence Theory of Conventional Terrorism, Kroenig & Pavel distinguish between four strategies*<sup>55</sup>

<p><i>Cost Imposition Strategies:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>Direct Punishment:</i> Deterrence by the threat of persecution and punishment of the perpetrators</li> <li>– <i>Indirect Punishment:</i> Deterrence by the threat of collective punishment of the perpetrator's environment</li> </ul> <p><i>Benefit-denial Strategies:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>Tactical Denial:</i> Deterrence by hardening possible targets and thereby reducing the likelihood of tactical success of an attack</li> <li>– <i>Strategic Denial:</i> Deterrence by the credible refusal to grant the strategic success of an attack (i.e., instilling terror and fear in the population)</li> </ul>
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51 Zaidi 2012, online.

52 See Enders and Sandler 1993, 829 ; Zimmermann 2003, 64.

53 See Gearson 2012, 193 ; Crenshaw 2009, 373.

54 See Enders and Sandler 1993, 830 ; Trager and Zagorcheva 2006, 88.

55 See Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 25.



*Resilience* as a counterpart to *Strategic Vulnerability*, which refers to the premeditated exploitation of existing vulnerabilities by an adversary.<sup>63</sup> According to Münkler and Wassermann the strategically resilient society is able to face the intended damage with “heroic serenity”<sup>64</sup> based on its consciousness and acceptance of the demands placed on individuals in the modern “risk society” as described by Beck.<sup>65</sup>

Thus to meet the challenges that the modern society places on the individual and the society requires conceptual shifts, away from the ideal of invulnerability, and the concept of total protection under a security paradigm, towards acknowledging inevitable remaining vulnerabilities, embracing the concept of coping and the conscious acceptance of life with its inherent risks,<sup>66</sup>

*Strategic Resilience* does not only require the population’s passive heroic endurance,<sup>67</sup> but also support of prevention of, response to and the coping with an attack or other type of shocks. Consequentially, the effect of *Strategic Resilience* does not start once an attack has occurred, but long before that and does not end afterwards. *Strategic Resilience* affects dealing with the mere threat of an attack, reacting to an attack and managing its potential consequences.

In this constellation, the population is not primarily seen by the authorities as a possible victim, but on an equal footing as a partner and supporter for emergency responders, who are first on the scene during the *isolation period*. This creates a force-multiplier effect, allows for a much faster response in case of emergency and has a positive effect on the population themselves, who through involvement / active participation have the feeling that they are better able to control the situation and are not just helpless victims.

Instances when citizens bravely responded to an ongoing attack, or helped prevent them in the preparation phase are well documented in the press as shown on the following page.<sup>68</sup>

63 See *ibid.*, 93.

64 *ibid.*

65 See Beck 2016.

66 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 87.

67 *ibid.*, 93.

68 Examples include the *Glasgow Airport attack* in July 2007 where citizen overpowered the assailants who had driven their vehicle loaded with combustibles into the airport terminal building and prevented them from igniting their explosive cargo. (See figure 1), in 2015 a vigilant shop assistant at a home improvement retailer prevented a

After an attack, it is crucial for the resilience of those affected, if and how quickly normalcy can be restored to their lives. This also represents a message to the outside, that is, to the rest of the population and to potential terrorists that through the attack the terrorists do not achieve their strategic objective. So, if terrorism is a means of communication, then *Strategic Resilience* is also a means of communication to respond to the message of terror.

So beyond the effect of helping to directly reduce the psychological impact of attacks on the population, and at least preventing or reducing the success of an attack, credible *Strategic Resilience* destroys the adversary's incentive to carry out attacks in the first place, since the desired effect of the plot that motivates the act of terrorism is denied.

Figure 1: Left image gives an example of the reported resilient response to Glasgow Airport Attack 2007.<sup>69</sup>

Figure 2: Right image gives an example of the reported resilient response to the London Bridge attack in 2019.<sup>70</sup>



Salafist bomb attack at the Frankfurt cycling race by alarming the police of suspicious purchases. (See Jansen 2015), In December 2019 civilians stopped the stabbing spree of a previously convicted terrorist armed with knives and a fake suicide belt, with the help of a whale tusk and a fire extinguisher (see figure 2)

69 The Daily Record, 4 July 2007, 1.

70 The Scottish Daily Mail, 30 November 2019, 1.



An escalation and return to large, complex attacks in Europe (as we know them from abroad, for example Sri Lanka), is not expected, according to estimates of the security authorities as these would require appropriate coordination and preparations, which are associated with a higher risk of discovery by the strengthened police and intelligence services.

Instilling and growing *Strategic Resilience* in a society Münkler & Wassermann admit, can however be a complex and long-term process as a society has to cope with three paradoxes when it tries to address its strategic vulnerabilities:<sup>71</sup>

1. *The Security Policy Vulnerability Paradox*,
2. *The Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox and*
3. *The Security Communicative Vulnerability Paradox*

### The Security Policy Vulnerability Paradox

According to the *Security Policy Vulnerability Paradox* the more resolutely and effectively a society strives to reduce its vulnerability through the means of security policy, the greater its vulnerability can become.<sup>72</sup>

When a society takes security measures to close its identified weaknesses the cost of such measures can outweigh their usefulness and ultimately lead to a rather greater than reduced vulnerability as an unintended consequence.<sup>73</sup>

Increasing security in “Western” open societies beyond certain levels impacts prosperity as it may lead to self-paralysis.<sup>74</sup> Damages could be rising taxes to pay for protection i.e. against disasters or terrorism, or restrictions on personal freedom, i.e. racial profiling in exchange for the possible prevention of terrorist acts.

Trying to counter terrorism, governments have the choice between a rock and a hard place as they have to find a balance between traditional security and prosperity. One of these goods has to stand back. Terrorist groups like *Al Qaida* have prominently revealed this dilemma with comparatively limited resources on 9/11, making it a serious strategic vulnerab-

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71 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 90.

72 See *ibid.*

73 See *ibid.*, 91 ; Rothkopf 2016, 10.

74 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 88.

ility.<sup>75</sup> In a verdict already in 1967, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) established that no money in the world and no measures taken can make all risks in life go away. The court developed the concept of the “concrete expression of hazards of life” (*Konkretisiertes Lebensrisiko*) which had to be accepted and with which one had to live.<sup>76</sup>

If total security is not possible because it is politically and economically undesirable, authorities have to decide which areas they consider critical (and undertake all efforts to protect and defend them) and which vulnerabilities are allowed to persist with the risk that they may be exploited. In order to counteract the vulnerabilities in other ways than through target hardening and direct punishment, but rather through ‘heroic composure’ of the population, an open and honest debate in the society is necessary.<sup>77</sup>

Acceptance of risk therefore does not mean inaction. But it is necessary to come to an arrangement with the fact that there will always be disasters. To be able to achieve the desired social consensus and thus the *Strategic Resilience* of that society, the government and the people must agree which uncertainties they consider to be “critical” and which vulnerabilities they do not intend to eliminate for good reasons.<sup>78</sup>

Gearson accordingly states that

*openness and sharing of information [...] is likely to allow populations to understand the nature of the challenges their communities face, [...] [and to] better support the development of resilient societies that terrorism finds difficult to coerce.*<sup>79</sup>

## The Security Communicative Vulnerability Paradox

Communicating openly with the public about a society’s vulnerabilities however risks unintendedly informing terrorists about the community’s weaknesses, who listen to what Western governments say, and are adaptive, flexible and interested in what they value.<sup>80</sup> Münkler & Wassermann call this the *Security Communicative Vulnerability Paradox* which posits that

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75 See *ibid.*, 93.

76 See Bundesgerichtshof 1967.

77 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

78 See *ibid.*

79 Gearson 2012, 192.

80 See *ibid.*, 193.

the more openly a society communicates about its vulnerability, the more vulnerable it may become.<sup>81</sup>

In the knowledge that potential perpetrators are witnessing the risk communication between authorities and the population, these must carefully weigh between the unintended consequences of exposing unknown vulnerabilities to a malevolent third party and threatening the normative foundations of the open society and ultimately its *Strategic Resilience* by censorship and secrecy measures.<sup>82</sup> Gearson suggest that in knowledge of the perpetrator's intended maximisation of his audience of the terrorising effect beyond the very limited direct target, authorities should opt for openness in order to avoid a potentially counterproductive effect by unintentionally scaring a large part of society through unnecessary secrecy.<sup>83</sup> Kroenig & Pavel propose placing more importance on the benefits of the deterrence effect that societies can achieve by "*developing and publicizing their resilience, including through adequate disaster planning and emergency responses systems*" than on the potential risks of openness.<sup>84</sup>

Münkler and Wasserman suggest that the prerequisite for this strategy to be successful will require an eye-level exchange and arbitration between the security experts who supposedly have fact-based strategic knowledge of security research and policy, and the citizens who are laymen in the field of security but who are having their own perception and subjective opinions about the situation.<sup>85</sup> Whether a concept such as that of "heroic composure" can develop its desired effect in such an exchange depends above all on how convincingly, sensitively and calmly the political and scientific security experts communicate about uncertainty.<sup>86</sup> This all depends on the finding the right time/occasion, the right channel, the right tone, the right message and the right sender. A consensus found on what the society really feels strongly threatened by and which disadvantages it is ready to accept in

81 See Münkler & Wassermann 2012: 93.

82 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

83 See Gearson 2012, 192 ; An often quoted sample of misplaced secrecy that unintentionally increases public anxiety took place on November 17, 2015, shortly after the Paris attacks during the press conference on the short-term cancellation of the international soccer match Germany against the Netherlands in Hanover, when the Federal Minister of the Interior, when asked whether there was still a persistent risk situation, responded with "*Part of these answers would be unsettling for the population.*" Munzinger 2015.

84 Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 30.

85 Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

86 *ibid.*

exchange for more security, is not permanent – it may change over time and may need to be renegotiated.

### Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox

Even if a society, on the basis of a consensus about its ‘most critical’ vulnerabilities, is making efforts to minimize them, and these efforts then increase security both objectively and subjectively, the vulnerability of this society may paradoxically rise overall insofar as the improvement in the safety or the sense of security increases the negative effect of any damage occurring, in particular intentional menaces (like terror attacks), to possibly strategic dimensions.<sup>87</sup>

Münkler & Wassermann describe this as the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* that states that the less vulnerable a society is or perceives itself to be, the more stressful and psychologically impacting are any breaches.<sup>88</sup> Attacks can shatter the sense of security of the society and create a feeling of vulnerability.<sup>89</sup> Thus, a terrorist who recognizes these dialectics and takes these into account in his plans, in the same way as he does the high security need of post-heroic societies, will try to attack precisely those areas in which there is supposed security.<sup>90</sup>

Efforts to preclude these vulnerabilities in the traditional style, in particular through the tightening of protective measures and security precautions in “critical” areas, will not only lead to further losses – in freedom and prosperity but can – due to the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* – also have the effect that vulnerability increases rather than decreases due to and instigated by media coverage.<sup>91</sup>

This underlines the importance of *Strategic Resilience* and preparedness which requires the deliberate consideration of risks and vulnerabilities as a pre-requisite.<sup>92</sup> The strategically resilient response to the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*, therefore, exists in heroic calmness as a conscious and deliberate paradox: It is important to generate *Strategic Resi-*

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87 See *ibid.*, 91.

88 See *ibid.*, 92.

89 See Rothkopf 2016, 6.

90 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 92.

91 See *ibid.*, 91.

92 See Diederichs 2017, 51.

lience not through the manufacturing of added protection, but through the acceptance of [certain levels of] risk and uncertainty<sup>93</sup>, an idea seconded by Rothkopf who posits that “*The real victory occurs the day after an attack, when life goes on undisturbed.*”<sup>94</sup>

To accept the limits of security and to cope with potential suffering due to exploited vulnerabilities, the individual requires the suffering to have a meaning.<sup>95</sup> According to Frankl “*suffering ceases to be suffering at the moment it finds a meaning.*”<sup>96</sup>

For the authorities, this means not only fulfilling society’s quest for more security, but also communicating the countering concept of a meaning-based acceptance of uncertainty far and wide for the greatest possible impact.<sup>97</sup> Gearson summarises well the multiple interacting constituents that make up the *Strategic Resilience* of society as portrayed in Vasu’s model of “*Resilience as a complex system*”.<sup>98</sup>

*“Terrorism’s violence as communication [is] replied to by society’s capacity for community strength and determination, which derives from informed and stoic acceptance of the limits of security, but also belief in its ability to cope with many challenges thanks to preparatory measures and information.”*<sup>99</sup>

### 1.3. Research Questions

Despite the widespread understanding among security professionals and academics that only a resilient society can respond to unexpected threats and events in a way that promotes security and deals with them appropriately<sup>100</sup>, European societies and their leaders have struggled to achieve strategic resilience as conceptualized by Münkler & Wassermann. This struggle persists even though they possess knowledge that resilience can be actively

93 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

94 Rothkopf 2016, 325.

95 Frankl 2006, 51.

96 *ibid.*, 51.

97 Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

98 Vasu 2007, 4.

99 Gearson 2012, 191.

100 See Giebel 2014, 370.

cultivated and shaped, at least to a large extent<sup>101</sup>, as they face a particularly terrible terrorist threat from the *jihadi* groups like *Al-Qaeda* and *Daesh*.

*Strategic Resilience* as described by Münkler & Wassermann in the face of terrorism, especially *jihadi* terrorism, is still seen as special, as outside of the norm in post-heroic societies. Cases where this behaviour is shown, garner attention and they are highlighted and celebrated by the media and authorities.<sup>102</sup> This seemingly re-validates Gigerenzer's observation made in 2004, that society expects that people "*faced with 'dread risk', which refers to events that are very unlikely and rare but that cause devastating damage to [...] react strongly with avoidance behavior, different than to other life risks, like traffic accidents, in which many people, distributed over a longer period of time, perish, so to speak, unspectacularly.*"<sup>103</sup>

This work sets out to help in closing this gap between abstract conceptual knowledge and action by concretizing Münkler & Wassermann's concept of *Strategic Resilience* and to make it actionable. The objective is to develop a mid-level theory/model that can be tested, an organising and analytical framework that can function as a starting point for governments who want to actualise the Münkler & Wassermann's concept across the government.

The research question of this work is therefore:

How can Münkler & Wassermann's abstract concept of *Strategic Resilience* be actualised in open, pluralist societies faced with a *jihadi* terrorism threat?

To answer this question, the work relies on three sub-questions:

- Sub-Question One: What are the underlying research-based theories of the *Strategic Resilience* concept?
- Sub-Question Two: What are the critical elements that can form a model, that may be distilled from the assessment of the identified theories in sub-question one, that can help build strengthen and sustain *Strategic Resilience* against terrorism?
- Sub-Questions Three: Can the findings of sub-question two be applied to the concrete challenge of *jihadi* terrorism in the open, pluralist society?

While sub-question one and two support theory building, sub-question three tests the theory through a multiple-case study with a literal replication design. The to-be-tested-hypothesis assumes that if the proposed frame-

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101 See Baban 2014, 9.

102 See Hassan and O'Grady 2019 ; BBC News 2017 ; BBC News 2016.

103 See Gigerenzer 2004, 286 .

work is valid and effective in answering the overall research question, it should be reflected in the resilience-focused counter-terrorism strategies employed by open-pluralist societies faced with jihadi terrorism. The units of analysis are the programmes and underlying measures taken by the authorities in case countries.

Cognisant of the temporary threat picture<sup>104</sup>, the work focuses on jihadi terrorism due to its special qualities that will be laid out in detail in Chapter Three, which make it especially fearsome in the eyes of the public and thereby especially dreadful and effective to create fear and rage.<sup>105</sup> The result should however be transferable to other types of terrorist threats.

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104 EU Terrorism Report 2020.

105 Moyes and Mackenzie July/2018, 10 ; Ashour 2009, 8.





## 2. Chapter: Methodological Approach & Case Selection

### Rationale

In order to achieve the research objective and answer the research sub-questions this work utilised a combination of qualitative research methods.

After introducing and examining the concept of *Strategic Resilience* and arguing for its continuing relevance for pluralist societies in face of ongoing challenges from terrorist actors (Chapter 1), the work defines and classifies the used terms in the context of this work and lays out the work's overall scope and limitations (see Chapter 3).

To answer *sub-question one*, the work proceeds to identify and to carefully examine the relevant existing scientific literature that can help explain how terrorism and its accompanying violence and threat scenarios affect the resilience of populations and individuals and their coping strategies in direct and indirect ways (see Chapter 4). The scope adopted, is intentionally wide beyond the field of studies on terrorism and deliberately cuts across diverse research areas including sociology, psychology, communications and disaster management. The focus is placed on scientific research that helps understand the effect particularly on those who are indirectly affected by terrorism – in contrast to studies that cover resilience regarding individuals and groups directly affected, e.g. in natural disaster like floods, wildfire or industrial accidents.

The identification and examination process of the literature is conducted in a five-step process:

1. Identification of relevant keywords,
2. Using the combination of the respective keywords as markers in online database search,
3. Screen the identified papers for their relevance in building, sustaining or strengthening *Strategic Resilience*,
4. The remaining identified theories and models are subsequently analysed in detail,
5. The elements that can contribute to *Strategic Resilience* are dissected from each theory and converted into concrete proposed policy measures.

The sum of all the different proposed single measures that were deduced from the analysis of the theories underlying the *Strategic Resilience* concept,

are subsequently aggregated in a spreadsheet calculation program (see Chapter 5). Through iterative cycles of filtering, classification, and categorisation, the over 100 micro- and mid-level *Strategic Resilience*-enhancing policy measures are subsumed under nine macro-level categories which, the work suggests, constitute the essential elements for building, strengthening and maintaining *Strategic Resilience* in a modern, pluralist society, and answers *sub-question two*. Based on these nine macro-level categories the work builds a comprehensive model, that it proposes can function as an organising- and analytical framework for building *Strategic Resilience*, thereby enabling open pluralist societies to build muscle to repel and withstand or to bounce back from jihadi terrorist attacks. That model is used to deduce general recommendations for practical measures to be taken preventively before an attack, as an immediate response to an attack, and measures to help coping after an attack.

Proceeding to answer *sub-question three* the relevance and validity of this new proposition is tested by selecting a positivist deductive case study approach as posited by Yin<sup>106</sup>, examining and comparing the counter-terrorism policies and programmes enacted to counter jihadi terrorism threat in two different countries. Both countries assessed, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Singapore who have a reputation for their resilience-focused approach to counter-terrorism, are otherwise dissimilar cases, on two extremes on the spectrum of parliamentary democracies.

The United Kingdom (UK) (see Chapter 6) is the prototype of a liberal parliamentary democracy. Its policy decisions are meant to be achieved through reasoned deliberation and debate, guided by logic and moderation. Its liberal values are protected from government overreach or religious fervour by an independent judiciary, a strong parliament, an independent press and a self-confident citizenry. The combination with a liberal trade and economic agenda has allowed the UK's capital to develop into inarguably, the most pluralistic city in the world, the prototype of the cosmopolitan city.<sup>107</sup>

The Republic of Singapore's (SG) (see Chapter 7) parliamentary system is built on the same Westminster System and its government has been credited for creating an open and globally interconnected city state through good governance and a *muscular secularism* that mandates societal toler-

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106 Yin, 2001, 49-51.

107 See Truc 2017: pos 1997.

ance and moderation as a necessary prerequisite for preserving harmony in a pluralistic, multi-ethnic society.<sup>108</sup> Despite practically limited options for opposition, especially concerning media freedom, the Singapore government has been able to claim large consent with those it governs.<sup>109</sup>

Since 2001 both the UK and SG have become the target of jihadi terrorism from *AlQaida* and *Daesh* and have since both supported supra-national counter-terrorism efforts. As pluralist, secular societies with prototypical cosmopolitan urban centres both countries are equally facing the threat from Muslim radicalisation of their nationals and of foreigners living in their countries. As a consequence, both countries have to also deal with the challenges of co-radicalisation and xenophobia.<sup>110</sup>

Despite these shared commonalities, as mentioned above both countries can be said to fall on opposite sides of the spectrum of practiced parliamentary democracy: The UK historically placed strong emphasis on limited government, a strong parliament and protecting individual freedoms, while Singapore based on different outside and inside circumstances opted for a dominant government, a practically limited parliament role and an emphasis on the community wellbeing over the protection of individual freedoms.<sup>111</sup>

In knowledge of these variances between the countries, the assessment of their policy responses to the similar *jihadi* terrorism threat, promises to be very fertile. The purpose thereby is not to identify all and every small measure or factor that may help the case country to achieve *Strategic Resilience* or to evaluate its effectiveness. The interesting thing is to see, if the newly established nine critical tasks are being reflected in the actual government programs in both countries. In addition, through the analyses of the cases, the author expects to identify additional practical measures that may be generalised and can further substantiate the implementation of the nine critical tasks elsewhere.

Utilising a holistic multiple-case replication design<sup>112</sup>, the new theory is tested by analysing each of the cases for convergent evidence as if they were a whole study in their own right. For each case the work first analyses in detail the countries' counter-terrorism strategies for the necessary context

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108 See Ramakrishna.

109 See Chin 2016 ; Ramakrishna.

110 See UK Government 2018 ; See Rashith 2019 ; See Hanes and Machin 2014.

111 See Mohamed Nasir and Turner 2013 ; See Ramakrishna.

112 As described by Yin 2001, 49.

before assessing the deployed programmes against the nine variables established in the new *Strategic Resilience* framework individually.<sup>113</sup>

For better understanding, each case assessment is quantified and visualised with the help of radar chart. The selection of both countries is neither a normative statement about the general effectiveness nor of the legitimacy of the measures as they are highly context specific.

The work then compares the conclusions of both cases with each other and draws a *cross-case conclusion*,<sup>114</sup> whether the cases were able to falsify the new theory (see Chapter 8). The qualitative comparison is again augmented by radar chart quantifying outliers and commonalities in the programme mix of both countries.

As a concluding step (see chapter 9) the findings of the work are then summarised and implications for academia and practitioners proposed.

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113 See Yin, 2001, 13.

114 See Yin, 2001, 49.

### 3. Chapter: Definitions and Limitations

#### 3.1. Introduction

This chapter elaborates on the concepts of terrorism and resilience to give the reader a clear understanding of the assumptions and thematic limitations of this work. The use of the terminology plays a crucial part, especially in a research area full of ambivalences and grey zones.<sup>115</sup> It is therefore necessary to take a closer look at the phenomenon of terrorism and *jihadi* terrorism, not as a theoretical exercise but how these groupings position themselves in practice and how they are perceived by a target society, which affects the society's resilience.

#### 3.2. Definitions

##### 3.2.1. Terrorism

The use of the term terrorism in this work is based on the assumption that perpetrators of terrorist acts are rational actors<sup>116</sup> and their resorting to terrorist tactics can be understood as a “*reasonable and calculated*”<sup>117</sup> action (even when they appear fanatical)<sup>118</sup> and who may generally be receptive of deterrence.<sup>119</sup> Correspondingly, medical studies have been unable to connect the cause of terrorism to psychopathology.<sup>120</sup>

While the behaviour may appear morally unjustifiable or may appear irrational, terrorism is “*an effective tactic*”<sup>121</sup> or “*operational method*”<sup>122</sup> that follows an internal strategic logic deemed instrumental to further the

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115 See Jenkins 1980, 1; See Crenshaw 2007, 7 ; See Wojciechowski 2009, 5.

116 See Wheeler 1991, 11 ; See Zimmermann 2003, 14 ; See Trager and Zagorcheva 2006, 94 ; See Crenshaw 2009, 373.

117 *ibid.*, 371.

118 See Wheeler 1991, 11.

119 See Quinlan 2006, 17 ; Trager and Zagorcheva 2006, 88.

120 See Radlauer 2006, 610.

121 Rothkopf 2016, 11.

122 Zimmermann 2003, 14.



on a changed feeling of vulnerability, inflict and may be subject to large indirect damages.<sup>134</sup>

### 3.2.2. Jihadi Terrorism

Among different perpetrators, there are stark differences in the application of terrorist tactics.

These are influenced by the different causes or grievances, objectives, intentions, capabilities, motivation, stakeholders, group structure and leadership of a group amongst others. This has an effect on the designation of legitimate versus non-legitimate targets, legitimate versus illegitimate types and styles of attack, the choice of instruments and weapons, the acceptable level of violence and its internal and public justification.

The many variations become very apparent when comparing different terrorist groups, e.g. religious extremist groups, political extremist groups from the far right to the far left, ethno-nationalist groups, racist groups or animal rights extremist defenders.

In order to provide broad answers to help mitigating the negative effect of terrorism on open *Western* societies, the author has chosen for this work to exemplarily focus on *jihadi*-inspired terrorism which has undeniably posed a serious challenge to numerous societies in Europe over the past years and continues to do so, with its political fall-out noticeable across Europe.

While there are undoubtedly other types of terrorism which pose a threat to open European societies (e.g. far right, ethno-nationalist, far left, etc.), and terrorist acts committed by these groups had and may have terrible consequences for the citizens targeted, they have been no match to the perceived notoriety, insolubility, depth and width of the terror threat posed by *jihadi* groups to the whole of Western societies over the past years.<sup>135</sup>

Beyond its statistically proven notoriety, *jihadi* terrorism has four specific characteristics which are discussed below, and which make this type of

134 See Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2007, 16–17 ; See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 17; See Levine and Levine 2006, 616.

135 See Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport Berlin 2017, 4 ; Cronin 2009, 6.

While the deliberate use of violence by non-state actors to advance political or ideological objectives is ostracized by the large majority of people in the Western society, the deliberate use of violence against innocent civilians as condoned by many terrorists is considered especially offensive and despicable. Jihadism is a modern Islamic ideology that theologically legitimises and necessitates the use of violence to further its objectives.<sup>138</sup> To jihadis, jihad is the outer jihad, the prescribed violent struggle to defend and spread Islam.<sup>139</sup> In their ideology, violence is not just an option, it is mandated. Different from the mostly “*demonstrative terrorism*” conducted by the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF) in Germany, *jihadi* terrorists are conducting “*destructive terrorism*” which “*is more aggressive, seeking to coerce opponents*”.<sup>140</sup> Accordingly these groups do not perceive “*violent combat solely as a means to an end*” but as “*a sacred end in and of itself*”<sup>141</sup>. This is a big difference to the most notorious and longest running campaign of political violence in Germany in the past, committed by the RAF and its splinter cells from the 1970ies to the -90ties. Their attacks, though also harming civilians, were most of the time carefully targeted, as the RAF was trying not to lose the sympathy of the (wrongfully) perceived well-meaning silent majority<sup>142</sup>. Jihadis in contrast, use “*theologically ideologically legitimized*” violence to “*mobilize support for [...] [their] cause*”<sup>143</sup>, proving the higher lethality and notoriety of (pseudo-)religious groups and movements compared to secular terrorist movements.<sup>144</sup>

144 See Nacos 2007, 32.



Strong commitment to violence against civilians<sup>145</sup>

Apart from the general “*intolerance and the frequent use of violence*”<sup>146</sup>, jihadism is characterised by the willingness of its militant followers to „*ideologically legitimize and practice violence against civilians and unarmed persons*”<sup>147</sup>. This is based on an absolute distinction, made between religious believers and non-believers and justified with the notion that “*no one is innocent; all are potentially guilty, if only by association*”.<sup>148</sup> As part of their “*destructive terrorism*” approach, they “*do not recognise any rules or conventions of war for combatants, non-combatants or the treatment of prisoners [...] [and] they use particularly ruthless weapons and methods to attack civilians*.”<sup>149</sup>

Their display of no mercy towards defenceless, unarmed civilians can create a nimbus of viciousness and evilness which may under certain conditions elevate the acts and the perpetrators from simple criminals to scary “supervillains” in the eyes of the society.<sup>150</sup>

This use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, in defiance of even rudimentary standards and norms of civilisation evoke strong feelings in the society targeted and may threaten personal meaning of life, especially if the transgressions are not punished and rectified.<sup>151</sup> The random nature of the targeting may further increase the personal perception of risk and a surge in death-awareness which are catalysers for a feeling of uncertainty and for a loss of “*personal meaning*” when the existential “*idea that the world is just and predictable*” is violently challenged.<sup>152</sup> As the “*individuals’ perception, processing, and appraisal of events*”<sup>153</sup> are affected by perceived threats to the personal meaning the individuals may react by ignoring and rejecting threatening information and their messengers, and instead may be developing strong support for aggression against people who hold opposing views, and thus lead to an exaggerated and radical nationalistic belief.<sup>154</sup>

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145 See Bhatt 2013, 25–26.

146 Ashour 2009, 8.

147 *ibid.*, 5.

148 Wilkinson 1986, 4.

149 *ibid.*

150 See Furedi 2007, 7 ; Bhatt 2013.

151 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 22 ; Park and Folkman 1997, 118 .

152 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 22.

153 *ibid.*, 21.

154 *ibid.*, 21–22.

Compelling narrative with absolute distinction between the believer and non-believers

In their constructed absolute view of the world as “us versus them” and “black & white”, and thus as a conflict between “the West” and Islam, where all Muslims are exclusively portrayed as victims<sup>155</sup> of an alleged conspiracy of the unbelievers with the aim of destroying Islam and Muslims<sup>156</sup>, jihadis leave no room for compromise as they condone violence against the alleged enemies in the West, near or distant, as a duty of outer jihad.<sup>157</sup>

The contrived absolute distinction between the believers and the non-believers<sup>158</sup> and the rejection of Western societies and their underlying concepts of “*democracy as well as the legitimacy of political and ideological pluralism*”, give the appearance of an existential antagonistic struggle without any hope of cessation or compromise.<sup>159</sup>

On the one hand, this development of a violent and absolute antagonism on the terrorist side, spilling over into a clash of civilisations or cultures without shared values nor common norms or rules, may create feelings of fear and anxiety in pluralist open Western societies. But on the other hand, the potential narrative of an existential struggle “us versus them”, “open societies versus totalitarianism” could strengthen the modern society’s identity and provide strong meaning and purpose which are understood to be crucial for building resilience.<sup>160</sup>

The problem is however that without a positively binding meaning and purpose, a principally constructive value-based rallying around the flag may turn into an effective co-radicalisation of the targeted open society and may end up polarising it along the lines of the attributed identity and lead to the society’s disintegration into in-groups and out-groups, pitted against each other.

The risk of a negative outcome is higher today. Adverse foreign state actors have the ability to fuel the internal debates by covertly pushing vitriolic and divisive content through social media platforms and by overtly providing a platform for divisive fringe voices on their foreign language

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155 See Biene and Junk 2017, 117.

156 See Frankenberger 2017, 64.

157 See Biene and Junk 2017, 118 ; Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport Berlin 2017, 6.

158 See Bhatt 2013.

159 Ashour 2009, 4.

160 See Smith 2017, 73-96.

television and media channels and through the direct political address of diaspora communities in the targeted country.<sup>161</sup>

The other problem is that the *jihadi* narrative of a just and morally mandated battle against the supposedly suppressive, hypocritical and morally degenerated *Western* societies, has found followers in Western societies.<sup>162</sup> This does not only refer to the home-grown terrorists who through their rejection of their own open native societies, shatter the society's self-concept and its esteem, but also by the broader embrace of this narrative by domestic anti-*Western* movements and their rejection of a positive nation-wide shared identity.<sup>163</sup>

To Kilcullen, it is evident that the terrorist threat in Europe only at first sight is primarily an armed battle, but even more so it is an intellectual battle, an “*ideological competition between open societies and takfiri [jihadi] groups*.”<sup>164</sup> Countering the *jihadi* narrative is not sufficient, according to Kilcullen but “*Western countries [...] must also as a matter of priority, articulate and enact their own narrative*”<sup>165</sup>

Confirming Furedi's assessment that “*idealism seems to be monopolized on the wrong side of the conflict*”<sup>166</sup>, the political leadership of Western societies have shown to be lacking the ability to precisely define what their societies shared values, purpose and identity are. Therefore, they have struggled to understand the conflict and the enemy and thereby failed to compellingly explain the situation to their own people in a credible comprehensive narrative of their own that would provide meaning and direction.<sup>167</sup>

If history may provide a lesson, it is maybe that Communist, terrorist and ideology-based movements in Western-Europe at the time of the Cold War, were not overcome by military/law enforcement means alone, but that these movements lost the intellectual battle first, as the *Western* governments were able to demonstrate to and persuade their publics of “*the falsity of the [Soviet] ideology, the illegitimacy of the regime, the possibility of successful resistance and the bankruptcy of the Soviet world-view*”.<sup>168</sup> Today

161 Nemr and Gangware March / 2019, 14–26.

162 See Furedi 2007, 92.

163 See *ibid.*, 77-101.

164 Kilcullen 2009, 247.

165 *ibid.*, 286.

166 Furedi 2007, 92.

167 See *ibid.*, 77-101.

168 Lenczowski 2012, 109.

in the intellectual battle with Anti-Western jihadism, Western governments are still struggling to achieve this upper hand.

### Concept of Paradisiology<sup>169</sup>

*“Suicide terrorism is the most aggressive form of terrorism”*<sup>170</sup>. This act of self-denial is a powerful symbol of a cosmic or sacred act where the perpetrator transitions from weakness to power by sacrificing his life for a higher cause, a concept foreign to an individualistic, liberal and secular post-heroic society.<sup>171</sup>

While the frequently high casualty numbers from a suicide attack may alienate moderate sympathisers, it helps to attract support from radical elements.<sup>172</sup> In addition, the apparent defiance of death, expressed in the suicide attack, has a unique coercive effect:<sup>173</sup> This ultimate act of self-denial, focused on the certain reward in paradise, once again denies the opportunity for accommodation or coercion here and now. The seemingly irrational behaviour creates a distressing vagueness about the looming threat in the targeted society.<sup>174</sup> If the public knowledge about jihadism is still sketchy today,<sup>175</sup> then fear is the natural reaction to the inability to recognize an ordering structure that provides clarity and orientation about the threat.<sup>176</sup>

#### 3.2.3. Resilience

If *Strategic Resilience* is an answer to strategic vulnerability of modern, liberal post-heroic societies,<sup>177</sup> one has to take a closer look at the definition of resilience.

Since the middle of the last century, “resilience” has come to wide-spread use, become a kind of buzz-word used in different disciplines like ecology,

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169 See Bhatt 2013.

170 Pape 2009, 161–162.

171 See Bhatt 2013.

172 See Pape 2009, 161–162 ; See Bhatt 2013.

173 See Pape 2009, 162.

174 See Radlauer 2006, 611 .

175 See Biene and Junk 2017, 116.

176 See Klein 1987, 53.

177 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012.

engineering, sociology or psychology.<sup>178</sup> The use of the term and general concept of resilience which has seen consistent growth since 9/11, also found its way into the *National Security Strategy* of the United States, built on the painful realisation that it is impossible “to deter or prevent every single threat.”<sup>179</sup> Today, the term is in use beyond national security and has proliferated into nearly all areas of life. The visual snapshot of a systematic literature review of “research articles related to defining and quantifying resilience in various disciplines” published between 2000 and 2015, Hosseini et al. underlines the discipline-crossing nature of resilience research.<sup>180</sup>

Similarly, a simple foreign language book search on [www.amazon.de](http://www.amazon.de) in 2020 produces 8000 book titles with the term “resilience” and 2000 titles when searching for the German equivalent “Resilienz”.

Irrespective of the discipline the common understanding of the term “resilience” in all different disciplines is related to and has the same linguistic origin – Latin. The Latin verb “resilire” is formed by the prefix „re“, meaning „back“, and the verb “salire“, translating into “to jump”.<sup>181</sup> Thus the translation of the verb “resilire” is to “jump back, to leap back, to recoil or to rebound”.<sup>182</sup>

This basic translation is at the core of all usage of the noun “resilience” and of the adjective “resilient” and is its common denominator. The use of the term “resilience” in one discipline at least in part, can be transferred into the usage in another discipline and thus can widen its scope of use. In a wider sense, the idea defining “resilience” shows a similarity in all disciplines using it: robust, flexible and redundant. This similarity makes the transfer of an intellectual approach easier: “Resilience” takes effect whenever a living being, a material or a system is touched by stress.

178 See Bara and Brönnimann 2011, 6 ; See Roth and Prior 2014, 105.


179 The White House 2010, 18.

180 Hosseini et al. 2016, 50.

181 Georges 1902, 2234.

182 *ibid.*, 2234.

Figure 3: A snapshot of clusters based on category, created by CiteSpace.<sup>183</sup>



In a general definition resilience can be described as “the *ability of an entity or system to return to normal condition after the occurrence of an event that disrupts its state.*”<sup>184</sup> In another definition a system can be described as resilient if it is able and has the competence and capacity to mentally and materially handle crisis – or disaster-induced stress and to return to the status-quo-ante.”<sup>185</sup>

Due to the complexity of the resilience construct and its context sensitivity there are different definitions for resilience for each discipline that are context specific.<sup>186</sup> Many of the offered definitions for resilience though do “overlap with a number of already existing concepts such as robustness, fault-tolerance, flexibility, survivability, and agility, among others.”<sup>187</sup>

183 Image and description Hosseini et al. 2016, 50.

184 Hosseini et al. 2016, 47.

185 See Lucini 2014, 31.

186 Southwick et al. 2014.

187 Hosseini et al. 2016, 47.

Due to the interconnectivity of the expressions of “resilience” in the different disciplines, it makes sense to take a look at their understanding and use of „resilience“.

In engineering resilience is described as the ability of a material to absorb energy through elastic deformation and still return to its original state, without suffering plastic deformation.<sup>188</sup> This is an important distinction to “toughness”, which describes the ability of a material to absorb energy not only by elastically deforming but from plastic deformation as well.<sup>189</sup>

Ecological resilience is concerned with the ability of ecosystems to maintain their fundamental characteristics despite being exposed to ecological disturbances. This means that a resilient eco-system is able to adapt to a changing environment, to a changing world, instead of dying out. As mentioned before (in engineering resilience), this is the difference between resilience and toughness. Holling who put the concept of resilience into ecology proposed the definition:

*Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables and parameters and still persist. In this definition resilience is a property of the system and persistence or probability of extinction is the result.*<sup>190</sup>

Taking the same systemic perspective and showing its multi-disciplinary disposition, resilience also found its way into sociology. Specifically “within the context of the sociology of disaster, crisis and disaster management, and disaster planning”, Lucini found, the concept of resilience has gained great importance.<sup>191</sup> This is also reflected in the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015* published by the *United Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction*, a disaster risk-reduction programme which strongly emphasis community resilience to bounce back and recover following disaster.<sup>192</sup> Therein *disaster resilience* is defined as

*the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain*

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188 See Redwing 2018a.

189 See Redwing 2018b ; See Redwing 2018a.

190 Holling 1973, 17.

191 Lucini 2014, 31.

192 See United Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) 2015.

*an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organising itself to increase this capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.*<sup>193</sup>

In its definition of community resilience, the *U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology* echoes the multiple determinants for mustering a resilient response and clearly emphasise the importance of anticipation and preparedness besides response and recovery:

*the ability to prepare for anticipated hazards, adapt to changing conditions, and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Activities, such as disaster preparedness—which includes prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery—are key steps to resilience.*<sup>194</sup>

While these mentioned determinants of resilience from a systemic perspective are dependent on a host of different interacting factors<sup>195</sup>, the individual always plays a central role which makes taking a closer look at individual psychological resilience necessary.

In the First World War, „shell shock“ or what is called today *post-traumatic stress disorder* (PTSD) was diagnosed among casualties in the trenches in sizable numbers.<sup>196</sup> Right then and since the 1922, „*Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock*“ the research into resilience of individuals, although the term resilience was not in use then, and how to investigate it, has been subject of research.<sup>197</sup>

The first primarily military driven question has been, how people are able to cope with traumatic stress from experiences like disasters or the trenches of “World War One” in such a way that they would carry on afterwards. What makes people withstand the most difficult of situations without breaking and to develop further in a positive way?

Psychological resilience can be defined in a more concrete way as the ability to cope with existential crises by using all available resources, to use them (existential crises) as a push for further personal development in a dynamic process of adaptation and development *that* will enable the

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193 *ibid.*, 4.

194 National Institute of Standards and Technology 2018.

195 Southwick *et al.* 2014, 2.

196 Linden and Jones 2014, 525.

197 See *ibid.*, 520–521 ; For a reprint of the report see Her Majesty's Stationery Office 2014.



*“healthy, adaptive, or integrated positive functioning over the passage of time in the aftermath of adversity”*<sup>198</sup>. This definition is so wide that it fits society and the individual alike. Even wider and more encompassing, covering all areas requiring resilience, is the definition that *“resilience refers to the capacity [of a dynamic system] for successful adaptation to disturbances that threaten system function, viability, or development.”*<sup>199</sup>

Following a comprehensive holistic approach to resilience the system analogy mandates that a system is only as resilient as its parts are.<sup>200</sup> Thus in regard of terrorism, a society is as resilient as its members. But one could also postulate that if a system is resilient, there is a good chance that the individual could be resilient too.<sup>201</sup>

### Resilience as a genetic disposition

If the reaction of an individual to a disaster or to an act of terrorism describes the degree of his or her resilience to the event, it is important to understand whether individuals are generally “programmed” to be resilient, in other words whether they are resilient by nature, with their resilience being a distinct characteristic to them. As an alternative possibility resilience would not be a hereditary trait, would not be found ingrained in the personal fabric of an individual and forever there, but could be trained and could be learnt.<sup>202</sup>

The proverbial “stiff upper lip”, the keeping of which is attributed to the British people as remaining stoic and unemotional in the face of adversity or danger could be part of the genes of an individual. Its origins in the studies of the Classics in British public schools may have been bred into generations of young people. But this is not necessary so: In “World War One”, over 80.000 British soldiers were treated in British hospitals suffering from “shell shock”.<sup>203</sup>

In 1939 at the beginning of the Second World War; His Majesty’s Government’s Ministry of Information tried to build on the image of “sober

198 Southwick *et al.* 2014, 1.

199 Masten 2016, 298.

200 See Vasu 2007.

201 See Kim 2016, 464.

202 See Wedding and Furey 2013.

203 See Linden and Jones 2014, 525.

restraint” by printing “2.45 million posters” with the slogan “Keep Calm And Carry On” to be “issued in the event of war”<sup>204</sup>

The experience of “World War One” apparently had shown that the theory of an inborn resilience in the human beings did not hold water nor was verifiable for each and every person in case of adversity, disaster or threat to life. Beside the genes there must be something else, even though there are many genes, possibly hundreds of them which will lend resilience to people. But scientists believe that genes only have an indirect influence on a resilient personality and behaviour, with a very low impact of the single gene.<sup>205</sup>

This does not mean that genetic contributions are not factors in the origin of resilience, but the genes are extremely sensitive to environmental influences.<sup>206</sup> Resilience can change to the better or to the worse during an individual’s lifetime.<sup>207</sup> Yehuda et al. are even talking about a possible epigenetic reprogramming of the gene function which means that the genetic blueprint or the DNA sequence is not modified, although the effect of the genes is changed by outer influence.<sup>208</sup> Understanding exactly which as Southwick et al. assert, that “*there are many different factors that could make some people more resilient than others.*”<sup>209</sup> As far as not genetically programmed, resilience is developing dynamically in a process taking place between the individual and as required by the respective environmental situation, which includes the supporting infrastructure.<sup>210</sup>

## Resilience of Critical Infrastructure

In this day and age, the public of modern open societies are used to and expect their infrastructure to function and deliver, even in case of disasters or terrorists acts. So, in the many applications of the resilience concept the resilience of critical infrastructure has strong prominence and is high

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204 University of London 2019, online.

205 See Southwick et al. 2014.

206 See Yehuda et al. 2013.

207 Kim-Cohen and Turkewitz 2012, 1303.


208 Yehuda et al. 2013.

209 Southwick et al. 2014, 5.

210 Kim-Cohen and Turkewitz 2012, 1303.

on the agenda of national and local governments as is reflected in the framework by the National Infrastructure Advisory council in figure 4.<sup>211</sup>

Figure 4: “A Framework for Establishing Critical Infrastructure Resilience Goals” published by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council.<sup>212</sup>



The strongly intertwined and interdependent economies in open societies, illustrated well in the figure below from the *Homeland Security Affairs* journal, however, can make them particularly vulnerable to shocks “as the failure of one or multiple infrastructure elements can cascade and affect the resilience of the entire system”<sup>213</sup>

Critical failure in such “system of systems” can suddenly expose citizens across a whole region or country to the effects of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*.<sup>214</sup>

The public in open societies do not only have to show resilience passively, but they are also an active part of the resilience system as the resilience definition in sociology, described above, clearly states when it declares that the handling of a crisis requires *mental and material* coping capabilities.<sup>215</sup>

There is a strong temptation to try to secure and safeguard resilience of critical infrastructure as well as of society primarily by technical means. Resilience there is seen as just an aspect of securitization. This is a technocratic and economic expectation that given enough high-tech and enough funding, disaster can be avoided.<sup>216</sup> This model may have certain advant-

211 See Bara and Brönnimann 2011, 26-27; Kaufmann 2015, 30 ; Prior and Hagmann March / 2012, 10–11.

212 Image taken from Berkeley and Wallace 19.2010, 17.

213 Verner *et al.* 2017, 7.


214 See *ibid.* ; Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 91.

215 See Vasu 2007, 4.

216 See Kaufmann 2015, 305-309 ; See Lucini 2014, 185.

ages by promoting investments into hardware and creating new jobs. But infrastructure is serving the community and its individuals and thus resilience of infrastructure is serving the resilience of the community and its individuals.

Figure 5: Exemplary “interdependencies among seven different infrastructure sectors and subsectors”<sup>217</sup>



At the same time resilience of infrastructure also interacts with community resilience and the resilience of its members. The resilience of communities and their individuals is depending on the resilience of critical infrastructure and vice-versa. They cannot be achieved one without the other.<sup>218</sup> For “professional resilience” to work it requires its protagonists to function in times of extreme duress.<sup>219</sup> The individual first-responder, police officer, fire

217 Quote and graphic taken from Verner *et al.* 2017, 7.

218 See Bara and Brönnimann 2011, 33.


219 See Lucini 2014, 50.

fighter, nurse or operator of a critical infrastructure has to be trusted to stand his man or her woman under the most adverse conditions.<sup>220</sup>

The engineering and ecosystems’ resilience which together forms the resilience of critical infrastructure is part of a system which encompasses their subsystems on the one hand and the resilience of communities and their subgroups or individuals on the other hand.<sup>221</sup>

This important connection between critical infrastructure (technical component) and the community (social component) as jointly underlying components of overall resilience is also reflected in Vasu’s model “*Resilience as a complex system*.”<sup>222</sup> The correct balance between technical resilience and social resilience decides on the success of the concept.

Figure 6: “*Resilience as a complex system*.”<sup>223</sup>



### 3.2.4. Strategic Resilience

There are many different types of shocks societies are faced with, including damages to their critical infrastructure. But the object of our analysis – the pluralist open society – has distinct qualities which affect its vulnerability and its resilience to it.

220 See O’Boyle *et al.* 2006, 351–357 ; For a negative example refer to the *Hurricane Katrina After Action Report* from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention February 2006 or read Bara and Brönnimann 2011, 33.

221 See *ibid.*, 35.

222 See Vasu 2007, 4.

223 Quote and graphic adapted from *ibid.*

In the definition adopted for this work, it may be described as a nation-state-centred pluralistic social construct, based on shared meaning and functioning on mutual trust and the rule of law in an inter-connected and interdependent efficiency-focused open-market economy. The population is characterised by putting a high value to individual freedom, cooperation, convenience and self-indulgence. At the same time, the people have little tolerance for pain, disruption or inconvenience, linked with the highest expectation for their safety and security for which responsibility has been handed over to the state's organs. Control over the government is exercised through democratic elections which give the population a direct influence on politics.

The threat of terrorism to the open society as described at the beginning of this chapter, does share similarities with the threats posed by other life risks (floods, storms, wildfires, industrial accidents, plane crashes, pandemics etc.) which authorities try to build technical and social resilience against. But this threat is also uniquely distinct from other life risks threatening and able to evoke stronger negative emotions in a society as the comparison below shows.

Table 2: *The different effects on society from terror attacks versus other disasters.*<sup>224</sup>

OTHER DISASTERS		TERROR ATTACK
Accidental	versus	Targeted
Tragic	versus	Callous
Expectable	versus	Random
Bad luck or negligence	versus	Malice
Common	versus	Rare
Local effect	versus	Global effect
Explainable	versus	Poorly understood
Mostly preventable	versus	Unstoppable
Mostly direct victims	versus	Mostly indirect victims
Local trauma	versus	National Trauma
Local destruction	versus	Destruction of <i>Global Meaning</i>
Fraternisation	versus	Division
Post Disaster Certainty	versus	Post Disaster Uncertainty

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224 Author's own work.

The special nature of the threat of terrorism described at the beginning of the chapter, and its perceived deliberate impact generates a massive amount of fear in the open society's population, although in comparison other life risks have a much higher statistical probability to kill or seriously harm citizens, even slipping on a banana peel and breaking your neck – but in the citizens' opinion, the banana peel is “not out to get them”.

The premeditation of these disturbances negatively affects the emotional need for trusting in relationships in the open society as its adversaries are not openly identifiable. Instead, they act clandestinely and ambush callously and purposefully in order to sow ethno-cultural distrust.<sup>225</sup>

Based on the above interrelated definitions of resilience, especially by Lucini and Masten, resilience in the *open society* may be understood as the will and ability of a society to prevent, withstand and recover from incidents which alter connections and relationships (including the trust in them) in the society and to the society and are perceived as negative, by mustering its material, social and psychological capital in a concerted effort.

*Strategic Resilience* may be understood as a subset of the Open Society Resilience which is concerned with such incidents which have been deliberately caused with a terrorist intent.

### 3.3. Limitations

Although ensuring the security of the citizens is the most rudimentary task and noble duty of the state, there is widespread negligence of this fact, also in open societies. Any terrorist attack on its civilian population or other soft targets is an attack on the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state and its acting authorities. In any response to the terrorist threat against its citizens, it is first and foremost the state which has the commanding, coordinating and instructing role. Without a carefully and professionally led effort by the government as a whole, a joint approach by the society as a whole which is necessary for *Strategic Resilience* against terrorism is not possible. Reflective of this indispensable role of the authorities in this effort, this work is focusing on identifying and defining the essential levers the government and the authorities respectively need, to generate, to activate and to sustain the desired resilient response. This is done in absolute clarity

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225 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 65.

that the success of a whole-of-society-approach as advocated in the *Strategic Resilience* concept, hinges on the actions and cooperation of non-government stakeholders across the society.

The author is aware that the characterisation of the open society, as used in this work, is generalised and not all countries which identify themselves as open societies would fit this description in its entirety. The author is also aware that societies, despite sharing the qualities here attributed to an “open society”, do have their own national culture, history, identity, leadership and demographics which may equally affect how each society addresses and responds to a potentially traumatic event, like a terrorist attack. Allowing this inherent diversity in the efforts of open societies to mitigate and muster a resilient response to the terrorism threat, in this research the author believes that it will give additional relevance and credibility to any general patterns the analysis will be able to deduce from the societies’ behaviours recorded in the case studies.

As terrorist methods and patterns of attack are constantly developing across the globe, the authorities also are responding with new counter- or mitigating measures of their own. The description of activities in Chapter Six and Seven cover programmes and measures up to the end of 2019. The findings of each case study however demonstrate that each country over time appears to develop strong preferences in regard to how they choose to address the terrorism threat and build resilience. The author therefore suggests that the state measures, assessed till the end of 2019, the types and styles of measures chosen reflect more than merely a picture of a certain point in time, but rather have a general validity.

While the work has been informed in preparation for and during the writing through background conversation with practitioners among others during the *RUSI Resilience Conference* 2015 (London), *OECD Counter Terror Conference* 2016 (Berlin), *World Counter Terror Congress* 2016 (London) *CBRN Conference* 2018 (Berlin) and *Crisis Prevention Conference* 2019+20 (Berlin), all information in this document is solely based on open-source materials. This means that in the analysis of the country case studies in Chapter Six and Seven, also only such programmes and measures were assessed which were publicly acknowledged by the authorities at the time of writing.<sup>226</sup> Occasionally the author has been unable to independently verify

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226 Public acknowledgement of existing capabilities may be delayed as one example from Singapore shows: As a response to a bomb attack on its oil refineries and a hi-jacking of a ferry, by members of the *Japanese Red Army* and *Popular Front for*



official government statements concerning a country's existing specific capability to deal with the terrorism threat. To reduce the reliance on a single source of information in security critical areas the author had to rely on his own estimates based on historical evidence of the authorities' specific capabilities in dealing with equally serious – though not terrorism-related – disasters in the past, like the SARS or H1N1 pandemic for example.

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*the Liberation of Palestine* in July 1983, the Singapore Government in secrecy set up a dedicated counter- terrorism police similar to the German GSG 9. Only 1991, after the successful raid on Singapore Airlines flight at Changhi Airport hi-jacked by Pakistani terrorists, by that newly formed unit, its existence became public and was officially acknowledged. See Public Service Division at Prime Minister's Office Singapore 2015 ; See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 20–21.



## 4. Chapter: Theories and Models

### 4.1. Introduction

This chapter identifies and carefully examines the relevant existing scientific theories and models that may underpin and substantiate the *Strategic Resilience* concept, by explaining how terrorism and its accompanying violence and threat scenarios affect the resilience of populations and individuals and their coping strategies in direct and indirect ways. Each identified model is analysed in depth, to dissect its critical elements that can contribute to *Strategic Resilience* and may be converted into concrete proposed policy measures.

### 4.2. Identification and Selection

The fundamental idea of *Strategic Resilience* is making sure that the intimidating and coercive negative effects of terror attacks potentially developing in an open society, are suppressed or unable to materialise. The research frequently describes these primary effects as fear, anxiety, stress and trauma, based on feelings of uncertainty, vulnerability, helplessness and senselessness.<sup>227</sup>

Understanding these potential effects of terrorism on open societies then allows deducing the fields of study relevant and of interest for the research on these issues and which then may point to potential coping mechanisms. These subjects may include inter alia, terrorism studies, fear and trauma management, clinical psychology, mass psychology, communication theory as well as risk and crisis management.

A search for relevant academic literature with a reference to resilience and *social or societal resilience* in the face of disaster or terrorism was then conducted. In the assessment of the results, it became clear that the terrorism threat does share similarities with the threats of other life risks (e.g. natural disasters, industrial accidents, train crashes, pandemics) – all of which authorities try to build technical and social resilience against. But

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227 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22 ; Wilkinson 1986, 3.

- Model of Global and Situational Meaning
- Just-World-Beliefs Theory
- Logo Theory [Existential Analytic Theory of Meaning]
- Terror Management Theory
- Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception
- Appraisal Tendency Theory
- Mass-Mediated-Terrorism Concept
- The Robespierre Affect
- Emotional Contagion / Social Influence Theory
- Affiliation Theory
- Conservation of Resources Model
- Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model

228 See Schaurer and Ruff-Stahl 2016 ; Maguen *et al.* 2008, 16.

### 4.3. Analysis

#### 4.3.1. Model of Global and Situational Meaning

*Global Meaning* may be described as an individual's personal answer sheet to the question "WHY" specific positive or negative events happen in the world, to make life appear more predictable, understandable and thereby controllable for the individual.<sup>229</sup>

Maguen et al. explain that "*humans strive to maintain worldviews that provide a sense of security and meaning to buffer against feelings of anxiety related to reminders of mortality and the limits of control over fate and environment.*"<sup>230</sup> *Global Meaning* consequently encompasses a multitude of beliefs: an individual's perception of the existing order in the world, beliefs about the self-worth, beliefs about the self in relationship to the world and others within it and the control over it, life goals and beliefs about what is right and wrong and what are justice and fairness.<sup>231</sup>

These beliefs held are also constitutional for the personal meaning, constructed by an individual in view of the vague, ambiguous threat of future terrorist attacks, and thereby determine his way and level of coping.<sup>232</sup> The decisive factor is what kind of meaning the individual prescribes to an event.<sup>233</sup> If the individual, based on his held beliefs can positively answer the "WHY" question to himself, he is said to be able to withstand almost any "HOW".<sup>234</sup>

Since the *Global Meaning* is built over time on life experience, it can also alter over time.<sup>235</sup> But apart from gradual shifts over time, research has shown that individuals in general cling to their held beliefs, showing a strong bias to interpret an external stimulus in a way that will allow them to maintain their previous view of the world (their *Global Meaning*), they do this instead of choosing an interpretation that would require them to alter or adjust their beliefs.<sup>236</sup> The same bias makes individuals "*tend to seek out*

229 See Park and Folkman 1997, 118-119 ; Smith 2017, 225.

230 See Maguen et al. 2008, 21 ; Arndt et al. 2002.

231 See Park and Folkman 1997, 118-119.

232 See Maguen et al. 2008, 23.

233 See Frankl 2006, 47.

234 See *ibid.*, 47.


235 See Park and Folkman 1997, 118-119.

236 See *ibid.*, 120.

experiences that confirm their global beliefs, even if these experiences confirm beliefs that are negative.”<sup>237</sup>

Fear and anxiety are the natural reactions to the inability to recognize an ordering structure which provides clarity and orientation.<sup>238</sup> Traumatic events, like terrorist attacks, can impact the existing structure based on held beliefs. In these cases, especially individuals with previous mental health difficulties are most likely to have difficulties coping with the stressors related to the threat of terrorism or actual attacks.<sup>239</sup> Also in general, “individuals with a previous trauma history tend to be more likely to be functionally impaired from exposure to subsequent traumas.”<sup>240</sup>

Figure 7: Park & Folkman’s Model of Global and Situational Meaning.<sup>241</sup>



237 *ibid.*

238 Klein 1987, 53.

239 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 24.

240 *ibid.*

241 Park and Folkman 1997., 117.

Park & Folkman explain the psychological process of the individual to find congruence between his previous beliefs concerning the world (including regarding himself, his goals, his relationship to others and justice), the so-called *Global Meaning*, and the *Situational Meaning* of a new event.<sup>242</sup>

Park & Folkman's "*Model of Global- and Situational Meaning*" as shown above, portrays the different individuals' steps in the process of how an individual tries to make sense of an event which may very well have been a jihadi terrorist attack or the perceived credible threat of it.

### Relevance

When considering the threat from terrorism, applying this model to a given situation allows deducing from it different opportunities for intervention as to reduce or eliminate cognitive dissonance and rumination, and instead to support coping to avoid "*spikes in anxiety and depression as well as symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)*" in the individuals.<sup>243</sup>


The opportunities for intervention exist during the *Initial Appraisal process* stage (A+B) as well as in the *In the Mean-Making Coping* stage (C+D).

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242 See Park and Folkman 1997.

243 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 15 ; See also Galea *et al.* 2002.

Figure 8: Amended Park & Folkman's Model of Global and Situational Meaning.<sup>244</sup>



#### Appraisal process stage

A) During the *Primary Appraisal*, the individual is assessing whether the new event or situation is posing a threat to him to which he would respond with a fight or a flight reaction.

The assessment is affected by different factors:<sup>245</sup>

- The scale of an event
- Threat to resources
- Tone and type of information about the event available through government or media (are fear-based reminders used?)
- The Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* (How safe does the individual feel? Is the new event a threat to previously held beliefs about his safety?)

<sup>244</sup> Adopted from Park and Folkman 1997, 117.

<sup>245</sup> See *ibid*.



- e. Existing memory of previous similar events
- f. Previous exposure to trauma
- g. Demographic factors
- h. Mental health conditions

B) During the *Secondary Appraisal*, the individual assesses which resources he can avail himself of to respond to the assessed potential threats.<sup>246</sup>

The following measures should be considered by the authorities to positively affect the *Primary Appraisal*:

- *The scale of an event*: The perceived level of threat emanating from an event is not solely based on the possible or expected number of casualties. The scale of an event, its potential number of casualties, the amount of destruction and longer-term impact does play a role though, in its assessment and its ability to produce fear and anxiety. Authorities should therefore put a focus on the prevention of large-scale attacks, especially Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. They should also communicate their efforts and achievements and put the probability of such attacks being successfully conducted, into perspective. Authorities must also communicate their ability to cope with the effects of such attacks through large-scale exercises, involving police and emergency services and first responders.
- *Threat to resources*: The ability of an individual to cope with an attack and continue his life just like he did before the attack, does strongly depend on whether his social, psychological and material resources have remained intact.<sup>247</sup> Authorities can reduce the perceived threat to personal resources through an attack, by promising in advance generous compensation packages for material losses, suffered in or as a consequence of an attack. This must include personal and business losses (considering a large prevalence of small and medium enterprises (SME) in Germany), for example because of destroyed or cordoned off premises. Concerning the loss of social resources, as a preventive measure, authorities can encourage development of such social resources, through supporting and enabling the creation and strengthening

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<sup>246</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>247</sup> For more on *Conservation of Resources Theory* refer to chapter 4.3.11 or to Hobfoll *et al.* 2006, 215.

of social bonds in sports and social clubs, societies, inter- and trans-generational projects, neighbourhood groups, volunteer opportunities and neighbourhood management. As a responsive measure, authorities should provide opportunities (and go public on it) for personal affiliation which is a natural reaction after the loss of social resources.<sup>248</sup> The perceived threat to psychological resources may be reduced by authorities through establishing a compelling narrative that provides meaning and purpose which allows the individual to make sense of the potential threat and expect better personal coping even with any direct suffering.<sup>249</sup>

- *The Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* where the beliefs held by an individual about his own safety and security, are shattered by an attack which breaches the existing imagined security barrier, underlines the importance of *Strategic Resilience* and preparedness. This requires the deliberate consideration of risks and vulnerabilities as a pre-requisite.<sup>250</sup> The strategically resilient response to the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*, therefore, lies in heroic calmness as a conscious paradox: It is important to generate *Strategic Resilience* not through the manufacture of added protection, but through the acceptance of (certain levels of) risk and uncertainty.<sup>251</sup> For the authorities, this means not only fulfilling the society's request for more security, but also communicating the counter-concept of the acceptance of uncertainty, far and wide for the greatest impact.<sup>252</sup>
- *Fear-based reminders from authorities or media*: By conducting “successful” attacks and threatening with more, terrorist convey the frightening message to the citizens of the impotence and weakness of the authorities.<sup>253</sup> When addressing the terrorism threat, authorities therefore must stay away from fear-based messaging that would only play further into the hands of the terrorists. Instead, they have to make use of their authority to sort out attacks in order to provide meaning and to encourage resolve, unity and defiance to the public.<sup>254</sup> This is possible as government authorities and their officials are (with few exceptions) the natural

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248 See Dechesne 2012, 85–86; Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 221.

249 See Frankl 2006, 51.

250 See Diederichs 2017, 51.

251 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

252 See Gearson 2012, 191; Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

253 See Nacos 2007, 202–203.

254 See Bangstad 2017, 37–41; Nacos 2007, 194–195.

authority in a disaster situation for the media, since the “*follow-the-leader-syndrome*” gives them “*influence [...] on the language used and the depth of the media’s reporting.*”<sup>255</sup> A study has shown that despite a lower volume of messages, the messages by the authorities have proven to have a greater impact on public opinion than competing ones.<sup>256</sup>

- *Existing memory of previous similar events*: Individuals are likely to have increased easy mental access to prior emotionally evocative events like terrorist acts in their memory. Thereby the often-attached emotions like fear, anxiety, anger or disgust, are stronger in their memory than ordinary non-salient events.<sup>257</sup> This latent accessibility of those memories may let the individual “*overestimate statistically small, but affectively potent risks*”<sup>258</sup>, like the “*dread risk*”<sup>259</sup> of becoming a victim of a terror attack and respond to it accordingly.

In the knowledge of this, authorities should communicate about risk and reassure the public through “*adequate disaster planning and emergency response systems.*”<sup>260</sup> When deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), it should be considered that beyond necessary and actionable information about the situation on how the authorities are responding and what the citizens themselves can do, further continuous reminders about terrorist threats is likely to increase the recipients’ level of anxiety. Studies also found that memories, which shape reality, can be influenced even at a later point in time.<sup>261</sup> By selecting and weaving different memories into a meaningful narrative that lets people make sense of previous, even traumatic events in their lives and in their connection to others, history – or the memory of it – can be re-written.<sup>262</sup> This allows individuals as well as the society to turn moments of defeat into moments of triumphant defiance and personal growth.<sup>263</sup> One of many examples for this can be

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255 *ibid.*, 106–107.

256 See Nacos *et al.* 2011b, 194.

257 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 19–20.

258 *ibid.*, 19–20.

259 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

260 Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 30.

261 See Vedantam 2017 ; Park and Folkman 1997, 120.

262 See Frankl 2006, 51 ; Vedantam 2017.

263 See Frankl 2006, 51.

- *Previous exposure to trauma:* According to multiple studies, people who have had previous exposure to and experience with a disaster situation, are expected to be better equipped to handle another new crisis situation, IF they had found a way to come to terms with the previous situation.<sup>265</sup> However, if individuals did not “properly” overcome a previous trauma, they “*tend to be more likely to be functionally impaired from exposure to subsequent traumas.*”<sup>266</sup>

- *Demographic factors:* The perceived threat experienced by an individual from an event and his perceived competence to adequately deal with a situation, are strong determinants of his response.<sup>267</sup> The individual threat perception about terrorism has shown to be influenced by demographic factors like gender, age, education and ethnicity.<sup>268</sup>

The following measures should be considered by the authorities to positively affect the *Secondary Appraisals*:

264 See Sherman 2015.

individual may also step in as an ad-hoc volunteer when needed. Courses offered in the UK to employees and research conducted in Berlin on course offers, showed a demand by the citizens for such offers.<sup>271</sup> Authorities need to consider how to meet the demand and develop creative solutions with partners from the emergency services or disaster response forces, law enforcement and academia on how to increase the reach and effectiveness, for example through:

- The delivery of online-based learning could be incorporated into the online training and coaching programs, already in place in large enterprises.
- The hours for the compulsory first aid course required to receive a driving licence in Germany, have recently been reduced. Maybe it would be wise to increase the qualification hours again or require drivers to come back into training and prove their abilities in first aid and rescue skills on a regular (bi-annual?) basis. Considering the logistical effort, one may also consider providing incentives for untrained citizens to undergo these courses and pick up the skills. Tax incentives or reduced fees for the driving test may be other incentives for people to brush up their skills.
- Also on the community level, the community could offer advantages to citizens who can show the right qualification (like certified first aid skills), by offering free access to community infrastructure like swimming pools or sports facilities or preferred access to public housing or university accommodation.<sup>272</sup>
- The offer of new formats like “First-Responder Parties” like “Tupperware Parties” where the basic training or refreshers are held at home among friends.
- Public Days, like First-Responder Days could be rolled out much more prominently, also as a sign of high esteem.
- “Fire Station Experience”: Set up more infotainment-based facilities where families, groups and school classes can train and learn about the risks and then practice the response in a playful manner. As a

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<sup>271</sup> See *ibid.*, 222.

<sup>272</sup> Since 2008 communities in England and Wales are able to use so-called *Time Credits* to reward their citizens for the time they contribute by volunteering. For an academic introduction into the concept of *time banking* and *time credits* and the application in Cambridge see Markkanen and Burgess 2015 ; See also Cambridge City Council 2014.

side effect this may also be beneficial for recruitment. [The measure should be connected to activities at different touchpoints, e.g. school for maximised effectiveness]<sup>273</sup>

- Consider scripting scenarios and adaptation of scenario-plays which can be shown in shows in amusement parks. As a side effect this may also be beneficial for recruitment. [The measure should be connected to activities at different touchpoints, e.g. school for maximised effectiveness]

### Meaning-Making Coping stage

- C) In the *Problem-Focused Coping*, the individual takes action in response to the event in order to change the situation. By education, training and providing necessary support, authorities can equip the individual to be able to better cope. Among others, these could include

- First aid skills
- Basic rescue and evacuation drills,
- Active shooter training
- Self-defence, or terrorism awareness/vigilance training

Which type of training, education and support is required has to be established, based on the specific circumstances of the individual and the applicable scenarios and general threat situation. They will be different for the bouncer of a night club in a crowded area in the centre of Berlin, to that of a primary school teacher in Heidelberg.

- D) The *Emotion-Focused Coping* is based on the positive re-framing /re-interpretation of the originally held *Global Beliefs* or of the time before the event which will allow the individual to achieve congruence between both and maintain his/her *Just-World-Beliefs*. Authorities have an ability to influence this process through “speech acts” and indirectly, through the “*follow-the-leader-syndrome*”<sup>274</sup> of the media.<sup>275</sup> Authorities may also use the effects of *emotional contagion* and create large gatherings offline or online and instruct multipliers and influencers who offer a new and more positive interpretation to the individual.

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273 Activities like RUN HIDE TELL in the UK are an example, how even young people can be equipped with skills to be able to better respond, if a situation should arise.

274 Nacos 2007, 106–107.

275 See Lippmann 2013.

Authorities may also try to prevent and hinder gatherings which want to disseminate a different interpretation of events (“fake news”). How this can be done is shown by the prevalent organisation of counter demonstrations in situ or online “shit storms” on *Facebook* / *Twitter* and/or by biased reporting by the media of events which are critical of the government and their prevalent world view.<sup>276</sup>

Furthermore, by increasing the general proficiency of the population to cope with negative emotions, individuals are likely to be better equipped to deal with the strong emotions connected to experiencing a terrorist attack. While this requires to take a long-term focus on the challenge, successful programs already exist (e.g. for children the *Papilio* prevention projects, developed in Augsburg)<sup>277</sup> and may be rolled out, adapted to the target segment as part of curricula in schools, apprenticeship programs, university or driver’s licence training (to prevent road rage). The potential positive effect which these measures can have on social relationships in a society in general, will go far beyond just dealing with the negative emotions stirred up by terrorism.

#### E) *Global Meaning*

Another possibility to improve the coping of individuals with the terrorist threat is to nurture a set of beliefs which help constitute a *Global Meaning* which in turn is supportive of that coping process. Considering their limited striking capability, terrorists cannot profoundly threaten the existence of countries; accordingly, it is not on the battlefield where they need to be primarily defeated, but in the people’s psyches.<sup>278</sup>

“Nudging” the world views in a direction that will allow citizens to better cope with attacks, by attaching a coping-friendly meaning to the events, requires a whole-of-government approach and effort. This is not an ad-hoc process, as engrained beliefs are not easily changed, but require a long-term nurturing process.

In the case of terrorism, “governments need to be able to communicate a coherent story about the enemy. [As] in any war the public needs to have some idea about who is the enemy and what they are fighting for.”<sup>279</sup>

276 See Haller 2017 ; See Fengler 2018 ; Kölner Stadt Anzeiger 2017 ; ZEIT ONLINE 2019.

277 See Papilio gemeinnützige GmbH 2020.

278 See Rothkopf 2016, 325.

279 Furedi 2007, xxxiv.

In the conflict with terrorists, the citizens need compelling reasons and purpose why they must endure the hardship and suffering which terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities.<sup>280</sup> To be defiant as a society and united in the face of these threats and of active measures by the terrorists to break-up unity and sow distrust, the citizens need to share common meaning and purpose. While altering global beliefs is difficult in important matters like security, it is ironically traumatic events like terror attacks which can shift opinions and galvanize the cohesion of society, as Furnham explains:

*One of the most robust findings in the literature is the fact that just world beliefs help people cope with disturbing or threatening events [...] and that the shared experience of these events causes people to develop a consensual view of reality.*<sup>281</sup>

However, today's increased differentiation of news reports, makes it harder to develop a consensual view of reality.<sup>282</sup> While this may appear challenging in a complex and contested information environment, recognized authorities nevertheless have an advantage when communicating. They can make use of their authority to "frame" terrorist attacks in order to provide meaning and encourage resolve, unity and defiance in the public.<sup>283</sup>

Authorities must identify and analyse the existing view of *Global Meaning* (including the *Just-World-Beliefs*) in the society and anticipate the threat and impact posed to the meaning by terrorism, and prophylactically proceed to uncover and distil meaning and purpose from these threat scenarios. After these processes, the purpose should then be infused into the existing view of *Global Meaning*.

#### F) *Emotional Contagion*

Not all emotions are the result of a conscious thought process. An emotional arousal may be transferred between individuals without conscious thought. The likelihood of the transfer is higher if the emotions are strong and negative. The effect is described in detail in *Emotional Contagion / Social Influence Theory* in chapter 4.3.9.

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280 See *Logo Theory [Existential analytic theory of meaning]* in chapter 4.3.3.

281 Furnham 1993, 326–327.

282 See Giebel 2014, 369.

283 See Bangstad 2017, 37–41.



#### 4.3.2. Just-World-Beliefs Theory

The *Just-World-Beliefs* (JWB) Theory proposes that people's self-concept is based upon the idea that the world is just and predictable, where everybody gets what he deserves, and everybody deserves what he gets.<sup>284</sup> Holding JWB has been identified as a powerful coping mechanism which helps in answering "WHY" distressing and disturbing events happen and is linked to producing lower stress levels, reduced impairment and better mental health after traumatic events.<sup>285</sup>

The individually held JWB create a safely predictable environment because "*fate is predictable and earned*", based on personal characteristics or behaviour.<sup>286</sup> The ability to see themselves as "*effective agents in the world, with the ability to control their fates*" is a powerful motivation for individuals to defend their justice-based ordering structure of fairly distributed outcomes, even despite contradicting evidence.<sup>287</sup>

In order to maintain personal JWB, research found that individuals react to perceived innocent suffering of others with an impulse to help righting the wrong, if they feel this can be achieved with reasonable effort or cost.<sup>288</sup> If they feel it may not be achieved, individuals may try to cope with the cognitive dissonance of innocent suffering versus their JWB, by directing blame and guilt at the victim.<sup>289</sup> Victims themselves, if they are holding JWB may react with blaming themselves for their behavior or situation. Both isolates and further injures the victims and their families.

Relevance:

The JWB-Theory is relevant for building and preserving *Strategic Resilience* in three ways:

- 1) While it is positive to hold JWB, terrorist may be able through heinous and callous attacks to severely impact or puncture the JWB and make

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284 See Park and Folkman 1997, 118.

285 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 23 ; Furnham 1993, 326-327.

286 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 22.

287 *ibid.*

288 See Furnham 2003, 801–802 ; Prati and Pietrantoni 2010, 903.

289 See Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 217.

the ordering structure unrecognizable, giving way to fear as the previously held clarity and orientation is destroyed.<sup>290</sup>

- Authorities need to preview possible scenarios of threats to JWB and develop satisfying answers to the “WHY” (we must endure?) question which will be raised by the people, media, political opposition as well as the terrorists’ sympathisers. Providing meaning for the struggle and the hardship it puts on individuals and the society, is an absolute essential.
  - Authorities must also be able to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the JWB – this may involve law enforcement, justice system, and health and social system.
  - When communicating with the people after an attack, the concept of justice to be dealt can be very powerful to address, if it can be followed up on.<sup>291</sup>
  - To sustain the JWB, it is also essential to provide necessary support like adequate victim compensation and public recognition of sacrifice to those carrying the burden.
- 2) The “victim blaming” component of JWB is important to address
- Authorities need to understand it and preventively sow it into their discourse to prevent isolation of victims by connecting their fate with the fate of the nation, city, town, community etc. The authorities also must not shy away from acknowledging the sacrifice made by the victims (e.g. the honouring of the murdered French police officer Arnaud Beltrame in 2018)<sup>292</sup>

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290 See Klein 1987, 53.

291 Walsh 2013 recounts such a powerful address after a terrorist attack during US President George W Bush’s visit to Ground Zero on September 14: „*The president, who had been in office less than eight months, grabbed a bullhorn and started thanking the fire fighters and other first responders at the scene, telling them that they were in the country’s prayers. Someone in the crowd shouted that he couldn’t hear the president, and Bush replied with the words that made history. “I can hear you!” he declared. “The rest of the world hears you! And the people – and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.” The crowd reacted with loud, prolonged chants of “USA! USA!” In this electric moment, Bush captured the mood of the country, delivering just what the American people wanted a combination of gratitude for the rescue workers’ bravery and diligence, defiance toward the terrorists, and resolve to bring the evil doers to justice.*“

292 An example is the case of Police Lieutenant-Colonel Arnaud Beltrame who was killed in a jihadi attack after offering himself as a hostage in exchange for the life of an innocent citizen. His ultimate sacrifice was honoured in a public state act by French President Emanuel Macron in the *Cour d’Honneur* at *Les Invalides* on live

- Victim compensation is a tangible public acknowledgment of sacrifice and innocent suffering and can prevent victim blaming. It should be treated confidentially. Any possible following discussion about the height of the compensation or its legitimacy should be expected and confronted.
  - Transgressions in the press or social media, attacking victims or their families in an inappropriate and demeaning manner by putting blame on them, should be ostracized by society and dealt with through the courts.
- 3) The authorities must consider efforts by terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the West to deliberately exploit JWB upheld in Western societies, by portraying the West as the rightful recipient of attacks to right a fundamental wrong.
- Terrorist groups are deliberately targeting JWB to justify their violence against the West while portraying the West's action as unjust and illegitimate, trying to undermine the population's will in the West to oppose them. The different memes and narratives (depending on the target audience) always portray the perpetrators as upholding the rights of the "real" victims:
  - Historical and perpetual injustice suffered by Muslims through the West since the crusades,
  - Alliance of the USA and the West with "the Jews" and their helpers, who are occupying the Holy Land and suppressing Palestinian people,
  - Support of "apostate regimes" in the Middle east by supplying weapons,
  - Suppression of Muslims in the West,
  - Dishonouring of Muslim women,
  - Racism.

These efforts when directed towards the outside, are not only a self-justification but a psychological weapon to create discord and division in the West and to reduce the population's will to continue the fight against terrorism. Authorities need to recognise this as psychological warfare and carefully choose their actions and their communications strategy along their own narrative.

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television on March 28<sup>th</sup> 2018. The ceremony can be seen here: <https://www.pscp.tv/w/ILyxBrOokobxN>.

### 4.3.3. Logo Theory [Existential Analytic Theory of Meaning]

At its core, *Logo Theory* states that every human being, regardless of his or her cultural heritage, draws strength from a single source of life, namely the meaningfulness of his/her existence.<sup>293</sup>

Man's existence is said to centre around meaning that is why he becomes mentally ill when this centre becomes frustrated – for example, by a crisis. If the human being in such situations lacks meaning or access to it, then he needs a meaning-centred support, possibly in addition to a therapeutic as well as a pedagogic one.<sup>294</sup>

Logo theory posits that self-transcendence of one's existence is a fundamental ontological characteristic of human existence: man is said not to be interested in any inner states (as suggested by Freud and Adler), but he is always outward-oriented toward the world, and within that world he seeks a meaning which he can fulfill (or a person whom he could love).<sup>295</sup>

And because of a pre-reflexive ontological self-image, he also somehow knows that he realizes himself to the very extent in which he forgets himself, and he forgets himself exactly as he surrenders himself to a cause, he serves, or a person he loves.<sup>296</sup> This need for meaning in man, Frankl describes with the *will to meaning* (“*Willen zum Sinn*”).<sup>297</sup>

If a person finds meaning, then he is – if need be – ready to renounce, to suffer, to make sacrifices, even to sacrifice his life<sup>298</sup> as “*suffering ceases to be suffering at the moment it finds a meaning*”.<sup>299</sup>

According to this theory, man can gain meaning in three ways:<sup>300</sup>

- Through deeds he does, or a work that he creates.
- By experiencing something or someone (through love for example)
- Through his ability to change his attitude towards a situation where man is confronted with the fact that he cannot change it and, in the process, changes himself: by maturing and growing beyond himself.

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293 See Schlieper-Damrich 2014.

294 *ibid.*

295 See Frankl and Batthyány 2017, 180.

296 See *ibid.*, 180.

297 See *ibid.*, 180.

298 See *ibid.*, 144.

299 Frankl 2006, 51.

300 See Frankl and Batthyány 2017, 185.

This applies to suffering, guilt and death as well: suffering can be transformed into achievement (*Leistung*), guilt into transformation (*Wandlung*), and the transience of human existence can be transformed into a spur for responsible action (*“Ansporn zu verantwortetem Tun”*).<sup>301</sup>

Suffering is understood as an ingredient of life. Insofar, the ability to suffer is an expression of viability or mental maturity (*“Lebensfähigkeit”*) that allows humans to turn tragedy into personal triumphs.<sup>302</sup>

This transformation relies on the peculiarity of being human which grants man the freedom to assume an “identity” (*“Freiheit zum Persönlichkeit – Werden”*).<sup>303</sup> It is the freedom from one’s own facticity and the freedom to one’s own existentiality.<sup>304</sup> It is the freedom from “being fixed” or determined and the freedom to “become different”, to change.”<sup>305</sup>

When Frankl speaks about meaning, he does not mean abstract meaningfulness, but rather a completely concrete meaning, namely the concrete meaning of a situation with which an equally concrete person is confronted in each case.<sup>306</sup>

Frankl’s *Logo Theory* of meaning does not merely establish a therapy for the mentally ill, but also serves and this above all, serves to sensitize all people for meaning in an existential analysis.<sup>307</sup> In this sense, his theory of meaning is pedagogically a very valuable help to prepare all people for critical events in life.<sup>308</sup>

Relevance:

Terrorism aims to destroy the will of a society to resist and to survive by targeting its soul, that is its faith or belief system, which is its *centre-of-gravity* in “Clausewitzian” terms,<sup>309</sup> *Logo Theory* provides answers through its *Logo Therapy* how to uphold that faith system even in distress when faced with an existential situation of suffering and loss.

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301 *ibid.*, 185.

302 *ibid.*, 15.

303 See *ibid.*, 269.

304 See *ibid.*, 269.

305 See *ibid.*, 269.

306 See *ibid.*, 183.

307 See Schlieper-Damrich 2014.

308 See *ibid.*

309 See Gorka 2012, 200.

*Logo Theory* allows the deduction that suffering without meaning or purpose, without a WHY is unsustainable for people; it cannot be taken over an extended period of time through discipline alone. *Logo Theory* maintains that “there is nothing in the world that would so effectively help one to survive even the worst conditions as the knowledge that there is a meaning in one’s life.”<sup>310</sup> Or as Frankl puts it simply: “suffering ceases to be a suffering the moment it finds a meaning”.<sup>311</sup>

In a crisis like a terrorist threat or attack, *Logo Theory* advocates action over rumination by focusing man’s gaze on the remaining good in suffering – and on discovering hidden possibilities of meaning – and then act upon it.<sup>312</sup>

*Logo Theory* teaches that seeking an answer to the “*Why me* - question”, related to suffering is not helpful. Man should rather focus on the question how to respond to the situation. The theory does so in the conviction that the environment does not determine a person: What matters, is what man makes of his environment, how he approaches it.<sup>313</sup> Embracing the discovery of “*What for*” will allow individuals to develop a “*tragic optimism*” of knowing how to suffer.<sup>314</sup>

The importance of a meaning orientation, putting the focus on the future, on a purpose that will be fulfilled in the future, has shown to have been absolutely critical for the survival of prisoners of war.<sup>315</sup> As is true for prisoners of war the same is true in the conflict with terrorists. The citizens need compelling meaning and purpose why they must endure the hardship and suffering terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities. To maintain such defiance as a society, its citizens need to share common meaning and values.

Building this attitudinal heroism towards the threat of death can be achieved by weaving, sustaining, and strengthening a defiant meaning-orientated narrative. To be believable, the values and meaning must however be reflected in the words and actions of the authorities and must be consistent with and aligned across the whole-of-government.<sup>316</sup> Depending on,

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310 Frankl 2006, 47.

311 *ibid.*, 51.

312 See Frankl and Batthyány 2017, 16.

313 See *ibid.*, 264.

314 Frankl 2006, 61-65.

315 See Frankl and Batthyány 2017, 27 and 175.

316 See *ibid.*, 196.

if this relates to the *Situational Meaning or Global Meaning*<sup>317</sup>, held in a society, the process of transforming these may be a longer or shorter-term process, but will require continuous care even after a meaning has been accepted.

#### 4.3.4. Terror Management Theory

The *Terror Management Theory* is built on the concept, that individuals have a natural anxiety towards death.<sup>318</sup> For this reason, individuals “*strive to maintain worldviews that provide a sense of security and meaning to buffer against feelings of anxiety related to reminders of mortality and the limits of control over fate and environment*”.<sup>319</sup> This fear of death influences the people’s everyday lives – often unconsciously<sup>320</sup>: Research has found out that people who are faced with decisions in certain situations react differently when faced with the idea of mortality.<sup>321</sup> Correspondingly, terrorist attacks and the perceived vulnerability from terrorism can be stark reminders of peoples’ mortality and as a consequence can “*affect individuals’ perception, processing, and appraisal of events*.”<sup>322</sup>

When death salience is triggered, individuals react by undertaking efforts to try to protect and uphold their anxiety-buffer of death-denying meaning-providing world views.<sup>323</sup> Typical reactions include:

1. The development and clinging to exaggerated nationalistic beliefs,
2. The support for aggression against people supporting opposing opinions,
3. The investment in close personal relationships and focus on the in-group,
4. The ignoring and/or rejection of threatening information and their originators.<sup>324</sup>

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317 See chapter 4.3.1.

318 See Becker 1973.

319 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21.

320 See Becker 1973.

321 See Solomon *et al.* 2015.

322 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21.

323 See Becker 1973.

324 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22.

Relevance:

To lessen the potential psychological effects of a terrorist attack on individuals described in the *Terror Management Theory*, authorities can undertake preventive measures which support the coping.

One way is through the support of *Emotion-Focused Coping*.<sup>325</sup> To help people overcome the fear of death, authorities need to nurture the feeling of belonging and secureness in the societal and cultural setting and of a social framework that creates meaning and the perception of comprehensive order and predictability.<sup>326</sup> Authorities must help create opportunities that allow individuals to personally grow and confirm their self-worth by contributing to something bigger than just themselves and to experience meaning, higher purpose and belonging. By “*imbedding the individual [as a valued participant] within a transcendent cultural drama*” Greenberg argues, the individual can himself lead “*a meaningful enduring existence*” and attain “*equanimity*”.<sup>327</sup>

To be successful in the long run, a whole-of-society effort is necessary and needs to be championed in a whole-of-government approach. Practical actions include:

- Establishment of a culture which provides “*a shared symbolic conception of reality that imputes order, predictability, significance, and permanence*”,<sup>328</sup>
- Support of societal bonding through social activities likes clubs and sports,
- Creation and valuation of volunteering opportunities,
- Inclusive societal and community model which finds roles for everyone.

Taking a *Problem-Focused Coping* approach do deal with the effect of death salience means undertaking efforts to positively affect an individual's appraisal of an event by providing him with the resources which allow him to feel more equipped to better deal with this situation.<sup>329</sup> These efforts to boost the self-help capability for practical coping with a threat can comprise early advice and advance training. These can include:

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325 See also *Mean-Making Coping Model* in Park and Folkman 1997.

326 See Solomon *et al.* 2015.

327 Greenberg *et al.* 1986, 206.

328 *ibid.*

329 See also *Mean-Making Coping Model* in Park and Folkman 1997.



- Emergency preparedness demonstrations and training,
- Life-saving / First aid demonstrations and training,
- Defibrillator use demonstrations and training,
- Security briefings, demonstrations, and
- Training of (social) media literacy skills to be able to better deal with information during crisis,
- Establishment, training and guidance of self-help neighborhood vigilance or watch groups,
- Business continuity planning and training at the workplace,
- Building evacuation exercises,
- Public service announcements,
- Inclusive community or neighbourhood management which will be a source of support in crisis.

Beyond the preventive measures described above, authorities can also directly address the probable psychological reactions identified by the *Terror Management Theory* research:

The development and clinging to exaggerated nationalistic beliefs:

The nation can be a source of meaning, belonging and purpose. It is a system of predictable roles and statuses given, based on shared values and understanding with established customs and rules of behaviour.<sup>330</sup> It is also a vehicle through which an individual can transcend to a higher state by delivering himself to its aspirational higher purpose.<sup>331</sup> Heroism, the sacrifice of the self for and into something greater outside of oneself is according to Becker (1973) a natural urge of the individual.<sup>332</sup>

*“Man will lay down his life for his country, his society, his family. He will choose to throw himself on a grenade to save his comrades; he is capable of the highest generosity and self-sacrifice. But he has to feel and believe that what he is doing, is truly heroic, timeless, and supremely meaningful.”*<sup>333</sup>

Accordingly, society needs to develop consensus on what heroism entails, to utilize the nationalistic excitement and nudge or channel the passion and

330 See Becker 1973, 4.

331 See Le Bon 2015.

332 See Becker 1973, 152.

333 See *ibid.*, 6.

effort into a productive direction.<sup>334</sup> National symbols, whose understanding is commonly shared, can be powerful too and should be utilised.

The support for aggression against people supporting opposing opinions:<sup>335</sup>

When self-esteem is depending on the intact world view, challenges to the world view are perceived as direct threats and the people holding these views seen as unreasonable, perverse or malign.<sup>336</sup> Possible means to limit the negative effect of these feelings could be:

- Provide symbolic means for confirmation of own world view and the person himself to reduce the perceived threat,
- Help society to develop other coping mechanisms,
- Set clear boundaries of No-Violence and of No-Slander,
- Try to channel the aggression in a productive way,
- Make use of positive effect of hate (fear diminishing),
- Build debating culture, based on the strength of rational arguments already in schools,
- Expose early on to other views and learn how to cope with them.

*The investment in close personal relationships and focus on the in-group:*<sup>337</sup>

- Provide the possibility for personal affiliation and the development of close personal relationships<sup>338</sup>,
- Consider the particular needs of direct victims and indirect victims,
- Try to overcome the in- versus outgroup set-up, by building and using personal relations at the community level,
- Promote exchanges and interactions across ethnic groups to quench stereotypes and to build relationships before ethnic quarrels start.

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334 See *ibid.*, 7.

335 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22.

336 See Lippmann 2013, 76.

337 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22.

338 See Baumeister and Leary 1995.

*The ignoring and rejection of threatening information and their origins:*<sup>339</sup>

This is a normal reaction when the information threatens to negatively impact the held world view and thereby the own self<sup>340</sup>

- Make information palatable and select the sender carefully.
- Promote an open culture of debate.

#### 4.3.5. Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception

The model of the *Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception* builds on the widely accepted assumption that the effectiveness of terrorism is based on how a society chooses to respond to it.<sup>341</sup> It suggests that the prevalent fear in a society expecting mass casualty attacks by terrorists, may pressure terrorist to meet these public expectations “to ‘*maintain their own credibility vis-à-vis their audience*’”.<sup>342</sup> Through this reciprocal threat perception between perpetrators and victims, “*the actual threat itself may well become a self-fulfilling prophecy*” Zimmermann suggests.<sup>343</sup> That threat perception may be further amplified through “*irresponsible, sensationalist reporting*” by the media.<sup>344</sup>

Along the same line is Furedi who posits that “*statements that constitute a public acknowledgement of confusion and fear [...] represent an invitation to terror.*”<sup>345</sup> According to Furedi, the tendency to demonize adversaries in the matters of security and foreign policy<sup>346</sup> alongside with the publicly presented fatalistic inevitability of another attack<sup>347</sup>, based on a vulnerability-led response to terrorism “*is likely to foster a climate that intensifies people’s feeling of insecurity and fear.*”<sup>348</sup> Furedi consequently suggests that this type

339 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22.

340 See Karlsson *et al.* 2009 ; Kaniasty and Norris 2004.

341 See Furedi 2007, 42.

342 Zimmermann 2003, 48.

343 *ibid.*, 56.

344 *ibid.*, 51–52.

345 Furedi 2007, 11.

346 See Rothkopf 2016, 62.

347 See Furedi 2007, 8.

348 *ibid.*, 15.

of society's response "helps magnify the impact of terrorism and encourages more attacks."<sup>349</sup>

Relevance:

The following suggestions can be deduced from the model:

Authorities must carefully watch their communications style and question its purpose: Preparing society for potential attacks in the future to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*<sup>350</sup> is prudent. But words need to be carefully chosen as public dread of mass casualty terrorism is made worse through framing the nature of the threat as unpredictable, random and incalculable.<sup>351</sup>

Informing the public of vulnerabilities must also not be simply an exercise to try to pre-emptively deflect criticism away from authorities for their failure to prevent such a future attack: Such a lack of confidence into the ability to protect the society may have worse effects on the society. In all communications, the authorities must have the *Security Communication Vulnerability Paradox* in mind.<sup>352</sup>

Authorities and the media should also withstand the urge for the demonization or mystification of terrorists and thereby aggrandizing them which increases the fear factor.<sup>353</sup> Terrorist should be treated and framed as criminals.

To help curb the effects of the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception authorities should encourage the media to adopt ethical and socially responsible reporting practices that prevent the inflation of fear and stereotypes connected to terrorism, while still respecting editorial independence.<sup>354</sup>

Political and public debate has been focused strongly on complicated "high-end, low probability 'super-terrorism' threats."<sup>355</sup> While the authorities need to plan also for the more unlikely exploitation of specific vulnerabilities, in the communication with the public, the focus should be risk-led

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349 *ibid.*, 15.

350 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 91.

351 See Furedi 2007, 7.

352 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

353 See Zimmermann 2003, 11.

354 See White 2020 ; See Basu 2019 ; See Zimmermann 2003, 51–52.

355 Gearson 2012, 171.

rather than vulnerability-led. “A major problem with assessing vulnerabilities is that they seem to proliferate the closer one looks; threats, though dynamic and amorphous, are not prone to spontaneously reproduce.” As Zimmermann points out.<sup>356</sup>

Government must also avoid sweeping generalisation and avoid abstract, impersonal terms and categories like “international terrorism” for example, which can incorrectly compound connected, but still discrete challenges into one large one. This will make the problem of terrorism appear even more complex and challenging on the one hand and thereby even more threatening on the other hand.

*Generalizing the terrorist threat by abstracting it [...], invites the likelihood of an exponential trajectory of analytical error. The nomenclature of the generalization of terrorism in the shape of sweeping, impersonal categories is symptomatic of its reductionist mindset; reductionism, in turn constitutes an invitation to deterministic thought; and determinism, by virtue of its model-like, teleological nature, is frequently quite removed from the nuts and bolts of reality.*<sup>357</sup>

There is a good knowledge about the psychological effect of direct exposure to terrorism, but less so about the impact the threat of terrorism has on individuals indirectly exposed.<sup>358</sup> More research is necessary. Also, the reciprocal effect between the media and government is not fully understood.<sup>359</sup>

Measures to reduce the threat perception in the society can come in many forms. In certain circumstances the use of military personnel to protect public buildings and to patrol streets has shown to reassure the population.<sup>360</sup> At the same time it can also have a deterrent effect.

#### 4.3.6. Appraisal Tendency Theory

The first individual reaction to an event can be broken down into an evoked emotion and the beginning of the initial (cognitive) appraisal of that event.<sup>361</sup> The evoked emotional state an individual is in, impacts on the

356 Zimmermann 2003, 62.

357 *ibid.*, 57–58.

358 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 16.

359 See Kepplinger 2016.

360 See Maulny 2017, 22.

361 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21.

ability to process and memorise information and “*plays a role in making judgments based on that information.*”<sup>362</sup> Building on this, the *Appraisal-Tendency Theory* posits that emotions are not always the result of a cognitive appraisal process, but may actually “*elicit specific cognitive appraisals*” that influence subsequent cognitions and behaviour<sup>363</sup> and it postulates that “*once these emotion related associations are activated, subsequent, temporally- and/or affectively-related events are likely to be appraised through a similar lens, regardless of the functionality of the appraisal.*”<sup>364</sup>

Using a multimethod approach in a field experiment with a nationally representative sample, Lerner et al. found that inducing the emotions of “*fear and anger altered beliefs and attitudes regarding matters of national interest. Experiencing more anger triggered more optimistic beliefs; experiencing more fear triggered greater pessimism.*”<sup>365</sup> By priming anger, Lerner was able to activate “*more punitive preferences*” while priming fear activated “*preference for conciliatory policies*”<sup>366</sup>

Lerner et al. are confident that the results from their experiment can be easily transferred into everyday life, where through a sustained exposure to media or government communications, the effects could even be increased.<sup>367</sup>

Maguen et al.’s research endorses Lerner’s findings that specific emotions trigger specific cognitive and behavioural responses which may include “*information about causation and perceived controllability.*”<sup>368</sup> Of great relevance to dealing with the threat of terrorism is Maguen et al.’s finding that the feeling of “*anxiety causes exaggerated estimates of personal risk and uncontrollability across situations, independent of the actual level of risk inherent in particular contexts.*”<sup>369</sup>

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362 Barsade 2002, 654.

363 Lerner et al. 2003, 144.

364 Maguen et al. 2008, 20.

365 Lerner et al. 2003, 148.

366 *ibid.*, 148.

367 See *ibid.*, 148.

368 Maguen et al. 2008, 20.

369 *ibid.*, 20.

### Relevance:

The *Appraisal Tendency Theory* advises that an individual's initial emotional response to a terror attack or a perceived threat “cannot only significantly shape individuals’ subsequent cognitions, behaviour, and functioning, but may also impact individuals’ ongoing adaptation and influence policymaking and society as a whole.”<sup>370</sup>

It accordingly mandates to take the following actions:

#### Monitoring

- It is an accepted fact that you cannot manage what you cannot measure.<sup>371</sup> It is therefore advisable to regularly measure the emotional state of the society. This can be done by regularly consulting and aggregating the research results produced by the private sector (e.g. the annual study “*Die Ängste der Deutschen*”<sup>372</sup>) and by the public sector with each other and by incentivising the alignment of existing ongoing research projects to continuously receive better comparable, better integrated and more conclusive results. Alternatively, the government could order the conduct of the necessary research themselves.

#### Examining

- Research has found those so-called “*negative emotions*” like fear and anger have very different effects on the individuals’ risk perceptions and thereby influenced their policy preferences. This posits the importance to go beyond just looking at “*global moods*” and to distinguish and examine different emotions which may be evoked by terrorist attacks, like grief, rage or loathing.<sup>373</sup>
- Research by Routledge et al. into the terror management function of nostalgia suggests that it is worthwhile to also include non-basic complex emotions, like nostalgia into the examination.<sup>374</sup> Further effort should be undertaken to identify the triggers (e.g. the style of media reporting, wording of government communication, type of terrorism footage,) for emotions like fear or anger that could be influenced.

370 *ibid.*

371 Drucker 1986.

372 See Infocenter der R+V Versicherung 2019.


373 See Lerner et al. 2003, 148 ; Plutchik 2001, 349.

374 See Routledge et al. 2008, 132.

### Shaping

- After monitoring and understanding the effects of terrorism-induced emotions on cognitive appraisal, authorities can shape their own messaging accordingly and encourage the media to avoid unnecessary and extensive reports of hardship on the society.

Figure 9: Non-basic complex emotions evoked by terrorism marked in Plutchik's 3D Wheel of Emotion.<sup>375</sup>



- In the knowledge of the strong influence of *Emotional Comparison* and *Emotional Contagion* on individuals' state of emotional arousal

375 Plutchik 2001, 349.



(especially) in unfamiliar situations, authorities should consider how existing social structures, like NGOs, community groups, sports clubs or the workplace and other opportunities for congregation can be used to purposefully “infect” individuals with desired emotions. While fear and anger-based messaging is usually discouraged, combining the research from Lerner and Plutchik suggests, that encouraging rage and anger may be a short-term remedy to prevent a society to fall into terror, fear and anxiety.<sup>376</sup>

- The public’s confidence level in the ability of the authorities to deal with /prepare for mitigating terrorist attacks is affected by the perceived performance of the government in dealing with other types of disasters.<sup>377</sup>
- *Especially previous terror attacks “are likely to have strong emotions associated with them, such as anger, fear, disgust, etc.”*<sup>378</sup> Authorities must pro-actively manage these feelings and provide adequate meaning that will allow for healthy coping. This must encompass all members of the society, but a special focus needs to be laid on vulnerable groups, people directly affected by an attack and their families and friends. But those indirectly affected which include children, the elderly and women who research shows often find it harder to cope, must also be accounted for.<sup>379</sup>

#### 4.3.7. Mass-Mediated-Terrorism Concept

In line with the widely held understanding of terrorism as communication by the deed, mass-communication expert Nacos *introduced the term Mass-Mediated-Terrorism to describe “politically motivated deeds, perpetrated by groups or individuals for the sake of communicating messages to a larger audience.”*<sup>380</sup>

376 See Lerner *et al.* 2003, 148 ; Plutchik 2001, 349.

377 See Nacos 2007, 185-186 ; Exemplary are the populations loss of trust and confidence in the aftermath of the poor U.S Government response to Hurricane Katrina in 2001 or in the aftermath of the German government handling of the European Migrant Crisis in 2015 see Infocenter der R+V Versicherung 2019, 3.


378 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 20.

379 See Diederichs 2017, 32.

380 Nacos 2007, 28.

According to Nacos' concept "in mass societies [...] the media provide the lines of communication between public offices and the general public" which together form the so- called "Triangle of Political Communication."<sup>381</sup>

Figure 10: Amended Modell of "Terrorism, the Triangles of Political Communication, and the Internet"<sup>382</sup>



While it has become comparatively easier today through the internet and social networks for terrorists to reach their sympathisers and followers, and to communicate somehow directly with the government via twitter, terrorists are unable to do without the mass media organisations, if they want to reach the wider public and meet their media-centred targets:<sup>383</sup>

381 *ibid.*, 15.

382 Nacos 2006, 4.

383 *ibid.*, 4.

Table 3: Terrorists' "media-centred objectives" according to Nacos.<sup>384</sup>

- Achieve the "awareness of various audiences inside and outside their target societies and thereby condition their targets for intimidation."
- Receive "recognition of their causes, they want people to ask, Why do they hate us? Why do they attack innocent civilians?"
- Get the "respect and sympathy of those in whose interest they claim to act."
- Achieve "a quasi-legitimate status and the same or similar media treatment that legitimate political actors receive."

To achieve access to the "Triangle of political communication", terrorists use highly expressive violent deeds as "a powerful message that commands the mass media's attention and thus that of their target audience(s)".<sup>385</sup> Terrorist do this by meeting the selection and publication criteria of mass media, as laid-out by Diehl:

- Simplification,
- Personalisation,
- Emotionalisation
- Dramatisation,
- Pointed communication,
- Scandalisation,
- Immediacy,
- Up-to-date"<sup>386</sup>.

The willingness of the global media to accept and share terrorist content, first had been drastically proven in the Jordanian desert in 1970 when reporters from Western networks interviewed Palestinian hijackers of four airliners and their hostages on live TV, sending out the messages of the *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* to a global audience.<sup>387</sup>

Taking just this one example in figure 11 into account, it is not surprising that by 1987 Livingstone saw "no limit to the creative opportunities – and danger to the society – for terrorists to dramatize and cajole the press to use their material."<sup>388</sup>

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384 *ibid.*, 4–5.

385 Nacos 2007, 197.

386 Diehl 2012, 20.

387 See Tuman 2010, 196–197; Taylor 2014.

388 Livingstone 1987, 217.

Figure 11: Image carried by the press of hijackers and hostages at Dawson's Field in Jordan in 1970.<sup>389</sup>



In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the infotainment characteristics of news media has further increased with commercial networks in the lead, often resulting in emotional, undifferentiated and dramatized reporting of terrorism-related news, with an unchallenged low-point in the reporting on 9/11 and the aftermath by the media.<sup>390</sup>

Despite a widely shared critical retrospective look on the post-9/11 reporting, mass media have continued to promote fear, anxiety and division in society.<sup>391</sup> Through undifferentiated and sensationalist reporting, short of explanations and actionable information which would help their audience to know how to prepare or cope with possible attacks they undermine the *Strategic Resilience* of the societies they are serving.<sup>392</sup> Figure 12 provides examples that promote anxiety and fear.

Using the *Triangle of Political Communication*-model the author will dissect the different interactions between the terrorists, the media and the

389 Photo taken from Gyr 2014.

390 See Nacos *et al.* 2011a, 197 ; See also Furedi 2007 ; See Truc 2017.

391 See Furedi 2007, 7.

392 See Nacos 2007, 185 ; See Sikorski *et al.* 2017, 846 ; See also Furedi 2007.

public to identify opportunities for intervention by authorities to avert a resilience-destroying effect on the society.

Figure 12: Examples of dramatised and undifferentiated headlines in the media coverage of terrorism.<sup>393</sup>



393 Covers from left to right: The Independent, 12 September 2001, 1 ; The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 16 December 2014, 1 ; The Sun on Sunday 15 November 2015, 1 ; New Statesman, November 2015, 1 ; New York Post 3 December 2015 online ; Newsweek, 8 October 2001, 1.

→ Terrorists to Mass Media (A)

To pass these media *gatekeepers*<sup>394</sup> terrorists need to produce news and deliver content that is “so good”, that the (especially private) media networks feel they cannot ignore it due to their infotainment focus.<sup>395</sup> Correspondingly, terrorists skilfully and purposefully serve the news cycle by producing news content, based on the preferred “*timings, news values, media schemas and frames*”<sup>396</sup> In their work on *Gatekeeping Theory*, Shoemaker/Kohen identified the factors with a special relevance to the terrorist threat which are crucial for far-reaching reporting of an event by mass media and thus for the success of terrorism as a communication strategy:<sup>397</sup>

- *High Level of Deviation*: By a single unprecedented attack, despite possibly being much less bloody than the hundred other small incidents before, by breaking norms that are generally accepted, perpetrators are able to profoundly stir-up the imagination of the masses<sup>398</sup> - and thereby the interest of the media.<sup>399</sup>
- *High Social Significance*: Terrorist attacks are measured by the actual or feared (!) impact on one’s life and society.<sup>400</sup> The negative *primary appraisal*<sup>401</sup> of the threat, one is faced with, due to the targeting of perceived illegitimate targets or vulnerable groups, the exceptional cruelty and viciousness of an attack or through attacks on certain symbolic dates or places, as well as the negative *secondary appraisal*<sup>402</sup> of the resources available to respond to the attack, due to the perceived unpredictability of attacks and the perceived randomness of victimisation, extend the impact of an incident far beyond the direct victim groups to the whole society, especially when the nature of the threat is framed to be beyond

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394 For more on gatekeeping theory see Shoemaker and Kohen 2006 ; Shoemaker and Vos 2009.

395 See Nacos 2007, 37.

396 Kahr *et al.* 2017, 5; For a comprehensive case study on the matter, refer to Schleifer, 2006, „*Psychological warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian media politics and military strategies*”.

397 See Shoemaker and Kohen 2006, 13-15.

398 See Le Bon 2015, 71.

399 See Shoemaker and Kohen 2006, 13-15.

400 See *ibid.*, 13-15.

401 Referring to Park and Folkman's 1997 *Model of Global and Situational Meaning*.

402 *ibid.*

comprehension and the act to be irrational and senseless.<sup>403</sup> Both factors identified by Shoemaker/Kohen<sup>404</sup>, have the ability to punch holes into the held *Just-World-Beliefs* of each individual in the audience that the world is sufficiently just, fair, predictable and safe.

- A third important factor for mass dissemination of “terrorist news” through the mass or traditional media networks is *Visual Impact*.<sup>405</sup> According to mass psychology theory, masses primarily think in images and may mainly be influenced by images through film, photo or narration.<sup>406</sup> Le Bon states that everything that arouses the masses, appears in the form of a gripping clear image in front of them.<sup>407</sup> The facts as such do not attract the popular imagination, but the way they take place does. It is therefore necessary to evoke or plant images in or into the mind of the masses in order to move them.<sup>408</sup> This can happen through non-visual cues like writing or talking. But this takes more time and it is uncertain that the perceived image is the “correct” one. Moving pictures however, accompanied by sound can transmit an emotional experience to their audience, including the feelings of shock, sorrow and fear, and thereby making it far more effective than text or still photos.<sup>409</sup> The media’s perspective and those of terrorist perpetrators on the importance of images, are congruent: without pictures in the media, there are no certain pictures in the mind. And without those, an attack misses a significant part of its purpose for the terrorists.<sup>410</sup> For this reason, the aftermath reporting on attacks is as important as the attack itself.

#### →Media to Public (B)

According to the *Agenda-Setting-Theory*, the mass media has an important impact on what issues the public assumes to be important and what they

403 See Furedi 2007, 7 ; See Arce and Sandler 2016: 183.

404 See Shoemaker and Kohen 2006, 13-15.

405 See Kahr *et al.* 2017, 4.

406 See Le Bon 2015, 69.

407 See *ibid.*, 71–72.

408 See *ibid.*, 27.

409 See Livingstone 1987, 218.

410 See Kahr *et al.* 2017, 4.



think about the issue.<sup>411</sup> Their influence can be broken down into two dimensions:<sup>412</sup>

- In the first dimension, the mass media impact WHAT their audience thinks about, by selecting a topic to draw their attention to, also impacting the audience's perception of a topic's importance by building consciousness.
- In the second dimension, the mass media impact HOW their audience thinks about a topic, by choosing a specific angle or frame for their reporting, affecting their audience's interpretations by including, omitting or highlighting specific information.

The *Agenda-Setting effect* has long been proven.<sup>413</sup> The media frequently and successfully have transformed the importance of an issue and thus primed or cultivated affective influence on the audience's criteria for the assessment of the world around them.<sup>414</sup> This agenda-setting ability makes the media an indispensable partner and ally in the authorities' quest to instil or preserve *Strategic Resilience* in the public.

Images, especially on television, can have a direct and elevated impact on audiences' perceptions, as previously posited by Le Bon and Lippmann.<sup>415</sup> Gerbner & Gross identified a correlation between increases in the time people spend watching television, with an increased likelihood that these people would perceive the social reality around them to be identical to the (fictional) reality portrayed on television.<sup>416</sup> This so-called *Cultivation Effect* was especially poignant, when it concerned issues which the viewers had no direct live experiences about.<sup>417</sup> As research suggests, this effect should equally apply to jihadi terrorism which fortunately only a fraction of the total population in Europe have had a direct live experience of.<sup>418</sup>

Gerbner and Gross also identified the effect of frequency learning in the audience, where the frequent depicting of events on television, makes people assume that these events are common in the reality.<sup>419</sup> The effect-

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411 See Lippmann 2013, 7-23 ; See McCombs and Shaw 1972.

412 See Balmas and Sheaffer 2010.

413 See McCombs and Shaw 1972.

414 See Nacos *et al.* 2011a, 197.

415 See Lippmann 2013 ; See Le Bon 2015.

416 See Gerbner and Gross 1976.

417 A point also made by Lippmann 2013, 7-23.

418 See Nellis and Savage 2012.

419 See Gerbner and Gross 1976.



iveness of extended TV exposure to fictional narratives or news coverage to alter audiences' attitudes and perceptions has been proven in different studies.<sup>420</sup> This is an indication that the 24/7 news cycle repetitions of terrorism coverage may be problematic.

Considering the large effect that reporting can have on audience's attitudes and perceptions, it is hard to disagree with Furedi who insists that "*mass media carries responsibility how it reports about events.*"<sup>421</sup> He believes that the media has failed in its role as gatekeeper and that its way of communicating about terrorism has contributed unnecessarily to an increased "*public dread of mass casualty terrorism.*"<sup>422</sup> Nacos blames the media's commercial infotainment focus for its failure to properly inform and empower citizens.<sup>423</sup>

This lack of information supplied is also reflected in the findings of a media analysis on the reporting in Germany of the 9/11 attacks. They found virtually no reporting on the background nor any recommendations for the audience how to react to it.<sup>424</sup> It equally found that media coverage in Germany about Salafism was shallow and not very differentiated, and the reporting of risks was vague.<sup>425</sup>

Research conducted by Sikorsky confirms the negative effects that media reporting on terrorism can have. The study found that "*undifferentiated news about IS terrorism indirectly affected participants' attitudes toward the general Muslim population in a negative way.*"<sup>426</sup> It also found that the "*undifferentiated news about IS terrorism increased participants' fear of terrorism.*"<sup>427</sup> In contrast the study found that "*differentiated news [...] [did] not significantly evoke fear.*"<sup>428</sup> It also found that the fear experienced when confronted with information about terrorism acts, was strongly influenced by its framing:

*Exposing participants to information about terrorist acts and highlighting a 'currently high risk of terrorism' significantly increased recipients' fear*

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420 See Atwell Seate and Mastro 2016; See Mutz and Nir 2010 .

421 Furedi 2007, 7.

422 *ibid.*

423 Nacos 2007, 185 ; See also Vowe 2013, 27.

424 See *ibid.*, 18.

425 See *ibid.*, 27.

426 Sikorski *et al.* 2017, 846.

427 *ibid.*, 845.

428 *ibid.*, 848.

Nacos suggests that the media can also positively influence the audiences' emotional response to the crisis by being a source of "*civic spirit, unity and patriotism*" and by promoting a "*we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment*".<sup>434</sup>

Domestic news organisations can be instrumental in helping to provide mental relief in serious incidents like terrorist attacks on innocent civilians which can create fear and panic in a society.<sup>435</sup> Authorities may usually benefit from the news networks' cooperative mood and their "*follow-the-leader-syndrome*" to be able to go public as soon as possible to frame the incident and their response to it.<sup>436</sup>

The first impression given by the authority's response to a crisis is decisive for the direction of the debate unfolding, once the critical phase is over.<sup>437</sup> The mass media is still the most effective tool to quickly reach the

437 See *ibid.*, 204.

wider public “to project the image of professional, resolute, and competent leadership” and to challenge the image of impotence and weakness, conveyed by successful terrorist attacks, and to preserve *Just-World-Beliefs*.<sup>438</sup>

If authorities do not communicate effectively and continuously with the press in a concise and precise manner during and after an attack, “the result is that rumours, not facts, are reported and attributed to anonymous sources [...] but if crisis managers [...] react to their [the media’s] need for information, they maintain their vantage point from which to frame and shape crisis information and construct the predominant story line.”<sup>439</sup>

→In a crisis situation like a terrorist attack, “response professionals are the most authoritative sources of information and thus are most sought out by the media.”<sup>440</sup> This puts them in the ideal position to influence the public by managing the information and framing the situation.

#### →Authorities to Public (D)

Just like the internet has enabled terrorists to broadcast their message online and made them more independent from the traditional news media channels, authorities also have been handed tools to circumvent the traditional news media and to communicate directly and unfiltered with the public.<sup>441</sup> However, as adoption of social media is not homogenous across the population, and infrastructure and geographic factors limit its access – even more so during a crisis situation – mass media still remains a vital instrument to reach the wider public, “especially when telling the public what to do and what not to do.”<sup>442</sup> Under the current circumstances, the internet and social media may be understood as valuable augmentations. Using multiple channels (indirectly through the media and directly through social media) to address the public necessitates consistency in the messages to avoid contradiction and prevent confusion.<sup>443</sup>

The technical advancement and diffusion of social media adoption has gone hand in hand with digitization and convergence processes in the

438 *ibid.*, 203.

439 *ibid.*, 200.

440 *ibid.*, 195.

441 See *ibid.*, 3–4; See *ibid.*, 217.

442 *ibid.*, 205.

443 See *ibid.*, 206.

media that have brought about profound change in the way media is produced, presented, processed, consumed, assessed, adopted, shared or co-created.<sup>444</sup> The advent of the internet has enabled a participatory culture where news, information and content in general is not only consumed, but also created and shared, also called *Prosuming*.<sup>445</sup>

*The Phenomena of Prosumption* has also strongly increased each citizen's potential of using the *Social Influence* and *Emotional Contagion Effect*, as described in chapter 4.3.9.<sup>446</sup> By being a communicator himself, every citizen is able to contribute to increasing security in the society or to its decreasing.<sup>447</sup> To limit its negative effects during a crisis, authorities must carefully monitor social media as well as the mass media to be able to quickly respond to wrong or harmful information, as negative information garners higher attention than the opposite and is more frequently and more widely shared.<sup>448</sup>

The communication needs of the public audience may vary, based on the circumstances. To achieve its positive effect, authorities need to ensure the adequacy of their security communication with the public, knowing what to say, when to say it, how to say it, and whom to say it to.<sup>449</sup>

- *Demographic factors* like age, gender or social status have long shown to produce different communication preferences in crisis situations.
- *Human factors* equally play important roles for successful communication, due to stress and distorted perceptions found to be common in safety-critical situations as well as the spatial and emotional distance of the audience.<sup>450</sup>
- *Psychological factors* may also prevent public service announcements to be followed, for example the *Ostrich Effect* identified by Karlsson et al..<sup>451</sup>

The *Ostrich Effect* describes the selective attention to information by individuals when faced with potentially negative information.<sup>452</sup> It may appear irrational for individuals not to welcome more information on a serious

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444 See Giebel 2014, 369.

445 See *ibid.*, 369.

446 See *ibid.*, 369.

447 See *ibid.*, 370.

448 See Barsade 2002, 652; See *ibid.*, 650.

449 See Giebel 2014, 368 ; See Lasswell 1948.

450 Giebel 2014, 367.

451 See Karlsson et al. 2009.

452 See *ibid.*, 96.

issue like a terrorism threat as it could have grave consequences for them on the one hand and would allow them to make better informed decisions on the other. But Karlsson et al. explain the *Ostrich Effect* by the individuals' preference for avoiding the psychological pain, connected with receiving "negative" information, "by sticking their head in the sand".<sup>453</sup> Accordingly, authorities cannot simply assume that public service announcement (PSA) are heard or read before, during or after an attack – despite a sufficient reach of the chosen communication channels- unless people are given the capacity to process and deal with the psychological pain connected with "negative" information.

Beyond the above factors, to fully reap this positive potential effect of its audience, Giebel suggested that the communicating authorities need to embrace the concept of the self-reliant and capable citizen whose existing knowledge, competences and skills should be integrated into the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.<sup>454</sup> These aspects Giebel posits, could contribute significantly to the resilience of a society and have a positive impact on the overall social design of its safety culture.<sup>455</sup>

Simply reaching their audience, has become increasingly challenging for authorities as the previously seemingly homogenous mass media audience today appears to be more segmented and differentiated than ever before, split up over many different channels.<sup>456</sup> While the segmentation and differentiation of the audience may initially increase the cost of communication, through digitalisation and big data it allows for an ever better adaptation/customisation of messages, up to the "segment of one". Mobile phone network-based or mobile app-based alert- and crowd-sourcing security applications are an exemplary way forward to put the concept into practice.<sup>457</sup>

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453 See *ibid.*, 96.

454 See Giebel 2014, 370.

455 See *ibid.*, 370.

456 See *ibid.*, 370.

457 See Diederichs 2017, 87.

Relevance:

To avoid or lessen the *Mass Mediated Terrorism Effect* on resilience, authorities have several interconnected options:

Towards terrorists:

- Authorities should prevent terrorists from being able to pull off operations that fulfil all the criteria of *High Level of Deviation*, *High Social Significance*, and a high *Visual Impact through Direct and Indirect Denial* by establishing a dedicated publicly declared, known, and publicly supported policy that
- Curtails publishing and sharing of terrorist incident-related media and messages,
- Establishes legislation that prevents the political recognition of claims or grievances if they are being advanced by the use of violent coercion through terrorist attacks,
- Mandates the regular conduct of public counter-terrorism exercises to train and display the preparedness of the authorities and society to repel an attack or to professionally deal with its consequences.

Towards the media:

- To instil or preserve *Strategic Resilience* in the public, authorities need to go public as soon as possible and utilise the “*follow-the-leader-syndrome*”<sup>458</sup> to set the stage and frame the incident and their response to it.
- Authorities need to prepare and provide information in a compelling, easy and comprehensible way, to provide data and explanations, to create infographics for use as images, to make it easy for the media to supply the population with actionable and up-to-date information.
- To continue to successfully direct the information flow, authorities should invest into well planned liaising with the media, communicate consistently, be responsive and allow as much access as possible.<sup>459</sup>
- The diligent and confident handling of representatives from the media needs to be part of the first responder leadership training.

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458 Nacos 2007, 106–107.

459 See *ibid.*, 198–199.

- Only in exceptional circumstances where media (live) reporting would endanger the response effort, authorities may consider to temporarily restrict reporting.<sup>460</sup>
- Authorities should proactively make an effort to have an exchange with news networks and journalists in “normal times” to inform them on how a specific type of coverage may unintentionally help terrorist succeed and try to encourage reporting guidelines.<sup>461</sup>
- Responsible-reporting guidelines must protect balanced and differentiated reporting while discouraging the use of emotionalising images and inciting language that may be conducive to create unjustified fears and to stir up blanket out-group stereotypes which could increase the perceived social significance of an attack in the population.
- To support coping in the society, authorities should encourage media to focus reporting on victims and their plight.
- With support of the authorities, the media can function as a platform for “*collective sadness and shared encouragement*” to the bereaved by sensitively featuring the victims and acknowledging their story and grief.<sup>462</sup>
- Authorities should work with the media to provide formats for dialogue in their programme where the audience is given the opportunity to participate in the public discourse, to be listened to and to discuss with experts and or follow Q&A sessions.<sup>463</sup>
- Authorities should include media as active participants in counter-terrorism exercises.

Towards the public:

- Authorities can prepare the society by clarifying that where there is life there is risk and offer mitigating strategies which together will reduce the perceived level of deviation and significance of a terror attack and its psychological impact on the population.

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460 Noteworthy cases include the suspension of the police rescue operation of the Israeli hostages in the Olympic village in Munich on 5 September 1972, after the terrorists were alerted by radio and television about the deployment of the police outside of their building. More recently the live reporting of police operations during the Mumbai terror attacks 26-29 November 2008 allowed the Pakistan-based handlers watching the television to guide the holed-up perpetrators via phone. For another case see also Seow 2018.

461 See Nacos 2007, 215–216.

462 *ibid.*, 60.

463 See *ibid.*, 59–60.

- Authorities should conduct regular public counter-terrorism exercises which make people used to the images related with terror.
- Authorities need to ensure the adequacy of their security communication with the public. This includes the need to be mindful of psychological pain, connected with “negative” information when considering which manner, tone, and time is most acceptable for the specific audience to receive and accept public service announcements.
- Authorities should prepare and provide information in a compelling, easy comprehensible way, provide data and explanations with actionable and up-to-date information.
- Authorities should adopt a *threat-based approach* that “*assesses an enemy’s intentions and capabilities*” instead of conducting a “*vulnerability-based analysis [that] identifies a weakness and hypothesizes a terrorist and a worst-case scenario*” which can lead to an atmosphere of fear and fatalism.<sup>464</sup>
- Authorities should reduce the potentially negative effect of social media-sharing by educating society about the problems of terrorist propaganda and building a public consensus for prosecuting those found fearmongering or to be disseminating hateful or inciting content, related to terrorism.
- Authorities must carefully monitor social media as well as the mass media during a crisis to be able to quickly respond to wrong or harmful information, as negative information garners higher attention and is more frequently and more widely shared.<sup>465</sup>
- Authorities should make use of the digitalisation and big data to achieve optimal customisation of messages, up to the “segment of one”.
- Authorities need to embrace the concept of the self-reliant and capable citizen and integrate the existing knowledge, competences and skills in the society into the preventive, proactive and reactive security concept.<sup>466</sup>

Towards themselves:

- To avoid unnecessarily increasing the population’s confusion and fear of terrorism, authorities must ensure that their own released statements are clear, consistent, precise, and differentiated.

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464 Jenkins 2006, 5 ; See Wilkinson 1986, 3.

465 See Barsade 2002, 652 ; See *ibid.*, 650.

466 See Giebel 2014, 370.



- Authorities must not hide their own lack of clarity behind unspecific terms.
- Authorities need to avoid compounding and generalising discrete threats by using terms like “international terrorism”.
- The usually high diversity of stakeholders with different interests who are affected in a terror attack on soft targets, demands a thoughtfully planned management of crisis communication that includes industrial, commercial and other non-governmental stake holders.<sup>467</sup>
- Crisis communication mechanisms need to be trained and tested before and included as an essential component in counter-terrorism exercises.<sup>468</sup>

#### 4.3.8. The Robespierre Affect

A large-scale research study conducted at the *University of Mannheim* on the physiological and psychological effects of television violence, observed the attempt of viewers to conclude a perceived open-ended chain of violence through the usurpation of punitive power.<sup>469</sup>

This development of violent reactions within the audience has turned out to be expected, especially if the portrayed illegitimate violence is directed against a sympathetic victim and is not going to be expiated or resolved.<sup>470</sup> Rather, the empathy with the victim and the associated anti-violent impulse provoke a violent backlash via a victim-perpetrator dialectic.<sup>471</sup>

The occurrence of the *Robespierre Affect* does not depend on the prevalence of gruesome visual images but is dependent on the way how the violence is embedded in the narrative and dramaturgical context.<sup>472</sup> If a solution to the “victim’s question” is denied or no convincing solution is offered, an outburst of *Robespierre’s Affect* is likely.<sup>473</sup>

This reaction model can be modified or lessened through fear of imminent sanctions and of other risks related to one’s own violent action, but

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467 Nacos 2007, 197.

468 See *ibid.*, 200–201.

469 See Grimm 1998, 117.

470 See *ibid.*, 117.

471 See *ibid.*, 117.

472 See *ibid.*, 117.

473 See *ibid.*, 117.

cannot be altered altogether: The aggressive-moral impetus remains in the imagination, where it can be freely used for subtle forms of aggression and violence legitimisation.<sup>474</sup> Accordingly, the way in which that build-up of morally fuelled aggression is expressed, does vary depending on the avenues available to the individual. It may range from “only” the construction of an enemy image to the endorsement of violence, to conducting violent activities.<sup>475</sup> Studies also found that it may be a conduit for political protest and increased approval of political violence.<sup>476</sup>

#### Relevance:

Authorities and press need to pay attention to the effect of open-ended chains of violence on the audience when reporting about events. They need to check their narrative.

Law enforcement authorities should review their policies on the permissibility of online content, regarding what is considered an *illegal incitement to violence*. The research shows that there are ways to create violent outrage through media which may so far, not be covered by law.

The energy created through the moral outrage can be targeted and/or channelled by terrorists or other non-government actors to polarise society. Authorities and the press need to predict the possibilities of it and prepare for it by carefully balancing their reporting. The press and society need to be alert not to accept self-defeating narratives from terrorist which blame the West.

Perpetually spinning their own credible and effective counter-narratives which provide explanations and means that avoid uncontrolled violence, may be a necessary and effective tool available to the authorities.

Authorities need to create narratives that would allow reaping the activating energy (created due to the violation of the personal sense of justice, based on the suffering of the victims) and channelling it into a useful purpose, e.g. when an all-society / community rally-around-the-flag effort is needed.<sup>477</sup> It should also be remembered that anger and fear are both considered negative emotions, but are connected to different states of mind.

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474 See *ibid.*, 115.

475 See *ibid.*, 115.

476 See *ibid.*, 115.

477 See *ibid.*, 111.

It is no coincidence that Palestinian groups repeatedly call for the “day of rage”.<sup>478</sup> Anger and rage can overcome fear in the short term, provide a feeling of clarity and controllability and may be activated to preserve resilience in a dread situation.<sup>479</sup>

#### 4.3.9. Emotional Contagion / Social Influence Theory

Emotions simply understood as “*subjective feelings*”, are “*intense, relatively short-term affective reactions to a specific environmental stimulus*.”<sup>480</sup>

Emotions may be the result of a cognitive conscious appraisal process but may be equally evoked by *Emotional Contagion*<sup>481</sup> and *Emotional Comparison*<sup>482</sup> which impacts the consecutive behaviour of individuals or groups.

Not all emotions are transferred with the same ease. Research found that negative emotions are more easily transferred than positive ones as well as emotions that are strongly expressed.<sup>483</sup>

#### Emotional Comparison

Social emotional comparison is the conscious adaptation of a sentiment, based on the perceived group’s prevailing emotional response to a threatening or ambiguous situation, like a terrorist attack.<sup>484</sup> These observed emotional responses “*provide embodied information about the costs and benefits of anticipated action, information that can be used automatically and immediately, circumventing the need for cogitating on the possible consequences of potential actions*”<sup>485</sup> allowing the observing individual to adequately set his own level of arousal.<sup>486</sup> On the group level, the *social comparison of emotional states* leads to group mood convergence and an

478 See Neack 2013, 115.

479 See Lerner *et al.* 2003, 148.

480 Barsade 2002, 647.

481 See Hatfield *et al.* 2016.

482 See Schachter 1959.

483 See *ibid.*

484 See *ibid.*

485 Zadra and Clore 2011, 676.

486 See Bartel and Saavedra 2000, p.199.

aligned perception of the environment.<sup>487</sup> *“Most of the time it makes sense and looking upon the reactions of others for directions has unquestionable survival value, but from time to time social influences may backfire and be misdirected.”*<sup>488</sup>

### Emotional Contagion.

Emotional contagion describes this unconscious transfer of emotions/moods between individuals or groups based on physical mimicry and the following self-evaluation.<sup>489</sup> It *“has significant implications for group cohesion [...] and group survival (e.g., fearful facial displays and vocalizations as a means for alerting other members of the group to imminent danger).”*<sup>490</sup>

If individuals or groups who have become „infected“ by an emotion through contagion, do not realize that *“they have caught it as a result of someone else’s emotion, they will [then] experience the origin of the feeling as coming from themselves.”*<sup>491</sup> The emotions can then alter the individuals’ appraisal process of events and thereby their actions. Barsade described this as a *“combinatory effect”* where people are *“not realizing that their seemingly cognitive and rational consideration of the facts is actually a product of other people influencing their mood and that this mood, in turn, is influencing their cognitive processes.”*<sup>492</sup>

The important role that emotions play when trying to preserve societal resilience in face of a terror threat, has been confirmed by Le Bon who posits that the art of arousing the imagination of the masses is the art of governing them.<sup>493</sup> The gripping, clear images that are produced through demonstrative and destructive acts of terrorism are meant to arouse strong emotions in the people’s minds – evoking feelings of fear, anxiety and death salience which may trigger the experience of loss of control and a loss of meaning.

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487 See *ibid.*, 197.

488 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 210–211.

489 See Gump and Kulik 1997, 305.

490 Levenson 1996, 186.

491 Barsade 2002, 680.

492 *ibid.*, 679.

493 See Le Bon 2015, 71–72.

Le Bon argues that facts as such do not attract the popular imagination, but the way they take place.<sup>494</sup> New convictions and beliefs of the masses spread only through the process of contagion, never with the help of reason.<sup>495</sup>

#### Relevance:

The theories posit that the actions by the authorities play an important role: their response in words (“speech acts”) and deeds offers an interpretation of the threat and any connected events to the observing media and the public, they themselves partly rely on to determine their own reaction.<sup>496</sup> The opinions of recognized authorities have a strong influence on the masses, regardless of truth or error. To guide the population’s thoughts and feelings, the message needs to be delivered in a credible way that corresponds to held beliefs of the population.<sup>497</sup> This is true for expressed emotion as well, since negative strong emotions, like anxiety and fear are easily transferred among people who Barsade refers to as “*walking mood inductors*,” *continuously influencing the moods and then the judgments and behaviors of others*.<sup>498</sup>

Therefore authorities need to show forth calmness, confidence and control on all levels, beyond what is being said and what is done in the awareness that “*emotion[s] can [...] influence pre-attentive perceptual processes*.”<sup>499</sup> To achieve group resilience, the messaging needs to be broad and wide-reaching, to encompass all stakeholders and groups including survivors, and thus to reach a critical amount of people to have an impact – people who have concerns or are anxious need to have a place to go to deal with them.

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494 See *ibid.*, 71-72.

495 See *ibid.*, 121.

496 See Lippmann 2013.

497 See Le Bon 2015, 120–121.

498 Barsade 2002, 679.

499 Zadra and Clore 2011, 677; See also Phelps *et al.* 2006 ; A negative example has been the reaction by Ms Mogherini, Head of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to the terror attacks in Brussels in March 2016, who in her facial expression and demeanour on live television showed strong vulnerability and anxiety, the opposite of what a political leader in such a situation should present. Source: Burrows 2016, online.

By achieving group resilience, authorities can instill individual resilience.<sup>500</sup> Due to its proven potential to activate masses, large social platforms and relevant discussions with contagious emotional potential should be monitored and automated analysis utilized, to get an earlier indication if an “emotion” is spreading.<sup>501</sup> The accountability of providers of mentioned on-line platforms for enabling the unchecked virality of inciting and seditious unlawful messages should be debated.<sup>502</sup>

Access to and influence on relevant community groups and stakeholders need to be established before an event and the need for emotional contagion of targeted groups arises. Tools in use in the UK are “*Servator*”-public reassurance measures, “Step-Change” – E-Learning campaigns, in cooperation with businesses, as well as the use of mobile apps.

Beyond simply trying to respond to evoked emotions set by terrorist events, authorities should make use of research beforehand and have available a tool box and influencers will allow them to actively create moods (including anger or desire for vengeance) which could have fear-cancelling effects when needed.<sup>503</sup> This challenge is made even more formidable in the open liberal societies, with activities by malign foreign actors who covertly exploit the emotional contagious potential of social media in the society.<sup>504</sup>

#### 4.3.10. Affiliation Theory

In social psychology, affiliation is understood as the tendency to seek the company of other persons, independent of the feelings towards these others, for a variety of reasons.<sup>505</sup> An external threat or ambiguous situation like terrorism triggers fear in individuals and motivates them to seek the company of others who are faced with the same threat.<sup>506</sup> This personal tendency towards affiliation is utility-driven, as individuals try to gain cognitive clarity about the level of threat they are facing to allow for countermeasures and a reduction in anxiety levels.<sup>507</sup>

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500 See Barsade 2002, 644.

501 Mirbabaie 2020.

502 See UK Home Office and UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 2020.

503 See *Appraisal Tendency Theory* in chapter 4.3.6.

504 Ewing 2017.

505 See Buunk and Dijkstra 2007, 330.

506 See Kassir *et al.* 2012, 342–343; see also Schachter 1959 ; see also Byrne 1961.

507 See Rofe 1984, 235 ; see also Rofe 2006, 1781.

Affiliation tendencies are accordingly related to or are directly affecting behaviour, observable during crisis, for example information search and sharing, threat perception, escape (to familiar persons or places), and evacuation of the family or countering panic.<sup>508</sup> In the long term, affiliation can provide psychological and physical support to disaster response.<sup>509</sup> Affiliation in these cases can be categorised as *problem-focused coping* attempts as well as *emotion-focused coping* attempts as part of the *Meaning-Making Coping Process* to reappraise an incongruent *Global- and Situational Meaning*.<sup>510</sup>

A study conducted in Israel among adults and children faced with weeks of terrorist attacks in the run up to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Iraq War in 2003 found that “*affiliation tendencies are determined by the perceived benefit- versus- damage that may be derived from being with others.*”<sup>511</sup> This “*benefit–damage perception*” itself is determined by three variables:

- “*The characteristics of the stressful situations,*
- *The individual,*
- *And the potential affiliates.*”<sup>512</sup>

Especially strong tendencies for affiliation were found in so called “*dangerous–avoidable situations*” (like war or terrorism): Where individuals thought that they were unable to change the source of the threat, they were seeking relevant information to be better prepared for the threat.<sup>513</sup> Individuals showed “*preference to be with similar others*” only if the “*need for cognitive clarity*” had not already been sufficiently served through other sources, like government information or through the media.<sup>514</sup> In these cases, the reported levels of anxiety were lower and individuals did not show interest to discuss the threat or seek further information. Instead, they sought the company of others to distract themselves from the threat and reduce their own level of anxiety.<sup>515</sup> In these cases, adults and children

508 See Diederichs 2017, 20.

509 See Spence *et al.* 2007.

510 See Park and Folkman 1997.

511 Rofe 2006, 1781.

512 Rofe 1984, 235.

513 See Rofe 2006, 1782.

514 *ibid.*, 1782.

515 See *ibid.*, 1788.

showed a preference for the company of “*non-anxious others*” to help them cope emotionally.<sup>516</sup>

Relevance:

- The need to affiliate with others during a terror threat situation will vary depending on the coping abilities of individuals, their perception of the threat and the available “others”.<sup>517</sup>
- Affiliation behaviour can help reduce anxiety in people and increase the feeling of belonging. Authorities should therefore make use of it and facilitate opportunities for the people in the society to come together, especially after an attack, like it was done in Paris right after the bloody attack on the magazine “*Charlie Hebdo*” in January 2015. The authorities should also make use of existing social and community structures and engage community leaders below the national level, to allow people to come together and find comfort in each other at the community level.
- Victims of terrorist attacks and their families as well as first responders are especially vulnerable and may strongly benefit from affiliation. Frameworks have to be created to facilitate their coming together.
- Through their accurate, timely, calm and transparent (as much as possible) information sharing, authorities may satisfy the “need for cognitive clarity” and reduce potential anxiety. This may reduce individuals search for and acceptance of unverified information from others, potentially through social media that could create more anxiety.
- When deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media) it should be considered that beyond the reception of necessary and actionable information that supports coping, the majority of people may prefer distraction from the threat rather than continuous reminders.
- This holds true for children as well who have less ability to cope with a threat, compared to adults, and accordingly, exposing them continuously to threat-related messages is likely to increase their level of anxiety. While the children’s need for cognitive clarity about the threat has to be addressed by providing the necessary information about the situation, by explaining how the authorities are responding, by informing them on

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516 *ibid.*, 1787.

517 See Rofe 1984, 235.



what they themselves can do and by addressing their questions, children should be shielded from continuous exposure to messages without any new actionable information and rather be distracted and encouraged to continue to live their lives normally.

#### 4.3.11. Conservation of Resources Model

The *Conservation of Resources Model* is based on the assumption that “people strive to retain, protect, and build resources and that what is threatening to them is the potential or actual loss of these valued resources.”<sup>518</sup> It is the deprivation of “resources [perceived to be] needed to realize personally relevant goals” that the individual experiences as stressful.<sup>519</sup>

Accordingly, the psychological impact of exposure to terrorism on an individual may be determined by the extent to which the resources of the individual will be affected, this includes possible economic, social as well as psychological resource loss.

Research by Hobfoll et al. found that in general those with fewer resources to begin with (indicated by low socio-economic status and limited self-efficacy), find it harder to cope with the effects of terrorist attacks, as they lack redundancy to replace lost resources and are more likely to develop *post-traumatic stress disorder* (PTSD).<sup>520</sup>

Especially for these more vulnerable groups, but also profiting all, the development and application of a “*resource loss questionnaire*” is recommended.”<sup>521</sup> According to Hobfoll et al. this should function as a “*quick screening tool [...] to identify high-risk individual[s]*” or groups who can then be administered the suitable level of care.<sup>522</sup>

Fear-based messages that would unnecessarily increase the perceived threat to the individual’s resources through government or media, should be avoided.<sup>523</sup> Instead, adopting this resources-focused model in a terror threat scenario mandates authorities to publish information about the social, psychological or material support available to individuals and to

518 Hobfoll 1989, 513.

519 See Dechesne 2012, 85–86.

520 See Hobfoll et al. 2006, 215.

521 *ibid.*, 215.

522 *ibid.*, 215.

523 See *ibid.*, 215; see also Nacos 2007, 21.



Closure also means that sufficient funds need to be provided in a timely fashion to pay for hospital costs, for funding necessary operations, for remodelling of housing if necessary, for regular therapy and ongoing care to help in allowing these people to continue their life. The financial obligations they had to meet before the attack for themselves or their dependants, need to be acknowledged and covered.

For business owners whose premises have been destroyed or damaged through an attack or have been simply sealed-off due to the spatial proximity to an attack, are likely to face a great threat to their economic resources if they are unable to continue trading for a time. Resulting payment defaults or even bankruptcies can affect multiple stakeholders, including employees, customers as well as suppliers and the local community in general. The authorities need to have these potential negative effects in mind when legislating and acting after an attack as well as to have to encourage the business community to work out specific business continuity plans for these types of events.

The wider public is also affected in the aftermath of a terror attack. Different types of resources may be affected, e.g. through necessary change of the routine due to the interruption of transport services or other infrastructure after an attack or due to avoidance behaviour of specific areas (e.g. crowded places) due to fear.

Removing tangible and visible damages to infrastructure and ensuring its functionality as soon as possible after an attack is therefore important to preserve those “resources” and the citizens’ trust in them.<sup>531</sup>

#### 4.3.12. Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model


In line with the author’s understanding of a resilient community, Kaniasty & Norris suggest that *“heightened communal sacrifices and concerns for each other could mitigate adverse psychological consequences of disasters or even take the disaster-struck community “beyond its pre-existing levels of integration, productivity, and capacity for growth”.*<sup>532</sup>

531 On July 07.07.2015 jihadi terrorist suicide bomb attacks on three underground trains (and a double-decker bus) killed 52 people and injured 700 more. The London Tube resumed its service the next morning except for the stretches directly affected by the bombs.

532 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 202.

Their *Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model* (SSDDM) explains the development and impact of social dynamics in the community on individual coping in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters (like terrorist attacks) that disrupt “*the social context within which individuals and groups function.*”<sup>533</sup>

Figure 13: *The Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model.*<sup>534</sup>



Following the instantaneous “*mobilization of social support*” in the initial phase of a disaster, victims often experience a deterioration of social support in the aftermath that negatively affects their coping and recovery abilities.<sup>535</sup>

The SSDDM model posits that this perceived deterioration of social support which negatively affects the mental health of victims, may be reduced (or deterred), by addressing / enhancing three facets of social support as shown in the table below.

*To an important but incomplete extent, the initial mobilization of received support counteracts this deterioration and preserves perceptions that supportive networks are still in place (protective assistance). Through this process of deterioration deterrence (paths support mobilization and protective assistance combined [see graphic above]), mobilization of received support indirectly affects mental health by preserving perceptions of social support.*<sup>536</sup>

533 Fritz 1976, 651; See Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 200.

534 Figure adapted from *ibid.*, 207.

535 *ibid.*, 207.

536 *ibid.*, 207.

Table 4: Social support and post-disaster social dynamics.<sup>537</sup>

Social support facet	Post natural disaster process
Received social support	Initial mobilization of the actual receipt of help
Social embeddedness	Initial sense of togetherness followed by a longer term decline
Perceived social support	Longer term decline in the sense of being connected with other

As the table shows, managing perceived social support deterioration is a multidimensional problem with different, but connected facets.<sup>538</sup> Accordingly, the levers / types of social support needed to effectively counteract the negative effects of SSD are multi-faceted, and may require a „*host of policies, programs, and changes in our ways of thinking*” – depending on the issue and the affected individuals.<sup>539</sup>

It is important to note that the way institutionalized support is given, may inadvertently increase trauma and emotional distress, as post-disaster support is often not distributed equally or according to the “the *rule of relative needs*”, but based on “*pre-existing socio-political and cultural structures*” in the community, putting those with status and more available assets at an advantage to receive support.<sup>540</sup>

In the uncertainty, vagueness and confusion during and in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, “*informational support may be even more important than tangible support*”, providing accurate, timely and transparent information to the affected population.<sup>541</sup> “*Otherwise [the authors suggest], authorities will exacerbate processes that contribute to support deterioration.*”<sup>542</sup>

*“Notwithstanding the essential role government agencies and other formal sources of support play in the aftermath of disasters, the greatest challenge lies in fostering naturally occurring social resources which are most vital for disaster victims, especially with regard to exchange of emotional support.”*<sup>543</sup>

537 Table adapted from *ibid.*, 201.

538 See *ibid.*, 220.

539 *ibid.*

540 *ibid.*, 206; *ibid.*, 220.

541 *ibid.*, 220–221.

542 *ibid.*, 220–221.

543 *ibid.*, 221.

Relevance:

The *Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model* provides good indicators of which types of policies and programs in the aftermath of man-made disasters may be supportive to the mid- and long-term emotional coping of victims.

– *Provide early, abundant, and visible social support*

Through their actions, compassion and words early into the crisis, authorities can “vaccinate” the victimised individuals with the belief that support will be available, if needed in the future. This can help confirm held *Just-World-Beliefs* and may reduce the perceived deterioration of support in the long run, allowing for better coping and faster recovery after an attack.

Actions include

- Availability of Informational support –
  - Clear pathway and transparency about the way forward,
- Provision of Material support,
- Availability of Medical support,
  - Disaster medicine
  - Restorative medicine
  - Recovery medicine
  - Psychological support,
- Availability of Financial support
  - Access to emergency funding for serving urgent payments
  - Medical costs
  - Adequate level of compensation
    - Injury compensation
    - Loss of property compensation
    - Loss of business compensation,
- Availability of emotional support
  - Showing compassion for the victims
  - acknowledgement of their suffering by high-ranking representatives of the state
  - Societal/national solidarity (e.g. blood donations action).<sup>544</sup>

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544 An example where in the eyes of the victims that solidarity was missing, was the sending of invoices for the certification of death by the Charité Hospital to families of victims killed during the Berlin Christmas Market Attack in 2016, just three days

– *Provide fair support*

“Authorities need to keep a close watch on “*the equity of distribution of social resources*”.<sup>545</sup> If help is made available, it needs to be distributed fairly – based on real needs, not based on status. Otherwise, it could harm community cohesion which itself is an important mitigating factor for adverse psychological reaction in a post-disaster scenario.

– *Fostering sources of non-formal social support*

The formal expression of government social support is insufficient to preserve the necessary sense of togetherness and connectedness in victims. Social support should be broadly based and nourished from the community level (through support from social groups and associations, victim support groups, workplace etc.), and most importantly from the individual level (through social support from friends, family and next of kin).

– *Restore sources of social embeddedness*

The alternative “natural” sources of social support mentioned above, may be disrupted though, due to the loss of significant others, separation from existing social circles through forced lifestyle changes because of an injury, to long recovery times away in hospital or rehabilitation, or to mental problems that prevent a return to the workplace. To mitigate the consequences, authorities need to plan for such situations and manage them by facilitating the creation, accessibility and use of alternatives sources for social interaction, sharing and grieving.

– *Protect sources of social embeddedness*

To counteract the potentially corrosive effect of a religiously or ethnically motivated attack on the feeling of community embeddedness and cohesion, an inclusive community dialogue needs to have been established beforehand. This will allow communities to be sensitized and reassured about its inclusiveness and help disperse divisive rumours or suspicions.<sup>546</sup>

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after the attack with a robust request for payment – while it took nearly eight weeks for the Governing Mayor to send his condolence notice. Source: Kurpjuweit 2017.


545 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 220.

546 See *ibid.*, 221.

4.4. Chapter Conclusion

Through the analysis above of the relevance of the identified models and theories for substantiating Münkler & Wassermann’s *Strategic Resilience* concept, the author was able to deduce and distil a total of 197 measures. As the graphic shows, the numbers of measures are unevenly distributed across the models, suggesting varying opportunities and thus needs for government engagement.

Figure 14: Distribution of 197 measures across the 12 Theories/Models.<sup>547</sup>



In this bulk and arranged along their theoretical origins, as shown in the table on the following pages, however, they are not helpful to form a whole-of-government approach which would be required, to successfully lead a whole-of-society-effort towards *Strategic Resilience*. While the policy measures are also not universally transferable or applicable to form such a whole-of-government-effort, they can form the basis for further analysis in the next chapter to develop generally applicable, yet actionable principles which any government can follow if they intend to strengthen the *Strategic Resilience* of their open society against jihadi terrorism, as this work has set out to do.

547 Author’s own work.



Table 5: Collection of measures deduced from the assessment of the different theories.<sup>548</sup>

<p><i>Model of Global and Situational Meaning</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Authorities should ensure that there is adequate support available to first responders/emergency personnel and their families during deployment and in case of injury (physical AND mental) or death.</li> <li>2. Authorities should support the selection and weaving of different memories into a meaningful narrative that lets people make sense of previously traumatic events in their lives and their connection to others and allow them to re-write history – or rather the memory of it. This allows individuals as well as the society to turn moments of defeat into moments of triumphant defiance and personal growth.</li> <li>3. Authorities need to establish and monitor procedures for trauma intervention/ therapy after exposure to an attack, to avoid compounding trauma and functional impairment. This is especially important for front-line staff, but equally for those indirectly exposed.</li> <li>4. Authorities should consider scripting scenarios and adaptation of scenario-plays that can be shown in live shows in amusement parks to increase awareness, and which could also help with recruitment. This should be connected to activities on different touchpoints, e.g. schools for maximum effectiveness.</li> <li>5. Authorities should establish a compelling narrative that provides meaning and purpose which allows the individual to make sense of the potential threat and to expect better personal coping with any direct suffering and thereby reduces the perceived threat to his psychological resources.</li> <li>6. Authorities should establish a shared meaning and purpose in the society, to ensure its defiance and unity in face of the terrorist threat.</li> <li>7. Authorities should incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills, for example by increasing the first aid training hours required to receive a driver's licence.</li> <li>8. Authorities should further incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills, for example by offering advantages to certain citizens, who have the right qualification (like certified first aid skills), by offering free access to community infrastructure like swimming pools or sports facilities or preferred access to public housing or university accommodation.</li> <li>9. Authorities should, as a preventive measure against potential resource loss, encourage development of social resources, through supporting and enabling the creation and strengthening of social bonds in sports and social clubs, associations, inter-generational projects, neighbourhood groups, volunteers' opportunities, and neighbourhood management.</li> <li>10. Authorities should incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills, for example by requiring drivers to come back into training and prove their abilities in first aid and rescue skills on a regular basis.</li> <li>11. Authorities should incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills by trying and offering new formats of training like "First-Responder Parties" like "Tupperware Parties", where the training is held at home among friends.</li> <li>12. Authorities should prepare content for vulnerable groups, for example young people to be equipped with skills to be able to better respond if a situation should arise.</li> </ol>
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548 Author's own work.

13. Authorities should set up infotainment-based facilities where families, groups and school classes can train and learn about the looming risks and practice the response to them in a playful manner. This may also help recruitment of first responders and should be connected to activities on different touchpoints, e.g. schools for maximum effectiveness.
14. Authorities should put in place generous compensation policies for material losses, suffered in or as a consequence of an attack. This must include personal and business losses (considering the large number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in Germany), for example because of destroyed or cordoned off premises.
15. Authorities should support individuals in equipping themselves with the necessary skills to be able to undertake problem-focused coping by educating, training and providing them with the necessary support. The skills include: first aid skills, basic rescue and evacuation drills, active shooter training, self-defence, or training in terrorism awareness/vigilance.
16. Authorities should take a whole-of-government approach and long-term focus with the aim to nudge people's global beliefs about terrorist attacks towards a coping-friendly-meaning.
17. Authorities should try to influence global beliefs held in society, not only using classic crisis and security communication, but through practical activities and legislation, whether financial, political, legal or otherwise
18. Authorities can support the development of an increased general proficiency in the society to cope with negative emotions through long-term programs adapted to the target segments as part of curricula in schools, apprenticeship programs, university or driver's licence training (to prevent road rage).
19. Authorities need to fulfil society's demand for more security, but also to communicate the countering concept of accepting uncertainty far and wide for the greatest impact. (see *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*).
20. Authorities need to consider the impact of past government performance in dealing with other types of crises on public confidence in the ability of the authorities to prepare for and mitigate a future terrorist attack.
21. Authorities need to put a focus on the prevention of large-scale attacks, especially chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. They should also communicate their efforts and achievements and put the probability of such attacks being successfully conducted, into perspective. Authorities must also communicate their ability to cope with the effects of such attacks through large scale exercises, involving police and emergency services responders.
22. Authorities should improve perceived ability of individuals to respond to an attack, through awareness and skill training.
23. Authorities should incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills, for example by reducing car taxes or fees for the driving test for citizens who maintain and prove their skill set.
24. Authorities should identify and analyse the existing *Global Meaning* (including the *Just-World-Beliefs*) held in the society, and anticipate the threat and impact, posed by and to the meaning by terrorism. Prophylactically, they should proceed to uncover and distil meaning and purpose from these threat scenarios. After that, the findings should then be infused into the existing *Global Meaning*.
25. Authorities should increase knowledge and awareness of first aid skills through rolling out "Public Days" like First-Responder Days more prominently and in close cooperation with local community.
26. Authorities should utilise their recognized authority to frame attacks, in order to provide meaning and to encourage resolve, unity and defiance in the public.

27. Authorities should provide the population with a compelling meaning and purpose WHY they must endure the hardship and suffering terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities. Authorities should thereby be able to communicate a compelling narrative about who the terrorists are and what they are fighting for.
28. Authorities should stay away from fear-based messaging that would only play further into the hands of the terrorists, when addressing the terrorist threat.
29. Authorities should support emotion-focused coping of citizens by taking congruent actions, including speech acts and through utilising the “*follow-the-leader-syndrome*” of the media.<sup>549</sup> Authorities may also use the effects of emotional contagion and create large gatherings offline or online, and instruct multipliers (like the media) and influencers that will unconsciously instil a new interpretation of events in the individual.
30. Authorities should prepare for and use the opportunities opened through a traumatic event like a terror attack, to shift opinions /global beliefs and thus galvanize the cohesion of the society.
31. Authorities should as a responsive measure provide and promote opportunities for affiliation which is a natural reaction after the loss of social resources.
32. Authorities should support citizens to improve their problem-focused coping abilities to reduce the perceived impact of an attack.
33. Authorities should communicate about risk and reassure through “*adequate disaster planning and emergency response systems*”<sup>550</sup> to mitigate effects of existing memory of previous similar traumatic events. As these may make the individual “*overestimate statistically small, but affectively potent risks*”<sup>551</sup>, like the “*dread risk*”<sup>552</sup> of becoming a victim of a terror attack, and make him emotionally respond to it accordingly.
34. Authorities must consider the individual threat perception about terrorism (influenced by demographic factors like gender, age, education and ethnicity) when trying to support the population in a resilient response. The authorities should ideally identify typical behavioural patterns (and preferences) during disasters and address the groups accordingly.
35. When deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media) authorities should consider that beyond necessary and actionable information about the situation, and how they are planning to respond and what the citizens themselves can do, further continuous reminders about terrorist threats are likely to increase the recipients’ level of anxiety, especially if they have previously experienced similar events.

549 Nacos 2007, 106–107.

550 Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 30.

551 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 19–20.

552 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

*Just-World-Beliefs Theory*

36. Authorities should show no shyness in acknowledging the sacrifice of those carrying the burden /those most affected by terror attacks (e.g. French police officer; Boston Marathon attack)
37. Authorities should prevent the isolation and the blaming of victims by preventively connecting their fate and sacrifice to the fate of the nation, city, town, community etc.
38. Authorities should support the litigation by affected victims for financial compensation from the perpetrators or involved third parties, e.g. to serve the people's need for justice by supplying a financial settlement.
39. Authorities should provide necessary support like an adequate victim compensation and psychological support to sustain the *Just-World-Beliefs* during and after an attack.
40. The authorities should anticipate and respond to efforts by terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the West to deliberately exploit upheld *Just-World Beliefs* in Western societies by portraying the West as the rightful target of attacks to remedy an injustice. Authorities need to recognise this as psychological warfare and must carefully choose their actions and their communication strategy consistently along their own narrative.
41. Authorities should not underestimate the people's need for justice or just simply for revenge after an attack, to support their coping.
42. Authorities should deconstruct the prevailing concepts of justice and deservingness ruling society, when defining and establishing the role of victims of terrorist attacks in the society.
43. Authorities should preview possible scenarios of threats to *Just-World-Beliefs* and develop satisfying answers to the „Why“ (must we endure this?) question which will be raised by the people, media, political opposition as well as the terrorist sympathisers.
44. Authorities need to provide meaning to the struggle and the hardship put on individuals and the society, resulting from the authorities' political choices.
45. Authorities must ensure the ability to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the *Just-World-Beliefs* – this may involve law enforcement, justice system, and health and social system.
46. Authorities should ensure an adequate level of victim compensation as a tangible and visible public acknowledgment of sacrifice and innocent suffering.
47. To avoid victim blaming out of envy, authorities should prepare and steer any necessary public discourse about the amount or legitimacy of compensation of terrorism victims early and with confidence.
48. Authorities should ostracise and where necessary, legally prosecute transgressions in the press or social media which are attacking victims or their families.

*Logo Theory*

49. Authorities need to provide first responders with a compelling meaning and purpose, why they and their families potentially must endure greater hardship in the conflict with terrorists, than the rest of the citizens.
50. Authorities should support victims to discover that there is at least something good in their suffering – and encourage them to actively pursue and look for new possibilities of meaning in the suffering.
51. Authorities should support victims to adopt a meaning orientation with a focus on the future, on a purpose that will promise fulfilment the future.

52. Authorities should embrace the idea that the provision of meaning in a crisis is as important as are material and social support for the victims.
53. Authorities need to help the victims to find this orientation as the latter can endure the worst conditions if they can put a meaning to it.
54. Authorities should consistently live up to the shared values and meaning they proclaim in their words and actions and stay aligned across the whole-of-government.
55. Authorities can tap into the six emotional needs man has, to create a meaningful narrative: The Need for Security / The Need for Adventure/Variety. / The Need for Significance / The Need for Connection / The Need for Growth / The Need for Contribution
56. Authorities need to instil shared common meaning and values in society to help it maintain its defiance against an aggression.
57. Authorities should respect that the process of transforming held *Situational Meaning* or and *Global Meaning* may be a longer- or shorter-term process and will require continuous care even after a new meaning has been accepted.
58. Authorities should focus their effort on weaving, sustaining and strengthening a defiant meaning-orientated narrative that will support attitudinal heroism towards the threat of death from terrorism.

#### *Terror Management Theory*

59. Authorities should consider the particular needs of direct victims and indirect victims concerning the building of close personal relationships and a focus on the in-group.
60. Authorities should make information palatable and select the sender carefully to overcome the public ignorance and rejection of threatening information and their senders.
61. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through conducting building evacuation exercises.
62. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through defibrillator demonstrations and training.
63. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through emergency preparedness demonstrations and training.
64. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through lifesaving / first aid demonstrations and training.
65. Authorities should support societal bonding through social activities like clubs and sports in a whole-of-government approach.
66. Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions, by establishing a debating culture based on the strength of rational arguments, already in schools and live it by example in politics. Authorities should promote an open culture of debate to reduce the ignoring and rejection of threatening information and their senders.
67. Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions, by ensuring that people are exposed early to other views and learn how to cope with them.
68. Authorities must help create opportunities that allow citizens to personally grow and confirm their self-esteem by contributing to something bigger than just themselves, and thus experience meaning, higher purpose and belonging.

69. Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions by making clear demands for „No-Violence“ early and continuously, and enforce them.
70. Authorities should address the problem of individual's aggression against people supporting opposing opinions by trying to channel the aggression in a productive way.
71. Authorities should support the creation of and high regard for volunteering opportunities in a whole-of-government approach.
72. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through security briefings, demonstrations and training.
73. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through the establishment, training of and guidance to self-help neighbourhood vigilance groups.
74. Authorities should develop an inclusive societal and community model that finds roles for everyone as a whole-of-government approach.
75. Authorities should establish and strengthen inclusive community or neighbourhood management that will be a source of support in crisis and will enhance problem-focused coping.
76. Authorities should establish symbolic means for confirmation of an individual's own world-view and own identity to reduce the perceived threat posed by opposing opinions and help society to develop other coping mechanisms.
77. Authorities should facilitate the building and the use of personal relationships at the community level to overcome in- versus outgroup set-up (e.g. through urban and neighbourhood planning and management).
78. Authorities should promote exchange and interaction across ethnicities to quench stereotypes and build relationships early, to overcome an in- versus outgroup set-up in a crisis.
79. Authorities should in a whole-of-government approach establish a culture that provides “*a shared symbolic conception of reality which in turn imputes order, predictability, significance, and permanence*”.<sup>553</sup>
80. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through workplace business continuity planning and training.
81. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through training of (social) media literacy skills to be able to better deal with information during crisis.
82. Authorities should undertake efforts to boost the self-help capability of individuals for practical coping with a threat. These can comprise advice and training.
83. Authorities should provide possibility for affiliation and the development of close personal relationships to support coping of the population.
84. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through public service announcements, while being mindful of psychological pain connected with “negative” information.
85. Authorities should undertake efforts to develop consensus in society on what heroism entails, to utilize the nationalistic excitement usually evoked by a terror threat and then nudge/ channel the passion and effort in a productive direction.

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553 Greenberg *et al.* 1986, 206.

86. Authorities need to nurture the feeling of belonging and secureness in the societal and cultural setting and social framework which create meaning and the perception of comprehensive order and predictability, to help people overcoming the fear of death (evoked by the terrorism threat).

87. Authorities should assess how make use of the fear diminishing (positive) effect of hate.

*Dynamics of Reciprocal Threat Perception*

88. Authorities should look at media censorship as one tool to help curb the negative effects of the Dynamics of Reciprocal Threat Perception through the media.

89. Authorities must carefully watch their communication style and question its purpose: Preparing society for potential attacks in the future to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* is necessary. But words need to be carefully chosen as public dread of mass casualty terrorism is made worse through framing the nature of the threat as unpredictable, random and incalculable. Informing the public of vulnerabilities must also not be a simple exercise to try to pre-emptively deflect criticism from authorities for failure to prevent such a future attack. Such a lack of confidence into the ability to protect the society may have worse effects on the society. In all communication, the authorities must have the *Security Communication Vulnerability Paradox* in mind.

90. Authorities should conduct more research on the psychological impact that the threat of terrorism has on individuals, in contrast to the well-researched impact of direct exposure to acts of terrorism.

91. Authorities should take informed decisions on the appropriate means to reassure the population through action instead of just words. Measures to reduce the threat perception in the society can come in many forms.

92. Authorities should ensure that in the communication with the public, the focus should be risk-led rather than a vulnerability-led.

93. All the while the authorities need to plan also for the more unlikely exploitation of specific vulnerabilities through “high-end, low probability ‘super-terrorism’ threats”.<sup>554</sup>

94. Authorities and the media should also withstand the urge for the demonization or mystification of terrorists and thereby aggrandizing them which could increase the fear factor. Terrorist should be treated and framed as criminals.

95. Authorities should avoid sweeping generalisation and abstraction, impersonal terms and categories like “International terrorism” that can incorrectly compound connected, but discrete challenges into one large threat. This would make the problem of terrorism appear even more complex and challenging.

*Appraisal Tendency Theory*

96. Authorities should undertake necessary research to identify the triggers (e.g. the style of media reporting, wording of government communication, type of terrorism footage) for emotions like fear or anger.

97. Authorities should regularly monitor the emotional state of the society.

98. Authorities should examine and distinguish the different effects of so-called “negative emotions”, like fear, anger, grief, rage or loathing (that are likely to be evoked by terrorist attacks), on individuals’ risk perception (and their influence on their policy preferences).

554 Gearson 2012, 171.

99. Authorities should examine the terror management function of non-basic complex emotions like nostalgia and develop tactics to utilise them.
100. After monitoring and understanding the effects of terrorism-induced emotions on cognitive appraisal, authorities should shape their own messaging accordingly and encourage the media to adapt their messaging style to avoid unnecessary mental hardship on the society.
101. Authorities should consider how existing social structures, like NGOs, community groups, sports clubs or workplaces or other opportunities for congregation can be used to purposefully “infect” individuals with desired emotions through “Emotional Comparison” or “Emotional Contagion”, to help coping with unfamiliar situations.
102. Authorities should develop the ability to incite carefully targeted rage and anger as a short-term remedy, to prevent a society from falling into fear and anxiety due to the “*dread risk*”<sup>555</sup> of terrorism.
103. Authorities should proactively manage strong emotions (such as anger, fear, disgust, etc.), associated with previous terror attacks, and provide adequate meaning that will allow for a healthy coping. This must encompass all members of the society. But authorities need to lay a special focus on vulnerable groups, people directly affected by an attack and their families and friends as well as those indirectly affected who research shows, often find it harder to cope, which include children, the elderly and women.

*Mass Mediated Terrorism Concept*

104. To reduce the level of deviation authorities should fight terrorists’ narrative by getting Muslim scholars to condemn them.
105. Authorities should assure that terrorists are brandished in society as outlaws to reduce sympathy and support.
106. Authorities should request providers of critical infrastructure to build redundancies into the systems to reduce the potentially negative social significance of the terrorism threat.
107. Through direct denial, authorities should make it hard for terrorists to conduct large-scale operations and thereby reduce the perceived potential size of an attack.
108. Authorities should go public as soon as possible and use their authoritative position to influence the public by managing the information and framing the situation and their response through the media.
109. Authorities should make news networks and journalists aware, through media guidelines or advice, which type of coverage is problematic because it advances the terrorists’ objectives.
110. Authorities should encourage the media to focus their reporting on victims and their plight, instead of on the perpetrators.
111. Authorities should ask the media not to be too concrete in their description of gory details of an attack and use little emotion.
112. Authorities should consider laws that regulate showing the carnage from terrorist attacks in the media.
113. Authorities should invest in good liaison with the media to be able to responsibly influence the information flow, if needed.

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555 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.



114. Authorities should acknowledge the role of the media for distributing important information to their audiences during crisis and should work with the media to assure a continuous flow of information in the moment of high alertness and distress that can give the audience the feeling of being involved in the unfolding events.
115. The Media should avoid spreading inconsistent or exaggerated reactions and appeals which help to *"augment the sense of danger and ensuing confusion."*<sup>556</sup>
116. Authorities should in addition to communicating accurately, give people capacity to process and deal with the psychological strain, connected with "negative" information.
117. Authorities should make arrangements to visually conceal attack sites to reduce the visual impact of an attack.
118. Authorities should equally provide the media with a steady flow of information during and after a terrorist attack.
119. Authorities should assess the appropriate frequency and tone of their communication since the selection and volume of news impacts the public's perception of the importance and urgency of problems and issues.
120. Authorities should be able to challenge the image of impotence and weakness conveyed by terrorists' successful attacks by feeding the media's *"need for information"*<sup>557</sup>. They should *"maintain their vantage point from which to frame and shape crisis information and construct the predominant story line"*<sup>558</sup>
121. Authorities should encourage and support the media to provide a platform for mutual encouragement and collective grief by sensitively featuring the victims and their story and grief.
122. Authorities should support the media to allow them to positively influence the audience's emotional response to an attack, by being a source of *"civic spirit, unity and patriotism"* and promoting a *"we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment"* during a crisis.<sup>559</sup>
123. Authorities should provide the media with footage, so that they are not dependent on using terrorist sources.
124. Authorities should support the media to provide formats in their programme for dialogue where the audience is given the opportunity to participate in the public discourse, to discuss with experts and or to follow Question & Answer sessions.
125. Authorities should cooperate with the media to assure that during a crisis the audience can see the familiar faces of "their" news anchors on the screen and hear their familiar voices on the radio. This can provide a feeling of belonging to the audience and of some normalcy when they try to make sense of the new situation after an attack.
126. Authorities should try to manage the visual (emotional) impact of an attack by providing the media with access but asking the media to carefully select the images to avoid unintended consequences.
127. Authorities may have to consider restriction to reduce the visual impact of an attack in a state of emergency.

556 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 211.

557 Nacos 2007, 200.

558 *ibid.*

559 *ibid.*, 59–60.



142. Authorities should regularly provide updated information for the population after a crisis situation. The searching for new information can reduce the audience's feeling of helplessness and senselessness, evoked by the attack, and provide "*the feeling of doing something*"<sup>562</sup>, connecting them to something bigger, becoming part of a community tragedy.
143. The websites and the twitter accounts of authorities should be seen as fast and reliable sources of information for the public and the media alike in a crisis situation. It allows the recipients to receive guidance and stay connected.
144. Authorities should "*communicate calmness, confidence, and an aura of control to a shell-shocked, fearful or impatient domestic public.*"<sup>563</sup>
145. Authorities should "*use the extraordinary public attention in order to get their message across, to demonstrate their composure, and to convince citizens to keep their cool and trust that the authorities will do everything possible to protect and assist them.*"<sup>564</sup>
146. Authorities should arrange for fast carrying out of forensics to clear attack sites as quickly as possible, to reduce the visual and psychological impact of an attack.
147. Authorities should make arrangements to repair any damages at the attack sites as quickly as possible, to reduce the visual and practical impact of an attack.
148. In the aftermath of an attack, authorities should offer support in a retrospective "sense-making", through communicative intervention measures that enable the recovery of personal control and replenishment of lost resources.
149. Authorities should consider different communication approaches, depending on the target segment. Authorities also need to consider that vulnerable individuals may have a higher prevalence of avoidance behaviour.
150. A well-planned management of crisis communication should be in place that is especially considering the needs of vulnerable groups during and after a terror incident.

*The Robespierre Affect*

151. Authorities should review their policies on the permissibility of online content in regard to what is considered an *illegal incitement to violence*. The research shows, that there are ways to create violent outrage through media which may so far not be covered by law.
152. Authorities and the press should foresee the possibilities of terrorist or other non-government actors to polarise society through targeted communication to create moral outrage and prepare for it by carefully balancing their reporting. The press and media need to be alert not to accept self-defeating narratives from terrorist that blame the West.
153. Authorities and press should pay attention to the effect of open-ended chains of violence on the audience when reporting about events. They need to check their narrative.
154. Authorities should spin own credible and effective counter narratives over a long time that provide explanations and means that do not have to lead to uncontrolled violence and may prove itself to be a necessary and effective tool in the future.

562 Nacos 2007, 59.

563 *ibid.*, 194–195.

564 *ibid.*, 204.

155. Authorities may help the population to overcome the stifling fear from the “*dread risk*”<sup>565</sup> of terrorism in the short term, by stirring up anger and outrage in the society, which provides a feeling of clarity and controllability.
156. Authorities need to create narratives that would allow reaping the activating energy of anger (created due to the violation of the personal sense of justice based on the suffering of the victims) and canalising it for a useful purpose e.g. when an all-society / community rally-around-the-flag effort is needed.

*Emotional Contagion / Social Influence Theory*

157. Authorities should be aware of the impact of observed emotional responses and utilise this knowledge about social emotional comparison in their crisis management and communication plan.
158. Authorities should establish access to and influence on relevant community groups and stakeholders, before an event and before the need for targeted emotional contagion of these groups arises. By achieving group resilience, authorities can manage individual resilience.
159. Authorities should monitor social platforms and relevant discussions with contagious emotional potential to get an earlier indication if an “emotion” is spreading that may activate the masses.
160. Authorities should showcase calm, confidence and control on all levels beyond what is being said and what is done in awareness that “*emotion[s] can [...] influence pre-attentive perceptual processes*.”<sup>566</sup>
161. Authorities must carefully consider their response to terrorist threats in words and action as these offer an interpretation of the threat and any connected events to the observing media and the public which they partly rely on to determine their own reaction.
162. Authorities should avoid “*inconsistent and often exaggerated reactions and appeals [...] [that] may augment the sense of danger and ensuing confusion*.”<sup>567</sup>
163. The authorities should deliver their message in a credible way that corresponds to held beliefs, in order to be able to guide the population’s thoughts and feelings.
164. Authorities may impede gatherings or demonstrations that want to disseminate opposing views that may lead to an adverse emotional contagion by encouraging the organisation of in situ counter protests or online through Facebook / Twitter shit storms by non-state actors.
165. Authorities should assure that their messaging is broad and wide-reaching, encompassing all stakeholders and groups, including survivors, to reach a critical amount of people, to have an impact on group resilience. Authorities should assure that people who have concerns or are anxious, are offered a place to go to deal with these feelings.
166. Authorities should be aware of the “*combinatory effect*”<sup>568</sup> of emotional contagion and provide a mood picture congruent with their messaging.

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565 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

566 Zadra and Clore 2011, 677.

567 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 211.

568 Barsade 2002, 679.

167. Authorities should make use of research and have available a toolbox that will allow them to actively create moods (including anger or desire for vengeance) which could have fear-cancelling effects when needed, instead of only responding to emotions evoked by terrorist events.

*Affiliation Theory*

168. Authorities should facilitate the creation of frameworks that allow victims of terrorist attacks and their families who are especially vulnerable, to come together to benefit from affiliation.
169. Authorities should support the establishment or support existing frameworks that allow first responders who are especially vulnerable, to come together to benefit from affiliation.
170. Authorities should consider when deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), that beyond the reception of necessary and actionable information that support coping, the majority of people may prefer distraction from the threat rather than continuous reminders.
171. Authorities should satisfy the need for cognitive clarity and reduce potential anxiety through accurate, timely, calm and transparent (as much as possible) information sharing.
172. Authorities should also make use of existing social and community structures and engage community leaders below the national level, to allow people to come together and find comfort in each other at the community level.
173. Authorities should facilitate opportunities for the people in the society to come together especially after an attack, as affiliation behaviour can help reduce anxiety in people and increase belonging (as it was done after the Attack on Charlie Hebdo).
174. Authorities should address children's need for cognitive clarity about the terrorism threat by providing the necessary information about the situation and explanations how the authorities are responding together with any information what the children themselves can do and address their questions.
175. Authorities should ensure that children are shielded from continuous exposure to messages without any new actionable information and rather be distracted and encouraged to continue to live their lives normally.

*Conservation of Resources Model*

176. Authorities must also consider compensation for losses endured, not necessarily due to terror attack, but already through a terror threat. For example, loss of income due to cancellations of events, based on intelligence assessments or on directly expressed threats that lead to the withdrawal of the authorities' permission to let the event start or continue.
177. Authorities should undertake all efforts to allow for a psychological closure and continuation of survivors' lives. It is important to those affected by an attack to see a fast trial and the punishment of the perpetrators (see *Just-World-BeliefsTheory* and *Robespierre Affect*). Until this has happened, their psychological well-being /resources may be impeded.
178. Authorities should ensure that psychological support and social support is provided to the survivors but also to their close family / mourning relatives affected by the attack, to allow them to continue their lives and routine as soon as possible.
179. Authorities should help to bring victims and their families (as soon as possible) into a state as close as possible to where they were before the attack happened, in order to allow them to continue their lives and close the terrorism chapter as soon as possible,

180. Authorities should provide sufficient funds in a timely fashion to pay for hospital costs, fund necessary operations, remodelling of the living spaces, if necessary, regular therapy and ongoing care to help to allow victims and their families to continue their lives. The financial obligations they previously fulfilled for themselves or dependents, need to be considered and covered.
181. Authorities should regularly conduct contingency planning exercises together with the providers of critical infrastructures and all stakeholders.
182. Businesses are an essential part of a vibrant and resilient community. If they are negatively impacted from an attack, the negative impacts on them are felt by multiple stakeholders. The authorities need to have these potential negative effects in mind when legislating, compensating and acting after an attack to try to minimize unnecessary hardship on businesses.
183. The authorities should encourage and support the business community to invest in their security (e.g. building security) and to work out business continuity plans in preparation for terror attacks, since businesses are an essential part of a vibrant and resilient community.
184. Authorities should conduct special contingency planning together with the critical infrastructure providers to reduce the potential social significance of the terrorism threat.
185. The authorities should educate and support the business community in what they can do to reduce the risk of attacks from happening at their site and how to reduce the impact of an attack if it happens, as businesses are an essential part of a vibrant and resilient community.
186. The authorities should focus on removing tangible and visible damages to infrastructure and ensuring its functionality as soon as possible after an attack.
187. Authorities should develop and apply a “*resource loss questionnaire*” as a “*quick screening tool [...] to identify high-risk individual[s]*” or groups to whom can then be administered the suitable level of care.<sup>569</sup>

*Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model*

188. Authorities should facilitate the establishment of an inclusive community dialogue that will allow communities to be sensitized and reassured of their inclusiveness before the need arises and help disperse divisive rumours or suspicions. This can counteract the potentially corrosive effect of a religiously or ethnically motivated attack on the feeling of community embeddedness and cohesion.
189. Authorities should assure that if help is made available, it needs to be distributed fairly – based on relative needs, not based on status. Otherwise, it could harm community cohesion which itself is an important mitigating factor for adverse psychological reaction in a post-disaster scenario.
190. Authorities should provide early and abundant informational support to the most affected that gives a clear pathway and transparency about the way forward.

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569 Hobfoll *et al.* 2006, 215.

191. Authorities should enable and support the fostering of sources of non-formal social support that help preserve the sense of togetherness and connectedness in victims. This social support should be broadly based and nourished from the community level (through support from social groups and societies, victim support groups, workplace etc.) and most importantly the individual level (through social support from friends, family and next of kin).
192. Authorities should facilitate the creation, accessibility and use of alternatives sources for social interaction, sharing and grieving in order to mitigate the consequences of the loss of previously existing “natural” sources of social support after the terrorist attack.
193. Authorities should provide early, abundant, and visible social support including availability of emotional support to victimized individuals,
194. Authorities must show compassion for the victims, officially acknowledge the victims’ suffering, and give proof of societal/national solidarity.
195. Authorities should provide early, abundant, and visible social support including the availability of medical support to victimized individuals, including disaster medicine, restorative medicine, recovery medicine and psychological support.
196. Authorities should provide early, abundant, and visible social support, including availability of financial support to victimized individuals that may cover access to emergency fund for serving urgent payments, adequate level of compensation, medical costs, injury compensation, loss of property compensation, loss of business compensation.
197. Authorities should provide early, abundant, and visible social support to “vaccinate” the victimised individuals with the belief that support will be available if needed in the future.





## 5. Chapter: Analysis and Conclusion

### 5.1. Introduction

This chapter aggregates and analyses the measures deduced in the previous chapter from the theories underlying the *Strategic Resilience* concept with the help of a spreadsheet calculation program. In a process of iterative cycles of filtering, classification and categorisation, the 197 micro- and mid-level *Strategic Resilience*-enhancing policy measures are subsumed under nine macro-level categories which, the work suggests, constitute the essential elements for building, strengthening and maintaining *Strategic Resilience* in an open, pluralist society. Based on these nine macro-level categories the chapter builds a comprehensive model that it proposes, can function as an organising- and analytical framework for building *Strategic Resilience*, thereby enabling open, pluralist societies to build muscle to repel and withstand or to bounce back from jihadi terrorist attacks. That model is used to deduce general recommendations for practical measures to be taken preventively before an attack, as an immediate response to an attack, and measures to help coping after an attack.

### 5.2. Identification and Categorisation of Measures

The analysis of the twelve scientific theories and concepts has allowed deducing a significant number of measures which could support the building, strengthening, protecting and re-establishing *Strategic Resilience* in an open society faced with a terrorist threat.

Depending on the purpose, the measures can be grouped into different categories for analysis. The measures may be grouped:

- By the objectives they are trying to achieve,
- By the stakeholders they address,
- By the state actors responsible for their execution or conduct,
- By the short-, mid- or long-term focus they take,
- By the specific type of challenges to address,

- By their reactive or proactive nature,
- By their effectiveness in the typical crisis cycle.

To select the most appropriate categories into which order to put the measures, the author decided to transfer the collected measures into an Excel file which through its filtering function, allows for selective analysis of the data.

- First, the 197 measures are transferred into an Excel file, sorted along the 12 *scientific models/ concepts and theories* the measures where stemming from.
- Each measure is then assigned to one of 41 categories that best describe the *type of action* each measure mandates.
- Each measure is then assigned to one *primary addressee* who is its foremost target. Nine different possible addressees across all measures were identified.
- Each measure is then appraised, based on its maximum effectiveness for the *timeline of a crisis* and each is assigned to one of the terrorist attack phases accordingly:
  - *Before*,
  - *During*,
  - *After*.

In iterative cycles of analysis, grouping and re-categorising the number of 41 categories describing the measure, was reduced to 23 categories.

- A new category is added to the list that defines whether a measure was primarily taken *BEFORE*, *DURING* or *AFTER* a terror attack? It is difficult in many cases to place a measure in just one time category, as some measures extend across two or all periods. Taking this possibility into account, the selections “*DURING / AFTER*” and *ALL THE TIME*” are added to the choice between *BEFORE*, *DURING* or *AFTER*.
- The number of primary addressees, who the measure is foremost targeting, is reduced to eight, as shown in alphabetical order in the table below.

Table 6: Overview of the primary addressees of the measures.<sup>570</sup>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>Business Owners,</i></li> <li>– <i>Community Leaders,</i></li> <li>– <i>First Responders,</i></li> <li>– <i>Law Enforcement,</i></li> <li>– <i>The Media,</i></li> <li>– <i>The Wider Community,</i></li> <li>– <i>Victims and Relatives,</i></li> <li>– <i>Vulnerable Groups.</i></li> </ul>
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- The 23 categories which so far had mostly described the actions resulting from the measures, were not as helpful as expected, not discrete and still too theory-focused. Through multiple iterations of assessment, the author was able to rearrange and further aggregate the measures to be more results-led and consequently reduced them to nine types shown in the table below.

Table 7: The different types of resilience-enhancing measures.<sup>571</sup>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>Coping Friendly Meaning Making,</i></li> <li>– <i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity,</i></li> <li>– <i>Management of Fear,</i></li> <li>– <i>Impact Prevention and Reduction,</i></li> <li>– <i>Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy,</i></li> <li>– <i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills,</i></li> <li>– <i>Limitation of Indirect (Psychological) Impact,</i></li> <li>– <i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion.</i></li> <li>– <i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected,</i></li> </ul>
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There may appear to be overlaps in the categories. But although any successful attempt to manage or reduce fear in the society or to provide an

<sup>570</sup> Author's own work.

<sup>571</sup> Author's own work.

effective coping-friendly meaning, will also support the emotion-focussed coping, there are distinct differences.

The differences are that “*Strengthening Individual Emotion-Focussed Coping skills*” and “*Raising Individual and Organisational Self-efficacy*” are enabling measures which should allow the individuals, after adoption of the particular skill, to self-reliantly change their state of mind, e.g. support their own coping from within. This is different to the other listed measures like the “*Management of Fear*”, “*Impact Prevention and Reduction*” or the “*Provision of Dedicated Support to Direct Affected*” which are supportive of citizens’ coping, but are not self-enabling per se.

Based on this new typification, the author is then able to formulate a concise list of only nine critical tasks which can guide any government who wishes to strengthen the *Strategic Resilience* of their open society against jihadi terrorism.

### 5.3. Nine Critical Tasks

#### One: Coping Friendly Meaning Making

Through the deliberate and seemingly random targeting of civilians, jihadi terrorists intend to create a feeling of senseless and of disproportionate suffering in the targeted *Western* societies. The psychological effect of the attacks is reinforced through their justification by terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the *West* as a just-response to wrongs done to the Muslim and/or Arab world in the past or present. Thereby the terrorists deliberately exploit held *Just-World-Beliefs* in *Western* societies, to break the will of these societies to defend themselves.

To counter this real and psychological warfare, authorities need to carefully choose their actions and their communication strategy, creating their own narrative. This requires the identification and analysis of the existing held *Global Meaning* (including the *Just-World-Beliefs*) in the society and the anticipation of the threat and an impact posed to the meaning by terrorism, and prophylactically proceeding to uncover and distil meaning and purpose from these threat scenarios. Having done that, these results should then be infused into the prevailing *Global Meaning*.

This amended narrative should establish a shared meaning and purpose in the society to ensure its defiance and unity in the face of the terrorist threat. This narrative needs to compellingly explain who the terrorists are

and what they are fighting for. It should further provide the population with a compelling meaning and purpose WHY they must endure the hardship and suffering which terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities.

The process of transforming held beliefs is usually a long-term process. But authorities should be prepared to use the opportunities opened through a traumatic event like a terror attack. Their effort should focus on weaving, sustaining and strengthening a defiant meaning-orientated narrative which will promote an attitudinal heroism towards the threat of death from terrorism. The nationalistic excitement usually evoked by a terror threat or act, can help prepared authorities to shift opinions and beliefs and to galvanize the cohesion of the society.

While the authorities may establish a sense in suffering in the population, they must also consider the population's need for justice or just-revenge after an attack to support their coping. Authorities must ensure their ability to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the *Just-World-Beliefs*, which may involve law enforcement, justice system, and health and social system.

Authorities should support the selection and weaving of different memories into a meaningful narrative which lets people find a sense in previous traumatic events in their lives and in their relationship to others, and allows them to re-write history – or rather the memory of it. This allows individuals as well as the society to turn moments of defeat into moments of triumphant defiance and of personal growth.

Whether established in the long-run or in the short-term, newly established meaning will require continuous care, even after it has been accepted. Authorities must consistently live up to the shared values and meaning they proclaim in their words and actions, and this must be aligned across the whole-of-government. The objective of the whole-of-government approach needs to establish a culture which provides “*a shared symbolic conception of reality that imputes order, predictability, significance, and permanence.*”<sup>572</sup>

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572 Greenberg *et al.* 1986, 206.

## Two: Ensure Cognitive Clarity

Providing informational support and assuring cognitive clarity in a society faced with a terrorism threat, is important for maintaining its *Strategic Resilience*. A relatively accurate description of a terrorist incident may only be given by that small amount of people directly affected by it. Those directly affected by an attack will still struggle to grasp and to precisely assess the overall threat situation and to draw accurate conclusions of their own. The rest of the population who were no direct witness to the attack, must form their opinion about the attack following the reporting of the social and mass media on the incident and the witnessed reactions of the authorities, as well as based on terrorist propaganda and official government statements. All this received information will be unconsciously interpreted, built on the person's held views and beliefs of the world. It is no surprise that uncertainty-induced anxiety and fear are frequently experienced emotions connected with terrorist incidents and threats.

By ensuring that the population is consistently provided with accurate, timely and relevant information, which is perceived to be credible, transparent and actionable, authorities may significantly reduce fear and uncertainty-induced anxiety from terrorism in the population, and thus may improve their self-help abilities in a crisis situation. This must be done conscious of the mass and social media impact and in consideration of the special communication needs of vulnerable groups.

## Three: Management of Fear

The fear of death caused by the “*dread risk*”<sup>573</sup> of terrorism can greatly challenge the normal functioning of individuals and may negatively impact their resilience before, during and after an incident. Through emotional contagion, social influence and media it also may undermine collective *Strategic Resilience*. Through the dynamic of a reciprocal threat perception, the collective fear may then even function as an incitement for more attacks. Managing this fear, reducing or eliminating it and preventing its spread, will help the sustainment of the *Strategic Resilience*. Government measures under this category are falling into four areas:

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573 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

1. Avoiding unwarranted fear reactions through prudent threat communication,
2. Provision of practical coping information,
3. Fear mitigation through psychological fear management techniques, social support and public reassurance measures,
4. Limiting the spread and impact of fear in collaboration with the social and mass media.

#### Four: Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy

The perceived self-efficacy of individuals or organisations to be able to cope effectively with a crisis situation is a core component for the creation of a *Strategic Resilience* of the society. Mastering this competency has a positive effect for the physical and emotional well-being of an individual or an organisation. But as a more general advantage, all individuals and organisations who are able to help themselves due to their acquired self-efficacy, may free up official emergency response capacity which then may be deployed otherwise. Strong self-efficacy may also help deter terrorist attacks by functioning as an effective *indirect-denial* of the objectives the terrorists aim to achieve through their attack as it reduces the potential coercive effect of these attacks on the population. In the eyes of the individual or organisations, the constituents of self-efficacy are context-dependent and overlapping. Therefore, authorities should support its coherent development, strengthening and confirmation.

#### Five: Impact Prevention and Reduction

*Strategic Resilience* of a society may be strengthened by the authorities preemptively denying anticipated malicious attacks from unfolding and from having a notable impact on the society. This covers *direct-denial* measures like target hardening and additional security presence by the authorities which make it hard for terrorists to conduct large-scale operations and which thereby reduce the perceived potential scale of an attack.

Such measures include the public communication on these (potential) actions. The aim is to show the low probability of such attacks being successful, to potential perpetrators as well as to the public. This also

includes the readiness and preparedness of effective and resilient crisis and emergency response capabilities.

As jihadis' target selection has been focusing on soft targets (such as random commuters, shoppers, concert goers, tourists), impact prevention also includes addressing the society and its critical stakeholders like providers of critical infrastructure and the private sector, if they were negatively impacted by an attack, it would be felt by the community as a whole. Impact prevention includes alerting these stakeholders and informing them about what they can do to reduce the risk of attacks from happening at their site and how to reduce the impact of a "successful" attack. It may further cover encouraging stakeholders to invest in their security (e.g. building security) and to prepare business continuity plans, including the creation of necessary redundancies in preparation for terror attacks.

Authorities should equally recognise and make use of the ordinary citizens as experts of everyday life and take them seriously, consciously integrating their skills into the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.<sup>574</sup> This may include the citizens' self-help and personal preparedness as well as community lay first responder schemes which will provide support to those requiring help in the "golden hour", directly after an attack and before professional responders arrive.

As the media would be an important conduit for presenting the impact of a terrorist attack to all who were not directly affected, they necessarily need to be included in impact prevention efforts in the preparatory phase.

#### Six: Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills

Developing the individual's proficiency to cope with negative emotions, is an important element in sustaining *Strategic Resilience* in the population, when faced with terrorist attacks. Emotion-focused coping skills enable an individual to achieve congruence between the *Situational Meaning* of an attack and his held *Global Meaning / Just-World-Beliefs* through their positive reframing and re-interpreting when necessary. Measures by the authorities which are supportive of individual emotion-focused coping skills stretch along a time continuum. They start in the short-term, i.e. with deliberately designed and carefully committed speech acts. In the long-term they require efforts to establish symbolic means for the positive

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574 See Giebel 2014, 370.



confirmation of individuals' personal world-view and their self-image. This includes responsible risk-communication and the promotion of an open culture of debate which will make individuals stay comfortable when being confronted with opposing information or opinions, without triggering fear or anger in them.

#### Seven: Limit Indirect (Psychological) Impact

The government measures under this category focus on the reduction of the indirect impact of an ongoing or recent attack on the society, both in the response and in the coping phase. The main attention is placed on those people who are affected indirectly by an attack. Their numbers are much higher than of those directly caught up in a terrorist incident. As terrorism is an act of communication which uses violence as a means to intimidate and coerce the population, limiting the communicative reach and impact of such an act can reduce its effectiveness. Counter-measures comprise the reduction of the visual and practical impact of an attack by the rapid removal of tangible and visible damages to the infrastructure and ensuring its operation as soon as possible, as well as managing the possible visual (psychological) impact distributed through the mass media and social media. To reduce the impact on those directly caught up and affected by an attack the categories of the prevention phase like problem-focused coping skills, emotion-focused coping skills as well as victim support and impact prevention and reduction will pay off during the response and coping phase.

#### Eight: Strengthen Societal Cohesion

Societal cohesion is a critical element for the *Strategic Resilience* of a society. Strong social bonds based on mutual trust in shared values and reciprocity, help a society to remain defiant against terrorism and produce a patriotic "we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment" during a crisis. Jihadi terrorists purposefully undertake various efforts to polarise and divide a society along ideological/religious lines. Through carefully targeted attacks and communication they aim to replace social trust with suspicion, and to achieve reciprocal co-radicalisation as a consequence of the thus generated moral outrage, pitting one group in the society against another. To be able to

withstand these forces and to bounce back from these attacks without further ascending the escalatory ladder, social bonds need to be strengthened before the need arises.

Authorities have a critical role as a facilitator who supports an inclusive community dialogue which will allow communities to be sensitized and to be reassured of their inclusiveness before the need arises, and to help disperse divisive rumours or suspicions. If the authorities give this role some substance, they can counteract the potentially corrosive effect of a religiously or ethnically motivated attack on the feeling of community embeddedness and cohesion. Through their example and policies authorities can facilitate the building up and the use of personal relations at the community level to overcome the in- versus outgroup set-up in a crisis and can promote exchanges and interactions across ethnic groups, in order to quench stereotypes and to build relationships before an incident happens.

Irrespective of whether an incident has been caused by a malign actor or by a natural disaster, strong social bonds and cohesion are important resources for a better community preparedness and crisis response. In a post-disaster scenario strong social cohesion is also identified as a positive factor for mitigating adverse psychological reactions and for promoting psychological well-being.

#### Nine: Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected

Providing victim support is a critical element in sustaining the *Strategic Resilience* of a society. By establishing and declaring generous and effective compensation and care policies which credibly promise to provide for all medical, material, financial, psychological and social needs of a possible victim to an attack, authorities can counter and substantially reduce the coercive effect of a terrorist threat to society.

Equally important are sources of non-governmental social support which help to preserve the sense of togetherness and connectedness in victims. This social support should be broadly based and nourished from the community level, and most importantly from the individual level.

To avoid compounding trauma and functional impairment after exposure to an attack, procedures for trauma intervention/therapy need to be established and monitored. This is especially important for front line staff, but equally for those who have been indirectly exposed or with previous trauma experiences. For direct victims the timely replacement of and com-

pensation for lost resources (material, social and psychological), based on confirmed relative needs and not just based on status, is most important. The objective should be to bring the victims back to a “status quo ante” the attack as close as possible. This strongly increases the chance for their recovery and successful coping.

Besides generous but fairly distributed victim support that acts as a tangible public acknowledgment of sacrifice and innocent suffering, bringing perpetrators to justice is an important duty of authorities that helps to sustain *Just-World-Beliefs* of the victims and society and may prevent victim blaming.<sup>575</sup>

When dealing with direct victims and their families, authorities should embrace the idea that the provision of meaning in a crisis is as important as material and social support. Authorities need to help the citizens to find meaning as these can endure the worst conditions if they can find a meaning in it. Dealing with those directly affected by terrorist attacks like first responders and direct victims and their families, the narrative poses a special challenge. These people require a compelling meaning and purpose beyond the general acceptance of life with risk, i.e. why they and their families must endure greater hardship due to the society’s conflict with terrorists, than the rest of the citizens.

#### 5.4. Priority Tasking in Different Crisis Phases


Based on the analysis of the 197 measures identified in the previous chapters, and cognisant of the three-phased crisis management model by Herrero and Pratt (1996)<sup>576</sup>, the author has defined three distinct phases of managing terrorist threats and the associated critical tasks, to aid governments in appropriately prioritizing their efforts.

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575 See Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 217.

576 See Herrero and Pratt 1996.

Figure 15: Number of resilience-enhancing aggregated government measures, identified during the three crisis phases of a terrorist attack, based on the analytical distillation process of the 197 measures, outlined in the previous chapter.<sup>577</sup>



Due to the different requirements of and in each phase, the importance of each of the individual nine critical tasks also varies in each phase, as shown in the figure above.

### The Mitigation and Preparedness Phase

Before an attack, the focus is on mitigation and preparedness. In the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase*, the focus is mostly on the wider population, with the media as a conduit. An emphasis is placed on reducing the number of those people who will become victims, who will rely on outside help, or who cannot help themselves due to the impact of a terrorist act. This is done by strengthening individual and collective resourcefulness and self-efficacy and by building up social-emotional capital and strong community and social bonds. A key component is assuring psychological preparedness of people by instilling a coping-friendly meaning and purpose in the society, faced with terrorist threat. This should be supported by efforts to eliminate fear-creating factors. Measures also include anticipating and mitigating the expected impact of an attack – and preventively limiting

<sup>577</sup> Author's own work.

the factors that would amplify or prolong the effect on the population. This is achieved by protecting critical infrastructure, improving business' security and continuity planning, by educating and training the citizenry to improve awareness and by mandating responsible media reporting.

### The Response Phase

In response to an attack, the focus lies on the elimination of the immediate threat and on limiting its negative effect through proactive crisis management and communication, following the successful elimination of the threat. During the *Response Phase* the focus is placed on supporting the population in coping with the situation. While authorities need to undertake all efforts to end an incident as soon as possible, it is equally important to inform and reassure the population about what is happening, what is the authority's response, and what the citizens can do themselves. Close liaison with the mass media is a critical element for achieving this. Those who cannot help themselves (vulnerable groups) need to be taken care of.

### The Recovery and Coping Phase


The third phase focusses on the reactive management of the consequences of the attack and on learning from the experience to be better prepared for the future. In the *Recovery and Coping Phase* resilience-enhancing measures therefore focus on the reactive management of the "fallout", mitigating the potential material, physical, social, psychological impact. This involves activating already preventively generated resources for those affected and supporting the meaning-making process – framing the attack, actively managing fear and anxiety in the society and bringing perpetrators to justice to allow for closure and the return of the society to a state similar to or better than before the attack.

## 5.5. Rings of Resilience Model

Combining the above findings, the author constructed a graphic model which offers a bird's-eye view of the complex system of the multiple inter-

related tasks needed to be completed by authorities during the different phases, to actualise the *Strategic Resilience* concept.

Figure 16: *Rings of Resilience Model*.<sup>578</sup>



Through its interlocked and seamless visual presentation of the tasks over time, the model makes it easily comprehensible that there is a necessity for whole-of-government-effort and for the involvement of agencies and the inclusion of stakeholders who might not usually deal with security topics.

By allowing to easily distinguish between the different phases and by proposing which respective tasks need to be prioritized at what time, the model instantly reveals the important role of mitigation and preparedness

578 Author's own work.

efforts in determining how well a society will be able cope with a terrorist attack. The importance of providing and preserving a coping-friendly meaning of ensuring continuous informational support and of an effective fear management is reflected by placing them at the centre of the model.

As fear and anxiety are the key levers terrorists utilise to make a society follow their demands, measuring and managing of fear in the population is required in all phases. It is important even before an attack happens. At all times, ensuring clarity of information through competent and trustworthy risk and crisis communication is important to maintain resilience in society, especially during the *Response Phase*.

Paying the same continuous attention to the shared coping-friendly meaning is a necessity. Authorities need to use the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase* to create a shared meaning, based on shared values which ensure a shared or common interpretation of the situation in the event of an attack. This established meaning may come under threat due to the potentially cataclysmic effect of an attack and of accompanying hostile psychological warfare measures. To safeguard the shared meaning, therefore requires continuous nurture and a flexible response during the *Response Period* before it will have to settle in and may have to be readjusted to assure adequate coping in the post-attack period.

Just the same as *Impact Reduction and Prevention* measures need to be put in place in advance to an attack, helping individuals in society to strengthen their individual emotional and practical skills to deal with the potential effect of an attack, needs to be part of *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase* before the need arises.

After an attack, the potential indirect psychological impact on those who are not directly affected, needs to be actively managed. For those directly affected by an attack it is critical to swiftly provide them with the necessary resources, with the main effort stretching over a long period in the *Recovery and Coping Phase*. To allow society to profit from societal cohesion in the aftermath of an attack, it is important to already have it developed and in place in the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase*, and that measures are prepared for the *Response* and *Recovery and Coping phase*.


## 5.6. Measures

Apart from helping to successfully identify and define the critical tasks, to allocate them to different crisis phases and combining them into a model,

the analytical distillation process of the 197 measures also allowed the author to propose concrete actions which underpin each of the tasks in each of the three phases.

The analysis found 80 measures which build or strengthen *Strategic Resilience* during the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase*, 30 measures which help sustaining resilience during the *Response Phase*, and another 92 measures which are most relevant for sustaining resilience in the *Recovery & Coping Phase*. These measures are unevenly distributed across the nine critical tasks, as shown in the graphic below.

Figure 17: *Weighing of resilience-enhancing government measures in the different phases in percent.*<sup>579</sup>



<sup>579</sup> Author's own work, based on the above assessment of the 197 measures.



5.6.1. Task and measures during the Mitigation and Preparedness Phase

Based on the assessment of the 197 measures, in the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase* before an attack, the following seven tasks which can strengthen *Strategic Resilience* in the society, should be prioritised by authorities:

- Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills,
- Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy,
- Impact Prevention and Reduction,
- Management of Fear,
- Coping-Friendly Meaning Making,
- Strengthen Societal Cohesion,
- Ensure Cognitive Clarity.

Figure 18: Shows the mix and number of resilience-enhancing aggregated measures available to authorities during the Mitigation and Preparedness Phase.<sup>580</sup>



Each of the seven tasks may be underpinned through aggregated measures: *Strengthen Emotion-Focussed Coping Skills* [7 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities should support citizens to improve their emotional-focused coping abilities to reduce the perceived impact of an attack.
- 2) Authorities can support the development of an increased general proficiency in society to cope with negative emotions, through long-term programs adapted to the target segments as part of curricula in schools, apprenticeship programs, university or driver’s licence training (to prevent road rage).
- 3) Authorities should address the problem of individuals’ aggression against people supporting opposing opinions, by ensuring that people are exposed early on to other views and learn how to cope with them.

580 Author’s own work.

- 4) Authorities should promote an open culture of debate to reduce the ignoring and rejection of threatening information and their senders. Authorities should establish a debating culture, based on the strength of rational arguments already in schools, and live it by example in politics.
- 5) Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions by establishing clear boundaries of no-violence early and continuously.
- 6) Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions, by trying to channel the aggression into a productive direction.
- 7) Authorities should establish symbolic means for confirmation or understanding of an individual's personal worldview and his self to reduce the perceived threat from opposing opinions and help society to develop other coping mechanisms.

*Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy[9 aggregated measures*

- 1) Authorities should support citizens to improve their problem-focussed coping abilities to reduce the perceived impact of an attack, and to reduce the social significance of a following shut-down of a critical infrastructure, by recognising the citizens as experts of everyday life and taking them seriously, consciously integrating their skills in the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.<sup>581</sup>
- 2) Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focussed coping abilities of the citizens through public service announcements, while being mindful of psychological pain connected with "negative" information.
- 3) Authorities should increase knowledge and awareness of first aid skills through rolling out "Public Days" like "First-Responder Days", more prominently and closely cooperating with local communities.
- 4) Authorities should consider scripting scenarios and adaptation of scenario-plays which can be shown in live shows in amusement parks, to increase awareness and to also help possible recruitment. These activities should be connected on different touchpoints, e.g. schools for maximum effectiveness.
- 5) Authorities should prepare content for schools which should allow even young people to be equipped with skills to be able to better respond, if a threat situation should arise.

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581 See Giebel 2014, 370.

- 6) Authorities should set up Infotainment-based facilities where families, groups and school classes can train and learn about the risks and practice the response in a playful manner. This may also help with recruitment and should be connected to activities on different touch-points, e.g. school for maximum effectiveness.
- 7) Authorities should undertake efforts to boost the self-help capability of individuals of practical coping with a threat. These efforts can comprise advice and training and should be supported.
  - a. Through emergency preparedness demonstrations and training,
  - b. Through life-saving / first aid demonstrations and training,
  - c. Through defibrillator use demonstrations and training,
  - d. Through security briefings, demonstrations and training,
  - e. Through training of (social) media literacy skills, to be able to better deal with information during crisis,
  - f. Through the establishment, training and guidance of self-help neighbourhood vigilance groups,
  - g. Through workplace business continuity planning and training,
  - h. Through conducting building evacuation exercises,
  - i. Through active shooter training,
  - j. Through self-defence, or terrorism awareness/vigilance training,
- 8) Authorities should incentivise brushing up first aid skills, for example:
  - a. By including first aid training into the school curricula which would allow even younger people to be equipped with skills to feel better able to respond in a threat situation. This could be done during a school trip, a project week or as part of other group activities.
  - b. By increasing the first aid training hours, required to receive the driver's licence,
  - c. By requiring drivers to come back into training and prove their abilities in first aid and rescue skills on a regular basis,
  - d. By reducing car taxes or fees for the driving test for citizens who maintain and prove their skill set,
  - e. By offering advantages to citizens who can show the right qualification (like certified first aid skills), by offering free access to community infrastructure like swimming pools or sports facilities, or preferred access to public housing or university accommodation,
  - f. By trying and offering new formats of training like "First Responder Parties" similar to "Tupperware Parties", where the training is held at home among friends.

- 9) Authorities must consider the individual threat perception of terrorism (influenced by demographic factors like gender, age, education and ethnicity), when trying to support the population in a resilient response. The authorities should ideally identify typical behavioural patterns (and preferences) during disasters and should address the groups accordingly.

*Impact Prevention and Reduction [11 aggregated measures]*

- 1) Business is an essential part of a vibrant and resilient community. If it is impaired by an attack, the negative impact on it is felt by multiple stakeholders. The authorities need to have these potential negative effects in mind when legislating, compensating and acting after an attack, and to try to minimize unnecessary hardships on business.
- 2) The authorities should educate and help the business community in understanding what they can do to reduce the risk of attacks from happening at their premises, and how to reduce the impact of an attack, if it happens.
- 3) The authorities should encourage and support the business community to invest in their security (e.g. building security) and to work out business continuity plans in preparation for terror attacks.
- 4) Critical infrastructure providers are an especially exposed part of the business community and need special attention.
- 5) Authorities should conduct special contingency-planning together with the critical infrastructure providers to reduce the potential (social) impact of the terrorist threat.
- 6) Authorities should request providers of critical infrastructure to build redundancies into their systems, to reduce the potential impact of the terrorist threat.
- 7) Authorities should regularly conduct contingency-planning exercises together with the providers of critical infrastructure and all stakeholders.
- 8) Authorities should remind the media that certain ways of reporting about terror attacks is making the terrorists' propaganda.
- 9) Authorities should speak with the media to discuss responsible reporting.
- 10) Authorities should consider regulating the showing of casualties from terrorist attacks in the media.
- 11) Through adopting *direct denial measures* law enforcement should make it hard for terrorists to conduct large-scale operations, especially

CBRN attacks and thereby should reduce the perceived potential scale of such attacks. Law enforcement agencies need to communicate their efforts and achievements and thereby put the probability of such attacks being successfully conducted, into perspective.

*Management of Fear [15 aggregated measures]*

- 1) Authorities should review their policies on the permissibility of online content in terms of what should be considered as *illegal incitement to violence*. The research shows that there are ways to create violent outrage through the media, which so far may not be covered by law.
- 2) Authorities should undertake the necessary research to identify the triggers (e.g. the style of media reporting, wording of government communication, type of terrorism footage) for emotions like fear or anger.
- 3) Authorities should regularly monitor the emotional state of the society.
- 4) Authorities should monitor online platforms and relevant discussions with contagious emotional potential, to get an early indication, if an “emotion” is spreading that may agitate the masses.
- 5) Authorities should establish access to and influence on relevant community groups and stakeholders before an event takes place and the need for emotional contagion of a targeted group arises.
- 6) Authorities should examine and distinguish the different effects of so-called “*negative emotions*” like fear, anger, grief, rage or loathing (which are likely to be evoked by terrorist attacks) on individuals’ risk perception (and their influence on their policy preferences).
- 7) Authorities should conduct more research on the psychological impact that the threat of terrorism alone has on individuals, in contrast to the well-researched impact of direct exposure to terrorism.
- 8) Authorities should take informed decisions on the appropriate action to reassure the population through other means than just words. Measures to reduce the threat perception in the society can come in many forms.
- 9) Authorities should examine the terror management function of non-basic complex emotions like nostalgia and develop tactics to utilise it.
- 10) Authorities should communicate about risk and reassure through “*adequate disaster planning and emergency response systems*”<sup>582</sup> to mitigate

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582 Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 30.

effects of existing memory of previous similar traumatic events. Such experiences may let the individual “*overestimate statistically small, but affectively potent risks*”<sup>583</sup>, like the “*dread risk*”<sup>584</sup> of becoming a victim of a terror attack, and make him emotionally respond to it accordingly.

- 11) Authorities should establish a compelling narrative which provides meaning and purpose to allow the individual to make sense of the potential threat and to expect better self-coping with any direct suffering and thereby to reduce the perceived threat to their psychological resources.
- 12) Authorities must carefully watch their communication style and question its purpose: Preparing society for potential attacks in the future to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*, is welcomed. But words need to be carefully chosen as the public’s dread of mass casualty terrorism is made worse through framing the nature of the threat as unpredictable, random and incalculable. Informing the public of vulnerabilities must also not be a simple exercise to try to pre-emptively deflect criticism from authorities for failure to prevent such an attack. Such a lack of confidence into the ability to protect the society may have worse effects on it. In all communications, the authorities must have the *Security Communication Vulnerability Paradox* in mind.
- 13) Through adopting *direct denial measures* law enforcement should make it hard for terrorists to conduct large-scale operations, especially CBRN attacks and thereby should reduce the perceived potential scale of such attacks. Law enforcement agencies need to communicate their efforts and achievements and thereby put the probability of such attacks being successfully conducted, into perspective.
- 14) Authorities must also communicate their ability to cope with the effects of such attacks through large-scale exercises, involving police and emergency services responders. This can also help to reduce the visual impact of an attack scenario in the future.
- 15) Authorities should prepare content for vulnerable groups in the society, for example young children, to be equipped with skills to be able to better respond, if a threat situation should arise.

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583 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 19–20.

584 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

*Coping-Friendly Meaning Making [10 aggregated measures]*

- 1) Authorities must help to create opportunities which allow citizens to personally grow and confirm their self-worth by contributing to something bigger than just themselves and thus experience meaning, higher purpose and belonging in order to defy fear of death.
- 2) Authorities need to instil a shared meaning and purpose in the society to help it maintain its defiance and unity in face of the terrorist threat.
- 3) This requires authorities to take a whole-of-government approach and a long- term focus in order to nudge the people's global beliefs about terrorist attacks towards a coping-friendly meaning which then provides "*a shared symbolic conception of reality that imputes order, predictability, significance, and permanence.*"<sup>585</sup>
- 4) Authorities need to clarify that life intrinsically is carrying risks (like terrorism), to reduce the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*.
- 5) Authorities should identify and analyse the existing held *Global Meaning* (including the *Just-World-Beliefs*) in the society and anticipate the threat and impact posed to the meaning by terrorism and should prophylactically proceed to uncover and distil meaning and purpose from these threat scenarios.
- 6) Authorities need to preview possible scenarios of threats to held *Just-World-Beliefs* and develop satisfying answers to the WHY (we must endure?) question which will be raised by the people, media, opposition as well as by the terrorist sympathisers. These answers should then be infused into the existing *Global Meaning*.
- 7) The authorities also have to anticipate and respond to efforts by jihadi terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the West to deliberately exploit upheld *Just-World-Beliefs* in Western societies, by portraying the open Western societies as the rightful recipient of attacks to right a wrong. Authorities need to recognise this as psychological warfare and must carefully choose their actions and their communication strategy consistently along their own narrative.
- 8) Accordingly, authorities should provide the population with a convincing meaning and purpose which explains who they are through their values and political choices, compared to who the terrorists are, what they are fighting for, and WHY the population must endure the hard-

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585 Greenberg *et al.* 1986, 206.

ship and suffering which terrorists may inflict on society and on each individual through their brutal killings and atrocities.

- 9) These efforts must go beyond classical crisis and security communication but have to happen through actions and legislation, be they financial, political, legal or otherwise.
- 10) As first responders are especially at risk, the sustaining of affirmative meaning and purpose in regard to why they and their families potentially must endure greater hardship in the conflict with terrorists than the rest of the citizens, are especially important.

*Ensure Cognitive Clarity [16 aggregated measures]*

- 1) Authorities should invest in good liaison with the media to be able to steer the information flow, if needed.
- 2) Authorities should make news networks and journalists aware through media guidelines or conversations which type of coverage is problematic because it may advance the terrorists' objectives.
- 3) Authorities should be prepared that during terrorist attacks on their citizens on foreign soil, they lose the home advantage with the media when competing with terrorists and other non-friendly actors for the media attention of the local population back home.
- 4) Authorities must consider the impact of the perception of the government's previous performance in handling other types of crises on the public's confidence level in the authorities' ability to prepare for / to deal with mitigating a coming terrorist attack.
- 5) Authorities should educate society that terrorism (footage) is propaganda, to reduce the visual impact of published material.
- 6) Authorities should make information palatable and select the sender carefully to overcome the disregard and rejection of threatening information and their originators.
- 7) Authorities should install a thoughtfully planned management of crisis communication in case of a terror incident which reflects the diversity of stakeholders with different interests.
- 8) Authorities must carefully watch their communication style and question its purpose: Preparing society for potential attacks in the future to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*, is welcome. But words need to be carefully chosen as the public's dread of mass casualty terrorism is made worse through framing the nature of the threat as unpredictable, random and incalculable. Informing the public of vulnerabilities must also not be a simple exercise to try to



pre-emptively deflect criticism from authorities for failure to prevent such a future attack. Such a lack of confidence into the ability to protect the society may have negative effects on the society. In all communication, the authorities must have the *Security Communication Vulnerability Paradox* in mind.

- 9) Authorities should ensure that in the communication with the public, the focus should be a risk-led rather than a vulnerability-led one, all the while the authorities need to plan also for the unlikely exploitation of specific vulnerabilities through “*high-end, low probability ‘super-terrorism threats’*”.<sup>586</sup>
- 10) Authorities need to fulfil society’s request for more security, but also to communicate the counter- concept of the uncertainty acceptance for the greatest impact. (*Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*)
- 11) Authorities should not simply assume that public service announcement (PSA) are heard or read before, during or after an attack – despite a sufficient reach of the chosen communication channels. The authors of the PSA need to consider which way, tone and time are most acceptable for the specific audience to receive and accept the information.
- 12) Authorities should adopt a risk-based approach that “*assesses an enemy’s intentions and capabilities*” instead of conducting a “*vulnerability-based analysis [that] identifies a weakness and hypothesizes a terrorist and a worst-case scenario*” that can lead to an atmosphere of fear and fatalism.<sup>587</sup>
- 13) Authorities should build trust through regular communication and contact with the population before a crisis situation arises. When the situation arises, the built-up trust and access allows for a better crisis management.
- 14) Authorities should effectively include the citizens in their security effort as every citizen is a communicator and should be able to contribute something to the goal of increasing security in the society.
- 15) A well-planned management of crisis communication should be in place which is especially considerate of the needs of vulnerable groups of the society during and after a terror incident.
- 16) Authorities should proactively manage strong emotions associated with previous terror attacks (such as anger, fear, disgust, etc.) and should

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<sup>586</sup> Gearson 2012, 171.

<sup>587</sup> Jenkins 2006, 5 ; See also Wilkinson 1986, 3.

provide for adequate meaning which will allow a healthy coping. This must encompass all members of the society. But authorities need to lay a special focus on vulnerable groups, people directly affected by an attack and their family and friends. Focus should also be on those indirectly affected which include children, the elderly, and women who, research shows, often find it harder to cope.

*Strengthen Societal Cohesion [12 measures]*

- 1) Authorities should establish access to and influence on relevant community groups and stakeholders before an event and the need for targeted emotional contagion arises. By achieving group resilience, authorities can manage individual resilience.
- 2) Authorities should facilitate the establishment of an inclusive community dialogue which will allow communities to be made sensitive and reassured of their inclusiveness before the need arises and will help disperse divisive rumours or suspicions. This can counteract the potentially corrosive effect of a religiously or ethnically motivated attack on the feeling of community's embeddedness and cohesion.
- 3) Authorities should deconstruct the prevailing concepts of justice and deservingness in the society when establishing the role of victims of terrorist attacks in society.
- 4) Authorities should as a preventive measure against potential resource loss, encourage development of social resources, through supporting and enabling the creating and strengthening of social bonds in sports and social clubs, societies, inter-generational projects, neighbourhood groups, other opportunities for volunteers, and in neighbourhood management.
- 5) Authorities should support societal bonding through social activities, like clubs and sports in a whole-of-government approach.
- 6) Authorities should support the creation and valuation of volunteering opportunities in a whole-of-government approach.
- 7) Authorities should develop an inclusive societal and community model which finds roles for everyone, in a whole-of-government approach.
- 8) Authorities should establish and strengthen inclusive community or neighbourhood management which will be a source of support in crisis and enhance problem-focussed coping.
- 9) Authorities should provide opportunity for affiliation and the development of close personal relationships.


- 10) Authorities should facilitate the building and the use of personal relations at the community level to overcome in- versus outgroup set-ups (e.g. through integrating all citizens into neighbourhood planning and management).
- 11) Authorities should promote exchanges and interactions across ethnicities to quench stereotypes and to build relationships before an incident, to overcome in- versus outgroup set-ups in a crisis.
- 12) Authorities should assure that terrorists are brandished as outlaws in society, to reduce sympathy and support for them.

5.6.2. Tasks and measures during the Response Phase

During the Response Phase, the following five critical tasks can strengthen the society’s *Strategic Resilience* to an attack and should be prioritised by authorities, based on the analysis of the 197 measures:

- *Ensure Cognitive Clarity,*
- *Coping-Friendly Meaning Making,*
- *Management of Fear,*
- *Impact Prevention and Reduction,*
- *Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected.*

Figure 19: Shows the mix and number of resilience-enhancing aggregated measures available to authorities during the Response Phase.<sup>588</sup>



Each of the five critical tasks may be underpinned through individual aggregated measures:

588 Author’s own work.

*Ensure Cognitive Clarity* [20 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities should go public as soon as possible and frame the incident and their response to it.
- 2) Authorities should work with the media to assure a continuous flow of information in the time of high alert and distress which can give the audience the feeling of participation in the unfolding news.
- 3) Authorities should effectively include the citizens in their security effort as every citizen is a communicator and should be able to contribute something useful to the goal of increasing security in the society.
- 4) Authorities should “*use the extraordinary public attention in order to get their message across, to demonstrate their composure, and to convince the citizens to keep their cool and to trust the authorities to do everything possible to protect and assist them.*”<sup>589</sup>
- 5) Authorities should “*communicate calmness, confidence, and an aura of control to a shell-shocked, fearful or impatient domestic public.*”<sup>590</sup>
- 6) Authorities should use their authoritative position to calm the public by managing the information and framing the situation through the media.
- 7) Authorities should be able to challenge the image of impotence and weakness conveyed by successful terrorist attacks, by reacting to the media’s “*need for information*”<sup>591</sup>.
- 8) Authorities should provide the media with a steady flow of information after a terrorist attack and should grant the media unrestricted access to an incident site, unless it could endanger the response efforts.
- 9) Authorities should prepare the appropriate frequency and tone of their communication, as the selection and volume of news “*affect how the public assesses the importance of problems and issues*”.<sup>592</sup>
- 10) Authorities should “*maintain their vantage point from which to frame and shape crisis information and construct the predominant story line.*”<sup>593</sup>
- 11) By making information palatable and selecting the sender carefully authorities can overcome the indifference to and rejection of threatening information and their senders.

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589 Nacos 2007, 204.

590 *ibid.*, 194–195.

591 *ibid.*, 200.

592 *ibid.*, 180.

593 *ibid.*, 200.

- 12) Authorities should consider different communication approaches depending on the target segment. Authorities also need to consider that vulnerable individuals may have a higher prevalence of avoidance behaviour.
- 13) Authorities should address children's need for cognitive clarity about the terrorism threat, by providing the necessary information about the situation and explanations how the authorities are responding. This should go together with any information on what the children themselves can do and should address their questions.
- 14) Authorities should regularly provide new information to the population during a crisis situation. The action of processing new information can reduce the audience's feeling of helplessness and senselessness, evoked by the attack, and can promote "*the feeling of doing something*"<sup>594</sup>, connecting them to something bigger, becoming part of a community tragedy.
- 15) Authorities should consider when deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), that beyond the reception of necessary and actionable information which supports coping, the majority of people may prefer distraction from the threat rather than continuous reminders.
- 16) Authorities (and the media) should avoid "*inconsistent and often exaggerated reactions and appeals [...] [that] may augment the sense of danger and ensuing confusion.*"<sup>595</sup>
- 17) Authorities should satisfy the "*need for cognitive clarity*" and should reduce potential anxiety through accurate, timely, calm and transparent (as much as possible) information sharing.
- 18) Authorities should show calm, confidence and control on all levels beyond of what is being said and what is being done, in the awareness that "*emotion[s] can [...] influence pre-attentive perceptual processes.*"<sup>596</sup>
- 19) Authorities should prosecute sources of fake news during the response phase.
- 20) Authorities should support the improvement of the problem-focussed coping abilities of the citizens through public service announcements, while being mindful of possible psychological pain, connected with "negative" information.

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594 *ibid.*, 59.

595 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 211.

596 Zadra and Clore 2011, 677.

*Coping-Friendly Meaning Making* [4 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities must ensure the ability to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the *Just-World-Beliefs*. This may involve law enforcement, the legal system, and the health and social systems.
- 2) Authorities should utilise their recognized authority to frame attacks in order to provide meaning and to encourage resolve, unity and defiance in the public.
- 3) Authorities should consistently live up to the shared values and meaning they proclaim in their words and actions and align across the whole-of-government.
- 4) Authorities should ensure that there is adequate support available to first responders/emergency personnel and their families during deployment and in case of injury (physical AND mental) or death.

*Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected* [1 measure]

- 1) Authorities should ensure that there is adequate support available to first responders/emergency personnel and their families during deployment and in case of injury (physical AND mental) or death.

*Management of Fear* [4 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities should be aware of the impact of observed emotional responses and utilise this knowledge for social emotional comparison in their crisis management and communication plan.
- 2) Authorities should show calm, confidence and control on all levels, beyond what is being said and done.
- 3) Authorities must carefully consider their response to terrorist threats in words and action as these offer an interpretation of the threat situation and any connected events to the watching media and the public which they partly rely on for their own interpretation and for their own reaction.
- 4) Authorities should consider when deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), that beyond the reception of necessary and actionable information which supports coping, the majority of people may prefer distraction from the threat rather than continuous reminders.

Impact Prevention and Reduction [1 measure]

- 1) Authorities should recognise the citizens as experts of everyday life and take them seriously, and should consciously integrate their skills into the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.<sup>597</sup>

5.6.3. Tasks and measures through the Recovery and Coping Phase

Based on the assessment of the 197 measures, the following seven tasks can strengthen *Strategic Resilience* in the society during the *Recovery and Coping Phase* in the aftermath of an attack and should therefore be prioritised by authorities in this period.

- Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected,
- Management of Fear,
- Ensure Cognitive Clarity,
- Coping-Friendly Meaning Making,
- Limit Indirect (Psychological) Impact,
- Strengthen Societal Cohesion,
- Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy.

Figure 20: Shows the mix and number of resilience-enhancing aggregated measures available to authorities during the Recovery and Coping Phase.<sup>598</sup>



Each of the seven critical tasks may be underpinned through individual aggregated measures:

Limit Indirect (Psychological) Impact [10 aggregated measures]

- Authorities should encourage the media to focus their reporting on victims and their plight instead of on the perpetrators.

<sup>597</sup> See Giebel 2014, 370.

<sup>598</sup> Author’s own work.

- Authorities should try to manage the visual (emotional) impact of an attack by providing the media with access to the site, and by asking them to carefully select the images.
- Authorities should provide the media with footage, so that they are not dependent on using terrorist sources.
- Authorities could consider partial temporary censorship specifically in the case of terrorist provided imagery, to reduce the (terrorist) intended visual impact of an attack.
- Authorities should cooperate with social networks to reduce the visual impact of an attack by for example, watermark images of attacks. Thus, marked images can be removed from social media.
- Authorities should request the media not to be descriptive in their reporting of gory details and to use as little emotion as possible.
- Authorities should prosecute sources of fake news.
- Authorities should focus on removing tangible and visible damages to infrastructure and ensuring its functionality as soon as possible after an attack.
- Authorities should make arrangements to visually conceal attack sites to reduce the visual impact of an attack.
- Authorities should make arrangements for the fast carrying out of the forensics to clear attack sites as soon as possible, in order to reduce the visual and practical impact of an attack.

*Management of Fear* [15 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities must carefully consider their response to terrorist threats in words and action. These offer an interpretation of the threat and any connected events to the observing media and the public which they partly rely on for their own interpretation and for their own reaction.
- 2) To help curb the effects of the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception, authorities should encourage the media to adopt ethical and socially responsible reporting practices that prevent the inflation of fear and stereotypes connected to terrorism, while still respecting editorial independence.
- 3) Authorities should cooperate with the media to assure that during a crisis the audience can see the familiar faces of “their” news anchors on the screen and hear the familiar voices on the radio who can provide a feeling of belonging to the audience and of some normalcy when they try to make sense of the new situation after an attack.



- 4) Authorities should support the media to provide formats in their program for dialogue where the audience is given the opportunity to participate in the public discourse, to discuss with experts, and/or to follow Q&A sessions.
- 5) The authorities should deliver their message in a credible way which corresponds to held beliefs, in order to be able to guide the population's thoughts and feelings.
- 6) Authorities should support emotion-focussed coping of citizens by taking congruent actions, including speech acts and through utilising the "*follow-the-leader-syndrome*" of the media.<sup>599</sup>
- 7) Authorities may also use the effects of emotional contagion and create large reunions offline or online. They may also instruct multipliers (like the media) and influencers in a way that will unconsciously affect the individual with a new interpretation of events.
- 8) Authorities may also try to prevent or obstruct gatherings which are out to disseminate opposing views that may lead to an adverse emotional contagion. This can be done offline through counter- protests or online through Facebook / Twitter "shitstorms", both conducted by non-state actors.
- 9) Authorities need to nurture the feeling of belonging and secureness in the societal and cultural setting and social framework which creates meaning and the perception of comprehensive order and predictability, to help people overcoming the fear of death (evoked by the terrorist threat).
- 10) Authorities should develop the ability to purposefully incite targeted public rage and anger which provide a personal feeling of clarity and controllability as a short-term remedy, to prevent a society to fall into fear and anxiety due to "*dread risk*"<sup>600</sup> of terrorism.
- 11) Authorities should make use of psychological research and have available a tool box which will allow them to actively create moods (including anger or desire for revenge) which could have fear-cancelling effects when needed, instead of only responding to uncontrolled emotions evoked by terrorist events.
- 12) After monitoring and understanding the emotional effects of terrorism on cognitive appraisal, authorities should shape their own messaging accordingly and should encourage the media to consider their mes-

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599 Nacos 2007, 106–107.

600 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

saging style such as to avoid placing unnecessary hardship on the society.

- 13) Authorities should facilitate opportunities for the people in the society to come together, especially after an attack. Affiliation behaviour, a feeling of togetherness, can help to reduce fear in people and increase belonging (as it was the case after the attack on the magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris).
- 14) The authorities should also make use of existing social and community structures and engage community leaders below the national level, to allow people to come together and find comfort in each other at the community level.
- 15) Authorities should consider how existing social structures, like NGOs, community groups, sports clubs, workplaces or other opportunities for congregation, can be used to purposefully “infect” individuals with the desired emotions through Emotional Comparison or Emotional Contagion, to help them coping with unfamiliar situations.

*Ensure Cognitive Clarity* [16 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities should provide the media with a steady flow of information during or right after a terrorist attack.
- 2) Authorities and the media should withstand the urge for the demonization or mystification of terrorists and thereby aggrandizing them which increases the fear factor. Terrorists should be treated and framed as criminals.
- 3) Authorities should avoid sweeping generalisation and abstract impersonal terms and categories like “international terrorism”. This may incorrectly compound connected, but discrete challenges into one large one. This would make the problem of terrorism appear even more complex and challenging, that would only play further into the hands of the terrorist when addressing the terrorism threat. Instead, the authorities have to make use of their ability to frame attacks in order to provide meaning and to encourage resolve, unity and defiance in the public.
- 4) Authorities should regularly provide new information to the population during a crisis. The action of processing new information can reduce the audience’s feeling of helplessness and senselessness, evoked

by the attack, and can promote “*the feeling of doing something*”<sup>601</sup>, connecting them to something bigger, becoming part of a community tragedy.

- 5) Authorities should satisfy the “*need for cognitive clarity*” and should reduce potential anxiety through accurate, timely, calm and transparent (as much as possible) information sharing.
- 6) Authorities should show calm, confidence and control on all levels beyond what is being said and what is being done in awareness that “*emotion[s] can [...] experceptual processes.*”<sup>602</sup>
- 7) Authorities should assure that their messaging is broad and wide-reaching, to encompass all stakeholders and groups including survivors, to reach a critical amount of people in order to have an impact on group resilience. Authorities should assure that people who have concerns or are anxious, have a place to go to deal with their feelings.
- 8) Authorities, in addition to communicating accurately, should give people the capacity to process and deal with the psychological pain connected with “negative” information.
- 9) Authorities need to avoid inconsistent or exaggerated reactions and appeals which help to “*augment the sense of danger and ensuing confusion.*”<sup>603</sup>
- 10) Authorities should effectively include the citizens in their security effort as every citizen is a communicator and should be able to contribute something useful to the goal of increasing security in the society.
- 11) Authorities should provide such early and abundant informational support to those most affected that it shows a clear pathway and transparency about the way forward.
- 12) Authorities should ensure that children are shielded from continuous exposure to messages without any new actionable information and that they rather be distracted and encouraged to continue to live their lives normally.
- 13) When deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), authorities should consider limiting themselves to necessary and actionable information about the situation and how the authorities are responding and what the citizens themselves can do. Further continuous reminders about terrorist

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601 Nacos 2007, 59.

602 Zadra and Clore 2011, 677.

603 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 211.

threats are likely to increase the recipients' level of anxiety, especially if they have existing memory of previous similar events.

- 14) Authorities should consider different communication approaches, depending on the target segment. Authorities also need to consider that vulnerable individuals may have a higher prevalence of avoidance behaviour.
- 15) Authorities should provide the population with a compelling meaning and purpose WHY they must endure the hardship and suffering which terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities. Authorities should therefore be able to communicate a compelling narrative who the terrorists are and what they are fighting for.
- 16) Authorities must consider the individual threat perception about terrorism (influenced by demographic factors like gender, age, education and ethnicity) when trying to support the population in a resilient response. The authorities should ideally identify typical behavioural patterns (and preferences) during disasters and should address the groups accordingly.

*Coping-Friendly Meaning Making* [13 measures]

- 1) Authorities should not underestimate the population's need for justice or just revenge after an attack to support their coping. They must find ways to satisfy these feelings.
- 2) Authorities should prepare for and use the opportunities opened through a traumatic event like a terror attack, to shift opinions /global beliefs and galvanize the cohesion of the society.
- 3) Authorities should undertake efforts to develop consensus in society on what heroism entails to utilize the nationalistic excitement usually evoked by a terror threat, and nudge/ channel the passion and effort into a productive direction.
- 4) Authorities should embrace the notion that in a crisis the provision of meaning is more important than material and social support. Authorities need to help the citizens to find meaning as people can endure the worst conditions if they can find a meaning in it.
- 5) Authorities must ensure the ability to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the *Just-World-Beliefs*. This may involve law enforcement, the legal system, and the health and social systems.
- 6) Authorities should support citizens to find compelling meaning and purpose, why they must potentially endure the hardship and suffering

which terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities.

- 7) Authorities should focus their effort on weaving, sustaining and strengthening a defiant meaning-orientated narrative which will support attitudinal heroism towards the threat of death from terrorism.
- 8) Authorities should consistently live up to the shared values and meaning they proclaim in their words and actions and have them aligned across the whole-of-government.
- 9) Authorities should respect that the process of transforming held *Situational Meaning* and/or *Global Meaning* may be a longer or shorter-term process. But it will require continuous care, even after a new meaning has been accepted.
- 10) Authorities need to create narratives that would allow reaping the activating energy of anger (created due to the violation of the personal sense of justice, based on the suffering of the victims) and channelling it into a useful purpose, e.g. when an all-society / community rally-around-the-flag effort is needed.
- 11) Authorities should support victims to adopt a new meaning orientation with a focus on the future, on a purpose which will be fulfilled in the future.
- 12) Authorities should support the selection and weaving of different memories into a meaningful narrative which lets people make sense of previous traumatic events in their lives and their connection to others and allowing them to re-write history – or rather the memory of it. This permits individuals as well as the society, to turn moments of defeat into moments of triumphant defiance and personal growth.
- 13) Authorities should provide the population with a compelling meaning and purpose WHY they must endure the hardship and suffering terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities. Authorities should therefore be able to communicate a compelling narrative who the terrorists are and what they are fighting for.

#### *Strengthen Societal Cohesion* [9 measures]

- 1) To reduce the level of deviation authorities should fight jihadi terrorist narrative by – getting Muslim scholars to condemn them.
- 2) Authorities and the press should foresee the possibilities of terrorists or other non-government actors to polarise society through targeted communication to create moral outrage and should prepare for it by carefully balancing their reporting. The press and media need to be

alerted not to accept self-defeating narratives from terrorists who blame the West.

- 3) Authorities should support the media to allow them to positively influence the audience's emotional response to an attack, by being a source of "*civic spirit, unity and patriotism*" and by promoting a "*we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment*" during a crisis.<sup>604</sup>
- 4) Authorities should assure that if help is made available, it needs to be distributed fairly – based on relative needs, not based on status. Otherwise, it could harm community cohesion which in itself is an important mitigating factor for adverse psychological reaction in a post-disaster scenario.
- 5) Authorities should encourage and support the media to provide a platform for "*collective sadness and shared encouragement*"<sup>605</sup> by sensitively featuring the victims, their story and grief.
- 6) Authorities should undertake efforts to develop consensus in society on what heroism entails, to utilize the nationalistic excitement usually evoked by a terror threat, and nudge/ channel the passion and effort into a productive direction.
- 7) The authorities should also make use of existing social and community structures and engage community leaders below the national level, to allow people to come together and find comfort in each other at the community level.
- 8) Authorities need to nurture the feeling of belonging and secureness in the used to societal and cultural setting and social framework. This creates meaning and the perception of comprehensive order and predictability to help people overcoming the fear of death (evoked by the terrorism threat).
- 9) Authorities should ensure an adequate level in victim compensation as a tangible and visible public acknowledgement of sacrifice and innocent suffering. To avoid victim blaming, authorities should prepare and steer any necessary public discourse about the amount or about the legitimacy of compensation to terrorist victims early and with conviction.

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604 Nacos 2007, 59–60.

605 *ibid.*

*Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy* [1 measures]

- 1) Authorities should recognise the citizens as experts of everyday life and take them seriously, consciously integrating their skills in the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.<sup>606</sup>

*Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected* [28 measures]

- 1) Authorities should help to bring victims and their families into a state as close as possible to where they were before the attack happened. This should allow them to continue their lives and to close the chapter on terrorism as soon as possible.
- 2) To start with, authorities should provide early and abundant informational support to the most affected that shows a clear pathway and transparency about the way forward.

>Social resources

- 3) Authorities should provide early, abundant and visible social support to “vaccinate” the victimised individuals with the belief that support will be available, if needed in the future.
- 4) Authorities should ensure an adequate level in victim compensation as a tangible and visible public acknowledgement of sacrifice and innocent suffering.
- 5) To avoid victim blaming, authorities should prepare and steer any necessary public discourse about the amount or of the legitimacy of compensation of terrorism victims early and with conviction.
- 6) Authorities should ostracise and where necessary prosecute transgressions in the press or social media, attacking victims or their families.
- 7) Authorities should prevent isolation and blaming of victims by preventively connecting their fate and sacrifice through discourse with the fate of the nation, city, town, community etc.
- 8) Authorities should not hold back in acknowledging the sacrifice of those carrying the burden /most affected by terror attacks.
- 9) Authorities should support the establishment of or support existing frameworks which allow first responders who are especially vulnerable, to come together and to benefit from affiliation.

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606 See Giebel 2014, 370.

- 10) Authorities should, as a responsive measure, provide opportunities (and promote them) for affiliation. The need for it is a natural reaction after the loss of social resources.
- 11) Authorities should enable and support the fostering of sources of non-formal social support which help preserve the sense of togetherness and connectedness in victims. This social support should be broad-based and nourished from the community level (through support from social groups and associations, victim support groups, workplace etc.), and most importantly the individual level (through social support from friends, family and next of kin).
- 12) Authorities should facilitate the creation, the accessibility and the use of alternatives sources for social interaction, sharing and grieving in order to mitigate the consequences from the loss of previously existing “natural” sources of social support, after the terrorist attack.
- 13) Authorities should consider the particular needs of direct victims and indirect victims concerning the re-building of close personal relationships and of a focus on the in-group.
- 14) Authorities should facilitate the creation of frameworks which allow victims of terrorist attacks and their families who are especially vulnerable, to come together to benefit from affiliation.
- 15) The community should support victims in such a way that they discover the remaining good in suffering and should encourage them to actively pursue the newly found possibilities of meaning in the suffering.

>Medical resources

- 16) Authorities should provide early, abundant and visible social support, including the availability of medical support to victimized individuals:
  - i. Disaster medicine,
  - ii. Restorative medicine,
  - iii. Recovery medicine,
  - iv. Psychological support.

>Psychological resources

- 17) Authorities should provide early, abundant and visible psychological support, including:
  - i. Availability of emotional support to victimized individuals,
  - ii. Showing compassion for the victims,



- iii. Acknowledgement of their suffering by high-ranking representatives of the state,
  - iv. Societal/national display of solidarity by blood donation actions.
- 18) Authorities need to establish and monitor procedures for trauma intervention/therapy after exposure to an attack, to avoid compounding trauma and functional impairment. This is especially important for “front- line staff”, but equally for those indirectly exposed or for those who had experienced a previous trauma.
  - 19) Authorities should offer support in the aftermath of an attack in retrospective “sensemaking” through communicative intervention measures which enable the recovery of personal control and the replenishment of lost resources.
  - 20) Authorities should develop and apply a “*resource loss questionnaire*” as a “*quick screening tool [...] to identify high-risk individual[s]*” or groups to whom can then be administered the suitable level of care.<sup>607</sup>
  - 21) Authorities should undertake all efforts to allow survivors for a psychological closure and continuation of their lives. It is important to those affected by an attack to see a fast trial and the punishment of the perpetrators (see *Just-World-Beliefs Theory* and *Robespierre Affect*). Until this happens, their psychological well-being /resources may be impeded.
  - 22) Authorities should support the ability of litigating by affected victims for financial compensation from the perpetrators or involved third parties, e.g. for terror financing, support etc. to serve the people’s need for justice.
  - 23) Authorities should not underestimate the population’s need for justice or just revenge after an attack, to support their coping.
  - 24) Authorities should ensure that psychological support and social support are provided to the survivors, but also to their close family / mourning relatives affected by the attack, to allow them to continue with their lives and routines as soon as possible.

>Financial resources

- 25) Authorities should provide sufficient funds in a timely fashion to pay for hospital costs, to fund necessary operations, for remodelling of the housing, if necessary, for regular therapy and for ongoing care to help victims and their families to continue with their lives. The financial

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607 Hobfoll *et al.* 2006, 215.

obligations they previously fulfilled for themselves, or their dependents need to be considered and covered.

- 26) “Authorities should provide early, abundant and visible social support including availability of financial support to victimized individuals:
  - i. Access to emergency fund for serving urgent financial obligations,
  - ii. Adequate level of compensation,
  - iii. Medical costs,
  - iv. Injury compensation,
  - v. Loss of property compensation,
  - vi. Loss of business compensation.
- 27) Authorities should put in place generous compensation policies for material losses, suffered in or as a consequence of an attack. This must include personal and business losses (considering a large prevalence of small and medium-sized businesses in Germany), for example because of destroyed or cordoned-off premises.
- 28) Authorities must also consider compensation for losses endured not necessarily due to terror attack, but through a terror threat.<sup>608</sup>

The identified measures underpinning each task in each phase have been dissected to provide a better understanding of the model’s sources, and to be used as a trove of examples for direct action to accomplish the nine critical tasks. The effectiveness and acceptability of individual measures identified here may vary, based on different circumstances in each country. The measures should therefore be seen only as secondary guidance in comparison to the *Rings of Resilience Model*.

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608 For example, loss of income due to cancellations of events (e.g. carnival processions in Braunschweig 2015, Rock am Ring concert 2017), based on intelligence or directly expressed threats which lead to the withdrawal of the authorities’ permission to let the event start or continue.

## 6. Chapter: First Case – The United Kingdom

### 6.1. Introduction

To test the relevance and validity of the *Rings of Resilience Model* proposed in the previous chapter's conclusion, this work adopts a positivist deductive case study approach as posited by Yin (2001)<sup>609</sup> examining and comparing the counter-terrorism policies and programmes enacted to counter *jihadi* terrorism threat in two different countries. Both countries assessed, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Singapore who have a reputation for their resilience- focussed-counter-terrorism approach, are otherwise dissimilar cases, on two extremes on the spectrum of parliamentary democracies.

Utilising a holistic multiple-case replication design as described by Yin (2001),<sup>610</sup> the new theory is tested by analysing two individual cases for convergent evidence as if they were a whole study in their own right.

This chapter first analyses in detail the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategies for the necessary context before assessing the deployed programmes against the nine variables established in the new *Strategic Resilience* framework individually.<sup>611</sup>

The same process is followed for the analysis of Singapore in the subsequent chapter.

### 6.2. The United Kingdom's Approach to Counter-Terrorism

The UK's current "Counter-Terrorism Strategy" *CONTEST* was formed from the lessons of 9/11 and the 2004 Madrid bombing, which showed to the Europeans and the British in particular, that they were not immune against suicide attacks.<sup>612</sup> Since its public release in 2006 under this name, the strategy has undergone multiple reviews and has seen several updates (latest in 2018) to reflect developments in terrorist methodology, especially

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609 Yin, 2001, 49–51.

610 See Yin 2001, 48–49.

611 See Yin, 2001, 13.

612 See Hewitt 2008, 98.

after the “7/7” attacks in London. But its key focus and its constituting components have remained the same.

The declared aim of the counter-terrorism strategy is “*to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.*”<sup>613</sup>

To achieve this objective *CONTEST* has since its inception, taken a multi-faceted approach to the terror threat. This approach consists of four strands:

- *PREVENT* – focusses on identifying and reducing the risk of radicalisation and addressing the supportive factors of discrimination and inequality,
- *PURSUE* – focusses on the disruption of terrorist plots through intelligence and law enforcement measures,
- *PROTECT* – focusses on identifying and reducing the vulnerabilities,
- *PREPARE* – focusses on increasing the ability to respond to and recover from an attack.<sup>614</sup>

The Government’s approach is two-fold: On the one hand, to try to fulfil society’s request for more security but on the other, also to communicate the countering concept of the uncertainty-acceptance, to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* where the held beliefs of an individual about his own safety and security are shattered by an attack that breaches his imagined security barrier.<sup>615</sup>

This choice of a strategically resilient response to the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* becomes especially clear in the inclusion of the *PREPARE* strand which presupposes that the complete elimination of the risk from terror is not possible, and prepares for mitigating its effects.<sup>616</sup> This choice is deliberately made and communicated by the Government, as underlined in the foreword by the Home Secretary, Rt Hon. Sajid Javid MP to the 2018 *CONTEST*: “*The stark reality is that it will never be possible to stop every attack. We do not live in a surveillance state and nor do we want to.*”<sup>617</sup>

The understanding that it is necessary to include the population in the counter-terrorism effort, has been developed over decades: The more

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613 HM Government 2018, 13.

614 See Hewitt 2008, 98–99 ; See HM Government 2018, 8.

615 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 91 ; See Gearson 2012, 191.

616 Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

617 HM Government 2018, 5.

passive concept of coping in heroic-calmness in face of a looming threat “*Keep Calm and Carry-On*”, first famously coined in World War Two, has extended to the different strands of counter-terrorism:

During the years of the “*the troubles*” in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998, the population was asked for participation in the *preventive* efforts through vigilance in view of potential hidden bombs. Businesses were primed to actively monitor their customers for suspicious purchases of potential ingredients for explosives. In the same way, staff at grocery stores or other crowded premises was also asked to take *protective* measures and to be on the lookout for individuals who may try to plant a bomb on their premises, to create death, panic, and confusion in the population.<sup>618</sup>

As a result of the shift of the *Irish Republican Army* (IRA) from targeting law enforcement-related targets to attacking general and critical infrastructure, the authorities undertook large efforts “*to identify over 400 vulnerable areas and work with people in this field to improve security through training and providing expert advice, including contingency plans designed by the Home Office.*”<sup>619</sup>

Faced with new methods of attacks different from those of the IRA, i.e. after 9/11, the “7/7” London bombings in 2005 or the Mumbai and Paris attacks of 2015, the risk assessment for the population was also continually updated, and the counter-terrorism concepts were upgraded.<sup>620</sup>

The first suicide attacks on British soil, committed by British citizens in London on 7/7/2005 had a strong impact on the perception of the terrorism threat to the UK and led to permanent changes, including the introduction of major updates to the terrorism legislation.<sup>621</sup> In the eyes of the authorities, it also underlined the importance of social resilience and preparedness.<sup>622</sup>

Following the Manchester Terror attacks in 2017, the British Counter-Terrorism Police concluded that their delivery of protective security measures alone, were insufficient to address the threat from terrorism the UK was facing and that they needed to encourage the public, especially the business community to be more engaged and interested in their own secur-

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618 See Hewitt 2008, 95.

619 *ibid.*, 94–95.

620 See Harris 2016 ; See Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017.

621 See Hall 2020 ; See Honeywood 2016.

622 Harris 2016.

ity and to become stronger co-creators of security<sup>623</sup> or as Neil Basu, the National Lead for Counter-Terror Policing in the United Kingdom, put it:

*“The public including the business community have to be encouraged to be more interested in their own security. [...] As well as every cop becoming a counter- terrorism cop, we need every citizen to be a counter-terrorism citizen and [...] every responsible business also needs to be a counter-terrorism business”.*<sup>624</sup>

This conclusion has been included in the “*PROTECT & PREPARE*” strands of the 2018 Counter-Terrorism Strategy which is based on six beliefs.<sup>625</sup>

- *An isolated law enforcement effort alone is not enough to counter the terrorism threat.* A complex and developing threat environment requires a comprehensive approach from government and the inclusion of the civil society. Civil society should not be seen as a burden, but as an asset, a partner in the effort to fight terrorism. This requires a cooperative approach with consequences for information sharing, community relationships, policing, solidarity, the role of self-help capabilities, personal responsibility, and for trust.
- *Fighting terrorism is a protracted conflict that requires the ability to sustain a functioning “home front”.* To sustain the morale at the *home front*, authorities need to infuse the population with a shared meaning of the conflict, gain their trust in the effectiveness of prescribed measures and policy direction, show progress, meet minimum security needs and provide help in the response and coping.
- *Assuring business continuity is active counter-terrorism policy.* As terrorists are ultimately trying to target the civil society through their deeds, protecting businesses, as a major organising element and provider of essential services to the civil society, is necessary. By enabling and assuring a necessary level of preparedness of the business community, authorities can reduce the direct and indirect effect of attacks and can speed up the resumption of services after an attack. To be truly effective, closer cooperation with the business community, building trust through listening to and considering their needs, as well as information sharing are absolutely vital.

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623 See Basu 2018.

624 *ibid.*

625 See HM Government 2018.

- *The infrastructure of an open society like the UK is vulnerable to attack.* While tremendous efforts can be undertaken to reduce the exposure of key installations like nuclear power plants and airports to potential attacks, hundreds of other potential infrastructure targets exist that cannot be secured in advance at a reasonable cost. Therefore, resilience to attacks and the ability to resume the provided service as soon as possible after an attack or to replace the services, need to be planned and prepared for in cooperation with all stakeholders.
- *The new type of marauding terrorist firearms or sharp-blade attacks in combination with vehicles attacks are difficult to prevent.* The response requires a multi-leg approach including the interdiction of firearms at the border, effective legislation against the ownership and carrying of such weapons, increased controls in the street, risk awareness training for truck/vehicle owners / rental companies and the mental and practical preparation of citizens for such methods of attack, to be able to properly deal with them.
- *Effective counter-terrorism legislation is necessary.* It must develop as the threat evolves, must serve the resilience objectives and take into account the citizens' perception of fairness and proportionality.

On the following pages, the author will analyse these different measures and programs under the *PROTECT & PREPARE* strands, currently enacted in the UK, for their impact on *Strategic Resilience*. Only unclassified open-source material is considered.

To provide a picture as comprehensive as possible, also measures and programmes which have only recently been introduced or have only just been announced, will be assessed against resilience-building factors identified in Chapter Four, based on the information which is available at the time of writing.

### 6.2.1. ACT: Action Counters Terrorism

#### Identify and Respond to Suspicious Behaviour or Items

*ACT: Action Counters Terrorism* is the name of the shared campaign platform used by UK Counter-Terror Policing (UKCTP) which brings together “all counter-terrorism communications under a single overarching brand.”<sup>626</sup>

As part of the *PROTECT* and *PREPARE* strand of *CONTEST*, it is aiming to improve the ability of members of the public to:

- Identify (a) and respond (b) to suspicious behaviour,
- Identify (a) and deal (b) with suspicious items,
- React to firearms or weapons attacks.

Through its different *ACT* activities, under the heading “communities defeat terrorism campaign”, *UKCTP* aims to raise the population’s vigilance, to enable the spotting of – and to encourage the reporting of suspicious behaviour and activity in their neighborhood or workplace, in order to help the security services tackle the terrorism threat. “*ACT includes branding, a [...] [dedicated] website on the Gov.UK portal, two podcasts available across a number of formats, posters [...] and films.*”<sup>627</sup>

While the *ACT* campaign is customised to target context-specific audiences (e.g. youth, holidaymakers, football fans etc.) with context-specific messages, the underlying objectives are identical and built on qualitative and quantitative research, conducted beforehand to explore how *UKCTP* could achieve its communications objectives, and what reasons had hindered more reporting by the public.<sup>628</sup>

As a result, the following proposals came out:

- “Increase knowledge of what to look for,
- Emphasise that reporting without a clear link to terrorism is OK,
- Provide reassurances around anonymity and fair treatment by Police,
- Normalise reporting,
- Leverage collective responsibility and empowerment to prevent an attack,
- Make reporting frictionless,

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626 MEDIACOM 2017, 2 ; See James 2017.

627 *ibid.*

628 See MEDIACOM 2017, 2.



- Tap into online as a widely used source of information,
- Ensure a clear and consistent call to action.”<sup>629</sup>

According to reports from the *National Counter Terrorism Security Office*, “over a fifth of public reports to the Anti-Terrorist Hotline and online through *Gov.Uk/ACT*, result in useful intelligence for CT officers.”<sup>630</sup>

Figure 21: Screenshot from “Life Has No Rewind Button” /ACT cinema campaign running for eight weeks in UK cinemas “to deliver [...] messaging with fewer distractions, more impact, and to more hard-to-reach audiences such as young people.”<sup>631</sup>



The other side of *ACT* focuses on improving the public's preparedness in case that they are caught up in an attack. At an official terrorism threat level of *SEVERE* which means that an attack is highly likely at any time, the *ACT* campaign shows different features which help strengthening the *Strategic Resilience* of the country. It puts the citizens in the driver's seat to decide about their own destiny and that of their community, allowing them to contribute to something bigger than themselves.

The campaign provides informational support and builds up problem-focused coping skills which give certainty to individuals of how to behave

629 *ibid.*, 5.

630 *National Counter Terrorism Security Office* 2019b.

631 *ibid.*

when faced with suspicious situations, and thereby also shows them a way how to deal with the overall threat.

For the individual following this behavioral guidance, the campaign promises to reduce (the potential) impact of the terror threat. In its messaging “*Communities Defeat Terrorism*” and “*Together we got it covered*”, the campaign also tries to reconfirm and strengthen societal cohesion. The media campaigns are only a small part of the *UKCTP* efforts to engage the public and business community. It is flanked by direct engagement efforts. The most prominent of them is *Project Servator*.<sup>632</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the ACT campaign that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should utilise targeted public service announcement to increase vigilance and preparedness of society towards threat to society.
- Authorities should inform citizens about the threats and risks, while providing practical behavioural guidance on what citizens can do.
- Authorities should explain the responsibility of each citizen for the safety and security of the community.
- Authorities should reduce citizens’ reluctance to act in a suspicious situation, by addressing potential objections, and stress the significance of individual action for the overall community.

ACT – Action Counters Terrorism	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

632 See chapter 6.2.3. Project Servator.

### 6.2.2. ACT: RUN, HIDE, TELL – How to respond to a Firearms or Weapons Attack

ACT is not only concerned with protective measures and vigilance, but also with the necessary preparations to assure that citizens and businesses know how to react if an attack should occur. The guidance given has been strongly shaped by the shift in terrorist attack patterns in the UK in recent times, especially the so-called *Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks* (MTFA), *bladed weapons-* and *Vehicle As a Weapon* (VAW) attacks.<sup>633</sup>

*Run Hide Tell* is a public UK Counter Terrorism Policing campaign (under the ACT- *Action Counters Terrorism* umbrella) which provides straight-forward guidance to members of the public on how to behave in case that they are caught-up in a knife or firearms attack in a crowded environment. The core message is to RUN, HIDE and TELL.

Figure 22: Campaign leaflet with core advice “RUN. HIDE. TELL.”<sup>634</sup>



633 See Harris 2016.

634 Image taken from Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters 2015.

The message is delivered to the general public through different means including campaign poster (see Figure 22) and sophisticated short films<sup>635</sup> which show the correct behaviour for individuals caught up in an attack and provides clear behavioural guidance under different circumstances. Authorities at first, were reluctant to start a communication about low probability – high impact events like terrorism because they were afraid of sounding alarmist.<sup>636</sup> But the increasing death toll from the mentioned shift in methods of attack by terrorist groups, made it necessary to expand the previous messages promoting just vigilance, to the preparation of advice.

Contrary to general belief “*organisations tasked with communicating about terrorism, and (promoting) the need for public vigilance, often find that they struggle to get the public engaged enough*”.<sup>637</sup> Accordingly, the message of the RUN, HIDE, TELL campaign is spread further through multiple channels – be they digital, social, print, through posters, flyers and cooperation with industry.

To reach its audiences the campaign’s message is adapted to the specific target segments, e.g. workplace, young people, holiday makers, commuters and others. Noteworthy are three adaptations of this public education campaign which UK Counter Terror Policing developed with stakeholders from the private sector, non-governmental organization, and concerned ministries.

#### Noteworthy Adaptation #1: The ABTA – Stay Safe Abroad Campaign:

Following the fatal *Daesh* attacks on British holiday makers at the tourist resort at Port El Kantaoui in Tunisia on 26 June 2015, and the attack at the Bardo National Museum in Tunis three months earlier, UK Counter Terror Policing and the Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA) launched the “The Stay Safe Abroad” Campaign. According to Scott Wilson, National Counter Terrorism Protect and Prepare Coordinator, it has been the

*“most successful information campaign CT Policing has ever delivered, with potentially life-saving information being taught to tens of thousands*

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635 See YouTube Channel of the National Police Chiefs' Council 2017.

636 Rogers 2017, online.

637 Rogers 2017.

*of holiday reps working for the UK's major travel companies, via a series of training modules, specifically tailored to the travel industry.*"<sup>638</sup>

Through several educational videos, the campaign gives practical advice to holiday reps as well as to holiday makers themselves on how to stay vigilant and how to respond in the case of attacks at a holiday destination.

#### Noteworthy Adaptation #2: The Sun Campaign:

To raise the consciousness of the harder-to-reach younger age groups of 11-16 year-olds about the 'Run, Hide, Tell' message, *UK Counter Terror Policing* has cooperated with the tabloid newspaper *The Sun*.<sup>639</sup> Tailored to the young audience, the campaign features British celebrities from sports, and show business personalities who have a reputation of being tough, but despite of this image encourage teenagers to 'Run, Hide, Tell', should they be caught up in a terrorist attack.<sup>640</sup> The campaign also "*created a three-fingered emoji to echo the simple police guidelines*" of "*RUN, HIDE, TELL*".<sup>641</sup>

The videos and posters were disseminated by the British Counter Terrorism Police and ran across the Sun's print edition, including cut-out-and-keep posters, its digital edition, social media including "*the Sun's Snapchat profile, and via its network of influencers.*"<sup>642</sup>

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638 CSM contributor 2018b.

639 See Cleeton 2017.

640 See *ibid.*

641 Boyle 2017.

642 Cleeton 2017.

Figure 23: “RUN, HIDE, TELL” cut-out in *The Sun*.<sup>643</sup>



### Noteworthy Adaptation #3: ACT for Youth: The story of NUR, EDIH, LET

Under the guidance of the Personal, Social, Health and Economic Education Association (PSHE Association) and Girlguiding<sup>644</sup> the UKCTP have developed education materials which are “designed to be used by schools and youth leaders to teach young people [in the age groups 11-16] what to do in the event of a terrorist attack.”<sup>645</sup> It spreads the “RUN, HIDE, TELL” message in a sensitive and non-alarmist way through “a live action and graphic novel-style animation”<sup>646</sup>, appropriate for young people. The animation is accompanied by an elaborate guidance and by fully prepared lesson plans,

<sup>643</sup> Image taken from The Front Row Partnership 2017.

<sup>644</sup> Formerly known as *The Girl Guides Association*, Girlguiding is the UK’s national guiding organisation for girls aged 5–18 years with over 400,000 members; For more info see Girlguiding 2020.

<sup>645</sup> Griggs 2017, 1.

<sup>646</sup> *ibid*.



provided to teachers and youth groups through the PSHE association, to help in the messages' delivery.<sup>647</sup>

Figure 24: Screensgrabs from "ACT for Youth: The story of NUR, EDIH, LET" education film with simple advice for young people.<sup>648</sup>



The key message is adapted to the age groups:

*"The advice for adults and advice for young people differs in one main area; whereas for adults the message is 'take charge' (for example insisting others go with you or trying to stop others from entering the area), the message for young people is 'take charge of yourself', thus ensuring their own personal safety."<sup>649</sup>*

647 Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017, 56.

648 Counter Terrorism Policing UK 2017b.

649 PSHE Association and National Counter Terrorism Security Office November / 2017, 4.

Like the ACT campaign targeting adults, the education material for young people also addresses the importance of vigilance and of reporting suspicious behaviour or such items for youths (see below).

Figure 25: ACT message adaptation for young people in NPCC's leaflet.<sup>650</sup>



## COUNTER TERRORISM POLICING

### ACT for YOUTH: Action Counters Terrorism

Helpful Advice

This quick-check leaflet is here to help you remember the key messages from the Story of Nur, Edih and Llet:

- How to identify and report suspicious behaviour
- How to identify and report a suspicious item
- What to do in a gun or knife terror attack

For further information visit: [gov.uk/nactso](https://gov.uk/nactso)

#### IDENTIFYING SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR

**Suspicious behaviour means any action that makes someone feel worried or anxious**

**Remember to focus on a person's behaviour, not their appearance**

Suspicious behaviour might include:

- Hanging around in an area the public are not allowed to enter
- Paying too much attention to things like: entrances, exits, CCTV or security staff, or taking photos of these
- Trying to hide their face or identity
- Asking unusual questions, for example about security arrangements in a public place
- Deliberately trying to avoid security staff
- What the person is doing doesn't seem right for the place they're in
- Trust your instincts, if you see anything suspicious, take action!



#### REPORTING SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR

When reporting suspicious behaviour, either find a responsible adult, call 999 and ask for police, or use the online reporting tool:  
<https://www.met.police.uk/tell-us-about/possible-terrorist-activity/>

Reporting might include:

- Who did you see, what did they look like, what were they wearing?
- What have you seen, what has happened, what was it that made you suspicious?
- Where did the situation happen and where were you?
- When did it happen – what time?

Don't be afraid and don't worry about over-reacting. Your actions could help avert an attack and save lives.



#### IDENTIFYING SUSPICIOUS ITEMS

**A suspicious item is any object that makes a person feel worried or anxious.**

Some features of suspicious items might be:

**Hidden:**

- Has the item been hidden?
- Has any attempt been made to hide the item from view or place it where it probably wouldn't be found accidentally?
- Innocent items are not usually hidden deliberately!

**Obvious:**

- Is the item obviously suspicious?
- Can wiring or batteries be seen?
- Is it taped or does it contain liquids or powders?
- Has it been found after seeing someone behave suspiciously?

**Typical:**

- Is the item typical of what you might reasonably expect to find in that place?



#### RESPONDING TO SUSPICIOUS ITEMS

**If you see anything that you think is suspicious, report it right away.**

Different ways to report a suspicious item:

- Speak to a responsible adult or security staff
- Move to a safe distance and call the police on 999
- Use the online reporting tool  
<https://www.met.police.uk/tell-us-about/possible-terrorist-activity/>

**DO NOT:**

- Ignore the suspicious item
- Move closer to look at it or pick it up
- Try to take charge of the situation yourself



#### WHAT TO DO IN A GUN OR KNIFE TERROR ATTACK

### RUN



- If you are caught up in a gun or knife attack, RUN to safety
- Don't waste time taking photos or videos
- Tell others to go with you
- Don't let anyone or anything slow you down
- Just RUN to safety, this is your best option

### HIDE



- If you can't run, HIDE
- Lock yourself in a room, with solid walls if possible
- Keep away from windows and doors
- Be very quiet, silence your phone
- Stay hidden until you are rescued, this may take some time

### TELL



- Only when you are safe, phone 999 and ask for the police
- Tell them what has happened, who you are and where you are
- Answer all their questions as best you can

All of these tailored campaign adaptations are still in use and are regularly replayed through the social media channels of UKCTP and by local police forces wherever appropriate. Updated adaptations are created when the

<sup>650</sup> National Police Chiefs' Council 2018.



need arises, based on developing requirements and circumstances, e.g. safety and security during summer festival season.

The effectiveness of “*RUN, HIDE, TELL*” leaflet and film was tested in a survey experiment in 2019 which examined the different behavioural intentions of 3003 UK and Danish participants.<sup>651</sup> The participants were split into three groups. Participants in the first group received the leaflet, the second group was shown the movie, while the third groups received no pre-event information.<sup>652</sup>

*This study demonstrated a number of important benefits of communicating with the public to prepare them to respond to terrorist attacks involving firearms. In particular, the potential for pre-event communications to enhance perceptions of security services' preparedness to respond and increase trust in official guidance during an incident. It also supports the contention that the assumption of public panic is empirically inaccurate. These results indicate that this type of communication campaign can positively influence intended behaviors in relation to encouraging actions that could save lives and discouraging nonprotective behaviors.*<sup>653</sup>

Due to the similarities of the measured impacts on participants in the United Kingdom and Denmark alike, Pearce et al. suggest that the *Run.Hide.Tell* guidance is suitable for roll-out in other countries.<sup>654</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the “RUN-HIDE-TELL” campaign that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should communicate about terrorism risks in an open, transparent, and non-alarmist way.
- Authorities should provide clear and actionable guidance on how to react when caught up in a *Marauding Terrorist Firearms- or Bladed Weapons Attack*.
- Authorities should consider the special needs of vulnerable groups like children and young people and should amend the information/guidance to meet the needs of these groups respectively.

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651 See Pearce et al. 2019.

652 See *ibid.*

653 *ibid.*, 1691.

654 See *ibid.*, 1692.

RUN HIDE TELL Campaign	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	✓
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	✓
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

### 6.2.3. Project Servator

*Project Servator* is an unannounced show of force in or around crowded places by armed counter-terrorism police in cooperation with local forces.

*“Deployments are highly visible and made up of a range of police resources, including uniformed and plain-clothes officers, police dogs and horses, and firearms officers. They are supported by state-of-the-art CCTV monitored in real time and other less visible security measures. The deployments are planned, based on intelligence, but are designed to be unpredictable and can turn up anywhere at any time.”*<sup>655</sup>

The deployments of *Project Servator* officers are supported by an outreach and communication campaign across different media and touchpoints in the vicinity as shown in the figure below.<sup>656</sup> Police may set up pavement signs in the street, distribute leaflets and place posters in nearby coffee shops, and may employ the *out-of-home* traditional posters and new digital advertisement spaces.<sup>657</sup> The deployments are additionally supported by official twitter announcements by local police forces as well as *UK Counter Terrorism Policing*.<sup>658</sup> The objective of this concerted and complimentary effort according to Superintendent Helen Isaac of the City of London

<sup>655</sup> CSM contributor 2018a, 2.

<sup>656</sup> See Baines *et al.* 2017, 2.

<sup>657</sup> See *ibid.*, 3.

<sup>658</sup> Countless examples for this can be found on *twitter* under the hashtag #ProjectServator <https://twitter.com/hashtag/ProjectServator>.

Police, is to ensure that “the message that the public gets is one of constant reassurance, of us [the police] needing their assistance in helping to keep the city safe.”<sup>659</sup>

Figure 26: *Project Servator advertisement encouraging commuter vigilance & cooperation in the London underground.*<sup>660</sup>



Through *Project Servator* the police aim to advance five key objectives:

- 1) *Community outreach*: By directly engaging with and informing the public about the terrorism threat, i.e., by providing information leaflets like in figure 28 and by answering questions and responding to citizens' concerns. By raising “awareness of how the public can help keep everyone safe”<sup>661</sup> through their own vigilance, police want to reduce the threshold for people to come forward with information now and in the future<sup>662</sup>
- 2) *Intelligence gathering*: According to the *National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NCTSO)* amplifying the message of national community vigilance campaigns at the local level through actions like *Project Ser-*

659 *ibid.*

660 Image adapted from Mitchell 2016.

661 CSM contributor 2018a, 2.

662 See Harris 2016, 57.

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vator deployments, “have helped increase intelligence reports by up to 50 percent.”<sup>663</sup>

Figure 27: Extract of Project Servator leaflet handed out by the Police asking the public for their support.<sup>664</sup>



### Project Servator

The City of London Police is dedicated to the protection of our communities. Project Servator is a very effective tactic used by the force to help deter and detect a wide range of criminality, from pickpockets through to terrorism, whilst providing a reassuring presence to the public.

It comprises unpredictable, intelligence-led visible police deployments involving uniform and plain clothes and other specially trained officers, supported by the full resources of the City of London Police such as horses and detection dogs.

Our deployments are also directly supported by our state-of-the-art CCTV control room and trained security officers\*, some of which you may see working with our City of London Police officers.

\*These officers are trained licensed (SIA) security officers from private industry who volunteer their services to support the police.



### What you will see

You will see a highly visible police presence that will turn up unannounced in locations across the City. These police deployments will be unpredictable in timing, duration and assets used. For example, they could appear in an area tomorrow morning for an hour and include dogs, vehicles and other measures, some of which may not be visible.

Some locations may not see a deployment for a week, while others might be visited more than once in a day yet will have a completely different look and feel.

The key to all of this is unpredictability.

You may encounter Project Servator deployments, so don't be surprised if you see one – they are there to help keep you safe. They are supported by officers who are there to help explain about the deployments and answer any questions you may have, so feel free to chat with them if you want to find out more.



### How YOU can help

Your support and assistance with Project Servator is essential for its success. You have a vital role to play by being vigilant and reporting anything suspicious IMMEDIATELY by calling 101 or 999 if it's an emergency.

Don't assume others have reported it already or that because others are not reporting, that it is not suspicious. If it doesn't feel right, report it.

### How YOUR BUSINESS or COMMUNITY can help

The success of these tactics rely upon support and vigilance from you as part of our community as well as the general public. It is really important that the public understand the nature of the operations and, crucially, feel reassured rather than alarmed.

That's where you come in.



### Together we'll help keep people safe



- 3) *Public reassurance*: The visible presence of police officers' acts as a reassurance to the public that an armed response will be available, if the need arises as projected by authorised firearms officers in figure 29.<sup>665</sup> By equally addressing non-terrorist-related crime and by the police's ability to question and engage, the officers further aid the building up of confidence and trust.

663 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2019b.

664 City of London Police 2018d.

665 Baines *et al.* 2017, 4.

Figure 28: *Project Servator – Authorised firearms officers deployed as reassurance and deterrence measure in the City of London.*<sup>666</sup>



- 4) *Disrupt and deter hostile reconnaissance*: By deploying officers trained in the use of *behavioural detection methods*, by the encouragement of vigilance within the local business community and by support through CCVT monitoring, *Project Servator* deployment as shown in figure 30 increases the chance to spot tell-tale signs of suspicious or illegal activities and make it “*difficult for criminals to gather the information they need to carry out their plans successfully*”.<sup>667</sup>

666 Image taken from City of London Police 2018b.

667 CSM contributor 2018a, 2–3.



Figure 29: *Project Servator deployment by North Yorkshire Police.*<sup>668</sup>



- 5) *Strengthen police-business partnerships:* The police's deployments offer an opportunity for the police force to engage the businesses and organisations located in the area, to raise the level of vigilance of their private security teams and staff members. It is also not uncommon for private security staff and police to jointly operate during deployments in crowded places or venues like airports, large shopping complexes or stadia.<sup>669</sup>

The open police deployment also allows officers to refresh and update the counter-terrorism security awareness training which many private in-house security personnel and staff have received by the *Counter Terrorism Security Advisor* (CTSA) as part of *ACT Awareness* (previously called "*Project Griffin*") trainings. It had been introduced to help them identify hostile reconnaissance of their business and its surroundings.<sup>670</sup> Private front-line staff in crowded places has been the focus of counter-terrorism policing and bespoke programs exist to reach this clientele with the shared-vigilance message beyond *Project Servator* engagements.

By mounting successful *Project Servator* operations, the UKCTP aims to reassure the UK population that the authorities are prepared to successfully handle the threat of terrorism, thereby confirming the *Just-World-Beliefs* held in the public.

<sup>668</sup> Image taken from North Yorkshire Police 2018.

<sup>669</sup> See Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017, 45.

<sup>670</sup> See CSM contributor 2018a, 2.

The visible police presence itself is said to have an anxiety-reducing effect on the population and as such improves their perceived resources to deal with the terror/crime threat.

*What general lessons can authorities take away from Project Servator which may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

Authorities should utilise temporary large highly visible local deployments of police forces:

- To engage with the public about the threat and risks of terrorism and explain the important role each citizen and business can play for the safety and security in their community,
- To reduce the threshold for people to come forward with information in the instant and in the future,<sup>671</sup>
- To reassure the public that armed response is available, if needed,<sup>672</sup>
- To disrupt and deter hostile reconnaissance,
- To strengthen police-business partnerships by engaging the businesses and organisations located in the area, to raise the level of vigilance of their private security teams and staff members.

<i>Project Servator</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 6.2.4. ACT Awareness: Identify and Respond to Suspicious Behaviour or Items

*ACT Awareness* (previously known as *Project Griffin*) is one component of the awareness and education campaign to sensitize the operators of

671 See Harris 2016, 48.  
 672 See Baines *et al.* 2017, 4.

crowded venues of potential terrorist threats, and to encourage them to use protective and preparedness measures to protect their business, staff and visitors.

Historically, faced with bombing attacks on critical infrastructure and tourist landmarks as well as businesses and the transport network, the security services in cooperation with the *Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure* (CPNI) focused on establishing and improving protective measures to address this specific threat. This was done by target-hardening and by promoting public vigilance to deter would-be terrorists, probably best reflected by the “ring of steel”<sup>673</sup> around the City of London and the recurring calls for “*public vigilance and participatory surveillance*” across London and the British public transport system.<sup>674</sup>

One of the bespoke programs is *ACT Awareness*, a counter-terrorism security awareness and training campaign, specifically offered to businesses of the retail and the commercial community, operating in or near crowded places.

The training is targeting in-house security personnel and all front-line staff and may last from 30 minutes to six hours, depending on the businesses’ needs and availability.

It focusses on teaching practical steps to help the audience to identify hostile reconnaissance of their business and its surroundings, and to make them sensitive to security precautions, according to the *Crowded Places Guidance*.

Trainings are delivered in a variety of ways to ensure a maximized reach and acceptability, from large corporations to the operators of small corner shops who do not have the time or resources to attend training sessions. But the latter may be open to receiving abridged advice through their local authorities or from their neighbourhood policing network or may make use of online training outside of their business hours.<sup>675</sup>

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673 Following the Provisional IRA bombings of the Baltic Exchange in 1992 and on Bishopsgate in 1993, the traffic flow into the London’s financial centre was re-arranged and solidified to prevent and deter further vehicle-borne bomb attacks. The number of access roads into the financial centre of London were reduced and fortified through one-way systems, flower-planting, bollards, police sentry boxes and CCTV cameras for face and number plate recognition. See Dyckhoff 2011.

674 Larsen and Piché 2009.

675 See Harris 2016, 58.



The training content is delivered in several ways:

- CTSA In-house trainings offered at the company's site,
- Industry self-delivery in person or based on the company's own e-learning system,
- ACT Awareness E-learning tool.

The introduction of the *ACT Awareness e-learning tool* has allowed counter-terrorism policing to strongly increase the number of employees trained in counter-terrorism (compared to face-to-face training), and offers a simple way for continuous engagement with the businesses and their employees, where necessary.<sup>676</sup>

Through cooperation with major prominent British companies as part of the Governments' *StepChange Initiative*, the content is being delivered to the employees through the companies' particular internal digital training systems. For companies and single trainees without their own E-learning system, a browser-based version is available as well.

According to Neil Basu, by the end of 2018 more than 1800 businesses had registered under the scheme and more than 500,000 employees have signed on and have completed the awareness training.<sup>677</sup>

Since then, the Government has continuously widened the scope of organisations which are trained and has also encouraged religious communities to participate.<sup>678</sup> Since 2020, it has eased access to the online course to the wider public and encouraged every citizen to take the course.<sup>679</sup>

The engagement between *UKCTP* and business does not end with the delivery of the training. The focus is on continued engagement where intelligence on changes to the threat environment, for example new terrorist *modi operandi* or attacks in other countries which may inspire copycat attacks, are continually shared with the security managers of relevant organisations or religious communities. For example, after the Christchurch Mosque attack Muslim faith groups received a security briefing.

By regularly sharing more information with the business community and other relevant stakeholders, also after a time, the police understand that after a training the business can better protect and prepare against attacks, and thereby deter attackers. And operating on the same "front-line",

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676 See Counter Terrorism Policing UK and Highfield E-Learning 2018.

677 Basu 2018.

678 See National Police Chiefs' Council 2019.

679 See Counter Terrorism Policing UK 2020.

businesses will equally share security-relevant information with the police when they become aware of it. The continuous engagement and flow of security-related information is ensured through local (*London PROTECT*) or national news alerts (*UK PROTECT*) which is sent out to registered businesses through the “*Cross-Sector Security Communications*” initiative and a dedicated mobile app *PSO London Shield*, operated by *Counter Terrorism Protective Security Operations* in the Metropolitan Police for authorised businesses in London similar to a successful model by the New York Police Department for public-private information sharing.<sup>680</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from ACT Awareness that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

Authorities should engage with corporate security teams and private security companies with a view to increase vigilance and preparedness against the terrorist threat in the community.

Authorities should share counter-terrorism security advice and intelligence to allow companies to increase their level of preparedness and resilience.

Authorities should make use of existing hierarchical- and communication structures in companies and NGOs to achieve a wide reach of their calls for preparedness and of their training.

<i>ACT Awareness</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

680 See Amadeo 2020 ; Metropolitan Police Service 2019.

### 6.2.5. ACT Strategic (formerly known as Project Argus)

*ACT Strategic* (formerly known as Project Argus) is a training program, targeting company owners and managers at the board level who have responsibility to formulate response plans for their organisation covered by the *Crowded Places Guidance*, including offices and retail businesses, night time activities, hotels, education- and health care providers.<sup>681</sup>

The training is delivered by a *Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor* and consists of a three hours tabletop simulation that “poses questions and dilemmas for participants working in syndicates, and aims to raise awareness of the threat from terrorism, [to their business] providing practical advice on preventing, handling and recovering from an attack.”<sup>682</sup>

What general lessons can authorities take away from ACT Strategic that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should sensitise company directors /management for the terrorism risk and should encourage the development of mitigation and business continuity strategies through direct engagement with CTSAs.

<i>ACT Strategic</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

### 6.2.6. Cross-Sectoral Security Communications (CSSC)

*The Cross Sectoral Security Communications (CSSC)* “is an initiative where authoritative security information is cascaded from a central hub to regional

681 See National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2017.

682 City of London Police 2018a.

The voluntary organisation follows a hierarchical-structured hub model where information is shared by the security services in a bridge call with the central hub. The members are selected representatives of the different industry sectors who would then process and cascade the information to regional hubs and into their industry sectors, down to individual organization and their employees.<sup>687</sup> *“The regional operational teams of each hub include members who are seconded from both the public and private sectors”*.<sup>688</sup>

By 2016, even before the national roll-out, the CSSC already represented 35 industry sectors, with a reach of 14 million recipients for their messages.<sup>689</sup> The stand-up time to send an alert to all members is said to be less than 20 minutes.<sup>690</sup> This rapidly available informational support and advice

690 See *ibid.*

reduces uncertainty in a crisis scenario and allows businesses a better and earlier appraisal of an event and to select appropriate measures to be taken which then can prevent or reduce the impact of an attack.

The implementation of information-sharing protocols *“with required departments, agencies and bodies, enables the provision of information and advice for communicating to the public”* across different threat categories.<sup>691</sup> While there is only limited staff provided by member organizations on a day-to-day basis, there is a team of senior security experts available to rapidly start operations, if an incident like a terrorist attack should occur.<sup>692</sup> They can then function as *“the interface between those who have information and those who need to receive it.”*<sup>693</sup> The national roll-out of the CCSC system is currently ongoing and is synced with the *Step-Change Initiative* with the objective to reach all business sectors and all members of the public with security-related messages that are timely, accurate and authoritative.<sup>694</sup>

While the hub ensures that member organisations will receive an alert or regular security advice, Randall points out, more needs to be done to *“ensure that everyone within an organisation receives the CSSC messages, where appropriate, and the original recipient knows how and when to pass on the different types of messages.”*<sup>695</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from CSSC that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should establish means *“for the police and government to communicate with the wider private sector, businesses of all sizes, with authoritative messages, alerts and information on safety and security, as well as to receive feedback from businesses on the security issues important to them.”*<sup>696</sup>
- Authorities should establish a *“broad and robust communications and intelligence infrastructure”* which connects the security services and private sector, to be able to share information and deal with ongoing security threats.<sup>697</sup>

691 *ibid.*

692 *ibid.*

693 *ibid.*

694 See Randall, MBE 2018b.

695 *ibid.*

696 Cross-Sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC) 2019, 1.

697 Randall, MBE 2018a.

- Authorities should ensure that organisations will receive urgent alerts as well as regular security advice.
- Authorities should ensure that this informational support and advice is rapidly available, to reduce uncertainty in a crisis scenario and to allow businesses to do a better and earlier appraisal of an event and of appropriate measures to be taken, which can prevent or reduce the impact of an attack.

<i>Cross Sectoral Security Communications (CSSC)</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	✓
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

### 6.2.7. Step-Change Initiative

With more than 700 ongoing terrorism-related investigations in May 2019 and 3,000 subjects of interest (SOI) and an existing pool of 20,000 former SOIs, the intelligence services are hoping to free their particular resources to be able to focus on the most pressing cases.<sup>698</sup>

To mobilise the potential in the private sector and in the wider population, the *National Counter Terrorism Security Office* set up a joint initiative named the “*National Counter Terrorism Step-Change Programme*” between police, the government and the private sector in 2018.<sup>699</sup>

Through several joint conferences and workshops with business leaders and through the creation of an overseeing board (*Step-Change Programme Board (SCPB)*) the industry partners agreed on a total of 25 projects across five different work streams that are driven forward as a priority, with

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698 See Gardner 2019.

699 See Aldworth 2018.

all costs lying where they fall.<sup>700</sup> The work streams are “*Crowded Places, Security and Resilience, Transport, Cyber (incl. Banking) as well as Travel and Tourism*”<sup>701</sup>

This new effort under the *Step-Change* label to “*create a truly mobilised society to protect against and prepare for terrorist incidents*”<sup>702</sup> is in many parts a continuation or rather an acceleration and expansion of an existing effort by the security services to “*hand over more responsibility to [the] private sector, to private security and the public – in an exchange for more training, more intelligence*” as Neil Basu puts it.<sup>703</sup> According to UKCTP In many parts of the private sector, this new role is welcomed, and the uptake of terrorism vigilance and awareness trainings continues to be strong.<sup>704</sup>

While the intensified outreach to the public and the private sector through new awareness initiatives and trainings appears hardly revolutionary, the announced intention to allow more “*intelligence-derived knowledge to be shared more widely beyond intelligence circles marks a significant cultural change*.”<sup>705</sup> This meets a demand from the private sector, especially from large corporations with their own security arrangements that have requested “*comprehensive, unclassified threat intelligence, ranging from post-incident analysis to incident alerts and shifts in hostile actors’ tactics*” to allow them to deter, detect and disrupt attacks themselves, while working hand-in-hand with the police.<sup>706</sup>

As a first step, the government has announced the creation of a *Step-Change online-hub*, an information sharing online platform, that should streamline and centralise the information sharing in one place and enable continuous connection – between police and businesses as well as from business to business.

Besides ever-closer cooperation with the private sector, *stronger* multi-agency engagement is key element of the *Step-change* initiative. By getting better at acquiring, analyzing and especially at sharing data, the British domestic intelligence service MI5 hopes that this will also “*allow local police and other agencies to be alerted to threats of which they are currently*

700 See *ibid.* ; see also CSM contributor 2018c.

701 Aldworth 2018.

702 CSM contributor 2018c.

703 Basu 2018.

704 See *ibid.*

705 Anderson 2017, 42.

706 Pool Re July/2018, 11.

*unaware*<sup>707</sup> enabling them to make better judgements based on their better knowledge of the national security risk, and to respond appropriately at the local level.<sup>708</sup> How this will pan out in practice and in detail will have to be seen as at the time of writing this is still an ongoing initiative.

There are already exemplary islands of cooperation where this concept of ever-closer-cooperation has been put into action. One example of such an arrangement is the *Hammersmith Business Improvement District (BID)*, a business-led not-for-profit partnership to manage and improve the attractiveness of the Hammersmith town centre in London.<sup>709</sup> The organisation funded through its member businesses, has undertaken a variety of actions to create a safer and more secure environment.

Their CCTV system, funded and operated by the *BID* that serves the town centre, including the inside of the large shopping centre which is linked directly to the police control room, providing access 24/7.<sup>710</sup> The private security operating in the centre and in the surrounding areas is connected via town link radio system (*SafetyNet*) to the CCTV control room, to the police and all *BID* member businesses.<sup>711</sup>

The *BID* security and its members are also able to report and share criminal incidents in a database in the area as they happen. They also receive security alerts through a crime reduction scheme operating it, accessible through a mobile application and a secure website which is also directly linked to the police.<sup>712</sup>

*BID* members additionally receive regular counter-terrorism awareness trainings and security updates as necessary and have access to complimentary risk assessment and business continuity planning.<sup>713</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the Step-Change Initiative that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should explore ways to activate more resources from private sector and the public in the fight against terrorism through more training and intelligence sharing.

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707 Anderson 2017, 42.

708 See *ibid.*, 33.

709 See Hammersmith BID 2019.

710 See National Business Crime Centre 2019.

711 See Hammersmith BID 2019.

712 See *ibid.*

713 See *ibid.*



- Authorities should explore ways for the national intelligence and counter-terrorism branches to cooperate with local police forces through more intelligence sharing.
- Authorities should explore opportunities to deepen and widen existing local cooperative business and police crime-prevention initiatives to equally improve preparedness for terrorism attack and responses.

<i>Step-Change Initiative</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 6.2.8. CTP Information Sharing Platform

As part of the Step-Change-Initiative an *Information Sharing Platform* (ISP) (formerly referred to as *ACT online hub*) to engage with public and private sector companies, is under development.<sup>714</sup> The funding for the project of 9,6 million British Pounds over five years is provided to the Mayor of London Office for Policing And Crime by *Pool re*, the UK'S national terrorism risk re-insurance body.<sup>715</sup>

This information sharing platform is promoted as an “*ecosystem that aims to design, promote and share protective security best-practice*.”<sup>716</sup> Beyond replacing the present PROTECT newsletters and “*Cross-Sectoral Security Communication*”, its purpose is to streamline and centralise the information sharing in one place, and to enable and foster a continuous dialogue between police and businesses as well as from business to business.<sup>717</sup>

714 See Mayor of London Office For Policing And Crime 2020.

715 McGrath 2019.

716 Basu 2018.

717 See Counter Terrorism Policing UK 2019.

According to official documents the platform “will provide to Counter Terrorism Specialists, Security Industry Professionals, Business and Industry:

- a. Product Library,
- b. Knowledge Hub,
- c. E-Learning,
- d. Webinars,
- e. Discussion forums,
- f. Targeted Messaging,
- g. What works Centre,
- h. Action Counter Terrorism (ACT) online reporting,
- i. Prevent referral<sup>718</sup>.

While the audience focus for the platform are professionals from business and industry, through a layered access protocol, certain sections of the platform will also be accessible to specialists from the security industry and the public.<sup>719</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from ACT online hub that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should create an ecosystem and nurture a community which streamlines and centralises the security-related information sharing in one place and which enables a continuous connection – between police and businesses as well as from business to business – thus fostering dialogue and fast information exchange between all community members.

ACT Online Hub	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	✓
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

718 McGrath 2019, 2.

719 See *ibid.*, 3.

### 6.2.9. Crowded Places Programme

Owners or operators of crowded places, for example shopping centres, railway stations, cinemas, schools, hotels or bars and clubs, carry a special responsibility beyond that for their staff, customers and business tenants, namely for any people who pass through or congregate at their sites. As the shift in the terrorists' target selection and methods of execution has shown, the responsibility of the operators goes beyond ensuring adequate health and safety standards; it must include mitigating the terrorist threat.

Businesses are not left to their own devices to deal with this challenge. Independent of registering for an *ACT-Awareness* training, operators of venues and events of, in or near crowded places in the UK, can refer to the *Crowded Places Guidance*, published by NaCTSO which provides sector-specific recommendations for action that can be taken up by venue operators, to increase the security from malicious attacks at their site.<sup>720</sup> This is complimentary to existing general industry guidance how to prepare for and manage any type of major incidents.<sup>721</sup>

To ensure businesses are adequately prepared, the NaCTSO offers sector-specific counter-terrorism protective security guidance for crowded places, to help the sites to “*detect, deter or reduce the impacts of a terrorist attack*.”<sup>722</sup> Through its “*Crowded Places Programme [...] NaCTSO promotes broader consideration of terrorist attack methodologies and outlines a wide range of risk management options*.”<sup>723</sup>

Attack methodologies include:

5. “*Non-penetrative vehicle attack*,
6. *Penetrative vehicle attack*,
7. *PBIED – Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (suicide) attack*,
8. *Firearms/Weapons attack – (Marauding Terrorist Attack)*
9. *Postal device attack, including courier and hand deliveries*,
10. *Placed IED*.”<sup>724</sup>

This guidance is offered as a publication and directly through the local *Counter Terrorism Security Advisors* (CTSA). It can be requested by busi-

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720 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2017.

721 See Revo 2017, 8.

722 National Police Chiefs' Council 2015 ; See also UK Home Office 2012, 4.

723 Rigby and Norris 2015, online.

724 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2018, 4.

nesses free of charge, to provide advice on making the business more secure. Based on the specific sector, the NaCTSO guidance advises on the most appropriate tactics to respond to the different types of threats.<sup>725</sup>

Beside the printed guide and personal instructions by the CTSAs, the information is shared through sector specific leaflets, short movies, and a dedicated website.<sup>726</sup>

Through the help of an assessment tool called ‘*Protective Security Improvement Activity*’ (PSIA) provided by the NaCTSO, participating businesses in the *Crowded Places Programme* are enabled to independently review and improve their security measures in a “*consistent, nationally comparable and auditable way*”.<sup>727</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from Crowded Places Programme that may be transferred and or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should provide owners or operators of crowded venues with sector-specific protective counter-terrorist security guidance to help the sites to “*detect, deter or reduce the impacts of a terrorist attack*.”<sup>728</sup>
- Authorities should enable operators, through providing appropriate self-assessment tools, to independently review and improve their security measures in a consistent, nationally comparable and auditable way.<sup>729</sup>

Crowded Places Programme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

725 See *ibid.*, 4.

726 See *ibid.*

727 Rigby and Norris 2015.

728 National Police Chiefs’ Council 2015.

729 See Rigby and Norris 2015.

#### 6.2.10. Loss Mitigation Credit (LMC)

As a tangible incentive to participate in the *Crowded Places Programme* and to implement the necessary protective security measures and preparedness activities, the NaCTSO has formed a joint initiative with *Pool Re*, the U.K. Government-backed provider of terrorism re-insurance. Together they offer participating businesses a *Loss Mitigation Credit* (LMC), which may translate into a reduction of the premiums for their terrorism damage insurance cover by 2.5%.<sup>730</sup>

The calculable financial benefit from LMC makes protective security measures a relevant item for the balance sheet. Therefore, it puts LMC on to the agenda of the business management team. The possible financial “punishment” of losing the *LMC*, if companies do not continue to adhere to the regulations of the *Crowded Places Programmes*, is a strong incentive for continuous efforts in this matter. The *LMC* makes terrorism insurance more affordable. Thus, it would allow more businesses to take out such a policy. With more businesses being taken care of, due to the mitigation of the potential impact of an attack through the insurance, less public resources and focus the businesses will require for their protection in and after a crisis.

*What general lessons can authorities take away from Loss Mitigation Credit (LMC) that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should undertake effective measures to bring preventive actions to mitigate terrorism risk on to the companies’ agendas.
- Authorities should provide tangible incentives for companies to invest in protective security measures and preparedness activities.

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730 See *ibid.*

## 6. Chapter: First Case – The United Kingdom

<i>Loss Mitigation Credit</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

### 6.2.11. National Stakeholder Menu of Tactical Options

Apart from the sector-specific *Crowded Places Guidance*, the NaCTSO also provides general advice to the private sector and the security industry on how to appropriately adjust their security posture in response to official UK Government's threat level changes, or in response to terrorist attacks.<sup>731</sup> For some industries regulated by the *Centre for The Protection of National Infrastructure* (CPNI) the enhanced security measures may “*be deployed at the request by police following an extraordinary Security Review Committee (SRC)*.”<sup>732</sup>

*"To ensure a consistent approach, the Response Levels replaced all other forms of escalation, and indicate how government departments and agencies and their staff should react to each threat. This system serves to inform and prompt businesses to consider their own security arrangements in light of any changes to the threat level."*<sup>733</sup>

731 See National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2018, 1.

732 *ibid.*, 1.

733 *ibid.*, 2.

Figure 30: *The five UK threat levels and the appropriate protective security response levels for businesses.*<sup>734</sup>

Threat level and definition	Response level	Description
<b>Critical</b> An attack is expected imminently	<b>Exceptional</b>	Maximum protective security. Critical measures to meet specific threats and to minimise vulnerability and risk
<b>Severe</b> An attack is highly likely	<b>Heightened</b>	Additional and sustainable Substantial and Severe protective security measures reflecting the broad nature of the threat combined with specific business and geographical vulnerabilities and judgements on acceptable risk
<b>Substantial</b> An attack is a strong possibility		
<b>Moderate</b> An attack is possible but not likely	<b>Normal</b>	Routine protective security. Low and Moderate measures appropriate to the business concerned
<b>Low</b> An attack is unlikely		

The advice is updated by the *NaCTSO* as new intelligence becomes available, through guidance notes, for example on developing procedures for dynamic lock-down methods in response to an evolving fast-moving firearms attack in the vicinity of a business site.<sup>735</sup> This guidance is then disseminated through the *Cross Sectoral Security Communications* (CSSC) community or the *CTSA* or police forces. To businesses this solution-focussed threat communication is very valuable, as it qualifies the significance of the threat levels. In this way, the advice enhances the perception of resources available to respond to a threat. It provides clear guidance to organisations on how they can appropriately enhance their own security posture. Through the multiplied enhanced ability to detect and delay attacks, the risk of imminent copycat attacks is reduced by deterrence, and potential loss of critical resource through an attack is prevented.

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the National Stakeholder Menu of Tactical Options that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

Authorities should provide solution-focused threat information to private sector companies, which gives clear guidance to them on how they can appropriately enhance their own security posture in accordance to the risk levels.

734 Image taken from National Counter Terrorism Security Office June / 2017, 2.

735 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2015, 1.

National Stakeholder Menu of Tactical Options	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

### 6.2.12. The City Security Council

The *Security Industry Authority* (SIA) is a government-independent organisation that takes responsibility of the training standards and of the licensing of individual security operatives as well as of accrediting security contractors who want to operate in the UK, to assure their meeting of the necessary standards. The organisation is also responsible for the control of those standards and for the observance of the licensing and accreditation requirements. The SIA reports that there are over 350.000 SIA-certified security operatives in the UK.<sup>736</sup>

UKCTP and CPNI have been in touch with these certified security operatives for several years (especially in the City of London) to generate additional “eyes and ears” through awareness trainings and have provided regular advice on how to react in a terror incident, through their *Crowded Places Guidance* and *London PROTECT* newsletters.

In 2019, major SIA-approved security contractors operating in London, have set up the *City Security Council* in cooperation with the *City of London Police* and the CPNI, in line with the recommendations from the *Harris Report*<sup>737</sup> to give certified security operatives a more prominent role in protecting security in the City of London.<sup>738</sup>

<sup>736</sup> Security Industry Authority 2019.

<sup>737</sup> Independent report that was compiled by Lord Toby Harris in 2016 to assess London's preparedness to deal with a major terrorist incident. See Harris 2016.

<sup>738</sup> See CSM contributor 2019.



The expressed objectives of the Council are:

- Improving standards of training for security personnel to enable them to assist with their response at times of crisis and emergency,
- Providing support to the police in times of crisis and emergency,
- Standardising effective and efficient responses, including media, physical reaction, and online messaging in support of clients/the public in times of crisis and emergency,
- Promoting shared values, common principles and Best Practice, including research on and reviews of current practices.

At this moment of writing, it is not yet clear if and how the roles of private security operatives could change in the event of a marauding terrorist firearms or bladed weapons attack as suggested in the *Harris Report*.<sup>739</sup> The details are still missing. But it is certain that the Home Office in line with its *Step-change Initiative* will have pushed for even greater involvement of the private security sector in the provision of cooperative security.<sup>740</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the City Security Council that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should evaluate with private security providers if and how these could provide support to the police, in times of crisis and emergency.
- Authorities should cooperate with private security providers to improve standards of their training for security personnel to enable them to assist with their response in times of crisis and emergency.
- Authorities should encourage the private security providers to cooperate with them to standardise effective and efficient responses in times of crisis and emergency.

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739 Harris 2016, 56.

740 See Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017, 44–45.

<i>The City Security Council</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.13. Secured-by-Design

Beyond raising vigilance and the encouragement of preparedness at the time of a potential attack, UK counter-terrorism policing is also undertaking efforts to more profoundly strengthen the resilience of the society by designing its environment in such a way as to help to deter, detect, and to delay any potential terrorist perpetrator.

*Secured-by-Design* (SBD) is a national police initiative which stems from the field of classic crime prevention work and in addition to terrorism, deals in particular with topics such as burglary protection and vandalism prevention.<sup>741</sup>

The initiative, which is managed by an independent police unit, wants to ensure that potential risks to building structures or places through terrorist attacks, are taken into account in the planning and approval phase of construction projects, and that appropriate measures are incorporated in the design of such projects.<sup>742</sup>

The initiative does this by providing training and advice on

*“counter-terrorism protective security design to anyone involved in the planning, design and development of the built environment from the preparation of local planning policy to the commissioning, planning, design and management of new development schemes through to detailed building design”*<sup>743</sup>

741 Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited without yearc.

742 See Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK) 2017.

743 UK Home Office *et al.* 2014, 4.

By raising awareness for risk early, *Secure-By-Design* allows for security to be designed into buildings for minimal obstruction. This results in little change to normal operations which increases the level of acceptance and eases adoption which then leads to improved deterrence and a reduced impact of attacks.

In order to ensure that this advice is received and understood, a dedicated how-to-guide, the *Resilient Design Tool*, a collaborative work between the CPNI, NaCTSO and multiple research organisations, is prescribed.<sup>744</sup> This guide sets out both, the different security measures and the appropriate processes in the blueprint, approval and implementation phase to incorporate in a building project.<sup>745</sup> The responsible local administration staffs who decide on construction projects, as well as architects, designers and developers, are sensitized through the guide and are offered bespoke trainings.<sup>746</sup> Local planners are encouraged to reject approval of project applications unless due diligence on terrorism risk mitigation has been undertaken, as prescribed in the *Resilient Design Tool*.<sup>747</sup> In building zones with a higher risk of terrorism, like Central London, this due diligence is mandatory.

Public as well as private project developers can request support and advice from their respective *Counter Terrorism Security Advisor* (or specialized *Architectural Liaison Officer* for Central London) to help them to include the appropriate counter-terrorism measures in their development.<sup>748</sup> Which measures are appropriate is determined by the risk of terrorism in the specific area and project. This situation is assessed based on a general national standard, available to local authorities.

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744 See Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited without yeara.

745 See *ibid*.

746 See UK Home Office 2012, 5.

747 See Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited without yeara.

748 City of London Police 2016.

Figure 31: *The four levels of risk of terrorist attacks.*<sup>749</sup>

<b>High</b>	The risk is the one which generates the highest concern. Comprehensive action is required as a high-priority to reduce vulnerability, wherever possible and proportionate.
<b>Medium-High</b>	The consequences of the risk materialising would be substantial. Action required as a priority to mitigate the risk, wherever possible and proportionate.
<b>Medium</b>	The risk is not substantial and can be managed via contingency plans. Status of risk should be monitored regularly.
<b>Low</b>	The risk should be addressed if possible, and contingency plans are required. The risk should be managed at local level.

Based on the level of risk for a project, different interlocking measures are proposed, usually focusing on three objectives:

- 1) *“Deter a would-be terrorist – by providing physical and electronic security measures, coupled with good management practices;*
- 2) *Detect intrusion – by providing alarm and visual detection systems with verification;*
- 3) *Delay of intrusion for a sufficient period of time to allow a [timely] response to attend – by putting in place physical security measures.”*<sup>750</sup>

Developers who can demonstrate expertise with and consistent adherence to designed-in security principles in their projects, can upon application, receive a certification which allows them to benefit from accelerated approval procedures for their projects. In addition, they can use the certification *“as evidence of compliance with building regulations, to discharge a planning condition or in [...] [their] own media and marketing campaigns.”*<sup>751</sup>

Even after the development and or construction phase, the *Secure-by-Design* team is at hand for site operators or owners to help them improve the security of their premises.<sup>752</sup> For a low nominal fee the team offers to audit the operator’s physical and non-physical security measures, fitting the risk environment. Involving both people and processes at the sites to ensure

749 Adopted from UK Home Office 2012, 6.

750 *ibid.*, 6.

751 Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited without yearb.

752 See Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited and Perpetuity Research and Consultancy International Limited without year.

overall security, play an important role in this audit.<sup>753</sup> After implementing appropriate recommendations from such an audit, operators can receive the seal of the *Secured Environment* for three years.<sup>754</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from Secure by Design that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should ensure that potential risks to building structures or built-up places through terrorist attacks are taken into account in the planning and approval phase of construction projects, and that appropriate measures are incorporated in the design of such a project.<sup>755</sup>
- Authorities should provide necessary support and guidance for helping building developers to include preventive counter-terrorism measures into their planning.
- Authorities should incentivise the auditing of building security.
- Authorities should establish a reliable visible seal of approval that publicly identifies building projects where appropriate /recommended security measures have been designed and built in.

<i>Secure-By-Design</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 6.2.14. Protective Security Management Systems

The *Centre for The Protection of National Infrastructure* (CPNI), provides UK companies with a comprehensive range of materials to prepare their businesses including their employees for different security threats, including terrorism.

<sup>753</sup> See *ibid.*


<sup>754</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>755</sup> See Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK) 2017.

Through the guidance of its “Protective Security Management System” (PseMS) the CPNI

*“provides a suite of materials to help businesses create an assurance system for security. By using a self-assessment check list, organisations can assess gaps in their protective security and better understand weaknesses in their own security systems.”<sup>756</sup>*

Figure 32: PseMS: Organisational security assurance through tangible business practices and controls.<sup>757</sup>



The CPNI additionally publishes up-to-date security recommendations in cooperation with NACTSO, following terrorist incidents, as e.g. the *Manchester Arena attack*.<sup>758</sup>

These recommendations cover guidance for increased deterrence through target hardening and through countering hostile reconnaissance. They also include guidance for improved detection through heightened employee vigilance and more effective CCTV operations as well as recommendations for impact reduction through physical protective security measures, effective screening measures and blast mitigation.<sup>759</sup>

<sup>756</sup> Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK) 2018, 9.

<sup>757</sup> Image taken from *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>758</sup> See Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK) 2017, 2.

<sup>759</sup> See *ibid.*, 3–4.

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the Protective Security Management Systems (PseMS) that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should support providers of national infrastructure to assess their particular protective security arrangements and to deploy the necessary processes and controls which are appropriate to the terrorism risk, they face.
- Authorities should share up-to-date security recommendations with critical infrastructure providers if the threat picture changes, for example following a terrorist incident.

<i>Protective Security Management Systems (PseMS)</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 6.2.15. 'Increasing Crowd Resilience' (ICR) Programme


In a response to the 2017 terror attacks, the *Home Office* set up and funded the “*Defence and Security Accelerator ‘Increasing Crowd Resilience’ (ICR) Programme*” in order to “*accelerate crowd safety innovations and technologies.*”<sup>760</sup> The “*first market exploitation*” under this programme is “*Krowd Safe*”, a mobile application which enables employing crowd vigilance inside a specified venue or location, by establishing a direct connection between crowd members and the security management of the location.<sup>761</sup>

<sup>760</sup> Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) 2019.

<sup>761</sup> See *ibid.*

When installed and logged into the WiFi, the application offers the crowd members a swift and easy reporting of (potential) threats in real-time to the site /event security team.<sup>762</sup>

Figure 33: KrowdSafe mobile application screenshot.<sup>763</sup>



Easy access and efficiency are supported using pre-programmed issue-types to select from, a picture upload function and an automatic localisation of the sender, including a 3D venue mapping ability.<sup>764</sup> The venue's security managers are then able to instantly reply and advise via chat where necessary, while taking appropriate security measures on their end at the same time. In case of an identified security situation, the application allows the

<sup>762</sup> See UK Home Office and Defence and Security Accelerator 2019.

<sup>763</sup> Image taken from Krowdthink 2019.

<sup>764</sup> See *ibid*.





*What general lessons can authorities take away from the KrowdSafe Mobile Application that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should urge operators of popular venues to employ crowd members in the early warning of (potential) threats. A swift and simple reporting should be made possible through the use of apps in real-time, directed at the site /event security team. This could potentially help to reduce the impact of a subsequent attack or could even prevent it due to an earlier alert of the security team.

<i>KrowdSafe Mobile Application</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.16. citizenAID RUN-HIDE-TELL-TREAT

Another application which is meant to make use of the intelligence of the crowd is an application called *citizenAID*. The app is a free-to-use mobile app and an accompanying pocket book which explains to people what to do in case of a terror attack or when faced with unattended or suspicious items. It builds on the *RUN-HIDE-TELL* concept and expands it by „*Treat* when safe to do so“, to culminate in “*RUN-HIDE-TELL-TREAT*”.<sup>768</sup>

In a step-by-step process the app guides the citizens in their response and in the treatment of different injuries, inflicted by terrorist through sharp

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768 Herron *et al.* 2019.

blades, gunshots, bomb blasts or vehicle-as-a-weapon attacks before the emergency services arrive on the scene.

Figure 35: Screenshots of citizenAID's straight-forward user interface.<sup>769</sup>



Taking the lessons from field surgery, its key objective is to increase the number of patients capable of surviving immediately after an attack, before professional medical help arrives, and which cannot be provided in a *hot zone* at once.<sup>770</sup>

As common in field surgery, the application puts a special focus on stopping bleeding through the right application of tourniquets, and even recommends and explains the application of the triage system when faced with multiple casualties.<sup>771</sup>

Apart from the phone app and the pocket book which can be carried around and which are meant to be consulted in the case of an attack,

<sup>769</sup> Images adapted from Thurgood 2018.

<sup>770</sup> See Herron *et al.* 2019.

<sup>771</sup> See *ibid.*

*citizenAID* is addressing the members of the public with its message of „Be prepared-not scared“ through multiple channels.<sup>772</sup>

Figure 36: *citizenAID* public outreach example <sup>773</sup>

**citizen  
AID**

**Be Prepared,  
Not Scared**

**Would you know what to do in the  
event of a terrorist attack?**

**Join the citizenAID team at  
Oxted School on Tuesday 10th July  
1900 - 2030**

If you are interested in attending, please email  
[Info@citizenaid.org](mailto:Info@citizenaid.org) to register.

**YOU Can Save Lives**

[www.citizenaid.org](http://www.citizenaid.org)  
+44 (0)121 794 2456  
[Info@citizenaid.org](mailto:Info@citizenaid.org)

Twitter Facebook

The *citizenAID* runs a dedicated website with learning materials and training videos, provided free of charge for non-commercial use as well as

<sup>772</sup> See citizenAID 2018b.

<sup>773</sup> Image taken from *ibid.*

tuition material for use in schools and universities.<sup>774</sup> It also organises live training sessions at schools and universities in cooperation with emergency services and the *National Counter Terrorism Security Office* and sends out demonstration teams to attend diverse community events as shown in the figures below.<sup>775</sup>

Figure 37: citizenAID volunteers at community events.<sup>776</sup>



Through different textbooks supporting the teacher in the classroom, *citizenAID* has adapted the *RUN, HIDE, TELL, TREAT* message to the specific age cohorts. For primary school pupils aged 5-7, the comic, “*Moggy’s Coming*” features the story of the “*Mulberry School Mice*” in emergency situations, enabling parents and teachers to help children understand and prepare for acts of terrorism in a non-threatening way.<sup>777</sup> The stories are supported by easy singing and other classroom activities.<sup>778</sup>

Through the clear step-by-step guidance on how to respond to a terror attack, the individuals’ problem-focused coping skills increase and their self-efficacy and confidence level to be able to deal with the situation, are raised. Understanding what to expect in the situation after an attack, as realistically displayed in the instruction video, increases the perceived informational support and cognitive clarity. Reducing uncertainty of and having an idea about what to expect and how to respond in an emergency, also limit the psychological impact and the anxiety experienced before and during an attack.

774 Herron *et al.* 2019.

775 See citizenAID 2018a.

776 Left image taken from *ibid.* ; right image taken from citizenAID 2018c.

777 Packham 2017.

778 See Hodgetts *et al.* 2017.

Empowering the citizens to help each other in the critical time of an attack increases the chances of survival and thereby reduces the potential impact of an attack. Especially, children can gain more confidence when an emergency situation arises. Finally, the expectation among the public of being able to help themselves, and the completed training to be able to help others, strengthens societal cohesion.

*What general lessons can authorities take away from citizenAID – RUN-HIDE-TELL-TREAT that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should provide clear step-by-step guidance on how to respond in a terror attack, to increase the problem-focused coping skills and raise individuals' self-efficacy and confidence level to be able to deal with the situation.
- Authorities should help citizens in understanding what to expect in the situation after an attack as realistically as possible, to increase the perceived informational support and cognitive clarity. Reducing uncertainty and giving people an idea of what to expect and how to respond, also limit the psychological impact and the anxiety, experienced before and during an attack.
- Authorities should provide training opportunities for citizens which empower them to help each other in the critical time directly after an attack, to increase the chances of survival and thereby reduce the potential impact of an attack. Especially, children can gain more confidence when an emergency situation arises.
- Authorities should emphasize the social cohesion and solidarity aspect when promoting the idea of self-help among the public.

<i>citizenAid – Run.Hide.Tell.Treat</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓



### 6.2.17. Local Resilience Forum

Resilience-building measures are not limited to the private sector or the wider public, but necessarily also involve the first responders. Based on the third and fourth strand of the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism – *PROTECT and PREPARE* – the UK has since 2004, the year of the Madrid bombing, undertaken concerted efforts to formulate a resilient response to terror. The effects of attacks are to be mitigated by strengthening the country's protection and by enhancing its emergency preparedness.

These efforts include:

- Providing “a coherent approach across different agencies to issues of resilience”,<sup>779</sup>
- Ensuring “the most effective use of the partnerships’ combined resources”,<sup>780</sup>
- Promoting collaboration across and within sectors.

The *Civil Contingency Act* (CCA) established the UK's single framework for generic civil protection, based on the principles of *Integrated Emergency Management* (IEM).<sup>781</sup>

*“The [Civil Contingency] Act and supporting Regulations and statutory guidance ‘Emergency Preparedness’ establish a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level.”*<sup>782</sup>

Local responders are divided into two categories and specific statutory duties are assigned to each of them:

*“Those in Category 1 are organisations at the core of the response to most emergencies (the emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties.”*<sup>783</sup>

The statutory duties of Category 1 responders encompass:

- “Risk assessment; (which, supported by a collective process, provides the grounding for delivering the substantive elements of the CCA),

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779 London Resilience Forum 2016, 5.

780 *ibid.*, 5.

781 See Pengelly 2011, 1.

782 Cabinet Office 2013.

783 *ibid.*, online.

- *Emergency planning,*
- *Business continuity management,*
- *Maintaining public awareness and arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred, [...]*
- *“Provision of advice and assistance to the commercial sector and voluntary organisations in the event of an emergency (business continuity promotion). [local authorities only]”*<sup>784</sup>

Category 2 organisations are defined by the CCA as “*bodies in the public and private sectors who are less likely to be involved in general resilience planning and front-line response work, but who may be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sectors*”.<sup>785</sup> This includes utilities providers like, water, gas, electricity, as well as communication and transport companies. All of these are required to perform more of a supportive role of *co-operation* and *information sharing* under the “*Contingency Planning Regulations (2005)*”.<sup>786</sup>

These duties of co-operation and information sharing equally apply to the Category 1 organisations.<sup>787</sup>

To “*cement the local-level partnership*” of Category 2, the regulation has established the format of the *Local Resilience Forum (LRF)* as a “*the principal mechanism for local multi-agency co-operation*”.<sup>788</sup>

It is built around:

- “*Coordinating Forums to ensure effective delivery of shared responsibilities,*
- *Structures to develop capabilities to respond [to] and recover from risks. This includes planning, testing and exercising*”.<sup>789</sup>

In the *Local Resilience Forum (based on police districts)* responders from both categories come together at least twice per year.<sup>790</sup>

“*While the LRF does not have a legal personality, nor powers to direct its members, the LRF must meet at least every six months. The main purpose of the LRF is to ensure effective delivery of the duties under the CCA and*

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784 Pengelly 2011, 1–2.

785 *ibid.*, 2.

786 *ibid.*, 2.

787 See Cabinet Office 2013, online.

788 Pengelly 2011, 2.

789 London Resilience Forum 2016, 7.

790 See Pengelly 2011, 2.



the associated Regulations that need to be delivered in a multi-agency environment, such as the production and update of the Community Risk Register (CRR), the production of multi-agency plans and arrangements to warn and inform the public during emergencies”<sup>791</sup>

Figure 38: London Resilience Forum “resilience through collective activity”<sup>792</sup>



The *London Resilience Forum* is the largest and most elaborated resilience forum in the United Kingdom. It is the core organising and coordinating element of the resilient response to terrorism in London.

<sup>791</sup> *ibid.*, 2.

<sup>792</sup> Graphic taken from the London Resilience Forum 2016, 6.

As the image below shows, the activities undertaken by the *London Resilience Forum* to achieve a resilient response are diverse. The organisation summaries them as follows:

- Assess risks to London’s resilience,
- Enhance London’s resilience through prevention and adaptation,
- Prepare, respond, recover and learn from exercises and emergencies,
- Help Londoners to be prepared.

Beside the above-mentioned responders of the different agencies and services providers from category 1 and 2, the *London Resilience Forum* brings together a diverse range of stakeholders/partners from a variety of sectors to assure the reach and relevance of measures and strategies, to help minimise any impact to the civil society, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 39: *London Resilience Forum stakeholders*.<sup>793</sup>



As can be seen in the figure above, the *London Resilience Forum* also includes representation from the *Faiths Forum for London*, representing

<sup>793</sup> Imager taken from Miller 2014, 11.

the *Faith Sector Panel*, to ensure that communities of faith may swiftly respond after a terror attack with messages of condemnation and unity <sup>794</sup> as happened in the aftermath to the *Westminster Bridge Attack*. <sup>795</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the Local Resilience Forum that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities need to take a coherent whole-of-government approach across different agencies and stakeholders to issues of resilience at the local and regional level. <sup>796</sup> Authorities need to build dependable relationships with all stakeholders before the crisis arises, to ensure interoperability between responders and the most effective use of the partnership's combined resources when needed. <sup>797</sup>
- Authorities need to promote collaboration across and within stakeholders' sectors.
- Authorities should ensure that faiths representatives are included in the resilience forum who may swiftly respond after a religiously motivated terror attack.

<i>Local Resilience Forum</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 6.2.18. Non-Damage Business Interruption Coverage

The 2015/16 terrorist attacks in Europe and at the Borough Market in London in 2017, which had focused on soft targets with comparatively very

<sup>794</sup> Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017, 49.

<sup>795</sup> See ITV News 2017 ; See Polianskaya 2017.

<sup>796</sup> See London Resilience Forum 2016, 5.

<sup>797</sup> See *ibid.*, 5.

little damage done to buildings or infrastructure, made a “Terrorism Insurance Gap” evident.<sup>798</sup> Post-incident disaster management and the necessary forensics prevented many businesses in proximity to the attack site from operating for days, despite no direct physical damages to their businesses. Some of these businesses did not recover from these indirect consequences and uninsurable losses.<sup>799</sup>

By passing the “*Counter Terrorism and Border Security Bill 2018*”, the British Parliament closed this “terrorism insurance gap” in early 2019. It allowed the U.K. Government-backed provider of terrorism re-insurance *Pool Re* to extend its coverage for its members for *Non-Damage Business Interruption* (NDBI) for the first time.<sup>800</sup>

The NBDI coverage saves insured large corporations and especially small traders from bankruptcy out of income loss, following impaired or prevented access to their commercial premises after an attack, and saves the community from loss of services/business.<sup>801</sup> The extension of insurance cover also expands the pool of insured businesses. Now it has also gained relevance for small traders who before did not feel directly targeted, or who are just small tenants. Getting cover now has an advantage for them. Getting insurance and paying the premium is also likely to prompt better awareness for business continuity planning among SMEs.

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the Non-Damage Business Interruption Coverage that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should assure that terrorism insurance also covers non-damage-related business interruptions, especially for SMEs.

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798 See Pool Re July 2018.

799 See *ibid.*, 5.

800 See *ibid.*, 5.

801 See *ibid.*, 5.

<i>Non-Damage Business Interruption (NDBI) Coverage</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

### 6.2.19. Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme

Under this scheme introduced in 1989, any member of the public has the right to ask the Attorney General to review a Crown Court sentence for a certain range of offences within 28 days, if he thinks that the sentence is unduly lenient.<sup>802</sup> If the request passes the Attorney General's "test", the case will be referred to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration. While originally introduced to mainly deal with criminal cases like rape, murder or robbery, different terrorism-related offences have been included over the years, with 19 new types of terror-related offences included in 2017 alone.<sup>803</sup>

As any citizen can easily submit a request for review to the Attorney General's Office the scheme ensures that especially victims of terrorism are in the position to request that sentences are revised, if and when their *Just-World-Beliefs* are further threatened by a feeling that these have been unduly lenient.<sup>804</sup>

The scheme can be seen as an empowerment of victims. It gives them a voice and allows them to influence their future which is forever linked with the terrorist perpetrators. It may also satisfy their quest for revenge and to express their hate, which is psychologically not necessarily a bad thing compared to a permanent feeling of fear, as studies have found.<sup>805</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the Unduly Lenient Sentence scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

802 See The Crown Prosecution Service 2019.

803 See UK Ministry Of Justice 2017.

804 See Day 2018.

805 See Lerner *et al.* 2003 ; See Day 2018, online.

- Authorities should ensure through appropriate legislation that sentencing for terrorism takes adequate consideration of direct victims’ and the public’s need for justice and final closure.

<b><i>Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme</i></b>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

## 6.2.20. Victim Support

The help and care for victims of terror attacks in the UK has significantly improved over the years, and authorities have learned from past attacks, and they are constantly re-evaluating their response.<sup>806</sup> Since the 2017 London Bridge attack for example, the City of London Police has placed over 100 emergency trauma packs at strategic locations in and around “the square mile” at company premises to improve the initial pre-hospital medical emergency response in the crucial first minutes after an attack before the emergency medical personnel arrive.<sup>807</sup>

Each emergency trauma pack “*offers effective medical capability containing a range of kit for initial medical management including items that can be used for major trauma, hostile attack or natural disasters.*”<sup>808</sup>

These packs which are held and paid for by the private sector, can be called upon 24/7 by the police and be delivered by an advanced first aid-trained security officer. London’s Police officers are also being trained in providing advanced first aid through these packs.<sup>809</sup> While this is just

<sup>806</sup> See Survivors Against Terror 2018, 3.

<sup>807</sup> See City of London Police 2017 ; See City of London Police 2018c.

<sup>808</sup> Prometheus Medical Ltd. 2017.

<sup>809</sup> See City of London Police 2018c.


one example, the response by law enforcement and emergency services to terror attacks is rated highly successful:

*Survivors of terror attacks rate the support they received highly, with most services being rated by 80% of respondents as good, very good or exceptional. Services such as NHS emergency provision were rated as exceptional by a full 65% of people and very good by a further 15%. The help provided by police and paramedics scored similarly highly.*<sup>810</sup>

Also, the immediate bereavement support offered to grieving family members of terror attack victims in the 72 hours after an attack, has shown to be a strength in the aftermath of the Manchester Arena suicide attack in June 2017.<sup>811</sup> It included “having a Bereavement Nurse in the Coroner’s Office who can respond if there is a sudden, unexpected death.”<sup>812</sup>

However, victims of terrorism find that longer-term support like mental health services, financial and legal support need improvement.<sup>813</sup> This mixed picture of the support offered through the government, is reflected in the findings by the “Survivors against Terror” charity.<sup>814</sup>

*Figure 40: The provision of mental health services, financial- and legal support in the UK for terrorism victims are lacking, according to study.*<sup>815</sup>



810 Survivors Against Terror 2018, 3.

811 See Berkhoff 2019, 18.

812 *ibid.*18.

813 See Survivors Against Terror 2018.

814 See Bardsley 2018.

815 Image taken from survey report Survivors Against Terror 2018, 8.

Charitable organisations play an important part in the recovery process of victims in the UK, financially, socially, emotionally and politically. The *Survivors' Assistance Network* is the first port of call for those affected by an attack and helps assess their needs and provides the necessary information, contacts and referrals. The group *Survivors Against Terror* provides a voice for survivors and organises activities to bring change into government policies, to better combat terrorism and better care for survivors.<sup>816</sup> They support survivors in finding purpose and meaning, in experiencing community and in taking back control of their lives.<sup>817</sup> They also help provide opportunities for recently injured survivors to speak with other people like wounded veterans or victims from previous attacks, who had gone through the same experience and could understand them, and have since recovered.<sup>818</sup> This helps survivors to gain confidence and hope for themselves, and offers access to a new community.

To the survivors of previous terrorist attacks who are helping later victims of terrorism to move forward, it provides purpose, meaning and gives them control of their own lives. As terrorists often choose iconic targets in major cities, the victims of the same attack may frequently come from many countries. Therefore, also the victim support organizations cooperate across borders (e.g. with <https://www.oneworldstrong.org> or <http://semperfund.org/>. and the charities (as well as the government) also provide support for foreign victims of terrorism in the UK.<sup>819</sup>

*What general lessons can authorities take away from the Victim Support that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should ensure close cooperation between the coroners, the police force, the security and the nursing teams to ensure that bereaved families may be safely shepherded through the first 72 hours after an incident.
- Authorities should ensure that the needs of the bereaved are placed at the centre of the process and ensure that this is reflected in the information policy of the police and the Coroner's Office towards the relatives.

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816 Bardsley 2018.

817 *ibid.*

818 Bainbridge 2018.

819 *ibid.*



- Authorities should consider to having a “bereavement nurse” directly in the coroner’s office who is able to quickly respond to sudden fatalities like from a terror attack.<sup>820</sup>
- Authorities must ensure an adequate level of long-term support of survivors with mental health services, financial and legal support.
- Authorities should ensure that NGOs who help and support victims and terror survivors to gain new confidence, purpose and meaning, receive adequate funding.


<i>Victim Support</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

### 6.3. UK Case Study Conclusion

The result of the analysis of the different programmes conducted under the *PROTECT & PREPARE* strand of the *UK’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism* reflects the *nine critical tasks* for building, strengthening and preserving *Strategic Resilience*, that *are at the core of the Rings-of Resilience Model* proposed in Chapter Five, emphasizing its relevance.

<sup>820</sup> See Berkhoff 2019, 18.

Figure 41: Nine critical tasks are reflected in the analysed UK counter-terrorism activities.<sup>821</sup>



Many of the programmes' activities fall into more than one category, suggesting that the programmes are efficient. The results of the analysis by themselves have to be taken with a pinch of salt though and do not allow to jump to a conclusion about the level of resilience and preparedness in the British society as a whole. This analysis has focused on government driven counter-terrorism programmes and did not include independently run activities by civil society and institutions. It is also leaving out existing national peculiarities and strengths which may make a number of government-run programmes unnecessary in certain areas.

The analysis does however give practitioners an idea where the UK government's focus is currently placed and where there may be areas necessitating additional efforts or requiring additional assessment to improve *Strategic Resilience*.

Simply judging by the number of activities in each task category, the analysis shows a strong focus on protective security measures that are concerned with *impact prevention and reduction* in combination with effective risk and crisis communication which assure adequate *informational support*. These measures are reflected in detailed counter-terrorism guidelines, and in up-to-date threat alerts and intelligence sharing that allows exposed

821 Author's own work.

businesses to adopt suitable mitigation measures. Last but not least, they show in the clear, concise and practical advice for the wider public what to do if caught up in an attack, and how to respond when coming across suspicious items or behaviours.

Corresponding with the authorities' effective risk communication is their emphasis on the need for *social cohesion* by calling on “every citizen to be a counter-terrorism citizen and [...] every responsible business [...] to be a counter-terrorism business”<sup>822</sup> who can complement or back-up the government's protective security measures through their own vigilance and *preparedness*. Today, businesses are already cooperating with UKCTP in an unprecedented way. The level of cooperation to help to detect, deny and to deter terrorist attacks is likely to further increase through the *step-change* initiatives.<sup>823</sup> Increased focus is now placed on boosting the vigilance and preparedness of the wider community by opening up ACT awareness trainings to the general public, and continuing support for public training initiatives for advanced first aid skills.<sup>824</sup>

The ability to limit the *indirect psychological impact* of jihadist terrorist attacks on the society and to *manage the potential fear*, is helped by the British people's long experience with terrorist attacks and the shared understanding that – as total security is not possible – keeping calm and carrying-on is the best public response. The very rapid response of police to end marauding terrorist firearms or bladed weapons attacks since Lee Rigby's murder in Woolwich in 2013, and the exemplary heroism and courage shown by individuals caught up in the attacks as portrayed in the press, has further helped to bolster confidence.

The ability of the authorities to *limit the indirect psychological impact* is also influenced by the strength of the “yellow press”. Depending on the circumstances including financial considerations, increase of circulation, and political partisanship, the tabloids' reporting of jihadi attacks and government response to them, may at certain times support clarity, unity and resolve. But it may also help to stir up fear, discord and distrust that are conducive for co-radicalisation<sup>825</sup> which has been strongly criticized by ter-

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822 Basu 2018.

823 See National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters 2019.

824 See Counter Terrorism Policing UK 2020 ; See National Counter Terrorism Security Office and St John Ambulance 2018.

825 See Sumpter 2017.

rorism survivors and the *Counter Terrorism Police* following the reporting on the Christchurch attack in March 2019.<sup>826</sup>

The necessary legislation and body for auditing effective government- and industry-independent self-regulators of the press, that could make above-mentioned transgressions less likely by introducing adequate code with accountability and recourse, had been established by Royal Charter in 2013.<sup>827</sup> But the commencement of *section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013*, that would create the conditions for significant numbers of publishers to be incentivised to join or set up an audited regulator (who is independent and would meet the 29 criteria defined in the Charter), has been held up by *Conservative* governments since and the promise to repeal section 40 has been part of the *Conservative* government's manifesto in October 2019.<sup>828</sup> The alternative press complaint handling body, the *Independent Press Standards Organisation* (IPSO) set up by the major tabloids as a response has been repeatedly judged the *Media Standards Trust* seen as failing to provide a “genuinely independent and effective system of self-regulation” as envisioned in the creation of the Royal Charter.<sup>829</sup>

In contrast to the apparent *laissez-faire* approach of the current government towards the tabloids, despite the virality of their online pages, it does intend to bring social media platforms and online service providers under the oversight of the independent regulatory body *Ofcom*, which already oversees broadcast media.<sup>830</sup> Its new *Online-Harms Act* is expected to come into law this year and is said to require the platforms to adopt transparent self-regulatory community standards and effective “Incident Content Protocols”.<sup>831</sup> These should ensure the swift removal from and denial of distribution of violent extremist content through online service

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826 After the horrendous attack on two mosques in Christchurch, three UK tabloids (The Sun, The Mirror and The Daily Mail) were found to have been instrumental for the wider dissemination of the attacker video and terrorist manifesto by reposting and amplifying it on to their sites, after the New Zealand police had asked not to publish it. At the same time, social media platforms like *Facebook* were undertaking all efforts to remove the same content and blocking its re-upload to their platforms over 1.5 million times.

See Cox 2019 ; See Basu 2019 ; Hacked Off 2019.

827 See Press Recognition Panel 2020, 30–31.

828 See Conservative and Unionist Party 2019, 48.

829 See Media Standards Trust 2019, 3.

830 See UK Home Office and UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 2020.

831 *ibid.*

platforms as advocated in the *Christchurch Call to Action*, the UK joined in May 2019.<sup>832</sup>

Based on the tradition of the British debating culture, society may be thought to be rather tolerant towards dissenting views and opinions. This openness may be considered as helpful for the *emotion-focused coping*, necessary after an attack. However, since the “7/7” suicide attacks by British-born Muslims, the government found it necessary to re-emphasise the promotion of “*fundamental British values*” in schools to “*regard people of all faiths, races and cultures with respect and tolerance*”, and to respect the rule of British law taking precedence over religious laws.<sup>833</sup>

This is indicative of a disagreement about *meaning* and identity in the British society regarding Britishness and the role of British Muslims within the society, and about Britain’s relationship with the Muslim world, brought to light after the British participation in the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>834</sup>

This is pointing to a general failure by consecutive British governments in the past “*to identify a distinct national notion of belonging*,”<sup>835</sup> an umbrella of an inclusive British civic national identity which can integrate the different and diverse ethnic groups that make up today’s multi-cultural Britain.<sup>836</sup>

This unresolved identity conflict is a source of friction in the authorities’ fight against jihadi terrorism or “*International Terrorism*”, as it is referred to.<sup>837</sup> This leads to disagreement in the society what this fight is about and against who it should fight.

The lack of shared understanding easily lends itself to the exploitation of connected or underlying social-cultural grievances. On the one side there is especially the victimisation, claimed by Islamist firebrands.<sup>838</sup> On the other side one has the far-right extremists harping on the otherness and the perceived threat of the Muslim ‘suspect community’.<sup>839</sup>

832 The *Christchurch Call to Action* is international initiative between governments and a number of large online service providers to eradicate violent terrorist content online. See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade 2019.

833 Department for Education 2014 ; See Kabir 2010, 11 ; See Asari *et al.* 2008, 1–2.

834 See Nesser 2011; See Verkaik 2014.

835 Hampshire 2005, 181.

836 See Asari *et al.* 2008.

837 See *ibid.*

838 See Nesser 2011.

839 See Abbas and Awan 2015.

While new research into British Muslims' views on government and counter-terrorism efforts suggest a sizable majority of Muslims have trust in the government and support their counter-terrorism efforts,<sup>840</sup> the remaining non-negligible-sized group may be receptive for influence operations that amplify existing grievances. Exemplary avenues are foreign-funded TV networks, online disinformation or covert funding and false-flag activism as practiced by Russia to increase of racial divisions in the United States.<sup>841</sup> The success of similar efforts in the UK, as part of the Brexit campaign, is highly likely, but cannot be verifiably assessed<sup>842</sup>: The intelligence report on the matter which was signed off by the *Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security* (PJCIS) on 17 October 2019 and whose publication has been delayed until July 2020, after the UK election, reveals “*the UK government’s failure to examine Russian attempts to influence the course of the Brexit vote and describes Russian interference in the country as “the new normal.”*”<sup>843</sup>

Shifting the attention from to those *directly affected* by an attack, the Government’s *provision of* emergency and initial medical *support* has been rated highly by the population. However, more resources are said to be needed for socio-psychological reintegration, with a focus on financial and psychological support. These assessments have been made before the Covid-19 response, which has brought to light serious fault lines in the British health care system, which many Brits had been accustomed to referring to as the envy of the rest of the world. If the negative comparison of the NHS with the better coping health care system in other countries will have lasting impact on the British perception and their demands of the system is still unknown at this moment, but not implausible.

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840 See Shanaah 2019.

841 See Ewing 2017.

842 See Wolchover and Robinson 2020.

843 Mackinnon 2020.

## 7. Chapter: Second Case – The Republic of Singapore

### 7.1. Introduction

Following the analysis of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy and the assessment of the country's deployed programmes against the nine variables established in the new *Strategic Resilience* framework in the previous chapter, this chapter replicates the same approach for the case of Singapore as part of the multiple-case replication design<sup>844</sup> adopted to test the relevance and validity of the *Rings of Resilience Model*.

### 7.2. Singapore's Counter-Terrorism Approach

Singapore's approach to counter-terrorism has to be understood in context of its history, geography, demography and political set-up.

The country has a small, but religiously and ethnically diverse population, with large minority groups living on a densely populated island without strategic depth, surrounded by large neighbouring countries. The historic memory of the Japanese invasion and occupation in 1942 is still recalled on the annual *Total Defence Day*. With it the country is reminded of its vulnerability and the consequential need to be strong, vigilant and prepared.

National Service (NS) for young men is an integral part of society and an important pillar for the security of the country. Full-time *National Service Men* (FT NSMen) can perform their duties in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the Singapore Police Force (SPF) or the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF). Apart from being an essential element of Singapore's defence posture, the National Service is also a nation-building element, where over a period of two years all male Singaporean citizens and second-generation permanent residents from all religions and races, are deliberately mixed and together are sworn in on the nation. After completing the National Service, they remain in a reservist status (as so called NSMen) which obliges them to serve up to 40 days per year until the age of 40.

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844 As described by Yin 2001, 49.

Singapore was first struck by international terrorism on its soil in 1974 when *Japanese Red Army* operatives supported by Palestinian extremists, bombed a petroleum facility and hijacked a ferry.<sup>845</sup> The incident was resolved without bloodshed, but offering safe passage to the Middle East for the terrorists. Singapore had appeared toothless. It reacted by strengthening its police force numbers by extending the possibility of doing one's NS from the SAF also to the SPF to produce additional trained reserve police officers whom the country could call up in a crisis. Singapore also started the clandestine formation and training of a dedicated counter-terrorism commando unit.

This unit was put to test (and its existence first acknowledged) 17 years later in 1991 when it successfully stormed a high-jacked Singapore Airlines plane, killed the four Pakistani terrorists, and freed all 123 hostages unharmed.<sup>846</sup>

The attacks of 9/11 and the discovery of plots by *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI), an *Al Qaida* affiliate, to commit large-scale attacks in Singapore and the following apprehension of 15 alleged terrorists were a watershed moment for the Singapore authorities.<sup>847</sup> Beyond the immense damage in blood and material destruction which the foiled attacks could have caused on the island, the Government saw the purportedly Islamic foundation of *Jemaah Islamiyah*'s violence as an existential threat to the Singapore way of life of peaceful coexistence of the different religions and ethnicities.<sup>848</sup>

Singapore's society of 5.6 million people is extremely diverse and the bad memories of deadly religious and ethnic conflicts which shortly after its independence in 1966 had spilled over the border from neighbouring countries, are still present in the mind of this young nation and were revived through the so-called *Little India Riots* in 2013.<sup>849</sup>

The country's population today encompasses "Buddhists (33.9%), Christians, (18.1%), Muslims (14.3%), Taoists (11.3%), Hindus (5.2%) and others (0.7%); some 16.4% are categorised as atheists. The country is also ethnically diverse, comprising Chinese (74.3%), Malays (13.4%), Indians (9.0%) and Others (3.2%)." <sup>850</sup> Since the days of the 1966 riots following independence,

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845 National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 20.

846 *ibid.*, 20–21.

847 See Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2003.

848 *ibid.*

849 See Liang and Sim 2014.

850 Hussin 2018, 173.



Singapore has made maintaining interfaith harmony a foundation stone of its government policy as it has modelled itself as a secular, open, and cosmopolitan society.<sup>851</sup> This model was actively challenged by the *jihadi* threat of *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

To reduce the distrust and the potential fear of the Muslim community as a result of the jihadi terror threat which showed in other countries after 9/11, the Government undertook a number of efforts on the society level: It requested and received the unambiguous condemnation of extremism by Muslim leaders in Singapore who accepted their exceptional ability and thereby duty as Muslims to contradict and to exorcise those who misused Islam to advance their own violent ideology.<sup>852</sup> At the same time, the Government reached out to all major religious groups in Singapore with the objective of bringing their community leaders together to reduce fears and prejudices among them through dialogue in the communities.<sup>853</sup>

To promote these interfaith dialogues, the Government created *Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles* (IRCC) in all of its 84 constituencies.<sup>854</sup> The Government was able to build on the existing organisational structure of the *Presidential Council for Religious Harmony* (PCRH) and the *Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act* (MRHA) it had enacted in 1990, as a reaction to an “increase in religious fervour and assertiveness” which had created inter-religious tensions, and to curb undesired political influence by faith groups.<sup>855</sup>

The MRHA allows the Government after consulting with the PCRH, to issue a restraining order to religious leaders and activists that it finds to be “causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility between different religious groups; or promoting a political cause”.<sup>856</sup> Since its introduction in 1990, no restraining order has been issued, but multiple religious leaders and activists received warnings that they would be liable to a restraining order if they did not change their behaviour.<sup>857</sup>

On the law enforcement front, Singapore cracked down on potential militants post 9/11 by utilising its legislative tools, especially the *Internal Se-*

851 Kwang 2019.

852 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 64–65.

853 See Hussin 2018, 175.

854 See *ibid.*, 178.

855 Government of Singapore 1989, 3.

856 Singapore Statutes Online 2001, 7–8.

857 See Hussin 2018, 180–181.

*curity Act*.<sup>858</sup> This is a remnant of colonial law which allows house searches without a warrant and the pre-emptive imprisonment of suspects without charge for up to two years, in order to protect national security.<sup>859</sup> The country also strengthened its border security and its attitude towards immigration, expanded its regional and international security and intelligence cooperation and strongly supported all international counter-terrorism legislation at the United Nations.<sup>860</sup>

In 2003, it was not terrorists but the outbreak of the *Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome* (SARS) in Singapore that for a short time threw the country into crisis. Through concerted government efforts, stringent measures which included indiscriminate screening of all travellers and home quarantines and starting “*a national movement on educating the public on symptoms of the disease, how it can spread and urging them to seek medical attention should they develop the symptoms*”, the authorities were able to quickly mitigate the health threat.<sup>861</sup> It took much longer to resolve the social impact of wide-spread fear regarding public life and the economy.<sup>862</sup>

Due to the SARS experience and following a thorough terrorism threat reassessment, the Government decided to reorganize Singapore’s security architecture as to make the fight against terrorism a top government priority.<sup>863</sup> The underlying structure would need to be conducive for a whole-of-government approach which required the coordinated and comprehensive action of all government departments. So, in August 2004, three months after the Madrid train bombings, the newly established *National Security Coordination Centre*, organisationally placed close to the top of Government, published the first National Security Strategy of Singapore, *dedicated “to the people of Singapore”*<sup>864</sup> as a “*framework of reference for all of us*.”<sup>865</sup>

On 68 pages it laid out Singapore’s comprehensive whole-of-nation approach to counter- terrorism, to “*prevent terrorist incidents, protect our vulnerabilities and help us respond effectively should attacks occur*.”<sup>866</sup> Naming a *jihadi* terrorist attack as the “Number One” threat to Singapore, the

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858 National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 23, 46.

859 See Singapore Statutes Online 1987.

860 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 44.

861 The Straits Times 2016.

862 See Chew 2009.

863 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 31.

864 *ibid.*, 3.

865 *ibid.*, 59.

866 *ibid.*, 59.

document provided a detailed overview of the security situation, explained who the enemy was in this conflict, and why Singapore was in this fight.<sup>867</sup>

While it reassured the population by describing all the things the Government had done and was doing to mitigate the threat, it also unequivocally made it clear that the Government depended on the citizens' help in its effort to keep the nation safe.

Figure 42: Two historic Total Defence campaign poster.<sup>868</sup>



This request on the population to “play its part” is congruent with the principles of the *Total Defence* framework which had been introduced in 1984.<sup>869</sup> The *Total Defence* framework postulates that for a credible defence, the responsibility for the nation's security cannot just lie with the armed forces. Instead, security must be a shared-responsibility of the whole population, to ensure maximised defence and deterrence capabilities, because threats are non-conventional, and because Singapore is a small country

867 See *ibid*.

868 Images taken from Public Service Division at Prime Minister's Office 2015.

869 See *ibid*, 60.

without strategic depth and with a unique social fabric.<sup>870</sup> This principle is well reflected in the earliest *Total Defence* campaign posters shown below.

The framework originally identified five intertwined areas apart from *Military Defence* which are important contributors to a “comprehensive defence” where the civil population can make important contributions. These areas are *Civil Defence*, *Economic Defence*, *Social Defence* and *Psychological Defence*.<sup>871</sup>

- The *Civil Defence* component supports a civilian population who is fully trained in civil defence emergency preparedness and life-saving skills, and is competent and confident to be able to look after themselves and help others in a national emergency or crisis situation.<sup>872</sup> This self-efficacy should instil confidence in their resilience and should reduce the feeling of being threatened by an attack. It should also provide peace-of-mind to members of emergency services and law enforcement to perform their duty away from their families during such a crisis.
- The *Social Defence* component stresses the importance to preserve social cohesion in this multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. It endorses service “to the larger community and country” to form and strengthen social bonds, and the “active participation in volunteer work.”<sup>873</sup>
- The *Economic Defence* component posits that a well-functioning economy with an agile private sector and workforce that is able and willing to adapt to changes and challenges in its environment, is an important contributor to the safety and security of Singapore.<sup>874</sup>
- The *Psychological Defence* component emphasises the role of each citizen in helping to maintain national resilience.<sup>875</sup> To safeguard the resilience of Singapore as a nation, each citizen is asked to do his part by preserving his confidence despite of adversities facing the nation and exhibit his patriotic spiritedness in action and words.<sup>876</sup>

In 2019, a sixth component was added: *Cyber Defence* which was renamed *Digital Defence* in 2020. This component urges Singaporeans to

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870 See *ibid.*, 60.

871 National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 60.

872 See Ministry of Defence Singapore 2004, 2.

873 *ibid.*, 2.

874 See *ibid.*, 2.

875 See *ibid.*, 1.

876 See *ibid.*, 1.

- “Adopt good cybersecurity practices to safeguard our personal data, devices and systems,
- Be aware of phishing attacks and internet scams.
- Use social media discerningly and responsibly,
- Be vigilant against fake news and the spread of deliberate online falsehoods.”<sup>877</sup>

Focusing on the direct terror threat, the National Security Strategy asks citizens to contribute to comprehensive security by being vigilant of suspicious items and of suspicious behaviour and to report it.<sup>878</sup> The citizens should also prepare themselves by acquiring the necessities, knowledge and training (e.g. first aid and equipment (e.g. emergency bag) to be able to look after themselves, their families and others, in case of an attack (e.g. improvised first aid).<sup>879</sup>

The private sector is equally asked to be on the look-out for suspicious items and suspicious behaviour and to invest in training, to improve protective security and to get the relevant security certification.<sup>880</sup> The companies are also required to have proper disaster planning in place and to undertake the necessary steps to assure business contingency management in the case of an attack.<sup>881</sup>

Religious leaders have a duty of speaking out against violent extremism, to report suspicious behaviour and to support national cohesion by religious moderation, respect and tolerance towards other faiths, in accordance with the adherence to the *Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act*.<sup>882</sup>

This distribution of core responsibilities of counter-terrorism between the authorities and the civil society remains in place in principle till today. But it has seen an incremental shift of more responsibility towards the population, as the terror threat assessment has evolved further. The population did however not automatically accept the increased responsibility, even after extended exposure to public appeals and public service announce-

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877 Ministry of Defence Singapore 2020a.

878 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 62.

879 See Wong 2017.

880 National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 62.

881 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020b.

882 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 65.

ment.<sup>883</sup> Thus the whole-of-nation-approach presents itself as a concept rather than as a reality.<sup>884</sup>

This became apparent to the Government in 2010, when the authorities set up a public awareness exercise through which they wanted to test the public vigilance towards terrorist threats. The exercise was modelled after a terrorist incident in New York City's Times Square in the same year, where police was able to defuse a car bomb after a member of the public had spotted and reported a suspicious smoking vehicle.<sup>885</sup>

The result in Singapore where wired-up vehicles were left smoking suspiciously in nine central locations, was disconcerting for the Government: Of 7,200 people who were directly exposed to the rigged cars in the scenario, only 260 took notice that something about the cars was wrong, and only 52 of these alerted the authorities or nearby security.<sup>886</sup> The visible complacency and the bystander effect was also reflected by poll results in the same year which showed Singaporeans did not feel that the country was under threat from terrorism.<sup>887</sup>

In acknowledgement of this finding, the Government focused on intensifying and systematizing its public education effort, from reaching primary school children to pensioners “*to establish a cultural norm of being vigilant and rejecting extremism and violence*”.<sup>888</sup> Its most realistic option in the short run though, was accepting that it may need to rely on only a few alert and prepared individuals who would really step up, should the need arise due to an attack.<sup>889</sup>

On the law enforcement side, the Government has continuously adapted to evolving threats on a tactical level and on the strategic level. Different from its beginning in 1974, when it was decided to create the Counter-Terrorism Unit in secret, the Government now places a great emphasises on communicating its efforts to reassure the population and deter terrorists.

As a reaction to the Madrid and 7/7 bombings in London for example, Singapore created a completely new police force, solely responsible for deterring, detecting and responding to attacks on its Metro network.<sup>890</sup>

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883 See Nadarajan 2012, 55.

884 See *ibid.*, 56.

885 See *ibid.*, 54.

886 See *ibid.*, 54.

887 See *ibid.*, 55.

888 *ibid.*, 54.

889 See *ibid.*, 55.

890 See *ibid.*, 76.

After a new pattern of marauding terrorist firearms and bladed weapons attacks emerged, Singapore signaled its resolve by creating and deploying visible *In-Situ Reaction Teams* (IRT) in crowded areas, to complement already existing capabilities of *Rapid Deployment Troops* (RDTs), equipped with tactical response motorcycles for faster response times.<sup>891</sup>

Since 2012, Singapore has also expanded its CCTV surveillance network by a total of 67,000 cameras.<sup>892</sup> These were installed in all public apartment blocks and multi-story carparks as well as in public spaces, like public transport walkways, hawker centres as well as neighbourhood and town centres. In 2019, another 2,500 locations across the island have been earmarked to receive 6000 more cameras over the next years, to support its counter-terrorism effort.<sup>893</sup>

By 2015, the experience of Daesh-inspired so-called lone wolf attacks in Europe and more cases of homegrown self-radicalizing in Singapore challenged the Government's patience and brought new urgency to its effort to "mainstream counter-terrorism" in the population.<sup>894</sup> The new preferred patterns of terror attacks, using vehicles, firearms or bladed weapons targeting random civilians without prior warning, had made it extremely difficult for law enforcement to foresee and prevent attacks just on their own. As if this was not bad enough, the Daesh ideology promoted by the attacks was even more extreme and more religiously divisive than the AlQaida positions.

So in 2016, the Government doubled down on the activation of a true whole-of-nation effort when the Prime Minister himself announced the launch of the *Singapore Secure Movement* (SGSecure).<sup>895</sup> Its stated objective is the strengthening and protecting of national cohesiveness and unity across races and religions, for it to become reality in everyday life.<sup>896</sup> This will allow Singapore to "*bounce back quickly and resiliently after an incident*", preserving Singapore's way of life and religious harmony.<sup>897</sup>

SG Secure offers resources, training, and companionship to Singaporeans to build their self-efficacy in such a way that they know how to behave under threat of an attack, how to respond in the event of an attack and how

891 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 2.

892 See Today Online 2016.

893 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 2.

894 Nadarajan 2012, 54.

895 See Lee 2016.

896 See *ibid.*

897 *ibid.*



to cope in the aftermath, aiming at increasing overall vigilance, cohesion and resilience in the nation.<sup>898</sup> The initiative is delivered through multiple channels, touchpoints and media in a whole-of-government approach and it visibly permeates most areas of public and community life.

This long-term effort complements Singapore's counter-terrorism deterrence posture (which has continuously increased its ability for direct denial and punishment) with indirect denial through the signaling of public resolve and community resilience. How credible the resolve and resilience is has not been tested in reality, but a representative national survey in July 2018 has shown that

*93% of the respondents believe that all Singaporeans will stand united regardless of race or religion, should an attack happen in Singapore. 96% of respondents were willing to help other Singaporeans affected by a terrorist attack here. Respondents were also confident that those around them will render assistance, with 76% believing that their neighbours will help them if they were affected.*<sup>899</sup>

Following from here, the author will look in detail at the different initiatives and measures the authorities Singapore are undertaking today to build or strengthen the societal resilience. These are visualized for a better overview on the opposite page.


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898 See *ibid.*

899 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 7.



Figure 43: Overview of the Singaporean activities and measures assessed in this chapter.<sup>900</sup>



900 Author's own work.

### 7.3. Singapore Community Programmes

*There are a wide range of programmes that are catered to educate and support the general public in essential civil defence skills and knowledge. These include mass participation in exercises, visits to households, distribution of educational materials, training tools and community events.*<sup>901</sup>

#### 7.3.1. Training and Engagement

##### 7.3.1.1. SGSecure Movement

SGSecure is a national movement launched in 2016, with the aim to prepare the public for the event of a terrorist attack. It calls on all Singaporeans to honour their own individual responsibility for Singapore's security by "*staying alert, staying united and staying strong*" in the face of terrorism.<sup>902</sup>

SGSecure offers information, resources, training and community to Singaporeans to build the self-efficacy to know how to behave under the threat of an attack, how to respond in the event of an attack, and how to cope and help others in the aftermath.<sup>903</sup>

The initiative is delivered through multiple channels, touchpoints and media in a whole-of-government approach, and it visibly permeates most areas of public and community life, as well as the private sector and schools. The activities include large and regular small-scale public exercises that can involve Counter-Terrorism Police, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), Civil Defence Forces, emergency services, volunteer emergency responders, businesses and special CBRN-defence units which are to underline the need for vigilance and to portrait resolve.

SGSecure focusses on three areas: *Vigilance, Cohesion, and Resilience*<sup>904</sup>

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901 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018c.

902 Government of Singapore 2016.

903 See *ibid.*

904 Government of Singapore 2018.

## Vigilance

SGSecure encourages citizens to be vigilant in their daily lives and to be alert of suspicious behaviour, suspicious objects and of vehicles which may be connected to terrorist activity and report them to the police.<sup>905</sup>

Apart from media and events, the SGSecure message is delivered through visits of all 1.39 million households in Singapore.<sup>906</sup> These visits are conducted by members of the police, SCDF, reservists and volunteers who inform residents of the terrorist threat and who spread the message of vigilance, cohesion, and resilience.<sup>907</sup> According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, by end of 2018, one third of all households in Singapore had been personally visited.<sup>908</sup> During these home visits, the teams also present the SGSecure mobile app and encourage Singaporeans to install it. This mobile application is an important component in the Government's effort to build greater preparedness, and it encourages all citizens to download it on their phones. Some of the mobile phone network providers agreed to pre-install the app on their devices.

The application has multiple functionalities:

- It allows the citizens to easily report suspicious items or activities directly to the *Police Counter-Terrorism Center*, complete with pictures and with the location data.
- It allows the citizens to receive security alerts and security-related messaging from the police and other *Home Team* agencies.
- In case of a crisis, it allows the Government to instantly warn and inform citizens by push message.
- It allows citizens to register as “myResponder”-volunteers who agree to receive alerts if minor emergencies like an incident with a cardiac arrest or a minor fire are reported in their vicinity, to allow them to promptly respond before the SCDF paramedics or fire fighters arrive.
- It allows citizens to locate the position of the next AED close to their location.

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905 See *ibid.*

906 See Lee 2016.

907 See *ibid.*

908 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 3.

## Cohesion

SGSecure also encourages citizens to work together to strengthen social cohesion across racial and religious lines in their daily lives in their community, neighbourhood, and their workplace to preemptively mitigate potential tensions, based on fear and distrust between different groups which could arise after a terrorist attack.<sup>909</sup>

During the home visits described above, citizens may for example be encouraged to join volunteer schemes in their community, run by partner organisations which help “to sensitise, train and prepare residents in the neighbourhoods for a terror attack, including in skills such as First Aid and CPR-AED.”<sup>910</sup>

## Resilience

SGSecure encourages self-efficacy by educating citizens how to behave if caught up in a terrorist attack, and how they can cope themselves or support the coping of loved ones in the aftermath of an attack.<sup>911</sup> It also trains the citizens at the community level in First Aid and CPR-AED through the *Community Emergency Preparedness Programme*, offered by the SCDF. This is aligned with the Government’s effort to equip all residential building blocks with one AED and to ensure at least two trained citizens on each floor.<sup>912</sup> Besides offering training in medical first aid, SGSecure also encourages citizens to get trained in “*Psychological First Aid*” as there is the understanding that “*psychosocial support in emergencies is best delivered as a community-based activity*.”<sup>913</sup> The Singapore Red Cross supports this effort by offering such training to citizens to enable them to “*provide Psychological First Aid to help people affected by an emergency, disaster or traumatic event*”.<sup>914</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the SGSecure movement that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

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909 See Government of Singapore 2018.

910 *ibid.*

911 See *ibid.*

912 Lee 2016.

913 Government of Singapore 2018.

914 *ibid.*

- Authorities should conduct regular large and small-scale public CT exercises to build awareness and confidence.
- Authorities should encourage citizens to be vigilant in their daily lives and be alert of suspicious behaviour, suspicious objects and vehicles which may be connected to terrorist activity and report them to the police.
- Authorities should offer information, resources, training and community to citizens to build their self-efficacy to know how to behave under the threat of an attack, how to respond in the event of an attack, and how to cope and help others in the aftermath.
- Authorities should devise a technical solution that:
  - Allows the citizens to easily report suspicious items or activities directly to the counter-terrorism police with pictures and the location data,
  - Allows the citizens to receive security alerts and security-related messaging from the police and other *Home Team* agencies,
  - Allows the Government to instantly warn and inform citizens by push message.
- Authorities should encourage citizens to work together to strengthen social cohesion across racial and religious lines in their daily lives in their community, neighborhood and their workplace to preemptively mitigate potential tensions, based on fear and distrust between different groups, which could arise after a terrorist attack.
- Authorities should establish volunteer schemes in their community that increase the vigilance and develop preparedness of citizens.
- Authorities should encourage self-efficacy by educating citizens how to behave if caught up in a terrorist attack.
- Authorities should educate citizens how they can cope or support the coping of loved ones in the aftermath of an attack.
- Authorities should train the citizens at the community level in first aid and CPR-AED usage.
- Authorities should ensure that residents of large residential building blocks have access to an AED and are able to use it.
- Authorities should encourage citizens to get trained in Psychological first aid.

SGSecure Movement	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	✓
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	✓

### 7.3.1.2. SGSecure Media Cluster

To assure maximum reach and a high number of impressions, the dissemination of the SGSecure campaign messages through the media has been of critical importance in addition to the house visits and community events (e.g. Emergency Preparedness Days). The *Ministry of Communication and Information (MCI)* steers this effort through a close cooperation with the media industry, including producers, editors and online influencers.<sup>915</sup>

The so-called *SGSecure Media Cluster* is an important tool to help the Government “rallying the public together and in maintaining social cohesion and resilience during times of communal tension and/or emergencies.”<sup>916</sup> The specifics of the Singaporean media environment which is closely curtailed by the *Media Development Authority* and ranked 151<sup>st</sup> in Press Freedom according to *Reporters without Borders* in 2019, is conducive to the dominating influence of the *SGSecure Media Cluster*’s messaging.<sup>917</sup>

In addition to dedicated counter-terrorism / vigilance content produced for television, cinema and *YouTube* channels, the *SGSecure* messages are also inserted into individual, fitting episodes of different established TV entertainment formats, on the various Chinese dialect and language programmes of the main Singapore TV Channels.<sup>918</sup> The *SGSecure Media Cluster* has also produced a number of travelling exhibitions to be shown

915 See Ministry of Communications and Information Singapore 2020b.

916 *ibid.*

917 Reporters Without Borders 2019.

918 See Ministry of Communications and Information Singapore 2017 ; These formats include dialect programmes, “Eat Already” (Jiak Ba Buay in Hokkien) and “Happy

in schools and at community events. Theatre plays have been produced in cooperation with the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY).

Apart from the SGSecure mobile application, the website Gov.sg has been designated by the MCI as the official information outlet for verified information and guidance to the public during a time of crisis.<sup>919</sup> From there the same information is also distributed through the official social media channels e.g. on *Twitter, Facebook, YouTube* or *Telegram*.

*What measures can authorities take away from the SGSecure Media Cluster that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should take a concerted whole-of-government approach to communicating to the public about terrorism.
- Authorities should produce or initiate the production of dedicated counter-terrorism/ vigilance content for television, cinema and *YouTube* channels.
- Authorities should evaluate including counter-terrorism messaging into single episodes of different established entertainment formats.
- Authorities should create travelling exhibitions or theatre plays on the subject, appropriate to be to be shown / performed in schools, community events, or at other venues (e.g. shopping mall exhibition spaces)
- Authorities should establish trusted channels of information and guidance to the public during a time of crisis.

<i>SGSecure Media Cluster</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Build Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	✓
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Deliver Dedicated Support for Directly Affected</i>	

Can Already” (Hua Hee Tio Ho in Hokkien) on Channel 8, and the Channel 5 programme, “Steady Lah!”.

919 Ministry of Communications and Information Singapore 2020a.

### 7.3.1.3. SGSecure Community Network

Following attacks on places of worship in Europe, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka the Government expanded their SGSecure outreach to all religious and cultural organizations in Singapore (beyond those already organized in the *Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles*) to increase their preparedness for potential attacks. This has been done with a clear expectation by the Government that these religious organisations fulfill their obligation “under SGSecure for their followers and for the wider society.”<sup>920</sup> By establishing the SGSecure Community Network (SGCN) the MCCY aims to “build stronger community networks and prepare places of worship to be crisis-ready.”<sup>921</sup>

Under this programme, religious organisations receive security briefings and are taught about counter-terrorism frameworks which should enable them, under guidance from Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) experts, to develop their own crisis management plans for their places of worship, and to pass on relevant security advice to their members.<sup>922</sup> The groups are also included in CT exercises organized by the MHA, to test their preparedness and to practice their skills.

*What measures can authorities take away from the SGSecure Community Network that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should support religious groups to develop their own crisis management plans for their places of worship and to pass on relevant security advice to their members.
- Authorities should also include religious groups in CT exercises to test their preparedness and to help them practice their skills.

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920 Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019e.

921 *ibid.*

922 See *ibid.*; See also *Security Advisories Booklet For Religious and Community Organisations* published by Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019a.



<i>SGSecure Community Network</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 7.3.1.4. SCDF Community Emergency Preparedness Programme

The three-tier structured *Community Emergency Preparedness Programme* (CEPP) offered to Singapore residents, teaches essential life-saving skills and core emergency procedures, including the *SGSecure* skillset.<sup>923</sup> Offered by the *Singapore Civil Defence Force* (SCDF), the programme's focus lies on building the ability of the citizens to practically apply their acquired knowledge in case of an emergency.<sup>924</sup>

– *I AM SAFE* Module

The first module, now offered as an e-learning module taught in only 15 minutes, should enable the citizen to take care of himself, as well as his family and those around him in an emergency situation.<sup>925</sup>

– *RESPONSE READY* Module

The second module taught and trained in 3,5 hours, aims to equip the citizen with three basic emergency preparedness skill, first aid, CPR-AED and firefighting, to be able to provide initial emergency assistance in a distress situation before the SCDF arrives.<sup>926</sup>

– *LIFESAVER* Module

After a four-hour training in the third module, the citizen is assumed to be equipped with enhanced life-saving- and emergency preparedness

<sup>923</sup> See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2020a.


<sup>924</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>925</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>926</sup> See *ibid.*

skills. He is expected to be able and willing to volunteer to help save lives and render assistance in emergency situations.<sup>927</sup>

Figure 44 and 45: <sup>928</sup><sup>929</sup> Promotion and sample scenes from Emergency Preparedness Days including staged police response to terrorist attack and engagement of residents at booth through police and volunteers.



To raise awareness for the programme and to provide practice for grass-roots volunteers and residents “on how to mobilize their resources and deal with large-scale emergencies within their neighbourhood”, the SCDF organizes dozens of community exercises, known as Emergency Preparedness Days, each year (48 in 2018) and is raising the numbers further in 2019 and 2020.<sup>930</sup> The exercises are organized in coordination with the community’s *Emergency and Engagement Committee* (C2E) and the *People’s Association*. The hypothetical crisis scenarios generally include a terrorism segment which may also involve attacks with CBRN materials and are supported

927 See *ibid*.

928 Image taken from People’s Association *et al.* 2018.

929 Image taken from Ang and Desmond 2016.

930 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018b ; Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c.

by the *Singapore Police Force* (SPF). At the same time they are used as an opportunity to portray “*the readiness of SCDF and other Home Team agencies, as well as volunteers*” to deal with such a crisis, to the community residents.<sup>931</sup>

Apart from the enacted scenarios on display, strong focus is placed on the residents to get hands-on-experience including extinguishing fires, applying CPR, to train “In-Place-Protection” and to test their knowledge of the public warning systems’ (PWS) signals and of decontamination procedures.<sup>932</sup> Their learning is supported through direct volunteer engagement, interactive tools, training simulators and modern education material as shown in the figures 49 and 50.<sup>933</sup>

*“Having residents trained in SGSecure core skillsets, will enhance the community’s ability to respond to emergency situations in their daily lives and to terrorist attacks should they occur.”*<sup>934</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Community Emergency Preparedness Days that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should organise regular emergency preparedness days in cooperation with the civil defence and first responders to raise awareness for and build self-efficacy in essential life-saving skills and core emergency procedures, including terrorism vigilance and preparedness among the citizens.
- Authorities should ensure that on emergency preparedness days citizens can get hands-on-experience including extinguishing fires and applying CPR, and that they can test and improve their relevant knowledge through interactive tools, modern education material and training simulators.
- Authorities should create and use the attention on emergency preparedness days to demonstrate their resolve and preparedness by tackling simulated crisis scenarios, which include a terrorism segment.

931 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018b.

932 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018b.

933 See *ibid.*

934 Ministry of Communications and Information Singapore 2017.

Community Emergency Preparedness Days	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	✓

### 7.3.1.5. SCDF-PA Civil Defence Ready Homes Programme

To reduce the burden on emergency services during a crisis situation, the SCDF, National Fire and Civil Emergency Preparedness Council (NFEC) and People's Association (PA) collaborate to increase the ability and preparedness of able citizens to help themselves. The *Civil Defence Ready Home Programme* encourages the 1.3 million households to assess their readiness to deal with emergencies as a social unit and guides them to obtaining the necessary civil defence skills to achieve the necessary crisis readiness.<sup>935</sup>

This includes efficacy in taking *In-Place-Protection* (IPP) measures in the case of the release of airborne biological, chemical or radiological agents stemming from a terrorist attack or an industrial accident, as well as the availability of readily pre-packed emergency bags, in case evacuation measures are required.<sup>936</sup>

The adoption of the above measures by the households is supported through media publicity, the distribution of easy-to-follow hands-on-guidance (e.g. *Civil Defence Emergency Handbook*<sup>937</sup> and *Civil Defence Ready-*

935 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2019b.

936 See *ibid.* ; Singapore Civil Defence Force 2019a.

937 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2019c.

*Homes check-lists*<sup>938</sup>) as well as through public education at community exercises, schools and workplaces.<sup>939</sup>

In addition, the SCDF also has gamified civil defence skills in its *SCDF Emergency Preparedness Center (EPC)*, an edutainment centre where families as well as groups can experience, learn and practice their skills in a playful manner.<sup>940</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Civil Defence Ready Home Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should provide self-help information and guidance to increase the ability and preparedness of able citizens to help themselves in their homes or in case of evacuation.
- Authorities should support the adoption of proposed measures through media publicity, the distribution of easy-to-follow hands-on-guidance (e.g. *Civil Defence Emergency Handbook* and check-lists) as well public education at community exercises, schools and workplaces.

<i>Civil Defence Ready Home Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

938 Singapore Civil Defence Force and People's Association 2019.

939 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c ; See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018c.

940 See Hussain 2015.

### 7.3.1.6. SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre

Opened in 2015, the purpose- built *SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre* (EPC) “utilizes highly visual and interactive exhibits to impart emergency preparedness knowledge and skills to its visitors of all ages.”<sup>941</sup>

It gamifies the *Community Emergency Preparedness Program*’s content through interactive features and through engaging hands-on simulations as shown in the image below. On 280 sqm this edutainment centre offers visitors an immersive experience into the different facets of personal emergency preparedness, whether dealing with fire, medical emergencies, extreme weather situations, terrorist attacks, chemical attacks or even war.

Figure 46: <sup>942</sup> Visitors learn firefighting skills in a gamified immersive way at the SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre.



*What measures can authorities take away from the SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

941 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2015.

942 Image taken from Chang 2015.

- Authorities should establish civil defence skills edutainment centres where families as well as school groups can experience, learn and practice their emergency preparedness skills in a playful manner.
- Authorities should consider making use of new *Virtual Reality* and simulation technologies to make the learning a *highly visual and interactive, as well as a desirable* immersive experience.

<i>SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

### 7.3.1.7. The Singapore Discovery Centre

The *Singapore Discovery Centre* (SDC) is an important public education component in the Government's effort to build a strong and resilient nation.<sup>943</sup> This edutainment centre was designed by a renowned architect and comprises state-of-the-art facilities including outdoor areas, and cinemas with free entry for Singaporeans. The centre teaches about Singapore's national heritage and civic values in an engaging and entertaining way, which has also made it a popular tourist destination. The SDC caters for different segments of the Singaporean population:<sup>944</sup>

- 4) To Singaporean citizen and especially families,
- 5) To educators to whom it offers dedicated tours as well as dedicated resources,
- 6) To primary and secondary school student groups with dedicated tours,
- 7) To grassroots volunteer groups who receive special tours,
- 8) To uniformed groups and NS FT service men.


943 See Singapore Discovery Centre 2018c.

944 See Singapore Discovery Centre 2018b.



*Total Defence* and the *SGSecure* messages are included in the exhibitions and cinema movies that promote national resilience through civic engagement as shown in the image below.

Figure 47: Poster for the immersive 4-D homeland defence-scenario movie *Operation Lightning Crush* shown in SDC cinema.<sup>945</sup>



The *Total Defence* concept and *SGSecure* messages are also gamified: the visitor's survival skills and appreciation for *Total Defence* are put to the

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945 Singapore Discovery Centre 2019.



test, for example in counter-terrorism paintball gameplays or immersive live-action “zombie apocalypse” pandemic scenarios as shown below.<sup>946</sup>

Figure 48: Excerpt from the school programme booklet<sup>947</sup>;

## COUNTER TERRORISM PAINTBALL

**LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

1. Understand the importance of leadership, teamwork and communication
2. Encourage students to work together for a common goal

**DURATION**  
3h (Programme is only conducted on weekdays)

**NO. OF PARTICIPANTS**  
Min. 24 pax / Max. 40 pax (per session)  
\*Complimentary bus transport (T&C apply)



Students learning how to target accurately with the paintball markers

Figure 49: Promotion Banner for the Area 51o Zombie Apocalypse event.<sup>948</sup>



**24 MARCH 2018**

# AREA 510

TOGETHER WE SURVIVE

**S'PORE DISCOVERY CENTRE'S  
DEBUT THRILLER ADVENTURE EVENT!**

**WARNING** EVENT MAY BE TOO INTENSE FOR CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 13. NO MASKS ALLOWED.

946 Zhang 2018.

947 Singapore Discovery Centre 2020.

*What measures can authorities take away from the Singapore Discovery Centre Concept that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should support the delivery of civic education to different groups in society by setting-up dedicated state-of-the-art edutainment venues or events.

At these venues or events, topics like national identity or social cohesion are made tangible through gamification and are embedded into immersive and entertaining group experiences as they are perceived as desirable.

<i>Singapore Discovery Centre Concept</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

### 7.3.2. Volunteering

In Singapore's community-based approach to counter-terrorism volunteering has long played an important role. From early on in its history, its security posture strongly depended on volunteers for its police force and on drafted recruits for its armed forces.<sup>949</sup> From the beginning, the involvement of a high proportion of the society in the safeguarding of its security was chosen not only for its force-multiplying effect. It became part of the Government's strategy to instill and strengthen a collective national spirit that could unite an ethnically diverse country.<sup>950</sup> In Singapore today, the Government is actively promoting and demanding the citizens' contri-

948 Singapore Discovery Centre 2018a.

949 See Public Service Division at Prime Minister's Office 2015.

950 See Kwang 2019.

butions to Singapore's safety and security and is actively endorsing and recognising community volunteering as a means to

- Reduce community stereotypes and prejudices,
- Build bonds in and between communities,
- Strengthen feeling of connectedness and belonging,
- Develop personal resilience through increased self-efficacy and connectedness,
- Establish community resilience and cohesion based on the established relations.

At the community level volunteering is organised in two streams:

Volunteers for the SPF or SCDF who are qualified and willing to commit themselves to mandatory minimum numbers of hours of service per month, are coordinated by the *Home Team Volunteer Network (HTVN)*. The HTVN is operated by the *Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)* and coordinates all volunteer affairs across the different agencies in its area of responsibility. It integrates volunteers into the force structure of the SPF or SCDF as auxiliary officers where they work side-by-side with “regular” officers across the island. All other volunteers who would like to contribute to grassroots organisations in their community, are supported and organised through *The People's Association (PA)*.

The *People's Association (PA)* was set up in 1960 “as a statutory board to promote racial harmony and social cohesion in Singapore.”<sup>951</sup> It aims to bring citizens from across different communities together to participate and volunteer in a multitude of different programmes, delivered by an extensive “network of 2,000 grassroots organisations” and by 100 community clubs supported by the PA.<sup>952</sup>

The PA especially encourages citizens to get active within their community and direct neighbourhood (which are all generally multi-ethnically mixed by design, following the Government quotas), and to “build bonds, promote neighbourliness and help one another in times of emergencies” by joining PA-supported communal interest groups, neighborhood support groups and emergency preparedness volunteer programmes.<sup>953</sup>

951 People's Association 2020.

952 *ibid.*

953 See *ibid.*

The PA's mission to promote racial harmony and social cohesion has also made it an important contributor to the SGSecure movement, by running emergency preparedness volunteer schemes. Through these schemes, the PA helps to “sensitise, train and mobilise the community to prevent and deal with a terror attack” and thus to mitigate the impact on the community.<sup>954</sup>

The schemes, programmes, local initiatives and interest groups are administered locally through so-called *Community Emergency and Engagement (C2E) Committees* which exist in each constituency. These committees are run by volunteers from the specific community within the PA framework and with support from various government agencies.<sup>955</sup>

*“During peace time, C2E Committees develop and maintain the Community EP plans, structures and systems. They organise exercises and EP activities to stay prepared and ensure operational readiness during emergencies. The C2E Committees also partner various government emergency authorities to educate public about Community EP. During times of emergency, C2E Committees coordinate community resources and grassroots emergency response efforts. Together with other grassroots organisations, they help emergency authorities defuse tension and restore public confidence and normalcy by disseminating critical information and collecting feedback.”*<sup>956</sup>

On the community level, the *C2E Committees* oversee and support different volunteers' programmes which again support community cohesion and resilience in the face of terrorist attacks. The shared “objective of the [...] programmes is to help the community stay calm, be resilient during emergencies and return to normalcy as quickly as possible.”<sup>957</sup> By participating in the programmes, the PA hope that citizens will not only pick up the vocational skills they have been trained for, but also appreciate the importance of racial harmony as the bedrock for a strong national social fabric.

The following volunteering opportunities through the HTVN and PA are worth mentioning as means to strengthening *Strategic Resilience*:

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954 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 3.

955 See People's Association 2019.

956 People's Association 2018.

957 People's Association 2019.

### 7.3.2.1. Volunteer Special Constabulary – Police Officer Scheme

*For over seventy years, Singapore has offered a Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC) career which allows trained citizens to serve part-time in the SPF, vested with rights and duties equal to regular police officers.<sup>958</sup> These VSC officers are operating across the Police Land Divisions and special units and may be deployed during major public events.<sup>959</sup>*

The VSC accepts qualified laymen and laywomen who will be trained to the necessary level. But also, NSMen, Singaporeans or Permanent Residents who previously did their two years in the National Service in the Singapore Police Force and have already been trained, are eligible.<sup>960</sup> *“Each tour of duty could last from a 4-hour shift to a full shift of 12-14 hours, depending on operational requirements.”<sup>961</sup>* Mostly, deployments will take place after office hours and on the weekends. There are currently about 1,200 VSC officers compared to about 9,500 regular uniformed officers in Singapore according to the most recent SPF annual report.<sup>962</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the VSC Police Officer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should welcome and direct the citizens’ desire to volunteer in their free time to serve for the community’s safety and security in a police auxiliary component.
- Authorities should consider the use of volunteer-based police auxiliary components which can support the regular force in regular tasks as well as during tensions.
- Authorities should promote the volunteer-based auxiliary component of community police to promote the idea of each citizen’s opportunities and responsibility to contribute to the security of everyone.

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958 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019h.

959 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019i.

960 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019j.

961 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019i.

962 Singapore Police Force 2019a, 69.

VSC Police Officer Scheme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

#### 7.3.2.2. Volunteer Special Constabulary – Community Officer Scheme

The *Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC) Community Scheme* has been set up in 2018 to add more visible police presence in highly frequented areas, like shopping malls or markets or community areas.<sup>963</sup> The VSC Community officers are usually deployed after office hours and on the weekends, in order not to interfere with the regular work of the volunteers.<sup>964</sup>

After a short period of training through the police, the volunteers are assigned as *VSC Community Officers* to Neighbourhood Police Centres. There they work alongside the regular police officers. On duty, the “*VSC (Community) officers will not carry arms but will carry a Police warrant card and be equipped with handcuffs, a baton and a communications set.*”<sup>965</sup> Their uniform is similar to those of the NPC Community police officers.

*What measures can authorities take away from the VSC Community Officer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police. Auxiliary component to benefit from the local knowledge and agency.
- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police. Auxiliary component to benefit from additional eyes and ears on the street.

963 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019k.

964 See *ibid.*

965 *ibid.*

- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police auxiliary component to benefit from a visibly larger law enforcement presence that can reassure citizens and deter terrorists.
- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police auxiliary component to form better relationships between the police and the community.
- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police auxiliary component to increase the number of trained and prepared citizens.

<i>VSC Community Officer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 7.3.2.3. Neighbourhood Watch Zone Liaison Officer Scheme

The *Neighbourhood Watch Zone (NWZ) Scheme* was launched in 1997 with the aim to instil mutual self-help and assistance among residents of the same neighbourhood.<sup>966</sup> As *NWZ Liaison Officers* the volunteers coordinate the implementation of crime and terrorism awareness as well as of prevention programs and activities in cooperation with the local *Neighbourhood Police Centre (NPC)* and the residents of the NWZ.<sup>967</sup>

The work of the NWZ Liaison Officers is instrumental in the scheme to

- “Develop networks of resident volunteers in each neighbourhood that are essential partners of the Police in [...] [the] fight against crime and increasingly, terrorism,”<sup>968</sup>

966 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019g.

967 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019f.

968 *ibid.*



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- “Foster a culture of good neighbourliness through mutual self-help in ensuring the safety and security of residents in [...] [the] neighbourhoods,”<sup>969</sup>
- “Give residents a greater sense of security, participation and stake in the community.”<sup>970</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Neighbourhood Watch Zone Liaison Officer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should train and support volunteers as NWZ Liaison Officers to promote mutual self-help and assistance among residents of the same neighbourhood.
- Authorities should train and support volunteers as NWZ Liaison Officers to build up self-efficacy and perceived problem-focused coping skills in the community.
- Authorities should train and support volunteers as NWZ Liaison Officers to strengthen the relationship between the police and the community.

<i>Neighbourhood Watch Zone Liaison Officer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

### 7.3.2.4. Civil Defence Auxiliary Unit Officer Scheme

The SCDF has realized that in its current structure of regulars, full-time *National Service Men (NSF)* and *NsMen*, it was unable to sustainably increase its numbers to handle catastrophic attacks such as 9/11, another SARS crisis or the fallout from another *Sumatra–Andaman*-like earthquake

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969 *ibid.*

970 *ibid.*



which had devastated life in the countries around the region. As a consequence, the SCDF decided to set up a volunteer scheme in 2006.<sup>971</sup> The scheme is modelled after the *SPF Volunteer Special Constabulary Scheme* and has the objective to raise *five hundred Civil Defence Auxiliary Unit Officers* to lend support in different areas, but especially in its emergency ambulance and firefighting services capacities and public Civil Defence education.

Through the programme, volunteers fulfilling a set of requirements are trained and then deployed alongside regular SCDF, NSF as well as NsMen in different occupations for a minimum of 16 hours of service per month.<sup>972</sup>

Different types of openings for auxiliary officers exist, based on their qualification and interest. In general, the openings can even be in operational front-line roles, i.e. at fire stations as *Auxiliary Emergency Medical Officers*<sup>973</sup> and *Auxiliary Firefighting & Rescue Officers*<sup>974</sup> who support firefighting, rescue and lifesaving efforts. Volunteers who already can prove existing extensive professional expertise in relevant areas like public education, fire safety or chemical engineering etc., may be eligible for joining a Senior Officer Scheme.

These volunteers can also be trained as *Auxiliary Public Education Instructors* or *Community Involvement Officers* and be deployed to SCDF Division HQ and there may support the Public Affairs teams in delivering the *Community Emergency Preparedness Programme (CEPP)*. In these roles they may „assist in civil defence events such as *Emergency Preparedness Days, Community Safety & Security Programmes, Community Exhibitions, Public Education Campaigns and Schools Emergency Preparedness Programmes*.“<sup>975</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Civil Defence Auxiliary Unit Officer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Civil Defence Forces should include volunteers into their force to be able to rapidly grow their number in frontline operations during large crises.
- Civil Defence Forces should include volunteers into their force to benefit from outside expertise in specialised areas.

971 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019e.

972 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019d.

973 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2020b.

974 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019e.

975 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019a.

- Civil Defence Forces should include volunteers into their force to take over non-operational tasks like reaching out, educating and training the community.

<i>Civil Defence Auxiliary Unit Officer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

### 7.3.2.5. Emergency Preparedness Programme

Through the *Emergency Preparedness Programme (EPP)* the PA “*seeks to strengthen the understanding and ties between people of different races and religions, impart EP skills and knowledge with an aim to build a safer and more resilient community.*”<sup>976</sup> It equips volunteers from the community “*with specialised training to respond to emergencies and assist the community in the recovery process.*”<sup>977</sup>

The volunteers are organised in so called *Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)*. Their training comprises:

- *Standard First Aid (SFA),*
- *Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), and*
- *Automated External Defibrillator (AED),*
- *Managing Crisis Behaviour (MCB), and other*
- *EP-related courses to enable them to carry out duties in times of activation.*<sup>978</sup>

<sup>976</sup> People's Association 2019.

<sup>977</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>978</sup> *ibid.*

*CERTs* lead community exercises in their constituency under the guidance of the Government emergency agencies, including SCDF and SPF.<sup>979</sup> To make the exercises extremely relevant for their community, the *CERTs* can choose from different terrorisms-related scenarios to be trained in the exercises.

In time of crisis, the *CERT* members are the backbone of the initial crisis response at the community level before SCDF or SPF responders will arrive on the scene. Subsequently, they are also prepared to render further assistance to SCDF or the SPF responders on scene, if required.

During normal service, *CERT* members may also be deployed at large national events to provide “*simple first aid and crowd control duties*.”<sup>980</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Emergency Preparedness Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- The authorities should recruit, train and support local volunteers to establish a community-based group of first-responders or *Community Emergency Response Teams* whose members are able to man the initial crisis response at the community level and then are able to render further assistance after the Police or emergency services have arrived.

<i>Emergency Preparedness Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

#### 7.3.2.6. Save-A- Life/Community First Responder Programme

The *Save-A-Life* (SAL) initiative launched in collaboration between the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Singapore Heart Foundation and the

<sup>979</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>980</sup> *ibid.*

People's Association is aiming at increasing the citizens' self-efficacy in case of a cardiac arrest, and at the general proficiency in first aid. To achieve this objective under the SAL initiative more than five thousand AED units have been installed in Singapore – with one AED in the lift lobby of every two blocks in public housing estates.

The locations of these public units as well as the location and accessibility data of another thousand units from private or other public organisations are stored in a national AED registry which is easily accessible through the *SGSecure* mobile application and the *MyResponder* mobile application.

To reduce the reserve of bystanders to act in an emergency, and to ensure the effective use of the AEDs the SAL initiative aims at training a total number of over 24,000 residents, equal to 300 residents per constituency, in CPR and AED skills.<sup>981</sup> The dedicated training is just one hour long and is called *DARE Plus* for *Dispatcher-Assisted first Responder (DARE) Plus*. It is offered step by step on CEPP and EP Days, as the AED units are installed in the neighborhood. Beside the CPR-AED skills, the *DARE Plus* training also teaches the *SG Secure Run, Hide, Tell* protocol, improvised first aid skills and the use of a fire extinguisher.<sup>982</sup>

Trained citizens are encouraged to register themselves as responders in their application, to be alerted by the SCDF in case of a cardiac arrest within a radius of 400 m. *“Nearest available AEDs Responders who are able to respond can choose to accept the notification and provide early intervention to the casualty, such as performing CPR and/or using the nearest available AED. SCDF's Ops Centre, may also ask responders to guide the ambulance crew by escorting them to the incident site”*.<sup>983</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Save-A-Life Initiative that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should undertake efforts to increase the citizens' self-efficacy in case of a cardiac arrest and their general proficiency in first aid as in the *Save-A-Life Initiative*.
- Authorities should encourage the ability and willingness of bystanders to act in a case of a cardiac arrest.
- Authorities should collect information on the locations of privately installed AED units and make them easily accessible to the public.

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981 See ZOLL Medical Corporation 2018.

982 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018g.

983 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2020c.

<i>Save-A-Life Initiative</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

### 7.3.2.7. Citizens on Patrol Programme

The *Citizens-on-Patrol (COP) Volunteer Programme* introduced in 1999, increases the visibility of police patrols in the neighbourhoods as well as at major traffic junctions and in town centres.<sup>984</sup>

The patrols by COP volunteers who are identifiable through their special vests, are trained in the SGSecure model, crime prevention methods as well as in community emergency preparedness skills, and receive updates on the latest security threats or on suspicious persons the police may be looking for.<sup>985</sup>

So, on patrol the COP members are the eyes and ears of the police and will alert police officers immediately if they detect any threat, crime or something suspicious.<sup>986</sup> Their presence on patrol is meant as a deterrent against criminals and hostile reconnaissance and also has a reassuring effect on the citizens. COP volunteers' activities also include the distribution of flyers on crime prevention and the support of SGSecure home visits. The seven hundred COP Patrols in Singapore are coordinated by the Neighbourhood Community Police. The volunteers are mostly aged between 40 and 60 years, usually being on patrol once or twice a month.<sup>987</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the COP Volunteer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

<sup>984</sup> See Koh 2019b.

<sup>985</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>986</sup> See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2020a.

<sup>987</sup> See Koh 2019b.

- Authorities should recruit and train local volunteers in crime prevention and counter-terrorism preparedness methods as well as in community emergency preparedness skills, to increase police patrols and public information efforts in their neighbourhoods. These local volunteers additionally are the eyes and ears of the police and may alert police officers immediately if they detect any threat, crime or something suspicious in the neighbourhood. Their presence will have a deterrent effect on criminals and hostile reconnaissance and have a reassuring effect on the citizens.

<i>Citizens-On-Patrol Volunteer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

### 7.3.2.8. Riders on Watch (ROW) Volunteer Scheme

The public transport system plays an important role in Singapore as car ownership is strongly discouraged by government laws due to the lack of space in the densely populated city. The number of commuters is continuously growing as the train network is expanded. As such, it poses an attractive terrorist target. Since the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, the police has continuously worked hard to deter attacks on the city's transportation system through the creation of a dedicated transport police, the expansion of CCTV and through structural protective security measures.<sup>988</sup>

*The Riders-On-Watch Volunteer Scheme* is the latest effort to increase the security of the public transport system and takes a community policing approach, as it is typical for Singapore.<sup>989</sup> Similar to the *Project Servator*

988 See Nadarajan 2012, 98.

989 See Singapore Police Force 2019b.

in London, the programme aims to increase the vigilance of the public transport users and to reduce the effort required to report and thereby also reduces the reluctance to report suspicious items or behaviour directly to the police.<sup>990</sup> Registered users under the scheme will also receive real-time alerts to their mobile phone on “persons of interest” allegedly connected to a crime, which may include the suspect’s appearance and last whereabouts.<sup>991</sup> In addition, the police will also share latest security information concerning the public transport system which the riders are encouraged to share with their network of friends and family.<sup>992</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the ROW Volunteer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should establish a volunteer-based public vigilance scheme on the public transport network to deter attacks and to minimise response times, by providing relevant threat-related information and raising alertness.

<i>Riders on Watch Volunteer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 7.3.2.9. Silver Watch Group Ambassador Programme

To improve the approach to the elderly in Singapore’s communities the *Silver Watch Group* (SWG) programme trains and supports so-called elderly *Silver Watch Group Ambassadors* who are to reach elderly citizens in the community and educate them about security threats, to provide

990 See Boey 2019.

991 See *ibid.*

992 See Singapore Police Force 2019b.

knowledge on crime prevention, to inspire them to get involved, and to “enlist their help as eyes and ears regarding suspicious or criminal activity” in the future.<sup>993</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the SWG Ambassador Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should train and support elderly citizens (or other vulnerable groups in the community) to reach other elderly citizens (or other vulnerable groups) in the community and to educate them about security threats, provide prevention knowledge and to inspire them to get involved, and to “enlist their help as eyes and ears regarding suspicious or criminal activity” in the future.<sup>994</sup>

Silver Watch Group Ambassador Programme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

### 7.3.2.10. Community Engagement Programme

The *Community Engagement Programme (CEP)* was set up in 2006 as a “long-term effort to strengthen intercommunal ties and put in place response plans to help deal with potential communal tension after an incident or crisis that could affect [...] social cohesion”,<sup>995</sup> as laid out in the *Social Defence* component of the *Total Defence concept*.<sup>996</sup>

Under the programme, community leaders from “grassroots organisations, education institutions, religious and cultural groups, businesses and

<sup>993</sup> See Sachi 2016 ; See Lim 2013 ; AsiaOne Online 2014.

<sup>994</sup> See Sachi 2016 ; AsiaOne Online 2014; See Lim 2013.

<sup>995</sup> Public Service Division at Prime Minister's Office Singapore 2015.

<sup>996</sup> See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2020a ; See Ministry of Defence Singapore 2004.



*unions, and the media and academia [...] are trained, prepared [...] [to] develop networks of trust to help manage and mitigate the effects of a crisis.”<sup>997</sup> The aim is both to strengthen social cohesion and to build up resilience in the wider community.”<sup>998</sup> These leaders will function as so-called *CE Connectors* who will support a resilient response to a possible sectarian terrorist attack and will quell the risk of communal conflicts in the future. To develop these advocates among the *CE Connectors*, CEP activities “include understanding cultural practices through exhibition panels set up at community events, visits to religious and cultural sites and dialogues with community partners.”<sup>999</sup>*

The *Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles* established four years earlier in all 84 constituencies, are exemplary for community-level platforms tasked to promote CEP activities for inter-racial understanding and inter-religious harmony.<sup>1000</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Community Engagement Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should train and support community leaders across relevant social, professional and religious groups to build networks of trust that could help them to better manage and mitigate possible community tensions that could occur after an incident or crisis that would negatively affect social cohesion.

Community Engagement Programme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	✓
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

<sup>997</sup> Public Service Division at Prime Minister's Office Singapore 2015.

<sup>998</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>999</sup> People's Association 2019.

<sup>1000</sup> Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2020a.

### 7.3.2.11. Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles

To remove the influence of radical fundamentalism on parts of the Muslim community in Singapore which was discovered during the inquiry into the *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) activities in 2001, and to prevent a potential reactive co-radicalization of other faith- or community groups in the Singaporean society, the Prime Minister himself launched the establishment of interfaith dialogue platforms in all constituencies already in 2002.<sup>1001</sup>

The Government was able to build on the existing organisational structure of the *Presidential Council for Religious Harmony* (PCRH) and on the *Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act* (MRHA). These had been introduced in 1990 as a reaction to an “increase in religious fervour and assertiveness” which had created inter-religious tensions, and to curb an undesired political influence of faith groups.<sup>1002</sup>

The newly established *Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles* (IRCC) consist of leaders from religious, ethnic and social groups from the local constituency as well as local business and educational organisations.<sup>1003</sup> Their members meet on a regular basis for inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues and networking sessions as well as on the national level for workshops and table-top exercises to train their shared understanding of crisis response, facilitated by the *Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth* (MCCY).<sup>1004</sup>

The IRCC's tasks in peacetime and in time of crisis include:

- Building informal ties with all social, faith and cultural groups present in the constituency, that can function as bridges which foster the development of trust and friendships between the different groups,<sup>1005</sup>
- Promoting racial and religious harmony through “inter-faith and interethnic themed activities” that help to deepen people's understanding of the various faiths, beliefs and practices,<sup>1006</sup>
- Devise crisis mitigation strategies to quickly defuse rumours or falsehoods in moments of racial or religious tensions,

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1001 See Hussin 2018, 178 ; See Nadarajan 2012.

1002 Government of Singapore 1989, 3.

1003 See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2020b.

1004 See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019c.

1005 See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019b, 2.

1006 *ibid.*

- Calm community tensions in case of a terrorist attack in Singapore and “assist in the recovery process, to help their communities and the nation return to normalcy.”<sup>1007</sup>

Originally the *IRCC* meetings therefore were primarily focused on getting a better understanding and appreciation of the other religious and ethnic groups in the constituency and in all of Singapore. But the meetings’ scope has extended as the challenges to racial harmony in Singapore have grown. The *IRCC*’s activities have become more focused towards the communities with a variety of activities. As social media’s and the internet’s external influence on public opinion has grown, the *IRCC* also have started with support of the MCCY to create safe spaces for the discussion of touchy or contentious religion or race-related subjects.<sup>1008</sup> Their aim still is to be able to tackle prejudices and to create real appreciation and not simply permissive tolerance between groups.<sup>1009</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the IRCC that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should motivate the representatives of all religious groups to enter into a dialogue at the community level in inter-religious round tables to get a better understanding of other religious and ethnic groups in the community, to reduce held stereotypes, and to build informal ties and trust to work towards peaceful and harmonious coexistence.
- Authorities should also provide the necessary incentives and the environment for members of inter-religious round tables to feel comfortable to discuss touchy or contentious religion or race-related subjects with the aim to tackle prejudices and to create real appreciation and not simply permissive tolerance between groups.

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1007 *ibid.*

1008 See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2017.

1009 See *ibid.*

## 7. Chapter: Second Case – The Republic of Singapore

<i>Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	✓
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	✓
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

### 7.4. Singapore School Programmes

Singapore's school system is an important government tool for educating its young citizenry and for nudging them towards its national values. The SGSecure messages and the civil defence preparations are incorporated in various formal/informal school programmes for students at different levels.

#### 7.4.1. Teaching and Engagement

##### 7.4.1.1. National Education

Singapore's *National Education* (NE) programme was first introduced in primary schools in 1997 and was overhauled in 2017 to assure the reliability and relevance in its delivery to students.<sup>1010</sup> The NE focusses on instilling the following key dispositions in its young citizens:

1. "A Sense of Belonging:  
*To develop a deeper understanding of who we are, and a shared understanding of the values that are important to us as a nation.*
2. A Sense of Reality:  
*To be aware of the contemporary realities — including Singapore's constraints and vulnerabilities — which affect us as a nation amidst the backdrop of a less predictable world.*

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1010 See National Library Board Singapore 2014.

### 3. A Sense of Hope:

*Having confidence and optimism in Singapore's future and the resilience to face the challenges ahead.[...]*

– The will to act:

*To be active citizens who have a collective resolve and a sense of shared mission towards building a Singapore for all.”<sup>1011</sup>*

The NE has not been created as a separate subject, but has been integrated into the existing curriculum, flanked by four annual commemorative days which are observed in schools: *Total Defence Day, National Day, Racial Harmony Day and International Friendship Day*.<sup>1012</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the National Education programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should ensure that the schools' curricula give ample consideration for the personal development of students in such a way that it instils personal confidence, emotional strength and resolve when faced with adversity. This should be underlined by a feeling of belonging and purpose through a sense of a shared (national) values and aspirations.

National Education Programme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	✓
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	✓
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

#### 7.4.1.2. Heritage Education Programmes

The acceptance and successful understanding of the *National Education* (NE) messages are also promoted outside of the classrooms by educational

1011 Pei Hwa Presbyterian Primary School (PHPPS) 2020.

1012 See National Library Board Singapore 2014.

visits (so-called *Learning Journeys*) to important national institutions and sites which should instill “*pride in Singapore’s achievements, to help them understand [...] [their] country’s limitations, build their confidence in building a better future for Singapore and nurture a sense of belonging to [...] [their] country.*”<sup>1013</sup>

These journeys include visits to civil defence and security institutions like the *Civil Defence Heritage Gallery*, the *Internal Security Department Heritage Gallery*, fire stations, or the *SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre*. This is meant to inculcate the importance of personal preparedness and vigilance for the nation’s resilience in line with the essential citizenship traits according to the NE.

The values of national resilience are also taught to primary or secondary school students on experiential guided tours across the island, so called “*SG Time Travellers Trails*”.<sup>1014</sup> On the trails, the history of these places is brought to life through inspirational storytelling from the nation’s history, describing cases of “*perseverance, trust and cohesion*” in the face of adversity.<sup>1015</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Heritage Education Programmes that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities could develop and apply narratives from the nation’s heritage to instill *pride in the mastered challenges of the past and confidence in the future* while teaching a realistic understanding of the nation’s limitations and challenges. These can inculcate the importance of personal preparedness and vigilance for the nation’s resilience.

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1013 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018e.

1014 National Heritage Board 2019.

1015 Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019d.

<i>Heritage Education Programmes</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	✓
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 7.4.1.3. Total Defence Social Studies Syllabus

To ensure the early preparedness of the population the Ministry of Education (MoE) has included SGSecure topics in the social study syllabus of primary and secondary schools.<sup>1016</sup> In reference to *Civil Defence* being one component of the *Total Defence* concept, students are taught about the terror threat and how they can react to it.<sup>1017</sup> Their learning is supported through text books, card games, mobile exhibitions, theatre plays, assembly talks and practical training of lock-down drills.<sup>1018</sup> Students are also given basic fire and emergency preparedness and awareness training, with practical exposure during *Emergency Preparedness Day* exercises.<sup>1019</sup>

Apart from providing an established topical hub where other security communications like SGSecure can be “plugged into”, the *Total Defence* concept itself plays an important role in the students’ syllabus throughout primary school.

Learning about the principle of *Total Defence* in schools, is aided by the MoE through the provision of regularly updated teacher’s guides and diverse age-specific learning resources including:

- *Total Defence Exhibition Stories*,
- *Total Defence Puzzle*,
- *#WeAreTotalDefence Colouring Activity*,

<sup>1016</sup> See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018f.

<sup>1017</sup> See Tay 2017.

<sup>1018</sup> See Ministry of Defence Singapore 2020b.

<sup>1019</sup> See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018f.

## 7. Chapter: Second Case – The Republic of Singapore

- *Total Defence Song*,
- *Total Defence Animation Videos*,
- *Total Defence Strategy Card Game*,
- *Total Defence Student Competition*.<sup>1020</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Total Defence Social Studies Syllabus that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- The authorities could develop age-adequate adaptations of the nation-centric *Total Defence* concept which allows them to embed the terrorism vigilance and preparedness message into it, and thus make the concept easily absorbable for the pupils.

<i>Total Defence Social Studies Syllabus</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

### 7.4.2. Volunteering

Singapore's schools and colleges place a great emphasis on co-curricular activities that contribute to community cohesiveness. By increasing their self-efficacy and connectedness through volunteering, students can develop their personal resilience. Their service to the community also supports community resilience, as the thus established relationships strengthen the bonds in and between communities and have a positive effect on the feeling of connectedness and belonging.

To support the national effort to keep Singapore safe and secure, pupils from upper primary level onwards are encouraged to learn first aid and

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<sup>1020</sup> Ministry of Defence Singapore 2020b.



emergency preparedness skills and to share them with the community. The following paragraphs will introduce the different national programmes at schools and colleges:

#### 7.4.2.1. National Civil Defence Cadet Corps Programme

The *National Civil Defence Cadet Corps (NCDCC)* was first set up as a uniformed group at secondary schools in 2005. All students in their primary year can apply to join the NCDCC through their school, similar to a co-curricular activity.

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA),

*The purpose of the NCDCC is to nurture and develop young students into caring and responsible citizens through their participation in interesting and challenging Civil Defence activities.*<sup>1021</sup>

Great care is taken that the trainings are adequately structured for the target age, with a mix of theoretical learning, realistic training and stimulating experiences. *Total Defence* and *SGSecure* form important parts of the curriculum.<sup>1022</sup>

Apart from getting trained themselves, cadets are expected to serve their community by advocating lifesaving skills in their school, to support local community engagement events and emergency preparedness days.

To those joining the NCDCC, it offers a multi-year structured personal and professional development path through secondary school which will take a Junior Cadet from acquiring self- and civil defence awareness, to mastering civil defence skills at an enhanced level, to leading cadets as a Cadet Leader, to finally becoming an instructor himself who as a Cadet Lieutenant will (hopefully) continue volunteering in civil defence upon graduation from his school.<sup>1023</sup>

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1021 Jurong West Secondary School 2019.

1022 Evergreen Secondary School 2020.

1023 See Evergreen Secondary School 2020.

Figure 50: NCDCC learning journey and framework.<sup>1024</sup>



Post-graduation, the cadets are expected to play their part in the *SGSecure* movement as competent community first responders who are able to help themselves, their families, neighbours and community in case of an incident, making Singapore a more secure place.<sup>1025</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the National Civil Defence Cadet Corps that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- The authorities could establish youth sections of the civil defence force to raise self-efficacy in the student body, spread preparedness knowledge into the communities and schools and secure responsible future leaders for the civil defence force.

1024 Image taken from *ibid*.

1025 See *ibid*.

National Civil Defence Cadet Corps (NCDCC) Programme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	✓

#### 7.4.2.2. Civil Defence Lionhearters Club (Post-secondary Schools)

In its strive “*towards building up the nation’s preparedness so that every individual can help themselves, their families and neighbours in times of emergency*” the SCDF has encouraged the establishment of *Civil Defence Lionhearters Clubs* at colleges and universities since 2009.<sup>1026</sup>

The objective of the *CD Lionhearters Club* is to “*develop members into confident community first responders in support of the SGSecure movement.*”<sup>1027</sup>

To fulfil this task, student members of the *Lionhearters Clubs* (called *CDLionhearters*) are trained in the *Community Emergency Preparedness Programme (CEPP)* and the *Community Engagement Programme (CEP)*.<sup>1028</sup>

Once trained, the *CD Lionhearters* may volunteer in different scenarios.

- In case of an emergency on-campus, *CD Lionhearters* may augment the campus emergency response resources by rendering first aid, support evacuations or provide initial victim support, before the SCDF arrives.<sup>1029</sup>
- In case of communal tension on campus grounds, *CD Lionhearters* are asked to mediate in a role as *Community Engagement Ambassadors*.<sup>1030</sup>

<sup>1026</sup> Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2018.

<sup>1027</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1028</sup> See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018a.

<sup>1029</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>1030</sup> See *ibid.*

- *CD Lionhearthers* are regularly deployed alongside SCDF officers to communities across Singapore, to help conduct *Emergency Preparedness Days* and to teach emergency preparedness and first aid skills to the residents.<sup>1031</sup>

In the past, *CD Lionhearthers* have also been deployed abroad as part of humanitarian relief missions to assist in development and reconstruction projects. While this is rare, the potential opportunity is widely advertised in member recruitment activities. Learning about cultural sensitivities and foreign traditions as preparations for such potential missions is part of the *CD Lionhearthers'* curriculum.

*What measures can authorities take away from the Civil Defence Lionhearthers Club that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- The authorities should encourage the establishment of community preparedness and community volunteer engagement activities at colleges and universities.

<b>Civil Defence Lionhearthers Club</b>	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	✓

#### 7.4.2.3. Junior Civil Defence Lionhearter Programme (Primary schools)

Launched in 2013 for primary schools, the SCDF has adopted a student-centric learning approach where upper primary school-level pupils who show leadership skills, are trained as *Emergency Preparedness Ambassadors*.<sup>1032</sup> Through workshops run by the SCDF, they receive first aid and

<sup>1031</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>1032</sup> See Tan 2013.

emergency preparedness skills training. Once trained, the pupils have the task to create interest in emergency preparedness topics and the importance of self-efficacy among their peers, at school as well as at home.<sup>1033</sup>

The pupil's duties may involve:

- Serving as young Emergency Preparedness (EP) ambassadors,
- Hard Skills Training
- Soft Skills Training

*What measures can authorities take away from the Junior Civil Defence Lionhearter Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- The authorities could introduce pupils at primary school level to the first aid and emergency preparedness skills and engage them through practical games and competitive activities that will help practice their leadership skills.

<i>Junior Civil Defence Lionhearter Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

## 7.5. Singapore Private Sector Programmes

Under the *Total Defence* concept, unimpeded economic development and uninterrupted business operations are a fundamental necessity for Singapore's overall security and prosperity.<sup>1034</sup> The Government has accordingly placed great importance to strengthening the vigilance and protective se-

<sup>1033</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>1034</sup> See Ministry of Defence Singapore 2020a.

curity of businesses to prevent and deter terrorist attacks. It has further encouraged companies to invest in proper disaster planning and to establish robust contingency management procedures to reduce the impact of any attack and as a support to the businesses' ability to bounce back.<sup>1035</sup>

While historically, following the *Laku incident* in 1974, the focus had been on strategic and critical infrastructure like the port, its petrochemical industry, the power grid or the transportation hubs (which following the incident received enhanced government protection), the shift in terrorist attack patterns to softer targets has made the government include more sites – especially highly frequented businesses and those operating in crowded areas.

The engagement of the private sector is conducted by the Singapore Police Force (SPF) and the *Singapore Civil Defence Force* (SCDF) under the guidance of the *Ministry of Manpower* (MoM) through a variety of education, training and volunteer programs which are presented on the following pages.<sup>1036</sup>

### 7.5.1. Training and Engagement

#### 7.5.1.1. SGSecure@Workplaces Programme

With the launch of *SGSecure* in 2016, existing and new efforts targeting the private sector have been brought under the *SGSecure's* umbrella.<sup>1037</sup> In a first step, the Ministry of Manpower (MoM) included *SGSecure* anti-terrorism preparedness elements into their existing health & safety workplace risk assessment programme *bizSAFE*, to ensure that businesses consider these elements in their future assessments.<sup>1038</sup>

In line with the broad *SGSecure* objectives of a united nation, the *SGSecure@Workplaces* initiative has equally broad objectives

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1035 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020b ; See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018d.

1036 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2017.

1037 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020c.

1038 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020b.

*“To strengthen the vigilance and resilience of workplaces to withstand terror attacks, and other situations that may adversely affect the harmonious working relationships at our workplaces.”*<sup>1039</sup>

On the practical level, the *SGSecure@Workplaces* programme encourages and supports businesses to invest in vigilance and protective security as well as in disaster planning and business continuity management.

By May 2019, over 60,000 companies had so far joined the programme and have registered a dedicated *SGSecure* representative with the MoM.<sup>1040</sup> This employee is responsible for rolling out *SGSecure* initiatives in the company, and to boost vigilance and preparedness of the workforce. The representative is supported by the MoM through *SGSecure Guidelines for Workplaces*<sup>1041</sup> and a six-module training course<sup>1042</sup> for self-training and teaching material for the employees. These guidelines are complemented by *Contingency Planning And Protective Security Advisories* as well as Contingency Planning checklists for workplaces and other premises, including building owners and tenants.<sup>1043</sup>

The representative also has access to workshops and receives regular security updates and lessons-learned reports about recent terror attacks abroad.<sup>1044</sup>

The *SGSecure Representative* may also initiate *SGSecure Responders* trainings for the company’s employees, through SPF and SCDF.<sup>1045</sup> During a crisis, the *SGSecure Representative* will coordinate the company’s response and act as the main point of contact for the SPF and SCDF.<sup>1046</sup> The *SGSecure* mobile application is used by police to alert the *SG Security Representative* of imminent danger (e.g. attacks on businesses in the vicinity).

*What measures can authorities take away from the SGSecure@Workplaces that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

1039 Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2019b.

1040 See Koh 2019a.

1041 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2017.

1042 Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020a.

1043 See Singapore Police Force 2017b.

1044 Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020b.

1045 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2017.

1046 See *ibid.*

- The authorities should introduce appropriate programmes which encourage and support businesses to invest in vigilance and protective security as well as disaster planning and business continuity management.
- The authorities should request companies to select a company representative who will coordinate the company's response in the case of an emergency and act as the main point of contact for the SPF and SCDF.
- The authorities should liaise on a regular basis with the representatives and share security updates and training opportunities.

<i>SGSecure@Workplaces Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 7.5.1.2. Project Guardian Scheme

Project Guardian is a public private partnership modelled after the *Project Griffin*, now the *ACT Awareness* scheme in London. Its basis is the forging of effective working relationships between the Singapore Police Force (SPF) and the private security personnel and a company's first responders, in an effort to effectively address a heightened terrorism threat.<sup>1047</sup> Through security briefings, trainings, workshops and joint counter-terrorism exercises, the private security sector is expected to broaden the police's and the emergency services' CT efforts by helping:

- To prevent and deter attacks through heightened vigilance,
- To limit the impact of any attack by mounting an initial response to a terror threat before the authorities arrive,
- To improve the self-help capabilities of their company, building or employer,

<sup>1047</sup> See Singapore Police Force 2020c.



- To “effectively provide the necessary support functions during crisis: *Evacuation, Cordon Support, Crowd Control, Traffic Diversion [&] Emergency Communications*”<sup>1048</sup>.

*What measures can authorities take away from the Project Guardian scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should conduct security briefings, trainings, workshops and joint counter-terrorism exercises with private security personnel and company first responders to enable the private security sector to augment the police’s and emergency services’ counter-terrorism efforts by helping to prevent and to deter attacks through heightened vigilance, to limit the impact of any attack by mounting an initial response to a terror threat before the authorities arrive, to improve the self-help capabilities of their company, building or employer and to effectively provide support functions effectively during a crisis.

<i>Project Guardian Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

#### 7.5.1.3. Security-By-Design – Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore

As a response to the heightened and evolving terrorism threat to the civilian infrastructure, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has shifted its focus on raising building security requirements for any new and ongoing devel-

<sup>1048</sup> *ibid.*

opments under construction, as well as for existing buildings whenever they are repaired, altered or are to receive any extensions.<sup>1049</sup>

Apart from buildings and developments which house critical infrastructure, “buildings that are iconic or have high public footfall”, like shopping centres or malls that are considered terrorist targets, are covered by the new rules.”<sup>1050</sup>

These new building security requirements are published in the *Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore (GEBSS)*.<sup>1051</sup>

“The GEBSS describe concepts and provide detailed information for security-oriented building design. [...] The targeted audiences include but are not limited to, building owners, architects, structural engineers, urban construction developers, construction project managers, security consultants, security system designers and others engaged in the design and construction of buildings.”<sup>1052</sup>

“General information is included to provide senior managerial staff and decision makers with an understanding of security concepts and to help emphasise the importance of physical design in security. At the same time, it also provides developers, engineers and architects with a resource for determining security-oriented design approaches to protect buildings against terrorist-related incidents.”<sup>1053</sup>

The implementation of the guidelines is facilitated through the mandatory assistance by accredited building security consultants. While previous elaborate guidance on building security existed, following it had not been mandatory.<sup>1054</sup> Compliance with the latest guidelines is controlled by the *Centre for Protective Security (CPS)* established under the *Infrastructure Protection Act (IPA)*, which took effect on 18 Dec 2018.<sup>1055</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Security-By-Design Guidance that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should raise awareness and establish clear, detailed mandatory guidelines and information for “security-oriented building design”

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1049 Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018b.

1050 Singapore Police Force 06.2019, 1.

1051 Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018a.

1052 *ibid.*, 10.

1053 *ibid.*

1054 See Cheong and Yangchen 2016.

1055 See Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018b.

to all stakeholders involved in the operation, design and construction of buildings that may be affected by a terrorist attack.

- Authorities should assure the compliance with the mandatory security-oriented building design through appropriate legislation, accreditations, and supervision by a dedicated body.

<i>Security-By-Design Guidance</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

## 7.5.2. Volunteering

### 7.5.2.1. SCDF Corporate Safety & Security Programme

The SCDF *Corporate Safety & Security Programme* (CSSP) is the corporate version of the SCDF *Community Emergency Preparedness Program* presented on page 263 but targeted at the industrial and commercial sectors, especially those handling hazardous materials<sup>1056</sup>

The programme's focus is laid on teaching fire prevention and emergency preparedness skills, but within a company setting. Companies trained under the programme are encouraged to cooperate with other businesses in geographic proximity in a mutual-aid scheme. They are also „encouraged to pool their resources and expertise to complement that of the SCDF.”<sup>1057</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the SCDF Corporate Safety & Security Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

<sup>1056</sup> See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018d.

<sup>1057</sup> *ibid.*

- Authorities should encourage industrial companies especially those dealing with hazardous materials, to cooperate in a mutual-aid scheme and pool their resources and expertise with other businesses in geographic proximity, to muster a better joint initial response to safety and security threats.

SCDF Corporate Safety & Security Programme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

#### 7.5.2.2. Safety and Security Watch Group Scheme

Based on the identification of an urgent need for all buildings in Singapore to raise their level of protective security against potential terrorist attacks, the *Safety and Security Watch Group* (SSWG) Scheme was set up in 2006 to enable “commercial establishments located in close proximity to institute common safety and security measures to protect against a localised terror attack”.<sup>1058</sup>

Under the scheme, which is jointly administered by the SPF and SCDF, building owners (or managers) are encouraged to register their building and join an SSWG, which is comprised of a group of buildings in geographical proximity.<sup>1059</sup>

Representatives of the building owners (or managers if they are responsible for overall security) as well as key tenants form the SSWG committees which are administered by the local *Neighbourhood Police Centres* (NPC) and are handled by an SSWG *Police Liaison Officer* (PLO).<sup>1060</sup> The PLO assists the building managers in the SSWG to conduct a security survey of

<sup>1058</sup> Singapore Police Force 2019c ; See also Singapore Police Force 2020a.

<sup>1059</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>1060</sup> See *ibid.*

their premises to establish a preliminary vulnerability assessment and to provide basic guidance for security enhancements. For more comprehensive guidance, building managers are encouraged to use the services of a professional security consultant.<sup>1061</sup>

During regular SSWG committee meetings, members can also discuss wider security issues and benefit from networking and best practice. On an annual basis, all SSWG committees meet at a joint conference to maximise the shared learning and to exchange experiences across sectors and industries.<sup>1062</sup> Building managers from an SSWG are also able to participate in the *Corporate First Responder (CFR) Scheme*. Under the scheme, the building management can be granted access to the cordoned off area in the aftermath of an incident, to undertake the necessary actions for business continuity.<sup>1063</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Safety and Security Watch Group Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should encourage “commercial establishments located in close proximity”, for example within the same commercial complex or in neighbouring buildings, to register their building and join a Safety & Security Watch Group Scheme, administered by the police and the fire services.<sup>1064</sup>
- Authorities should ensure that SSWG members in the scheme benefit from assistance to conduct a security survey of their premises to establish a preliminary vulnerability assessment and to receive basic guidance for security enhancements.
- Authorities should further facilitate the exchange among SSWG members on common safety and security issues to enable the dissemination of best practice in protecting against a local terror attack.

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1061 See *ibid.*

1062 *ibid.*

1063 Singapore Police Force 2020b.

1064 Singapore Police Force 2019c.

Safety and Security Watch Group (SSWG) Scheme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

### 7.5.2.3. Corporate First Responder Scheme

True to its mantra that the question of a terrorist attack in Singapore is not “if” but “when”, the Government urges businesses to complement their impact prevention efforts of target hardening or other protective security measures by additional impact reduction efforts as through contingency planning and impact mitigation strategies.<sup>1065</sup> A major component of this effort is the *Corporate First Responder Scheme*. Its objective is to increase the level of preparedness for the repercussions of an attack in the private sector, to enable it to return to business as usual as soon as possible in the aftermath.<sup>1066</sup>

Businesses joining the Scheme are asked to form CFR teams comprised of “key building personnel with local knowledge of the premises, systems and processes” [who], may [...] be called upon to assist SCDF emergency responders in rescue and recovery operations and SPF in investigations. This will help expedite SCDF and SPF operations and hasten return to normalcy.”<sup>1067</sup>

In exchange, CFR member businesses can nominate key personnel who will receive “access to restricted sites post-incident when safety permits, even while rescue, recovery and post-incident investigation activities are ongoing, [...] to sustain essential business functions and take mitigation measures that will help maintain the businesses’ viability after the incident.”<sup>1068</sup>

<sup>1065</sup> See Singapore Police Force 2020b.

<sup>1066</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>1067</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1068</sup> *ibid.*

*What measures can authorities take away from the Corporate First Responder Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should require businesses to help accelerate emergency services and police operations and “hasten return to normalcy” after an attack on their building, by setting up trained teams of corporate first responders, comprised of “key building personnel with local knowledge of the premises, systems and processes” [who], may [...] be called upon to assist [...] emergency responders in rescue and recovery operations and [...] [the police] in investigations.”<sup>1069</sup>
- Authorities should incentivise the private sector to form Corporate First Responder Teams. Under the scheme the participating businesses will be allowed to nominate key personnel who will receive exclusive “access to restricted sites post-incident when safety permits, even while rescue, recovery and post-incident investigation activities are ongoing, [...] to sustain essential business functions and take mitigation measures that will help maintain the businesses’ viability after the incident.”<sup>1070</sup>

Corporate First Responder Scheme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	✓

#### 7.5.2.4. Industry Safety and Security Watch Group Scheme

To address the heightened vulnerability levels of certain industries to terrorism and the wider consequences for Singapore in case of an attack, the police in cooperation with the respective industry associations have de-

<sup>1069</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1070</sup> *ibid.*

veloped the *Industry Safety and Security Watch Group* (iSSWG) Scheme.<sup>1071</sup> This programme engages the companies in these system-relevant industries on their security in custom-made ways.<sup>1072</sup> The industrial sectors which currently benefit from the programme are the chemical, manufacturing, financial, retail and hotel industries.<sup>1073</sup>

ISSWG member companies benefit from:<sup>1074</sup>

- Bespoke police statistics and intelligence briefings relevant to their sector,
- Alerts and updates on the terrorism threat picture that enable changes to their protective measures,
- Opportunities to network on, to share in and to assess the effectiveness of protective security procedures as well as business contingency measures in their industry,<sup>1075</sup>
- Training of their private security personnel in SGSecure skills under the Project Guardian scheme,<sup>1076</sup>
- Enhanced self-help abilities through emergency preparedness trainings by the SCDF, to form so-called *Company Emergency Response Teams*.<sup>1077</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Industry Safety and Security Watch Group that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should address the heightened vulnerability levels of certain industries to terrorism and the wider consequences for the country in case of an attack, by collecting the businesses in industry groups and engaging them in a cooperative way. The measures in support of the key industries can include:
- The sharing of bespoke police statistics and intelligence briefings relevant to their sector,
- Providing regular updates and alerts on the terrorism threat picture which initiate changes to their protective measures,
- Training of their private security personnel in counter-terrorism,

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1071 See Singapore Police Force 2019c.

1072 See Singapore Police Force 2017a.

1073 See Singapore Police Force 2019c.

1074 See *ibid*.

1075 See Yeo 2016.

1076 See Singapore Police Force 2019c.

1077 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018d See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2020b.



- Facilitating intra-industrial opportunities to network on, to share in, and assess the effectiveness of protective security procedures as well as business contingency measures in their industry,
- Enhancing the companies' self-help abilities through emergency preparedness trainings to form company emergency response teams.

<i>Industry Safety and Security Watch Group Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

## 7.6. Singapore Victim Support

Singapore does not have a dedicated terrorism victim support program. Since its independence, Singapore has been fortunate to have been spared from casualties of terrorist attacks on its soil. It did not have to share the experience of mass casualty events from terrorism which the UK, France, neighbouring Indonesia or Sri Lanka had to go through after *jihadit* attacks in recent years. But since 9/11, Singapore has taken note of the newly developing terrorism threat scenarios and of the adjustments the affected countries made, to improve their first response as well as the after-care procedures, and the long-term treatment of survivors.

Since 2007, the country has been regularly conducting large-scale mass casualty event exercises where the multi-agency response to terror attacks is trained. Special emphasis is laid on the hospitals' emergency preparedness, occasionally including even scenarios where the hospitals are under terrorist attack themselves as shown below.<sup>1078</sup>

1078 See Changi General Hospital 2016; See Mei 2017.

Figure 51: Press photo from Counter-terrorism exercises at Ng Teng Fong General Hospital.<sup>1079</sup>



Figure 52: Screenshot from Home Team News by the MHA of the counter-terrorism exercises heartbeat at Ng Teng Fong General Hospital.<sup>1080</sup>



1079 Image taken by Kevin Lim (The Straits Times) see Mei 2017.

First established in 2003 the year of the SARS outbreak in the country, Singapore today has several well-established trauma units with low mortality rates which meet the highest international standards.<sup>1081</sup> Special care is taken of the aftercare which includes the “*psychosocial reintegration*” of the patients to avoid the “*adverse physical, psychological, social and financial effects*” of long absence from work.<sup>1082</sup> Since 2017, speedy return-to-work as a treatment goal has been institutionalized through the Government’s Return-to-Work (RTW) programme at seven public hospitals, funded through the *Ministry of Manpower* and the *Workplace Safety and Health Council*.<sup>1083</sup>

*This is done through a customised service approach with the assignment of an RTW Coordinator who will take an injured worker-centric approach in early intervention and support. The RTW Coordinator will consider the specific circumstances of the injured worker and [the needs of the] employer to develop a plan, in consultation with medical professionals, to support faster recovery and return to work.*<sup>1084</sup>

To ensure better pre-hospital care, since 2020 virtual reality-augmented training for mass casualty events is part of the curriculum of all medical students and is currently being rolled out to all pre-hospital care providers, including SCDF and SAF.<sup>1085</sup>

Beside medical first aid, psychological first aid is part of the SGSecure curriculum for community first responders as the authorities believe that the community is able to deliver psychological support in a crisis.<sup>1086</sup> To ensure that survivors of terrorist attacks and those indirectly affected, receive adequate support, the Ministry of Health (MoH) has trained volunteers since 2017 to serve in *Human Emergency Assistance and Response Teams (HEART)*. These are focused on supporting the psychological recovery of the community after an attack.<sup>1087</sup>

Apart from providing direct psychological first aid to survivors on the ground in the case of an attack, applying the simple “3 L formula” of psychological first aid – “*Look, Listen and Link*”, the members of the

1080 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2016.

1081 See Paulo *et al.* 2019.

1082 Minister of State Sam Tan 2017 ; See Paulo *et al.* 2019.

1083 Minister of State Sam Tan 2017 ; Hoe 2018.

1084 Minister of State Sam Tan 2017.

1085 National University of Singapore 2019.

1086 Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2019a.

1087 See Hamzah 2019.

HEART Network have an ongoing coordinating and piloting function.<sup>1088</sup> Over the whole recovery and coping phase, they should ensure a smoother government response to the patients' needs and should help to "*facilitate greater communication with medical institutions, which may encounter patients coming in with psychological trauma.*"<sup>1089</sup>

There is no dedicated financially supporting compensation offered to victims of a terrorist attack in Singapore. Several financial assistance schemes however do exist for Singaporeans to cover healthcare-related costs as well as programmes for short- and long- term livelihood support for those who are unable to fend for themselves because of accidents, health problems or due to other incapacitations.<sup>1090</sup>

*What measures can authorities take away from the Victim Support in Singapore that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities should conduct mass casualty incident exercises regularly to test and continually improve the hospitals' emergency preparedness and the necessary multi-agency response.
- Authorities should make use of the capabilities of VR to prepare and train more first responders for mass casualty incidents in a cost and time-effective way.
- Authorities should aide the psychosocial reintegration process of injured survivors by establishing dedicated consultants who support the victims directly with advice and practical support in all steps on their way from the hospital to return-to-work.

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1088 Er and Seng 2019, 2.

1089 Hamzah 2019.

1090 See Ministry of Health Singapore 2020 ; See Tan 2019 ; See Lai and Tan 2012.

<i>Victim Support Activities</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual &amp; Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention &amp; Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

### 7.7. Singapore Legal instruments


Singapore has enacted several laws which support the preservation of *Strategic Resilience*. The following assessment focusses only on the laws' applicability and effectiveness during terrorist incident or threats. It does not undertake a general evaluation of the adequacy or reasonableness of these laws under other circumstances.

#### Internal Security Act

The Internal Security Act (ISA) permits the issue of restriction orders without a warrant and of preventive custody orders without charges for persons believed to be involved in terrorism, for up to two years.<sup>1091</sup> These orders may be renewed indefinitely or may be removed, after the person is deemed to have been rehabilitated.

<sup>1091</sup> See Singapore Statutes Online 1987.

Figure 53: “The number of Restriction and Detention Orders issues under ISA against self-radicalised Singaporeans”, as of Jan 2019.<sup>1092</sup>



After 9/11, the ISA has been used predominantly against radical jihadis. In 2002, 31 persons connected to the foiled attack plans of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Singapore, had been arrested under the ISA.<sup>1093</sup> Since that time, detentions under the ISA have been rare. The number of Restriction and Detention Orders issues under ISA against self-radicalised Singaporeans

But the number of issued ISA Restriction- and Detention Orders has increased with the rise of *Daesh*.<sup>1094</sup>

- Through permitting preventive custody of persons who are found to plot attacks or who have travel plans to join the fight for *Daesh*, the act supports *impact prevention*,
- By putting restriction orders on persons who are found to hold and share radical views which threaten religious harmony in the country, the promotion of these ideas is stopped and *social cohesion* is *strengthened*.
- The act supports the *maintenance of meaning* by protecting *Just-World-Beliefs* in the population and thus is enabling an effective and strong government response to terror threats levelled against the over-all society.

1092 Image taken from Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c.

1093 Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2003.

1094 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019b.

*What measures can authorities take away from the Internal Security Act that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which enables the effective policing of the spread of radical propaganda and of views detrimental to the social cohesion of the society.
- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which enables an effective and strong government response to terror threats levelled against the society.

### Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act

The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) had been enacted in 1990 as a reaction to an “increase in religious fervour, missionary zeal, and assertiveness” which had created inter-religious tensions, and to curb undesired political influence by faith groups.<sup>1095</sup>

The MRHA allows the Government after consulting with the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH), to issue restraining orders to religious leaders and activists who it finds to be “*causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different religious groups; or promoting a political cause*”<sup>1096</sup>. Those receiving such an order may be prevented “*from addressing orally or in writing any congregation or group of worshippers, or publishing any publication, or holding office in an editorial board of a religious group without prior government approval.*”<sup>1097</sup>

Those found in breach of a restraining order, risk to be criminally charged under the *Section 298A of the Penal Code* for disturbing public tranquility or under the *Sedition Act*.<sup>1098</sup> The MRHA has proven to be so effective, that no restraining order has been issued under the MRHA since its first enactment in 1990, as those found in breach of MRHA have shown restraint after receiving an advance warning.<sup>1099</sup>

- The act helps maintain social trust and cohesion by asking all religions for moderation, tolerance and respect assuring them that transgressions by any faith will be punished.

1095 Government of Singapore 1989, 3.

1096 Singapore Statutes Online 2001, 7–8.

1097 *ibid.*, 8 ; See also Hussin 2018, 180.

1098 Lai 2019.

1099 Min and Mohan 2019.



- The act reduces the potential divisive impact of a sectarian terrorist attack as it obliges religious leaders to react with prudence and restraint to attacks and not to start a blame game with other races or religions.

What measures can authorities take away from the *Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA)* that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which helps to maintain social trust and cohesion, by asking all religions for moderation, tolerance and respect assuring them that transgressions by any faith will be punished.
- Authorities should pass appropriate legislation which helps to reduce the potential divisive impact of a sectarian terrorist attack as it obliges religious leaders to react with prudence and restraint to attacks and not to start a blame game with other races or religions.

#### Administration of Muslim Law Act Section 87

Under *Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA)* – Section 87 which covers Muslim Religious School rules, Islamic education in Singapore is overseen by the *Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (Muis)*.<sup>1100</sup> No individual or organisation may teach Islam or provide Islamic education in Singapore without a certificate of recognition by the Muis.<sup>1101</sup>

Everyone who wants to teach, needs to be registered under the *Asatizah Recognition*

*Scheme (ARS)* by the Muis that assesses the professional competence in Islamic teaching and the compliance to the *ARS Code of Ethics*. This Code requires teachers to teach only moderate and non-divisive schools of Islam in a way that is mindful of “the well-being and the harmony of the [whole] society”.<sup>1102</sup>

Quranic teachers found to be lacking the qualifications for recognition under the ARS can benefit from strongly subsidised Quranic training (Specialised Certificate for Quran Teachers SCQT and Specialised Diploma

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1100 See Singapore Statutes Online 2009, 11.

1101 See Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 2017, 1.

1102 *ibid.*, 4.



for Quran Teachers SDQ) which upon successful completion would allow them to apply again.<sup>1103</sup>

Islamic education centres and providers (IECPs) which want to be recognized under the scheme, need to prove that their curriculum and teaching materials comply to the ARS Code of Ethics, and are allowed to employ only teachers who are registered under the ARS.<sup>1104</sup>

Recognition is given for a maximum of three years after which it will be reviewed; IECPs or teachers found in breach of the ARS Code of Ethics, may have their recognition revoked at any time.<sup>1105</sup>

- The Act and its application in the ARS through Muis help to strengthen social cohesion by confining religious teachings to a value corridor which is observant of the preservation of the harmony and well-being of the whole society.
- Through its effective application and the expulsion of non-compliant teachers, the Act also reassures the non-Muslim population of the loyalty of the Muslim-community to the nation and prevents speculations and accusations which could bring distrust and fear.

*What measures can authorities take away from the Administration of Muslim Law Act Section 87 that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation that helps to *strengthen social cohesion* by confining religious teachings to a value corridor observant of preserving the harmony and well-being of the whole society.
- Authorities could ensure through the effective application of religious teaching legislation and the expulsion of non-compliant teachers, that the non-Muslim population is reassured of the loyalty of the Muslim-community to the nation and *prevents* speculations and accusations which could bring distrust and fear.

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1103 See *ibid.*, 3.

1104 See Hussin 2018, 175.

1105 See Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 2017.

## Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act

The Act passed in 2018<sup>1106</sup>, allows police during a “serious incident” or in the expectation of an impending incident to enforce the Act and order a halt to all communication and news gathering in or from a certain geographical area by the media or private citizens.<sup>1107</sup> This can prevent the endangering of tactical police operations and may preserve their communication dominance.

- It can *prevent the wide-spread impact* of an impending attack by suppressing its media effect if the threat is turning into an event.
- It can *reduce the potential impact* of an unexpected attack by stopping the uncontrolled spread of the pictures of the event, aka “the terrorist propaganda”.
- It can help to *protect cognitive clarity* during an incident by preventing the dissemination of unverified footage and messages from an incident area.

*What measures can authorities take away from the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which may prevent the impact of an impending attack by suppressing its media effect if the threat is becoming true.
- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which may reduce the potential impact of an unexpected attack by stopping the uncontrolled spread of the pictures, aka “the terrorist propaganda”.
- Authorities should pass appropriate legislation which may help to protect cognitive clarity during an incident by preventing the dissemination of unverified footage and messages from an incident area.

## Singapore Armed Forces Amendment Act

The 2007 Amendment to the Singapore Armed Forces Act grants soldiers during their deployment on homeland security duty, the same executive

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1106 See Singapore Statutes Online 2018.

1107 See Hong 2018.

powers as exercised by police officers.<sup>1108</sup> It has allowed the deployment of Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel in joint patrols with the police (called deterrence patrols, as shown in figure below), thereby temporarily freeing police officers to be deployed to counter-terrorism operations and investigations when required.<sup>1109</sup>

All front line police officers receive a one-day joint training preparing them for joint patrols, while SAF personnel undergo a one-week training that covers „*areas such as scenario-based simulation and live-firing for homeland security operations; search-and-arrest procedures [...]; knowledge of legal powers and rights of private defence; and retractable truncheon drills*“.<sup>1110</sup>

By January 2019, over 22,000 soldiers, both full-time service men and reservists (NSMen) had been trained for joint deployment, with 18,000 soldiers to be trained in each following year.<sup>1111</sup> The Act helps to *prevent an impact* of terrorism by deterring attacks through a larger law enforcement presence. The Act further helps to *reduce the potential impact* of an attack by the Government's ability to quickly surge the number of trained firearms officers in the street to suppress an ongoing attack. In addition, the presence of deterrence patrols in the street can reassure citizens that the Government is prepared to deal with any threat, thereby helping citizens to manage their fear of terrorism.

By deploying an SAF force including full-time national service men and reservists directly in the street to help to protect the citizens against marauding terrorist attacks, the *meaningfulness* of their service to the nation increases in the eyes of the soldiers and the citizens and can contribute to increased *social cohesion*.

*What measures can authorities take away from the Singapore Armed Forces Amendment Act that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation that enables a larger law enforcement presence through the effective training and deployment of military personnel in joint deterrence patrols with police, temporarily freeing police officers to be deployed to counter-terrorism operations and investigations when needed.

1108 See Singapore Statutes Online 2000.

1109 See Loh 2019.


1110 Beng 2017a.

1111 See Beng 2017b.

The Infrastructure Protection Act

The *Infrastructure Protection Act (IPA)* passed in 2018<sup>1112</sup>, requires developers and owners of buildings with high footfall or of iconic sites which may pose attractive terrorist targets, to undertake protective security measures “*necessary to deter and deny attacks, and minimize the impact should an attack occur.*”<sup>1113</sup>

Figure 54: Infographic Infrastructure Protection Act published by the Ministry of Home Affairs, part one.<sup>1114</sup>



The necessary measures are defined by and based on the *Security-By-Design (SBD) review process* (managed by the *Centre for Protective Security (CPS)*). Each owner or developer have to commit themselves to them in order to obtain approvals for their developments or any planned repairs,

1112 Singapore Statues Online 2017.

1113 Singapore Police Force 06.2019, 1–2.

1114 Graphic taken from annex to Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018b, 1.

renovations or additions to existing buildings or sites.<sup>1115</sup> The measures required, as stipulated by the *Security-by-Design* assessment, may comprise “the deployment of security technology like CCTVs, security personnel, vehicle barriers, and strengthening the building against blast effects.”<sup>1116</sup>

*“MHA will also be able to direct owners of selected buildings to put in place additional security measures to guard against terrorist attacks. If a terrorist attack is assessed to be imminent, emergency orders can be issued to protect a building.”*<sup>1117</sup>

The private securities guards of these designated sites are also equipped with enforcement rights in the surrounding areas in order to prevent or disrupt pre-attack planning and hostile reconnaissance.<sup>1118</sup> They can stop people and request identification, “inspect their clothes, vehicles and belongings”, prohibit photos and temporarily evict individuals from the area.<sup>1119</sup>

- The Act supports *impact prevention* by deterring or disrupting potential attackers.
- The Act may *reduce the impact* of an attack because of better structural protection at at-risk-sites.

*What measures can authorities take away from the Infrastructure Protection Act that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?*

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which supports impact prevention by deterring or disrupting potential attackers through hardened infrastructure and protective measures.
- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which helps to reduce the impact of a potential attack as a consequence of better structural protection at at-risk-sites.

1115 See Singapore Police Force 06.2019.

1116 *ibid.*, 1–2.

1117 Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018b.

1118 See *ibid.*


1119 *ibid.*, 1.

Legal Instruments (summary)	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	✓
Management of Fear	✓
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

7.8. Singapore Case Study Conclusion

The result of the analysis of the different programmes in place under the *Total Defence* counter-terrorism approach in Singapore, reflects the *nine critical tasks* for building, strengthening and preserving Strategic Resilience, that are at the core of the *Rings-of Resilience Model* proposed in Chapter Five, emphasizing its relevance.

Figure 55: Singapore’s different counter-terrorism activities fall within the nine critical tasks of Strategic Resilience.



Several of the programmes' activities fall into more than one category, meaning that they contribute to fulfilling several tasks at the same time. Consequently, running some programmes may be more effective than others.

A simple high or low number of contributing activities to one task does not allow to come to a simple conclusion about the level of resilience and preparedness created in the society, as this analysis has focused on government-driven programmes. It did not include purely civil society-run activities and institutions and nor did it take account of existing national peculiarities or strengths which in certain areas may make additional strong official efforts unnecessary.

The analysis does however give practitioners a hint where the Government's focus is currently placed and where there may be a need for additional effort or additional assessment to further improve Strategic Resilience.

Simply judging by the number of activities under each task category, the analysis shows a strong focus in Singapore on protective security measures that are concerned with *impact prevention and reduction*. These are backed-up by multiple efforts to raise the vigilance of the civil society and the private sector and their respective *self-efficacy*, should protective measures be breached and a terrorist attack occur. In line with the idea that keeping Singapore safe, is a shared responsibility, the effort to equip Singaporeans with the skills which enable them in assisting in the prevention of attacks and in mitigating the consequences, are delivered in a whole-of-government multi-agency approach across all sectors of the society and, are calculated to exude a strong deterrence effect.

Corresponding to the national *Total Defence* approach taken, these more technical resilience-enhancing measures are matched by an equal number of activities which contribute to building and sustaining the social resilience – through a *meaningful national narrative*, multiple programmes to *strengthen societal cohesion* and open official risk communication. Service to the community is applauded and rewarded, and safeguarding the cohesion of Singapore's unique multi-ethnic social fabric is at the core of its shared meaning. As a mandatory prerequisite, tolerance and openness towards other races, and beliefs and religious moderation are taught to Singaporeans from kindergarten up to national service. This common knowledge is helping with *emotion-focused coping*. The embrace of and adherence to these principles are encouraged in all aspects of life in Singapore.

Through a long record of good governance, of the effective managing of past disasters and of transparent communication the Government has gained high trust in the population. As a consequence of *consistent pro-active risk communication*, the *fear of a terrorist threat* is low and the potential indirect impact of an attack is expected to be limited. This is further aided by the close bonds with the main media outlets and by legal checks which curtail the negligent or malignant spread of uncorroborated inflammatory suspicions and accusations, as regularly encountered in the virtual space after alleged jihadi attacks in other countries.

Those *directly affected by an attack* do benefit from modern healthcare system which has been trained for mass- casualty events through pre-hospital care and trauma units. *Psychosocial reintegration* of trauma patients is aided by the support of dedicated *return-to-work consultants* and community-administered social and psychological support.



## 8. Chapter: Cross-Case Comparison and Conclusion

### 8.1. Introduction

Following the analysis of the two individual cases UK and Singapore as part of the multiple-case replication design, this chapter compares the conclusions of both cases with each other and draws a *cross-case conclusion* as prescribed by Yin assessing whether the cases were able to falsify the proposed *Rings of Resilience Model*.<sup>1120</sup> For illustrative purposes the qualitative comparison is augmented by radar chart, quantifying outliers and commonalities in the programme mix of both countries.

### 8.2. Assessment

By comparing the mix of programmes that were measured and assessed for each case in the chapters five and six and visualising the percentage-share of the total number of programmes in each country across the nine categories, which contribute to *Strategic Resilience*, the UK and Singapore show differing centres of gravity in their national approach to achieve *Strategic Resilience*.

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1120 See Yin, 2001, 49.

Figure 56: Comparison of percentage-share of the total number of the assessed programmes in each country across the nine categories.




Table 8: Percentage-share of the total number of the assessed programmes in UK and Singapore in each of the nine categories.<sup>1121</sup>

Programmes in %	Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	Impact Prevention & Reduction	Limit Indirect Psychological Impact	Management of Fear	Coping Friendly Meaning Making	Ensure Cognitive Clarity	Strengthen Societal Cohesion	Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected
UK	1,52%	13,64%	28,79%	3,03%	4,55%	3,03%	24,24%	13,64%	7,58%
SG	2,21%	14,71%	21,32%	2,21%	5,15%	16,18%	9,56%	22,06%	6,62%

This is not surprising as the case countries are dissimilar in many ways, including culturally as shown in the country comparison of the well-known *Hofstede's 6 Cultural Dimension*.<sup>1122</sup>

Stronger emphasis on *strengthening societal cohesion* in Singapore than in the UK is to be expected considering the collectivist nature of the Singaporean society compared to the UK, based on differing social norms that value social responsibility over personal freedom and is woven into the national narrative and self-concept of Singapore. The ability to galvanise


1121 Author's own work.

1122 See comparison on the next page.

collective action is also one important way for small countries with a small population to try to fulfil their security needs.

Similarly, Singapore's emphasis on providing and preserving an *effective coping friendly meaning*, is reflective of the felt necessity to strengthen and preserve societal cohesion, especially considering the challenges that stem from the heterogeneous multi-ethnic and multicultural fabric of its society in a volatile geographic neighbourhood. It is also reflective of Singapore's ability to promote one dominant narrative through a big government with centralized control and a high *Power Distance* in society (as shown in *Figure 63*). The environment in the UK and the role of government in the UK is very different, and consequently the Government's ability to successfully promote one central narrative is much more restricted and actively challenged.

*Figure 57: Comparison between the UK and Singapore across Hofstede's 6 Cultural Dimension.<sup>1123</sup>*



This may well explain the UK's multi-layered effort to assure *cognitive clarity* through informational support. As the role of and the trust in government is lower, with more focus on the individual than on the community and its needs to operate in a contested media environment, there is a high need for communication. That requirement has further been repeatedly amplified through terror incidents and has leads to new channels and protocols being introduced. In comparison to the UK situation the Singapore

<sup>1123</sup> Figure and numbers adapted and from Hofstede Insights without year.

government has great control over the media environment, it operates in. On top of that, the Singapore government is also able to further amplify its messages through government and non-governmental organisations.

Efforts to *prevent and reduce direct impact* of a terrorist attack, play an important role in both countries. However, the case analysis identified comparatively more measures in the UK than in Singapore. This is to be expected considering that the UK has had a long list of terrorist attacks which it suffered on its soil even before the *jihadi wave* started. As a result of such attacks the country therefore has continuously responded with new measures to mitigate future threats and is doing so today. As a country that has suffered little or no attacks, Singapore might be expected to lag behind in terms of programmes and policies implemented, but it is actively learning lessons from the UK.<sup>1124</sup> The recently updated infrastructure protection guidelines<sup>1125</sup> and increased CCTV surveillance are examples.<sup>1126</sup>

For all the remaining four categories, *Figure 70*, shows similar values for both case countries. While the slight difference in numbers may be considered insignificant, it is still worthwhile looking at the qualitative data behind the numbers.

In the delivery of *dedicated support for those directly affected* from a terrorist attack, both countries undertake not insignificant efforts. The UK, however, is scoring only a slightly higher value share, considering that the country has suffered hundreds of victims over the years, whose wellbeing strongly depended on the quality and level of support given.

To make their populations better prepared for terrorist attacks and avoid preventable casualties, both Singapore and the UK put a similarly high focus on *raising self-efficacy* in the society. Both countries have adopted clear risk communication and practical public service advice to build the citizens' self-efficacy. Singapore has an advantage as it can build on an existing whole-of-society *Total Defence* concept. The authorities are able to plug their counter-terrorism prevention and preparedness efforts into the *Total Defence* concept and build on existing organisational structures for its facilitation. The UK authorities in turn benefit from higher levels of attention for their public service announcements, without the need to constantly alert the public to the threat.

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1124 See Vasu 2007.

1125 See Singapore Police Force 06.2019.

1126 See Today Online 2016.

To limit the indirect (psychological) impact from attacks on the rest of the population, the authorities in both cases use legislation and a mix of inducements and coercion, that is why there is not a high number of programmes that can be counted under this category. While Singapore and the UK have very different starting points, considering their general media environment and the laws governing it, when it comes to *jihadi* terrorism content both countries strongly legislate and police its dissemination, with legislation added as seen fit and which also extends to international social media platforms. An exception today is only the British press which may publish similarly unnerving and divisive terrorism-related content offline and on its online pages, so far unimpeded by government regulation. But it is on the radar of non-governmental pressure groups.

While both countries aim to better prevent and *manage fear* in the population by limiting the virality of negative content, both countries use careful risk communication to achieve a prepared but not scared population. Part of the communication also includes efforts to reassure the population of state preparedness through rapid law enforcement and emergency response in case of an attack through highly visual law enforcement deployments into public spaces or by actually successfully responding and ending live attacks in a very short time. This happened repeatedly during *Jihadi-inspired* knife attacks in UK. In absence of real attacks, regular public counter-terrorism exercises (as conducted annually in all of Singapore's districts) are used to reassure and to ask for sustained vigilance.

Tolerance to dissenting views and beliefs, uncertainty acceptance and openness to change and resilience in adversity are taught as virtues in the UK and Singapore in order to raise *emotion focused-coping-skills*. In Singapore, they form part of the national narrative and are encouraged in all aspects of life, which may partly explain the extremely low *uncertainty avoidance* identified by Hofstede in the Singaporean population, as shown in Figure 88. Cognitive congruence between the *Situational Meaning* of an attack and the held *Global Beliefs* in the Singaporean population is further strengthened at the highest government level by repeatedly issuing a “*Not if, but When*”-message concerning the probability of the next terror attack.

Despite the strongly dissimilar circumstances in the case countries as shown above and described in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Chapter, that affect the direction of counter-terrorism efforts in each country, all programmes and measures assessed across the two case studies that are undertaken in order to mitigate and muster a resilient response to the terrorism threat, contribute to the completion of the nine critical tasks identified in the 5<sup>th</sup> Chapter.

While the description and analysis of programmes and measures in the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Chapters represent only a picture of the situation at a point in time in a very dynamic and responsive terrorism and counter-terrorism environment, they still have general relevance beyond this period: What may be deduced from the analysis and is visible in *Figure 87* is that each country shows preferences how they choose to address the terrorism threat and build resilience. It also shows where the two countries have opportunities to increase their efforts by adding activities and or shifting them into other categories. Several events at the time of writing but after the completion of the country case analysis, are confirming the findings' continuing relevance.

On 21 January 2020, the Home Office announced a year-on-year increase of £90 million funding for counter-terrorism policing, bringing it to a total £906 million in 2020/21, which will further strengthen the country's *terrorism impact prevention and reduction efforts*.<sup>1127</sup>

By spring 2020, the UK Government will introduce a new law to be debated in Parliament, named '*Protect Duty*' Law or simply *Martyn's Law* that also has the same impact prevention and reduction focus.<sup>1128</sup> According to the Home Office, the new law as currently proposed, would place a legal duty on operators of crowded venues "*to consider the risk of a terrorist attack and take proportionate and reasonable measures to prepare for and protect the public from such an attack. This could include increased physical security, having training in place, incident response plans and exercises for staff on what to do during an attack.*"<sup>1129</sup>

In December 2019, *UK Counter Terror Policing* has started its call on the whole of UK public to take a free counter-terrorism online training<sup>1130</sup>. This had previously been reserved for professionals in front line roles at crowded places and companies. Now it aims at bolstering the vigilance and preparedness (*problem-focused coping skills*) of the wider public. According to the NaCTSO, nearly 70,000 new people signed up during the corona lock down, bringing the total number to over 500,000 participants by June 2020.<sup>1131</sup>

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1127 See UK Home Office 2020b.

1128 See UK Home Office 2020a ; the proposed law is named after Martyn Hett who died in the *Manchester Arena Attack* , and whose mother has since been campaigning for better terror protection of public venues.

1129 *ibid.*

1130 See National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2019a.

1131 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2020.

Reflective of the untapped potential visible in the radar chart to further strengthen societal cohesion and personal efficacy, a *Royal United Services Institute* (RUSI) occasional paper published in March 2020, established that overall, liberal democracies like the UK lack abilities to effectively deal with non-traditional threats<sup>1132</sup>. As a result, it found “*large parts of the population [...] ill-equipped to take action for themselves in case of serious disruption or interference*”.<sup>1133</sup> To avoid the exploitation of these gaps by adversaries and a further overstretch of professional civil and military responders, the paper argues for a stronger involvement of the wider population in national security.<sup>1134</sup> The study’s author argues the case for introducing national resilience training for teenagers which should equip these with “*basic national security skills, specifically those required for citizens and their communities to (partially) mitigate the effects of non-kinetic aggression, in addition to nature-related contingencies such as severe weather events and contagious diseases.*”<sup>1135</sup>

This proposed shift of national focus to embrace community resilience and cohesion through significant involvement of the citizen in national crisis response aligned to a *Total Defence* approach, would constitute to a strong “counter-cultural” shift for the UK, “*where large parts of the population are uneasy about the government reaching into their personal lives.*”<sup>1136</sup>

The fact that the leading security and defense think tank with its partners and sponsors is not afraid of a political backlash from this proposal, underlines RUSI’s conviction that more investment in the citizens’ individual *problem solving-focused coping skills* and in the *strengthening of social cohesion* (both areas proposed by this work) are very relevant for the *Strategic Resilience* of an open liberal society.

In Singapore in the meantime, at the time of writing, the early and initial response by the authorities to the COVID-19 pandemic has been considered exemplary with record low fatality rates. Its approach to the pandemic is reflective of the resilience-led approach, of a prepared administration and society, that is able through whole-of-government effort to limit the crisis’ direct and indirect impact, provide necessary support, and – complemented by transparent and effective crisis communication –

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1132 See Braw 2020, 2.

1133 *ibid.*, 3.

1134 See *ibid.*, 3.

1135 *ibid.*, 3.

1136 *ibid.*

maintain social trust and encourage community resilience, avoiding the divisiveness and discord experienced from the crisis in other countries. After extending the same attention and care to the migrant workers' who are housed in special dormitories and are politically, socially and economically detached from the community the government has been able to get the spike in infections under control and maintains a low death rate of just 27 deaths from 55,938 confirmed cases (52,350 recovered) as of 18 August 2020.<sup>1137</sup>

### 8.3. Case Study Conclusion

Concluding the theory testing, the case study analysis found that the *nine critical tasks* that are at the core of the new *Rings-of-Resilience model* proposed by this work, to establish strengthen and maintain *Strategic Resilience* in open pluralist societies, are being reflected in the actual government resilience-focused counter-terrorism efforts and programmes in both the United Kingdom and in Singapore that are faced with a jihadi terrorist threat.

As a result, it can be stated, that neither the UK case study, nor the Singapore case study, nor the cross-case comparison, were able to falsify the hypothesis.

The analysis of the cases further shows that the *nine critical tasks* proposed by the model, form a useful and practical framework for the categorisation and assessment of existing programmes / efforts. It allows authorities the self-assessment of their effort – indicating strengths and weaknesses, enabling conscious decisions which gaps to close and which not. Importantly the framework also allows the comparison of programmes with each other. This is important in resource allocation decisions which governments are regularly confronted with in face of finite resources.

The dissimilarity of the described cases further indicates – if not a general, then a wider applicability of the model beyond the two tested cases. Other open pluralist societies faced with the same terrorism challenges are likely to benefit from adopting the same framework. Research sub-question three: “Can the findings of question two be applied to the concrete challenge of jihadi terrorism in the open, pluralist society?” can be answered with a “YES” with good confidence.

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1137 The Straits Times 2020.



As it was set out, applying the analytical frame of the nine resilience categories to the programmes also helped in the identification of numerous practical measures in each category that may be generalised and most of which are likely to enhance the prevention, response and coping abilities of other open pluralist societies as well. Only minor adaptations may be necessary, to customise them to the specific circumstances of each country.



## 9. Chapter: Synopsis

This work has set out to answer the question, how Münkler & Wassermann's abstract concept of *Strategic Resilience* can be actualised in open, pluralist societies faced with a *jihadi* terrorist threat.

The relevance of this question is based upon the system-inherent, unavoidable vulnerabilities open, complex and pluralist societies such as the liberal democracies of Europe are facing.<sup>1138</sup> In addition to the vulnerabilities posed by natural disasters and diseases, the deliberate exploitation of these vulnerabilities by strategically acting adversaries such as terrorist organisations, leads to a “strategic vulnerability”.<sup>1139</sup> The exploitation of the “strategic vulnerability” of modern, “post-heroic societies”<sup>1140</sup> by terrorists presents these societies and their authorities with the dilemma of finding the right balance between prosperity and freedom on the one hand, and security on the other hand, in order to meet the society's basic need of security and demand for protection.<sup>1141</sup>

In view of these strategic vulnerabilities, the understanding that the attempt to successfully defend a society in a traditional sense against all possible terrorist threats is sure to fail, has cleared the way for a widely shared understanding among security professionals and academics that only a resilient society can respond to unexpected threats and events in a successful manner that promotes security and deals with the threats adequately.<sup>1142</sup>

Confronting this threat by terrorism, requires the societies to open up to and to pursue the concept of *Strategic Resilience* which describes the will and ability of a society to prevent, withstand and recover from incidents which have been deliberately caused with a terrorist intent and which threaten to negatively alter connections and relationships (including the

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1138 See Gearson 2012, 193 ; See Münkler 2015, 245, See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 91.

1139 See *ibid.*, 91.

1140 *ibid.*, 92.

1141 See *ibid.*, 91 ; See Kaufmann 2015.

1142 See Giebel 2014, 370.

trust in them) in the society and to the society, by mustering its material, social and psychological capital in a concerted effort.<sup>1143</sup>

*Strategic Resilience* does not only require the society's passive heroic endurance<sup>1144</sup>, but also needs to support the prevention of, response to and the coping with an attack or other type of shocks. Consequentially, the effect of *Strategic Resilience* does not start only when an attack has occurred, but does so long before such an event, and does not end with it. *Strategic Resilience* affects the question of how to deal with the mere threat of an attack, how to react to an attack and how to manage its potential consequences. To resolve this issue, the population is not primarily seen as a possible victim by the authorities but is understood as an equal partner and useful supporter for emergency responders who are first on the scene during the *isolation period*. This philosophy creates a force-multiplier effect, allows for a much faster response in case of an emergency and has a positive effect on the population themselves who through their involvement and active participation, have the feeling that they are better able to control the situation and are not just helpless victims. After an attack, it is crucial for the keeping up of the resilience of those people affected, if and how quickly normalcy can be restored to their lives. This also represents a message to the outside, that is to the rest of the society and to (potential future) terrorists, that through such attacks they will not be able to achieve their strategic objective. So, beyond the effect of helping to directly reduce the psychological impact of attacks on the population and at least trying to prevent or to reduce the success of an attack, credible *Strategic Resilience* is intended to obstruct the adversary's incentive to carry out his attacks in the first place, as the desired effect of the plot which motivates terrorist to act, is denied to him. Through this benefit-denial, *Strategic Resilience* can also have a deterrence effect.<sup>1145</sup>

Despite the knowledge that resilience is something that can be actively created and shaped, at least to a large extent<sup>1146</sup>, European societies and their leaders<sup>1147</sup> have struggled to achieve *Strategic Resilience* as conceptualised by Münkler & Wassermann – although they have been facing an

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1143 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 77.

1144 See *ibid.*, 93.

1145 ; See Gearson 2012 ; See Kroenig and Pavel 2012 ; See Trager and Zagorcheva 2006 ; See Quinlan 2006 ; See Gray 2002.

1146 See Baban 2014, 9.

1147 See ABC News 2016.

particularly dreadful terrorist threat as posed by *jihadi* groups of *Al Qaida* and *Daesh*: Representative surveys in societies targeted by *jihadi* attacks consistently demonstrate increased levels of fear, uncertainty and more pessimistic outlooks and show signs of co-radicalisation through prevalence of negative stereotypes of Muslims and revenge attacks on Muslims.<sup>1148</sup>

To close this gap between the conceptual knowledge and the implementation of *Strategic Resilience*, this work has dissected the concept's underlying interdisciplinary theories and models, in order to identify an interdisciplinary organising framework which can provide practical guidance for the adoption of a complex whole-of-government multi-agency and cross-sector approach, necessary to successfully counter the *jihadi* threat.

As a result of this process the author has identified nine critical tasks a government should focus its efforts on if it wants to achieve, to strengthen or to preserve *Strategic Resilience* against terrorism:

### Coping-Friendly Meaning Making

Through the deliberate and seemingly random targeting of civilians, *jihadi* terrorists intend to create a feeling of senseless and disproportionate suffering in the targeted *Western* societies. The psychological effect of the attacks is reinforced through their justification by terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the *West* as a just-response to wrongs done to the Muslim and/or Arab world in the past or present. Thereby the terrorists deliberately exploit held *Just-World-Beliefs* in *Western* societies, to break the will of these societies to defend themselves.

To counter this real and psychological warfare, authorities need to carefully choose their actions and their communication strategy, creating their own narrative. This requires the identification and analysis of the existing held *Global Meaning* (including the *Just-World-Beliefs*) in the society and the anticipation of the threat and an impact posed to the meaning by terrorism, and prophylactically proceeding to uncover and distil meaning and purpose from these threat scenarios. Having done that, these results should then be infused into the prevailing *Global Meaning*.

This amended narrative should establish a shared meaning and purpose in the society to ensure its defiance and unity in the face of the terrorist

1148 See Ipsos MORI 2020 ; See PEW Research Center 2019 ; See Infocenter der R+V Versicherung 2019 ; See Atkinson 2017 ; See Ipsos Public Affairs 2017 ; See Hecker and Tenenbaum 2017.

threat. This narrative needs to compellingly explain who the terrorists are and what they are fighting for. It should further provide the population with a compelling meaning and purpose WHY they must endure the hardship and suffering which terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities.

The process of transforming held beliefs is usually a long-term process. But authorities should be prepared to use the opportunities opened through a traumatic event like a terror attack. Their effort should focus on weaving, sustaining and strengthening a defiant meaning-orientated narrative which will promote an attitudinal heroism towards the threat of death from terrorism. The nationalistic excitement usually evoked by a terror threat or act, can help prepared authorities to shift opinions and beliefs and to galvanize the cohesion of the society.

While the authorities may establish a sense of suffering in the population, they must also consider the population's need for justice or just-revenge after an attack to support their coping. Authorities must ensure their ability to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the *Just-World-Beliefs*, which may involve law enforcement, justice system, and health and social system.

Authorities should support the selection and weaving of different memories into a meaningful narrative which lets people find a sense in previous traumatic events in their lives and in their relationship to others, and allows them to re-write history – or rather the memory of it. This allows individuals as well as the society to turn moments of defeat into moments of triumphant defiance and of personal growth.

Whether established in the long-run or in the short-term, newly established meaning will require continuous care, even after it has been accepted. Authorities must consistently live up to the shared values and meaning they proclaim in their words and actions, and this must be aligned across the whole-of-government. The objective of the whole-of-government approach needs to establish a culture which provides “*a shared symbolic conception of reality that imputes order, predictability, significance, and permanence.*”<sup>1149</sup>

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1149 Greenberg *et al.* 1986, 206.

## Ensure Cognitive Clarity

Providing informational support and assuring cognitive clarity in a society faced with a terrorism threat, is important for maintaining its *Strategic Resilience*. A relatively accurate description of a terrorist incident may only be given by that small amount of people directly affected by it. Those directly affected by an attack will still struggle to grasp and to precisely assess the overall threat situation and to draw accurate conclusions of their own. The rest of the population who were no direct witness to the attack, must form their opinion about the attack following the reporting of the social and mass media on the incident and the witnessed reactions of the authorities, as well as based on terrorist propaganda and official government statements. All this received information will be unconsciously interpreted, built on the person's held views and beliefs of the world. It is no surprise that uncertainty-induced anxiety and fear are frequently experienced emotions connected with terrorist incidents and threats.

By ensuring that the population is consistently provided with accurate, timely and relevant information, which is perceived to be credible, transparent and actionable, authorities may significantly reduce fear and uncertainty-induced anxiety from terrorism in the population, and thus may improve their self-help abilities in a crisis situation. This must be done conscious of the mass and social media impact and in consideration of the special communication needs of vulnerable groups.

## Management of Fear

The fear of death caused by the “*dread risk*”<sup>1150</sup> of terrorism can greatly challenge the normal functioning of individuals and may negatively impact their resilience before, during and after an incident. Through emotional contagion, social influence and media it also may undermine collective *Strategic Resilience*. Through the dynamic of a reciprocal threat perception, the collective fear may then even function as an incitement for more attacks. Managing this fear, reducing or eliminating it and preventing its spread, will help the sustainment of the *Strategic Resilience*. Government measures under this category are falling into four areas:

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1150 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

1. Avoiding unwarranted fear reactions through prudent threat communication,
2. The provision of practical coping information,
3. Fear mitigation through psychological fear management techniques, social support and public reassurance measures,
4. Limiting the spread and impact of fear in collaboration with the social and mass media.

### Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy

The perceived personal self-efficacy of individuals or organisations to be able to cope effectively with a crisis situation is a core component for the creation of *Strategic Resilience* of the society. Mastering this competency has a positive effect for the physical and emotional well-being of an individual or an organisation. But as a more general advantage, all individuals and organisations who are able to help themselves due to their acquired self-efficacy, may free up official emergency response capacity which then may be deployed otherwise. Strong self-efficacy may also help to deter terrorist attacks by functioning as an effective *indirect denial* of the objectives the terrorists aim to achieve through their attack, as it reduces the potential coercive effect of these attacks on the population. In the eyes of the individual or organisations, the constituents of self-efficacy are context-dependent and overlapping. Therefore, authorities should support its coherent development, strengthening and confirmation.

### Impact Prevention and Reduction

*Strategic Resilience* of a society may be strengthened by the authorities preemptively denying anticipated malicious attacks from unfolding and from having a notable impact on the society. This covers *direct-denial* measures like target hardening and additional security presence by the authorities which make it hard for terrorists to conduct large-scale operations and which thereby reduce the perceived potential scale of an attack.

Such measures include the public communication on these (potential) actions. The aim is to show the low probability of such attacks being successful, to potential perpetrators as well as to the public. This also



includes the readiness and preparedness of effective and resilient crisis and emergency response capabilities.

As jihadis' target selection has been focusing on soft targets (such as random commuters, shoppers, concert goers, tourists), impact prevention also includes addressing the society and its critical stakeholders like providers of critical infrastructure and the private sector. If they were negatively impacted by an attack, it would be felt by the community as a whole. Impact prevention includes alerting these stakeholders and informing them about what they can do to reduce the risk of attacks from happening at their site and how to reduce the impact of a "successful" attack. It may further cover encouraging stakeholders to invest in their security (e.g. building security) and to prepare business continuity plans, including the creation of necessary redundancies in preparation for terror attacks.

Authorities should equally recognise and make use of the ordinary citizens as "experts of everyday life" and take them seriously, consciously integrating their skills into the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.<sup>1151</sup> This may include the citizens' self-help and personal preparedness as well as community lay first responder schemes which will provide support to those requiring help in the "golden hour", directly after an attack and before professional responders arrive.

As the media would be an important conduit for presenting the impact of a terrorist attack to all who were not directly affected, they necessarily need to be included in impact prevention efforts in the preparatory phase.

### Strengthen Emotion-Focused coping skills

Developing the individual's proficiency to cope with negative emotions, is an important element in sustaining *Strategic Resilience* in the population, when faced with terrorist attacks. Emotion-focused coping skills enable an individual to achieve congruence between the *Situational Meaning* of an attack and his held *Global Beliefs / Just-World-Beliefs* through their positive reframing and re-interpreting when necessary. Measures by the authorities which are supportive of individual emotion-focused coping skills stretch along a time continuum. They start in the short-term, i.e. with deliberately designed and carefully committed speech acts. In the long-term they require efforts to establish symbolic means for the positive

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1151 See Giebel 2014, 370.

confirmation of individuals' personal world-view and their self-image. This includes responsible risk-communication and the promotion of an open culture of debate which will make individuals stay comfortable when being confronted with opposing information or opinions, without triggering fear or anger in them.

### Limit Indirect (Psychological) Impact

The government measures under this category focus on the reduction of the indirect impact of an ongoing or recent attack on the society, both in the response and in the coping phase. The main attention is placed on those people who are affected indirectly by an attack. Their numbers are much higher than of those directly caught up in a terrorist incident. As terrorism is an act of communication which uses violence as a means to intimidate and coerce the population, limiting the communicative reach and impact of such an act can reduce its effectiveness. Counter-measures comprise the reduction of the visual and practical impact of an attack by the rapid removal of tangible and visible damages to the infrastructure and ensuring its operation as soon as possible, as well as managing the possible visual (psychological) impact distributed through the mass media and social media. To reduce the impact on those directly caught up and affected by an attack the categories of the prevention phase like problem-focused coping skills, emotion- focused coping skills as well as victim support and impact prevention and reduction will pay off during the response and coping phase.

### Strengthen Societal Cohesion

Societal cohesion is a critical element for the *Strategic Resilience* of a society. Strong social bonds based on mutual trust in shared values and reciprocity, help a society to remain defiant against terrorism and produce a patriotic “we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment” during a crisis. Jihadi terrorists purposefully undertake various efforts to polarise and divide a society along ideological/religious lines. Through carefully targeted attacks and communication they aim to replace social trust with suspicion, and to achieve reciprocal co-radicalisation as a consequence of the thus generated moral outrage, pitting one group in the society against another. To be able to

withstand these forces and to bounce back from these attacks without further ascending the escalatory ladder, social bonds need to be strengthened before the need arises.

Authorities have a critical role as a facilitator who supports an inclusive community dialogue which will allow communities to be sensitized and to be reassured of their inclusiveness before the need arises, and to help disperse divisive rumours or suspicions. If the authorities give this role some substance, they can counteract the potentially corrosive effect of a religiously or ethnically motivated attack on the feeling of community embeddedness and cohesion. Through their example and policies authorities can facilitate the building up and the use of personal relations at the community level to overcome the in- versus outgroup set-up in a crisis, and can promote exchanges and interactions across ethnic groups, in order to quench stereotypes and to build relationships before an incident happens.

Irrespective of whether an incident has been caused by a malign actor or by a natural disaster, strong social bonds and cohesion are important resources for a better community preparedness and crisis response. In a post-disaster scenario strong social cohesion is also identified as a positive factor for mitigating adverse psychological reactions and for promoting psychological well-being.

### Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected

Providing victim support is a critical element in sustaining the *Strategic Resilience* of a society. By establishing and declaring generous and effective compensation and care policies which credibly promise to provide for all medical, material, financial, psychological and social needs of a possible victim to an attack, authorities can counter and substantially reduce the coercive effect of a terrorist threat to society.

Equally important are sources of non- governmental social support which help to preserve the sense of togetherness and connectedness in victims. This social support should be broadly based and nourished from the community level, and most importantly from the individual level.

To avoid compounding trauma and functional impairment after exposure to an attack, procedures for trauma intervention/therapy need to be established and monitored. This is especially important for front line staff, but equally for those who have been indirectly exposed or with previous trauma experiences. For direct victims the timely replacement of and com-

pensation for lost resources (material, social and psychological), based on confirmed relative needs and not just based on status, is most important. The objective should be to bring the victims back to a “status quo ante” of the attack as close as possible. This strongly increases the chance for their recovery and successful coping.

Besides generous but fairly distributed victim support which acts as a tangible public acknowledgment of sacrifice and innocent suffering, bringing perpetrators to justice is an important duty of authorities that helps to sustain *Just-World-Beliefs* of the victims and society and may prevent victim blaming.<sup>1152</sup>

When dealing with direct victims and their families, authorities should embrace the idea that the provision of meaning in a crisis is as important as material and social support. Authorities need to help the citizens to find meaning as these can endure the worst conditions if they can find a meaning in it. Dealing with those directly affected by terrorist attacks like first responders and direct victims and their families, the narrative poses a special challenge. These people require a compelling meaning and purpose beyond the general acceptance of life with risk, i.e. why they and their families must endure greater hardship due to the society’s conflict with terrorists, than the rest of the citizens.

The accomplishments resulting from the nine critical tasks described above, are interconnected and interdependent. The potency/efficacy of each task is affected by the level of accomplishment achieved, regarding the other tasks. The benefits from and the effect of the government’s efforts will be maximised, if these are organised in a whole-of-government effort and executed in a multi-agency approach. In their efforts to accomplish the tasks, authorities need to consider both, the technical aspect like the resilience of critical infrastructure and the social aspect like the resilience of communities, organisations or individuals as the interwoven components of an overall resilience.

The analysis has further revealed that the timing and order of addressing the nine critical tasks is important, especially that the task of early prevention and that of long-term engagement as a country’s ability to respond to an attack with resilience, is strongly dependent on what governments did to prevent an attack and how they have been preparing for such an event and its aftermath.

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1152 See Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 217.

The work distinguishes between three different critical phases of a terror attack – the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase*, the *Response Phase*, and the *Recovery and Coping Phase*, in each of which to assess the situation and to direct government action towards accomplishing the nine critical tasks:

### Mitigation and Preparedness Phase

Before an attack the focus is on mitigation and preparedness. In the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase* the focus is mostly on the wider population, with the media as a conduit. An emphasis is placed on reducing the number of people who will become victims and who as such would have to rely on outside help, because they cannot help themselves due to the impact of a terrorist attack. This is achieved by strengthening individual and collective resourcefulness and self-efficacy and by building up social-emotional capital and strong community and social bonds. A key component is assuring psychological preparedness by instilling a coping-friendly meaning and purpose to the society, which is faced with a terrorist threat, supported by efforts to eliminate fear-creating factors. Measures also include the anticipation and the mitigation of the expected impact of an attack – and the preventive limiting of the factors which could amplify or prolong an attack's effect on the population. This can be done by protecting critical infrastructure, by improving business' security and continuity planning, by educating and training the citizenry to improve awareness, and by mandating responsible media reporting.

### Response Phase

Triggered by an attack, the *Response Phase* focusses on the elimination of an immediate threat and on limiting its negative effect through proactive crisis management and communication. During the *Response Phase* the focus is placed on supporting the population in coping with the situation. While authorities need to undertake all efforts to end an incident (such as a marauding terrorist firearms or knife attack) as soon as possible, an equal level of importance is placed on informing and reassuring the population about the event and about, what the authority's response to it is, and what the citizens can do themselves. A close liaison with the mass media is a

critical element for achieving this goal. Those who cannot help themselves (vulnerable groups), especially need to be taken care of.

### Recovery and Coping Phase

The then following *Recovery and Coping Phase* focusses on the reactive management of the consequences of the attack (and the public reaction to them) and on learning from this experience to be better prepared for the future. In the *Recovery and Coping Phase* resilience-enhancing measures focus on the reactive management of the “fallout” by mitigating potential material, physical, social, psychological impact. This involves activating preventively prepared resources for those affected, and supporting the meaning-making process by framing the attack, by actively managing fear and anxiety in the society and by bringing perpetrators to justice to permit the closure of the event and the return of the society to a state similar to or better than before the attack.


Applying the nine critical tasks to the three phases described above, the work suggests that measuring and managing the fear of the population is required in all phases, preferably even before an attack happens, as fear and anxiety are the key levers terrorists utilise to cajole a society to follow their demands. At all times, ensuring transparency and clarity of information through a competent and trustworthy risk and crisis communication is important to maintain resilience in the society, especially during the *Response Phase*.

The same continuous attention is necessary to the shared coping-friendly meaning. Authorities need to use the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase* to create a shared meaning on shared values which ensures a shared interpretation of events if an attack has happened. This established meaning may come under threat due to the potentially cataclysmic effect of an attack and possible accompanying hostile psychological warfare measures. To safeguard this shared meaning therefore requires continuous nurture and a flexible response during the *Response Phase* before it will have to settle in and may then have to be readjusted to assure adequate coping in the after-attack period.

Just as *Impact Reduction and Prevention* measures need to be put in place long before an attack, individuals in a society must be instigated to strengthen their individual emotional and practical skills to deal with the potential effect of an attack. This must be part of the *Mitigation and*

*Preparedness Phase* before the practical need arises. After an attack, also the potential psychological impact on those not directly affected, has to be actively managed. To help those who have been directly affected by an attack it is critical to swiftly provide them with the necessary resources, with the major effort stretched out over a longer period into the *Recovery and Coping Phase*. To allow the society to profit from societal cohesion in the aftermath of an attack, this cohesion should already be strengthened in the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase*, and promoting measures should be prepared for the *Response* and *Recovery and Coping Phases*.

Figure 58: Rings of Resilience Model.<sup>1153</sup>



Combining the above findings, the author has designed a graphical model which offers a birds-eye view of the complex system of a multitude of


<sup>1153</sup> Author's own work.





Kingdom historically has placed a strong emphasis on limiting government power, a strong parliament and on protecting individual freedom. Singapore on the other hand was founded on a different external and internal environment and thereby has opted for a dominant government, a practically limited role of the parliament and for the safeguarding of the societal well-being to be more important than individual freedoms. Both countries also have experienced different levels of exposure to *jihadi* terror attacks, with Britain suffering multiple serious *jihadi* attacks a since 2001, while Singapore has suffered none so far. Other factors including size, their respective geopolitical neighbourhood as well as their demographic and ethnic structure, add to the dissimilarity between the two countries.

Figure 59: Visual Comparison of UK and Singapore .<sup>1155</sup>



<sup>1155</sup> Author's own work.

When comparing the mix of programmes that were measured and assessed for each case in the chapters five and six and visualising the percentage-share of the total number of programmes in each country across the nine categories, which contribute to *Strategic Resilience*, the UK and Singapore show differing centres of gravity in their national approach to achieve *Strategic Resilience*.

Stronger emphasis on *strengthening societal cohesion* in Singapore than in the UK is to be expected considering the collectivist nature of Singaporean society compared to the UK, which is based on differing social norms that value social responsibility over personal freedom and is woven into the national narrative and self-concept. The ability to galvanise collective action is also one important way for small countries with a small population to try to fulfil their security needs.

Similarly, Singapore's emphasis on providing and preserving an *effective coping-friendly meaning*, is reflective of the necessity to strengthen and preserve societal cohesion, especially, considering the challenges that stem from the heterogeneous multi-ethnic and multicultural fabric of its society in a volatile geographic neighbourhood. It is also reflective of Singapore's ability to promote one dominant narrative through a big government with centralized control and a high *Power Distance* in society. The environment for and role of government in the UK is very different, and consequently its ability to successfully promote one central narrative is much more restricted and actively challenged.

This may well explain the UK's multi-layered effort to assure *cognitive clarity* through informational support. As the role of and the trust in government is lower, with more focus on the individual than on the community and its needs to operate in a contested media environment, there is a high need for communication. That requirement has further been repeatedly amplified through terror incidents and has led to new channels and protocols being introduced. In comparison to the UK situation the Singapore government has great control over the media environment, it operates in. On top of that, the Singapore government is also able to further amplify its messages through government and non-governmental organisations.

Efforts to *prevent and reduce direct impact* of a jihadi terrorist attack, play an important role in both countries. However, the case analysis identified comparatively more measures in the UK than in Singapore. This is to be expected considering that the UK has had a long list of terrorist attacks

which it suffered on its soil even before the *jihadi wave* started. As a result of such attacks the country has continuously responded with new measures to mitigate future threats and is doing so today. Singapore, as a country that has suffered little to no attacks in its history, could be expected to lag behind in implemented programmes and policies, but is actively taking lessons from the UK.<sup>1156</sup> The recently updated infrastructure protection guidelines<sup>1157</sup> and increased CCTV surveillance are examples.<sup>1158</sup>

Across the remaining categories in *Figure 90* the number of programmes in both countries is similarly distributed. It is important to note that a low number of contributing activities to one task does not allow coming to a simple conclusion about the level of resilience and preparedness created in the society as whole. Administrations in both case countries for example work hard to *limit the indirect (psychological) impact* from attacks on the rest of the population through their prudent risk and crisis communication and using legislation and a mix of inducements and coercion to limit negative media impacts. However, there is not a high number of dedicated programmes that can be counted under this category. Similarly, tolerance to dissenting views and beliefs, uncertainty acceptance and openness to change and resilience in adversity are taught as virtues in the UK and Singapore in order to raise *emotion focused-coping-skill*. In Singapore, they even form part of the national narrative and are encouraged in all aspects of life. Cognitive congruence between the *Situational Meaning* of an attack and the held *Global Beliefs* in the Singaporean population is further strengthened at the highest government level by repeatedly issuing a “*Not if, but When*”-message concerning the probability of the next terror attack.

Therefore, the comparative quantification at the surface level of two profound qualitative assessments has limitations. The visual overview does however give practitioners an indication where a government’s focus is currently placed and where requirements for additional efforts or the need for further assessment may exist, in order to further improve *Strategic Resilience*.

So, despite the strongly dissimilar circumstances in the case countries as shown above, that do affect the direction or impetus of counter-terrorism efforts in each country, the case study found all programmes and measures identified and assessed across the two case countries to positively contrib-

1156 See Vasu 2007.

1157 See Singapore Police Force 06.2019.

1158 See Today Online 2016.

ute to at least one of the nine critical tasks proposed in the *Rings-Of-Resilience* model.

The analysis of the cases has also confirmed the pivotal role which providing, nurturing and protecting an effective coping-friendly meaning can play, when a pluralist society is challenged to physical and psychological battle by jihadi terrorists.<sup>1159</sup> To accept the limits of security and to cope with potential suffering due to exploited vulnerabilities, the individual requires for the suffering to have a meaning.<sup>1160</sup> For the authorities, this means not only fulfilling society's quest for more security, but also to credibly communicate the countering concept of a meaning-based acceptance.<sup>1161</sup> Governments unable to precisely define what their societies' shared values, purpose and identity are, will likely struggle to understand the intellectual conflict with the enemy. Therefore, they will fail to compellingly explain the situation to their own people in a credible comprehensive narrative of their own making which could provide a coping-friendly shared meaning and offer direction.<sup>1162</sup> As a further consequence their societies are in danger to be polarised along the lines of falsely attributed irreconcilable identities. This can lead to the disintegration of the societies into in-groups and out-groups, pitted against each other. Adding to this, the increased ease to fuel the internal debates with non-attributable "vitriol" and disinformation for adverse foreign state actors, has further exacerbated the risk of a negative impact in recent years. Examples for effective targeted amplification of divisions by foreign actors are the 2016 election in the US, or the Covid-Crisis in the European Union in 2020.

In consideration of the strong dissimilarities between the two countries examined in the case study, the fact that both have opted to address the *jihadi* terrorist threat in a similar way, is a good indicator that the nine critical tasks are of general relevance beyond these two cases. The work therefore concludes, that embedded in the *Rings-of-Resilience* model, the critical tasks can function as an organisational analytical framework for governments in their efforts to build up, strengthen and sustain *Strategic Resilience* against terrorism as proposed by Münkler & Wassermann (2012). Utilised in this way, the model can support the assessment and improvement of an existing programs portfolio by identifying weaknesses or gaps in

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1159 See Kilcullen 2009, 247.

1160 See Frankl 2006, 51.

1161 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

1162 See Furedi 2007, 77–101.

actual efforts. It can help countries to recognise scope-limiting preferences (how they choose to address the terrorist threat and to build resilience) which might have developed over time. It can also indicate where countries have chances to increase the effectiveness of their programme portfolio by adding or amending programmes.

### 9.1. Implications for Academia

- a. Like the term “terrorism” whose use and meaning is highly ambiguous, the meaning of the term resilience also is very context specific. During the research for this work, the author found that similarly the term “*Strategic Resilience*” without any further explanation or defined context can mean a million things to a million people. When trying to use the terms “terrorism resilience” or “resilience against terrorism” for example as a pointer for the definition of *Strategic Resilience*, they turned out as misnomers, as i.e. they were understood as describing the ability of a society to prevent and withstand the radicalisation and recruitment of its members by terrorist groups. The lack of a precise and universally understood and agreed wording as well as the interdisciplinary nature of the concept of *Strategic Resilience* has hindered the academic debate. Vice versa, without such a debate there has been no push for precise wording, even though all *Western* pluralist societies which are faced with the same *jihadi* terrorist threat, would equally profit from a stream of sound *Strategic Resilience* research founded on a broadly based cross-national interdisciplinary academic discourse. This work has taken up the baton by substantiating the term *Strategic Resilience* with a detailed multi-phased model which can lower the threshold for a necessary interdisciplinary scientific dialogue and can encourage debate and further research in this area.
- b. The work has shown that *Strategic Resilience* can offer open, post-heroic societies a potential approach to credibly and effectively support a *benefit-denial* strategy, directed against terrorism.<sup>1163</sup> Beyond the effect of helping to directly reduce the impact of terrorist attacks on the society, and of at least preventing or reducing the success of such an attack, *Strategic Resilience* can also function as a *Strategic Denial* according to

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1163 See Chapter 1 page 19-21.

Kroenig & Pavel's (2012) deterrence theory of conventional terrorism. It can deter adversaries from carrying out attacks in the first place, since the desired psychological effect of the attack which uppermost motivates the act of terrorism, is credibly denied.<sup>1164</sup> Understood in this way, *Strategic Resilience* becomes a means of communication to respond to the message of terror, by signaling to the population and to potential terrorists that through their attack the terrorists will not achieve their strategic objective. As in strategic nuclear deterrence, credibility is just as crucial in deterring conventional terrorism. This work has identified nine critical elements for building, strengthening and sustaining *Strategic Resilience*. In the course of this, it has become clear that all nine elements are not likely to always be present and not always in equal strength in each country. Building on this, further research in criminal psychology would be desirable to understand the importance the terrorists ascribe to individual constituting elements of *Strategic Resilience*, for keeping up an overall credible deterrence effect.

- c. This work has identified and defined nine critical tasks governments should invest their time and focus in if they want to achieve, strengthen or to preserve *Strategic Resilience* in their country. The work has also provided a list of exemplary measures which can underpin and help to complete each task. Further research would be recommendable into the function, effectiveness and the appropriateness of individual measures and actions that could show which of the measures under a certain category are the most effective to fulfil their task in a specific situation and which specific combination of measures maybe the most effective. Due to the mutual dependencies of the different measures and the many data required as a consequence, it may be a challenging task. But it could be highly beneficial identifying the marginal rate of return on investments in specific measures through an input-output model.
- d. The case analysis has indicated that a strong national identity founded on shared meaning, mutual values and a common purpose can be helpful to protect the social resilience of pluralist societies against the challenge of divisive jihadi rhetoric and attacks. In contrast to these findings, there exists a popular belief in progressive political and academic circles in Western Europe which demonises the pursuit of a strong national identity as incompatible, even antagonistic to the flourishing

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<sup>1164</sup> See chapter 1 page 19-21.

of a pluralist multi-ethnic society or community. Such a restricted view is problematic as it may preclude research being conducted or funded which assumes a neutral or positive view on shared national identity and patriotism. Thereby any positive findings which could help in the formation of a strategically resilient society, might be prevented. This in turn may lead to suboptimal scientific advice given to governments, as this would be based on incomplete research. The questioning of the legitimacy of the nation state through its blanket stigmatization by equating it to the extreme deformities of nationalist chauvinism and racism, is problematic. It may give jihadis the chance to reinforce their de-legitimisation attempts and their divisive propaganda which includes an alleged conspiracy of the non-believers with the aim of destroying Islam and all Muslims.<sup>1165</sup> In the knowledge of such possible negative consequences, academic research should challenge unsubstantiated and undifferentiated criticism of the nation-state concept and question non-factual research limitations.

## 9.2. Implications for Practitioners

- a. To practitioners in the respective agencies and ministries the findings of this work and specifically the model offers an easy-to-use analytical framework. It should help practitioners to take stock of their existing efforts to protect their country from the consequences of terrorist threats, to assess their requirements across government functions, to understand and justify necessary expenditures, and to utilise it as an easily comprehensible tool to communicate with decision makers.
- b. The model visualises the contributing factors across disciplines and agencies to reach the common shared goal of achieving *Strategic Resilience*. It can provide the necessary shared focus and the justification for planning and implementing the required steps in the necessary multi-sectoral cross-government way. The many and diverse underlying measures across the different government sectors identified in this work, provide further practical arguments for multi-disciplinary and cross-agency collaboration and for also including such people and groups not usually counted among those concerned with counter-terrorism. Clearly displaying the interdependencies of using soft measures and hard meas-

1165 See Frankenberger 2017, 64.

ures in achieving the *Strategic Resilience* of the society, the model can also help to overcome the reluctance of policy makers who are tasked with protecting their society from the threat of terrorism, to equally invest in soft social measures.

- c. The findings also have shown that trust is a critical resource in a government's effort to maintain cognitive clarity, to uphold coping-friendly meaning and to manage fear, which are prerequisites to foster a strategic resilient response from the population faced with a terrorist threat. Just as the trust and confidence in the government is challenged by the attack itself; it is also challenged by the government's handling of the threat and by attacks in the information space. This requires the authorities' commitment to upholding a constant, transparent and consistent communication before, in and after a crisis. At the same time, they continuously have to monitor the information space to be able to quickly identify and respond to malicious information operations. There it does not make a difference whether such information originates at home or from abroad, is motivated by financial gains or political objectives or whether the conduct itself is criminal or legal. As a first step, governments need to invest in better media literacy of their citizens to reduce a potential negative impact. This will not be enough though: As these threats to and from the information domain are likely to increase due to easier access to technological tools for covert foreign actors as well as foreign-owned state media, *Western* open societies have to decide about how they want to mitigate the risk posed by malign actors, who exploit the information space, without throwing out their own values of freedom of expression and privacy.
- d. In order to create an understanding for the need for personal preparedness and winning the acceptance of the population for this necessity, the importance of an early and transparent risk communication as a prerequisite for instilling resilience was underlined by this work's findings. Upfront openness about potential risks also reduces the negative psychological impact if an incident does occur and can build trust into the then following crisis communication. To signal their urgency and resolve to prepare against the terrorist threat, governments should consider organising regular scenario-based public counter-terrorism exercises a part of their risk communication.
- e. Testing the model with the help of the case studies has shown that a society can greatly benefit from having a National Service when imple-



menting a concept of *Strategic Resilience*, an idea mirrored in a recent OpEd by the Vice President of the *Federal Academy for Security Policy* (BAKS) in Germany, who endorsed National Service as a chance for strengthening resilience and societal cohesion.<sup>1166</sup>

Beyond raising the relevant preparedness skills in the population and increasing the pool of citizens trained in the military and/or civil defence, in medical emergency services or as police officers, a National Service drives home the idea that security is a responsibility shared by the whole society. Depending on the specific national set-up and political environment, a National Service as a side effect can also be a socially integrating force and a deeply meaningful shared experience. It can offer satisfaction for the people's emotional needs for personal significance, for close personal connections, for a sense of contribution, for confidence of belonging, for the chance for personal growth, and for adventure. To maximise the positive influence of a National Service on the nation, and to fully benefit from its integrative effect, governments should consider permanent residents (as introduced in Singapore for permanent residents of the second generation) to be drafted into the National Service duty. As a consequence, such a government has to consider also the described potential benefits to the whole society when doing a cost-benefit calculation comparing National Service versus a professional force. Consequently, the control over organisational decisions on National Service matters should be at the Prime Minister's Office or also the Ministry of the Interior rather than just at the Ministry of Defence.

- f. Even if an across-government political consensus for adopting a whole-of-society *Strategic Resilience* concept-based counter-terrorism approach cannot be agreed upon, the work's findings can empower sub-state stakeholders or units to independently introduce policies and actions from the bottom-up which may move a society forward on the path towards improved *Strategic Resilience*. The work's findings also give options for smaller incremental steps to such governments who want to improve the *Strategic Resilience* of their country but who organisationally and/or politically cannot gain acceptance for the wholesale-adoption of the *Strategic Resilience* concept: With the 9-factor model as a guide, the long list of concrete measures from chapter four and five, offers a toolbox of proposals for direct action in the different areas.

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1166 Keller 2020.

- g. This work has identified a framework which may help governments to organise their comprehensive response to the threat from non-state, i.e. *jihadi* terrorist actors. But the same *Strategic Resilience* framework may also be applicable for governments under grey zone / hybrid threats emanating from malevolent state actors who clandestinely wage psychological warfare in order to weaken the society's trust in the government and to damage its legitimacy. The use of such irregular tactics like coercion and disinformation, by such actors shows a strong similarity to the threats emanating from terrorism. These tactics also try to split the society through fear and uncertainty in order to achieve their ideological/political objectives. In the absence of a presently existing comprehensive model to guide a whole-of government response to mitigate state actor-led hybrid-/ grey zone threats, the author suggests testing his model's practicality for such a scenario.

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