

National Flamencoism

Flamenco as an Instrument of Spanish Public Diplomacy in Franco's Regime (1939-1975)

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In December 1963, the flamenco dancer and choreographer Guillermina Martínez Cabrejas, known under her stage name of Mariemma, addressed the Spanish Minister of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga, with a long letter of complaint (Martínez Cabrejas). Her point was clear: Because she had been lending a great service to the image of Spain and to the prestige of the authentic “Spanish Dance” worldwide since the 1940s, she deserved some financial compensation after a last-minute cancellation of some scheduled performances by the Ministry. Hence, Mariemma remembered her successful performance in the Comic Opera in Paris “despite the campaign directed against me inside and outside the theater, for I had been declared a ‘Francoist’ at a time when the public opinion worldwide was resolutely counter to Spain” (Martínez Cabrejas). Not by chance did Mariemma include in her letter the words uttered in 1948 by the highest representative of the Spanish government in Washington DC, the diplomat Jose Félix de Lequerica, who expressed himself after Mariemma’s performance in New York in the following terms: “After a long time finding in the international press nothing but a litany of insults against Spain, it is rewarding and soul-stirring to read finally some compliments about something Spanish” (Martínez Cabrejas).¹ That “something Spanish” was flamenco music and dance.

1 “A pesar de la campaña desarrollada contra mí dentro y fuera del teatro, por haber sido declarada ‘franquista’ en momentos en que la opinión mundial se manifestaba resueltamente contra España . . . Después de tiempo que llevamos no encontramos en la prensa más que verdaderas letanías de insultos contra España, es consolador y alegría el alma leer al fin elogios sobre algo español.” All translations into English our own.

Strictly speaking, flamenco is a popular Romani-Andalusian musical genre which emerged in its present form in the eighteenth century from the fusion of ancient Moorish, Romani, Castilian and Jewish roots. It is traditionally characterized by a strong passionate and emotional expression displayed on stage in different manifestations—singing (*cante*), musicianship (*toque*), and dancing (*baile*).

The identification of flamenco as a semi-state music and theatrical genre dates back to the origins of the dictatorship of General Franco (1939-1975). Nevertheless, it took some time for flamenco to prevail over other styles and to become an instrument of Francoist public diplomacy, thus giving rise to the phenomenon of “National Flamencoism” (in Spanish, *nacionalflamenquismo*). We define it as the identification of flamenco with the essence of Spanish culture. According to Theresa Goldbach, “a conflation of flamenco with other Spanish national genres, an exaggeration of flamenco costuming, and an overly commercialized interpretation of the genre all marked the style of *nacionalflamenquismo*” (1).² National Flamencoism emerged in cultural studies by analogy with National Catholicism (*nacionalcatolicismo*), which refers to the idea that the Roman Catholic religion is the basis for the Spanish national identity (Álvarez Bolado; Botti; Payne 171-91). In both cases, a particular cultural trait is forcibly expanded to impose a common identity to the whole of Spanish society. In both cases, the concept has an homogenizing effect: A variety of cultural identities and values, sometimes in conflict—as happened amongst the regional cultural traditions of the Basque, Catalan, Galician, Castilian, and Andalusian people—were subsumed into something greater, amalgamated in the case of flamenco in a musical genre with popular roots.

This chapter aims to explain how the dictatorship of General Franco created an institutional framework in order to instrumentalize flamenco, thereby putting it at the service of Spain’s international agenda. We intend to show the motivations, mechanisms, and some of the initiatives through which the dictatorship seized the cultural wealth of flamenco and its international acclaim, and incorporated it into its foreign propaganda. Our approach intends to go beyond contributions of flamencology and cultural studies, which have underlined the political and identity links between flamenco and the Franco regime primarily from an aesthetic and performative point of view (Washabaugh). Based on unique source material from the Spanish administration, we contend that the political use of flamenco by the dictatorship can be located in a broader context of the diplomat-

2 For other cultural approaches to this phenomenon, see Álvarez Caballero, Hayes, and Washabaugh.

ic use of music by governments during the Cold War (Ahrendt; Gienow-Hecht; Tompkins). Despite Spain's relative isolation under the dictatorship, "flamenco diplomacy"—namely, the political instrumentalization of flamenco in the international arena—can be regarded as a local expression amidst a global struggle for prestige and political legitimacy fought with cultural weapons since the 1950s, in which Spain clearly took part.

FLAMENCO MUSIC AND THE FRANCOIST MUSIC DIPLOMACY

Since the late nineteenth century, the social and identity background of flamenco music has generated a debate on the nature of this style. Is flamenco a traditional, pure, and essentially ethnic musical genre (*cante jondo*), or is it rather a hybrid, popular genre, a commercial and globalized kind of music in a continual process of aesthetic adaptation to different performance practices (Folch; Orozco; Pantaleoni)? At the beginning of the Franco dictatorship, the discussion was reformulated as an opposition between two phenomena. On the one hand, a kind of respectable flamenco music and dance, a regional variant of the authentic Andalusian folklore, could be supported by the state under the formula of "Choirs and Dances" (*Coros y Danzas*).³ On the other hand, a commercial and market-oriented variety called *género folclórico* ("folk genre"), consisting of an amalgam of clichés and stereotypes rooted in distinctive Andalusian particularities, was rejected by the state on the grounds that it allegedly caricatured the real musical Spanish character.

This opposition linked with a wider contemporary debate on the role of popular music in the propaganda and cultural diplomacy of Francoist Spain. Two stages can be distinguished in this regard. In a first phase (1939 to the mid-1950s) Spain was culturally oriented towards the European fascist powers and, gradually after 1945, to Western anticommunist states. Notwithstanding their rivalry, Falange (FET y de las JONS), the sole legal party of the Spanish dicta-

3 "Coros y Danzas de la Sección Femenina" (Choirs and Dances of the Womens' Section) was a dancing and singing company created in 1939 and extinguished in 1977 that belonged to the "Falange Española", the Spanish fascist party. According to the Falangist writer Mercedes Formica, the idea of its foundation came from Pilar Primo de Rivera, sister of Falange founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera and founder herself of the Women's Section, the only single mass organization of feminine character that existed during the dictatorship (Richmond 152).

torship created in 1937 from the union of the fascist Spanish Falange and traditionalist groups, and the Catholic Church marshaled cultural affairs.⁴ In these years, the Spanish regime advocated creating a “Spanish music,” a fusion of several folk music traditions from the regions of Spain, an endeavor which Falange and the *Comisaría General de Música* (General Music Office) undertook in 1940 through the Ministry of National Education. Their efforts soon exceeded.

At the level of “serious music,” the government laid the foundations of an idealized Spanish classical music based on the repertoire of world-famous composers, such as Juan Crisóstomo de Arriaga, Isaac Albéniz, Enrique Granados, Manuel de Falla, and Joaquín Turina. Their music was believed to share an unmistakable Spanish air, which was difficult to define beyond the invocation of a certain “soul,” “genius,” or Spanish “essence” (Moreda Rodríguez, “Folklore and Gender” 637). The Spanish government displayed widely this sort of music in a series of German-Spanish Festivals held jointly with the Nazi government between July 1941 and August 1942 in Bad Elster (Saxony), Madrid, and Bilbao (Moreda Rodríguez, “Hispanic-German”). At the same time, a National Orchestra of Spain and a National Chamber Orchestra were created in 1940, both depending eventually on the Ministry of National Education as the department directly involved in the promotion of classical music throughout Spain. Over time, the dictatorship diversified the initiatives on this issue, launching in 1952 an International Festival of Music and Dance in Granada, which included a session devoted to flamenco singing—specifically pure *cante jondo*—and in the sixties and seventies both an Opera and a Ballet Festival in Madrid and Barcelona.⁵

In the realm of popular music, the Government created a National Institute of Musicology and launched the so-called *Misiones Folclóricas* (Folk Missions) which between 1941 and 1961 collected and transcribed folk material in different regions of Spain, with the aim of creating and publishing a corpus of Spanish folk music. Within this framework, *Coros y Danzas* emerged as the best musical Spanish trademark abroad, going on an initial international tour through Latin

4 The acronym “FET y de las JONS” corresponds to the official name of the party, “Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista” (Traditionalist Spanish Phalanx of the Committees of the National Syndicalist Offensive).

5 On the International Music and Dance Festival of Granada and the Opera and Ballet Festival of Madrid and Barcelona, see *Archivo General de la Administración* (AGA), Alcalá de Henares (Madrid, Spain), Sección de Cultura, (3) 52.15, Boxes 73579 and 88419.

America in 1948 and continuing to visit the US, several European countries, and the Middle East in the following years. This ensemble arrogated the role of representing genuine Spanish musical folklore, which according to Falange was popular, anonymous, choral, and underpinned by the so-called baile suelto, a dance without physical contact between men and women, thus acceptable for strict Catholic sexual morality. By doing so, they subsumed regional particularities under a common national identity which was epitomized in the representation of Castile as the forger of the unity of Spain. Therefore, flamenco found little place in Coros y Danzas performances, where conversely different variants of Andalusian regional dancing were well represented (Stehrenberger). As a genre that concentrates primarily on the individual, flamenco carried too many connotations of anarchy and rebellion. In addition, it was psychologically associated with sexual exuberance and a certain orientalism. In a nutshell, flamenco collided with the cultural roots of National Catholicism.

Despite this first mismatch, a certain type of commercial music of Andalusian and flamenco flavor became very well-accepted beyond Spanish borders, setting the path for a shift in official Francoist cultural policy with regards to music diplomacy. In fact, the backgrounds of a marketable flamenco variant are historically to be found in the late nineteenth century at the *cafés cantantes* (flamenco cafés), and already in the interwar period at the *óperas flamencas* (flamenco operas). The latter consisted of a kind of variety show mixing flamenco and *copla* or *canción española* (Spanish song), which allowed cante jondo to be performed out of its small Romani nucleus for the first time (Cruces Roldán). Between 1933 and 1945 many film productions exemplified this specific usage of flamenco, while some of them were co-productions with the German film industry, such as *Carmen de Triana* (1938), with Imperio Argentina or *Suspiros de España* (1939), with Estrellita Castro (Jarvinen and Peredo-Castro; Paz and Montero 222-23). Likewise, during the 1940s and 1950s some private flamenco groups, like the ones led by Luis Pérez Dávila “Luisillo,” Carmen Amaya, and Antonio Ruiz Soler “Antonio,” succeeded in their long tours around Europe, Latin America, and the US. They were promoted by such big impresarios as the Frenchman Fernand Lumbroso—who later participated in the Spanish government’s musical diplomacy, as we will see below—or the American Sol Hurok (Robinson), with whom Carmen Amaya recorded *Original Gypsy Dances* in 1941 (Arce; Madridejos). *Copla* singers like Lola Flores and Concha Piquer were also prominent figures in flamenco show business.

Against this backdrop, Spanish music diplomacy entered a second phase in the mid-1950s. Spain was opening to the world economy at that time, pursuing international recognition through a strategic alignment with the Western bloc—

for example, the Spanish-US military agreement in 1953 marked a milestone in this regard (Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla et al.; García Delgado and Jiménez 125-49; Viñas 45-332). The country underwent fast and steady economic growth, along with the development of tourism as the first national industry and the rise of a mass consumption of cultural products (Cazorla 133-71; Pack 83-104). Meanwhile, the waning power of Falange amidst the governmental elites and the rise of technocrats and a pragmatic policy called *desarrollismo* (developmentalism) had enormous leverage on Francoist musical concerns. Castile was no longer privileged as the epitome of the Spanish nation, and it was displaced instead by Andalusia as the region that could best represent Spain abroad. Very timely, Andalusia lacked nationalist tensions, and was the ancestral home of a numerous Roma community without political organization (Orozco)—not to mention the sun, joy, and quaintness that millions of tourists were looking for. Andalusia was also the home of flamenco music in its most popular variant, a cultural export easily recognizable worldwide. It was then the reorientation of the Spanish cultural core that lies at the emergence of what we might call flamenco diplomacy—that is, the use of commercial flamenco by the state as a tool for Spain's self-representation abroad.

Since its creation in 1951, the Ministry of Information and Tourism (MIT) joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as a key official actor in the realm of cultural diplomacy (Delgado Gómez Escalonilla; Jevenois and Romero de Terreros), assuming a critical role in the touristic diffusion of Spain through every kind of instrument, including the promotion of popular culture inside and outside Spain. MIT's most important cultural enterprise in this sense was the Planes Nacionales de Festivales de España (National Plans of the Spanish Festivals). Launched in 1954, they consisted of annual three or four-month campaigns running approximately from May to September and including various dance, music, and theatrical shows performed by significant domestic and international ensembles in theaters, urban gardens, and monumental complexes or natural venues. Building on previous experiences, namely the Granada Festival and the new International Festival of Santander created in 1952, the Festivales de España (FE) turned into the main accomplishment of the high-level state music policy under Francoism (Ferrer Cayón). They enjoyed the highest official support (both in terms of funding and political endorsement), the widest domestic and international propaganda, and, at least according to official Spanish sources, the greatest success.

Decisive support to the FE came when Manuel Fraga was appointed Minister of Information and Tourism in 1962;⁶ shortly thereafter he began to work closely with two collaborators, his brother-in-law Carlos Robles Piquer—General Director of Information (1962-67) and General Director of Popular Culture and Entertainment (1967-69)—and Enrique de la Hoz—Deputy General Director of Popular Culture (1962-69). Their networking resulted in a significant increase of the FE from the point of view of their frequency, their quality level, and their funding. As an example, 45 FE and almost 800 different shows took place in 1963, while their number amounted to 83 in 1969 (MIT, Report 1964; Robles Piquer, *Memoria* 264-69). At the same time, the budgets of the Festivals shot up from 4-5 million pesetas per year in the 1950s to 100 million per year in the 1960s.⁷ In addition, the MIT and the MFA improved their coordination, permeating—albeit at a lower intensity—the Ministry of National Education.

The FE under Fraga's office had two major targets. Domestically, the FE sought to bring so-called educated art forms to the lower strata of Spanish society, as was the case with other contemporary European dictatorships (Buch et al.). In doing so, they supported “the rise of the cultural and artistic level of the Spanish population, the creation of a refined taste for aesthetic manifestations among the masses, and the human dignity by providing easy access to the highest forms of intellectual creation” (MIT, Report 1964).⁸

At an international level, and reflecting the turn in Spanish foreign policy, the government intended to promote Spain as a tourist destination abroad and to contribute to the international acceptance of the dictatorship through the FE's policy (Sanz and Morales Tamaral). As a result, the MIT enhanced coordination with private travel agencies vis-à-vis the international dissemination of FE since the beginning of the 1960s—for instance, a travel guide from 1965 advertised Madrid as “the capital of good food, joy and flamenco” (MIT, Notes on Advertising). Even the Library of Congress showed an evident interest in these musical shows, asking the MIT for booklets of the FE in October 1964 (Library of Congress).

6 For an insider's account of the many activities developed by the MIT in the subsequent decade, see the memories of the Minister Fraga between 1962 and 1969 (*Memoria Breve* 33-255).

7 The evolution of the FE's budgets can be reconstructed in the annual reports located at the AGA, (3) 49.12, Boxes 44166, 44265, and 44267.

8 “... elevación del nivel cultural y artístico de la población española, creación de una autentica afición por las manifestaciones estéticas en las masas populares, dignificación del hombre por su acceso a las formas superiores de la creación espiritual.”

Robles Piquer inspired the MIT's master guidelines for the popular culture policy, as well as devised its adaptation to the public relations of the dictatorship. His was the idea of the state as the best mediator among public and private actors behind cultural diplomacy implementation, extolling Spain's unique position between the characteristic abstentionism in cultural matters of liberal states and the excessive interventionism imposed by totalitarian ones (Robles Piquer, *Puntos* 4-9). Robles Piquer had also a notion of what a *ballet español* (Spanish ballet) should mean. Not exclusively identified with flamenco though almost monopolized by it, *ballet español* meant in his view "a cultivated product rooted in popular tradition, traditional dances and clothing, and the experience of its typical values" (Robles Piquer, Letter to Moreno).⁹ The dance troupes led by Luisillo, María Rosa, Rafael de Córdoba, Antonio Gades, Vicente Escudero, and Antonio Pavón, all of them renowned flamenco dancers, were labeled by this category.

Nevertheless, Spanish ballet and the social pedagogy behind MIT's cultural businesses clashed with the burst of enthusiasm triggered by trendy Western pop and rock 'n' roll music. Particularly popular among young people, events like the Festival de Benidorm were not role models in the eyes of the Ministry, "for they tend[ed] to distort the audience's taste, create bad taste, or decrease rather than increase the artistic culture of the Spanish people" (MIT, Confidential Report).¹⁰ The criterion was to be "modern but Spanish," as the title of a song recorded in 1970 by the popular Spanish singer Manolo Escobar stated ("Moderno pero Español").¹¹ Characteristically, the concert by the Beatles in Madrid in July 1965 was boycotted by the Spanish government through a massive police presence. The four British pop stars received a bullfighter's hat as a welcome gift upon their arrival at Madrid's airport, and they were later shown by the media among flamenco dancers on a visit to a sherry wine cellar, both signs of

9 "procedimiento de elaboración culto, efectivamente, del acervo popular, las danzas y vestiduras más autóctonas y la vivencia de sus valores típicos."

10 "propenden a deformar el gusto del público, o a crear el mal gusto y a que el nivel de la cultura artística de los españoles descienda antes que aumente."

11 The song was part of the original soundtrack of the film *En un lugar de La Mancha* (dir. Mariano Ozores, 1970). This is a commercial comedy typical of the touristic Spain of the 1960s, in which the conflict between tradition and modernity is exemplified by the main character's refusal to sell his property, located on the Mediterranean Coast, to a real estate developer. For a long-term perspective on the dialectics between modernity and tradition in the use of Spanish popular music as a tool of musical diplomacy see Marc.

the dictatorship's unease with foreign popular music, as well as symptoms of the government's desire to *españolizar*—in other words, to adapt any kind of cultural expression to Spanish standards (Luqui 97-112). The Spanish government sought ultimately to avoid an explicit prohibition of modern music trends, thus adapting them to acceptable art forms for the dictatorship's values and, at the same time, diminishing its subversive and unsettling potential (Gracia García and Ruiz Carnicer).

FLAMENCO MISSIONS TO GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION

Two dance exchanges with Germany and the USSR better elucidate the actors, motivations, and outcomes that played an important role in the implementation of flamenco diplomacy within the institutional framework of the FE. The first state-guided flamenco mission concurred with the 25th anniversary of the end of the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), which was lavishly celebrated by the dictatorship in 1964 under the slogan "25 Years of Peace" ("XXV Años de Paz"). For this occasion, the MIT encouraged an ambitious cultural program inspired by pedagogic and political motivations, including popular contests, documentaries, exhibitions, and all kinds of musical concerts. The aforementioned Opera Festival, together with the Spanish-Latin American Music Festival, were launched in Madrid for the occasion. The official commemoration's goals were twofold. Firstly, it sought to assert the essentially conservative, nationalist, and authoritarian principles of the Francoist regime, yet adapting them to the rapid social and economic transformation resulting from the unprecedented prosperity achieved during the years of developmentalism. Secondly, and according to the Campaigns and Festivals Section's chief, it sought to praise the cultural standard attained by the Spanish people thanks to the unceasing educational concerns of the dictatorship after more than ten years of FE's campaigns (Campos de España).¹²

Such broad propagandistic aims put a tacit ideological slant on every single show sponsored by the Spanish regime during 1964, even when the artists involved were not consciously willing to contribute to that aim. This happened particularly with the three music pieces commissioned by the MIT for the *Concierto de la Paz* (Concert of Peace), for which the contemporary avant-garde

12 Ramón Campos de España was in charge of the MIT's Campaigns and Festivals Section and appointed Deputy Commissioner of the "25 Years of Peace" Festivals.

musicians Miguel Alonso, Cristóbal Halffter, and Luis de Pablo enjoyed freedom to compose their works as long as they adapted to the “noblest of events, such as the one being commemorated” (qtd. in Contreras Zubillaga 183). Furthermore, the MIT did not only establish a National Council of Festivals and organize the first National Meeting of Festivals at the end of 1963 in order to prepare the 25 Year commemorative ceremonies, it also pursued closer cooperation with the cultural attachés that had been appointed to some strategic Spanish embassies for the occasion. The Operation Festivals, as the exuberant cultural campaign was called in the official documents, sought a strategic scheduling of diplomatic music exchanges—eased when possible by foreign funding—for the dissemination of Spanish culture abroad (MIT, “Acta”).

As a result of such ambitious plans, it is highly significant that flamenco emerged as an intangible, semiofficial diplomatic means directed to rally a very specific target audience—Spanish emigrants—for a clear reason, namely, to bring them back into the fold of the motherland. In this context, the FE made the leap overseas to perform in Santa Isabel, the capital of Spanish Guinea (now Equatorial Guinea) in November 1964, in which flamenco was represented by the Spanish Ballet of María Rosa.¹³

Nevertheless, the dictatorship’s biggest effort to increase the international impact of the 25 Years of Peace events was the visit of the Spanish Ballet of Mariemma to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in July 1964. That endeavor, which was inspired by a cluster of international propaganda efforts, both at the state and the civil society level, was possible thanks to coordination among different institutions, such as the MIT, the German Arbeits- und Sozial-Ministerium (German Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Affairs), the Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf Wirtschaftsförderungsamt (State Capital Düsseldorf’s Business Development Office), the Instituto Español de Emigración (Spanish Emigration Institute, IEE), and the emigrants’ Casas de España (Houses of Spain) in North Rhine-Westphalia. However, it was actually an actor, named Manuel Collado, who came up with the idea in March 1964. Collado was an important Spanish actor and stage manager. He maintained a close relation to MIT’s authorities as his theater company participated annually in the FE campaigns. Accustomed to German performing arts since he had studied in Germany years before, and because he had translated German authors into Spanish, Collado had no troubles obtaining permission from the MIT and the IEE to

13 On the documents on the performance of the Ballet Maria Rosa in Santa Isabel from 17-21 November 1964 see AGA, (3) 49.12, 44140.

negotiate *in situ* every detail of the tour with all involved parties beginning in May of that year (Collado, “Anteproyecto”).

Collado’s prompt report to the MIT from Germany testifies to constant administrative obstacles and funding problems, including the delayed disbursement of 5 million pesetas to nurture the project (Collado, Letter to Araujo).¹⁴ Spanish authorities improvised some changes along the way. Firstly, after considering several venues for the show, including Bonn, Hamburg, and Frankfurt, the organizers selected Düsseldorf, Dortmund, and Mannheim as the festival’s sites, following the recommendations of local artistic partners. These industrial cities and their surrounding urban areas were home to tens of thousands of Spanish workers who had emigrated since the late 1950s in search of better employment opportunities (Bundesanstalt 39-40). The numbers of this community in Germany speak for themselves: the FRG hosted 200,000 Spanish workers, which amounted to 45 percent of the total number of Spanish emigrants in Europe between 1959 and 1964 (Sanz Lafuente 293-305).

Secondly, Collado’s first proposal of a FE in Germany, which consisted of a flamenco show with additional theater plays, classical music concerts, and exhibitions, was restructured into a simple performance of Spanish dance starring Mariemma. Her show comprised a condensed glance at the history of Spanish folk music, including regional Basque and Aragonese dances, Andalusian “fandango” and, of course, flamenco, with live music played by the Madrid Symphony Orchestra under the direction of Enrique Luzuriaga, who was also Mariemma’s manager at the time (Cavia Naya). The German première of the film *Sinfonía Española* (Spanish Symphony, 1965), an audio-visual glorification of Spain as a tourist Mecca, enriched the event. The film, which was produced by American director Samuel Bronston, who had achieved widespread commercial success with the Hollywood productions *El Cid* (1961) and *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (1964). *Sinfonía Española* (all shot in Spain), was praised by Robles Piquer for “its artistic beauty . . . its positive insight into the old and modern Spain and its consideration as the feature film that has best visually described Spain with serious and significant contents” (Robles Piquer, Note to Fraga, 8 Apr.).¹⁵

14 Joaquín Araujo led the Programming Administration at the MIT’s General Department on Festivals (Comisaría General de Festivales).

15 “la belleza cinematográfica de *Sinfonía Española*, su positivo enfoque respecto a la España de siempre y a la de hoy y el hecho de ser el mejor documental de largo metraje que ha fotografiado a España con un contenido serio y trascendente.” Due to Ro-

As stated in the program handout designed and translated into German by Collado, Mariemma's flamenco performances between 14 and 19 July 1964 represented an "artistic mission" in the FGR. Since "Spain and its history are performed on the German stage," the event should serve as a "deep memory of the Homeland for our countrymen who live there and also for the German audience at the celebration of the 25 Years of Peace" (Robles Piquer, Note to Fraga, 8 Apr).¹⁶

In spite of the persuasive effect pretended by flamenco diplomacy, the selected target groups did actually notice the underlying political message that surrounded this propaganda initiative, expressing some reservations shortly after the FE was announced. When they first heard about Mariemma's visit to Germany, Spanish emigrants remembered some previous disappointing musical experiences promoted by the Spanish government—Coros y Danzas above all—which in their opinion did not correspond to their self-ascribed identity (Collado, "Informe General"). In Mannheim it was possible to gather enough Spanish immigrants willing to pay the low price tickets, but in Düsseldorf and Dortmund the organizers had to give away tickets to ensure a sufficient audience (Collado, Report to De la Hoz and Magariños).¹⁷ On the reception of flamenco among Spanish emigrant communities in neighbouring Belgium, cultural studies have shed some light that allows us to deepen our case study. Even when immigrants from Spain were willing to see flamenco as a familiar musical genre, Spaniards in Belgium tended to remove any kind of biased Spanish nationalist connotation in flamenco, re-appropriating it as an ancestral cultural heritage and, mainly, a means of socializing and networking in the host country (Ruiz Morales). Either way, there is evidence that Mariemma's performance enjoyed greater success than Bronston's film in general terms (Collado, "Informe General").

A possible hostile reception of flamenco diplomacy in the German public opinion was clear enough to Collado, who recommended a subtle administrative procedure and avoided explicit references to the state sponsorship in order to prevent distortions or public alarm (Collado, Report to De la Hoz). All efforts were in vain. Some German press outlets strongly criticized the tour due to its

bles' compliments on the film, *Sinfonía* finally preceded each Festival during the 25 Years' celebrations.

16 "España y su historia se representan en el escenario alemán . . . recuerdo vivo de la Patria a nuestros compatriotas residentes en dicho país y al público alemán, con motivo de la conmemoración de XXV Años de Paz Española."

17 Fernando Magariños led the Assistance Abroad Section ("Sección de Asistencia Exterior") at the IEE.

ideological background. The journalist Kurt Krausbeck wrote on 23 June in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*:

We are not against Spanish artists and really want to live in peace with Franco. But celebrating his revolution in Germany is a slap in the face to every democrat for whom democracy is considered more than a temporarily useful form of governance. . . . A democracy that celebrates a *coup d'état* against democracy in Spain, does not show disrespect towards democracy? Will we celebrate “GDR” holidays in our National Theater in the future? (qtd. in Collado, “Informe General”)¹⁸

According to the *Neue Rhein Zeitung*, Mariemma’s performance in Düsseldorf proved how totalitarian states took such opportunities and exploited them for their own political goals. Despite these dissonances, the contemporary musical reviews reflected a consensual atmosphere of acceptance: “Flamenco up to Exhaustion,” (qtd. in Aymamí)¹⁹ titled the *Rheinische Post* an article in their 18 July issue, highlighting flamenco’s emotional power in contrast to other neutral popular Spanish genres (Robles Piquer, Note to Fraga, 15 July). In addition, the *Neue Rhein Zeitung* described the festival as a great gift offered to both German and Spanish audiences (Aymamí).²⁰

This partial success achieved by the first FE abroad encouraged the MIT to continue in the same way while diversifying music diplomacy towards unexplored strategic objectives of Spanish foreign policy. The next target area was the other side of the Iron Curtain, specifically the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, flamenco played a significant role again.

The Spanish-Soviet cultural diplomacy program was initiated by the French impresario Fernand Lumbroso in November 1964, who was by then in charge of French-Soviet cultural exchanges. He outlined an attractive music business after an interview with MIT officials in Madrid in November 1964. The draft included

18 “Wir haben nichts gegen spanische Künstler und wollen mit Franco im Frieden leben. Aber seinen Putsch-Feiertag bei uns mitfeiern, das ist ein Schlag ins Gesicht jedes Demokraten, dem die Demokratie mehr als eine zeitweise zweckmäßige Staatsform ist. . . . In einer Demokratie, die Feiertage erfolgreicher Putschisten gegen die Demokratie mitfeiern—heißt das nicht bekunden, wie wurscht und fremd einem Demokratie sei! Wird man künftig auch etwa der Feiertage der ‘DDR’ durch Feierstunden im Nationaltheater gedenken?”

19 “Flamenco bis zur Erschöpfung”

20 Luis Aymamí was in charge of migration affairs in Düsseldorf as a member of the staff of the Spanish Consulate.

a first visit to Moscow led by the Ballet of Antonio, one the most accomplished world-famous Spanish flamenco dancers at that time, and, in turn, a tour in Spain featuring the Ballet of the famous Russian choreographer Igor Moiseyev, which specialized in performing folkloric dances from the fifteen Soviet Republics. In Lumbroso's opinion, this bilateral initiative carried out by dance diplomats was to pave the way for further exchanges of soloists and classical concert performances between Spain and the Soviet Union (Lumbroso). Robles Piquer accepted Lumbroso's proposal immediately, arguing that Spain could gain a big advantage on the international stage with such strategic maneuver. The exchanges could help to urge the US government to invest in Spain in order to contain communism, since, according to Robles Piquer, "it is useful to have communists around when dollars are required" (Robles Piquer, Note to Fraga, n.d.).²¹ In any case, nobody should be surprised by a rapprochement between Francoism and the USSR because in Robles's opinion, the "Russian soccer team has visited Spain before and played against its Spanish counterpart, who can be considered up to some extent as official as the Spanish Festivals, as well as an emblematic symbol of the nation" (Robles Piquer, Note to Fraga, n.d.).²²

The Cold War atmosphere could indeed not be more favorable for a deepening of Spanish-Soviet diplomatic relations. Notwithstanding its alignment with the West, the Spanish government jumped on the *détente* bandwagon encouraged by the concurrent Vatican rapprochement towards the Eastern Bloc. Madrid and Moscow initiated a bilateral round of talks in Washington DC, in June 1964, leaving behind decades of misunderstandings in the UN. The outcome was an informal agreement for the promotion of Spanish-Soviet tourist and artistic exchanges as a first step towards a future multi-level rapprochement (Suárez Fernández 245-74). Two Spanish-Soviet press and naval agreements followed this first deal in September 1966 and February 1967, respectively.

Significantly, the deal was signed at the same time as Lumbroso put forth the Antonio-Moiseyev exchange in late November 1964. The project was set aside in March 1965, however, because the Soviet authorities offered unacceptable low fees to the Spanish ensemble. As a result, Antonio continued with his professional duties in Canada and the US, while the Spanish MFA demanded that the flamenco mission precede Moiseyev's tour as a key condition to a final

21 "es conveniente tener comunistas cuando se quiere tener dólares."

22 "Al fin y al cabo el equipo nacional ruso de fútbol ha venido a España y ha jugado con el equipo nacional español, al que puede considerarse quizá tan oficial como a los Festivales de España y más representativo del país en ciertos aspectos."

agreement (De la Serna).²³ Everything may have come to nothing had it not been for the unexpected emergence of a private liason. The accomplished bullfighter and member of the Spanish political and cultural elites Luis Miguel Dominguín, who had addressed the Soviet cultural administration some months before in order to organize two bullfights in Moscow and Leningrad (Dominguín), was asked in December 1965 by the Soviet Ministry of Culture to mediate among the Spanish authorities, putting the dance exchange back on track again (Boni).²⁴

After a long, arduous negotiation, Antonio was finally allowed to perform in eight Soviet cities, including Leningrad, Kiev, and Moscow between June and July 1966. His performances received all imaginable compliments from the audience and the press: “Antonio is a dancing Paganini” (qtd. in MIT, File 2),²⁵ declared Moiseyev after enjoying the dancer’s accurate flamenco technique in Moscow. On 9 July, the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* similarly noted the aesthetic delight of the audience, claiming that Antonio depicted the talent of the entire Spanish people (MIT, File 2). The Spanish Ambassador to Paris reported on 23 June the evident contrast between the popular acclamation of Antonio’s performance by the Soviet audience and the unenthusiastic reception of the American Ballet Theater tour that took place at that time (Cortina Mauri).

Subsequently, Moiseyev’s ballet toured several Spanish cities as the grand finale to the FE campaign in August and September 1966. Spanish representatives monitored the visit very closely trying not to leave any detail to improvisation. For example, Antonio received Moiseyev and his company in his studio, the Spanish press covered every daily movement of the Soviet dancers, and visits to Seville’s most famous *tablaos* (flamenco bars) and Basque industries were scheduled. To increase the political significance of the musical exchange, the secret police supervised the tour thoroughly (MIT, “Proyecto”).²⁶ Seeking to fulfill the specific objectives of the dictatorship regarding the Soviet visit, the Dirección General de Seguridad (General Directorate of Security) infiltrated in the company of Moiseyev two musicians as local staff who acted as informants for the Spanish government. The dance diplomats were supposed to be overwhelmed by the Spanish endeavors to modernize the Spanish working class,

23 General Director of Cultural Relations at the MFA.

24 V. Boni was the Chief of Gosconcert, the Concert Association of the Ministry of Culture in the USSR.

25 “Antonio es el Paganini del baile.”

26 Further newspaper clippings on the Moiseyev’s visit to Spain in AGA, (3) 49.12, 44170.

“convincing them with facts that the workers could be better redeemed than in the ways proposed by the Soviets” (Arespacochaga).²⁷

An ideological background dominated Francoist music diplomacy until the end of the dictatorship, as the Fourth International Dance Festival celebrated in Madrid between October and November 1975 revealed. At that time, the strict international isolation which burdened Franco’s regime in the 1940s revived because of the last death penalties that were enacted by Franco in September 1975, only shortly before his own death. In the context of this extreme situation, performing flamenco on the stage of Madrid’s Teatro de la Zarzuela implicitly assumed a political overtone once again. First of all, it is quite surprising that the Spanish representation at the event was run by Antonio as the leader of a new National Ballet of the Spanish Festivals. It was the first official Spanish dance company launched in 1974, long after flamenco had been associated with Spanish national authenticity. Moreover, the stage turned into a political space when La Scala Ballet and the Belgian Ballet du XXe Siècle, directed by Maurice Béjart, decided to protest against the recent executions by refusing to perform at the festival. Eventually, the show could go on thanks to the personal contacts from the MIT’s managers such as Mario Antolín Paz, the MIT’s General Director of Theatre who succeeded in programing different French, British, and American ballets at the last moment (Antolín Paz).

CONCLUSIONS

Flamenco diplomacy under Franco’s dictatorship consolidated as an official diplomatic practice that resorted extensively to private actors—namely, impresarios and popular flamenco stars. It was strengthened fundamentally when the MIT assumed a leading position in the implementation of the state music policy and the international promotion of Spanish popular culture from the 1950s onwards. The Ministry’s administration tried to close the gap between classical and folk music developed in the years when Falange and Coros y Danzas were in charge of music policy, transforming the popular music styles into high culture. However, this pedagogical target failed: The popularization of elitist cultural manifestations did not actually mean that lower or middle-class audiences

27 “[C]onvencerles con realidades que, a la masa obrera, se la puede redimir mejor de lo que ellos propugnan por otros caminos.” Juan Arespacochaga was the MIT’s General Director of Touristic Promotion.

attended classical music shows which they could not afford—or which they did not really want to attend.

Beyond the Pyrenees, Franco's regime instrumentalized flamenco under the conviction that it would achieve immediate positive results for Spain's recognition and tourist developments. Some reasons explain this choice. On the one hand, the Roma community did not have a strong political organization, which was a pleasant advantage for the dictatorship's propagandistic aims in order to appropriate its culture heritage easier.²⁸ On the other hand, flamenco had already been commercialized since the late nineteenth century through *cafés cantantes* and *óperas flamenco*. This consumerist way of understanding flamenco, associated with all imaginable Andalusian clichés and romantic connotations—for example, depicting Andalusia as a land of bullfighters, bandits, and brave women—was shared by many people around the world. Thus, Franco's dictatorship reshaped flamenco into a cultivated form of “Spanish ballet,” almost monopolized by flamenco, yet only as far as music and dance were concerned. Lyrics were set aside since they were not paramount to fulfill the main goal of Spanish tourism policy—namely, to leverage the image of a modernizing and unique nation recognized as a legitimate partner by the Western, and even the Eastern, bloc.

Regardless of the ambivalent reception of flamenco missions in some cases—for example, among the Spanish emigrants in the FRG—the most influential achievement under Franco's dictatorship was, in short, to transform flamenco into a “national ballet.” Francoism created a National Flamencoist system based on the inclusion of flamenco in the national apparatus of public diplomacy. Domestically, the instrumentalization of flamenco resulted in its depoliticization, primarily because this asserted that flamenco represented the ancient roots of “Spanish” music history and a single “national” identity.

Finally, flamenco diplomacy brings us closer to the difficult balance between private diplomats' agency and state guidance in public diplomatic affairs, and more precisely to the current public diplomacy program fostered by the Spanish government, namely the Marca España (“About”). Not only does the collaboration of state and private actors on a shared international image of Spanish culture continue to be scarcely harmonic, but it also supports the old Francoist discourse of flamenco's allegedly Spanish essence (Perujo). Flamenco courses, agreements for a global dissemination of flamenco art, and the inclusion of flamenco on the

28 It was not until the 1970s that a group of “new flamenco” performers began to subvert the Francoist simplification of flamenco art, engaging regionalist political movements with an Andalusian inspiration (Grimaldos).

Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2010 suggest that a long academic path awaits the study of flamenco diplomacy in the future.²⁹

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