

views” and “historical retrospectives” she is able to move forwards and backwards in time, linking developments in Central Africa with those on the African coast and in Europe.

The text certainly says much more about Europeans and their desire to “penetrate” the veiled “dark continent” than about Africans. Moreover, von Mechow was by no means free from racist prejudices. Yet what he wrote about African commerce, politics, and everyday life is important, not least because no earlier written sources for this region exist. Moreover, here we encounter someone whose vision of a future German colony in Central Africa, imbued with the colonial enthusiasm of his day, turned out to be pie in the sky – making this book a welcome antidote to most of the grand narratives on exploration and colonisation (including postcolonial ones), which tend to focus on the success stories. We learn a great deal about African “domestic” slavery, the struggle of porters for better working conditions, poison ordeals, indigenous geographical knowledge (or the perceived lack of it), the diplomatic significance of gifts (including gifts of women), local warfare, as well as about Putu Kasongo’s monopolies of cattle and of long-distance trade between the area east of the Kwango and the Atlantic Ocean.

Heintze’s work offers everything one could possibly require of a scholarly edition. Her 246-page introduction, supported by 800 detailed footnotes, exhaustively covers the different periods of von Mechow’s life, giving priority to his expedition of 1878–81 but also discussing his role in the better-known Loango expedition of 1874–76. The meticulous transcription of his expeditionary journal, enhanced by a further 1,200 footnotes, is likewise invaluable. The whole publication is a *tour de force*.

Adam Jones (jones@uni-leipzig.de)

**Hickel, Jason, and Naomi Haynes** (eds.): *Hierarchy and Value. Comparative Perspectives on Moral Order*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2018. 157 pp. ISBN 978-1-78533-996-7. Price: \$ 95.00

As the editors write in their “Introduction,” this volume, based on a special issue of *Social Analysis* from 2016, investigates something that strikes many anthropologists as anomalous. That is, people who live fairly content in hierarchical systems, analysed most famously in something else that concerns the volume, Louis Dumont’s model of hierarchy in India. The substantive chapters, then, are concerned with hierarchy and the values associated with it, both to illuminate and raise questions about Dumont’s work.

The first of those chapters is by Signe Howell, who describes two value systems among the Lio of Indonesia, the hierarchical *adat* (custom) and the fairly egalitarian Catholicism, which is attempting to subordinate *adat* by treating it as colourful folk custom. At least so far, however, Catholic egalitarianism is primary only in

the restricted sphere of religious activities such as church services, while *adat* is primary in most of the rest of life, and especially in the clan activities that are central to the maintenance of the cosmological order.

The next chapter, Diego Maria Malara and Tom Boylston’s description of Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, is concerned not with the co-existence of value structures but with how people’s practical relationship with a hierarchical structure of values and social relations can modify the effects of that structure. The chapter presents three aspects of that practical relationship. One is the obligation of superiors to support obedient subordinates, modelled on the image of mother love. Another is the existence of mediators who can speak to the powerful on behalf of the subordinate. The third, appropriate when the dominant person is powerful but does not behave properly, is to submit publicly but in practice to ignore what the powerful person wants.

The next chapter, by Frederick H. Damon, draws on settings ranging from the Trobriands through the American South after the Civil War to modern government policies, to make the argument that creating value requires destruction of some sort. This can be giving away a *kula* valuable, as it can be the public lynching of a Black in Texas and massive government spending on real or rhetorical wars. This, Damon says, reverses Dumont’s position: the moral and ritual order do not stand apart from and govern social practice. Rather, the social practice of destruction generates that order.

In the next chapter, Stephan Feuchtwang argues that Dumont was wrong to treat India as the ideal case of hierarchy, rather than as only one sort of hierarchy. He does so using Mauss’s idea of civilisation, defined by a body of collective representations and practices that usually is hierarchical. Against Dumont, Feuchtwang says that civilisation’s constituent social units can differ and have more than one moral-evaluative frame, and routinely they contain the basis of an internal critique of the civilisation’s hierarchy and, indeed, of the civilisation itself. Feuchtwang illustrates his case in terms of the history of Chinese civilisation.

In the following chapter, Arsalan Khan describes the hierarchical worldview of Tablighi Jamaat, an Islamic revivalist movement in Pakistan. A key part of Tablighi practice is several months devoted to *dawat*, speaking to people face-to-face, and urging them to good Islamic practice. The practices of *dawat* and other areas of Tablighi life are taken to reflect and produce piety, and do so in terms of hierarchies that Khan describes. The Tablighi set themselves against Islamists, concerned with efficacy rather than what they see as Tablighi fixation on form and reliance on Allah to bring about an Islamic society. For the Tablighi, Islamists turn people into undisciplined folk who ignore their place in the hierarchical order and the duties appropriate to it.

The final substantive chapter, by Olaf H. Smedal, describes the Ngadha in Indonesia. They are organised in terms of kin-based Houses and are divided into commoners and a small set of nobles who seem to have no

special privileges or cosmic significance. Children take on their mother's rank, but any noble woman who has sex with a commoner loses her noble rank and House membership, though membership can be restored by a ritual that defines the offending woman as commoner. Smedal says that nobles generally, but decreasingly, disapprove of female cross-rank transgression, while commoners think that the disapproval and punishing ritual are ridiculous. As Smedal explains, the effect of the rule is to make it increasingly difficult for noble women to marry and produce the next generation of nobles, to the point that in some Houses noble women have renounced their rank. These noble lines, then, appear to be doomed.

The volume ends with an "Afterword" by David Graeber. It presents what he sees as Dumont's intellectual frame and his moral and political position, and makes two related arguments. One is that Dumont was opposed to capitalism and favoured an older hierarchical social and moral order. The other is that "hierarchy" has become increasingly common in anthropology since around the 1950s, displacing terms like "rank" or "dominance," a terminological shift that marks a conceptual shift, an increasing assumption that inequalities are legitimate and stable from the perspective of the people anthropologists study.

If inequalities are to be legitimate in people's eyes, values that justify them seem necessary. Taken together, such inequalities and values are a hierarchy in Dumont's sense. However, Dumont did much more than note their conjunction in hierarchical systems. It is to the credit of the writers in this volume that they illuminate and question those other things that Dumont linked to hierarchy. In doing so, they help make hierarchies problematic and linked to social processes and practices in ways that Dumont probably did not intend but that make the notion of hierarchy more useful as an analytical concept.

James G. Carrier (jgc@jgcarrier.demon.co.uk)

**Hinton, Alexander Laban:** *The Justice Facade. Trials of Transition in Cambodia.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 282 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-882095-6. Price: £ 24.99

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) were established in 2006 to prosecute international crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge regime between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979, during which as much as a quarter of Cambodia's population is estimated to have perished through starvation, forced labour, torture, and execution. The tribunal was to have a hybrid structure, with Cambodian and international staff working side by side and applying international standards. Much has been written along the way discussing the ECCC's various "successes" and "failures."

In "The Justice Facade. Trials of Transition in Cambodia," Alexander Laban Hinton invites us to critically

reflect upon the "transitional justice imaginary" – the yardstick against which the ECCC has generally been assessed.

His book opens with a preface describing a booklet published by a Cambodian NGO. The booklet contains drawings that depict the personal transformation of a Cambodian villager, "Uncle Yan" from traumatised to healed – a transformation effected through his participation in the ECCC trials. The storyline is linear and portrays a process of emergence from the nightmares of the regressive, brutal, communist past to dreams of a progressive, peaceful, and prosperous (market-driven and "developed") Cambodia. It is this storyline, that Hinton describes as a facade that masks multiple other realities. On the one hand, it masks the various ways in which transitional justice is lived and experienced on the ground. On the other, it masks its own historical and political roots and limitations.

With deft use of imagery, Hinton takes us behind the facade. He draws particularly upon the image of the Justice Cascade – the title of a 2011 book by Kathryn Sikkink. Sikkink argued that holding former leaders legally accountable for past crimes would aid transitions from authoritarianism to liberal democracy, the norms of which would then "cascade" down from international to local forums, becoming internalised and reproduced along the way. Hinton alludes to the way this fits into a broad civilizing mission that also includes the liberation of markets from former command economies.

In response to the assumption of a smooth, monidirectional flow from above to below suggested by the cascade metaphor, Hinton gives his book a tripartite structure under headings that capture the complex and unpredictable ways in which the "transitional justice imaginary" meets real people's lives: "vortices," "turbulence," "eddies." Hinton also uses the fiery images of sparks, fizzling, and combustion to describe what happens at points of encounter between discordant realities. One could perhaps instead extend his use of the fluid cascade metaphor to describe how the transitional justice imaginary filters through, splashes off, or seeps into various terrains of knowledge, power, and practice, sometimes nourishing new growth but sometimes also swamping or buckling novel ideas.

Hinton has a long experience of conducting in-depth research in Cambodia, and this enables him to use the phenomenological, experience-near approach in this book to great effect. He draws upon interviews with individuals who have been involved with the ECCC, particularly victims and NGO outreach workers. These stories unmask much of what is eclipsed by the "Justice Facade," disclosing power dynamics and cultural realms, particularly that of Buddhism, that frame lives and discourses, that are absent from the transitional justice imaginary. In doing so, Hinton reveals elements of people's experiences, hopes and fears – from before, during, and after the Khmer Rouge period – that have been hidden by the ECCC process.