

Chapter VIII The State of the Allied Forces Before the Java Operation

1. The State of the Allied Forces Before the Outbreak of the Second European War*

The United States

The New War Plan Orange

Since 1922, the U.S. Navy had kept the major part of the U.S. Fleet in the Pacific Ocean.⁽⁹²⁾ This was because the Japanese advance toward the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands as well as the decline in Russian power after World War I had made the U.S. Army and Navy very much concerned about the movements of Japan in the Pacific Ocean.

The plan of operations against Japan was called War Plan Orange, and the gist of the plan drawn up in 1928 was as follows:⁽¹⁷⁴⁾

1. In case hostilities are opened between the United States and Japan, Japan's first hostile act will probably be an invasion of the Philippines. In such a case, the forces stationed in the Philippines shall hold out against the Japanese attack as much as possible and try to secure Manila Bay.
2. Leaving some forces such as submarines, small naval vessels and patrol aircraft behind in the Philippines, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet shall withdraw its main force to the Indian Ocean to avoid the brunt of the attack of the Japanese fleet.
3. During the holding operations in the Far East, an expeditionary force shall be prepared as soon as possible on the United States mainland to win the final victory.

However, the plan only indicated the strategic course to be followed against Japan; without concrete arrangements to implement it, it was no better than a paper plan.

From 1935 onwards, with the international situation becoming tense mainly due to the actions of Japan, Germany and Italy, both the U.S. Army and Navy secretaries recognized that the current Plan Orange was too obsolete and drew up a new Plan Orange. Compared to the old plan, it was remarkably specific and practical, and it also included [items on] the co-operation between the U.S. and British Navies. The cooperation was in outline as follows:^(92, 174)

* The author refers only in a general way to his sources without giving chapter and verse. In a few cases, we could trace his source and restore the original text; however, in most cases, this turned out to be a hopeless task.

1. The basic policy is that in case of war against Japan in the Pacific Ocean, Britain shall dispatch a battle fleet to Singapore and operate based on Singapore, while the U.S. Fleet shall concentrate in Hawaii.
2. In a war against Japan, both the United States and Britain shall make their waters available for each other's vessels.

The Rainbow Plans

Subsequently, along with Germany's expansion in Europe, Italy's acting in concert, and Japan's employment of armed force in wider areas of mainland China, it was considered impossible to cope with this state of affairs with the present Plan Orange. In February 1939, the Rainbow Plans were newly drawn up on the assumption that Britain and France would act in concert with the United States. Their outline was as follows.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾

1. Assumptions
Assuming that the United States will wage war against either Japan, Germany or Italy individually, or against their combined forces. In that case, we assume that Britain and France will support the United States or act in concert with her.
2. The plans
 - (1) [Rainbow] 1
A plan to defend the area to the north of 10° N* in the western hemisphere.
 - (2) [Rainbow] 2
Along with the defense of the western hemisphere stated in Rainbow 1, the United States, jointly with Britain and France, shall assume her share of the operations to protect the interests of the allied countries mainly in the Pacific. No forces will be sent to Europe.
 - (3) [Rainbow] 3
Along with the defense of the western hemisphere stated in Rainbow 1, [the United States] will rapidly conduct an operation to secure control of the western Pacific.
 - (4) [Rainbow] 4
A plan to provide for the defense of the entire western hemisphere as well as the eastern Pacific.
 - (5) [Rainbow] 5
A plan where, in order to attain the aims of Rainbow 1 and Rainbow 4, and assuming that combined operations with Britain and France will be conducted, the United States will dispatch military forces to Europe to deliver a decisive blow to Germany and Italy.

However, the deployment of the U.S. Army and Navy in the Far East around September 1939 at the time of the breakout of World War II was not so much different from that in 1931.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ The forces in 1931 were the following.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾

The U.S. Asiatic Fleet

Southern China Patrol Unit: 19 Destroyers (based in Chefoo)
Yangtze [Patrol] Unit: 6 River-Gunboats (based in Shanghai)
Others: 12 Submarines and some auxiliary vessels

The U.S. garrison army on the Philippines

About 10,000 men ([with] officers mainly consisting of Americans, and noncommissioned officers and men of Filipinos, half of the army were Philippine Scouts)

* Actually 10° S. See *Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan* (https://history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-6/CMH_Pub_10-6.pdf), p. 10: *north of 10 degrees south latitude*.

As of 1939, only two cruisers were added to the [Asiatic] Fleet, while as for the Army, after the Philippines Independence Act was passed in 1934, the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, with the support of its American Military Advisor MacArthur, was making strenuous efforts to have a regular force of 10,000 men and a reserve force of 400,000 men by 1946 (the year of full independence).⁽¹⁷⁷⁾

Britain

After World War I, the U.S. and Japanese navies rapidly grew larger, replacing the German Fleet, which had [practically] disappeared. Japanese naval power provided a potential threat to the security of the sea communications between Great Britain, India, Australia and New Zealand, and Britain considered it neither necessary nor possible to maintain fleets of adequate strength in both the western and eastern hemispheres; it was accordingly decided that the British Fleet should be held in a central position in European waters, from which it could reinforce the Far East as and when required.⁽⁸⁵⁾

In order to implement this strategy, a naval base with adequate strength and facilities at a strategically advantageous position in the Far East came to be considered necessary. As a result of discussions between the top leaders concerned of the Army and Navy, they came to the conclusion that their only existing base in Hong Kong was not strategically worthy in terms of its geographical location and facilities, and that it was necessary to construct a base in Singapore since it was strategically the best situated for the control of sea communications in the Indian Ocean and the southwestern Pacific. This was in 1921.⁽⁸⁵⁾

Because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain maintained cooperative relations with Japan during the Russo-Japanese War and in World War I. However, having perceived Japan's expansionist designs since Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China in 1915, Britain changed course to contain Japan's intentions. In 1921, Britain abrogated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and simultaneously drew up a strategy with Japan as a potential enemy, and proceeded to try to implement it.⁽⁸⁵⁾

The plan to construct a naval base in Singapore was approved by cabinet and parliament in 1923 and was supposed to be carried out, but due to the subsequent political situation in Britain and conflicting opinions over the defense of the base between the Army, Navy and Air Force, it was not easily realized. After various twists and turns, the construction of the base was finally started from May 1932 onward, based on the following policies.⁽⁸⁵⁾

1. The main deterrent against naval attacks on Singapore shall be guns.
2. As auxiliary forces, fighter planes for the defense and attack planes for attacks on enemy ships shall be added.
3. The first stage of the construction of the base shall be the full installation of guns for coastal defense and the preparation of the required air units and airfields, which shall be completed by 1936 or 1937 at the latest.

After Hitler took political control in Germany in January 1933, the country in quick succession took steps to break up the [post] Versailles [political] order, withdrew from the League of Nations in October that year, and proclaimed rearmament in March 1935, thereby becoming a major threat to Britain. Furthermore, as Italy was also stirring, the situation had changed in such a way that [Britain] could no longer afford to dispatch massive military forces to the

Far East, while emptying Europe as specified in the current Far East strategy plan, and that it should be anticipated that the strength of the fleet which could be sent to the Far East would have to be governed by home requirements.⁽⁸⁵⁾

In July 1935, the British Government authorized the start of part of the second stage of the construction work on the Singapore base (the construction of additional heavy artillery emplacements and two airfields). It was considered that the completion of this second stage work would enable Singapore to hold out for about seventy days against the expected scale of attacks before the arrival of a British fleet in the Far Eastern waters. However, improvements in aircraft performance [made it possible] to use aircraft for offensive purposes, which brought about a [new] phase where such a plan as to solely fortifying Singapore should fundamentally be reconsidered. After having reexamined the defense plans on site from a new angle, Major General [W.G.S.] Dobbie, who had become the commander in [British] Malaya in 1937, sent the following reports to the War Office from October to November that year.⁽⁸⁵⁾

1. It is possible for the enemy to land on the east coast of Malaya during the northeastern monsoon (from October to March), because poor visibility on the waters during that period will limit the capability of our air reconnaissance.
2. It is very likely that when Japanese forces should come for an attack on Singapore, instead of a direct attack from the sea front, as [we] have considered earlier, they will [first] seize Singora, Pattani, or Kota Bharu, push forward their advanced airfields there, and carry out attacks from the north. Therefore, the security of [the base in] Singapore would largely be dependent on the defense of northern Malaya and Johore.
3. From the above point of view, the defense of Singapore should in fact be considered inclusive of the defense of the whole of the Malay Peninsula.

The major general further warned in July of the next year (1938) that the jungle in Johore was in most places not impassable for infantry. Despite such warnings, the construction work on [the naval port of] Singapore was continued following the plan of 1932.⁽⁸⁵⁾ It was finally around August 1940 when the proposals of Major General Dobbie were actually adopted, but then it was too late.

In July 1937, the China Incident broke out in the Far East, which frequently caused conflicts between Japan's military operations and Britain's [attempts to] preserve its interests in China, and added to the tensions between both countries. Also, from the latter half of 1938 onwards, the situation in Europe became more critical, and with Germany's advance into Sudetenland in October that year as the turning point, a [new] plan of operations which would meet the new state of affairs needed to be drawn up. The plan sent by the Chiefs of Staff to the Committee of Imperial Defence in February 1939 focused on naval strategies and was in outline as follows:⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

1. This plan is a strategic plan for Britain in case Britain and France should jointly go to war against Germany and Italy. It also anticipates the case that Britain may fight Japan in the Far East, too.
2. The theaters regarded to be most important to Britain are the home country, the Mediterranean, and the Far East, in that order.
3. The Home Fleet and the Mediterranean Fleet shall be deployed respectively on the waters near Britain and in the Mediterranean mentioned in the previous item, and be assigned the task to enforce naval blockades against Germany and Italy as well as to destroy [their] fleets.

4. In the operation in the Mediterranean, its western basin shall be a French responsibility and the responsibility for its eastern basin falls on Britain.
5. The protection of shipping lanes spanning the rest of the world shall be the responsibility of the area fleets abroad (in the East, the China [Station] Fleet and the East Indies Fleet) or the navies of the dominions.
6. In order to respond to Japanese aggression in the Far East, the need to dispatch a fleet from Europe is recognized. But we are not strong enough to maintain a third fleet equivalent to the Home Fleet or the Mediterranean Fleet. Since part of the forces in the European theater will have to be spared for dispatching such a fleet, [the scale of] the dispatched forces shall depend on the war situation in Europe.

While the Committee of Imperial Defence was examining the plan, the situation in Europe rapidly changed; in March 1939, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, which was followed by the Italian invasion of Albania. Consequently, on 2 May of the same year, the committee drew the following conclusions:⁽⁸⁵⁾

1. The order of priority regarding our potential enemies shall be Germany, Italy and Japan, in that order.
2. It is not possible to definitely state how soon a fleet can be dispatched to the Far East after Japan has initiated an offensive there or how large a fleet can be sent.

Also, the Admiralty, while making clear its view that even if war broke out in the Far East, it would be impossible to send more than two capital ships,⁽⁹²⁾ informed the United States in the same month (May 1939) that owing to the necessity of watching the Mediterranean, it would be impossible to send a battle force to Singapore and suggested that the U.S. Navy defend the Malay Barrier (the British and Dutch colonies from Timor to Malaya). It was obvious that the contents of this announcement fundamentally changed the basic principles of the Anglo-American agreement for joint operations formed one and a half years before. By that time, the United States had already begun to work on the Rainbow Plans on the assumption that it could not count on the British Fleet in the Far East.⁽⁹²⁾

In March 1939, an Anglo-French staff meeting on their joint operations was held in London, where France accepted the following items.⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

1. The French Navy shall assume control of the western basin of the Mediterranean.
2. If Japan takes the offensive in the Far East, the need to dispatch one fleet to the Far East is recognized. However, the dispatch shall be dealt with in due consideration of the balance of peril between Europe and the Far East.

Based on this meeting, a conference was held in June of that year in Singapore between the commanders of the British and French forces on site. In this conference, the following conclusions were drawn and sent as recommendations to both governments:⁽⁸⁵⁾

1. Since it seems impossible to station adequate naval forces in the Far East in peacetime, the only practical solution seems to have considerably large air units on hand [there] instead.
2. The strength of the combined British and French air and ground units [stationed in the Far East] is inadequate.
3. Reinforcements of two brigades should be sent to the Far East as soon as possible.

4. In order to avert Thailand from plotting with Japan, diplomatic steps should be taken so that British and French forces can freely pass Thai territory in time of war.

In July of the same year, in view of the uncertainty about dispatching a British fleet to the Far East, the [British] Committee of Imperial Defence decided to increase the period for Singapore to hold out on its own from seventy to ninety days, and ordered an investigation into the possibility of storing enough supplies to support civilians and the garrison for six months in Malaya.⁽⁸⁵⁾

In August, the committee decided to reinforce Singapore, and sent reinforcements of one infantry brigade, one field [actually: mountain] artillery regiment and two bomber squadrons, and was further planning to send in September two bomber squadrons from mainland Britain, when World War II broke out. The British forces in the Far East at that time were roughly the following:⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

1. Navy

(1) China Station (Commander in Chief: Admiral [P.] Noble)

{1} Area covered: the whole western Pacific excluding the waters around Australia and New Zealand

{2} Bases: Singapore and Hong Kong

{3} Forces: 4 cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier, 10 destroyers, 5 escort vessels, 15 submarines, 5 coastal defense vessels, 20 river-gunboats, and 6 torpedo boats as the core

(2) East Indies Station (commander in chief: Rear Admiral [R.] Leatham)

{1} Area covered: the entire Indian Ocean

{2} Base: Trincomalee (Ceylon)

{3} Forces: 3 cruisers, 7 escort vessels (of which 5 vessels belonged to the Indian Navy)

(3) The Australian Navy

Forces: 5 cruisers, 3 destroyers and 2 escort vessels

(4) The New Zealand Navy

Forces: 2 cruisers and 2 escort vessels

2. Air Force (forces in Malaya)

24 Bombers (in 2 squadrons), 24 torpedo bombers (in 2 squadrons), 10 flying boats (in 2 squadrons), a total of 58 aircraft (in 6 squadrons)

3. Army

(1) Malaya

{1} Singapore: 5 Infantry battalions, heavy artillery units and antiaircraft artillery units as the core, [comprising] 23 guns for the stronghold, [a total of] about 12,000 men

{2} Penang: 1 Infantry battalion as the core, [consisting of] about 3,000 men

{3} Northern Malaya and Johore: Voluntary units of about 1,000 men as the core

{4} Reserve: 1 Infantry Brigade and 1 mountain artillery regiment [consisting of] about 7,000 men
23,000 men in total

(2) Hong Kong: 4 Infantry battalions and artillery units as the core, [consisting of] about 19,000 men

(3) Burma: About 20 infantry battalions as the core, [consisting of] about 20,000 men

The Netherlands

[Even] after [seeing] Japan's growing tendency toward expansion in the Far East after the Russo-Japanese War, the purpose of the Dutch Navy had remained the preservation of the

sea lines of communication between the home country and its East Indies colony as well as the shipping lanes between the islands within the colony, and it assumed that in anticipated future conflicts with Japan, the British and U.S. navies would play the major role. Accordingly, the Dutch Navy [had chosen] not to have capital ships; its forces consisted of cruisers and destroyers as their core, which were suitable for the protection of shipping lanes.⁽¹⁷⁹⁾

Therefore, it was not at all possible for the Netherlands to defend its colony in the Far East solely with its own navy, and it had to depend on Britain with its large interests and forces in the Far East. In the spring of 1936, the Dutch Government examined the defense situation of Dutch East Indies, and came to the conclusion that its defensive capability was very weak. Because it considered that the security of the Dutch East Indies was of interest [also] to Britain, the Dutch Government proposed to the British Government informal talks between both countries concerning defense policies in the Far East.⁽⁸⁵⁾

The British Government agreed that cooperation between the British and Dutch units in the Far East was desirable, but did not make a commitment that it would cooperate in the defense of the Dutch East Indies. Asked about the matter, the Committee of Imperial Defence also advised the Government in July that "the Dutch should be encouraged to improve their defences but that it would be unwise to consent to any proposals for a joint Anglo-Dutch Defense Scheme."⁽⁸⁵⁾ However, considering it desirable that the Dutch air forces in the Dutch East Indies would be appropriately equipped to play their part in a combined air defense of the Far East, the British Air Ministry held talks on technical matters with their Dutch counterparts.⁽⁸⁵⁾

The Netherlands had the following forces [in the East Indies] at the breakout of World War II (September 1939):^(34, 87)

1. Navy: 2 Cruisers, 5-6 destroyers, 12 submarines and some other vessels
2. Air Force: About 100 Army aircraft and about 50 Navy aircraft, a total of about 150 [aircraft]
3. Army: About 19,000 men on Java, and about 12,000 men on the islands other than Java, a total of 31,000 men

2. The Situation of the Allied Forces Right Before the Opening of Hostilities

Although the allied forces had thereafter made efforts to reinforce their forces in the Far East, the war situation in Europe did not allow them to send adequate reinforcements. The situation of the allied forces [in the Far East] right before the opening of hostilities was as follows:

Britain

1. Air Force

In late January 1941, the Chiefs of Staff gave approval only to [the deployment of] army troops out of the request made by the local forces (in Malaya), which had been 582 aircraft of the Air Force and twenty-six battalions [of the Army]. As for [the deployment of] the air force, [the Chiefs of Staff] insisted on setting the [total deployment at only] 336 aircraft as they had estimated earlier, and decided to attain this goal as much as possible by the end of 1941.⁽⁸⁵⁾ However, the war situation in Europe made it impossible to fulfill this plan at all. The following forces were [stationed in the Far East] at the time of the opening of hostilities:^(85, 139)

- (1) Malaya: 158 Aircraft, [consisting of] 13 squadrons and 88 reserve aircraft, (about 60 of which were operable)
- (2) Burma: 16 (Buffalo) fighter planes
21 (P-40) fighter planes

2. Army

In the summer of 1940, when the Chiefs of Staff estimated the defense forces required for the Far East at eighteen battalions (six brigades) as the core on condition that 336 aircraft [should be fully made available] by the Air Force, there was in Malaya [already] a force of nine battalions, or about 30,000 men including volunteers.⁽⁸⁵⁾ By the end of 1940, this force was increased to seventeen battalions as the core, totaling about 40,000 men, with which the deployment of the targeted number of troops was more or less attained. After that, the request [for an increase to] twenty-six battalions was almost fulfilled by April of next year, which rapidly increased the total [size of the ground] forces to close to twenty-six battalions, totaling 60,000 men. However, this was based on the condition that an air force of 582 aircraft were made available. In view of very slow progress in the reinforcement of the air force, the local garrison further made a request for [an increase in] ground forces to forty-eight infantry battalions as the core, with attached tank, artillery, antiaircraft [artillery] and engineer units.⁽⁸⁵⁾ Concerning this request, reinforcements were made from the summer to the autumn of 1941, which increased the infantry to thirty-one battalions as the core. However, the tank units which the local garrison had most [strongly] requested were not reinforced.⁽⁸⁵⁾ The army strength [in Malaya] at the time of the opening of hostilities was as follows:^(85, 95)

Malaya area (including northern Borneo)

- 31 Infantry battalions (about 3-5 divisions)
- 8 Field and mountain artillery regiments (about 175 guns)
- 2 Antitank gun regiments and some smaller units (about 95 guns)
- 8 Volunteer infantry battalions and 10 other units
- A total of 88,600 men (consisting of 19,600 British, 15,200 Australians, 37,000 Indians, and some 16,800 Malays)

3. Navy

Having her hands full with the war against Germany in Europe, Britain was too busy to pay attention to the situation in the Far East. However, the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the reinforcement of forces in the Atlantic by the U.S. Fleet from June to August allowed the Navy some scope to organize an Eastern Fleet to contain Japan's southern advance, and dispatch it to the Far East in December of that year. The strength of this fleet was as follows:⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

- Battleships: *HMS Prince of Wales*, *HMS Repulse* (to Malaya), and *HMS Revenge* (to Ceylon)
- Aircraft Carriers: *HMS Indomitable* (who ran aground near Jamaica on 3 November; with no alternatives, the dispatch [of carriers] was cancelled.)
- 4 Destroyers

The United States

Around the spring of 1941, with their attention still taken up by the situation in the Atlantic, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were too busy to consider the situation in the Far East at all.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ However, such factors as the possibility of a military buildup in the Far East after the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union in June that year and the possibility of gaining air supremacy at last by the completion of the state-of-the-art heavy bomber B-17 allowed the country to send large reinforcements around November of that year with as goal a perfect defense of the Philippines.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ [As a result,] the strength available at the time of the opening of hostilities became as follows:⁽¹⁷⁷⁾

1. Army

(1) Ground forces:

U.S. Army: The Philippine Division and 7 regiments of [other] various forces, ground units of air units, and harbor defense units, a total of 31,095 men

Philippine Army: 10 Divisions (though poorly equipped and trained), about 80,000 men

(2) Air forces: 1 Regiment each of bombers, fighter planes and combined forces, a total of 277 aircraft (of which about 150 aircraft were operable)

2. Navy⁽⁹²⁾

1 Heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 13 destroyers, 29 submarines, 4 seaplane tenders, 4 submarine tenders, 5 minesweepers, 6 torpedo boats, 6 gunboats and 6 other types of vessels; 32 flying boats, about 20 reconnaissance seaplanes, 1 marine regiment (1,600 men) and ground personnel of the 16th Naval District (20,000 men)

The Netherlands

The Dutch strength in the Far East around August and September of 1940 was by and large as follows:⁽⁸⁶⁾

Navy: 2 Cruisers, 6 destroyers and 16 submarines as its core

Air force: About 150 aircraft (most of them were outdated U.S. aircraft)

Army: About 30,000 men

The Dutch Navy had successively shifted its forces to the Dutch East Indies after the collapse of its home country, and by December 1941, the following forces were added [to the forces in the Dutch East Indies]:⁽¹⁷⁹⁾

2 Cruisers, 1-2 destroyers, and 3 submarines

3. The Situation of the Allied Forces at the Time of [Japan's] Launch of the Dutch East Indies Operation

The following is the deployment of the allied forces in the Dutch East Indies as of early January 1942, when the Japanese forces were about to launch the Dutch East Indies operation:

Surface Forces^(87, 92, 178, 179)

Dutch East Indies Fleet

Waters near Java

- 2 Light cruisers: *HNLMS De Ruyter* and *HNLMS Tromp* [probably *HNLMS Java* is meant]
- 5 Destroyers: *HNLMS Piet Hein*, *HNLMS Van Ghent*, *HNLMS Kortenaer*, *HNLMS Banckert*, and *HNLMS Witte de With*
- 3-4 Minelayers and minesweepers
- 1 Gunboat: *HNLMS Sumatra* [Actually a *Java*-class cruiser]
- 3 (Old-type) submarines: *K-VII*, *K-VIII*, *K-IX*
- Sea to the north of Australia
 - 1 Gunboat: *HNLMS Soerabaja* [former coastal defense ship *HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën*]
 - 1-2 Minelayers
- Waters near Makassar
 - 1-2 Minelayers
 - 2 Submarines: *K-X* and *K-XVIII*
- Waters near Singapore
 - 1 Light cruiser: *HNLMS Tromp*
 - 2 Light cruisers: *HNLMS Evertsen* and *HNLMS Van Nes* [Actually destroyers]
 - 6 Submarines: *K-XI*, *K-XII*, *K-XIII*, *K-XIV*, *K-XVI*, and *O-XIX*
- U.S. Asiatic Fleet
 - Sea to the north of Australia
 - 1 Heavy cruiser: *USS Houston*
 - 2 Light cruisers: *USS Boise* and *USS Marblehead*
 - 11 Destroyers
 - Waters near Makassar
 - 5-9 Submarines
 - Waters surrounding Celebes
 - 3 Seaplane Tenders: *USS Heron*, *USS Childs* and *USS [William B.] Preston*
 - 3 Submarines: *USS Pickerel*, *USS Permit* and *USS Swordfish*

Air forces^(85, 86, 95, 139)

Forces Areas	Dutch East Indies		Australia	United States	
	Army	Navy	Air Force	Army Forces Far East	Asiatic Fleet
Java	60 Fighter planes	15 Reconnaissance seaplanes		10 Heavy bombers	
Southern Sumatra	15 Fighter planes 35 Bombers	10 Flying boats			
Tarakan		2-3 Flying boats			
Balikpapan	15 Bombers				
Menado					
Kendari		5-6 Flying boats			2-3 Flying boats
Ambon	5 Fighter planes 15 Bombers	10 Flying boats	12 Bombers		5 Flying boats
Kupang			12 Bombers		
Port Darwin				100 Fighter planes 10 Bombers	
Total	145	42-44	24	120	7-8

Ground units⁽⁸⁵⁾

Units Areas	Dutch East Indies Army	Australian Army	Notes
Tarakan	1,300	—	
Menado	1,500	—	
Balikpapan	800?	—	
Kendari	?	—	
Makassar	500?	—	
Ambon	2,600	1,000	Australian Army advanced in late December
Kupang	400	1,500	Australian Army advanced in mid-December
Dili	250	250?	Occupied by both armies on 17 December
Total			

Remarks: Excluding Java and Sumatra