

in the territory of the former British Togoland, Togoland unificationists, such as Francis Ametowbla, began to flee across the border into French Togoland to avoid detention.⁷³⁵

As a result of the independence disturbances, Nkrumah wanted to take direct responsibility for security and intelligence matters after independence,⁷³⁶ so in 1958, Daniel Chapman, was released from his position as chairman of the Ghana Intelligence Committee and demoted to principal of the Achimota College, for which he nursed a bitter grievance. At Achimota College it soon became an open secret that he bore strong resentment towards Nkrumah and his government. Chapman in turn was accused of indulging in “tribalism” and of passing on secrets to the Republic of Togo.⁷³⁷ The former chairman of the Ghana Intelligence Committee was informed eventually that he himself was under surveillance by the Ghana Intelligence Service, which had emerged from the Special Branch. Judging by the wording, it was someone close to the nucleus of power who informed him, possibly the Principal Secretary of Ghana’s African Affairs Secretariat, Michael Dei-Anang.⁷³⁸ Chapman’s trajectory is imbued with bitter irony: to achieve Ewe unification, Chapman had sided with Nkrumah in the early 1950s and, after Ghana’s independence, he even chaired the Ghana Intelligence Committee that would later prosecute unificationists. Now Chapman had become a victim of his own politics, as his unification aspirations were stigmatized as “tribalism” and rendered remote.

6.8.1 Securitising the Independence of French Togoland (1957)

In March 1957, the French government enacted a slight amendment to the statute, thereby adhering to the General Assembly and wishes, which the Togolese Legislative Assembly pronounced on 8 December 1956 and 13 February 1957 concerning an enlargement of autonomy over public liberties and the protection of their exercise. This change did not satisfy the nationalists, so that in April 1957, during the Trusteeship Council’s 19th Session (1957), Sylvanus Olympio appeared in an oral hearing before the Trusteeship Council. After appearing only before the Fourth Committee for nearly six years, it was the first time since the summer of 1950 that he had decided to address that body. As he had noted earlier, when pointing out that the Trusteeship Council had already dealt France a serious setback twice (the refusal to supervise the referendum and the transmission of the subsequent memorandum to the General Assembly), he seemed to have hoped that the balance of opinion in the Council had shifted to France’s disadvantage.

735 By October 1961, 5,700 Ghanaians (belonging to various ethnic groups and also Togoland-unrelated opposition parties) had taken refuge in francophone Togo.

736 PRAAD, 038/SF12 [old signature], *Field Intelligence Organisation*.

737 PRAAD (Accra), RG 17/1/224, *Daniel Chapman*, The Activities of the Headmaster of Achimota College, Mr. D.A. Chapman, 2 September 1960.

738 PRAAD (Accra), RG 17/1/224, *Daniel Chapman*, Personal and Confidential Letter (without number), 3 September 1960.

Photo 28: Sylvanus Olympio before Trusteeship Council (17 April 1957)



Source: UN Photo.

Olympio appealed for not terminating the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland merely because of the statute, and, since the current Legislative Assembly was not elected by universal suffrage, he called for new and free elections. Olympio maintained that there was a “total absence of democratic liberties in Togoland under French administration.”⁷³⁹ He pointed out that in late March 1957, the French administration used the independence unrest in Ghana as a pretext to ban mass meetings near the Togo-Ghana border. Suspiciously, the decision had been delayed a full two weeks after the disturbances, that is, until the eve of a scheduled CUT meeting. In another incident in Atakpamé, the French authorities allegedly made use of armed peace-breakers to give the French administration a pretext to intervene and break up a rally organized by the CUT. Olympio remarked “Those recent events had confirmed in him the belief that there was a real danger of the establishment of a self-perpetuating autocracy rather than a democratic State in Togoland.”⁷⁴⁰ Olympio interpreted the French representative’s response, asserting that it was the business of the Togoland Assembly itself and that the Administering Authority had no power to intervene, as “an invitation to dictatorship in Togoland, which now had a one-party Assembly supporting a one-party Government.”⁷⁴¹ The French representative, Robert Bargues, played down the incident at Atakpamé and replied that the meeting had been banned for the protection of the people assembled there. Olympio rebutted that the CUT did not need protection.⁷⁴²

General Debate

After the hearing, the French representatives, Robert Bargues, requested to postpone the debate on the hearing, the statute, and the trusteeship territory in general until the United Nations Commission had returned and submitted its report.⁷⁴³ At first, the request was ignored and the anti-colonial Council members dwelt at length on the politi-

⁷³⁹ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 194.

⁷⁴⁰ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 194.

⁷⁴¹ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 195.

⁷⁴² TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 198.

⁷⁴³ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 202.

cal situation in French Togoland.⁷⁴⁴ The Syrian delegate accused that the French “Administering Authority had tried to remove the Trust Territory from United Nations supervision”⁷⁴⁵ by requesting termination of trusteeship on the basis of a statute that “could only be described as a farce,”⁷⁴⁶ inappropriate as an instrument leading to self-government or independence. New elections, in accordance with the previous General Assembly’s resolution, were considered essential. The Council adopted a Belgian proposal to defer establishing a drafting committee on French Togoland and to abstain from passing any resolution on the issue until the return of the United Nations commission.⁷⁴⁷ Yet, the Indian and Syrian delegations subsequently claimed that the decision applied only to a drafting committee, whereas resolutions which the Council itself might want to adopt were still admissible. The Syrian Council President, Asha, upheld their interpretation. The Syrian and Indian delegation thus submitted a draft resolution requesting France to establish a new Legislative Assembly by free elections based on universal suffrage.⁷⁴⁸ The colonial powers opposed the draft on the ground that it was inconsistent with the spirit of compromise which characterised the General Assembly resolution. The Italian delegate formulated “it would be wrong for the Council to reopen the matter at that stage with a draft resolution which was based on the testimony of a single petitioner, and which did not even take the Administering Authority’s views into consideration. [The Italian delegation] saw no need for prodding the Administering Authority constantly and systematically.”⁷⁴⁹ The Indo-Syrian draft resolution was then rejected by two tie-votes.⁷⁵⁰ Once again, the Council frustrated Olympio’s request.

The ‘4th Visiting Mission’

Although the UN Visiting Commission was a sort of fourth, special Visiting Mission, it is important to remember that it differed significantly from the three previous regular Visiting Missions. It was not dispatched by the Trusteeship Council, but by the General Assembly, and therefore not subject to the Trusteeship Council’s restrictive *rules of procedure* such as parity between Administering and non-Administering Authorities (in fact, not a single Administering Authority was represented on the Visiting Commission). Although it did not have a mandate to receive written petitions (this was still the prerogative of the Council), it was not prevented from investigating freely upon claims from the opposition parties. This was facilitated through its significantly larger membership, in contrast to the usual four-member composition of regular Visiting Missions. For this very reason, its report was much more significant than those of earlier regular Visiting Missions.

The Visiting Commission spent the entire month of June 1957 in French Togoland. Independence demonstrations and calls for new elections accompanied its stay in Lomé.

⁷⁴⁴ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), pp. 226–34.

⁷⁴⁵ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 232.

⁷⁴⁶ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 232.

⁷⁴⁷ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 245.

⁷⁴⁸ See T/L.754, “Togoland under French administration – India and United States of America: draft resolution,” available at TCOR 19th Session, Annex (T/19S/Annexes, *Agenda Item 3*, p. 50).

⁷⁴⁹ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 259.

⁷⁵⁰ TCOR, “19th Session” (1957), p. 262.

In Lomé, echoing the successful approach of former Governor Péchoux, Prime Minister Nicholas Grunitzky sought to securitise his efforts to dissuade the Commission's attendance at rallies of the opposition. He argued that, given the proximity to the frontier, "public order might be seriously threatened."⁷⁵¹ The Commission prevailed upon the Prime Minister not to insist upon his objections, and in the event no disorder whatsoever occurred.

On the day when the Commission attended the Legislative Assembly, the Government took considerable security measures to prevent the possibility of disturbances. Some representatives of the press were even excluded, and only a limited number of persons were permitted to attend the meeting. There were heavy police patrols in the town, but no serious incidents occurred. In general, the forces of order were present in reasonable numbers during the Commission's tour. In the halls of the Assembly itself, Robert Ajavon, President of the Legislative Assembly, expressed to the members of the UN Commission that the Legislative Assembly, then exclusively comprising members of pro-French parties, unanimously whished that the Assembly should not be dissolved and renewed, not so much out of fear of not being re-elected but out of "a desire to see the new Government and the new Legislative Assembly continue with their task in good circumstances and in social peace and security."⁷⁵² The Commission noted that these arguments "were repeated [...] by supporters of the Government throughout the country, not only in doubtful constituencies, but also in areas where there appeared to be a virtual certainty that the present members would be returned in a new election."⁷⁵³ In other words, the pro-French parties tried to prevent new elections by securitising them. Ajavon elaborated that...

"For a dependent country, gentlemen, there are two ways to win its independence: the one, brutal, bloody, destructive; the other, peaceful, based on patient negotiation in an atmosphere of good will and mutual understanding. We preferred the latter. And no one can blame us for that."⁷⁵⁴

But Ajavon's statements were soon to be overshadowed. On 20 June 1957, in Mango, in northern French Togoland, fistcuffs broke out between young supporters of a pro-government chief and a pro-opposition chief after the latter returned from a meeting with the Commission. As the conflict transitioned to the town's market square, supporters of the pro-government chief shot at the group of opposition members, killing one and seriously injuring four.⁷⁵⁵ Two days later, on 22 June 1957, another regrettable incident

⁷⁵¹ TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 53.

⁷⁵² TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 56.

⁷⁵³ TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 56.

⁷⁵⁴ TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 76.

⁷⁵⁵ ANT (Lomé), 2APA Mango – 48, *Administration Générale et Politique*, 1957, Letter N°27/c, Commandant de Cercle to Prime Minister, 21 June 1957, p. 3; TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United

occurred in northern Togoland, at Pya-Hodo, in the *circonscription* of Lama-Kara, as the result of which at least seven people lost their lives. According to the representatives of the Lama-Kara branches of Juvento and the CUT, the *commandant de circonscription* of Lama-Kara had threatened reprisals against nationalists who refused to take part in the manifestations organized by the local authorities. Juvento and CUT supporters responded by rioting, erecting road barricades, and throwing stones. The auxiliary police and a squad of local militia arrived on the scene. When by nightfall the *commandant de circonscription* tried to clear the barricades and have the rioters arrested, he was hit by an arrow and the order was given to shoot. The estimates of casualties range from an official figure of seven to unofficial reports of 14 killed, and 10 seriously wounded.⁷⁵⁶ Several members of Juvento and CUT were arrested and detained.

Two deputies representing the Kabré people of Lama-Kara as well as a report by the Prime Minister, Grunitzky, attributed the incident to local leaders of the CUT and Juvento, who, so it was claimed, had attempted to organize an insurrection against the local Government authorities.⁷⁵⁷ CUT and Juvento, of course, made use of the incidents by casting a bad light on the French Administering Authority, who in turn tried to argue that the presence of Visiting Missions was often a cause of violence between competing parties and should therefore be scaled back.

It was no use. In the section of the report on political freedoms, the Commission noted that "the relationship between opposing parties is marked by a certain bitterness and that in consequence the political situation in the Territory is somewhat tense."⁷⁵⁸ The Commission held the view that "in many areas opposition parties do not enjoy the same measure of political freedom of expression and assembly as do the pro-government parties. This is particularly so in the north of the Territory, where the opposition must reckon with the well-known objections and often public condemnations of traditional chiefs."⁷⁵⁹ Furthermore, the Commission considered that the presence of the armed forces and *gendarmerie* under French control was a substantial limitation on the autonomy enjoyed by Togoland. Clearly, the Commission was not convinced of the continued necessity of reserve powers possessed by the French High Commissioner.⁷⁶⁰

Beyond the question of political liberties, the Commission's report casted grave doubts on the French administration's liberalism on the voter registration and polling

Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 72; ILRM (New York Public Library), b. 12, *Togoland*, Daily Graphic, "Unificationists demonstrate in French Togoland", 27 June 1957.

756 Albert Menveyinou Alidou Djafalo commanded the platoon that perpetrated the Pya-Hodo massacre that would be commemorated by General Eyadema fifteen years later. After independence, Alidou Djafalo became one of Eyadema's closest friends and most trusted lieutenants – a key figure in the new military regime installed after the 1967 coup.

757 TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), pp. 71–72.

758 TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 59.

759 TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 59.

760 TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 58.

procedure. The Commission therefore followed Olympio's demand that new elections to the "representative organs in Togoland on the basis of universal suffrage would represent the implementation of an important democratic principle embodied in the Statute and might contribute towards the creation of a more favourable political atmosphere."⁷⁶¹

Overall the Commission concluded that the statute "represents a very significant step in the achievement of the objectives of Article 76 of the Charter and of the Trusteeship Agreement, has been broadly interpreted and liberally applied, and that in consequence Togoland possesses a large measure of internal autonomy or self-government."⁷⁶² On the other hand the Commission found that "there are still important restrictions by virtue of the retention of certain specified powers and competences."⁷⁶³ It was felt that "a trend of events had been set in motion which makes inevitable further broadening of the degree of autonomy achieved by towards full autonomy."⁷⁶⁴

The French for their part were furious with the report, which in their eyes...

"[...] would not miss discussing on the tribune not only the aspects of a conflict between the French Government and the Togolese but also the protests of the opposition, which would thus find the permanence of its means of complaint to an international body. A similar procedure was not foreseen in the incorporation of British Togo into Ghana, in order to preserve the hypothesis that the former British Togolese would no longer be willing to continue their life in a unitary state, and it is difficult to see the reasons for the adoption of a discriminatory measure against us in its very principle."⁷⁶⁵

The French grudgingly considered the admission of international arbitration and thus interference in what they considered an 'internal domain' to be a serious precedent, not only for trusteeship territories but also for territories that were in the process of gaining autonomy. French Togoland was by no means an isolated case and had to be considered in the context of all territories that were not yet fully self-governing.⁷⁶⁶

The Trusteeship Council's 7th Special Session

When the Trusteeship Council met at its 7th Special Session (1957) to discuss the Commission's report, the French delegate, Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, opened with a statement that the Statute would not enshrine the relationship between France and the Autonomous Republic of Togoland in an unalterable manner, but would remain fully evolutionary in character.⁷⁶⁷ Accordingly further amendments to the statute would be put into

⁷⁶¹ TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 59.

⁷⁶² TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 58.

⁷⁶³ TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 58.

⁷⁶⁴ TCOR, "7th Special Session: Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland under French Administration" (1958), p. 58.

⁷⁶⁵ ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/2182/5, *Royaume-Uni*, Commission d'Information, p. 2.

⁷⁶⁶ ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/2182/5, *Royaume-Uni*, Commission d'Information, p. 1.

⁷⁶⁷ TCOR, "7th Special Session" (1957), p. 2.

effect as soon as the Trusteeship Agreement was terminated. French Togoland's Minister of Finance, Georges Apedo-Amah, who came along as a member of the French delegation, added that "the residual powers still held by France had been transferred to Togoland, or in other words, as soon as the statute had come into full effect, the mission of the present Legislative Assembly could be regarded as completed."⁷⁶⁸ Therefore elections to it would be possible before the statutory date of renewal.

Photo 29: Apedo-Amah & Kosciusko-Morizet (12 September 1957)



Source: UN Photo.

After a lengthy wrangling over wording and amendments, the Council adopted an US resolution based primarily on the idea of an early general elections to establish a Legislative Assembly fully qualified to express its views on the future of the territory. The report of the Commission together with the work of the Council was transmitted to the General Assembly.

Fourth Committee Hearing (1957)

During the Fourth Committee's 12th Session (1957), Robert Ajavon, President of the Togoland Legislative Assembly and Georges Apedo-Amah, Togolese Minister of Finance, both appeared as members of the French delegation. Together with the French representative, Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, they expressed satisfaction with the Visiting Commission's report. They felt the time had come to complete Togoland's self-government by transferring the residual powers still vested in France and renewed the request to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. Ajavon stressed that "Togoland would need France's

768 TCOR, "7th Special Session" (1957), pp. 19–20.

economic and financial aid for several more years. The Government of Togoland realized that political independence without economic independence would be illusory and that premature independence could be harmful to the social structure of a country and detrimental to its development.”⁷⁶⁹ Ajavon proclaimed that the Togolese government was prepared to hold elections before the end of 1958 if the statute, that had been modified in March 1957, would be accepted fully and trusteeship be lifted automatically when the newly elected Legislative Assembly would meet for the first time.⁷⁷⁰ Ajavon thus indicated that the Togolese government was at least prepared to suspend the demand for a termination of trusteeship until 1958. Yet, the French representative, Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, on the other hand, continued to demand the immediate termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. He appealed to the members of the Committee...

“to consider the facts dispassionately and to cast aside out-dated ideas of colonialism and anticolonialism and of the arbitrary opposition of the so-called Administering Authorities to the so-called non-administering Powers. The problem to be settled was a human problem. The resolution to be adopted would affect human beings who had faith in the impartiality of the United Nations and would influence the future of a people. To a certain extent the prestige and influence of the United Nations were at stake when a decision was to be taken on so serious a subject.”⁷⁷¹

Photo 30: Akakpo & Ohin before 4th Committee (8 November 1957)⁷⁷²



Source: UN Photo.

769 GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 231.

770 GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 232.

771 GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 235.

772 André Akakpo (left, speaking), and Alexandre John Orin.

In the following, the Committee listened to the opposition: Alexandre John Ohin (MPT), André Akakpo (MPT), Anani Santos (Juvento) and Sylvanus Olympio (AEC). Santos went first. In his tame lawyerly style, he reiterated the plea for new elections and a rejection of the French proposal. Santos maintained that although the UN Commission had been dispatched at the invitation of the French Government, the latter appeared reluctant to accept its conclusions. He warned that the slight increase in autonomy granted in March 1957 was merely “to induce the United Nations to agree to the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.”⁷⁷³

Both Ohin and Akakpo expressed that continued trusteeship under the auspices of the United Nations was the only way for French Togoland to achieve ‘true’ independence and that the Trusteeship Agreement should therefore not be terminated before this goal was achieved.

Ohin proclaimed that the people of northern Togoland “were being deceived. The sanguinary incidents at Mango and Lama-Kara in June 1957 were sacrifices which only a desperate people would be willing to make.”⁷⁷⁴ He claimed that the opposition had refused to take part in the Government because “No true patriot could accept a post under a government whose deputies represented, not the majority of the people, but a minority upheld by a régime of intimidation, persecution and electoral fraud.”⁷⁷⁵ Accordingly the “question was not one of being pro- or anti-French, or even pro- or anti-colonialist: the question was whether a people which had reached maturity had the right to manage their own affairs, both domestic and foreign, and to give free expression to their views without fear of brutal oppression.”⁷⁷⁶ Akakpo protested against the premature termination of trusteeship and the referendum in French Togoland, which had not been supervised by the United Nations and had been marked by fraud and gerrymandering. He securitised the future statehood of Togo:

“[Under the new statute] Togoland still could not freely determine its domestic policies or its policy with regard to France and as it still participated, through representatives, in the functioning of the central organs of the French Republic, the danger of integration [into the French Republic] remained. The achievement of the goals of trusteeship was thus threatened [...] The members of the Government and the Togoland Legislative Assembly, who had not been elected by universal suffrage, were setting up a virtually dictatorial system in the Territory.”⁷⁷⁷

He described the difficulties in organising political meetings, as the authorities ordered the local chiefs to disrupt the opposition parties in their organisation, whereupon the *commandants de cercle* had these banned.⁷⁷⁸

⁷⁷³ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 236.

⁷⁷⁴ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 238.

⁷⁷⁵ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 238.

⁷⁷⁶ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 238.

⁷⁷⁷ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 239.

⁷⁷⁸ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 240.

Olympio maintained that “France had offered Togoland only a substitute for independence.”⁷⁷⁹ He claimed that:

“attempts on the part of political parties [...] to organise political rallies have met so far with the sternest of repressive measures, such as imprisonment, deportation and shooting down in cold blood. Some of these measures were taken directly by the French officers of the administration or indirectly through the African Chiefs who are Government Agents.”⁷⁸⁰

Photo 31: Santos & Olympio before 4th Committee (8 November 1957)



Source: UN Photo.

Olympio pointed out that the Commission reported that opposition rallies were held in private locations away from the city centre, while pro-French party rallies were mostly held in central public streets or squares. He demanded that political freedom should be restored, and all political parties should be enabled to exercise their right to freedom of expression, assembly, and movement. He also referred to the repressive measures in the wake of the shootings in Lama-Kara and Mango, in which, according to him, a total of 19 people died, whereafter “a reign of terror was unleashed in this otherwise peaceful district”⁷⁸¹ and several hundred were imprisoned as a result of the incident.

He pre-empted a retort by the French delegation, which would probably argue that the French Government was no longer responsible for the internal security of the country. Yet, Olympio underlined that “the Trusteeship Agreement was still in force.”⁷⁸² He deemed it inconceivable why Togolanders should “settle for anything less than indepen-

779 GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 240.

780 GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), “Circulated statement by Sylvanus Olympio”, p. 6.

781 GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), “Circulated statement by Sylvanus Olympio”, p. 7.

782 GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 240.

dence when their blood brothers and neighbours [in British Togoland] had attained it?”⁷⁸³ Therefore, the Fourth Committee should not accept Ajavon’s proposal to agree to the election of a new Legislative Assembly on the condition that all amendments to the Statute would have to be approved by the present Legislative Assembly, since this would defeat the very purpose of new elections.

The question-and-answer session that followed shows how the representatives of the Fourth Committee, especially those from the anti-colonial states, were drawn into the opposition’s securitising moves. The petitioners and the representatives engaged in a considerable number of brief exchanges on the disruption of political activities and on political persecution, violence, and imprisonment in French Togoland.⁷⁸⁴ It was obvious that the petitioners of the opposition parties made quite an impression on the representatives of the Fourth Committee. Yet, in one instance Santos expressed his disappointment in the exchanges at the UN:

“The only course open to the opposition, since it had renounced force or violence, was to appeal to the United Nations to organize free democratic elections under United Nations supervision. Those requests had been the object of various General Assembly resolutions, but as the desired result had not been obtained, they were renewed each year.”⁷⁸⁵

The Indonesian representative, Imam Abikusno, was interested in probing the securitisation move undertaken by Olympio and raised the question whether the agitation of the opposition parties had been deliberately fomented before the arrival of the UN Visiting Commission to create the impression that there was no peace and order in French Togoland. Olympio countered that his party had never agreed with the French authorities’ claim that visits by UN missions led to unrest. Rather, it had been the policy of the French authorities to discourage members of the Visiting Missions from attending rallies, on the (securitised) pretext that violence would occur. It was to the credit of the composition of the recent UN Visiting Commission, which unlike the regular Visiting Missions did not reflect a cross-section of the Trusteeship Council but of the Fourth Committee, that it had not been deterred by such threats and had participated in rallies without any disturbances.⁷⁸⁶

As foreseen by Olympio, at the end of the oral hearing, the French representative, Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, put the blame regarding the excessive use of repression on new government of the Autonomous Republic as he stated that “France did not wish to intervene in purely Togoland affairs.”⁷⁸⁷ Kosciusko-Morizet insisted that...

“the opposition which the petitioners represented was only a minority, and if the opposition in every country represented in the United Nations was invited to address the Committee he was sure that its remarks would often be more severely critical than

⁷⁸³ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 241.

⁷⁸⁴ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), pp. 242–55.

⁷⁸⁵ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 249.

⁷⁸⁶ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 251.

⁷⁸⁷ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 259.

those of the petitioners. It was not the function of the United Nations to help an opposition or a minority to gain power with the aid of the democratic system, but to promote the advancement of all territories.”⁷⁸⁸

The Syrian representative, Jawdat Mufti, responded to this statement by paying tribute to the petitioners. He regretted that there had been attempts to discredit them and thus interfere with the right to petition enshrined in the Charter.⁷⁸⁹

General Debate

In the general debate, it became clear that many anti-colonial representatives suspected that France's stance was dictated by the intention to preserve the possibility of incorporating Togoland into the French Union after the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. Yet, as a condition for this, the anti-colonial representatives insisted on new elections to the Legislative Assembly. The majority of the Fourth Committee agreed that terminating the Trusteeship Agreement before its objectives had been fully achieved was unacceptable and therefore considered Ajavon's condition that the Trusteeship Agreement be terminated automatically an ultimatum.⁷⁹⁰ Aware that the two-thirds majority required to lift the Trusteeship Agreement could not be obtained, France was forced to concede and declared in the Assembly that it would transfer all powers to the Togolese government except for defence, foreign policy and currency, and that the Legislative Assembly should be re-elected by universal adult suffrage in 1958, while the government of the Autonomous Republic invited the UN to supervise these elections.

Following this concession, the Fourth Committee quickly adopted an amended version of a five-power draft resolution that free UN-supervised elections would clarify the domestic political situation in Togoland and resolve the issues of statute revision as well as the termination of trusteeship.⁷⁹¹ Finally, the Haitian representative, Max Dorsinville, was elected as Commissioner for the supervision of the 1958 elections to the Togolese Legislative Assembly.

For once, both the unificationists and the French and Togolese governments were somewhat satisfied with the compromise which had been achieved at the UN. For the time being, the unificationists had succeeded in stopping the attempt to integrate Togoland into the French Union, and thus the door for genuine independence and reunification of the Ewe people had been pushed open again. The UN-supervised elections would provide the first opportunity since 1952 to demonstrate the real strength of their electorate.

On the other hand, the General Assembly resolution meant that the UN practically recognized the institutions of the Statute and was now finally committed to terminating the Trusteeship Agreement within a year, and France was quite confident that her protégé parties would return to power.

⁷⁸⁸ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 259.

⁷⁸⁹ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 260.

⁷⁹⁰ GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 232.

⁷⁹¹ A/C.4/L.508, submitted jointly by Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ireland and Liberia. GAOR, “12th Session: 4th Committee” (1957), p. 335; GAOR, “12th Session: Plenary” (1957), pp. 554–57.