

# Federal Language and Federal Realities

by Jan-Erik Lane

*Despite the popularity of federalism as a discourse, it is difficult to pin down what real federalism amounts to. Equating federalism with decentralization, democracy or consensus political culture is more rhetoric than observation upon the countries with a federal dispensation. A federal constitution introduces a duality between the nation-state and the provincial states, which comes with a cost in the form of increasing transaction costs, compared with a unitary framework. Supporting increasing political transaction costs is necessary in very large countries in order to arrive at political stability. But it may also result in stalemate and policy failure.*

*Obwohl sich der Föderalismusdiskurs einer gewissen Beliebtheit erfreut, stellt sich eine genaue Definition des Föderalismusbegriffs als schwierig dar. Eine schlichte Gleichsetzung von Föderalismus mit Dezentralisierung, Demokratie oder einer politischen Konsenskultur ist meist eher rhetorischer Natur denn von einem empirischen Blick auf föderal strukturierte Staaten geprägt. Eine föderalstaatliche Verfassung schafft eine Dualität aus Nationalstaat und Gliedstaaten, die sich von unitarischen Systemen vor allem durch höhere Transaktionskosten unterscheidet. Das Tragen dieser steigenden politischen Transaktionskosten erweist sich in überdurchschnittlich großen Staaten als notwendig, um politische Stabilität zu erreichen. Gleichzeitig können diese Kosten auch zum Stillstand bzw. zum Politikversagen führen.*

## I. Introduction

If it is true, as federalism claims, that federal states are superior to unitary states, then what could be the reason(s)? Federalism is often spoken about today, as new interstate arrangements like regionalism are looked upon as federalist institutions. Thus, *Hesse* and *Wright* early raised the question whether Europe was in the process of federalization, given the development of the European Union and the according variety of institutions – economic and otherwise.<sup>1</sup>

There exist and have existed a variety of federations or unions, of which some can be said to be successful. Scholars who argue the theory of federalism tend to focus on the existing big federal states in the world. They see the federal state

1 Hesse, J.J./Wright, V.: *Federalising Europe?*, Oxford, 1996.

format as the only feasible arrangement for these big countries, since a unitary dispensation could not work.

The aim of this paper is to examine the differences between a federal state and a unitary one in order to understand the mentioned claim of institutional superiority. Why would running a federal state result in better outcomes than running a unitary state, all other things being equal?

## II. What is the Essence of a Federal State?

Federalism employs a terminology of its own to identify the dispensation that it favours. Thus, a federal state most often signals that it is a federation and not a unitary republic in the preamble of the country constitution. Its central government is labeled the “federal” government and its provinces or regions are called “states”. If the constitutional language is different, can one also conclude that the political realities are different, comparing a federal state with a unitary one?

One may raise the question whether a country can be a real federal state, although it refrains from employing the federalist language. Two interesting cases are Spain and South Africa. There is no mentioning of key federalist terms in the constitutional documents of these two countries, but scholars have nevertheless included them among the federal states of the world. An explicitly federal dispensation was among the constitutional alternatives when the Republic of South Africa revised its basic law in the 1990s. Spain has made numerous constitutional amendments to its unitary framework, which may amount to a real federalization of the country, depending upon, of course, what a “real federal state” amounts to. Spain does not officially use federalist language, nor does the RSA.

It is also the case that there exist countries that call themselves “federal”, but one would hesitate to classify them so objectively. An example is the United Arab Emirates that lack all the kinds of institutions that go with federalism, being merely a union of traditional sheikdoms. Whether one is to call the Soviet Union a “federal” state depends upon what a real federal state is. This question of the essence of federalism has received several tentative answers, *inter alia*:

- *Political decentralization*: In a federal state, the provincial governments have list of competences that bolster their position in the political system.<sup>2</sup>

2 Hooghe, L./Marks, G./Schakel, A.N.: *The Rise of Regional Authority*, London, 2010.

Real federalism as decentralization is a hypothesis that needs corroboration from evidence about how federal states operate. It cannot be taken for granted that they are always less centralized than unitary states.

- *Democratisation*: A federal state tends towards democracy in one form or another, as it endorses both self-rule by the provinces and participation by the provinces in decision-making upon national government affairs.<sup>3</sup>  
The link between a federal dispensation of some sort and the democratic regime is a probabilistic one, to be established by means of empirical research. As a matter of fact, several countries that employ the federal language score low on standard democracy indices as well as the respect for human rights.
- *Consensus mechanism*: Federal institutions provide the provinces with a *say* in national decision-making through a second chamber in the legislature, thus increasing the need for supermajorities.<sup>4</sup>  
Federal states allow for the representation of their provinces in a federal chamber according to various modes of bicameralism. Symmetric bicameralism makes decision-making more complicated, as a positive decision may require not only a majority in the lower chamber but also a majority of some sort in the upper chamber. Whether more complex decision-making methods enhance political consensus or political stability is a question for research.
- *Veto players*: Federal legislatures tend to have considerable influence in national decision-making, being provided with a veto against either the national assembly or the president. The existence of veto players promotes political stability by hindering too quick decisions and cycling.<sup>5</sup>  
Again, this effect of federal institutions will have to be researched. A federal chamber may become so unrepresentative that it merely blocks national policy-making, which if lasting long may lead to stalemate and even political instability.

The often cited example of federalism as conducive to stalemate and minority protection of the status quo is federalism in Latin America,<sup>6</sup> especially the case of Brazil with its highly unrepresentative federal chamber.<sup>7</sup>

3 Elazar, D.: Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa, 1992.

4 Lijphardt, A.: Patterns of Democracy, New Haven, 1999.

5 Tsebelis, G.: Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton, 2002.

6 Gibson, E. (ed.): Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, Baltimore, 2004.

7 Stepan, A.: Electorally Generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems, in: Gibson, E. (ed.), op. cit., 323–361.

Two points may be made in relation to the distinction between federal language and federal reality:

- The use of federal language is not always a reliable sign of the occurrence of federalism.
- Real federalism may be conducive to decentralization, democratization, consensus and political stability, but these effects cannot be taken for granted.

Bypassing the use of federal language, one may look for the difference between a federal state and a unitary one in specific federal realities.

Federalism as a discourse in political theory offers a rosy picture of the federal dispensation with its many institutions on the basis of the assumption that they somehow promote positive outcomes. Little is mentioned in this discourse about the Achilles heel of federal political systems, namely the constant risk of sub-optimal policy outcomes and potential secession.

## II. Federal Duality

A real federal state has built into it some kind of legal duality, opposing the central government and the provincial governments. Provinces are not merely regions in the country, but they are constituent parts of the entire political organization, meaning they have a say on constitutional changes. Most federal countries handle this duality by calling the provinces “states”.

Whether the provinces are named states or not, they may have a variety of state characteristics. There is large variation in the institutional set-up of the provinces under a federal dispensation. However, one characteristic or property is essential, namely the aforementioned say in the process of constitutional amendment. This requires in turn some form of federal legislative chamber.

The states under a federal dispensation may have a variety of competences, as federal institutions vary greatly, although the number of states that call themselves “federal” is not large. Thus, one may analyse at length the complexity of rules pertaining to the following aspects:<sup>8</sup>

- Composition of the federal chamber

8 Watts, R. L.: Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations, in: Annual Review of Political Science, 1 (1998), 117–137.

- Recruitment of federal representatives
- Competences of the federal chamber in legislation and budgeting
- Role of the federal chamber in constitutional changes
- Strong role of the provinces in constitutional changes

The federal countries differ considerably in how they have structured these five institutional aspects. Moreover, federal institutions vary also in terms of the institutionalization of the various aspects of the provinces or “states” themselves. Among them:

- Own private law
- Own public law
- Own court system
- Own police forces
- Own language

Given the large diversity in the institutional set-up among real federal states – USA, Switzerland, Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Australia, India, Austria –, it is impossible to formulate an ideal-type of federalism. Each country has its style and format of federalism. But it can only call itself “federal” if it has a federal chamber whose participation is necessary in constitutional changes. The only exception to this rule the author is aware of is Canada.

Comparing the federal states with unitary ones, one finds no similar requirement in any of them. Constitutional changes are handled by the lower chamber with the possibility of a referendum. Unitary states may have a second chamber, but it is not “federal”, meaning representing the provinces as such. Instead, the second chamber either represents the people in the province on a proportional basis, or it is an appointed body like in the UK.

### III. Federal Anomalies

Countries that employ the federal language for self-designation do not display a coherent set of real federal institutions. On the contrary, we can observe not only institutional variety in real federalism but also some remarkable anomalies, meaning deviations from federal discourse.

Suppose one considers the US and Switzerland as benchmark models of real federalism, then some notable deviations may be pointed out:

- Australia: no provincial taxes
- Canada: no federal chamber

- Belgium: no territorial jurisdictions
- Germany: no federal chamber legislators
- UAE: no representative institutions
- Venezuela: no senate
- India: frequent federal emergency intervention
- Brazil: excessive provincial blocking power
- Federated States of Micronesia: unicameral legislature
- Comoros and St Kitts and Nevis: unicameral legislature

It is difficult to comprise this federal variation in a few clear cut distinctions like classical federalism, dualistic federalism, German federalism, etc.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps the small island states do not really constitute federal states at all, as the provinces are not at all “states” in the established sense.

#### IV. Regions, Provinces and States

In all political systems one can detect a division of competences between governments at various levels: central, regional and local. Unitary states handle this allocation of competences in various ways, sometimes with and sometimes without the enshrinement of autonomy for lower tiers of government. Unitary states sometimes employ the so-called prefectoral model in order to check that competencies are executed in accordance with law and central regulations. There may be asymmetric division of competencies, as unitary states engage in home rule for certain regions or provinces.

In federal systems, the provinces constitute states, meaning a stronger protection for their competences and autonomy. Federations vary as to how the competencies are specified: exclusive, concurrent and remaining competencies. Whereas unitary states may rely heavily upon local governments, federal states give the provincial governments the key role.

It is not true that unitary states are always centralized with few competencies, little autonomy and close surveillance for the lower tiers of government. There may be substantial regional or local government autonomy without any *prefecture*. Why, then, opt for federalism?

<sup>9</sup> Majeed, A./Watts, D.L./Brown, D. M. (eds.): Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, Toronto, 2006.

## V. The Implications of Size

It has been argued that federalism derives its plausibility from historical circumstances, such as external threat, internal heterogeneity, or ethnic diversity. These reasons for turning to the federal alternative instead of the more often occurring unitary framework are sometimes relevant but can hardly be generalised. What one cannot fail to observe when looking at real federal countries is the fact that they are large, population wise or in terms of territorial size. There are certainly a few exceptions, but it holds that most very large states have a federal dispensation. Why?

The operation of federal duality results in considerable costs: multiple constitutions, several governments, administrative complications etc. Size allows these costs to be spread out either per capita or per square kilometer. These complexity costs may be supportable when compared to the benefits in terms of organizational stability at the provincial level.

Unitary states also employ regional or local governments. There are regional or local assemblies, directly elected, resulting in a government of some kind. However, these regional or local governments are not clothed in the same strong legal framework as the states in federal countries. Their existence is regulated in the constitution and in ordinary legislation, where these governments enjoy no veto powers. Thus, changes are not difficult to make in their structure or functions, independent of whether they have a say. This low level of entrenchment may be unacceptable for large territories.

Moreover, the unitary language differs from the federal language in a manner that reflects the weaker constitutional recognition of the unitary provinces or regions compared with the federal ones. Thus, the leader of the regional or local government is not typically designated “Premier” or “Governor”. However, it would be a mistake to believe that unitary states provide a substantial direct central government administration at the regional or local level. Such forms of so-called deconcentration may occur but they co-exist with various forms of political decentralization in the sense of policy-making by directly elected regional assemblies.

In the Appendix, the size – population as well as area – of federal states is presented. Spain and South Africa are included in the group of federal states due to their regional bodies having a say in constitutional revisions, while the UAE, Sudan, Iraq, Myanmar and Ethiopia as well as Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the rumps of the Yugoslavian federal state, are bypassed.

Looking at a current list of federations, one can observe that most federal states are very large entities. Only a few unitary states show the same immense size measures. The reason of erecting a federal state seems to be more linked with size than to foreign threat or social and cultural diversity.

Relating these federations to standard indices on human rights and democracy after 1945, one may note that a federal dispensation does not guarantee democracy, as indicated in several countries in Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia.

## VI. Established Explanations of Federalist Institutions

A federation of states is typically constructed when there is a special reason, such as foreign threat or internal division. War, or the threat of war, was underlined by *Riker*, but this seems more of historical than systematic relevance. Perhaps the military ambitions of Imperial Japan played a role in the making of Australia, but war or military threat has no relevance for understanding the strong support for the maintenance of the Australian federation. The *Riker* argument seems completely out of place for the making of Nigeria and post-apartheid South Africa or recent Spanish developments.<sup>10</sup>

The cleavage explanation of federalism targets the implications of severe regional tensions in the social structure in combination with explicit institutional attempts to deal with them. Thus, ethnic (or perhaps even religious) tensions may be accommodated within a federal dispensation, allowing for a state comprising several nations, such as India, Belgium and Nigeria.

Yet, this argument only begs the question whether social heterogeneity is conducive to federalism. After all, ethnically or religiously divided societies may opt for the creation of several unitary states, like in Former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Holding together a federation based upon ethnic or religious cleavages may actually only be possible when there is a one party state that assures uniform direction. Such a party system lacking, as in the Soviet Union, the federation may succumb to secession.

One may expect the federal discourse to become an institutional legacy in a country where federalism works. However, historical evidence indicates that

<sup>10</sup> *Riker, W.*: Federalism, in: *Greenstein, F./Polsby, N.* (eds.): *Handbook of Political Science*, vol 5., 1975, 93–172.

“once federal, always federal” is not a valid rule. Federations do fail, are dissolved or undergo slow but distinct institutional change.

The basic reasons for maintaining a federal state are not so much foreign threat or internal cleavages but the economic and political implications of an immense state size. On the other hand, not all large “unions” constitute federations.

## **VII. Not all Unions are Federal States**

One may discuss whether the European Union is a federation in the same sense as e.g. the USA or Canada. If the EU could be called “federal”, then perhaps other forms of regional co-operation would also qualify for this label, such as ASEAN and UNASUR. However, this would blur the distinction between federations and confederations, which retains its validity. To capture the distinctive features of a federal state, one must bypass both external forces and internal social cleavages and target costs in political organization.

## **VIII. Federalism and Transaction Costs**

When a country is small or medium sized, then the unitary dispensation would be the normal case. An exception are the small island countries where only a federation could work, since several unitary states would simply be too costly to run – cf. the example of Micronesia, the Comoros or Saint-Kitts and Nevis.

When countries are huge – population-wise or in area, then there seems to be a choice. A federal constitution outlines a political system with some form of duality between the nation-state and the provincial states. This duality may promote the rule of law and democracy, but it may also lead to inertia, dead-lock and stalemate.

Federalism increases transaction costs in order to institutionalize this duality between the central government and the provincial states. Whether higher transaction costs promote democratic stability or hinders it is, however, an open question.

Political decision-making may minimize transaction costs by employing a unitary framework with a one chamber legislature for budgeting, taxation and law making. It may structure the state in two or three levels of government to secure the implementation of national government policies. Federal states increase transaction costs by operating two states: one nation-state and a set of provincial states. Transaction costs will be maximized when the provincial states constitute veto players with a definitive say over all national government policies by means

of a Senate, based upon symmetrical bicameralism with equal representation of all provinces, independently of population size.

## IX. Advantages and Disadvantages of Higher Transaction Costs

Federalist scholars argue that a federal dispensation is worthwhile, despite the increasing transaction costs. They refer mainly to democratic stability and political decentralization. However, some deplore the inertia that federalism may be conducive to. Thus, *Scharpf* speaks of a “joint decision trap” that federalist arrangements create for both the national government and the provincial governments – a stalemate in the Senate when the lower chamber adheres to one political will but the upper chamber follows another.<sup>11</sup> At the same time he speaks about an omnipresent drive towards *Politikverflechtung*, meaning the unavoidable linking together of the national government and the provincial governments on many policy issues, not only in federal political systems.

Federal transaction costs seem to make sense in very large countries but hardly elsewhere. In big states there is a need for regions to enjoy political stability in the form of constitutionally protected provincial governments. They may respond to regional political wills, thus making decentralization workable. However, federalism runs the constant danger of regions obstructing the national government and even calling for secession.

What federalist theory claims is that there are limits to economies of scale in political organization. When a country is huge, then making the regions into provincial states may be an attractive option in constitutional design. Yet, as complexity arises with the entrenchment of federalist institutions, so do transaction costs increase.

## X. The Provincial Veto

The essence of a real federal state is the veto – individual or collective – of the provinces in relation to federal government decision-making, either generally or with regard to constitutional revisions. Federalism implies state duality, as provincial states are embedded within a nation-state, thus pitting provincial governments against a federal or central government.

State duality may be conducive to decentralization, democracy and political stability. But these outcomes cannot be taken for granted. It depends upon the

11 *Scharpf, F.*: Games Real Actors Play, Boulder, 1997.

existing political forces in the country. The shape of the *party system* has a major impact upon how the rules of federalism play out, like for instance in Venezuela.<sup>12</sup> If there is a dominant party nationally or regionally, then the institutions of federalism may not deliver what their adherents hope for.

## XI. Conclusion

Federalist theory makes somewhat arrogant claims on behalf of a federal dispensation, stating that it performs better than a unitary one. Skeptical analysts, such as *Riker*, pointed out early that the evidence hardly supports such contentious statements.<sup>13</sup>

Federalist theory faces some ambiguities. On the one hand there is federal language and on the other hand there are federal realities. They do not always match.

Federalism implies the belief that federalist institutions outperform unitary institutions. When implemented, however, a federal dispensation does not always deliver outcomes like democratic stability, political decentralization and policy flexibility. One may argue the other way around, namely that unitarism is the normal case (some 180 states of the world), federalism the exception (some 20 states). Federal institutions make sense in larger and often sub-divided countries.

Institutionalists sometimes launch an argument in favour of federalism ahead of unitarism. However, the positive federal outcomes are probabilistic in nature. How real federalism plays out depends not only upon how the federal institutions are framed but also upon how the political preferences of the *demos* are aggregated and transformed in the party system. Thus, federalism under one-party dominance is very different from federalism under a competitive party system. The federal discourse certainly holds universal appeal, but real federalism makes sense only in very large countries due to the inherent political organization costs.

12 *Penfold-Becerra, M.*: Federalism and Institutional Change in Venezuela, in: *Gibson, E.* (ed.), op. cit., 107–225.

13 *Riker, W.*, op. cit.

## Appendix: Federalism, Population and Area

Country	Federation?*	Population (mn.; 2000)	Population (log <sub>e</sub> ; 2000)	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Area (log <sub>e</sub> )
India	1	1.008,90	6,92	3.151.251,0	14,96
United States	1	283,20	5,65	9.400.722,0	16,06
Brazil	1	170,40	5,14	8.420.640,0	15,95
Russian Federation	1	145,50	4,98	16.600.000,0	16,62
Pakistan	1	141,30	4,95	871.273,6	13,68
Nigeria	1	113,90	4,74	908.399,1	13,72
Mexico	1	98,90	4,59	1.923.122,0	14,47
Germany	1	82,00	4,41	349.898,0	12,77
Ethiopia	1	62,90	4,14	1.135.775,0	13,94
South Africa	1	43,30	3,77	1.226.429,0	14,02
Spain	1	39,90	3,69	485.472,7	13,09
Argentina	1	37,00	3,61	2.775.401,0	14,84
Canada	1	30,80	3,43	9.590.309,0	16,08
Venezuela, RB	1	24,20	3,19	929.507,1	13,74
Malaysia	1	22,20	3,10	323.151,4	12,69
Australia	1	19,10	2,95	7.662.592,0	15,85
Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia)	1	10,70	2,37	88.010,5	11,39
Belgium	1	10,20	2,32	31.318,3	10,35
Austria	1	8,10	2,09	84.905,6	11,35
Switzerland	1	7,20	1,97	41.452,4	10,63
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	3,80	1,34	51.385,3	10,85
United Arab Emirates	1	2,60	0,96	102.580,3	11,54
Comoros	1	0,50	-0,69	2.200,0	7,70
Micronesia	1	0,10	-2,30	700,0	6,55
St Kitts and Nevis	1	0,04	-3,22	400,0	5,99
China	0	1.275,10	7,15	9.344.594,0	16,05
Indonesia	0	212,10	5,36	1.697.375,0	14,34
Bangladesh	0	137,40	4,92	135.886,9	11,82
Japan	0	127,10	4,84	358.359,0	12,79
Vietnam	0	78,10	4,36	333.167,8	12,72
Philippines	0	75,70	4,33	232.172,8	12,36
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0	70,30	4,25	1.614.726,0	14,29
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0	67,90	4,22	1.000.480,0	13,82
Turkey	0	66,70	4,20	790.418,8	13,58
Thailand	0	62,80	4,14	506.001,2	13,13
United Kingdom	0	59,40	4,08	219.140,8	12,30
France	0	59,20	4,08	550.787,7	13,22
Italy	0	57,50	4,05	296.127,4	12,60
Congo, Kinshasa	0	50,90	3,93	2.346.334,0	14,67
Ukraine	0	49,60	3,90	586.548,7	13,28
Burma-Myanmar	0	47,70	3,86	656.424,2	13,39
Korea, Rep.	0	46,70	3,84	91.306,0	11,42
Colombia	0	42,10	3,74	1.153.540,0	13,96
Poland	0	38,60	3,65	305.676,3	12,63
Tanzania	0	35,10	3,56	944.552,2	13,76
Sudan	0	31,10	3,44	2.507.269,0	14,73

Country	Federation?*	Population (mn.; 2000)	Population (log.; 2000)	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Area (log. e)
Kenya	0	30,70	3,42	597.289,1	13,30
Algeria	0	30,30	3,41	2.309.484,0	14,65
Morocco	0	29,90	3,40	411.474,1	12,93
Afghanistan	0	25,90	3,25	646.212,0	13,38
Peru	0	25,70	3,25	1.302.897,0	14,08
Uzbekistan	0	24,90	3,21	445.830,2	13,01
Uganda	0	23,30	3,15	240.491,6	12,39
Nepal	0	23,00	3,14	147.402,7	11,90
Iraq	0	22,70	3,12	441.138,6	13,00
Romania	0	22,40	3,11	231.660,4	12,35
Taiwan	0	22,20	3,10	32.920,3	10,40
Korea, Dem. Rep.	0	21,60	3,07	126.959,7	11,75
Saudi Arabia	0	20,30	3,01	1.912.761,0	14,46
Ghana	0	19,30	2,96	235.516,0	12,37
Sri Lanka	0	18,90	2,94	61.956,2	11,03
Mozambique	0	18,30	2,91	781.072,6	13,57
Yemen, Rep.	0	18,30	2,91	391.374,2	12,88
Kazakhstan	0	16,20	2,79	2.707.851,0	14,81
Syrian Arab Republic	0	16,20	2,79	193.961,3	12,18
Cote d'Ivoire	0	16,00	2,77	313.565,6	12,66
Madagascar	0	16,00	2,77	579.021,4	13,27
Netherlands	0	15,90	2,77	32.983,4	10,40
Chile	0	15,20	2,72	668.868,7	13,41
Cameroon	0	14,90	2,70	463.006,3	13,05
Angola	0	13,10	2,57	1.235.014,0	14,03
Cambodia	0	13,10	2,57	182.318,4	12,11
Ecuador	0	12,60	2,53	248.705,8	12,42
Zimbabwe	0	12,60	2,53	394.272,1	12,88
Burkina Faso	0	11,50	2,44	276.522,2	12,53
Guatemala	0	11,40	2,43	108.418,3	11,59
Mali	0	11,40	2,43	1.249.355,0	14,04
Malawi	0	11,30	2,42	110.956,3	11,62
Cuba	0	11,20	2,42	100.428,7	11,52
Niger	0	10,80	2,38	1.182.223,0	13,98
Greece	0	10,60	2,36	105.139,9	11,56
Zambia	0	10,40	2,34	760.305,1	13,54
Czech Republic	0	10,30	2,33	80.165,0	11,29
Belarus	0	10,20	2,32	205.718,3	12,23
Hungary	0	10,00	2,30	95.568,6	11,47
Portugal	0	10,00	2,30	93.102,5	11,44
Tunisia	0	9,50	2,25	155.244,6	11,95
Senegal	0	9,40	2,24	211.298,5	12,26
Sweden	0	8,80	2,17	433.618,7	12,98
Dominican Republic	0	8,40	2,13	45.356,8	10,72
Bolivia	0	8,30	2,12	1.090.806,0	13,90
Guinea	0	8,20	2,10	253.825,2	12,44
Haiti	0	8,10	2,09	25.683,4	10,15
Azerbaijan	0	8,00	2,08	87.881,2	11,38
Bulgaria	0	7,90	2,07	119.438,6	11,69
Chad	0	7,90	2,07	1.268.417,0	14,05

Country	Federalization?*	Population (mn.; 2000)	Population (log <sub>e</sub> ; 2000)	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Area (log <sub>e</sub> )
Rwanda	0	7,60	2,03	27.283,8	10,21
Somalia	0	7,30	1,99	639.620,6	13,37
Hong Kong, China	0	6,90	1,93	1.040,0	6,95
Burundi	0	6,40	1,86	28.289,8	10,25
Honduras	0	6,40	1,86	113.208,0	11,64
Benin	0	6,30	1,84	116.045,6	11,66
El Salvador	0	6,30	1,84	20.886,1	9,95
Tajikistan	0	6,10	1,81	146.659,2	11,90
Israel	0	6,00	1,79	31.135,0	10,35
Paraguay	0	5,50	1,70	402.937,7	12,91
Slovak Republic	0	5,40	1,69	47.843,8	10,78
Denmark	0	5,30	1,67	32.407,5	10,39
Georgia	0	5,30	1,67	72.279,4	11,19
Lao PDR	0	5,30	1,67	231.129,8	12,35
Libya	0	5,30	1,67	1.618.321,0	14,30
Finland	0	5,20	1,65	333.517,9	12,72
Nicaragua	0	5,10	1,63	121.810,7	11,71
Jordan	0	4,90	1,59	89.520,5	11,40
Kyrgyz Republic	0	4,90	1,59	196.275,6	12,19
Papua New Guinea	0	4,80	1,57	422.882,3	12,95
Croatia	0	4,70	1,55	53.732,7	10,89
Turkmenistan	0	4,70	1,55	476.077,4	13,07
Norway	0	4,50	1,50	349.504,6	12,76
Togo	0	4,50	1,50	60.296,6	11,01
Sierra Leone	0	4,40	1,48	69.097,9	11,14
Moldova	0	4,30	1,46	32.540,9	10,39
Costa Rica	0	4,00	1,39	50.525,3	10,83
Singapore	0	4,00	1,39	632,6	6,45
Armenia	0	3,80	1,34	30.643,8	10,33
Ireland	0	3,80	1,34	67.816,9	11,12
New Zealand	0	3,80	1,34	249.003,8	12,43
Central African Repu	0	3,70	1,31	631.687,8	13,36
Lithuania	0	3,70	1,31	64.801,6	11,08
Lebanon	0	3,50	1,25	10.254,4	9,24
Uruguay	0	3,30	1,19	175.471,3	12,08
Albania	0	3,10	1,13	27.900,0	10,24
Liberia	0	3,10	1,13	91.042,6	11,42
Congo, Brazza	0	3,00	1,10	329.168,3	12,70
Panama	0	2,90	1,06	73.322,3	11,20
Mauritania	0	2,70	0,99	1.022.853,0	13,84
Jamaica	0	2,60	0,96	9.036,6	9,11
Mongolia	0	2,50	0,92	1.558.417,0	14,26
Oman	0	2,50	0,92	309.426,8	12,64
Latvia	0	2,40	0,88	62.352,9	11,04
Bhutan	0	2,10	0,74	38.303,9	10,55
Lesotho	0	2,00	0,69	30.448,0	10,32
Macedonia, FYR	0	2,00	0,69	25.823,0	10,16
Slovenia	0	2,00	0,69	20.440,8	9,93
Kuwait	0	1,90	0,64	16.132,8	9,69
Namibia	0	1,80	0,59	802.492,1	13,60

Country	Federation?*	Population (mn.; 2000)	Population (log.; 2000)	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Area (log e)
Botswana	0	1,50	0,41	589.403,2	13,29
Estonia	0	1,40	0,34	38.744,7	10,56
Trinidad and Tobago	0	1,30	0,26	4.857,0	8,49
Gabon	0	1,20	0,18	255.991,3	12,45
Mauritius	0	1,20	0,18	1.860,0	7,53
East Timor	0	1,00	0,00	15.000,0	9,62
Bahrain	0	0,70	-0,36	700,0	6,55
Qatar	0	0,60	-0,51	10.104,6	9,22
Luxembourg	0	0,40	-0,92	2.696,4	7,90
Iceland	0	0,30	-1,20	100.376,3	11,52

\* Federalism according to *Watts* 1999: Federal = 1, Unitary = 0.