

2. Theoretical and Historical Framework

In the following chapter I will situate the topic of the study in a broader theoretical and historical context. I will introduce the concepts of citizenship and gender, which constitute the theoretical framework guiding this study, and provide an overview of their central assumptions, by highlighting the current state of research. In the first part, I will briefly outline the actual debate around citizenship and its specific historical development in Brazil in order to illustrate the existence of a differentiated citizenship and its implications. Afterwards, I will introduce the city as the context, framework, and social space within which this citizenship is constantly contested and negotiated.

In the second part, I will elaborate on the actual debate around gender, and argue for focusing on the processes of its construction—by introducing the concept of “doing gender”—before examining some concrete interactions in everyday life situations, and sketching out domestic relations and structures in urban Brazil. Finally, in the last part of the chapter, I will show how closely linked the concepts of citizenship and gender are in theory and practice. After demonstrating feminist concerns with citizenship, I will go more into detail on the specific interdependence of citizenship and gender in the case of Latin America, focusing on women’s engagement in popular urban movements and the reasons behind their involvement in citizenship activities, as well as on the impacts of their agency.

2.1 CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship, then, is an intellectual and political tradition that has been repeatedly revisited and updated and, therefore, today consists of a string of citizenship discourses.¹

There are various understandings of citizenship. In the past few decades there has been an increased interest in the study of citizenship, and as a result a remarkable amount of academic work about it has emerged, leading to the establishment of the field of so-called “citizenship studies”² in the 1990s.³ Alterations in social, economic, and cultural conditions, defined by Turner and Isin as “postmodernization” or “globalization,” made the articulation of new claims for citizenship rights possible and caused “an urgent need to rethink the political agent or subject under these transformations.”⁴ In Latin America, and elsewhere, processes like (re-)democratization and its consolidation, the experiences and struggles of social movements, migration, and many other manifestations of so-called globalization led to an increasing adoption of the Western notion of citizenship in the scientific and political vocabulary.⁵ Referring to the reasons behind the increased use of the term, sociologist Maxine Molyneux summarizes that citizenship

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- 1 Shafir, Gershon. 1998. “Introduction. The Evolving Tradition of Citizenship” in *The Citizenship Debates. A Reader*, edited by G. Shafir. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 2.
 - 2 Isin and Turner emphasize that although citizenship studies “is not yet an institutionalized field, it has established itself as a *de facto* field in the humanities and social science in the 1990s” (Isin, Engin F. and Bryan S. Turner. 2011. “Citizenship Studies. An Introduction” in *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, edited by E. F. Isin and B. S. Turner. Los Angeles: SAGE, p. 1).
 - 3 Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*, p. 1; Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. “Women, Citizenship and Difference”, *Citizenship: Pushing the Boundaries. Feminist Review* (57): 4; Shafir 1998, Introduction, p. 1.
 - 4 Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*, p. 1.
 - 5 Dagnino, Evelina. 2007. “Dimensions of Citizenship in Contemporary Brazil”, *Fordham Law Review*, 75 (5): 2469; Shafir 1998, Introduction, pp. 1f; Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*, p. 1; Sojo, Carlos. 2002. “The idea of citizenship in the Latin American debate”, *Cepal Review* (76): 26.

not only signifies a way of problematising the politics and policies of liberal democracy, the dominant political form in the modern world, but it can encompass a wide range of social and political issues raised by the new post-Cold War international and national context. Citizenship provides a political language for thinking about broader questions of social membership which have been sharply reposed by global trends such as migration, nationalism, indigenous claims and social marginalization.⁶

Thus, social movements formulated their struggle for crucial social issues, inclusion, and recognition in the language of rights and obligations—in the language of citizenship—and “found in the concept of citizenship not only a useful tool for their specific struggles, but also a powerful articulating link among them.”⁷ The concept of citizenship allowed social movements to overcome their prior isolation due to their great number and diversity, and to embed their different priorities and demands in a general struggle for the expansion of democracy.⁸

The ongoing academic debate over citizenship has focused on its various aspects and traditions. In the following chapter, therefore, I will first highlight the principal elements and topics of the ongoing theoretical debate on citizenship, and then turn my attention to the specific example of Brazil and its historical development of citizenship, before finally embedding it in the urban context.

2.1.1 The Citizenship Debate

One central element of the citizenship debate in Latin America, and elsewhere, has been the discussion about whether citizenship refers only to a *legal status* of membership in a nation-state, or whether it is also “a *social process* through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights.”⁹ The two aspects are closely related, and it is very important to

6 Molyneux, Maxine. 2001, *Women’s Movements in International Perspective*. Latin America and Beyond, New York: Palgrave, p.163.

7 Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*, p. 1; Dagnino 2007, *Dimensions of Citizenship in Contemporary Brazil*, p. 2469.

8 Dagnino, Evelina. 2003. “Citizenship in Latin America. An Introduction”, *Latin American Perspectives*, 30 (2): 212.

9 Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*, p. 4; Isin, Engin F. 2008. “Theorizing Acts of Citizenship” in *Acts of Citizenship*, edited by E. F. Isin and G. M. Nielsen. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 16; Isin, Engin F. 2009. “Citizenship in a Flux. The Figure of the Activist Citizen”, *Subjectivity* (29): 369.

understand that the legal status entails processes and practices of negotiating, contesting, and broadening the content and character of given rights, and *vice versa*. Even though most studies agree on this fact, they still make an abstract separation and focus either on citizenship as status, or citizenship as practice.¹⁰ While studies which concentrate more on the former are mostly about membership, for instance, based on legal definitions of nationality,¹¹ studies paying more attention to citizenship as a practice normally analyze “new subjects, sites and scales of claim making,”¹² such as social movements and their claims, negotiations and struggles for equal access to rights. However, the case of social movements also shows how citizenship as membership and citizenship as process overlap and intersect. As we can see for example in the housing movements in Brazil, their formal membership of the political community is not questioned, but their access to and negotiation of the rights associated with that membership status are.

In the context of differentiating between citizenship as a formal legal status and citizenship as a process and practice, scholars have also differentiated between *substantive* and *formal* citizenship. Especially in the field of sociology there has been a great interest in studying and focusing on substantive citizenship by looking at the concrete patterns of inclusion and exclusion within the nation-state.¹³ According to Brubaker substantive citizenship is “[t]hat which constitutes citizenship—the array of rights or the pattern of participation,”¹⁴ and Bauböck affirms that it is “the particular nature of the relation [between individual and state] itself and the characterization of both individuals and states implied in it. We can, for example, describe this relation as a transaction of rights and obligations.”¹⁵

10 Isin 2009, *Citizenship in a Flux*; Isin 2008, *Theorizing Acts of Citizenship*, p. 17.

11 For example Bauböck, Rainer, Eva Ersbøll, C. A. Groenendijk, and Harald Waldrauch, editors. 2006, *Comparative Analyses*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

12 For example Isin 2008, *Theorizing Acts of Citizenship*, p. 17.

13 Brubaker, William R. 1990. “Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany” Dissertation, Columbia University, New York, pp. 37f; Isin 2008, *Theorizing Acts of Citizenship*, p. 17.

14 Brubaker 1990, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France*, p. 36.

15 Bauböck, Rainer. 1994, *Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International Migration*, Aldershot: Elgar, p. 23.

This suggests that it is important not only to look at the formal status or “rights in theory” but also at the ability to “exercise rights in practice,”¹⁶ because formal and substantive citizenship are hardly separable, and inform one another. When researching the civic struggles and demands of certain groups in society, like social movements, the gap between formal and substantive citizenship becomes obvious and one can observe exactly how rights are configured, and in what ways people try to shape and negotiate their inclusion.¹⁷ Accordingly, Isin and Turner state that “[b]eing politically engaged means practicing substantive citizenship, which in turn implies that members of a polity always struggle to shape its fate.”¹⁸ The possibility of a discrepancy between formal and substantive citizenship means, “[t]hat formal citizenship is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for substantive citizenship of either kind.” Brubaker explains that even though possessing formal state-membership people can be excluded from social, civil, and political rights, and that formal membership is a necessary condition for some, but not for all components of substantive citizenship. As an example of the latter he points to social rights, which are also obtainable for non-citizens.¹⁹

Most scholars build their definition of citizenship on the work of sociologist T.H. Marshall who formulated his assumptions about citizenship in the context of the postwar creation of the British welfare state. For Marshall, citizenship is “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.”²⁰

In his famous article “Citizenship and Social Class” from 1950, Marshall traced back the development of citizenship in Britain to the eighteenth century and divided citizenship into three “elements,” or, as Shafir calls them, “generations” of citizenship rights, namely political, social, and civil.²¹ In his analysis of citizenship, in the eighteenth century the *civil* element—“the rights necessary for individual freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech,

16 Glenn, Nakano E. 2011. “Constructing Citizenship. Exclusion, Subordination, and Resistance”, *American Sociological Review*, 76 (1): 3.

17 Brubaker 1990, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France*, p. 36.

18 Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*, p. 4.

19 Brubaker 1990, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France*, pp. 36f.

20 Marshall, T. H. 2009. “Citizenship and Social Class” in *Inequality and Society. Social Science Perspectives on Social Stratification*, edited by J. Manza and M. Sauder. New York: Norton, First published in 1950. pp. 149f.

21 Marshall 2009, *Citizenship and Social Class*, p. 148; Shafir 1998, Introduction, p. 14.

thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice”—developed first, and then the *political* element—“the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body” followed in the nineteenth century. Finally, Marshall explains, the twentieth century provided *social* rights—“the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society,” in “equal partnership” with civil and political rights.²²

Marshall’s notion and discussion of social rights especially has since then become an object of intense debate regarding social citizenship.²³ For him, the emergence of social rights in the historical development of citizenship “was necessary, to transform formal rights into *substantive* ones; only with adequate economic and social resources would individuals be able to exercise civil and political rights.”²⁴ Marshall emphasized the expansion and “progress” of citizenship over time and the associated inclusion of new actors into society.²⁵ He complains that civil and political rights had no effect on social inequality and he argues that the inclusion of the poor, and “class-abatement” can therefore only be achieved by social rights: “It [social rights] has assumed the guise of action modifying the whole pattern of social inequality.”²⁶ The importance of social rights for democracy is highlighted not only by Marshall, but also by other authors.²⁷ As Peter Dwyer for example accurately summarizes: “Rights, and in particular social or welfare rights as they were often referred to, are central to the idea of citizenship. They help to define the extent and quality of a citizen’s

22 Marshall 2009, *Citizenship and Social Class*, pp. 148f.

23 Fraser, Nancy and Linda Gordon. 1998. “Contract versus Charity. Why Is There No Social Citizenship in the United States?” in *The Citizenship Debates. A Reader*, edited by G. Shafir. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 115.

24 Glenn, Evelyn N. 2002, *Unequal Freedom. How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 19.

25 Marshall 2009, *Citizenship and Social Class*, p. 153. He refers in his case to the English working class.

26 *Ibid.*

27 “The precise combination and depth of such rights [civil, political, social] vary from one state to another but a modern democratic state is expected to uphold a combination of citizenship rights and obligation” (Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*, p. 3); “there can be no democratic citizenship without social rights” (Fraser et al. 1998, *Contract versus Charity*, p. 126).

substantive welfare entitlements and are also often the focus of wider welfare debates and struggles.”²⁸

Though most scholars recognize the importance of Marshall’s work and mainly build on his division of citizenship into three “elements,” his work has also been object of intense criticism in historical and normative debates: The first criticism concerns the fact that Marshall treated citizenship in his historical analysis of its development as a uniform concept by taking the case of Britain as a universal model.²⁹ But what Marshall might assume for the case of Britain is not necessarily true for the development of citizenship in other countries, as Yashar and other scholars show for example for Latin America.³⁰ Here, for example, corporatist regimes in the mid-twentieth century extended social rights, but did not necessarily promote political rights.³¹ Accordingly, Holston emphasizes: “Rather, the spread, timing and substance of citizenship vary substantially with historical and national context.”³²

The second criticism of Marshall is connected to the first, and refers to his description of a progressive, linear, and cumulative expansion of citizenship rights. Many scholars do not support such a “homogenous expansion” and draw attention to the lack of analysis “of the causal mechanisms that produced an expansion of citizenship.”³³ Interestingly, in Britain, too, such an expansion of citizenship rights was not the case for all parts of the population. Women, for example, were denied many of the characteristics of full political and civil citizenship in Britain before 1928 (see also section 2.3.1). Researching the example of the United States, Nakano Glenn also criticizes Marshall’s

28 Dwyer, Peter. 2010, *Understanding Social Citizenship. Themes and Perspectives for Policy and Practice*, Bristol: Policy, p. 5.

29 Turner, Bryan S. 2001. “The Erosion of Citizenship”, *British Journal of Sociology*, 52 (2): 191; Shafir 1998, Introduction, p. 15.

30 See for example Carvalho, José M. de. 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil. O Longo Caminho*, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, Goirand, Camille. 2003. “Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil”, *Latin American Perspectives*, 30 (2): 22 or Assies, Willem, Calderón, Marco A. and Ton Salman. 2002. “Ciudadanía cultura política y reforma del estado en América Latina. Citizenship, political culture and reform of the State in Latin America”, *América Latina Hoy* (32): 58ff.

31 Yashar, Deborah J. 1999. “Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America”, *World Politics*, 52 (1): 80f.

32 Holston, James. 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship. Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil*, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, p. 317.

33 Turner 2001, *The Erosion of Citizenship*, p. 190; see also Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 7 or Shafir 1998, Introduction, p. 15.

assumption of a linear inclusion, in that it “does not capture the complexity, dynamism, and fluidity of citizenship,”³⁴ and Young acknowledges that although all groups in “liberal capitalist societies” enjoy equal citizenship rights, social injustice and inequality persist, and some groups are still “treated as second-class citizens” and *de facto* excluded from citizenship.³⁵ Accordingly, many Latin American scholars in particular have frequently criticized Marshall’s assumption and revealed its inapplicability to the nonlinear development in the region.³⁶

This debate on the question of universality of citizenship³⁷ is especially interesting when studying social movements. Due to the paradigm of universality, they find themselves in a “dilemma of difference”³⁸ as Young calls it. The assumption of the universality of citizenship implies the idea of equality and inclusion of all members of a society, that “[w]hatever the social or group differences among citizens, whatever their inequalities of wealth, status, and power in the everyday activities of civil society, citizenship gives everyone the same status as peers in the political public.”³⁹ Thus social movements on the one hand, to be included, have to refer to this principle of equality and the universality of citizenship and as a consequence to deny their difference. On the other hand, they find it necessary to emphasize existing “group-based-differences” because the formal equal treatment disadvantages those groups.⁴⁰

34 Glenn 2011, *Constructing Citizenship*, p. 3.

35 Young, Iris M. 1998. “Polity and Group Difference. A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship” in *The Citizenship Debates. A Reader*, edited by G. Shafir. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 264.

36 See for example Assies et al. 2002, *Ciudadanía cultura política y reforma del estado en América Latina*, pp. 61; 71-77; Jelin, Elizabeth. 1993. “¿Cómo construir ciudadanía? Una vision desde abajo”, *European Review of Latin American and the Caribbean Studies/ Revista Europeade Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe* (55): 24.

37 The universality debate opens up to the discussion of the necessity of differentiated or group-based citizenship or multicultural citizenship, which will not be discussed here in detail, but can be read in Young 1998, *Polity and Group Difference*; Kymlicka, Will. 1998. “Multicultural Citizenship” in *The Citizenship Debates. A Reader*, edited by G. Shafir. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 167–187; Yashar 1999, *Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge*.

38 Young 1998, *Polity and Group Difference*, p. 281.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 263.

40 *Ibid.*, p. 281.

Or, as Shafir summarizes: “Formal equality, ironically, creates substantive inequality.”⁴¹

The third criticism of Marshall deals with his concentration on the nation-state in his analysis, the fact that he is treating citizenship as “always rooted in the unit of the nation-state.”⁴² In the context of globalization, studies began to question whether citizenship had to be exclusively related to the nation-state.⁴³ Especially experiences of international migration and new supra- or transnational organizations like the European Union, for example, made it necessary, argued some scholars, to rethink the meaning of citizenship in modern theories—liberalism, communitarism and republicanism⁴⁴—all of which refer to the nation-state as the main source of authority.⁴⁵ These studies challenge the idea of the nation-state as the only authority over citizenship, and broaden the debate by considering citizenship as meaningful beyond traditional national boundaries. Even though most of the studies still relate citizenship to the nation-state and equalize it with membership of a state, there is already an important production of literature on so-called post-national or transnational citizenship. Furthermore, scholars often refer to the origin of citizenship in the ancient Greek cities, and emphasize that it was only from the late eighteenth century onward that citizenship became associated exclusively with the nation-state instead of the

41 Shafir 1998, Introduction, p. 25.

42 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 317; Marshall 2009, *Citizenship and Social Class*, p. 149.

43 For further reading see Soysal, Yasemin N. 2007, *Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*, Chicago et al.: Univ. of Chicago; Sassen, Saskia. 2011. “Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship” in *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, edited by E. F. Isin and B. S. Turner. Los Angeles: SAGE, pp. 277–293; Isin, Engin F., and Bryan S. Turner, editors. 2011, *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, Los Angeles: SAGE; Bauböck 1994, *Transnational Citizenship*; Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1999. “The ‘Multi-Layered Citizen’. Citizenship in the Age of ‘Globalization’”, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 1 (1): 119–136.

44 “Liberalism puts strong emphasis on the individual, and most rights involve liberties that adhere to each and every person. Concomitantly, communitarism emphasizes the community (or the society or the nation), whose primary concern is with the cohesive and just functioning of society. Republican theories in both their conservative and radical variants put emphasis on both individual and group rights and emphasize the role of conflict and contest in the expansion or construction of such rights” (Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*, p. 4).

45 *Ibid.*, pp. 3f.

city.⁴⁶ In this context, especially in the area of urban studies, it is argued that citizenship should be reinserted into the urban context and that increasingly cities are replacing the nation as the important places and reference points of citizenship (for a further discussion of urban citizenship see section 2.1.3).⁴⁷ Hence, the discussion of national versus transnational, as well as urban dimensions of citizenship have also become an important aspects of the citizenship debate, and should therefore not be ignored.⁴⁸

The fourth criticism of Marshall's work is "the absence of any understanding of ethnic and racial [or gender] divisions in relation to national citizenship."⁴⁹ Instead of problematizing explicitly existing hierarchies in his analysis of the development of citizenship, Marshall assumes a "heterogeneous society," in his case reflecting exclusively the citizenship experience of *white, men* from the working class.⁵⁰ Especially feminist theory has questioned and criticized this ideal of citizenship—as I will show in more detail in section 2.3.1—and Latin American scholars in particular have emphasized the importance of taking social categorizations into account when talking about citizenship. As Alvarez et al. adequately stress: "The rigid social hierarchies of class, race, and gender that typify Latin American social relations prevent the vast majority of de jure citizens from even imagining, let alone publicly claiming, the prerogative to have rights."⁵¹

46 Isin, Engin F. and Myer Siemiatycki. 1999. "Fate and Faith. Claiming Urban Citizenship in Immigrant Toronto", *CERIS Working Paper Series* (8): 7; Painter, Joe. 2005. "Urban Citizenship and Rights to the City", Background Paper for the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: 4; Gomes, Paulo C. d. C. 2001, *A Condição Urbana. Ensaios de Geopolítica da Cidade*, Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 31-125.

47 For example Holston, James and Arjun Appadurai. 1999. "Cities and Citizenship" in *Cities and Citizenship*, edited by J. Holston. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 1–18; Purcell, Mark. 2003. "Citizenship and the Right to the Global City. Reimagining the Capitalist World Order", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 27 (3): 564–590; Isin et al. 1999, Fate and Faith.

48 Isin 2009, Citizenship in a Flux, p. 369; Isin et al. 2011, Citizenship Studies, p. 4; Siim, Birte and Judith Squires. 2008. "Contesting Citizenship. Comparative Analyses" in *Contesting Citizenship*, edited by B. Siim and J. Squires. London: Routledge, p. 2; Isin et al. 1999, Fate and Faith, p. 10.

49 Turner 2001, The Erosion of Citizenship, p. 191.

50 Ibid.; Fraser et al. 1998, Contract versus Charity, p. 116.

51 Alvarez, Sonia E., Dagnino, Evelina and Arturo Escobar. 1998. "Introduction: The Cultural and the Political in Latin American Social Movements" in *Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements*, edited

The fifth criticism of Marshall questions his optimism “about the ease with which social citizenship could be built upon a foundation laid in terms of civil citizenship.”⁵² In their examination of the relation between civil and social citizenship, Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon show that, especially when dealing with social citizenship, the different traditions and understandings of citizenship by country become apparent. Pointing to the United States, they demonstrate that a strong civil rights tradition has not led automatically to the obtainment of social rights, as described by Marshall for the case of Britain, but may also hinder the development of social citizenship. The almost complete absence of social citizenship in contemporary United States discourse is in their opinion due to a strong presence of and emphasis on a civil citizenship tradition which is dominantly characterized by contract as the hegemonic social relation.⁵³ Fraser and Gordon argue that the rise of civil citizenship created new forms of property rights and contract relations, and especially that “contract exchange was increasingly represented as the basic form of human interaction.”⁵⁴ They assert that over time noncontractual forms of relations, apart from family relations, were modified towards contractual exchange, and that the increasing “hegemony of contract” led to the generation of the concept of charity as a “unilateral gift” opposing the concept of contract, because “[a]ny interaction that seemed neither contractual nor familial now appeared to be unilateral and entirely voluntary, entailing neither entitlements nor responsibilities.”⁵⁵ The ideological consequence of this “contract-versus-charity” dichotomy was that charity increasingly came under attack, and became stigmatized as “unilateral gift-giving.”⁵⁶

In sum, the cultural mythology of civil citizenship stands in a tense, often obstructing relationship to social citizenship. This is nowhere more true than in the United States, where the dominant understanding of civil citizenship remains strongly inflected by notions of “contract” and “independence,” while social provision has been constructed to connote “charity” and “dependence.”⁵⁷

by Alvarez, Sonia E., Dagnino, Evelina and Arturo Escobar. Boulder: WestviewPress, p. 12; see also Sojo 2002, *The idea of citizenship*, p. 36.

52 Fraser et al. 1998, *Contract versus Charity*, p. 117.

53 *Ibid.*, pp. 114f; Shafir 1998, *Introduction*, p. 15.

54 Fraser et al. 1998, *Contract versus Charity*, p. 123.

55 *Ibid.*

56 *Ibid.*, pp. 122ff.

57 *Ibid.*, pp. 125f.

Fraser and Gordon's argumentation supports the first and second criticism of Marshall by showing the necessity of greater sensitivity to the historical and national context of citizenship.

This brief overview of the principal elements and topics of the ongoing theoretical debate on citizenship has demonstrated the existence of different positions and areas of emphasis within the discussion. This study seeks to highlight the importance of understanding citizenship as an inseparable combination of both formal status and social practice, because as we will see, especially in section 2.1.3.1, regarding the struggles for housing, legal status also entails processes and practices of negotiating, contesting, and broadening the content and character of given rights, and *vice versa*. Hence, combining both these aspects of citizenship, this study will be guided by the following definition: Citizenship is a dynamic concept, incorporating both a historically specific bundle of rights and obligations (formal status), and the constant processes of negotiating this bundle and respectively the acts by which these rights are being claimed (practice/process).⁵⁸

Integrating both aspects into my understanding, and accordingly into my analysis, I also hope to avoid some of the pitfalls addressed by the elaborated criticism above of Marshall's one-dimensional definition. Only an analysis of the entanglement of both the formal status—citizenship from above—and the social processes of its negotiation—citizenship from below—is able to detect the “blind spots” and uncover the concrete patterns of inclusion and exclusion within the nation-state. Additionally, it allows us to focus not only on dominant state discourses, but also on the “performative dimensions of membership which define the meanings and practices of belonging in society”⁵⁹ and thus to incorporate the views and voices of excluded social actors, who are important agents in the creation of a citizenship from below. This point is particularly interesting for the aim of this study, which focuses on precisely these actors in the squats of Rio de Janeiro, seeking to describe their own understanding and construction of citizenship.

58 This definition combines Marshall's basic assumption to understand citizenship as a status and the literature which claims to focus on citizenship as a social practice, like for example Shafir 1998, Introduction, and Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*.

59 Holston et al. 1999, *Cities and Citizenship*, p. 200.

2.1.2 Citizenship in Brazil

While the notion of democratic citizenship entails a composite of rights that, in theory, cannot be contingent upon privileges based on class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, religion, and other features, in practice some social groups (...) are de facto excluded from the full benefits of citizenship.⁶⁰

In Latin America in general and in Brazil specifically, the extension of formal rights has not yet led to their consistent recognition and application in practice.⁶¹ As emphasized above, citizenship cannot therefore be analyzed only in terms of formal membership, but rather it is important that “we should be attentive to the difference between having rights in theory and being able to exercise rights in practice, that is, having substantive citizenship.”⁶² In other words, those who possess formal state-membership can nevertheless be excluded from social, civil, and political rights. This is, as we will see in the following section, the case in Brazil, where people are often excluded from access to, and the possibility of exercising, their “full citizenship,” and instead experience the results of a historically rooted differentiated citizenship.

60 Armony, Ariel C. 2007. “Fields of Citizenship” in *Citizenship in Latin America*, edited by J. S. Tulchin and M. Ruthenburg. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ., p. 96.

61 Dagnino 2003, *Citizenship in Latin America*; Goirand 2003, *Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil*; Fischer, Brodwyn. 2008, *A Poverty of Rights. Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro*, Stanford: Stanford University Press; Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*; Bitencourt, Luis. 2007. “Crime and Violence. Challenges to Democracy in Brazil” in *Citizenship in Latin America*, edited by J. S. Tulchin and M. Ruthenburg. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ., pp. 171–186; Hagopian, Frances. 2007. “Latin American Citizenship and Democracy Theory” in *Citizenship in Latin America*, edited by J. S. Tulchin and M. Ruthenburg. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ., pp. 11–56; Armony 2007, *Fields of Citizenship*; Jelin 1993, *Cómo construir ciudadanía*, pp. 22, 27.

62 Glenn 2011, *Constructing Citizenship*, p. 3.

2.1.2.1. A Differentiated Citizenship

To understand and explain the unequal access to rights experienced by certain parts of the Brazilian population, some scholars⁶³ have suggested that, when talking about citizenship in Brazil, it is important to look back at history and its specific development over time. In doing so, they draw critically on T.H. Marshall's assumption of a linear development of citizenship, emphasizing that "the timing and substance of citizenship's development vary in different historical and national contexts but also (...) this development is never cumulative, linear or evenly distributed. Rather, citizenship always simultaneously expands and erodes in uneven ways."⁶⁴ Thus, to understand the specific historical development of citizenship in the case of Brazil, the anthropologist James Holston advocates taking into account both formal membership and the substantive distribution of rights, which in combination, over time, has produced what he calls an "inclusively inegalitarian citizenship." He explains that:

This formulation of citizenship uses social differences that are *not* the basis of national membership primarily—differences of education, property, race, gender, and occupation—to distribute different treatments to different categories of citizens. It thereby generates a gradation of rights among them, in which most rights are available only to particular kinds of citizens and exercised as the privilege of particular social categories. I describe it, therefore, as a differentiated citizenship that uses social qualifications to organize its political, civil, and social dimensions and to regulate the distribution of powers. This scheme of citizenship is, in short, a mechanism to distribute inequality.⁶⁵

Holston emphasizes that due to the perpetuation of this early formulation of citizenship—what he calls a differentiated citizenship—"most Brazilians have been denied political rights, limited in property ownership, forced into segregation and often illegal conditions of residence, estranged from the law, and funneled into labor as servile workers."⁶⁶

63 For example Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*; Fischer 2008, *A Poverty of Rights*; Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*.

64 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 15.

65 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

66 *Ibid.*

Using the term *differentiated citizenship* in his analysis, Holston explicitly draws on Iris Young's notion of the same.⁶⁷ Young argues that the universal idea of citizenship had in practice led to the exclusion and homogenization of certain groups and to a so-called "dilemma of difference." On the one hand, in order to be included, these groups have to appeal to the principle of equality and the universality of citizenship, and as a consequence must deny their difference. On the other hand, however, they find it necessary and important to emphasize existing "group-based-differences" because the formal equal treatment in fact disadvantages them.⁶⁸ Thus, to avoid exclusion, Young opts for a solution based on a heterogeneous public, and stresses the need for a group-differentiated citizenship instead of a universal citizenship.⁶⁹ Accordingly, for Young "the best way to realize the inclusion and participation of everyone in full citizenship" is then a differentiated citizenship, as to fight perpetuated oppression and disadvantages of certain groups it becomes in her opinion necessary to articulate "special rights that attend to group differences."⁷⁰

Although using the same notion for his analysis, Holston comes nevertheless to a different conclusion. Holston asserts that Young's understanding of a differentiated citizenship "allows for a generalized distribution of specific legalized privileges to compensate for various kinds of difference."⁷¹ He counters that demand by emphasizing that citizenship in most countries already is and has been differentiated, and thus underlines again the importance for a historical analysis of citizenship in order to reveal this fact. Criticizing Young for her "ahistorical" and "uncomparative" portrayal of citizenship, Holston argues that "from the beginning of Brazilian nationhood, they [elites] created a national citizenship that was universally inclusive in membership and massively inegalitarian in distribution of rights and membership" and points out that this "paradigm of inegalitarian national citizenship" persists and is widespread among nations as a means of managing social differences.⁷² He thus challenges Young's presumption that differentiated citizenship is the best way to achieve full citizenship for everyone, and emphasizes that quite to the contrary "Brazil's differentiated citizenship consolidated social inequalities and perpetuated them

67 Holston, James. 2011, *Contesting Privilege with Right. The Transformation of Differentiated Citizenship in Brazil*. http://indiancities.berkeley.edu/speaker_content/docs/Holston_Contesting_Privilege_with_Right_2011_Feb.pdf (31 Oct 2015), p. 5.

68 Young 1998, *Polity and Group Difference*, p. 281.

69 *Ibid.*, p. 271.

70 *Ibid.*, pp. 264f.

71 Holston 2011, *Contesting Privilege with Right*, p. 7.

72 *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 11f.

in other forms throughout society.”⁷³ For Holston, legalizing differences thus means legalizing and reproducing inequality:

[B]y legalizing special treatment as a matter of course to attend to group differences, they [nations] legitimate and reproduce inequality throughout the social system. What Young proposes is thus a token of this historical type of citizenship, albeit one she imagines restricted to compensating oppressed social groups. Considering its world history, it is difficult not to conclude that this thinking is wishful, if not deluded.⁷⁴

Thus, while for Young a differentiated citizenship is the solution to dissolve inequality, for Holston it constitutes the very root of it. Holston’s critique of the reproduction of inequality through a differentiated citizenship is also shared by other scholars. Shafir, for example, accordingly states that a differentiated citizenship can also be hierarchical, and that “[s]uch hierarchy of citizenships leads to struggle over the types of citizenship rights distinguished by Marshall, not all of which can be granted by all and a few of which cannot be taken for granted by some.”⁷⁵

In this study, I will draw on Holston’s understanding of a differentiated citizenship as an argument for the exclusion of certain parts of the population from “full citizenship” throughout Brazilian history. I thereby share his strong argument for the need to look at the historical development in each single case and country, as well as to distinguish between formal membership and the substantive distribution of rights. Only then it is possible to recognize the causes and correlations of the exclusion of certain parts of the population, which in turn is a prerequisite for change. Hence, in the following section, I will provide an overview of the historical development of citizenship in Brazil.

2.1.2.2 The Historical Development of Citizenship in Brazil

In his book “Insurgent Citizenship—Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil” James Holston traces back the development and formulation of a differentiated citizenship in Brazilian history. To prove his argument he analyzes key aspects of Brazil’s imperial and republican past, up until democracy:

[T]hroughout Brazilian history, the difference-based formulation of citizenship overwhelms. It persists as a system of unequal and differential access to rights, privileges, and powers from the colonial period (1500-1822), to the imperial (1822-1889), and

73 Holston 2011, *Contesting Privilege with Right*, p. 12.

74 *Ibid.*, pp. 12f.

75 Shafir 1998, *Introduction*, p. 25.

through the republican (1889-present), thriving under monarchy, both civilian and military dictatorships, and electoral democracy.⁷⁶

Like Holston, other scholars, such as Camille Goirand and José Murilo de Carvalho, also stress the historical development and specificities of Brazilian citizenship. Hence, Goirand identifies three “key steps” in Brazil’s construction of citizenship. First, the end of the nineteenth century; second, the 1930s and Vargas era; and thirdly, the democratization process of the 1980s and 90s.⁷⁷ In the following, I will therefore highlight these scholars’ main arguments, so as to depict the historical development of citizenship in Brazil.

In the course of independence, according to Holston, the first Brazilian Constitution of 1824 had already established, a “conceptual framework of a differentiated citizenship” in Brazil.⁷⁸ Regulating political rights, the Constitution defined who had the right to vote and accordingly, who were those defined citizens. This definition, given in Article 6 of the Constitution of 1824,⁷⁹ remains “essentially unchanged” today, and “formulated national membership in terms of unconditional *ius soli* and conditional *ius sanguinis*.”⁸⁰ Citizenship was formally not restricted to any kind of social categorization, such as for example religion, ethnicity, or gender, but was strongly linked to the condition of freedom. As slavery had not yet been abolished in 1824, slaves were excluded and not

76 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 40.

77 Goirand 2003, *Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil*.

78 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 90.

79 Art. 6: “São Cidadãos Brasileiros: I. Os que no Brazil tiverem nascido, quer sejam ingenuos, ou libertos, ainda que o pai seja estrangeiro, uma vez que este não resida por serviço de sua Nação. II. Os filhos de pai Brasileiro, e Os illegitimos de mãe Brasileira, nascidos em paiz estrangeiro, que vierem estabelecer domicilio no Imperio. III. Os filhos de pai Brasileiro, que estivesse em paiz estrangeiro em serviço do Imperio, embora elles não venham estabelecer domicilio no Brazil. IV. Todos os nascidos em Portugal, e suas Possessões, que sendo já residentes no Brazil na época, em que se proclamou a Independencia nas Provincias, onde habitavam, adheriram á esta expressa, ou tacitamente pela continuação da sua residencia. V. Os estrangeiros naturalizados, qualquer que seja a sua Religião. A Lei determinará as qualidades precisas, para se obter Carta de naturalisação.” (Presidência da República. 1824, Constituição Política do Imperio do Brazil de 25 de Março de 1824. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/Constituicao24.htm (14 Nov 2015)).

80 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 63.

considered citizens.⁸¹ Holston shows that, although not formally restricted in membership, political rights were only made available to some citizens,⁸² by “dividing the category of ‘citizen’ into classes, mixing six sorts of restriction to limit suffrage among adults: gender, income, household dependence, residence, religion, and birthright.”⁸³

In the following years the exclusion of certain groups from political rights was further extended. Through electoral reforms in 1881, Law 3029, the so-called “Saraiva Law” (*Lei Saraiva*), was passed. One of its consequences was that the already existing income requirement, as a condition in order to be able to vote, was raised from 100 to 200 mil-réis per annum. Although Holston and Carvalho assume that 200 mil-réis per annum was not that much money, a very strict enforcement of the condition, and new bureaucratic obstacles to prove this income through a number of legally recognized documents, meant that many people stopped voting.⁸⁴ Law 3029 also made voting optional and, as both authors agree, the most significant mechanism to exclude people from political participation was established: the requirement of literacy.⁸⁵

[O]nde a lei de fato limitou o voto foi ao excluir os analfabetos. A razão é simples: somente 15% da população era alfabetizada, ou 20%, se considerarmos apenas a população masculina. De imediato, 80% da população masculina era excluída do direito de voto (...). Em 1872, havia mais de 1 milhão de votantes, correspondentes a 13% da população livre. Em 1886, votaram nas eleições parlamentares pouco mais de 100 mil eleitores, ou 0,8% da população total. Houve um corte de quase 90% do eleitorado.⁸⁶

Holston affirms that at the end of the century, most Brazilian citizens were deprived of political rights. In the founding Republican Constitution of 1891 the income requirement was finally dropped, and slavery officially abolished in

81 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, pp. 63, 90; Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, pp. 28f.

82 Art. 90-97 (Presidência da República 1824, *Constituição Política do Imperio do Brasil*).

83 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 90.

84 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, pp. 38f; Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, pp. 100f.

85 These requirements (both or one of them) were also included in other Constitutions during the nineteenth century, for example in Chile, Mexico or Peru (Sabato, Hilda. 2001. “On Political Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century Latin America”, *The American Historical Review*, 106 (4): 1290–1315).

86 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, p. 39.

1888. But the most important barrier, the exclusion of analphabetic citizens, was maintained until the Constitution of 1988.⁸⁷ This barrier remained an effective mechanism for excluding large part of the population from political citizenship throughout the twentieth century, especially as analphabetism continued to be high in Brazil, due to the failure of sufficient provision of public education. While the Constitution of 1824 had allowed analphabetic people to vote and had included at least theoretically the right to free primary education (in practice, this right was not enforced), the Republican Constitution “absolved the state of any responsibility for educating citizens to become voters.”⁸⁸ In this sense, the exclusion of analphabetic and the reluctance of the state to provide sufficient education are a good example of the early development of a differentiated citizenship in Brazil:

Brazil had taken an enormous step backward at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of its Republic. Moreover, for the next hundred years, from 1881 to 1985, each generation of political elites reconfirmed the step backward: they continued to differentiate political citizenship by reiterating in federal constitutions and electoral laws the principal means of disenfranchisement first decreed in the Saraiva Law, namely the exclusion of illiterates.⁸⁹

Carvalho summarizes that until the 1930s civil and political rights had been precarious and that it is difficult even to talk about the existence of a social citizenship. To refer to this precarious citizenship situation, he describes it as a “negative citizenship” (“*uma cidadania em negativa*”).⁹⁰ But, despite this critical evaluation, he nevertheless stresses that there were also already some political movements and other actors fighting for their rights, indicating the beginning of a nascent active citizenship.⁹¹ He emphasizes that from early on people were active agents who tried to improve their living conditions within the nation-state. Hence, summarizing the situation until the 1930s, one can say that:

Although an inclusive status, however, Brazilian national citizenship was not an egalitarian one. From the beginning, inclusion mattered less than the kind and quality of

87 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, p. 40; Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 102.

88 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 103.

89 *Ibid.*, p. 102.

90 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, pp. 61, 75.

91 He refers here especially to the abolition movement (Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, pp. 65f).

included citizen. All free native-born residents may have been Brazilian national citizens, but not all citizens had legally equal and uniform rights.⁹²

The 1930s and the Vargas era marked another key step in Brazils' construction of citizenship. After the Revolution of 1930 important electoral reforms occurred in 1932, including amongst other things for the first time women's suffrage.⁹³ According to Carvalho, the evolution of political rights after 1930 was complex because "[o] país entrou em fase de instabilidade, alternando-se ditaduras e regimes democráticos."⁹⁴ In fact, during the Estado Novo from 1937 to 1945, political rights were curtailed, and after a short period of new growth for political citizenship from 1945 until 1964, this experience ended again with the implementation of dictatorship in 1964.⁹⁵ Holston emphasizes that even though it improved again during the years 1945 to 1964, political citizenship during that period was still restricted due to the continued exclusion of analphabetic citizens. Particularly concentrated in the countryside, in 1950 half of the Brazilians were still unable to write and read, and thus, according to Holston, a differentiated citizenship was maintained.⁹⁶

Although political rights fell short under the corporatist and populist state of Vargas from 1930 to 1945, the literature on citizenship emphasizes the expansion of social rights for the first time in Brazilian history. Accordingly, Goirand summarizes "[t]hat Brazilian citizenship is social before being political"⁹⁷ and Carvalho concludes that "[o] período de 1930 a 1945 foi o grande momento da legislação social. Mas foi uma legislação introduzida em ambiente de baixa o nula participação política e de precária vigência dos direitos civis."⁹⁸ Both authors thereby also illustrate that Marshall's assumption of a linear and cumulative development of citizenship in three steps, as described in section 2.1.1, is not valid for the case of Brazil.

92 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 63.

93 *Ibid.*, p. 103; until then, women had been excluded from political citizenship, not only in Brazil, but in many other (Latin American) countries too. Women were allowed to vote (to name some examples) in Argentina in 1947, in Colombia in 1954 or in Ecuador in 1929.

94 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, p. 87.

95 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 103; Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, pp. 87f.

96 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 104.

97 Goirand 2003, *Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil*, p. 22.

98 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, p. 110.

The expansion of social rights under Vargas was especially aimed at the reorganization and regulation of the urban labor force.⁹⁹

[T]he state constituted urban workers as special citizens by bestowing social rights they had never had (...). However, it did so as the means to absorb them into its legal and administrative orders. Vargas reformulated the citizenship of workers precisely to eviscerate any alternative public sphere of autonomous working-class organization.¹⁰⁰

But the implementation and extension of social rights did not benefit all Brazilians. The access to social rights—such as to be allowed to register grievances, to have access to labor benefits, be able to register passbooks, join unions, etc.—was limited only to workers, and despite being already restricted to that category, some of them were also excluded, as Holston emphasizes: “Although the government presented it as the universal incorporation of the ‘workers of Brazil’ into a regime of social rights and citizenship, not all workers, much less all citizens, had access to these rights.”¹⁰¹ Social rights were limited to urban workers¹⁰² with possession of legal contracts in occupations regulated by law, and thus not all professions were included, such as for example domestic workers, the majority of whom were women.¹⁰³ According to Holston, Vargas’s system of social citizenship therefore “differentiated Brazilian citizens into unequally graded subgroups with regard to the distribution of social rights: urban/rural, employed/unemployed, formal market/informal market, contracted/uncontracted, registered/unregistered, and unionized/not unionized.”¹⁰⁴ Even though certain parts of the Brazilian population were thus officially excluded from access to social rights and thereby legally marginalized, historian Brodwyn Fischer emphasizes that this does not mean that the affected population themselves adopted Vargas’ “legislation’s definition of valuable work.” Researching the practices and experiences of the excluded urban poor of that time, she stresses that even if working as *registered* wage-earners (with the so-

99 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 186; Goirand 2003, *Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil*, p. 22; especially his “labor, social security and social welfare laws were new, radical and wide-ranging” (Fischer 2008, *A Poverty of Rights*, p. 116).

100 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 186.

101 *Ibid.*, p. 191.

102 The exemption of workers in agriculture reduced the amount of beneficiaries considerably (Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, p. 114).

103 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, pp. 192f; Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, p. 114.

104 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, pp. 194f.

called “*carteira assinada*”) meant a certain prestige, working without it was acknowledged as a “rational choice” and people doing so also recognized as “workers” and “valuable members of the community.”¹⁰⁵

Hence, in the 1930s appeared what Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos describes as a “regulated citizenship”: “Citizenship is embedded in the professions, and the rights of the citizen as restricted to the rights of the place he occupies in the productive process, as recognized by law. All those whose occupations the law does not recognize, therefore, become pre-citizens.”¹⁰⁶ This understanding of citizenship “as a condition strictly related to labor” remained in place in Brazil, and would exclude workers from labor and social security systems, for decades.¹⁰⁷ Although widely adopted in the context of studies on citizenship in Brazil from 1930 to 1945, Holston points to two problems related to Santos’ description of the citizenship situation in Brazil as “regulated.” First of all, for Holston, the term “regulated” is already misleading, because in his opinion an “unregulated citizenship” does not exist. He therefore suggests describing the extension of social rights under Vargas rather as a “differentiated” type of citizenship, because:

Identifying it as difference-specific has a significant advantage: it indicates that far from creating a new model, Vargas perpetuated the historic paradigm of Brazil’s inclusively inegalitarian citizenship by giving it modern form, by adapting its differentiations to the new conditions of modern urban industrial society.¹⁰⁸

Therefore, secondly, Santos’ differentiation between “citizens” as the included and “pre-citizens” as the excluded makes no sense for Holston, because “both groups contain national citizens (...) are member-citizens of the same polity. It is precisely the inequality of their common citizenship that is the problem.”¹⁰⁹

Another “key step” in the construction of citizenship in Brazil was the democratization process of the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Along with the paralysis of political rights and very slow progress in social rights during the time of 1945 to 1964, the military government was especially characterized by a lack of the

105 Fischer 2008, *A Poverty of Rights*, pp. 145f.

106 Santos, Wanderley G. d. 1979, *Cidadania e Justiça*, Rio de Janeiro: Campus cited in: Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 193.

107 Dagnino, Evelina. 2005. “Meanings of Citizenship in Latin America”, *IDS Working Paper*, 258): 6; Fischer 2008, *A Poverty of Rights*, p. 143.

108 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 193.

109 *Ibid.*

possibility for citizens to exercise civil rights. In the process of the so-called “opening” (“*abertura*”)—the time of transition from dictatorship to democracy from 1974 onwards—the country experienced an unprecedented political participation and mobilization, which finally led to the end of the military dictatorship in 1985 and to the Constitution in 1988.¹¹⁰ In the context of the emergence of new political participation and social mobilization, citizenship in Brazil became a popular and common notion, especially among social movements, as an instrument and common reference point to formulate their demands for the recognition and expansion of rights.¹¹¹ The new emerging social movements used citizenship as a common and conjunctive reference to fight for their interests, and began thus also to “redefine” the notion of citizenship.¹¹² These actors thus tried to create a “citizenship from below” in order to fight previous concepts of citizenship, like that of a “regulated citizenship” or a “citizenship by concession”.¹¹³

The role of the social movements, of the 1970s and 1980s in shaping this redefinition of citizenship is obviously rooted in their own struggles and practices. Although they drew on a history of rights that had given rise to regulated citizenship (...), they reacted against conception of the state and of power embedded in that history. They also reacted against

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- 110 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, pp. 192f, 199; Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 107.
- 111 Dagnino 2003, *Citizenship in Latin America*, p. 211; Goirand 2003, *Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil*, pp.18f
- 112 Dagnino 2003, *Citizenship in Latin America*, p. 211; Dagnino, Evelina. 2007. “Citizenship. A Perverse Confluence”, *Development in Practice*, 17 (4/5): 549; Dagnino 2005, *Meanings of Citizenship in Latin America*, p. 3.
- 113 Dagnino 2003, *Citizenship in Latin America*, p. 213; Teresa Sales also evolved the notion of “citizenship by concession” (“*cidadania concedida*”). Trying to find the “roots of social inequality in the political culture of Brazil,” she emphasizes the over time persisting political power and influence of the large landowners even after the creation of the Republic and abolition. In Sales conception, rights in Brazil thus are considered as “gifts” and “favours,” and conceded in the powerful (Dagnino 2005, *Meanings of Citizenship in Latin America*, p. 6). “*A cidadania concedida está na gênese da construção de nossa cidadania. Isso significa que os primeiros direitos civis necessários à liberdade individual – de ir e vir, de justiça, direito à propriedade, direito ao trabalho – foram outorgados ao homem livre, durante e depois da ordem escravocrata, mediante a concessão dos senhores de terras*” (Sales, Teresa. 1994. “Raízes da Desigualdade Social na Cultura Brasileira”, *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, 25: no page).

the control and tutelage of the political organisation of popular sectors by the state, political parties, and politicians. Their conception of rights and citizenship embodied a reaction against previous notions of rights as favours and/or objects of bargain with the powerful (...) (*cidadania concedida*). In this sense the struggle for rights, (...) encapsulated not only claims for equality but the negation of a dominant political culture deeply rooted in Brazilian society.¹¹⁴

The efforts and struggles of the social movements are reflected in the Constitution of 1988, the so-called “Citizens Constitution” (*Constituição Cidadã*). It expanded political, civil and social rights considerably in Brazil and eliminated one of the hitherto main obstacles for the universality of voting: the requirement of literacy.¹¹⁵ New social rights were guaranteed, and amongst others the right to education, work, and healthcare were included in Article 6 of the 1988 Constitution.¹¹⁶

Analyzing the historical development of citizenship in Brazil after 1988, Carvalho points out that despite the noticeable amplification of rights, social and civil rights in particular are still not fully guaranteed in practice, and not fully accessible for most of the Brazilian population even today.¹¹⁷ The decline of social rights after democratization is not only a phenomenon limited to Brazil, but is observable in many Latin American countries. For Yashar and Dagnino the neoliberal reforms—realized as a consequence of the economic crisis in the 1980s and 1990s—are the reason for the still inadequate granting of social rights after 1988.¹¹⁸ According to Dagnino, in Brazil, “[t]oday’s democratization processes are locked in a perverse confluence of two distinct political projects.”¹¹⁹ On the one hand she refers to the increasing participation of civil society, the extension of citizenship and deepening of democracy in the context of the 1988 Constitution; and on the other hand, she points to the determination of the governments to achieve a “minimal state, which requires the shrinking of its social responsibilities and the gradual abandonment of its role as guarantor of rights.”¹²⁰ The neo-liberal definition of citizenship implies a “strictly

114 Dagnino 2007, *Citizenship*, p. 553.

115 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, p. 200.

116 Goirand 2003, *Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil*, p. 18; Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, p. 206.

117 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, pp. 206f, 210f, 220.

118 Yashar 1999, *Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge*, p. 85; Dagnino 2003, *Citizenship in Latin America*, p. 215.

119 Dagnino 2007, *Citizenship*, p. 550.

120 Dagnino 2003, *Citizenship in Latin America*, p. 215.

individualistic understanding” and the establishment of a strong connection between citizenship and the market. That changes the understanding of what it means to be a citizen and who has to guarantee citizenship rights. In a neo-liberal version, being a citizen means individual integration into the market as producer or/and consumer, and it is the market which is increasingly substituting the state’s responsibility—so hard won by the social movements—to provide citizenship rights. Dagnino adverts to the fact that under neo-liberal logic especially social rights are increasingly eliminated, because they are accused of hindering “freedom of the market” and “economic development and modernization.”¹²¹ So, for her:

The perverse nature of the confluence between the participatory and the neo-liberal projects lies in the fact that both not only require a (...) proactive society, but also share several core notions, such as *citizenship*, *participation*, and *civil society*, albeit used with very different meanings.¹²²

The neo-liberal redefinition of citizenship and the associated withdrawal of the state also led to a new understanding of the provision of social policies. These are increasingly reduced to “emergency efforts” for “‘needy’ human beings” requiring charity, and not for citizens possessing rights. This has striking consequences especially for social policies on poverty and inequality, as responsibilities are withdrawn from the public sphere and become increasingly a “moral duty of every member of society.”¹²³ This view of citizenship, and especially the understanding of social citizenship as “charity,” is reminiscent of the “contract-versus-charity” dichotomy introduced by Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon in section 2.1.1 for the case of the United States. Although analyzing the civil right tradition and its consequences for social citizenship in different nation-states, both cases show how “the idea of collective solidarity that underlies the classical reference to rights and citizenship is (...) being replaced by an understanding of solidarity as a strictly private moral responsibility.”¹²⁴

To summarize, a closer look into the history of the development of citizenship in Brazil has shown the importance of taking the national context and its specific historical development into account when talking about citizenship and trying to understand the patterns of exclusion in contemporary societies. In considering

121 Dagnino 2007, *Citizenship*, p. 553.

122 *Ibid.*, p. 550.

123 Dagnino 2003, *Citizenship in Latin America*, p. 217.

124 *Ibid.*

Brazilian history, it became clear that Marshall's assumption of a progressive, linear, and cumulative expansion of citizenship rights cannot be maintained for the case of Brazil, where citizenship indeed expanded and eroded unevenly throughout the course of history:

A cronologia e a lógica da seqüência descrita por Marshall foram invertidas no Brasil. Aqui, primeiro vieram os direitos sociais, implantados em período de supressão dos direitos políticos e de redução dos direitos civis por um ditador que se tornou popular. Depois vieram os direitos políticos, de maneira também bizarra (...). Finalmente, ainda hoje muitos direitos civis, a base da seqüência de Marshall, continuam inacessíveis à maioria da população (...). Seria tolo achar que só há um caminho para a cidadania. A história mostra que não é assim. Mas é razoável supor que caminhos diferentes afetem o produto final, afetem o tipo de cidadão, e, portanto, de democracia, que se gera.¹²⁵

The historical formulation of a differentiated citizenship, as described by Holston, still persists and shapes and explains the understanding and exercise of citizenship in Brazil up until today. The brief overview of the historical development of citizenship in Brazil above has also confirmed that citizenship cannot be analyzed only in terms of formal membership, as those who possess formal state-membership can nevertheless be excluded from social, civil, and political rights. To date, there exists a distinct gap between the formulated equal rights in the 1988 Constitution and the implementation of and access to those rights in practice. Many people are not able to exercise their “full citizenship”—by putting into practice what is written in theory—and so experience the results of a differentiated citizenship, for example being confronted in their everyday lives with significant lack of access to affordable housing, and by unequal access to public goods and services.

But, as emphasized by scholars like Fischer, Lister, and Carvalho, it is also important not to deny the existence of the efforts and strategies of “the excluded” to change their living conditions and to fight inequality and exclusion in the course of (Brazilian) history.¹²⁶ To describe these struggles “from below,” Holston develops the concept of an insurgent citizenship, which confronts the “entrenched regimes of citizen inequality.”¹²⁷ In the following I will therefore go

125 Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, pp. 220f.

126 Lister, Ruth. 2011. “From the Intimate to the Global. Reflections on Gendered Citizenship” in *The Limits of Gendered Citizenship. Contexts and Complexities*, edited by E. H. Oleksy, J. Hearn, and D. Golańska. New York: Routledge, pp. 29; Fischer 2008, *A Poverty of Rights*; Carvalho 2001, *Cidadania no Brasil*, pp. 65f.

127 Holston 2009, *Insurgent Citizenship in an Era of Global Urban Peripheries*, p. 245.

more into detail regarding the actors involved and provide the context for these citizenship struggles—the city.

2.1.3 The City: Context and Development of an Insurgent Citizenship

The previous section has demonstrated that the exclusion of certain parts of the Brazilian population from “full citizenship” is not a new phenomenon, but a practice that has a long tradition and has been exercised for decades. But the affected people have contested this practice, seeking—and finding—answers to their exclusion. James Holston argues that the historical formulation of a differentiated citizenship also produces and coexists with counter-formulations in the form of a new participatory citizenship—a so-called insurgent citizenship—which has emerged especially in the peripheries of Brazilian cities since the 1970s, destabilizing and contesting the historically deep-rooted formulations of citizenship.¹²⁸ He states:

[P]recisely in the urban peripheries, residents come to understand their basic needs in terms of their inhabiting the city, suffering it, building their daily lives in it, making its landscape, history, politics a place for themselves. The many meanings of this making often coalesce into a sense that they have a right to the city. This transformation of need into right has made cities a strategic arena for the development of new and insurgent citizenship. By insurgent urban citizenship, I refer to the political transformation that occurs when the conviction of having a right to the city turns residents into active citizens who mobilize demands around city-based issues and often through residentially-based organizations that confront entrenched national regimes of citizenship inequality and disability.¹²⁹

Holston’s conception of an insurgent citizenship turns out to be a useful reference for my analysis, as it embeds the struggles for full citizenship in everyday practices, locates them in the urban context, and organizes them around the need for housing. In the following section I will go into detail with regard to these aspects and relate them critically to the topic of my research.

128 Holston 2008, *Insurgent Citizenship*, p. 4.

129 Holston, James. 2013. “Housing Crises, Right to the City, and Citizenship” in *The Housing Question. Tensions, Continuities, and Contingencies in the Modern City*, edited by E. Murphy and N. B. Hourani. London: Ashgate, p. 261.

Insurgent citizenship as conceptualized by Holston focuses on the everyday practices and the lived experience of the inhabitants of the city. This conception of citizenship thus considers a subaltern perspective, highlighting their agency and capacity to develop a citizenship “from below” within dominant and excluding conceptions of politics. The idea of an insurgent citizenship also confirms my observations that citizenship is something that can emerge from everyday life and practices (see chapter 4). I therefore strongly endorse Holston’s conception of a citizenship embodied in everyday practices, as well as his reference to the emergence of resistance to dominant formulations of citizenship. However, I also agree with Brodwyn Fischer’s critique of Holston’s conception of an insurgent citizenship as failing to adequately take into account the historical consistency of resistance and the agency of oppressed groups. What Holston stresses as a novelty—as “new”¹³⁰—is rather a problem of lack of historical research that takes the voices of the affected and oppressed population into account.¹³¹ The danger with such a portrayal is that it may generate the impression of a newly emerging resistance which in fact, when placed in the context of a larger body of historical sources and archives, can be traced back much further in history; this historical context must be emphasized in order to avoid representing oppressed and disadvantaged groups as passive and powerless agents.¹³² There is a historical consistency of agency that has to be addressed! As

130 See quote from Holston above.

131 Fischer, Brodwyn. 2010. “Review Essay. Histories and Anthropologies of Citizenship”, *American Anthropologist*, 12 (1): 155.

132 One of the early examples of an insurgent citizenship is that of the tenant strikes and movements which emerged as early as 1907 and 1922 in the rapidly growing cities such as Buenos Aires (Argentina) and Veracruz (Mexico) and were directed against the state’s inability to provide conditions that led to the availability of adequate housing for the working class. Interestingly, women in particular played a major part in these movements. For further reading see Baer, James A. 1993. “Tenant Mobilization and the 1907 Rent Strike in Buenos Aires”, *The Americas*, 49 (3): 343–368; Potthast, Barbara. 2012. „Frauen und soziale Bewegungen in historischer Perspektive“ in *Studien zu Lateinamerika*, vol. 16, *Soziale Bewegungen und Demokratie in Lateinamerika. Ein ambivalentes Verhältnis*, edited by H.-J. Burchardt and R. Öhlschläger. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 43–58; Castells, Manuel. 1983, *The City and the Grassroots. A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements*, London: E. Arnold; Lanz, Stephan. 2009. „Der Kampf um das Recht auf die Stadt. Städtische soziale Bewegungen in Lateinamerika“ in *El Pueblo Unido? Soziale Bewegungen und politischer Protest in der Geschichte*

Fischer—who is researching the formation of poor people’s citizenship rights in Rio de Janeiro throughout the twentieth century—emphasizes:

If there is a note of caution to be sounded about Insurgent Citizenship, it lies at the juncture of history and anthropology. (...) Holston’s characterization of the past does not for the most part depend the archival pursuit of common people, who might speak with the force and clarity of his modern informants. His interpretation depends, instead, on secondary sources: most precisely on a prominent strand of Brazilian historiography that emphasizes continuities in systems of class and racial oppression over time but is only shallowly rooted in historical research capable of showing the law’s workings in their full complexity. Historians of this mold have rarely asked the sorts of questions Holston posed of his ethnographic present; given Brazil’s persistent inequities, they took it as self-evident that the poor and powerless had been ineffective in their interactions with formal law and politics. (...) Once the past is interrogated with an ethnographic eye, it appears that poor and middling Brazilians have long engaged legal ambiguities to their advantage, that they have often employed a language of rights, and that the links between city building and citizenship so beautifully elucidated by Holston have parallels in the early decades of the 20th century.¹³³

Fischer’s critique also reminds us of the benefits of an interdisciplinary analysis, which allows us to combine different approaches and methods in order to open up new spaces of research and avoid the pitfalls of a one-sided display.

Another important characteristic of Holston’s conception of an insurgent citizenship is the fact that he locates it in the urban space. He argues that it is precisely the city—and especially the urban peripheries—that has been and remains the main arena for the negotiation and development of (new forms of) citizenship.¹³⁴ Advocating “the urgent need to develop a framework of investigation which considers that cities are challenging, diverging from, and even replacing nations as the important space of citizenship—as the lived space not only of its uncertainties but also of its emergent forms,”¹³⁵ Holston shares the opinion of a number of scholars who are promoting the idea that citizenship should be reinserted into the urban context and that cities are increasingly

Lateinamerikas, edited by J. Mittag and G. Ismar. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, pp. 365–388.

133 Fischer 2010, Review Essay, p. 155.

134 Holston 2009, *Insurgent Citizenship in an Era of Global Urban Peripheries*, pp. 22f.

135 Holston et al. 1999, *Cities and Citizenship*, p. 189.

replacing the nation as the central place and reference point of citizenship (as mentioned in section 2.1.1).

Cities, particularly global cities, have therefore become political spaces where concentration of different groups and their identities are intertwined with the articulation of new claims and citizenship rights (Sassen, 1996b). It is this vast domain of groups, identities and appropriation and use of urban space to articulate claims that constitutes urban citizenship as a field of research.¹³⁶

Thus, people that are excluded from full access to the city organize, for instance in the form of social movements, and claim their “right to the city.” Holston, like most scholars studying urban citizenship, refers to the idea of this “right to the city,” which was originally developed in 1968 by the French sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre in his famous book “*Le droit à la ville*” (“The Right to the City”).¹³⁷

In the context of an increasing socio-economic segregation in cities like Paris at the end of the 1960s, Lefebvre argues for a need “to restructure the power relations that underlie the production of urban space, fundamentally shifting control away from capital and the state and toward urban inhabitants.”¹³⁸ He emphasizes the right of city inhabitants to urban life,¹³⁹ understood as the right to participation in its production and decision-making processes as well as the right

136 Isin et al. 1999, Fate and Faith, p. 8.

137 For further reading on the right to the city see for example Mitchell, Don. 2003, *The Right to the City. Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space*, New York: Guilford Press; Purcell 2003, Citizenship and the Right to the Global City, Purcell, Mark. 2002. “Excavating Lefebvre. The Right to the City and its Urban Politics of the Inhabitant”, *GeoJournal* (58): 99–108; Marcuse, Peter. 2009. “From Critical Urban Theory to the Right to the City”, *City*, 13 (2-3): 185–197; Harvey, David. 2006. “The Right to the City” in *Divided Cities. The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2003*, edited by R. Scholar. New York et al.: Oxford University Press, pp. 83–103; Sugranyes, Ana, and Charlotte Mathivet, editors. 2010, *Cities for All. Proposals and Experiences towards the Right to the City*, Santiago: Habitat International Coalition (HIC); The notion was also adopted and used by several NGO’s and the UN-Habitat Program: UN-Habitat and UNESCO. 2015, *Discussion Paper Urban Policies and the Right to the City. Public Debate 18 March 2005*. <http://www.hic-mena.org/documents/UN%20Habitat%20discussion.pdf> (29 Jul 2015).

138 Purcell 2002, Excavating Lefebvre, pp. 101f.

139 In his case the urban working class.

to its appropriation by making full use of the urban space.¹⁴⁰ Accordingly, Lefebvre states: “the *right to the city* is like a cry and a demand (...). The *right to the city* cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed *right to urban life*.”¹⁴¹ Hence, Holston’s conception of an insurgent citizenship also echoes discussions of critical urbanists like Lefebvre and provides a useful context to frame and explore struggles for citizenship, which are located in urban people’s everyday lives and practices, such as this case study.

Focusing on the processes of negotiating citizenship and on the acts by which formal rights are being claimed in the urban context, the concept of insurgent citizenship enables us to consider, and to connect, a citizenship “from above” with a citizenship “from below.” I further agree that the spatial context of citizenship—such as, for example, the city—with its specific features and historical characteristics, should be taken into account when analyzing struggles for citizenship. However, I am critical of the assumption that cities are replacing increasingly the nation-state as the important places and reference points of citizenship. At a time when over 50% of the world’s population lives in urban areas,¹⁴² cities are of course important venues of negotiations of inclusion and exclusion, and represent one of the important levels at which citizenship is exercised and contested. But cities are still embedded in the nation-state, and laws—which form an essential part of citizenship (formal status)—are still ultimately enacted at the national level or, if at a trans- or supranational level, enacted only with the nation-states’ approval.¹⁴³ Thus, in my opinion, the city is one of the many arenas¹⁴⁴ from which the nation-state is shaped—and *vice versa*—but not replaced. People acting in an urban context claim their right to a decent life—their rights to housing, education, healthcare, etc.—addressing and challenging ultimately the nation-state as the in- and exclusionary defining framework (see section 4.2). Thus, the city is one of the political spaces where

140 Lefebvre, Henri. 1996, *Writings on Cities*, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 177-181; Purcell 2003, *Citizenship and the Right to the Global City*, pp. 577f.

141 Lefebvre 1996, *Writings on Cities*, p. 158.

142 United Nations. 2014, *World’s Population Increasingly Urban with more than Half Living in Urban Areas*. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html> (27 Jul 2015).

143 For example the European Union.

144 It should be noted that in some countries a large part of the population still lives in rural areas. Thus, making the city the main arena of citizenship also runs the risk of producing new forms of exclusion, by not taking account of other spaces of citizenship.

citizenship can be enacted. To summarize, I therefore agree with the opinion of Isin and Turner, when they state:

Moreover, the increasing importance of cities in organizing and shaping cultural, social, symbolics [sic], and economic flows has also prompted a recognition of their role in fostering citizenship. Thus, the sovereign state is no longer the only locus of citizenship. Yet very few citizenship laws are enacted either above or below national levels (e.g. EU). So while negotiations for citizenship take place above and below the state, laws are still enacted at national levels. Hence national trajectories and practices still constitute important issues in citizenship studies despite the fact that citizenship is now negotiated at a variety of levels and sites.¹⁴⁵

Besides embedding the struggles for full citizenship in everyday practices and locating them in the urban context, Holston also stresses their emergence around residence and housing issues. He argues that through autoconstructing the city, and especially the urban peripheries, since the 1970s, the urban low-income population “gained a sense of belonging by appropriation and production—in effect, of an ownership based on productive use—that in turn consolidated a new kind of earned right to the city.”¹⁴⁶ Their exclusion turns into action, into an insurgent citizenship:

As residents battled against eviction and for infrastructure and services, they mobilized on the basis of their daily lives in the city. They create a specifically urban status of belonging, an agenda of claims legitimated on the basis of their sense of city-making, and a discursive public about both that countered the national citizenship that had marginalized them.¹⁴⁷

Hence, struggles for housing and related basic needs are central to Holston’s understanding of urban citizenship and thus also make it an essential and important topic of research. To learn more about the urban context that frames the everyday negotiations and practices of citizenship and gender dynamics in the squats *Chiquinha Gonzaga* and *Manoel Congo* in Rio de Janeiro’s city center, therefore, in the following section I will sketch out the main phases of urban development and policy in Rio de Janeiro over the last decades and up until today, and will show the historically rooted differentiated access the

145 Isin et al. 2011, *Citizenship Studies*, p. 5.

146 Holston 2013, *Housing Crises, Right to the City*, p. 262.

147 *Ibid.*, p. 264.

inhabitants have to their city, which forms the basis for the claims and practice of an insurgent citizenship.

2.1.3.1 Rio de Janeiro: A Short History of a Consistent Urban Exclusion

Lack of access to shelter and services is the starting point for a vicious circle of poverty.¹⁴⁸

In Latin America, 80 % of the population currently lives in urban areas, which makes it the most urbanized region in the world. The rapid growth of Latin American cities since the beginning of the twentieth century has increasingly gone hand-in-hand with poverty and a lack of proper urban policy and planning.¹⁴⁹ As a result, today “Latin American and Caribbean cities remain strongly dual, divided, and segregated spatially and socially.”¹⁵⁰ In Brazilian cities, and especially in Rio de Janeiro, from early on these problems found a highly visible expression through the emergence and spreading of the *favelas*. In order to understand the differentiated access of the inhabitants to their city, it is necessary to adopt a longitudinal perspective on urban dynamics covering a period of more than a century.

During the nineteenth century, significant changes took place in Rio de Janeiro—which had already started with the relocation of the Portuguese Royal family there—which drastically influenced its emerging urban landscape. After Independence, the expansion of the coffee- industry and the abolition of slavery in 1888 led to a new economic growth and the attraction of international capital to the city, which in turn increasingly brought national and international workers to Rio de Janeiro.¹⁵¹ Along with this urban growth and change, the social

148 Martine, George and Gordon McGranahan. 2010, *Brazil's Early Urban Transition. What can it Teach Urbanizing Countries?*, London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), p. 35.

149 UN-Habitat. 2012, *The State of Latin American and Caribbean Cities 2012. Towards New Urban Transition*, Nairobi: UN-Habitat, pp. XI, 19.

150 UN-Habitat 2012, *The State of Latin American and Caribbean Cities*, p. XII.

151 As a consequence of industrialization and the expansion of the coffee-based economy, Rio de Janeiro (at this time the capital of Brazil) and São Paulo had to deal with the highest levels of internal migration at that time (Brito, Fausto. 2006. “The Displacement of the Brazilian Population to the Metropolitan Areas”, *Estudos Avançados*, 20 (57): 222); I will only briefly comment on the nineteenth century,

segregation of the city—which had already started during colonial times—was further established.

Through the construction of Rio de Janeiro’s first public transportation system in the middle of the nineteenth century—the *bonde de burro*¹⁵² and the steam train—the expansion of the city into new areas outside the city center became possible. Hence, through a growing mobility, the tendency of the upper classes to settle along the coast was further intensified, and the city began to segregate into a wealthy south zone and a low-income-dominated north zone.¹⁵³ Despite these developments, at the end of the nineteenth century the city center still remained the main working and thus also living area for most of the people who came in great numbers to earn their living in Rio de Janeiro. Being financially limited in their access to transportation¹⁵⁴, and since workplaces—such as factories—were mainly located in the city center, they settled there and lived together in unhygienic conditions in overcrowded collective houses, the so-called *cortiços*.¹⁵⁵ Thus, as Brazilian geographer Mauricio de Almeida Abreu summarizes, at the end of the nineteenth century, the ideological basis for the occupation of the city had already been established:

Já no fim do século XIX estavam, pois, lançadas as bases ideológicas da ocupação da cidade no século XX. As áreas da zona sul, servidas por carris, passaram a ser sinônimo de estilo de vida “moderno”, ideologia intensamente capitalizada pelas companhias

and will not go into much detail regarding the economic and political changes of that time, as to do so would be far beyond the scope of this study.

152 A sort of carriage drawn by donkeys.

153 Almeida Abreu, Mauricio de. 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, Rio de Janeiro: IPP–Instituto Pereira Passos, pp. 35-59; Nacif Xavier, Helia and Fernanda Magalhães. 2003. “The Case of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil”, *Case Studies for the Global Report on Human Settlements Urban Slums Report*: 2f. Many of these early inhabitants of the city were former slaves, searching for better living conditions and opportunities in the growing urban areas.

154 There is not much literature on the history of urban transportation in Rio de Janeiro. See for example Pereira da Silva, Maria L. 1992, *Os Transportes Coletivos na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Tensões e Conflitos*, Rio de Janeiro: Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, Turismo e Transporte and Barat, Josef. 1975, *Estrutura Metropolitana e Sistema de Transportes. Estudo do Caso do Rio de Janeiro*, Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Planejamento Econômico e Social – IPEA/INPES.

155 Ferreira, Alvaro. 2011, *A Cidade no Século XXI. Segregação e Banalização do Espaço*, Rio de Janeiro: Consequência, p. 44; Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, p. 42.

imobiliárias que aí atuavam. As áreas abertas pelas ferrovias (...) por sua vez, deveriam se destinar aos mais pobres, que para lá já se deslocavam voluntária ou involuntariamente. Com efeito, datam do final do século as primeiras tentativas de erradicação dos cortiços do centro da cidade.¹⁵⁶

The proliferation of the *cortiços* in the city center increasingly concerned the elites, and under a sanitary discourse, they were increasingly eradicated and their inhabitants displaced by the government.¹⁵⁷ One influential example was the demolition of the so-called *Cabeça de Porco* (Pig head), a big *cortiço* near the main train station—located in the same street as the squat *Chiquinha Gonzaga* today—which at a single blow left more than 2,000 people homeless.¹⁵⁸ This practice was further enhanced through the first public urban reforms, which took place in Rio de Janeiro under the administration of Major Pereira Passos (1902–1906) and changed the face of the city significantly. In the context of economic growth, the extension of export activities, and an increasing incorporation into the global market, the city was modernized in order to “provide the city with an urban space that could express its increasing importance on the international scene.”¹⁵⁹ Hence, new prestigious buildings, such as for example the Municipal Theater (*Teatro Municipal*), were constructed, the economically important harbor restructured, streets asphalted, and infrastructure and sanitation improved—especially in the south zone of the city.

Another important part of the urban restructuring included the transformation of the until then narrow streets into wide boulevards based on Haussmann’s Parisian design, as for example the construction of the great *Avenida Central*—today *Avenida Rio Branco*—in the city center. As a result thousands of low-income people were evicted and their houses bulldozed. Evicted people were forced to move away from the city center because land value and rent skyrocketed. Thus, while most of them moved to the northern suburbs, others resettled on the hills of the city, giving thereby rise to a new form of popular

156 Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, pp. 140f.

157 From early on questions of ethnicity played an important role in this context. For further reading on that topic see for example Chalhoub, Sidney. 1996, *Cidade febril – Cortiços e epidemias na Corte Imperial*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.

158 Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, p. 50; Nacif Xavier et al. 2003, *The Case of Rio de Janeiro*, p. 10.

159 Brandão, Zeca. 2006. “Urban Planning in Rio de Janeiro. A Critical Review of the Urban Design Practice in the Twentieth Century”, *City & Time*, 2 (2): 37; Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, p. 59.

housing: the *favelas*.¹⁶⁰ In contrast to the prosperous parts of the city, these forms of housing developed without any state support. In order to further legitimate exclusion and displacement, the development of the *favelas* was accompanied by an official discourse of marginality, which then, as today, depicted the *favelas* and their inhabitants as a source of criminality, danger, infectious diseases, and social disorder.¹⁶¹ But, as Janice E. Perlman shows in her famous book “the Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro” this stereotypical and marginalizing presentation of the *favela* population is a “myth” and mainly an instrument of the dominant classes to justify oppression, as the inhabitants of the *favelas* have in fact, always been very integrated into society and city life.¹⁶²

The social stratification that originated with Pereira Passos’ Reforms increased further in the following years, but public investment switched from the center to the southern zone of the city. As Abreu emphasizes:

A intervenção direta do Estado sobre o urbano levou à transformação acelerada da forma da cidade, tanto em termos da aparência (morfologia urbana) como de conteúdo (separação de usos e de classes sociais no espaço). A longo prazo, entretanto as conseqüências foram ainda maiores. Com efeito, atuando agora diretamente sobre um espaço cada vez mais dividido entre bairros burgueses e bairros proletários e privilegiando apenas os primeiros na dotação de seus recursos, o Estado veio a acelerar o processo de estratificação espacial que já era característico da cidade desde o Século XIX, contribuindo assim para a consolidação de uma estrutura núcleo/periferia que perdura até hoje.¹⁶³

Thus, the spatial expansion of the *favelas* in the following decades ran alongside the expansion of the formal city, as the *favelas* settled wherever work was available. Cheap labor was needed for the growing urban industrial expansion, and the number of urban inhabitants grew significantly over the years (see Table 1), reaching the highest numbers in the 1950s and 1970s.

In search of a better life, people migrated in great numbers to the city especially from the northeastern regions of Brazil.¹⁶⁴ Many of these immigrants

160 Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, pp. 59–67; Brandão 2006, *Urban Planning in Rio de Janeiro*, pp. 37ff.

161 Lanz 2009, *Der Kampf um das Recht auf Stadt*, p. 369.

162 Perlman 1976, *The Myth of Marginality*.

163 Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, p. 73.

164 For studies on internal migration flows and its development in Brazil see for example Baeninger, Rosana. 2011. “Migrações Internas no Brasil Século 21.

arrived in Rio de Janeiro without financial means to settle down, thus they faced great difficulties in gaining access to housing after arriving in Rio de Janeiro.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, without any opportunity to establish themselves in the formal housing market, often their only choice was to settle in the *favelas* or other illegal settlements of the city,¹⁶⁶ which were normally self-constructed and lacked sufficient state provision of basic public goods and services.¹⁶⁷ These settlements grew and became concentrated especially in the northern suburbs (*Baixada Fluminense*), where the industrial area of Rio de Janeiro progressively developed over time, and also on the hills of the southern zone—the residential area of the middle and upper classes—where services (especially domestic services) were in demand.¹⁶⁸

Attempts by the government to solve the housing problems, for example through government-funded housing programs—the construction of the so-called *conjuntos habitacionais* during the years 1930-1964—were largely symbolic since they had no significant effect on the housing shortage.¹⁶⁹ The housing crisis was further exacerbated through steadily rising property prices (especially in the middle- and upper-class southern and central areas of the city), an increasing real estate speculation, and the enactment of the tenancy regulating law (*lei do inquilinato*) in 1942.¹⁷⁰

Evidências Empíricas e Desafios Conceituais” in *Mobilidade Espacial da População. Desafios Teóricos e Metodológicos para o seu Estudo*, edited by J. M. Pinto da Cunha. Campinas: Núcleo de Estudos de População-Nepo/Unicamp, pp. 71–93 or Brito 2006, *The Displacement of the Brazilian Population*.

165 Correia, Fernanda G. n.a., *Breve Histórico da Questão Habitacional na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro*. http://www.achegas.net/numero/31/fernanda_correa_31.pdf (01 Nov 2015), p. 32.

166 There are three main types of irregular settlements: *Cortiços* (collective buildings), *loteamentos* (illegal subdivisions of land) and *favelas*, see Martine et al. 2010, *Brazil’s Early Urban Transition*, p. 32 or Nacif Xavier et al. 2003, *The Case of Rio de Janeiro*, p. 8.

167 Pereira Leite 2008, *Pobreza y Exclusión en las Favelas*, p. 215; Bonduki, Nabil G. 1994. “Origens da Habitação Social no Brasil”, *Análise Social*, XXIX (3): 729.

168 Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, pp. 103, 143; Killisch, Winfried and Jürgen Dietz. 2002. „Sanierung von Favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Bessere Lebensbedingungen in städtischen Marginalsiedlungen“, *Geographische Rundschau* (3): 47f.

169 Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, p. 95.

170 The law not only, as intended, restricted the profit of the landlords, but also favored the eviction of the low-income population and fostered the spreading of businesses

O aumento do valor do solo, a distância cada vez maior que separava os locais de emprego dos novos loteamentos, o congelamento dos aluguéis (que diminuía em muito a oferta de novos habitações), tudo isso resultou numa crise habitacional generalizada que afetou principalmente a população pobre. Conseqüentemente, multiplicou-se a população favelada (...).¹⁷¹

*Table 1: Percentage of total population living in urban areas and annual growth rates, Brazil 1940–2010*¹⁷²

	Urban at start of period (%)	Rate of Population growth
1940-1950	31.2	2.4
1950-1960	36.2	3.0
1960-1970	44.7	2.9
1970-1980	55.9	2.5
1980-1991	67.6	1.9
1991-2000	75.6	1.6
2000-2010	81.1	1.2
2010	84.4	-----

The eviction of *favelas* and their low-income populations, especially from areas attractive to speculative building, continued in the following years and was intensified by the authoritarian regime between 1962 and 1974. After a following brief period of urban *laissez faire* politics, from 1979 on, urban politics started to change: the first administrative and planning foundations for future renewal projects and infrastructure programs in the *favelas* were laid, and their first measures and programs implemented.¹⁷³

with private properties. For more details on the *lei do inquilinato* see Bonduki, Nabil G. 1998, *Origens da Habitação Social no Brasil. Arquitetura Moderna, Lei do Inquilinato e Difusão da Casa Própria*, São Paulo: Estação Liberdade / FAPESP, pp. 247-264, 317; Bonduki 1994, *Origens da Habitação Social no Brasil*, p. 714.

171 Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, p. 116.

172 Martine, George and Gordon McGranahan. 2013. “The Legacy of Inequality and Negligence in Brazil’s Unfinished Urban Transition. Lessons for other Developing Regions”, *International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development*, 5 (1): 10.

173 Nacif Xavier et al. 2003, *The Case of Rio de Janeiro*, p. 13; Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, pp. 134f; Killisch et al. 2002, *Sanierung von Favelas in Rio*, p. 48.

The Municipal Master Plan (*Plano Diretor Decenal da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro*) in 1991 also included several *favela* upgrading programs, such as for example the famous *Favela-Bairro*¹⁷⁴ program which started in 1994 under the coordination of the then just established Municipal Housing Secretariat (*Secretaria Municipal de Habitação*, SEHAB), responsible for the housing policy in Rio de Janeiro.¹⁷⁵ Instead of aiming at the removal of the *favelas*, these programs now aimed *inter alia* at their urbanization and socio-spatial integration, in order to convert them into legal and regular neighborhoods of the city.¹⁷⁶

However, despite the implementation of those housing programs, the low-income population is still affected by a lack of access to affordable housing and unequal access to public goods and services—in similar ways to the situation a century ago. The census from 2010 revealed that actually around 23% of the inhabitants of the State of Rio de Janeiro and 6% of the total Brazilian population are currently living in *favelas*.¹⁷⁷ After returning to democracy in the 1980s, neoliberal policies and economic crisis led *inter alia* to falling wages, rising unemployment, growth of the informal sector, and a lack of infrastructure development and construction in Rio de Janeiro (and throughout Brazil), which

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- 174 For further information on and discussion of the *Favela-Bairro* project see Killisch et al. 2002, Sanierung von Favelas in Rio, pp. 49f; Cavallieri, Fernando. 2003. “Favela-Bairro. Integração de Áreas Informais no Rio de Janeiro” in *A Cidade da Informalidade. O Desafio das Cidades Latino-Americanas*, edited by P. Abramo and S. P. Taschner. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Sette Letras /FAPERJ, pp. 265–296; Jaitman, Laura and José Brakarz. 2013, *Evaluation of Slum Upgrading Programs. Literature Review and Methodological Approaches*, n.a.: Inter-American Development Bank; Fiori, Jorge and Elizabeth R. R. Riley. 2004. “Melhoria Física e Integração Social no Rio de Janeiro. O Caso do Favela Bairro” in *Brasil Urbano*, edited by E. Fernandes and M. M. Valença. Rio de Janeiro: MAUAD, pp. 189–210.
- 175 Since 1987 housing policy has been the responsibility of the municipal authorities. One the one hand this has fostered more flexible and people-oriented politics; on the other, financial resources are much more limited (Killisch et al. 2002, Sanierung von Favelas in Rio, p. 48).
- 176 Killisch et al. 2002, Sanierung von Favelas in Rio, pp. 48f; Nacif Xavier et al. 2003, The Case of Rio de Janeiro, p. 14; Cavallieri 2003, Favela-Bairro, pp. 265, 269f.
- 177 Garcia, Janaina. 2011, *Mais de 11 Milhões Vivem em Favelas no Brasil, diz IBGE; Maioria está na Região Sudeste*. <http://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2011/12/21/mais-de-11-milhoes-vivem-em-favelas-no-brasil-diz-ibge-maioria-esta-na-regiao-sudeste.htm> (14 Jul 2015); Cavallieri, Fernando and Adriana Vial. 2012. “Favelas na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro. O Quadro Populacional com Base no Censo 2010”, *Coleção Estudos Cariocas* (20120501): 5.

in turn fostered the rising of rents and private property speculation. Thus, the historically established significant deficit in housing was intensified and led the number of *favelas* and informal settlements have increased again.¹⁷⁸ In 2012 the João Pinheiro Foundation—a prestigious institution in housing studies—estimated the country’s housing deficit to be about 5,792 million units,¹⁷⁹ mostly concentrated among families with an income of 0-3 minimum wages.¹⁸⁰ It is noteworthy and alarming that the number of vacant properties in 2010 in Brazil has been estimated at 6,052 million units, and thus more or less corresponds to this deficit.¹⁸¹ The maintenance of vacant domiciles is a common strategy of real estate speculation, in order to further increase the prices of the buildings on the real estate market over time. Map 2 shows the percentage distribution of vacant domiciles in relation to permanent households in the year 2000. It indicates the high number of vacant domiciles especially in the city center (23%)—location of *Manoel Congo* and *Chiquinha Gonzaga*—and the upper-middle-class neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca (30%). Both areas have experienced an intensive process of investment and land valorization over the last decade, and especially in the context of the preparations for the Soccer World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. The price per square meter in Barra da Tijuca increased from R\$ 2,177 in 2008 to R\$ 8,280 in 2014, and in the city center from R\$ 3,752 in 2008 to R\$ 9,493 in 2014.¹⁸² This development

178 Pereira Leite 2008, *Pobreza y Exclusión en las Favelas*, p. 215; Levy, Charmain. 2010. “Brazilian Urban Popular Movement. The 1997 Mobilization of the Inner-City Slum Movement in São Paulo”, *Studies in Political Economy* (85): 36; Alves Teixeira, Tiago R. 2011, *O Estatuto da Cidade e os Movimentos Sociais*. SUERB I Simpósio de Estudos Urbanos: desenvolvimento regional e dinâmica ambiental, 29 a 31 de agosto de 2011, Universidade Estadual do Paraná, Paranavaí. http://www.mauoparolin.pro.br/seurb/Trabalhos/EIXO_5_MOVIMENTOS_SOCIAIS_URBANOS_5_ARTIGOS/ALVES_TEXEIRA_O_ESTATUTO_DA_CIDADE_E_O_S_MOVIMENTOS_SOCIAIS.pdf (14 Jul 2015), p. 3.

179 Fundação João Pinheiro 2014, *Nota Técnica 1 Déficit Habitacional*, p. 9.

180 The João Pinheiro Foundation, for example, estimates that 62.7% of the housing deficit corresponds to families with 0-3 minimum wages (Fundação João Pinheiro 2013, *Déficit Habitacional Municipal no Brasil 2010*, p. 41).


181 *Ibid.*, p. 73.

182 Garcia Castro, Demian and Patrícia Novaes Ramos. 2015. “Empreendedorismo Urbano no Contexto dos Megaeventos Esportivos. Impactos no Direito à Moradia na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro” in *Rio de Janeiro. Os Impactos da Copa do Mundo 2014 e das Olimpíadas 2016*, edited by D. Castro Garcia, C. Gaffney, P. Novaes Ramos,

was also confirmed during the interview with one of the members of the SEHAB:

Vai melhorar sempre pros setores mais abastados, né (...). Sempre, pra quem mora aqui na Zona Sul, vai ficar ótimo. Agora, quem está com problema aqui vai ser expulso, rapidamente. O aluguel tá cada vez subindo. Quer dizer, quem mora aqui de aluguel vai ser expulso logo, logo. Porque essa valorização da terra que está acontecendo tá, eu digo que é uma limpeza étnico-social que está acontecendo na Zona Sul. Na Zona Sul, na Zona Norte, quer dizer Tijuca, Vila Isabel.¹⁸³

Map 2: Percentage distribution of vacant domiciles in relation to permanent households, Rio de Janeiro 2000¹⁸⁴



As mentioned in the interview, this development came along with a dramatic increase in forced evictions of the low-income population, especially from areas of interest to real estate speculation, further exacerbating the housing problem

and Rodrigues Juciano. Rio de Janeiro: Observatório das Metrôpoles / IPPUR/UFRJ, pp. 76ff.

183 Interview with a member of the SEHAB in Rio de Janeiro, 02.06.2011.

184 Drawn from Frota Sigaud, Márcia. 2007. "Caracterização dos Domicílios na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro", *Coleção Estudos Cariocas* (20070402): 4; lightly modified by myself.

and following old patterns of segregation in the city.¹⁸⁵ Contemporary governmental housing programs such as My House, My Life (*Minha Casa Minha Vida*, MCMV)¹⁸⁶ also continue to locate the low-income population far away from the city center, preferably in the less valuable suburbs of the eastern zone where they still confront a lack of infrastructure and basic services and are often far away from their actual places of work in the city center (see section 4.1.2).¹⁸⁷

185 The implementation of the Pacification Police Unit (*Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora*, UPP) in some of the central *favelas* had also led to an increase of land value and prices in the *favelas*, where people also used to, and continue to, pay rent. As Regina Bega dos Santos states: “*Morar em favela pode ser uma alternativa, mas não é para todos aqueles que estão fora do mercado formal de moradia. A demanda é sempre maior que a oferta e mesmo os “barracos” de favela, com os preços regidos pelos mesmos mecanismos do mercado formal de moradia, são ainda altos para a parcela mais pobre da população*” (Santos, Regina B. 2004, *Movimentos Sociais Urbanos*, São Paulo: Editora UNESP, p. 120). For further reading on the topic of the UPPs in Rio de Janeiro see for example Cano, Ignacio, Dorian Borges, and Eduardo Ribeiro. 2012, *Os Donos do Morro. Uma Avaliação Exploratória do Impacto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro*, Rio de Janeiro: LAV/UERJ; Garcia Castro et al. 2015, *Empreendedorismo Urbano no Contexto dos Megaeventos*, p. 82 or Blasi Cunha, Juliana. 2011, *O PAC e a UPP no “Complexo Pavão-Pavãozinho-Cantagalo”*. *Processo de Implementação de Políticas Públicas em uma Favela da Zona Sul da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro*. XI Congresso Luso Afro Brasileiro de Ciências Sociais Diversidades e (Des)Igualdades, 07 a 10 de agosto de 2011, Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA), Salvador. http://www.xiconlab.eventos.dype.com.br/resources/anais/3/1308347052_ARQUIVO_paperConlab.pdf (30 May 2015).

186 For information and evaluation of the program see for example Marques, Eduardo and Leandro Rodrigues. 2013. “O Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida na Metrópole Paulista. Atendimento Habitacional e Padrões de Segregação”, *Estudos urbanos regionais*, 15 (2): 159–177; Pádua Rodrigues, Leandro de. 2015, *Como Avaliar a Produção Habitacional do Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida?* V Seminário Discente do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política, 04 a 08 de maio de 2015, São Paulo. <http://www.sistemas.fflch.usp.br/ocspkp/sdpscp/Vsem/paper/view/383/188> (16 Jul 2015); Bonduki, Nabil G. 2009. “Do Projeto Moradia ao Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida”, *Teoria e Debate* (82): 8–14.

187 Garcia Castro, Demian, Christopher Gaffney, Patrícia Novaes Ramos, Rodrigues Juciano, Carolina Pereira dos Santos, and Orlando Alves dos Santos Junior. 2015. “O Projeto Olímpico da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Reflexões sobre os Impactos dos

But, as mentioned earlier, since the beginning of urbanization there has been resistance to the excluding character of urban policy, in Brazil and elsewhere.¹⁸⁸ In cities, it was and is mainly urban social movements seeking to improve the living conditions for the low-income population, with many women among their participants (see section 4.3). Since the 1950s and especially the 1970s, grassroots movements, in the form of civic associations and neighborhood organizations developed in the *favelas* and around the city at a local level, and in the form of direct action—very often with the support of progressive wing of the Catholic Church—through the Basic Ecclesial Communities (*Comunidades Eclesiais de Base*, CBEs). These movements organized around basic goods and services they were lacking, such as healthcare, transportation, sewage, water, electricity, and housing, and were often fighting for legalization and against removal.¹⁸⁹

One specific strategy to confront the growing lack of housing—increasingly applied during the 1970s and 1980s in capitals and larger cities of Brazil—was the occupation and claiming of unused urban land.¹⁹⁰ Through progressive linking of these often only locally organized housing movements from the 1980s onwards, large and nationally organized urban movements emerged, such as the National Union for Popular Housing (*União Nacional de Moradia Popular*, UNMP), the Centre of People’s Movements (*Central de Movimentos Populares*, CMP), the National Confederation of Neighborhood Associations (*Confederação Nacional das Associações de Moradores*, CONAM) or the National Movement of Struggle for Housing (*Movimento Nacional de Luta Pela Moradia*,

Megaeventos Esportivos na Perspectiva do Direito à Cidade” in *Rio de Janeiro. Os Impactos da Copa do Mundo 2014 e das Olimpíadas 2016*, edited by D. Castro Garcia, C. Gaffney, P. Novaes Ramos, and Rodrigues Juciano. Rio de Janeiro: Observatório das Metrôpoles / IPPUR/ UFRJ, p. 23; Martine et al. 2013, *The Legacy of Inequality and Negligence*, p. 35.

188 Such as for example the already mentioned tenant strikes and movements at the beginning of the twentieth century in Argentina and Mexico (see section 2.1.3).

189 Hochstetler, Kathryn. 1997, *Democratizing Pressures from Below? Social Movements in New Brazilian Democracy*. Latin American Studies Association XX International Congress, 17-19 April 1997, Guadalajara. <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA97/hochstetler.pdf> (16 Jul 2015), pp. 2f; Santos 2004, *Movimentos Sociais Urbanos*, p. 126.

190 Santos 2004, *Movimentos Sociais Urbanos*, pp. 132f; Drago, Felipe. 2011. “Autogestão na Produção Habitacional. Programa Crédito Solidário, entre a Institucionalização e o Confronto Político” *Dissertação de Mestrado*, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, p. 84.

MNLM).¹⁹¹ After transition to democracy, civil society enthusiastically engaged in the debate over the new Constitution, and different actors tried to integrate their respective claims. The housing movements and other actors from civil society demanding urban reform came together as the National Movement for Urban Reform (*Movimento Nacional da Reforma Urbana*, MNRU) with the aim to elaborate a legal proposal that could be presented to the National Constituent Assembly. Although not all the demands presented in the final popular amendment for urban reform (*emenda popular pela reforma urbana*) were included in the 1988 Constitution, for the first time a section on urban policy was incorporated, consisting of Articles 182 and 183.¹⁹² Article 182 anchored the social function of the city in the Constitution, which should be enacted on a municipal level through a Master Plan (*Plano Diretor*). The development of such a Master Plan then became obligatory for cities with more than twenty thousand inhabitants. Furthermore, the article states that the social function of urban land can be promoted through subdivision, expropriation, and progressive taxation.¹⁹³

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- 191 Queiroz e Mello, Irene de. 2014. “Trajetórias, Cotidianos e Utopias de uma Ocupação no Centro do Rio de Janeiro” Tese de Mestrado, UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 75f; Freitas Oliveira, Elaine de. 2008, *Revitalização dos Centros Urbanos. Intervenção Público-Privada na Distribuição Sócio-Espacial da População e Movimentos Sociais de Contestação*. XVI Encontro Nacional de Estudos Populacionais, 29 de setembro a 03 de outubro de 2008, Caxambú. http://www.abep.nepo.unicamp.br/encontro2008/docspdf/ABEP2008_1221.pdf (16 Jul 2015), p. 3; Gohn, Maria d. G. M. 1991, *Movimentos Sociais e Lutas pela Moradia*, São Paulo: Edições Loyola, pp. 12ff; Levy, Charmain. 2005. “The Housing Movement in the City of São Paulo. Crisis and Revival” in *Collective Action and Radicalism in Brazil. Women, Urban Housing and Rural Movements*, edited by M. Duquette and M. Galdino. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 101f, 108.
- 192 Avritzer, Leonardo. 2010. “O Estatuto da Cidade e a Democratização das Políticas Urbanas no Brasil”, *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais* (91): 205–209; Cordeiro Fonseca Ferreira, Regina F. 2008. “Constituição Cidadã e o Direito à Cidade. 20 Anos de Luta e Muitos Desafios”, *Proposta* (117): 36f.
- 193 Art. 182: “A política de desenvolvimento urbano, executada pelo Poder Público municipal, conforme diretrizes gerais fixadas em lei, tem por objetivo ordenar o pleno desenvolvimento das funções sociais da cidade e garantir o bem-estar de seus habitantes. § 1º O plano diretor, aprovado pela Câmara Municipal, obrigatório para cidades com mais de vinte mil habitantes, é o instrumento básico da política de desenvolvimento e de expansão urbana. § 2º A propriedade urbana cumpre sua função social quando atende às exigências fundamentais de ordenação da cidade expressas no plano diretor. § 3º As desapropriações de imóveis urbanos serão feitas

Article 183 had a considerable impact on squatters' rights, as it allows residents of small house lots to obtain an ownership title after five years of continuous residence.¹⁹⁴

After the Constitution was passed social movements continued their struggle and formulated their demands, such as the inclusion of the right to housing in the constitutional text, or the regulation of the article on urban policy, aiming especially at the specification of the concept of social function and the mechanisms for its implementation.¹⁹⁵ In order to call attention to the housing deficit and the number of vacant and decayed buildings in Brazilian cities (for Rio de Janeiro, see Map 2), more housing movements were started in the 1990s—when living conditions further deteriorated as result of the neoliberal reforms—to occupy these buildings and to claim the social function of housing in practice.¹⁹⁶

com prévia e justa indenização em dinheiro. § 4º É facultado ao Poder Público municipal, mediante lei específica para área incluída no plano diretor, exigir, nos termos da lei federal, do proprietário do solo urbano não edificado, subutilizado ou não utilizado, que promova seu adequado aproveitamento, sob pena, sucessivamente, de: I – parcelamento ou edificação compulsórios; II – imposto sobre a propriedade predial e territorial urbana progressivo no tempo; III – desapropriação com pagamento mediante títulos da dívida pública de emissão previamente aprovada pelo Senado Federal, com prazo de resgate de até dez anos, em parcelas anuais, iguais e sucessivas, assegurados o valor real da indenização e os juros legais” (Presidência da República. 1988, Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm (22 Jul 2015)).

- 194 Art. 183: “*Aquele que possuir como sua área urbana de até duzentos e cinquenta metros quadrados, por cinco anos, ininterruptamente e sem oposição, utilizando-a para sua moradia ou de sua família, adquirir-lhe-á o domínio, desde que não seja proprietário de outro imóvel urbano ou rural. § 1º O título de domínio e a concessão de uso serão conferidos ao homem ou à mulher, ou a ambos, independentemente do estado civil. § 2º Esse direito não será reconhecido ao mesmo possuidor mais de uma vez. § 3º Os imóveis públicos não serão adquiridos por usucapião*” (Presidência da República 1988, Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil).
- 195 One of the main actors of that struggle was the *National Forum of Urban Reform* (*Fórum Nacional da Reforma Urbana*, FNRU) who had originated from the MNRU and is active until today. Among its members are also the MNLM and the CMP.
- 196 Cardoso, Adauto L. 2008. “Vazios Urbanos e Função Social da Propriedade”, *Proposta* (116): 8; Santos 2004, *Movimentos Sociais Urbanos*, pp. 137–142.

These grassroots movements obtained very important changes in legislation, to justify pressure on the authorities in their demand for decent living conditions.¹⁹⁷ Among their achievements they secured the inclusion of the right to housing in Article 6 on social rights of the 1988 Constitution in the year 2000,¹⁹⁸ and the enactment of Law number 10.257—the City Statute (*Estatuto da Cidade*)¹⁹⁹—in 2001, regulating the constitutional articles 182 and 183 on urban policy. The City Statute provides further instruments for urban policy: it allows local administrations to better realize and enforce the social function of property, for instance by counteracting real estate speculation and the vacancy of buildings through expropriation after five years of disuse, or through progressive property taxation²⁰⁰. It further strengthened the role of the municipalities in the formulation of urban development directives, and obliged them to introduce Master Plans within five years. Another success for social movements was the introduction of the principle of “democratic management of the city,” making popular participation obligatory in the formulation, exercise, and monitoring of urban planning and development.²⁰¹ Additionally, in order to support and urge

197 Also, according to the General Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 25.1), housing is part of the basic conditions for a decent life (United Nations. 1948, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a28> (22 Jul 2015)). Without housing, access to health, education and work become much more difficult or even impossible, as the interviews with the inhabitants of both squats also demonstrated.

198 Art. 6: “São direitos sociais a educação, a saúde, a alimentação, o trabalho, a moradia, o lazer, a segurança, a previdência social, a proteção à maternidade e à infância, a assistência aos desamparados, na forma desta Constituição” (Presidência da República 1988, Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil).

199 See Presidência da República. 2001, *Lei No 10.257, de 10 de Julho de 2001*. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/LEIS_2001/L10257.htm (22 Jul 2015).

200 Tax on urban property and land (*Imposto sobre a Propriedade Predial e Territorial Urbana*, IPTU).

201 Presidência da República 2001, Lei No 10.257. For more reading and discussion on the City Statute see Avritzer 2010, O Estatuto da Cidade e a Democratização; Cordeiro Fonseca Ferreira 2008, Constituição Cidadã; Rolnik, Raquel. 2015, *10 Anos do Estatuto da Cidade. Das Lutas pela Reforma Urbana às Cidades da Copa do Mundo*. http://www.usp.br/fau/cursos/graduacao/arq_urbanismo/disciplinas/aup0278/Bibliografia_Basica/Ae01-2015.03.12-rolnik-10_Anos_Estatuto.pdf (23 Jul 2015); Santos Carvalho, Celso, and Anaclaudia Rossbach, editors. 2010, *The City Statute. A Commentary*, São Paulo: Cities Alliance and Ministry of Cities;

local governments to implement the City Statute, in 2003—under the government of Lula—the Ministry of Cities (*Ministério das Cidades*) was created, which integrated the areas of housing, sanitation, urban transportation, and land affairs into one single institution to facilitate their articulation.²⁰²

Hence, since the beginning of urban development, citizenship struggles “from below” had confronted the “entrenched regimes of citizen inequality”²⁰³ and had finally achieved a formal inclusion of the right to housing and mechanisms for its implementation in the Brazilian Constitution. Here the entanglement of legal status and social process (see also section 2.1.1) becomes apparent, as the processes and practices of negotiating rights were able to contest and broaden the content and character of given rights, to retroact on the legal status. But the struggles for urban citizenship also vividly demonstrate that in Brazil those who possess formal state-membership can nevertheless be excluded from social, civil and political rights.

Despite the achievements of urban social movements, to date there still exists a distinct gap between the formulated rights in the 1988 Constitution and the implementation of and access to these rights in practice. The requirement of the social function of property is rarely implemented by the private sector, and governments are still unable to enforce and apply sufficiently the right to housing in practice,²⁰⁴ as also confirmed by one of the members of the SEHAB during our interview:

[D]esde da década de 70 que os movimentos, que as ONGs, que as Universidades, inclusive técnicos de municípios que demandaram a legislação, porque não existia nada pro urbano. Nem na Constituição, nem na lei, nem nada. Ai nós conseguimos então, na Constituição o Art. 182,183, e outro também sobre a questão da participação. Então, foi uma conquista muito grande. Lutamos muito, muito. E, justamente quer dizer, essa, essa demanda também da moradia foi fundamental pra explicar muito claramente que o direito a moradia tem que ser respeito e tem que ser previsto, etc. Mas isso não acontece (...) porque os interesses capitalistas são muito fortes.²⁰⁵

Fernandes, Edésio. 2007. “Constructing the ‘Right To the City’ in Brazil”, *Social & Legal Studies*, 16 (2): 201–219.

202 Rolnik, Raquel, Renato Cymbalista, and Kazuo Nakano. 2011. “Solo Urbano e Habitação de Interesse Social. A Questão Fundiária na Política Habitacional e Urbana do País”, *Revista de Direito da ADVOCEF*, 1 (13): 131.

203 Holston 2009, *Insurgent Citizenship in an Era of Global Urban Peripheries*, p. 245.

204 Santos 2004, *Movimentos Sociais Urbanos*, pp. 138f.

205 Interview with a member of the SEHAB in Rio de Janeiro, 02.06.2011.

Hence, since many people in their everyday lives in Brazil are still confronted with a significant lack of access to affordable housing and with unequal access to public goods and services, social movements continue their struggle to occupy vacant buildings in the city centers of Brazil in order to raise awareness of their exclusion and force governments to implement the existing legislation. Two of these movements are the already mentioned MNLM and CMP, which were both founded at the beginning of the 1990s, emerging out of the social struggles in the quest for democracy in the 1980s, and which are the national movements responsible for the squats *Manoel Congo* and *Chiquinha Gonzaga*.

The MNLM²⁰⁶ was founded in 1990 during the *I Encontro Nacional dos Movimentos de Moradia*, and is active in 15 states of Brazil.²⁰⁷ Its central aim is the “*solidariedade pelo espaço urbano, numa luta orgânica e única em conjunto com o MST - além da terra, luta pelo lote, pela casa, saneamento e demais necessidades da população.*”²⁰⁸ Thus, even though their main concern is to pursue urban reform, and especially to establish a housing policy of social interest, they understand that these topics are related to other needs, such as healthcare and education, and therefore incorporate the latter into their struggle. As one of the national coordinators of the movement explained:

O objetivo do movimento é mudar a cidade. Estabelecer uma nova lógica de planejamento e de construção das cidades, que caibam todos e todas com a mesma qualidade. Com os mesmos acessos, os mesmos jeitos. Com acesso aos bens, aos serviços da cidade. Para que não seja uma cidade planejada na ótica do mercado, na ótica do capital, onde poucos que pagam têm tudo. Os muitos que não têm dinheiro para pagar não têm nada. Quando tem alguma coisa conquistada, às vezes uma moradia num bom local, conquistada. É tirado por esse planejamento excludente. Você ta vendo a ação que está sendo construída. Por conta dessa lógica de planejamento da cidade-mercadoria. Onde o transporte que é o nosso direito à mobilidade, para eles é transporte coletivo uma grande mercadoria! Que os ônibus lucram muito. Então tudo que para nós é um direito e uma condição de vida digna,

206 For a further overview and detailed description of the MNLM see for example Queiroz e Mello 2014, *Trajetórias, Cotidianos e Utopias*; Drago 2011, *Autogestão na Produção Habitacional* and also Fornazin, Henrique. 2014. “Luta pela Moradia na Ocupação Manuel Congo. Imagens e Implicações Subjetivas” *Dissertação de Mestrado*, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro.

207 Pará, Acre, Mato Grosso do Sul, Distrito Federal, São Paulo, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Sergipe, Bahia, Tocantins, Rio de Janeiro, Paraná, Paraíba and Rio Grande do Sul (MNLM-RS. 2007, *MNLM Rio Grande do Sul*. <http://mnlm-rs.blogspot.de/> (28 Jul 2015)).

208 MNLM-RS 2007, *MNLM Rio Grande do Sul*.

para eles é uma mercadoria. Eles querem saber como vão lucrar com aquilo. Então a nossa luta é pela desmercantilização dessas necessidades, desses serviços, desses pés que são necessários para a nossa vida. A gente acredita que só assim, só com a desmercantilização, é que a cidade vai entrar numa nova lógica de construção. Onde caibam todos. Onde caiba você na Gávea, num condomínio onde dois carros de polícia te guardando, mais a sua segurança privada, né? E os outros sejam varridos, igual a ocupação da Cruz onde a polícia mata você estando dentro. Então que lógica de cidade é essa? Agora mudar essa lógica não se muda com um ato. Não se muda com um decreto. É um processo de luta, de formulação, reflexão, mobilização, enfrentamento, negociação ... num consenso! E que o movimento nacional está comprometido com ele, porque a lição do movimento nacional da luta pela moradia, quando a gente organiza uma ocupação, a gente não ta convidando as pessoas a terem uma casa. Estamos convidando eles a participar de uma luta por uma outra cidade.²⁰⁹

In striving to achieve their aim, the movement's main strategy is to occupy vacant public buildings and land in central areas, such as the squat *Manoel Congo*.²¹⁰ In their struggle for urban reform the MNLM, both past and present, also relates to and supports other movements, such as the Landless Workers' Movement (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Terra*, MST), the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil (*Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil*, CNBB), the Central Union of Workers (*Central Única dos Trabalhadores*, CUT) the CMP, and others.²¹¹

The CMP²¹² was founded in 1993 during the *I Congresso Nacional de Movimentos Populares*, and is also active in 15 states of Brazil.²¹³ In contrast to the MNLM, the CMP constitutes a unit of several movements with a broad range of topics²¹⁴ that emerged in order to bring together and support their common

209 Interview in *Manoel Congo* with the national coordinator of the MNLM, a 51-year-old woman, 06.04.2011.

210 For the internal organization of the MNLM and its rules, see section 3.2.

211 Drago 2011, *Autogestão na Produção Habitacional*, p. 83.

212 For a further overview and detailed description of the CMP see for example Drago 2011, *Autogestão na Produção Habitacional*; Genilce Gomes, Francisca. 2010. "A Central de Movimentos Populares (CMP) e os Desafios da Articulação dos Movimentos Sociais" *Dissertação de Mestrado*, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, São Paulo.

213 Drago 2011, *Autogestão na Produção Habitacional*, p. 58.

214 "No encontro de fundação, estiveram presentes 950 pessoas oriundas de 22 Estados do País e representando vários movimentos, tais quais os de prostitutas, negros,

struggles and to mitigate the threat of their individual fragmentation.²¹⁵ As formulated by the CMP: “*Seu eixo central de atuação é as Políticas Públicas com Participação Popular, um instrumento de articulação dos movimentos populares.*”²¹⁶ One of their main fields of action today is the struggle for urban reform and for a housing policy of social interest, which is also expressed through the hegemony of housing movements within the CMP.²¹⁷

To sum up, the short historical overview on urban development and policy in Rio de Janeiro has demonstrated the consistent exclusion of certain parts of the population from access to and the benefits of the urban space. As sociologist Stephan Lanz stresses, since the beginning of urbanization the government was unwilling to meet the immigrants’ high demand for housing and infrastructure, and was mainly interested in satisfying the needs of the elites of the city.²¹⁸ The consequences of this practice persist today, and—following old patterns—the low-income population is still spatially displaced and in practice excluded from constitutional rights, such as the social right to housing. However, through their exclusion, the urban space also becomes the context and framework in which citizenship takes place and is continuously negotiated and shaped. Since early on, the affected population had organized, for example in the form of social movements, and fought their exclusion and differentiated access to the city, constructing thus a “citizenship from below.”

mulheres, crianças e adolescentes, homossexuais, moradores de rua, portadores de deficiência, índios, movimento por transporte, moradia, saúde, saneamento, direitos humanos, entre outros, demonstrando a amplitude e a diversidade ali representadas” (CMP–SP. 2011, Central de Movimentos Populares São Paulo. <http://cmp-sp.blogspot.de/p/historia.html> (29 Jul 2015)).

215 Genilce Gomes 2010, A Central de Movimentos Populares, p. 47.

216 CMP–SP 2011, Central de Movimentos Populares São Paulo.

217 Genilce Gomes 2010, A Central de Movimentos Populares, pp. 66f, 94f.

218 Lanz 2009, *Der Kampf um das Recht auf Stadt*, p. 368; Almeida Abreu 2010, *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, p. 143.

2.2 GENDER

On ne naît pas femme, on le devient.²¹⁹

Since its emergence in the 1970s, the notion of gender has been highly debated and, as with the notion of citizenship, in recent years the academic arena has developed various understandings of its meaning. As a consequence, in the field of Gender Studies different methodological and theoretical approaches with different foci have developed.²²⁰ Thus, when talking about gender, the underlying theoretical approach must be taken into account and must be made explicit.²²¹

Gender is far, however, from reaching a state of consensus. While most feminist scholars agree on the distinction between sex and gender, and the need to explore masculinity as well as femininity, and homosexuality as well as heterosexuality, there is a vigorous intellectual debate about the construction of gender, and the way it should be used by scholars and critics.²²²

Therefore, after first providing a short overview of the main aspects and the development of the ongoing gender debate, I then will go more into detail regarding the main theoretical approach I refer to in this study, the concept of “doing gender.” In a third step, I will then focus on the concrete case of Brazil and introduce some central terms into the debate on gender regarding household structures and organization, which will serve as the basis for section 4.2, where I will pick them up again to underpin my arguments.

2.2.1 The Gender Debate

From the very beginning, feminist theory emphasized that discrimination against and oppression of women was a historical result that had been socially constructed, and not an effect of naturally existing differences between the two

219 Beauvoir, Simone de. 1949, *Le Deuxième Sexe, Tomé II. L'Expérience Vécue*, Paris: Gallimard.

220 Bereswill, Mechthild. 2008. “Geschlecht” in *Handbuch Soziologie*, edited by N. Baur. Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwiss., pp. 99f.

221 Stephan, Inge. 2006. „Gender, Geschlecht und Theorie“ in *Gender-Studien. Eine Einführung*, edited by C. v. von Braun and I. Stephan. Stuttgart: Metzler, pp. 56.

222 Stephan 2006, Gender, Geschlecht und Theorie, p. 56.

sexes.²²³ Therefore, in the 1970s feminist theory began to adopt the analytical distinction between sex and gender which had been introduced by previous medical research on trans- and intersexuality in the 1960s.²²⁴ In this context sociologist Ann Oakley presented the following definition:

‘Sex’ is a word that refers to the biological differences between male and female (...) ‘gender’ however, is a matter of culture: it refers to the social classification into ‘masculine’ and, ‘feminine’. The constancy of sex must be admitted, but also must the variability of gender.²²⁵

The theoretical differentiation between sex and gender offered a new argument not only for feminist theory but also for the feminist movement. It facilitated the insight that since existing gender hierarchies were socially constructed and not naturally given, they could also be criticized and changed.²²⁶ This differentiation was without a doubt an important step in the development of feminist theory; however, further research and empirical studies also exposed the problems of making a theoretical distinction between sex and gender. The biggest criticism directed towards such a differentiation (between sex and gender) was that theory indeed still assumed—rather than challenging, as intended—that an underlying biological sex really existed. Some scholars considered that such a separation of the “natural/biological” from the “cultural” sphere would reify the first (natural/biological), and thus be used to further support the devaluation and oppression of women.²²⁷

As a result of the debate on sex and gender, in 1986 Joan Wallach Scott proposed an alternative way to define gender in her famous and influential article “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis.” There she states:

223 Knapp, Gudrun-Axeli, and Angelika Wetterer, editors. 1995, *Traditionen Brüche. Entwicklungen feministischer Theorie*, Freiburg im Breisgau: Kore, p. 205.

224 Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, p. 67; Griesebner, Andrea. 2003. „Geschlecht als soziale und als analytische Kategorie. Debatten der letzten drei Jahrzehnte“ in *Frauen- und Geschlechtergeschichte. Positionen / Perspektiven*, edited by J. Gehmacher and M. Mesner. Innsbruck et al.: StudienVerlag, p. 43.

225 Oakley, Ann. 1972, *Sex, Gender and Society*, London: Temple Smith, p. 16 cited in Griesebner 2003, *Geschlecht als soziale und als analytische Kategorie*, p. 43.

226 Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, pp. 67f.

227 Opitz-Belakhal 2010, *Geschlechtergeschichte*, pp. 12f; Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, p. 68; Knapp et al. 1995, *Traditionen Brüche*, p. 210.

[G]ender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power. Changes in the organization of social relationships always correspond to changes in representations of power, but the direction of change is not necessarily one way.²²⁸

Using a poststructuralist approach, Scott focuses on the problems of the theoretical division of sex and gender, and especially on the risk of the ontologization of gender differences through historical research. She criticizes the so-common descriptive usage of gender by historians and argues for a more analytical usage of the term.²²⁹ Instead of taking for granted the natural existence of only two sexes, Scott emphasizes the importance of “perception” and “representation” and, as Claudia Opitz illustrates, respectively “language” and “discourses” for the development of the differences between the sexes.²³⁰

While at the beginning, the differentiation between sex and gender sought to produce awareness of the social and cultural construction of “gender identities,” and aimed “to dispute the biology-is-destiny formulation,”²³¹ over time the debate turned into a more fundamental critique of essentialist conceptions of gender.²³²

Building on Scott, Judith Butler in particular radically broadened the idea of the social construction of gender. In her famous 1990 book “Gender Trouble,” she dissolves the distinction between sex and gender and argues that sex, just like gender, is socially and culturally constructed: “Indeed, sex, by definition, will be shown to have been gender all along.”²³³ Butler wants to show that sex and the assumed natural existence of two sexes are the effect of powerful and hegemonic discourses, and not “prediscursive” given facts.²³⁴

If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at

228 Scott, Joan W. 1986. “Gender. A Useful Category of Historical Analysis”, *The American Historical Review*, 91 (5): 1067.

229 Scott 1986, Gender, p. 1057; Griesebner 2003, Geschlecht als soziale und als analytische Kategorie, pp. 44f.

230 Opitz-Belakhal 2010, Geschlechtergeschichte, p. 14.

231 Villa, Paula-Irene. 2003, *Judith Butler*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, p. 9.

232 Braun, Christina v. von, and Inge Stephan, editors. 2006, *Gender-Studien. Eine Einführung*, Stuttgart: Metzler, p. 4.

233 Villa 2003, Judith Butler, p. 12.

234 *Ibid.*, pp. 61ff.

all (...). It would make no sense, then, to define gender as the cultural interpretation of sex, if sex itself is a gendered category. Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of meaning on a pre-given sex (a juridical conception); gender must also designate the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established. As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which “sexed nature” or “a natural sex” is produced and established as “pre-discursive,” prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts.²³⁵

As a result of these findings, Butler stresses the importance of identifying and reconstructing the discursive production of the natural condition of gender to show the underlying power structures and relations in society.²³⁶ In criticizing the sex/gender division and stating that sex is not the basis of gender but only a part of it, Butler exposes also the problem of using the category “women” as a common identity. Referring to the complexity and heterogeneity which stands behind the term “women,” she emphasizes the importance of asking how the subject is formed and endorses the openness and changeability of categories beyond ontological assumptions.²³⁷

Apart from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion of the subject, however, there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term *women* denotes a common identity (...). If one “is” a woman, that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pre-gendered “person” transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, but because gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained.²³⁸

Her radical deconstructionist approach to gender brought Butler harsh criticism from scholars and the feminist movement.²³⁹ Particularly the feminist movement, whose political struggle is based precisely on the common and collective identity

235 Villa 2003, Judith Butler, pp. 10f.

236 Ibid., pp. 62f; Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, p. 106.

237 Villa 2003, Judith Butler, pp. 4, 37, 45.

238 Ibid., p. 6.

239 Scott’s and Butler’s work resulted in a debate on the importance of the physical experiences for gender studies. For a short overview see Opitz-Belakhal 2010, *Geschlechtergeschichte*, p. 19.

of being “women” and fighting for their rights and recognition, contested Butler’s assumptions. To suppose and accept that “women” do not exist would question the basis, and hence the existence, of the feminist movement itself. The postmodernist critique of the maintenance of the category “women” not only generated a problem for the feminist and women’s movement in terms of their right to exist but also for individual women, because “there is a denial of a unified experience upon which women can frame claims for rights.”²⁴⁰ Thus, despite the theoretical critique and the deconstructive claim for the rejection of the category “women,” actors, although being aware of this problem, continue to use it mainly as a strategy. This “strategic essentialism” is mainly used by actors so as to be able to present themselves as a homogeneous group in order to realize and achieve political goals.²⁴¹

This brief overview is intended to illustrate the different positions and understandings of gender in the social scientific discourse, and allows me to classify this study within the existing gender debate. While most scholars agree that gender is socially and culturally constructed and that the analytical division between sex and gender is problematic, the degree of understanding varies, and the most radical approach is to be found in the complete dissolution of the existence of a “natural” sex as in the poststructuralist thinking of, for example, Judith Butler. Following a deconstructionist approach, I agree with the critique of the division of sex and gender and consider it very important to understand and emphasize gender as socially and culturally constructed. Notwithstanding this, especially in empirical studies and political practice, it is hard to completely abandon theoretical categories, even if contested, as, for example, the category “women.” Describing and explaining societies in Social Science and Humanities without resorting to categories such as “women” or “men” is difficult, if not impossible in practice, and therefore, I also argue, necessary.²⁴² Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize the potentially problematic homogenization underlying these terms. Therefore—although aware of the problems and discussions regarding the category “women,” especially that stemming from the

240 Hobson, Barbara and Ruth Lister. 2001, *Keyword: Citizenship*. <http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/files/7681/11128861501citizenship.pdf/citizenship.pdf> (29 Dec 2015), p. 12.

241 Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, p. 110. Also, the feminist movement does not deny the use of the category “women,” but authors within that movement greatly emphasize the diversity existing within this category.

242 Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, p. 114.

debate on intersectionality²⁴³, I will use the term “women” in this study. Not only for practicability reasons, but also because I believe, in agreement with the feminist movement, that a common experience of “women” does exist, which is socially and culturally constructed. However, despite such a common experience, the broad heterogeneity of individuals and realities within the group of women and in different historical contexts needs to be taken into account in each analysis.

After this general overview, in the following section I will go into detail regarding one of the approaches within Gender Studies, that of “doing gender.” This focuses on the processes of the construction of gender, and is therefore particularly useful for revealing the agency of individuals, as intended in this study.

2.2.1.1 Doing Gender

[G]ender itself is constituted through interaction.²⁴⁴

To avoid the pitfalls of the sex/gender division, some scholars²⁴⁵ have suggested that apart from taking the social and cultural construction of gender as one of its main characteristics, it is also important to further concentrate on the processes of the construction of gender.²⁴⁶ This interactionist perspective within Gender Studies aims therefore at capturing the empirical processes of the social and cultural construction of gender through the analysis of the processes of “doing

243 For a short overview on the actual debate on Intersectionality see for example Célleri, Daniela, Tobias Schwarz, and Bea Wittger. 2013. “Introduction. Interdependencies of Social Categorisation in Past and Present Societies of Latin America” in *Interdependencies of Social Categorisations*, edited by D. Célleri, T. Schwarz, and B. Wittger. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert, pp. 7–23 and Tuider, Elisabeth. 2013. „Von der Frauenforschung zur Intersektionalität. Ansätze der Theorisierung und Politisierung von Geschlecht und Macht“ in *Frauen (und) Macht in Lateinamerika*, edited by E. Tuider, H.-J. Burchardt, and R. Öhlschläger. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 39–52.

244 West, Candace and Don H. Zimmerman. 1987. “Doing Gender”, *Gender and Society*, 1 (2): 129.

245 For example Hageman-White, Goffman and Garfinkel, Kessler/ McKenna, West and Zimmerman.

246 Gildemeister et al. 1995, *Wie Geschlechter gemacht werden*, pp. 211f.

gender.”²⁴⁷ In order to avoid taking gender as a fixed characteristic of individuals, the “doing gender” approach focuses on gender as “an emergent feature of social situations”²⁴⁸ and thereby stresses the interactional, performative, and situationally changing character and praxis of gender constructions and identities in everyday life situations.²⁴⁹ This “ethnomethodological conception of gender”²⁵⁰ was introduced to the scientific community in 1987 by Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman in their famous article “Doing Gender,” which aimed to offer a new understanding of and critical answer to the hitherto dominant perspectives on sex and gender.²⁵¹

Our purpose (...) is to propose an ethnomethodologically informed, and therefore distinctively sociological, understanding of gender as a routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment. We content that the “doing” of gender is undertaken by women and men whose competence as members of society is hostage to its production. Doing gender involves a complex of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and micropolitical activities that cast particular pursuits as expressions of masculine and feminine “natures” (...). Rather than as a property of individuals, we conceive of gender as an emergent feature of social situations: both an outcome of and rationale for various social arrangements and as a means of legitimating one of the most fundamental divisions of society.²⁵²

To develop and explain their approach of “doing gender,” West and Zimmerman refer especially to Harold Garfinkel’s empirical studies on transsexuality. Taking the case of the transsexual Agnes, who was born in a male body and later underwent sex reassignment surgery to become a woman, Garfinkel shows in his book “Studies in Ethnomethodology” published in 1967 “how gender is created through interaction and at the same time structures interaction.”²⁵³ He observes Agnes prior to and after her surgery while trying to “pass” as a woman, and describes the work she had to carry out in everyday interactions. Part of this

247 Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, p. 81.

248 West et al. 1987, *Doing Gender*, p. 126.

249 Gildemeister et al. 1995, *Wie Geschlechter gemacht werden*, p. 212; Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, pp. 80f; Opitz-Belakhal 2010, *Geschlechtergeschichte*, p. 27; Kotthoff 2002, *Was heißt eigentlich „doing gender“?*, p. 2.

250 West, Candace and Sarah Fenstermaker. 1995. „Doing Difference“, *Gender and Society*, 9 (1): 9.

251 West et al. 1987, *Doing Gender*, p. 125.

252 *Ibid.*, p. 126.

253 West et al. 1987, *Doing Gender*, p. 131.

process included among other things changing her behavior in conversations, for instance by being more reserved and not asserting her opinions.²⁵⁴ The case study of Agnes is so illustrative because it brings explicitly to light the problematic assumption of the existence of an underlying biological sex as the basis for the culturally constructed gender, as assumed in the traditional sex/gender distinction. To stress and analyze the social and cultural construction of gender, therefore, West and Zimmerman suggest a new differentiation, namely between three analytical independent concepts: *sex*, *sex category*, and *gender*.²⁵⁵

Sex is a determination made through the application of socially agreed upon biological criteria for classifying persons as females or males (...). The criteria for classification can be genitalia at birth or chromosomal typing before birth, and they do not necessarily agree with one another. Placement in a *sex category* is achieved through application of the sex criteria, but in everyday life, categorization is established and sustained by the socially required identificatory displays that proclaim one's membership in one or the other category. In this sense, one's sex category presumes one's sex and stands as proxy for it in many situations, but sex and sex category can vary independently; that is, it is possible to claim membership in a sex category even when the sex criteria are lacking. *Gender*, in contrast, is the activity of managing situated conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one's sex category. Gender activities emerge from and bolster claims to membership in a sex category.²⁵⁶

In this threefold analytically independent conceptualization of gender, "biology" or "nature" is also interpreted as culturally constructed,²⁵⁷ and together with

254 Kotthoff 2002, Was heißt eigentlich „doing gender“?, p. 2; Degele 2008, Gender/Queer Studies, p. 80; West et al. 1987, Doing Gender, p. 131.

255 West et al. 1987, Doing Gender, pp. 127; 131; Gildemeister et al. 1995, Wie Geschlechter gemacht werden, p. 212; Gildemeister, Regine. n.a., *Soziale Konstruktion von Geschlecht*, Berlin. http://www2.gender.hu-berlin.de/geschlecht-ethnizitaet-klasse/www.geschlecht-ethnizitaet-klasse.de/indexb5e9.html?set_language=de& (02 Jun 2012), p. 10.

256 West et al. 1987, Doing Gender, p. 127.

257 West and Zimmerman comment in a footnote on the concept of sex: "the determination of an individual's sex classification is a social process through and through" (West et al. 1987, Doing Gender, p. 148) and in "Doing Difference" West and Fenstermaker state: "From an ethnomethodological viewpoint, sex is socially and culturally constructed rather than a straightforward statement of the biological 'facts'" (West et al. 1995, Doing Difference, p. 20).

stressing the continuing situational and interactional character of this construction processes, the notion of gender as a fixed and static characteristic of the individual is ruled out.²⁵⁸ As Gildemeister states, in this understanding the classical view of gender is inverted, because gender is not seen as the “natural” base of differences in human behavior anymore, but as the result of complex social processes.²⁵⁹

In their work and their reflections on gender, West and Zimmerman put forward the question “can we ever *not* do gender?”²⁶⁰ and suggest by way of an answer that “[i]nsofar as a society is partitioned by ‘essential’ differences between women and men and placement in a sex category is both relevant and enforced, doing gender is unavoidable.”²⁶¹ This assumption, that “doing gender is unavoidable,” has provoked harsh critique from many scholars. Especially the idea of gender as omnirelevant has been rejected.²⁶² Scholars like Hirschauer, Butler, and Deutsch have advocated also considering the possibility of *undoing* gender—that is, a temporary and situational neutralization of gender differences.²⁶³

Another important objection to the concept of “doing gender” is that gender is interdependent with other social categorizations such as class or race, and therefore may also be less important in certain situations and interactions. Even Candace West admits to having drawn “an incomplete framework for understanding social inequality” by neglecting other categorizations such as race and class. Therefore, in 1995 in her joint article with Sarah Fenstermaker, “Doing Difference,” she reformulates and broadens her previous assumptions about “doing gender” and joins the debate on intersectionality.²⁶⁴

[W]e hope to advance a new way of thinking about gender, race, and class, namely as ongoing, methodological, and situated accomplishments. (...) conceiving of these [gender, race, and class] as ongoing accomplishments means that we cannot determine their relevance to social action apart from the context in which they are accomplished (...). While sex category, race category and class category are potentially omnirelevant to social

258 Gildemeister et al. 1995, *Wie Geschlechter gemacht werden*, p. 213; Gildemeister n.a., *Soziale Konstruktion von Geschlecht*, p. 10.

259 Gildemeister n.a., *Soziale Konstruktion von Geschlecht*, p. 10.

260 West et al. 1987, *Doing Gender*, p. 137.

261 Ibid.

262 Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, p. 93.

263 Kotthoff 2002, *Was heißt eigentlich „doing gender“?*, p. 7.

264 West et al. 1995, *Doing Difference*, p. 9.

life, individuals inhabit many different identities, and these may be stressed or muted, depending on the situation.²⁶⁵

Finally, it is important to mention that both the ethnomethodological²⁶⁶ and the discourse-analytical²⁶⁷ approaches, although having different foci, are not mutually exclusive, especially if we understand them primarily as scientific tools that help us to find answers to our research questions. Choosing one of the approaches thus depends mainly on the research interest and, related to this, the available sources.²⁶⁸ While the ethnomethodological approach of “doing gender” is especially useful to reveal and make visible the individuals’ agency, the discourse-analytical approach focuses more on the structural constraints and power constellations that lead to the exclusion of certain groups.²⁶⁹

Accordingly, the concept of “doing gender” is particularly useful for my work for the following three reasons. First, as stated above, it allows us to avoid the pitfalls of the sex/gender distinction and to focus on and emphasize the social and cultural construction of gender without the necessity of abandoning certain categories and concepts such as, for example, the category “women.” The categorization of a person, the introduction of a *sex category* such as “female,” is, according to the “doing gender” approach, part of everyday life categorizations carried out through interaction, and therefore becomes significant, even if socially constructed. Second, when working empirically, the question emerges of how to capture and identify theoretical concepts, like gender in general, and the processes of its construction in everyday life situations—in practice—in particular. As it is “an ongoing activity embedded in everyday interactions”²⁷⁰ the concept of “doing gender” conceptualizes people as actors possessing agency, and thus allows us to concentrate on the empirical.²⁷¹ Since my work focuses on the actors’ understanding and performance of gender in the squats *Chiquinha Gonzaga* and *Manoel Congo*, the concept of “doing gender” thus offers the opportunity to consider and analyze their perspectives and their specific agency in each specific context. Third, the available sources, the

265 West et al. 1995, *Doing Difference*, p. 30.

266 For example authors like West and Zimmerman, Goffman and Garfinkel.

267 For example authors like Scott and Butler.

268 Griesebner 2003, *Geschlecht als soziale und als analytische Kategorie*, p. 46; Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, p. 111.

269 Opitz-Belakhal 2010, *Geschlechtergeschichte*, p. 28; Degele 2008, *Gender/Queer Studies*, p. 111.

270 West et al. 1987, *Doing Gender*, p. 130.

271 Griesebner 2003, *Geschlecht als soziale und als analytische Kategorie*, p. 46.

interviews conducted in the squats, provide suitable material for the “doing gender” approach. Assuming that speaking is also a performative act, the actors’ narratives allow the identification and examination of their own constructions of gender and their different gender identities in everyday life situations.

Moving closer to the concrete interactions in everyday life, in the next section, I will sketch out domestic relations and structures in Brazil, as a concrete situation. I will also introduce some central terms into the debate, which then will serve as a frame for the concrete analysis of gender relations in my empirical case study in section 4.3.

2.2.2 Gender Relations and Urban Household Structures in Brazil

Contemporary research on domestic relations and structures which places women at the forefront stresses two changes in particular in the organization of domestic life in Brazil. First, studies determine a growing number of women participating in income-generating work, and second, they also reveal an increasing number of women becoming the main person responsible for their households.

According to data from the National Household Data Sample Survey (*Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios*, PNAD) disclosed by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (*Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*, IBGE), women’s participation in the labor market has steadily increased from 50.1% in 2000 to 54.6% in 2010. In contrast, men’s participation was in 2014 about 75.7%, and despite women’s increased presence in the labor market, it still remains much higher.²⁷² The growth of female presence in the labor market has also been greater in urban areas. While in 2010 in rural areas female participation was about 45.5%, in urban areas it was 56%, almost 10% greater.²⁷³ Looking more closely, however, at the conditions under which women enter the labor market, data reveal that they still “remain disproportionately represented in the lowest paying sectors of employment and are not keeping pace

272 IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. 2014, *Estatísticas de Gênero. Uma Análise dos Resultados do Censo Demográfico 2010*, Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, p. 108.

273 IBGE 2014, *Estatísticas de Gênero*, pp. 109f.

with men in terms of their relative labor market position.”²⁷⁴ As Table 2 illustrates, women are still far more common than men in informal and poorly remunerated (23.1%) or even unpaid jobs (2.1%). Often the consequences are not only lower wages for women, but also reduced access to social security and other benefits that formal contracts offer. And finally, this situation is also more likely to reproduce gendered views of women in relation to their work.

*Table 2: Percentual distribution of workers aged 16 years and older in Brazil, by sex and employment status*²⁷⁵

Employment Status	2000		2010	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Formal employment*	73.1	65.0	80.2	70.9
Informal employment	21.4	27.1	17.6	23.1
Unpaid work	2.4	5.5	0.7	2.1

*Formal employment includes workers with formal contracts, military personnel and civil servants, self-employed workers and employees contributing to social security. In contrast to informal employment, formal employment includes for example access to vacations, maternity leave, unemployment insurance, and benefits, etc. (IBGE - Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2014, p. 112).

To explain the increasing number of women who are participating in income-generating work, especially in urban households, scholars point to the economic crisis of the 1980s, which forced women into the labor market with the aim of improving the well-being of their families by increasing the number of income-earning household members. Additionally, an accelerated education of women, a reduced fertility rate, and processes of urbanization promoted female labor-market participation.²⁷⁶

274 McClenaghan, Sharon. 1997. “Women, Work, and Empowerment. Romanticizing the Reality” in *Gender Politics in Latin America. Debates in Theory and Practice*, edited by E. Dore. New York: Monthly Review Press, p. 25.

275 Own presentation based on IBGE 2014, Estatísticas de Gênero, p. 114.

276 Santana Pinhos, Patricia de and Elizabeth B. Silva. 2010. “Domestic Relations in Brazil. Legacies and Horizons”, *Latin American Research Review*, 45 (2): 103; La

Apart from these factors, another important part of the explanation is the growing number of women in urban Brazil who are becoming the main person responsible for their households. This phenomenon is broadly discussed in the literature under the term “female-headed households” (*chefia feminina de família*). It is important to emphasize that female-headed households are not homogeneous units but may have various compositions. To capture its heterogeneity, Luiza Santos Carvalho differentiates three types of the *chefia feminina de família*: the “*chefia de jure*,” which implies the absence of a male partner but does not necessarily imply that the female (the women) is monetarily maintaining the family; the “*chefia de facto*,” which denotes a female maintenance of the family but does not necessarily imply the absence of a male partner; and lastly Carvalho describes a third meaning, the combination of the absence of a male partner and the female maintenance of the family.²⁷⁷

According to the report of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (*Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada*, IPEA)²⁷⁸ between 2001 and 2009 the number of female-headed households increased from 27% to 35%. Most of these households (49.3% of all female-headed households in 2009) were composed of women without a male partner, who had assumed the sole responsibility for their children and the economic maintenance of the family. The number of these households, however, has decreased over recent years, and the number of female-headed households in which the male partner is present has grown significantly (from 8.8% in 2001 to 26.1% in 2009).²⁷⁹ Studies also

González Rocha, Mercedes de. 2002. “The Urban Family and Poverty in Latin America” in *Latin American perspectives in the classroom, Rereading Women in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Political Economy of Gender*, edited by J. Abbassi and S. L. Lutjens. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 64f; Simões, Solange and Marlise Matos. 2010. “Ideias Modernas e Comportamentos Tradicionais. A Persistência das Desigualdades de Gênero no Brasil” in *Desigualdades de Gênero no Brasil. Novas Ideias e Práticas Antigas*, edited by M. F. de Souza. Belo Horizonte: Argumentum, pp. 20f; Sorj, Bila. 2004. “Trabalho Remunerado e Trabalho Não-Remunerado” in *A Mulher Brasileira nos Espaços Público e Privado*, edited by Fundação Perseu Abramo. São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo/ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 109.

277 Santos Carvalho, Luiza M. S. 1998. “A Mulher Trabalhadora na Dinâmica da Manutenção e da Chefia Domiciliar”, *Revista Estudos Feministas*, 6 (1): 180.

278 The IPEA uses data from the PNAD.

279 IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. 2010. “PNAD 2009 Primeiras Análises. Investigando a Chefia Feminina de Família”, *Comunicados do Ipea* (65): 4-8.

indicate that numbers of female-headed households have increased especially in urban areas, where the proportion of women *chefe de família* is three times higher than the proportion of women *chefe de família* living in rural areas.²⁸⁰

Particularly since the 1980s, all these findings have led many scholars to challenge the until then prevailing myth of the man as head and principal breadwinner of the family. The former mostly homogeneous portrayal of family organization, which did not take gender relations sufficiently into account, contributed to the universalized notion of a prevailing patriarchal nuclear, so-called “traditional” family.²⁸¹ Other forms of family organization, such as female-headed households, have therefore often been characterized as “nontraditional.” Historian Elizabeth Dore challenges this assumption by emphasizing that, female-headed households are not in fact a new phenomenon as is often presented in the literature, but that they have existed, and have even been the norm, since the early nineteenth century.²⁸²

Apart from the debate over whether they are a new phenomenon or not, most studies on female-headed households and women’s increasing participation in income-generating work lead to the question of how these changes have affected domestic life and especially gender arrangements within the family. Scholars agree that women’s participation in the labor market has not led to significant

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- 280 Alves Mendes, Mary. 2002, *Mulher Chefes de Família. A Complexidade e Ambigüidade da Questão*. XIII Encontro da Associação Brasileira de Estudos Populacionais, 4 a 8 de novembro de 2002, Ouro Preto. http://www.abep.nepo.unicamp.br/docs/anais/pdf/2002/GT_Gen_ST38_mendes_texto.pdf (30 Dec 2014), p. 1; Scott, Parry R. 2002, *Mulheres Chefes de Família. Abordagens e Temas para as Políticas Públicas*. Pré-Evento Mulheres Chefes de Família: Crescimento, Diversidade e Políticas, 4 de novembro de 2002, CNPD/FNUAP/ABEP, Ouro Preto. http://www.abep.nepo.unicamp.br/XIIIencontro/Scott_intro_mulher_chefe.pdf (30 Dec 2014), p. 1; Chant, Sylvia. 2002. “Researching Gender, Families and Households in Latin America. From the 20 th into the 21th Century”, *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 21 (4): 547.
- 281 Dore, Elizabeth. 1997. “The Holy Family. Imagined Households in Latin American History” in *Gender Politics in Latin America. Debates in Theory and Practice*, edited by E. Dore. New York: Monthly Review Press, p. 102; Santos Macedo, Márcia d. 2008. “Mulheres Chefes de Família e a Perspectiva de Gênero. Trajetória de um Tema e a Crítica sobre a Feminização da Pobreza”, *Caderno CRH*, 21 (53): 392f.
- 282 Dore 1997, The Holy Family, p. 102.

changes in the domestic division of labor²⁸³ or to an alleviation of their domestic responsibilities, but on the contrary, has contributed to the intensification of women's general workload. As they often remain the main persons responsible for unpaid domestic work and at the same time have to contribute to the family's income, women may have to perform a so-called double shift.²⁸⁴ As we will see in section 4.3, when it comes to engagement in citizenship activities to improve their living conditions, such as the fight for housing and education, women are also at the forefront.


Corresponding data from the IBGE confirms that even though the number of women entering the labor market has more than doubled over the last 40 years, at the same time they remain the main person responsible for non-remunerated domestic activities, such as childcare, cleaning, and cooking inside the family.²⁸⁵ Figure 1 shows that women in Brazil cover most of the domestic work, doing on average 26.6 hours of this work per week, while those who are employed during the week do 22.0 hours on average. In contrast, men only spend an average of 10.5 hour per week on housework, and even less when they are employed (9.5 hours).

283 Domestic division of labor: Who does what and is responsible for what? (Jelin, Elizabeth. 1991. "Family and Household. Outside World and Private Life" in *Family, Household, and Gender Relations in Latin America*, edited by E. Jelin. London et al.: Kegan Paul International/ Unesco/ Routledge Chapman & Hall, p. 36).

284 See for example McClenaghan 1997, *Women, Work, and Empowerment*; Chant 2002, *Researching Gender, Families and Households*; Santana Pinhos et al. 2010, *Domestic Relations in Brazil*; Goldani, Ana M. 2000, *Famílias e Gêneros. Uma Proposta para Avaliar (Des)igualdades*. <http://biblioteca.planejamento.gov.br/biblioteca-tematica-1/textos/direitos-da-cidadania/texto-40-2013-familia-e-generos-uma-proposta-paar-avaliar-des-igualdades.pdf> (30 Dec 2014); Alves Mendes 2002, *Mulher Chefes de Família*; Venturi, Gustavo and Marisol Recamán. 2004. "Introdução. As Mulheres Brasileiras no Início do Século XXI" in *A Mulher Brasileira nos Espaços Público e Privado*, edited by Fundação Perseu Abramo. São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo/ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp. 15–30; Simões et al. 2010, *Ideias Modernas e Comportamentos Tradicionais*; Safa, Helen I. 2002. "Economic Restructuring and Gender Subordination" in *Latin American perspectives in the classroom, Rereading Women in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Political Economy of Gender*, edited by J. Abbassi and S. L. Lutjens. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 43–60.

285 IBGE 2014, *Estatísticas de Gênero*, p. 119; IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 2010, *PNAD 2009 Primeiras Análises*, p. 16.

Figure 1: Average of hours per week spent on housework, of persons 16 years or older, by sex in Brazil 2009²⁸⁶



The number of hours per week spent on domestic tasks is especially high among low-income families. While they have to perform these tasks by themselves, families with better income often hire domestic workers.²⁸⁷ These domestic workers are again mostly women (83% of all domestic workers worldwide are female)²⁸⁸ so that existing gender structures which hold women responsible for domestic tasks are maintained and reproduced.

Women's average total workloads during the week are still much higher than men's, which reveals the persistence of inequality between women and men in the home. It also indicates the ongoing lack of social recognition of so-called

286 Own presentation with data from: IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. 2010, *Uma Análise das Condições de Vida da População Brasileira 2010*. Tabelas Completas/ Mulheres. http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/condicaoedevida/indicadoresminimos/sinteseindicossociais2010/default_tab.shtm (10 Oct 2015), Table 9.10.

287 Soares, Cristiane. 2008, *A Distribuição do Tempo Dedicado aos Afazeres Domésticos entre Homens e Mulheres no Âmbito da Família*. XVI Encontro Nacional de Estudos Populacionais / ABEP, 29 de setembro a 03 de outubro de 2008, Caxambú. http://www.abep.nepo.unicamp.br/encontro2008/docsPDF/ABEP_2008_978.pdf (01 Nov 2015), pp. 8f.

288 ILO – International Labour Organization. 2013, *Domestic workers across the world: global and regional statistics and the extent of legal protection*. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_173363.pdf, p. 19.

reproductive work as *work*, and therefore often makes it extremely difficult for women to balance their non-remunerated work within the family with their remunerated work either outside or inside the home.²⁸⁹ Certainly, the increasing incorporation of women into the labor market has, in theory, the potential to increase the autonomy and self-determination of these women, but it is not enough to change gender inequalities within the family as long as “normative assumptions of the female role, continue to be reinscribed.”²⁹⁰ Especially for women in low-income households, entering the labor market it is very often a question of survival, and can also be interpreted as motivated by an intention to fulfil their roles as mothers, rather than an intention to achieve personal gains. From this perspective, women’s entry into the labor market can be also interpreted as an extension of their reproductive role.²⁹¹

2.3 GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP

Even though the concepts of Citizenship and Gender have been discussed separately above, in an analysis of both it becomes clear, and is therefore necessary to show, how closely linked they are in both theory and practice.

Citizenship has always been gendered in the sense that women and men have stood in a different relationship to it, to the disadvantage of women. Yet, for much of its history, a veil of gender-neutrality has obscured the nature of this differential relationship. Today, as feminist theorists have stripped away this veil, the challenge is to reconceptualise citizenship in gendered terms in the image of women as well as men. We are thus talking about citizenship and gender from two angles: as a historical relationship and as a political and theoretical project.²⁹²

Thus, in the next section I will demonstrate how feminist thinking has been concerned with and has criticized citizenship theory over recent decades, before

289 For missing recognition of women’s work in the private sphere see also section 2.3.1.

290 McClenaghan 1997, *Women, Work, and Empowerment*, p. 29.

291 *Ibid.*, pp. 28–30; Alvarez, Sonia E. 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil. Women’s Movements in Transition Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 47.

292 Lister, Ruth. 2001, *Citizenship and Gender*. http://www.academia.edu/565216/Citizenship_and_Gender1 (01 Dec 2014), p.1.

going more into detail about the specific interdependence of citizenship and gender in the case of Latin America, focussing on women's engagement in popular urban movements, and the reasons behind their involvement in citizenship activities, as well as the impacts of their agency.

2.3.1 Feminist Thinking on Citizenship

Is citizenship gendered?²⁹³

Over the last decades, feminist thinking has been concerned with citizenship theory.²⁹⁴ Its main object thereby has been to criticize the assumed universality and gender neutrality of liberal citizenship theory and to call attention to the fact that “citizenship has been quintessentially male”²⁹⁵; that is to say, to the fact of the historical exclusion of women from citizenship.²⁹⁶ On the one hand, feminists reject the prevailing conception of citizenship on the grounds that it is problematic in terms of the exclusion of women. On the other hand, citizenship has become “an avenue which has become positively crowded by feminist scholars (...) intent on re-gendering citizenship from the standpoints of women.”²⁹⁷ The opportunity to extend citizenship rights for women and to “(re)claim concepts which have been hi-jacked [sic] in the interest of men”²⁹⁸ is highlighted in the literature on citizenship and gender, and points at an important object of feminist thinking about citizenship, namely that of broadening and reconstructing the traditional conception.²⁹⁹

293 Walby, Sylvia. 1994. “Is Citizenship Gendered?”, *Sociology*, 28 (2): 379–395.

294 For an overview see Voet, Maria C. B. 1998, *Feminism and Citizenship*, London et al.: Sage Publications; Durish, Patricia. 2002. “Citizenship and Difference. Feminist Debates Introduction to the Annotated Bibliography” in *Annotated Bibliographies Series of the Transformative Learning Centre (TLC)*, edited by D. Schugurensky. Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, pp. 1–16.

295 Lister 2001, *Citizenship and Gender*, p. 1.

296 Durish 2002, *Citizenship and Difference*, pp. 2f; Lister 2011, *From the Intimate to the Global*, pp. 27ff.

297 Lister 2001, *Citizenship and Gender*, p. 2.

298 Ibid.

299 Durish 2002, *Citizenship and Difference*; Bussemaker, Jet and Rian Voet. 1998. “Citizenship and Gender. Theoretical Approaches and Historical Legacies”, *Critical Social Policy*, 18 (3): 281f.

Feminist thinking criticizes the absence of gender in liberalist writing, such as that of T.H. Marshall, Mann, and Turner.³⁰⁰ Especially T.H. Marshall's work, being highly influential on the theory of citizenship, has frequently come under attack from feminist writers due to its gender-blindness. One point of criticism is his assumption of the universality of citizenship, endorsed by liberalist theory. Liberalist theory, varying in its content from classical to social and neo-liberalism, has been the most influential theory in Western European modern history.³⁰¹ As Durish states, "[i]t is the theoretical paradigm of liberalism that animates the concept of citizenship in present day western capitalist democracies and therefore all feminist theory on citizenship positions itself in some relation to liberalism."³⁰² One of the most important features of liberalism is its "doctrine of individualism." Liberalism places the sovereign, rational, equal, and free human being, who is provided with a set of inalienable rights, at the center of its theory. This assumption incorporates the idea of universalism, which holds that liberalism transgresses the interests of any particular group or nation.³⁰³ As discussed in section 2.1.1, the liberal paradigm of the universality of citizenship implies the idea of equality and inclusion of all members of a society, such that "[w]hatever the social or group differences among citizens, whatever their inequalities of wealth, status, and power in the everyday activities of civil society, citizenship gives everyone the same status as peers in the political public."³⁰⁴

This assumption has attracted immense criticism from feminist writers. Voet, Young, Lister, and others have argued that for women the assumption of this universality and equality was only true in theory, not in practice. They show that women were excluded from citizenship from the very first time the concept was put into practice.³⁰⁵ Bussemaker and Voet point out that:

300 See Yongxiang, Wang, Li Jingping, and Guo Zhonghua. 2012. "Constructing a Gender-oriented Mode for Modern Citizenship", *Journal of Cambridge Studies*, 7 (4): 34; Walby 1994, *Is Citizenship Gendered?*.

301 Bussemaker et al. 1998, *Citizenship and Gender*, p. 286.

302 Durish 2002, *Citizenship and Difference*, p. 5.

303 Ibid., pp. 5f; Dietz, Mary G. 1987. "Context is all. Feminism and Theories of Citizenship", *Daedalus*, 116 (4): 3.

304 Young 1998, *Polity and Group Difference*, p. 263.

305 Hobson et al. 2001, *Keyword: Citizenship*, p. 4; Lister 2001, *Citizenship and Gender*, p. 1; Young 1998, *Polity and Group Difference*, p. 267; Bussemaker et al. 1998, *Citizenship and Gender*, p. 281.

From the 5th century BC till the mid-20th century AD full citizenship was a privilege almost exclusively given to (some) men. Therefore, we should not be surprised that until recently the discourse of citizenship has connected citizenship with maleness, whether through the idea of citizen as soldier, as someone carrying male virtues (*virtù*), as an economically independent being or breadwinner, or as someone who is allowed to share public office. Because of its conceptualization, most citizenship theories have excluded women from the full status of citizenship.³⁰⁶

The quote also reveals that it is not only women that have historically been excluded from citizenship. As discussed earlier in section 2.1.2, in Brazil social differences were used from the very beginning to exclude certain parts of the population from full citizenship. This was most evident, for example, with the fact that universalism only applied to free or sovereign individuals, a condition bound to owning property.³⁰⁷ Therefore, citizenship status, and the claim that this implies a universalism in practice, were not valid for the part of the population that could hardly own property, such as women, slaves, peasants, workers, and children.³⁰⁸

The marks of the historical exclusion of women and other groups from citizenship are still visible today. In most countries women formally achieved full citizenship only during the twentieth century. Moreover, significant inequality gaps persist—despite the rights women have achieved over time. Therefore, scholars also point to the importance of distinguishing between formally granted and substantive rights (see section 2.1.1) when talking about women’s citizenship, and of remaining aware of the gap often existing between them.³⁰⁹

The critique of the idea of universalism and the exclusion of women from citizenship introduces a new dilemma for feminist thinkers, namely whether they should advocate for equality or for difference. Young states that due to the paradigm of universality women and other oppressed and disadvantaged groups find themselves within a “dilemma of difference.”³¹⁰ As explained earlier in section 2.1.2.1, on the one hand, in order to be included, these groups have to appeal to the principle of equality and the universality of citizenship, and as a consequence, they must deny their difference to some extent. On the other hand,

306 Bussemaker et al. 1998, *Citizenship and Gender*, p. 281

307 Durish 2002, *Citizenship and Difference*, p. 6.

308 Ibid.; Fraser et al. 1998, *Contract versus Charity*, pp. 120f.

309 Bussemaker et al. 1998, *Citizenship and Gender*, p. 281; Molyneux 2001, *Women’s Movements in International Perspective*, p. 166.

310 Young 1998, *Polity and Group Difference*, p. 281.

movements find it necessary and important to emphasize existing “group-based-differences” because the formal equal treatment disadvantages oppressed groups.³¹¹ Or, as Shafir summarizes: “Formal equality, ironically, creates substantive inequality.”³¹² So, for feminists the question of whether to opt for the recognition of difference or for the equality of women has become a highly debated issue in feminist thinking.³¹³ Pateman identified this problem as “Wollstonecraft’s dilemma”:

The extremely difficult problem faced by women in their attempt to win full citizenship I shall call "Wollstonecraft's dilemma." The dilemma is that the two routes toward citizenship that women have pursued are mutually incompatible within the confines of the patriarchal welfare state, and, within that context, they are impossible to achieve. For three centuries, since universal citizenship first appeared as a political ideal, women have continued to challenge their alleged natural subordination within private life. (...) On the one hand, they have demanded that the ideal of citizenship be extended to them, and the liberal feminist agenda for a "gender-neutral" social world is the logical conclusion of one form of this demand. On the other hand, women have also insisted, often simultaneously, as did Mary Wollstonecraft, that as women they have specific capacities, talents, needs and concerns, so that the expression of their citizenship will be differentiated from that of men.³¹⁴

This discussion is especially relevant for Latin America, where women fighting for their rights deployed a language of difference, emphasizing gender differences and especially their traditional role as mothers, as we will see in the next section.

Another point of criticism and indicator of the gender-blindness of Marshall’s work can be found in his description of a progressive, linear, and cumulative expansion of the three stages of citizenship rights (see section 2.1.1). Feminists have argued that this is the description of the experience of *white, male* wage-workers in Britain and therefore ignores the different development

311 Young 1998, Polity and Group Difference, p. 281.

312 Shafir 1998, Introduction, p. 25.

313 For a summary of the discussion see Durish 2002, Citizenship and Difference.

314 Pateman, Carole. 1987, *The Patriarchial Welfare State. Women and Democracy*. http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/publications/docs/pdfs/CES_WP7.pdf (01 Dec 2014), pp. 29f.

and “struggles of minorities, women or colonized peoples for citizenship.”³¹⁵ In many countries, the evolution of women’s citizenship differed from that of men. Very often women gained political rights before full civil or social rights.³¹⁶ Even in Britain before 1928 women lacked many of the full characteristics of political and civil citizenship. Often, however, political citizenship was the condition and “power base” necessary to gain more civil rights, and *vice versa*.³¹⁷ That Marshall nevertheless adheres to his assumptions shows how much the specific concerns of women are ignored in citizenship theory. Lister points out that the special patterns of women’s achievement of rights have been mainly ignored in mainstream theorization on citizenship, and that such theorization “has tended to dismiss women’s earlier exclusion as a historical aberration, now more or less effectively remedied.”³¹⁸

Another important characteristic of liberalism that has been intensively debated by feminists is its strong distinction between the public and the private sphere. Political Theorist Carol Pateman, declared in 1983: “The dichotomy between the private and the public is central to almost two centuries of feminist writing and political struggle; it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is about.”³¹⁹ Pateman argues that the separation of the two spheres and the classification of women to the private sphere arose at the expense of women because equality in the public sphere was based on women’s subjection to the private one: “What it means to be an ‘individual’, a maker of contracts and civilly free, is revealed by the subjection of women within the private sphere.”³²⁰

As a result, women were excluded from citizenship, and the liberal ideal of equality and universalism helped to obscure this fact.³²¹ Feminists have criticized

315 Canning, Kathleen and Sonya O. Rose. 2001. “Introduction. Gender, Citizenship and Subjectivity: Some Historical and Theoretical Considerations”, *Gender & History*, 13 (3): 428.

316 Fraser et al. 1998, Contract versus Charity, p. 116; Bussemaker et al. 1998, Citizenship and Gender, p. 287; Siim, Birte. 2000, *Gender and Citizenship. Politics and Agency in France, Britain, and Denmark*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 14; Walby 1994, Is Citizenship Gendered?, pp. 380f.

317 Walby 1994, Is Citizenship Gendered?.

318 Lister 2001, Citizenship and Gender, p. 1.

319 Pateman, Carole. 1983. “Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy” in *Public and Private in Social Life*, edited by G. F. Gaus and S. I. Benn. New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 281.

320 Pateman, Carole. 1988, *The Sexual Contract*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 11.

321 Durish 2002, Citizenship and Difference, p. 9.

and challenged the public/private distinction as a gendered one because historically “the liberal notion of ‘the private’ has included what has been called ‘woman’s sphere’ as ‘male property’ and sought not only to preserve it from the interference of the public realm but also to keep those who ‘belong’ in that realm—women—from the life of the public.”³²² Whereas liberalists approve state intervention in the public sphere, the private sphere is understood as the sphere of the family, which the liberalists maintain should therefore be free from state interferences.³²³ To further favor the denial and difficulties of women’s full access to and participation in public life, the association of men with the public and of women with the private sphere was also accompanied by a special distribution of values to each sphere.

In the liberal tradition, married women’s legal subordination (...) reflected an essentialist categorization of men and women’s qualities and capacities, rooted in the public-private dichotomy. On the “public” side stood the disembodied citizen who displayed the necessary “male” qualities of impartiality, rationality, independence, and political agency. This was upheld by the “private” side to which embodied, partial, irrational, emotional, and dependent women were relegated.³²⁴

Hence, the public/private distinction is for feminist writers one of the main reasons for women’s oppression and exclusion from full citizenship—on the one hand because it fostered women’s exclusion from the public and political arena with its liberal principles, and on the other hand because women’s work and activities in the private sphere, such as childcare, are less valued than activities and work in the public sphere. Feminist writers show that it is highly problematic to assume and interpret women’s activities in the private sphere as being “natural” and therefore not political.³²⁵ Pateman offers the criticism that even though feminists have pointed out the “complex interdependence between the two spheres,” today especially the public, “civil” sphere is still treated as if it were independent from the private realm.³²⁶ Feminist scholars stress that the way

322 Dietz 1987, *Context is all*, p. 4.

323 Voet 1998, *Feminism and Citizenship*, p. 32; Dietz 1987, *Context is all*, p. 4.

324 Lister 2011, *From the Intimate to the Global*, p. 29.

325 Prokhovnik, Raia. 1998. “Public and Private Citizenship. From Gender Invisibility to Feminist Inclusiveness”, *Feminist Review*, 60 (1): 87; Siim 2000, *Gender and Citizenship*, pp. 32f; Yongxiang et al. 2012, *Constructing a Gender-oriented Mode*, p. 35; Tupper, Jennifer. 2002. “The Gendering of Citizenship in Social Studies Curriculum”, *Canadian Social Studies*, 36 (3): no page.

326 Pateman 1988, *The Sexual Contract*, p. 12.

in which the gendered division of labor in the private sphere conditions the access of women and men to the public sphere, and therefore to citizenship rights, is often ignored.³²⁷

In summary, women have been historically excluded from citizenship, and this has largely been ignored by citizenship theory. The contribution of feminist scholars in emphasizing the need for the inclusion of a gender perspective when conceptualizing citizenship is therefore very important. It has been shown that taking gender into account when talking about citizenship enables us to look behind dominant discourses and facilitates a critical perspective on the concept of citizenship, by revealing the exclusion of certain actors—such as for example women—from citizenship rights in both theory and practice, as well as the reasons behind this exclusion. Hence, a gendered analysis of citizenship also allows the development of a different and critical perspective on citizenship, beyond dominant discourses of universality and equality.

The incorporation of issues of gender, and of course also other social categorizations, such as ethnicity, class, and religion, helps to situate citizenship then in its specific context, and thus brings out the diverse lived experiences of citizenship of the different actors involved, as well as their agency. A gendered analysis of citizenship also allows the examination of the private sphere with its existing and predominant gender structures, and helps to reveal and explain the unique motivations and possibilities involved in women's agency and involvement in citizenship activities. Thus, it has also been confirmed again that citizenship cannot legitimately be analyzed solely in terms of possessing a status, as formal state-membership. Because only when also analyzed as a process can the specific actors involved—for example, women—along with their agency, become the focus of attention. As Maxine Molyneux puts it:

While citizenship has been a goal of feminist political struggle for over a century, it has been an ever-changing one. Gendering citizenship requires us to see both how women's agency has been involved in defining that goal, and also how, over time, its meaning, as well as that of the rights with which it is associated, have changed.³²⁸

Hence, it is only possible to thoroughly understand citizenship in each specific case, and to detect the existence of a differentiated citizenship, by taking into account other relevant social categorizations, such as gender—and *vice versa*.

327 Lister 2001, *Citizenship and Gender*, p. 2.

328 Molyneux 2001, *Women's Movements in International Perspective*, p. 166.

In the section that follows I will go into detail regarding the specific interdependence of citizenship and gender in the case of Latin America. I will focus on women's engagement in popular urban movements, and unveil the reasons behind and impacts of women's agency.

2.3.2 Women and Citizenship in Urban Latin America

There was (...) a clear continuum in Latin America between women's roles in the family and in struggles for citizenship rights.³²⁹

Despite the long-standing exclusion of women from full citizenship in both theory and practice, very often it was, and still is, mainly women initiating and promoting citizenship activities, such as fighting for housing, healthcare, and education. In Latin America women's engagement in urban social movements—demanding a vindication of their rights—has a long tradition and has been the subject of numerous academic publications.³³⁰ In this section I will mainly focus on the academic debate over the reasons for low-income women's engagement in urban citizenship activities such as the fight for housing, and the broader impacts of their participation.³³¹

329 Molyneux 2001, *Women's Movements in International Perspective*, p. 171.

330 As a detailed description of the history and development of women's participation in social movements in Latin America is beyond the scope of this study, see for an overview Potthast 2012, *Frauen und soziale Bewegungen*; Miller, Francesca. 1991, *Latin American Women and the Search for Social Justice*, Hanover: University Press of New England; Potthast, Barbara. 2003, *Von Müttern und Machos. Eine Geschichte der Frauen Lateinamerikas*, Wuppertal: Hammer; Jaquette, Jane S., editor. 1994, *The Women's Movement in Latin America. Participation and Democracy*, Boulder: Westview Press; Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*; Radcliffé, Sarah A., and Sallie Westwood, editors. 1993, *'Viva'. Women and Popular Protest in Latin America*, London et al.: Routledge; Jelin, Elizabeth, J. A. Zammit, and Marilyn Thomson, editors. 1990, *Women and Social Change in Latin America*, London: Zed Books Ltd.

331 Even though I will focus on women's participation in urban popular movements, it is also important to mention the existing diversity of the women's movement in Latin America. As Maxine Molyneux adequately summarizes: "In sum, the Latin American women's movement in its heterogeneous and distinctive forms has been a more diverse and vital force than has often been recognized. As Jaquette has noted, its contemporary political contours were shaped by three sociohistorical

One of the biggest questions permeating the literature on women's participation in social movements is that of the reasons for their participation. To avoid generalizing about women's interests, authors like Yvonne Corcoran-Nantes and Sonia E. Alvarez, for example, stress the need to consider the diverse motivations of women for engaging in citizenship activities.³³² Indicating the interdependencies of social categorizations like ethnicity, class, and gender that shape women's position in society, Alvarez reminds us that

"women's interests" are not more analytically useful as a conceptual category than "men's interests." When one considers that women span all social classes, races, ethnicities, religions, nationalities, political ideologies, and so on, then an infinite array of interests could be constructed as women's interests. Gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual preference, and other social characteristics determine women's social positioning and shape women's interests.³³³

Hence, when it comes to the analysis of women's agency, it is difficult to identify or even talk about women's interests. It has been argued elsewhere³³⁴ that because of the diversity and heterogeneity of women, being of the same sex is not enough to assume common interests, and that "[w]omen's interests should be seen as processes which are constructed in specific historical contexts and in

components: a feminist movement with demands broadly similar to those of European, Canadian and US women; a women's movement which mobilized against dictatorship and authoritarianism and against the violation of human rights; and a popular movement which turned survival strategies into sociopolitical demands. To these can be added the significant mobilization of women by political parties" (Molyneux 2001, *Women's Movements in International Perspective*, p. 173).

332 Corcoran-Nantes, Yvonne. 1993. "Female Consciousness or Feminist Consciousness? Women's Consciousness Raising in Community-Based Struggles in Brazil" in *'Viva'. Women and Popular Protest in Latin America*, edited by S. A. Radcliffe and S. Westwood. London et al.: Routledge, pp. 139f; Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*, p. 23.

333 Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*, p. 23.

334 Molyneux 2001, *Women's Movements in International Perspective*, Molyneux, Maxine. 1985. "Mobilization without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua", *Feminist Studies*, 11 (2): 227–254; Vargas, Virginia and Saskia Wieringa. 1998. "The Triangle of Empowerment. Processes and Actors in the Making of Public Policy for Women" in *Women's Movements and Public Policy in Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean*, edited by G. Lycklama à Nijeholt, V. Vargas, and S. Wieringa. New York: Garland Pub., pp. 3–23.

confrontation, negotiation or alliance with men, society, the state and each other.”³³⁵ Therefore, some scholars build their analysis on sociologist Maxine Molyneux’s work. Molyneux also points to the danger of generalizing about women’s interests and criticizes the “false homogeneity imposed by the notion of women’s interests.”³³⁶ To avoid such a homogenization, she suggests an analytical differentiation into two “conceptions of women’s interests,” those being “strategic gender interests” and “practical gender interests.”³³⁷ While strategic gender interests are “those involving claims to transform social relations in order to enhance women’s position and to secure a more lasting repositioning of women within the gender order and within society at large,”³³⁸

[p]ractical gender interests are given inductively and arise from the concrete conditions of women’s positioning within the gender division of labor. In contrast to strategic gender interests, these are formulated by the women who are themselves within these positions rather than through external interventions. Practical interests are usually a response to an immediate perceived need, and they do not generally entail a strategic goal such as women’s emancipation or gender equality.³³⁹

In her later work, responding to the critique of her distinction as being too “neatly categorized”³⁴⁰ Molyneux expands on the transformational character of her categorization by indicating that practical interests can also be transformed into strategic struggles.³⁴¹ In this regard, especially when it comes to the participation of women in popular urban movements and the reasons for their engagement, some authors suggest that practical gender interests prevail.³⁴² Even though strategic and practical gender interests may sometimes be difficult to separate clearly, when observing need-based struggles, the analytical distinction into strategic gender interests and practical gender interests seems to be a useful one. It offers a way to look at women’s articulation and mobilization without

335 Vargas et al. 1998, *The Triangle of Empowerment*, p. 6.

336 Molyneux 1985, *Mobilization without Emancipation?*, p. 232.

337 Ibid.

338 Molyneux 2001, *Women’s Movements in International Perspective*, p. 153.

339 Molyneux 1985, *Mobilization without Emancipation?*, p. 233.

340 See for example Vargas et al. 1998, *The Triangle of Empowerment*, p. 6; Westwood, Sallie and Sarah A. Radcliffe. 1993. “Gender, Racism and the Politics of Identities in Latin America” in *Viva! Women and Popular Protest in Latin America*, edited by S. A. Radcliffe and S. Westwood. London et al.: Routledge, p. 20.

341 Molyneux 2001, *Women’s Movements in International Perspective*, p. 155.

342 Corcoran-Nantes 1993, *Female Consciousness or Feminist Consciousness?*, p. 141.

thinking solely about feminism and feminist interests in the first place. As Molyneux herself stresses: “If in the formulation of practical interests, women take inequality or male authority over them for granted, then this is a different way of seeing the world to that which evolves in the course of political discussion premised on alternative, egalitarian visions.”³⁴³

Although historically, women’s participation in citizenship activities is not a new phenomenon, in Latin America it became especially visible during the 1970s and 80s. In Brazil, as well as in other Latin American countries, military dictatorships were accompanied by social and economic policies which “profoundly undermined the survival strategies of poor and working-class families and communities”³⁴⁴ in urban areas. This development further overlapped with an accelerated urban growth from the beginning of the twentieth century, especially since the 1950s, characterized by an insufficiency of urban infrastructure development policies and unequal access to public goods and services for the urban population.³⁴⁵ Together with the denial of access to “institutional channels of political participation,” such as free elections, these developments led to the emergence of numerous urban grassroots movements in low-income neighborhoods, which organized around issues such as housing, transport, basic services, healthcare, cost of living, childcare, and unemployment.³⁴⁶ These popular movements were dominated mainly by women, who organized self-help efforts (neighborhood kitchens and associations, community health, etc.)³⁴⁷ in their communities.

Most scholars agree that the reasons for the engagement of women in those popular social movements are thus based on the gendered division of labor in society, which allocates the provision for the family and the defense and organization of living conditions to women, acting out their traditional roles as housewives and mothers.³⁴⁸

343 Molyneux 2001, *Women’s Movements in International Perspective*, p. 156.

344 Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*, p. 44.

345 Jelin, Elizabeth. 1990. “Citizenship and Identity. Final Reflections” in *Women and Social Change in Latin America*, edited by E. Jelin, J. A. Zammit, and M. Thomson. London: Zed Books Ltd., p. 187; Potthast 2012, *Frauen und soziale Bewegungen*, p. 54; Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*, p. 45; see also Table 1, section 2.1.3.1.

346 Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*, p. 39; Corcoran-Nantes 1993, *Female Consciousness or Feminist Consciousness?*.

347 Cf. Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*, pp. 38f.

348 See for example Potthast 2012, *Frauen und soziale Bewegungen*; Jelin 1990, *Citizenship and Identity*; Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*;

The lack of adequate social services and the deficient urban infrastructure found in peripheral neighborhoods directly affects women and their ability to perform their ascribed feminine role (...). It is women who are held primarily responsible for the day-to-day planning of their families' subsistence, even if men are held socially responsible for its "provision". Thus, sociostructural changes which undermine family subsistence, and therefore threaten women's ability to perform their socially ascribed roles as "wives, mothers, and nurturers", may lead some women to take whatever actions are within their reach to normalize the situation of their households.³⁴⁹

Interestingly, those women themselves often emphasize and legitimate their participation in these movements as *mothers*. Women claiming their rights as mothers and housewives is a crucial characteristic of the women's movement in Latin America. While in Western Europe and the US women denied differences between men and women and sought a more gender-neutral participation of women in the public sphere, in Latin America women deployed a language of difference, emphasizing gender differences and especially their traditional role as mothers.³⁵⁰ The use of motherhood as the basis and referent for the legitimization of women's participation in citizenship activities is what Sonia Alvarez calls the *politicization of motherhood*.³⁵¹ Kevin Neuhouser holds that women's collective mobilization resulted from their problems in obtaining the necessary resources to fulfill their role as mothers, and therefore women opted to refer to motherhood as "the primary positive identity available to women."³⁵² In contrast, men, even though also lacking resources to be *fathers*, didn't assume the risk of mobilization because they possessed alternative culturally valued identities which were structurally less costly.³⁵³

Molyneux 2001, *Women's Movements in International Perspective*; Machado Vieira, Leda M. 1993. "'We Learned to Think Politically'. The Influence of the Catholic Church and the Feminist Movement on the Emergence of the Health Movement of the Jardim Nordeste Area in São Paulo, Brazil" in *'Viva'. Women and Popular Protest in Latin America*, edited by S. A. Radcliffe and S. Westwood. London et al.: Routledge, pp. 88–111.

349 Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*, p. 46.

350 Safa, Helen I. 1990. "Women's Social Movements in Latin America", *Gender & Society*, 4 (3): 355; Miller 1991, *Latin American Women*, p. 74.

351 Alvarez 1990, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*, p. 51.

352 Neuhouser, Kevin. 1998. "'If I Had Abandoned my Child'. Community Mobilization and Commitment to the Identity of Mother in Northeast Brazil", *Social Forces*, 77 (1): 333.

353 Neuhouser 1998, "If I Had Abandoned my Child", p. 331.

The accentuation of the traditionally ascribed role as mothers and wives is also interpreted as a strategy used by these women to facilitate and justify their entrance into the public sphere and to bring their concerns from the private to the public sphere. To avoid challenging the nature of their gender subordination, and to organize around issues related to the private sphere, is thus a way to avoid larger conflict with and resistance from men in both private and public spheres due to their activism.³⁵⁴

It makes sense for women to organize as mothers and to emphasize communitarian values within political cultures where motherhood is sacred, where men's and women's roles are sharply distinguished and considered both natural and normatively appropriate, and where the political culture rests on a Catholic concept of community rather than on an individualistic social contract. The rhetoric of political motherhood is thus rational and powerful for women, a "collective action frame" that avoids the costs of a frontal attack on traditional values while leaving considerable room to maneuver in the public sphere.³⁵⁵

Searching for women's motivations for engaging in citizenship activities also implies looking at the broader impacts of their mobilization. In the academic literature on women's engagement in citizenship activities—especially their engagement in popular urban movements—the question raised is whether one can observe a lasting impact on their lives with regard to the gendered division of labor and the gender equality within their homes. Most scholars agree that the consequences of women's engagement in popular protest can be twofold. On the one hand, their engagement with and entrance into the public sphere has a great potential for change and may therefore lead to a rupture of the—hitherto prevailing—traditional patterns of gender roles.³⁵⁶ On the other hand, it may also

354 Moser, Caroline O. N. 1993, *Gender Planning and Development. Theory, Practice and Training*, London et al.: Routledge, p. 36.

355 Jaquette, Jane S. 1994. "Conclusion. Women's Political Participation and the Prospects for Democracy" in *The Women's Movement in Latin America. Participation and Democracy*, edited by J. S. Jaquette. Boulder: Westview Press, p. 228.

356 As for example the case studies of Andujar, Andrea. 2005, *Mujeres Piqueteras. La Repolitización de los Espacios de Resistencia en la Argentina (1996-2001)*. Informe final del concurso: Poder y nuevas experiencias democráticas en América Latina y el Caribe. Programa Regional de Becas CLACSO. <http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/becas/semi/2005/poder/andujar.pdf> (07 Dec 2014) and Schütze, Stephanie. 2005. „Wir kämpfen um Raum für uns und unsere Kinder. Raum, Geschlecht und politische Partizipation in Mexiko-Stadt“ in *Das räumliche*

lead to an extension and reinforcement of women's traditional reproductive roles and responsibilities in the private sphere, especially as they often already have to perform a double shift.³⁵⁷ As the ones mainly responsible for the private sphere, women suffer most from inadequate or non-existent access to housing, basic services, healthcare, etc., and therefore it is also mainly they who need to find solutions to deal with it—such as for example through engagement in citizenship activities. Hence, women are often forced to balance different roles at the same time—domestic work, childcare, income-generating work, and community activities.³⁵⁸

It is important to understand that mobilization around motherhood and need-based issues provides the potential for both, and that women's engagement in citizenship activities does not automatically lead to greater gender equality or a consciousness of gender subordination, as Molyneux adequately summarizes:

Again, while few doubted that female participation in the world outside the home broadened women's experience, it was more difficult to demonstrate that it made a tangible or lasting impact on the majority of women's lives with regard to the division of labour and power relations in the home. (...) it showed that activism or participation could make a difference, as the testimonials of many key activists verified. But outside this group, often it did not, or did so for only a short time, with participants returning to the familiar oppressive patterns of before. One conclusion that could be drawn was that activism alone, in the absence of a transformative politics and supportive material circumstances, did not lead to 'empowerment'. This issue therefore revealed to women

Arrangement der Geschlechter. Kulturelle Differenzen und Konflikte, edited by M. Rodenstein. Berlin: Trafo, pp. 101–117, show.

- 357 See for example Jelin 1990, *Citizenship and Identity*; Molyneux 2001, *Women's Movements in International Perspective*; Flores, José à. H. and Beatriz Martínez Corona. 2006. "Género, Empoderamiento y Movimientos Sociales. La Unión Campesina Emiliano Zapata Vive, en la Región Tepeaca-Tecamachalco, Puebla", *Región y Sociedad*, XVIII (36): 107–146; Lind, Amy and Martha Farnelo. 1996. "Gender and Urban Social Movements. Women's Community Responses to Restructuring and Urban Poverty", United Nations Research Institut for Social Development. *UNRISD Occasional Paper* (76): 1–38; Hainard, François and Christine Verschuur. 2001. "Filling the Urban Policy Breach. Women's Empowerment, Grass-Roots Organizations, and Urban Governance", *International Political Science Review*, 22 (1): 33–53.
- 358 Moser, Caroline O. N. 1989. "Gender Planning in the Third World. Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs", *World Development*, 17 (11): 1801; Hainard et al. 2001, *Filling the Urban Policy Breach*, p. 37.

activists both the potentiality and the limits of active citizenship, indicating that its significance and outcome were more contingent processes than had been assumed.³⁵⁹

Having situated the topic of this study in a broader theoretical and historical context, we will now take a closer look at the two case studies: the squats *Chiquinha Gonzaga* and *Manoel Congo* in Rio de Janeiro's city center, and the reality of the lives of their inhabitants.

359 Molyneux 2001, Women's Movements in International Perspective, p. 177.