

The evolution of governance reforms under conditions of political business cycles

evolution; governance; innovation; political business cycle; reforms

The authors present a model for an evolutionary approach of governance reforms under conditions of political business cycles. The model is based on a political business cycle model by Frey (1976, 1978 and 1979), which is elaborated further by using the ideas of Saviotti and Pyka (2004 and 2011). By combining these two approaches to a new one, a process for governance innovation in the public sector is introduced.

I. Problem

Governance is a catch word which is used in private and public management literature and practice. *Public governance* refers to the coordination within a public office or of several public offices of a jurisdiction, whereas corporate public governance deals with corporate governance within a public enterprise and the relations to the owing jurisdiction. There are different forms of governance related to different forms of *management concepts* (Eichhorn/Friedrich 1976; Friedrich/Ukrainski/Timpmann 2014) prevailing in public sector economic units like public offices or public enterprises. The main *changes in governance* stem from a change in tasks related to products which have to be produced and the change of management concepts prevailing in a public office, a public enterprise or these economic units of a jurisdiction. If the tasks change then the management concept necessary to perform these tasks is changing too. This implies changes of the production of the internal pre-services or of services received from other economic units of the jurisdiction. Decision making concerning finance, procurement, production, and delivery varies as well. The changes of tasks are partly due to evaluations of management but also due to decisions in political bodies of a jurisdiction. They cause an ongoing evolution in governance, which may lead to small adaptive changes but also to larger reforms such as organisational reforms. These reforms may include even more than one jurisdiction concerning functional, fiscal, territorial reforms, etc. and shifts of the activities of sectors. Such basic changes are mostly related to decisions of political bodies reacting to drastic changes of the social environment, etc. In a democratic framework an ongoing concern is the mix between publicly produced goods and goods produced by privately owned economic units, as the resources to produce both types of production are restricted. If the *mix of public and private production* is changed, time is needed to reorganise production. Moreover, after some easily realised addi-

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tional production, an increase of public production leads to a more complicated public production structure and an increasing absorption of production factors and financial means. The same is due to reductions in production after some closures which are easy to implement. Further reductions need changes in management concepts that are costly and do not allow the closure of public production so easily. The voters are influenced by the availability of such productions. If the public production is increased extensively, the marginal utility of the public service receiver will diminish. However, there are fewer resources available for privately produced goods, and their reduction will increase the marginal utility gained from this production.

As there are *political groupings* like parties that attract voters who are in favour of the products of the public sector and parties which serve the voters who prefer the private sector production, the potential to attract voters vary. One has to expect changes in decisions of public bodies, which lead to changes in public production. There is an *evolutionary process* of extension and reduction of public production connected to reorganisations. A mix of overlapping reforms develops. To highlight such unbalanced processes we will deal with the following *research questions*:

- How to show the process for a jurisdiction and its public offices by a simplified coordination model?
- How can we show the connection to the political business cycle theory?
- How to model these relations to explain governance reforms implying also innovations in public production?

Section II. of the article is devoted to the first question and we focus on the business cycle theory in section III., whereas section IV. deals with the model and some possible extensions of the approach. The article ends with conclusions and a summary of results.

II. Governance through fiscal and political coordination

A simplified model sketches some main interrelations between the public offices and the political decision making in a jurisdiction (Friedrich 1983; Feng/Friedrich 2002, 2013). There is no omniscient ruling government determining measures to maximise welfare as assumed in the orthodox approach to public finance (Brennan/Eusepi 2004). There are several actors who play different roles in governance and the analysis is due to the constitutional approach (Brennan/Eusepi 2004). Therefore, the following *three-level model* consists of *public offices at the bottom belonging to a jurisdiction* (figure 1). There are public offices j in region j and two regions, 1 and 2. The public offices are co-coordinated financially by a regional directory of that jurisdiction that allocates the budget to the public offices (e.g. *ministry of finance of a government*). The directory management shows preferences for the outputs X_j of the public offices j according to a utility function, which it maximises (equation (5) in figure 1).

The *voters of the jurisdiction* live in region j and their voting behaviour has an impact on the government decisions. Voters are sensitive to the output of public office j expressed by the parameter i_j ($j = 1$ and 2) and the financing of budget D through parameter f_j ($j = 1, 2$). They do not like higher budgets because they expect a reduction in consumption of privately produced goods as their disposable income may be cut. There is a vote function (equation (5) in figure 1,

showing that the votes consist of the sum of votes achieved in the regions ($j = 1$ and 2)). The aim of the government is to maximise votes according to the vote function.

The size of the budget D_j of public office j has to cover the costs for labour L_j and material C_j (see equation (2) in figure 1). The factor prices q_L and q_C are given. We assume a production function, where the production depends on labour L_j and on material C_j (see equation (1) in figure 1). The utility of management depends on output X_j and labour L_j (equation (3) in figure 1). The management of public office j maximises his utility. The administrative sector is coordinated by the *budget process*, which might be bottom up and top down.

The first step to *detect a solution* is to maximise the utility of low rank public office 1. For that purpose equations (1) and (2) get inserted in equation (3). The resulting expression is maximised. After rearranging the terms one yields:

$$(6) X_{11} = (1 + \beta_1) * (D_{11n})^2 / ((2 + \beta_1)^2 * q_L * q_C)$$

Such a relation is also found for public office 2. Managers of public office 2 maximise utility (equation (4) in figure 1) under the restriction of:

$$(7) D_n = D_{11n} + D_{12n}$$




Figure 1: Model of political and administrative coordination of a jurisdiction

Source: Batey/Friedrich (2000)

The relation $2 * D_{11n} = D_{12n}$ is evoked and the relation $D_{11n} = D_n/3$ is found. In analogy one finds relation $D_{12n} = D_n * 2/3$.

By substituting X_{11} and X_{12} in the vote function and substituting D_{11n} and D_{12n} in the budget relation the vote function depends solely on D_n . Maximising votes for both regions by differentiation to D_n yields the optimal budget:

$$(8) D_{n \text{ optimal}} = (2 * i_1 (1 + \beta_1) / (2 + \beta_1)^2 + 8 * i_2 (1 + \beta_2) / (2 + \beta_2)^2) / 27 * q_L * q_C * (f_1 + f_2)$$

The model solution shows the *optimal budget* D_n (equation (8)) gained under the assumption that reaction parameters i and f are given.




Figure 2: Size of optimal budget in case of given voters' reaction parameters

Source: Feng/Friedrich (2013)

The model can be also reformulated in such a way that the size of the parameters i_j depend on X_j and the f_j parameters depend on D . Maximising votes (equation (6)) obtains the relation (9):

$$(9) \frac{\partial V}{\partial D} = (\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial D} + \frac{\partial V_2}{\partial D} + \frac{\partial V_1}{\partial X_1} * \frac{\partial X_1}{\partial D} + \frac{\partial V_2}{\partial X_2} * \frac{\partial X_2}{\partial D}) = 0$$

The *maximisation of votes* reveals the following: With constant parameters of evaluations the marginal changes of voters from evaluating the output and budget changes must be the same. The sum of the f evaluation parameters changes equals the sum of the output evaluation changes caused by the budget change (see figure 2).

If the *changes of the parameters* are considered as well then the changes from these variations also have to be added. The result for the optimal budget depends on the size and positive or negative signs of the changes of $\frac{\partial f_1}{\partial D}$, $\frac{\partial f_2}{\partial D}$, the budget sizes as well as the positive or negative signs of the changes of $\frac{\partial i_1}{\partial X_1}$, $\frac{\partial i_2}{\partial X_2}$, the output sizes and the responsiveness of the outputs to budget changes. In figure 2 the curves of the output dependent vote components and the budget components move. Other optimal budget sizes result.

If with an increase in budget the additional utility stemming from the bigger output becomes less, then i parameters shrink, so do the output dependent components (figure 2) and the optimal budget as well. If the marginal increase of resistance increases simultaneously, the parameter f increases because private production will be marginally higher valued, there is also a ten-

dency to a steeper budget dependent component (see figure 2) and decreasing budget. In times when public production becomes more highly valued the optimal budget and therefore the public production becomes higher. A countervailing movement stems from a developing of resistance because of smaller development or shrinking disposable income and private production (the f reaction parameters) may increase. For the *voters' reaction parameters different functions* according to the voters' evaluation development may be introduced. Thus, budget oscillations, increases and decreases result and the political circumstances will be transmitted to the coordination of the jurisdictions public offices and their public production.

Moreover, the model allows demonstrating *variation of governance* through the *effects of changes* of production techniques, factor prices, utility functions of management in low rank and middle rank public offices, and through voters' responses. *Extensions* of the model to more jurisdictions and levels of government (Feng/Friedrich 2002) were made. One can also show the effects of other *administrative coordination* mechanisms through production assignments, production restrictions, minimum production requirements, and production rules, staffing rules, assignment of positions, job cones (Friedrich 1985; Friedrich/Pfeilsticker 1986), input restrictions and quality requirements. The goal function of government may also reflect, apart from dependencies on voting results, the influence of an ideology.

III. Political business cycle theory and its influence on governance and public production

As elaborated above, changes in political conditions lead to budget variations through changes in governance and coordination of public offices. Therefore, political business cycles are reflected in the processes of administrative coordination, governance and determining an optimal budget. Literature on political business cycle theories deals with descriptions of political business cycle (Akerman 1947; Frey 1968, 1976, 1978, 1979; Tufte 1975) and with the basic view that politicians try to remain in office by winning votes (Nordhaus 1975).




Figure 3: Adaptive and active policy influencing economic and political cycle

Source: Similar to Berndt (1979), Frey (1979)

They can do this in two ways. One is to adapt to voters' wishes and political circumstances (Frey 1968) or to actively influence the economic and political business cycle in order to create a favourable condition for them in times of votes (Nordhaus 1975; Berndt 1979).

The first, more *passive strategy* is marked by the dotted line in figure 3. There might be a change in government, which causes (according to the will of voters) changes in the production of the public sector, which changes the economy, influencing the popularity of a government. There are investigations to identify which economic circumstances influence the popularity of a government such as unemployment, inflation, etc. With the second strategy, shown by the solid line, the *government actively tries to influence the economy* and governments' popularity by gifts to voters, transfers, extensive budget policy, or to reduce unemployment and inflation to achieve high popularity in voting times (Kalecki 1943; Nordhaus 1975). In the empirical description it is difficult to separate the effects of the strategies. Even in the model above where the government tries to fix the vote winning optimal budget, one may assign it to the first strategy until the government does not actively try to change the parameters i and f .

The so-called *partisan theory* of the political business cycle (Hibbs 1977, 1992, 2005; Alesina 1987; Mueller 2003) assumes that the partisan politicians are assigned to ideologies, milieus, different groups in society, pressure groups, religion and ideological believers, etc. offering voting programmes that fit to these interests. Their general behaviour may be according to a partisan politician utility function, which depends on an achievement of ideologically based goals and a consent function (popularity) with voters (Rothenberg 1965). This utility function may vary in different phases like a pre-elective phase, a campaign phase, a government forming phase, and a government phase (Schleicher 1971). Some authors assume that especially in the campaign phase vote maximisation is of dominating priority (Downs 1957; Harding 1957). Often, two parties in competition are assumed, but there are complicated problems of multi-party systems in the mentioned phases, e.g. coalition formation in the government forming phase, cabinet's stability in the government phase (Mueller 2003), because of information problems,

voters' strategic behaviour, the economic situations, and the kind of problems relevant for voters and government popularity, etc.

For our following analysis we do not evolve the best strategy and measures to influence the evaluations of voters in order to explain the political outcome. Our main concern is with *governance changes caused by adaptation* to voting results according to their ideology, practice, politics and governance as long as they are in government. When government changes, a new policy and governance reform is followed until one of the following votes is lost. The politicians are partisan politicians who are in favour or against of public activities and want to reform the public service production. For the sake of simplicity a two party system is assumed where the voters wish to receive more or less public or private production. The development of the economy and development of popularity is introduced by a simple hypothesis by the reaction to voters to increasing and decreasing public production. If these reactions cause a political business cycle, a cycle in governance may follow.

IV. A model of governance reaction to vote results

The political situation described is similar to that discussed by Frey (1968). There, the voters react on the provision of infrastructure and the provision of services produced by the *infrastructure*. If there is a shortage of public infrastructure, such as roads, traffic connections, education, poor legislation and justice, the voters may turn to vote for another government if they feel this shortage (Frey 1968, p. 94). On the other hand, if there is an oversupply of infrastructure the voters feel a scarcity in privately provided goods and services because the maintenance of infrastructure leads to a high fiscal load. A change in voting can happen, too.

Due to the imprecise definition of infrastructure and with long lags to finish physical infrastructure or to get it ready for producing services there is a lasting development starting from a change in favour and not an immediate reaction of voters. Therefore, in the *model presented here*, voters may act on the production of *publicly produced or privately produced goods and services*, which comprise more activities than just real capital investment. The voters may on the one hand identify a whole bundle of activities to increase service delivery, or on the other hand activities to reduce public production and thus leave themselves with more disposable income to buy privately produced goods.

This might be expressed by the *ratio of privately produced goods to publicly produced goods*. When total production is given then this ratio decreases with growing public production. At the same time, the ratio of private to total production decreases. This development can be vice versa. If the economy grows then the ratio of private production to public production decreases if the growth rate of public production is higher than that of private production. Consequently, the relation private to total production shrinks. With this development a movement in votes occur. These turnarounds of activities, which are often called reforms lead to appropriate legislation, new public offices, sometimes new services and governance expansion which support the desired process. They can also be linked to new legislation, closures of public offices, reduction or changes of production and adaptations in governments. These activities are linked to techni-

cal, organisational, management, legal *innovations in the public sector* and are usually called *public sector reforms*, which comprise a *reform programme*.

There will be public innovations caused by the behaviour of voters. How innovations develop in the private sector is described by Saviotti and Pyka (2004, 2011). A new sector starts with a new product variation or technological invention in the private sector and innovation may occur if a firm is going to turn to the related production. For the new sector a so-called adjustment gap exists, which is the difference between the actual demand at the sector start and the maximum possible demand at that period.

On the one hand, the adjustment gap can be increased by search activities as more applications for the products produced by this sector can be found. On the other hand, search activities become less intensive in the course of time. The aggregated demand equals the number of firms multiplied by an average output, which is growing over time. The growth of the sector is expressed by the increased number of firms. This growth is positively influenced by available financial availabilities, but reduced by the intensity of competition among them and by competition to firms of all sectors and by mergers which grow with the extent of the saturation of the sector. With the diffusion of knowledge to competitors and growing acceptance by buyers, the market grows as well as the number of suppliers. The number of firms in a sector increases first and then decreases until it reaches an almost constant level when exit of firms and entry of firms is nearly balanced. This is due to a high adjustment gap in the beginning and growing competition and mergers. When a new sector is created the number of firms in an old sector decreases faster due to inter-sector competition. There are evolutionary waves of sectors. The total output increases as the authors assume increasing average output of firms in the sectors during the evolution. The authors conclude that their scenarios point to real developments to be observed.

The authors extend their model by introducing barriers to entry of firms. The size of the entry barrier depends on the resources needed to enter and on the human capital available lowering the entry barrier. The entry barrier grows rapidly to its highest value and then falls leading to a reduction in the number of firms. Entry barriers dampen the growth of the macroeconomic output.

Saviotti and Pyka's (2004, 2011) model offers an enlightening description of evolutionary processes of sector developments on the basis of simple assumptions. There are also similarities to life cycle models of goods and markets (Heuss 1965; Hanusch/Pyka/Wackermann 2009).

The thoughts of Saviotti and Pyka can be used to model evolutionary developments of governance in the public sector as well. There are *two parties* that want to win votes. One *party named A* is engaged in increasing public production to provide public infrastructure and public services of general economic interests. The other *party named B* wants to reduce the production of such services and to keep public infrastructure low. The pool of voters is split between both parties.

In analogy to sector developments we can interpret public activity developments and public production developments. They take the form of a governance change or a restructuring and reshaping of production, often called administrative reforms. A reform is initiated and takes time to be executed. The first steps in the first period are those that can be made more easily and these lead to some desired changes in production. However, as the resources are restricted

the next steps in the second period are more difficult to undertake and production changes become slower. Moreover, within the jurisdiction the resistance of public offices to production changes grows, because some have to be closed if a reduction in public production takes place, but also to allow the opening of new ones in case of reform to higher production. In contrast to Saviotti and Pyka, we do not follow the development of the number of firms but the volume of public production of a jurisdiction.

Thus, the expansion of public production Y_A occurs at a falling rate as expressed in a very simple form by equation (10):

$$(10) Y_A = KE1 * (1 - k/t) \text{ where } k < 1, t = 1, n$$

The equation (10) shows the public production Y in period 1 if *the expanding party A is in power*. Value $KE1$ and constant k , which is smaller than 1, determine the initial value of production. Output increases if the expression in brackets is increased, but at a lower rate because of organisational resistance and scarcity of resources.

In addition, the reduction of public production Y_B can be simply demonstrated by equation (11):

$$(11) Y_B = KR1 / t \text{ where } t = 1, n$$

Value $KR1$ gives the production value at period when the reducing party B gets into power. When party B governs, the *public production* Y_B falls but at a lower rate because of organisational resistance and sunken resources in the old structures. The production developments are shown in figure 4.

In contrast to Saviotti and Pyka, we offer a concept for starting the expansion or contraction process in the public sector. This is determined by voting results. In a situation where the voters feel a *scarcity of provision of public services* they switch in favour of voting for party A and party A gets into power. If voters feel a *scarcity of private production* they may change their voting behaviour and vote in favour of B then giving the power to party B to take over the government.




Figure 4: Public production after switches of government

Source: Authors' compilation

We can show in figure 5 the resulting relation w of private production to public production. For the sake of simplicity, private production is assumed to be constant in figures 4 and 5. The point of change might happen when *critical relations* between the private and public produc-

tions will be passed implying that an *upper boundary* w_A and a *lower boundary* w_B is reached. The relation between private and public production is defined as w (private production/public production ratio). One can imagine that there is a corridor for the relation with a ceiling and a floor value of ratios between private and public production. If the ceiling or floor value is reached a switch in government occurs that now has to reduce the relation if an upper limit is reached or increase the relation when the lower limit is reached. According to the national accounting there is in some countries a ratio of over 5 to 1 between private and public production. Therefore, w_A should be higher than 5 to 1 and w_B smaller. The distance between the relation w_A and w_B can be interpreted as a maximum adjustment gap. When the upper boundary w_A is reached the gap for party A is at a maximum enabling party A to take power and when the lower boundary w_B becomes reached the maximum gap for party B is realised.

The ratio w decreases with increasing public production until the w_B value. Consequently, a *change in government* occurs. Thereafter, it increases until the value w_A is reached and the government changes.

At the first switch point the increasing function switches to the falling function. Consequently, the *new function* of decrease is determined by choosing the value of Y at the switch point (in the figure above, 5 and take this as period 1 because the function comes from infinity). Using the following *equation* one can *determine the value* KR for the next function:




Figure 5: Switches of government

Source: Authors' compilation

$$(12) Y_B \text{ (at switch)} = KR/1 \quad (13) KR_1 = 1 * Y_B \text{ (at switch)} \text{ hereafter } Y_B \text{ (at switch)} = KR_1/1$$

The new value of Y_B in +1 is calculated and divided by the periods to find the public productions. They are inserted into the *relation* w . The next value is at period switch +2. Then the w value is increasing until the upper value w_A . Thereafter, a next switch takes place. The value of Y_A at the switch is equal to a *new constant* KE_1 times $(1-1/t)$, which means:

$$(14) Y_A \text{ (at switch period)} = KE_1 (1-k/t)$$

$$(15) KE_1 = Y_A / (1-k/t)$$

The *next public production* values are found by (16) and so on for the following t (switch period +1), etc.

(16) $Y_A = KE_2 (1 - 1/t)$, with $t = \text{switch period} + 1$, n

Then the increasing w values are determined until the next switch. A sequence of changing reforms and governance are determined showing how the political process drives innovations in a jurisdiction or in the public sector. To explain the mechanism of the model the private production was kept constant. However, one can introduce an equation concerning the *private production* as well, which symbolises a private crowding output if party B governs and public production increases.

(17) $Y_{PA \text{ Private production}} = \text{Basic private production} - a * \text{public production}$

This expression has to be considered when calculating w . Then w is decreasing faster and the switch value is achieved earlier. The time to the next reform becomes shortened and the number of reforms increases.

If the public production decreases when B is in power then the private production might increase, as shown in equation (18):

(18) $Y_{PB \text{ Private production}} = \text{Basic private production} + b * \text{public production}$

This dependence also leads to a more flexible w as it increases faster, and the sequence of reforms get shorter. A basic private production and a minimum public production can be considered with the public production.

A sequence of reform changes for assumed values (see table 1) of parameters and of resulting public production (reform and governance changes) are depicted in table 1. There are also changes shown, which result from applying alternative parameter values. Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the results graphically.

The evolution of governance reforms under conditions of political business cycles

Period _t	Y_A	KR_A					v	Y_B	KR_E			w
	Public production if party A governs	Constant for production increasing reforms					Private production /public production	Public production if party B governs	Constant for production decreasing reforms			Private production /public production
1	16	84	100	0.8	0.2	0.8	6.25					
2	48	84	100	0.8	0.6	0.4	2.1					
3	59.2	84	100	0.8	0.74	0.26	1.7					
4	64	84	100	0.8	0.8	0.2	1.6					
5 (switch)	67.2	84	100	0.8	0.84	0.16	1.5	67.2	67.2	100	67.2	1.5
6								33.6	67.2	100	33.6	3
7								22.4	67.2	100	22.4	4.5
8 (switch)	16.8	84	100	0.8	0.2	0.8	5.95	16.8	67.2	100	16.8	5.95
9	50.4	84	100	0.8	0.6	0.4	1.984					
10	62.16	84	100	0.8	0.74	0.26	1.6					
11	67.2	84	100	0.8	0.8	0.2	1.5	67.2	67.2	100	67.2	1.5
12								33.6	67.2	100	33.6	3
13								22.4	67.2	100	22.4	4.5
14 (switch)	16.8	84	100	0.8	0.2	0.8	5.95	16.8	67.2	100	16.8	5.95
15	50.4	84	100	0.8	0.6	0.4	1.984					
16	62.16	84	100	0.8	0.74	0.26	1.6					
17 (switch)	67.2	84	100	0.8	0.8	0.2	1.5	67.2	67.2	100	67.2	1.5
18								33.6	67.2	100	33.6	3
19								22.4	67.2	100	22.4	4.5
20								16.8	67.2	100	16.8	5.95

Table 1: Example of evolution of reforms

Source: Authors' compilation

V. Extensions of the model and conclusions

This very primitive first attempt can be extended by the introduction of fixed vote dates or periods. This allows more severe changes as the switch may not be possible when the w value is reached. The ongoing evolution is stopped by the voters later. The periods examined could be interpreted as *voting periods*. A party therefore could be in power for some voting periods.

Another way of extending the model is through more explicit inclusions of *barriers to reforms*. The reform development functions applied could be more sophisticated, e.g. growth functions such as e^{pt} instead of t or other forms. We can also introduce a stage dependent function, which indicates that after some volume of public production change the barriers increase heavily because important traditional public offices have to be closed or the resources fall short. Microeconomic phenomena could be introduced as well, which lead to different barriers for the reform evolution. There would not be manifold basic knowledge gains by these substitutions. Of more interest is the mentioned introduction of *output growth of the private economy*. Then the w movements are less drastic and the periods to reach new switch points become longer. The approach presented can also be widened to include the *active cycle making* of the government if its reforms change the voters sensibility to w . The government might prevent the evolution to reach a switch value by stopping the reforms at least until the vote date has passed or even by introducing shortly alternative programmes.

The model can be combined with models of *public choice* (Mueller 2003), and multiple party and coalition formation cases and their break down if critical values of w are reached. Section II. gives hints that regional conditions such as voter distributions, different sensitiveness in regions to public production, etc. may be considered. It is interesting to consider *different jurisdictions* that might have different governments with different parties in power (Feng/Friedrich 2002), and regionally different w values. By applying development theories in regional science the effects of reforms on regions might be included as well. The approach can be also related to *public finance* and the creation of *deficit or surplus budgets* or balanced budget policies accompanying the reform processes. Moreover, the bridge can be built to *Harrod Domar growth theory* and effects on the natural, warranted and actual rate of growth. A further line of research is to look into the *actual paths of reform evolutions*, to model them more precisely and to gain econometric empirical evidence on such developments.

Here, we concentrated on *political changes as reasons* for public sector and public management innovations. As governments have to take care of the survival of society and that of the state, this type of model can be also related to other circumstances, which call for innovations in the public sector such as integration of countries, class, ethnic and religious struggles, population developments, basic changes in the location advantages of a society through new traffic connections, changing the centre of world trade, climate changes, wars and invasions, etc.

Zusammenfassung

Peter Friedrich und Kadri Ukrainski; Die Evolution von Governance Reformen unter den Bedingungen des Politischen Konjunkturzyklus

Evolution; Governance; Innovation; Political business cycle; Reformen

Die Autoren entwickeln ein Evolutionsmodell für Verwaltungsreformen, das auf einem politischen Konjunkturmodell von Frey (1976, 1978, 1979) basiert und mit Überlegungen von Savio, P. P. und A. Pyka (2004, 2011) verbunden wird. Diese Kombination ermöglicht die Berücksichtigung von Gründen und Auslösern für innovative Verwaltungsreformen.

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